FCO 21/487 Detention of Anthony Grey

1968/0

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FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH DEPT.

OFFICE

FILE No.

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FEC 1301

TITLE: CHINA DETIGATION

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CONFIDENTIAL

papano

- 8 JUL 1969

C 134/1

Int. J.MY:

If this refut is well. frameal. I taken it wo

compfermentini

that the Chines expret to be releasing At Sory in Odster.

IR. AUSHONY GREY:

for wive

Mr Mouton. Wohn

John Dickie of the Daily Mail, who has been 2/1.

taking a special interest in the Brooke and, to a lesser

extent, the Grey cases, told me today that a Daily Mail

correspondent abroad had, within the last 24 hours, been Witting 32.

told by a Chinese diplomat that "your Mr. Grey might be

out before your Mr. Brooke".

The

Водет

? Bem

When he first told me this, Dickie let slip,

accidentally I think, that this conversation took place in

Bonn. Later, however, when I asked him if he could be a bit

more specific about this information, he said he could not be.

(It is, I imagine, highly unlikely that a Chinese diplomat

would have a conversation with a Daily Mail correspondent in

Bonn, since Bonn and Peking do not have relations;

I suppose it is not impossible).

however,

I said I did not think publication of this story

would be helpful to Grey and might have an adverse effect

upon his mother, raising her hopes perhaps without good reason.

He said he agreed with this and did not think the story would

be written.

copies to:

Sir T.Brinelow;

whittay

ак

(Well Haydon)

30 June, 1969.

Mr. Giffard;

P.5. to P.U.S.

CONFIDENTIA

Flag A

CONFIDENTIAL

COVERING TOP SECRET

Sir J. Jolusk

Mr. Moreton

padaly

MR. ANTHONY GREY OF REUTERS

AND THE CONVICTED NEWSWORKERS IN HONG KONG

RE L.

REGIC:

- 8 JUL 1969

638

FEL 124/11

The Governor of Hong Kong has still to be informed

that the Secretary of State has agreed the recommendation

Flag B (in my submission of 18 June that, at the present stage of

the Grey case, the least unsatisfactory course is probably

to have the eleven convicted newsworkers in Hong Kong serve

out their sentences until their due release dates in

September/October.

I have delayed informing the Governor

in the hope that we might be able to give him a precise

indication of the timetable in the Brooke case.

This

however is not yet clear. The Permanent Under-Secretary informed the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires of our latest counter-

proposals yesterday; but it could be some time before

agreement is reached on procedures.

I think, therefore,

that we should inform the Governor now of the Secretary of

State's decision about the newsworkers, and promise him

further guidance in due course about the implications of

the Brooke case.

2. I submit a draft telegram to Hong Kong.

Department concur.

Hong Kong

3. A further submission is being prepared about the

implications of the Brooke case for the Grey case.

Copies to: Sir T. Brimelow

пошида

16 Boyd. B

Mr. Giffard

Mening

Janne Telmang.

(James Murray)

4 July, 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL TelSent 182.4/2

COVERING TOP SECRET

Toknow L

4/2

SECRETARY OF STATE.

SECRET

has.

seer and

MR. ANTHONY GREY.

ayready 262

pajamo

I have the following comments on the foregoing

submission.

You will recall that in my minute of 8 May,

I recommended that we should urge Sir David Trench to

find ways and means, without prejudicing the security

of Hong Kong, of releasing all eleven new workers

(including Wong Chak) in June or July. You accepted

this recommendation and instructed me to pursue it

during my recent visit to Hong Kong. This I did.

3. After the Governor had given me his initial

reaction which, in essence, was that the prospects of his

finding a defensible means for the earlier release of all

eleven newsworkers were not good, he agreed to re-examine

every aspect of the matter and to send me a full

appraisal by my return to this country on 19 June.

Accordingly I decided to defer my recommendation to you

in this matter until I had seen the Governor's

assessment.

Since I minuted to you on 8 May there are four

new factors which have to be taken into account:-

(i) The Governor's promised re-appraisal (Flag B).

(ii) The time factor. It is now only eight

SECRET

or/

SECRET

or nine weeks before the first of the newsworkers is

due for release and the last will be out within a

month of the first.

(iii) The possibility of serious riots and

troubles in the Hong Kong prisons if further concessions

were made to "left-wing" prisoners without similar

concessions being made to the other prisoners.

(iv) The news announced yesterday that the

Chinese had eased still further the conditions under

which they are holding hr. Grey. According to Mr.

Grey his period of open-air exercise has been greatly

extended and he has now been given access to all his

books and is allowed to listen to the radio. This

encourages the belief that the Chinese intend to

release him after all the newsworkers are released in

Hong Kong.

In the light of these factors I accept the

recommendation of the Department though I think

it desirable that Cater in Hong Kong should continue

to keep in touch with his "contact" in order to

reduce any possibility of any misunderstanding arising

over the next few weeks.

6./

SECRET

[

SECRET

There is, however, one point which still

causes me considerable concern. As I pointed out in

(82) my telegram from Hong Kong on 7 June (Flag A) we

have repeatedly told the Chinese that we could not

get involved in a direct bargain over Mr. Grey.

If they suspect, before Wong Chak is released on

3 October, that we are going to do a deal with the

Russians (their current No. 1 enemy) over Mr. Brooke,

it might jeopardise the chance of Mr. Grey being

released without our being asked to make further

concessions. I strongly hope, therefore, that

nothing will be done or said about the release of

Mr. Brooke until after 3 October,

HEXD)

25 June, 1969.

cc: Sir Denis Greenhill

Sir J.Johnston

Sir A. Galsworthy

hr. Moreton

SECRET

разбир

871

Sir A. Galéworthy

Lord Shepherd

I agree with this submission and Mr. Murray's conclusion.

I am sure our capacity to continue to govern Hong Kong and to

keep faith with the Chinese there must be the over-riding

consideration, both in moral terms, because of our responsibility

for the welfare of the population in Hong Kong, and in economic

terms, to the degree we benefit from the prosperity which Hong

Kong enjoys, which is dependent on continuing internal

confidence in our will to govern and to stand firm under Chinese

pressure. We have told the Chinese quite unequivocally over a

long period that we will not suspend the rule of law by releasing

convicted prisoners in response to blackmail. To do so now would

be to throw away all we have gained from this firmness and to

heighten the Chinese victory, since they would not only have got

us to do their bidding, but to do it after we had said we would

not, and when we were within sight of having sat it out with them

over Grey. And I believe, far from attracting acclaim, we might

be very seriously criticised on the grounds that if it were

possible to release prisoners now, then they could have been

released earlier, and that we had therefore unnecessarily

prolonged the restrictions on Mr. Grey by our own indecision.

Copy to:

Private Secretary

Mr. Baker

Sir T. Brimelow

Mr. Carter

L& Lunston

(J.B. JOHNSTON)

20.6.69.

I strongly agree.

Anhalsaniy

220/6

Mr. Giffard

Mr. Murray

SECRET

1075

Sir J. Johnston

SECRET

(Covering TOP SECRET

Flag A (826

Flag B Flag B

MR. ANTHONY GREY OF REUTERS

In Hong Kong telegram No. 466 of 7 June Lord Shepherd

reported that the Governor of Hong Kong would be sending a

re-

full/appraisal of the problem of Mr. Grey and the convicted

newsworkers to reach London before Lord Shepherd's return.

This re-appraisal has now been received (Hong Kong telegram

No. 478 of 13 June).

RECOMMENDATION

Subject always to such observations as Lord Shepherd

may have on his return, I recommend that the Governor should

thereafter be informed that, as we now see it, the least

unsatisfactory course is probably to have the newsworkers

complete their sentences in September/October, in the

reasonably confident expectation that Mr. Grey will be

released immediately thereafter. Hong Kong Department concur.

BACKGROUND

The Governor makes the following points:-

(a) Any concession not directly connected with the eleven

newsworkers would be irrelevant to the solution of the

Grey case.

(1)

(b) If anything is to be done there are only two possibilities:

to release the eleven newsworkers as an open

political gesture (course A); Or

(11)

to find a cover story for remission of their

sentences (course B).

SECRET

(Covering TOP SECRET

SECRET

Mr. Grey with the newsworkers might cause the Chinese

to raise their price and could embarrass the Chinese

"moderates".

(a) There are major objections to the release of the

newsworkers as a political gesture (course A):

(1)

It would weaken our stance that we govern Hong

Kong under the rule of law, and would encourage

future Communist pressure.

(11) It would result in a significant loss of political

confidence in Hong Kong. Morale of police, prison

staff and security forces would be adversely affected.

(e) The objections to releasing the newsworkers under a cover

story (course B) are:

(1) It is hard to find such a story.

(ii) Nobody would believe it.

(f) The Governor advises firmly against course A but states

that he will continue to search for a cover story under

course B, although he is pessimistic about finding one.

(g) Finally the Governor compares the cases of Mr. Brooke

and Mr. Grey: the former cannot be said to involve a

threat to the security of the United Kingdom;

in the

latter a serious threat to the security of Hong Kong is

the essence of the difficulty.

ARGUMENT

I have the following comments on the Governor's arguments.

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

(a) I agree that nothing less than the release of the eleven

newsworkers in Hong Kong will secure the release of

Mr. Grey. I do not think that the Chinese will release

Mr. Grey prematurely. But I am reasonably confident

that the release of the eleven will be followed by the

release of Mr. Grey, since I think it would be difficult

for the Chinese to change the price to which they are

publicly committed (but see also paragraph 7(a) below).

(b) I find it difficult to understand the alleged puzzlement

of the Chinese at the recent reductions in sentences and

the embarrassment of Chou Enl-Lai.

The objections to course A are strong. As I have argued

in past submissions, I believe that there is no doubt that

open defeat in this matter would encourage the Chinese to

conclude that, when subjected by them to sufficient

pressure, we shall always be prepared to bend the law for

political ends. They would consequently be encouraged to

try the same tactics when it suited them.

(a) More important, however, than the conclusions drawn by the

Chinese Government, are those drawn by the inhabitants of

Hong Kong. As long as the inhabitants of Hong Kong believe

that we are prepared to resist, on their behalf, pressures

from the communists, we can continue to run the Colony.

If our determination to do so were put seriously in doubt,

our position would become progressively more difficult.

A "kowtow" over Mr. Grey would be interpreted as a rebuff

SECRET

- 3 -

SECRET

by those Hong Kong Chinese who remained steadfast

throughout the "confrontation".

(e) As regards course B, I think it would be impossible to

contrive a cover story that would be accepted by the

press and the public. In the case of Wong Chak, the

eleventh newsworker, we were able to contrive means to

bring his sentence into line with those of the other ten

newsworkers and thus to ensure the release of all eleven

by 3 October this year. The credulity of observers was

already strained by this exercise. Course B would mean

a contrived story not only for each of the other ten

newsworkers but also for Wong Chak for the second time.

I fear that any such attempt could only make the Hong

Kong authorities look dangerously foolish and undermine

public confidence.

Thus it seems to me that the Governor should not be pressed

further for the immediate release of the newsworkers. Except

for the real risk of trouble in the prisons (to which the

Governor has drawn attention) I think that in the short term

the security situation is probably sufficiently improved for

the shock to be absorbed. But in the long term, we would be

conceding a Chinese victory which would have incalculable

consequences for the future of the Colony. Our position in

Hong Kong depends on the belief of the local population in our

determination. If they doubt this they will start to re-insure

with the other side.

This means that we are concerned not

SECRET

simply about a loss of face but about the erosion of public

support for and confidence in the Hong Kong Government's

ability to withstand communist pressure. And our only

possible gain from these risks would be the curtailment of

Mr. Grey's ordeal by a matter of 3-4 months.

6. There is an important secondary argument against our

trying to insist on the release of the newsworkers against

the better judgement of the Governor. In the storm of

criticism likely to arise in Hong Kong, it would almost

certainly become public knowledge that the releases had been

against the advice of the Governor and others bearing

responsibility on the spot. It could have most unfortunate

effects in Hong Kong if the impression were thus to be created

of a serious divergence of view between the Hong Kong

authorities and ourselves on a matter pertaining to the

security of Hong Kong.

7. There is a further much less considerable argument

against premature releases. Relations of other British

subjects detained in China e.g. the Gordon family, would

claim that we had in effect done a deal with the Chinese to

secure the release of Mr. Grey, and would press us to propose

further deals to the Chinese (involving other convicted

prisoners in Hong Kong) to secure the release of our other

nationals.

8. What bearing has the Brooke case on all this? There

is no doubt that public knowledge of a bargain with the

Russians over Mr. Brooke will pose problems for us in the

SECRET

- 5 -

SECRET

handling of the Grey case, possibly with the Chinese but

almost certainly with sectors of the public here.

(a) The Chinese are bound to be impressed by our willingness

(b)

to bend the law in respect of the Krogers and,

particularly in the sour climate of Sino-Soviet

relations, to contrast it with what has been said to

them about the impossibility of prematurely releasing

convicted prisoners in Hong Kong.

to further pressure by them in the

This may well lead

matter of the whole

problem of convicted "confrontation" prisoners in Hong

Kong, and possibly even to attempts to strike bargains

for other British subjects now in detention in China.

We must accept that there is some risk that they might

put up their price for Mr. Grey to include convicted

prisoners other than the newsworkers. But I personally

doubt if they will do so in view of the firmness with

which they have established the link between Mr. Grey and

the newsworkers. (In any case, all this is perhaps

rather a possible argument for firmass and delay in the

Brooke case rather than for immediate concessions in the

Grey case.)

Those in this country directly involved in the Grey case

(1.e. Reuters, certain sections of the press and the Grey

family) may press the more strongly for an early bargain

with the Chinese. But I am by no means certain that

public opinion generally would come to the conclusion that

because we had in very special circumstances made

SECRET

- 6-

SECRET

concessions to the Russians about the Krogers, we

should necessarily follow this up by caving in to the

Chinese over the convicted newsworkers. Moreover,

there are important and relevant differences between

the Brooke and Grey cases which could be demonstrated, some with the general public, others more selectively. The Governor makes the point that the two cases carry very different implications for the security of the territories

concerned.

It may be helpful if I list the other respects

in which I see important differences.

(a) What is envisaged in the case of Mr. Brooke is in effect

an exchange. The Chinese have throughout refused an

exchange in the case of Mr. Grey. Their terms are the

release of the newsworkers unconditionally in Hong Kong. (b) We shall in any case have in effect complied with these

terms in a matter of some thirteen weeks from 1 July.

Thus on the terms the Chinese have put to us, the end of

Mr. Grey's ordeal is in sight.

(c)

The bargain over Mr. Brooke would involve the exchange of convicted prisoners (albeit for offences of very different seriousness). In the case of Mr. Grey on the other hand we should be releasing convicted prisoners in exchange for someone who has been accused of no irregularity. (d) The difference in numbers involved is important:

a married

couple for one in the case of Mr. Brooke; eleven for one

in the case of Mr.

Grey.

SECRET

- 7-

SECRET

(e) The Krogers are in a very special and restricted

category of prisoners, whereas the newsworkers are

eleven among 254 communists who are serving sentences

for offences arising out of the 1967 troubles.

(f) Even if Mr. Grey is released, there are still twelve

other British subjects detained in China. Concessions

10.

to the Chinese over Mr. Grey might encourage the Chinese

to put a price on other heads, something which they have

not hitherto done and which we would want to avoid.

All this seems to me to provide an adequate justification

to the public here for refusing to accept a deal over Mr. Brooke

as good grounds for proceeding to a deal over Mr. Grey - Such

criticism as we would incur for dragging our feet is likely

to be much less damaging than the criticism if it became known

that the Governor had been overruled on an issue which he

regarded as central to the security of Hong Kong.

11. A postscript.

If the foregoing line of argument is

accepted I would nevertheless see some advantage in our telling

the Governor that if he were to decide, as September approaches,

that a time had come when the premature release of the

newsworkers by a matter of a few weeks would be regarded by

the Chinese as a gesture of accommodation rather than an act

of weakness, he should not exclude this.

Copies to: Private Secretary

Mr. Godden

Mr. Baker

Sir A. Galsworthy

Sir T. Brimelow

Mr. Carter

Mr. Giffard

James May

(James Murray)

18 June, 1969.

SECRET

- 8-

Ukr

FEC 16.

Far Eastern Department

pajanyo

3 July, 1969.

I enclose a copy of an article which appeared in the Sunday Express of 29 June reporting the views of a Hong Kong Government official on a "deal" with the Chinese over Anthony Grey.

2. Apart from the fact that the article contains a number of errors of fact the exaggerated toue in which it is written "relations with China have tremendously laproved in the past six months" and "there is no doubt that China has acted honourably" is not very helpful at this stage in the Grey 0882. It would sean likely that the authors of the article had received assistance in their detailed reconstruction of events in Sino/British relations this year and I presume it was the sans official whose opinions are reported in the opening paragraphs.

3. I realise from the problems which we encounter with the press in London how difficult it is to preserve some balance in reports on the Grey case. But I hope that local correspondents in Hong Kong can be encoureged to exercise some restraint when reporting the case during the next three months.

R. J. T. Nolaren, Esq.,

HONG 106.

(C. Wilson)

Copy to:

J. N. Allan, Esq., Peking.

MR M

Мизкач

Tsx. 4/68.

ne of the

With the Compliments of the

Political

Adviser JUL 1769

Hong Kong FEL 130

は

12/

Political Adviser

SECRET

Mr. K.C. Jay telephoned on Tuesday, 10th June to say that he would like to see me in the near future: accordingly I made arrangements to see him the next day (wednesday, 11th June) at 11 a.m.

854

Referring to our meeting on 4th June, Jay said that he had now received a message directly from Prize Minister CHOU En- lai: on the surface, Jay warned, the message was not very good but if studied carefully - and reading between the lines it would be seen to be favourable. Briefly, the Prime Minister allegedly had written that he had been very disappointed at the unsuccessful attempts to negotiate with the H.K.Ġ. over the question of the newsworkers and Anthony Grey: it seemed to CHO☺ that (as usual) Chairman MAO had been right and he (CHOU) had been wrong: that dealing with the imperialists was a matter fraught with difficulties as they would see only their point of view and act accordingly. In spite of this rather gloomy appreciation of the situation, however, CHOU had then gone on to say that nevertheless he would appreciate Jay's assessment of the present situation in Hong Kong and any advice that Jay would care to offer as to possible future action.

Jay's explanation of this message from CHOU was that firstly he had no alternative course but to say that Chairman MAO was right: equally, it was clear o Jay that CHOU was disappointed that nothing spacific had come from the Chinese proposals for a deal over Grey: in particular

in particular - and this is pure Jay speculation Jay felt that the Prime Minister vas disapminted or even frustrated that he had not received information earlier from us that we vere considering the setting up of the long-tern Board of Review to consider confrontation prisoners, etc.: if we had given this prior notice, Jay feels that it would have given CHOU time to prepare Chairman" MAO for a "change in policy", possibly leading to special arrangements over the newsworkers. At this stage I repeated, as I have done so often, the line that there was no question of "a deal", that the setting up of the Board of Review was a reflection of our assessment of the present security situation, etc. etc. Jay once again said that he certainly understood (with difficulty) our stand on this but was sure that Peking, and in particular Prime Minister CHOU and Chairman MAO, would never be able to follow this line of reasoning. Jay believes that a ray of hope lay in the request from CHOU for Jay's assessment of the present situation and for his advice as to the future. Jay is convinced that the message really boiled down to this request and her believed CHOU really wishes the channel to remain in being but that it should be used more meaningfully.

Jay said that he had already replied to CHOU CHOU's request was written in such a way that he clearly needed an urgent ansver. Jay said that his reply was along the lines that, whilst Chairman KÃO vas as usual undoubtedly right, nevertheless he vas equally convinced that CHOU was not wrong: that he was of the opinion that the channel had been of benefit to Peking as vell as the H.I.G. and that it could continue to be of value. He claimed that be again repeated the advice t hat now that it was known that the 11 newsworkers would definitely and legally be released by

/contd.

SECRET

October, it was very much in China's interest that Grey should be released before the last newsworker (WONG Chak) vas released from prison in October: he had argued that the detention of Grey had attracted a great deal of publicity not only in Hong Kong and Britain but all over the world and that by releasing Krey soon the Chinese Government would, he expected, appear in

favourable light.

my new

Tory; whi

Find be

And even

Mix

Later in the discussion Jay spoke briefly of the reception which FEI Yi-aing had received in Peking and in particular by CHOU En-lai: it was Jay's understanding that FEI had been severely criticised on the way in which he and his hench- had directed the confrontation with the H.K.G. and that he was also criticised for his way of living in Hong Kong which in Peking's view was not appropriate for a senior communist.

As promised at our last meeting, I handed Jay a list of the 11 newsworkers showing their "earliest dates of release":

he was clearly pleased to receive this information and said that he would pass it on to the appropriate authorities.

As agreed with you and H.E. I then spoke to Jay briefly about Lord Shepherd's visit. I emphasised that it was really a routine visit, part of a long and arduous world tour that Lord Shepherd was undertaking. Lord Shepherd had come to Hong Kong after attending the SEATO meeting in Bangkok and, among other things, had taken a short rest here. He had, of course, held discussions with H.E. and senior official and unofficial members of Government and undertaken a fairly full programme: this in spite of the fact that he was rather unwell during his stay in Hong Iong. There was general agreement on matters discussed and no radical changes were proposed: his main interests were to do with labour legislation priorities and technical education.

Other matters discussed were:-

I explained that Hr. Healey

(1) Visit of Mr. Denis Healey: would only be in Hong Kong for one full working day and that, although he would be having brief discussions with H.E. and C.B.F., the main purpose of the visit was to visit the troops;

(2) Ir. Denson's visit to Shanghai, etc: I said that we were pleased to learn of the approval given to Hr. Denson to make these visits - an encouraging sign;

(3) Action against 17 officials of the Waterworks Union: In discussing Das Jay said that his information was to the effect that neither Peking nor the local communists regarded this as a serious matter and that we could assume that the communists would not be "too difficult' over this;

(4) South China Iron Works: Jay handed to se copies of documents, mainly letters from the Legal Department, about these land transactions. It was Jay's opinion and that of the Bank of China that the land exchange had already been completed

/contd...

SECRET

except for one or two sinor legalities, along the lines of a specific and definite offer made by Mr. McRobert of the Legal Department in 1960. It was clear that this had been a very Long drawn out affair with delays on the part not only of the solicitors for the South China Iron Works but also on the part of Government: as late as April 1964 Mr. McRobert had confirmed that Government would abide by the proposals made to the S.C.I.V. in 1960. Included in the documents vas a copy of a receipt for money paid to the Treasury for the land conversion. These papers are now with P.A.C.S.(L), who will be making comments in the next few days.

(J. Cater)

13th June, 1969.

C.C.

Mr. J. Murray, CMG (London) Mr. J.B. Denson, OR (Peking) D.S.D. H./A.I.G. I.8.5.

SECFET

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Group...

Fco....

21..

Class.

Piece.

4.8.2.......

not yet-tamustone

Following document(s) trap

viterned & closed

Folio 253 - Letter 1/7/69

E/253

4/6/69

and closed until . . . .

Ky Holder 6.7.99

2010

CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

рафент

IMMEDIATE FOREING AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO PEKING TEGRAM NUMBER 207

24 JUNE 1969.

(FED 13

2/7

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO PEKING TELEGRAM NO 207 OF 24 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO HONG KONG, WASHINGTON AND POLAD SINGAPORE.

ANTHONY GREY.

GREY'S LATEST LETTER TO HIS MOTHER CONTAINS THE FOLLOWING PASSAGE: QUOTE I AM SO HAPPY TO TELL YOU THAT SOME CHANGES WERE MADE IN MY DAILY LIFE ON 30 MAY. ON THAT DAY, I WAS TOLD THAT FOR AN HOUR AND A HALF EACH MORNING AND AFTERNOON, I COULD LEAVE MY ROOM, IN WHICH I AM LIVING, AND GO TO EITHER THE COURTYARD OR TO THREE ROOMS UPSTAIRS: I COULD ALSO HAVE MY PORTABLE RADIO, AND ACCESS TO ALL MY BOOKS. IN ADDITION I WAS TOLD I COULD CLOSE THE DOOR OF THE ROOM IN WHICH I SPEND THE MAJORITY OF MY TIME. THE PERIODS IN WHICH I AM ALLOWED TO GO OUTSIDE OR UPSTAIRS ARE 10.30 A.M. TO MIDDAY, AND 4 P.M. TO 5.30 P.M. MY WALKING IN THE COURTYARD IS NOW NOT ENTIRELY SUPERVISED, SO I AM IN THE YARD ON MY OWN, AND THIS IS MORE RELAXING, AND LISTENING TO THE RADIO TOO, MAKES A VERY BIG DIFFERENCE TO MY DAILY LIFE. UNQUOTE.

2. HE INDICATED THAT HE WAS LISTENING TO MUSIC AND HAD HEARD THE COMMENTARY ON THE THAT HE IS LISTENING ALSO TO THE BBC NEWS

CONFIDENTIAL

QUOTE POP UNQUOTE

DERBY, WE ASSUME THEREFORE BULLETINS.

/ 3. THIS IS

וּ.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. THIS IS GOOD NEWS AND MARKS A CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENT IN GREY'S CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT. FROM THE CHEERFUL TONE OF THE

REST OF THE LETTER IT IS CLEAR THAT THE CHANGES HAVE IMPROVED HIS MORALE. WE MUST HOPE THAT THE CHINESE WILL PROGRESSIVELY RELAX THE RESTRICTIONS ON GREY'S FREEDOM AS HIS RELEASE APPROACHES, ON THE LINES ENVISAGED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO. 2258 OF 11 DECEMBER 1968 (NOT TO ALL). AS THE CHINESE DECISION FOLLOWS THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE REDUCTION OF WONG CHAK'S SENTENCE AND MORETON'S INTERVIEW WITH THE CHINESE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE CHINESE HAVE TAKEN THE POINT THAT ALL THE NEWSWORKERS WILL BE OUT BY EARLY OCTOBER AND ARE THEMSELVES PREPARING FOR THE

RELEASE OF GREY.

4. IN VIEW OF THE GREY FAMILY'S PAST INDISCRETIONS WITH THE PRESS AND IN ORDER TO AVOID A DRAMATIC PRESENTATION OF THE LETTER, REUTERS

PERSUADED MRS. GREY TO ALLOW THEM TO RELEASE THE INFORMATION IN A QUIETLY WORDED STATEMENT. THIS WAS ISSUED TODAY.

STEWART

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION:

FAR EASTERN DEPT

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry No. F FF

DEPARTMENT

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegggprshould

reach addresseC(8)

た

эх

24/6.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

(Date)..

Despatched

120

--------pakokupH

----‒‒‒‒ading...NIH------.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret Sheet

Confidential

Resched Unclassified

PRIORITY MARKINGS

Flash Immadiara. Priority Routine

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

En Clair. Cólo Cypher

Draft Telegrøn to:-

PERING No. 207

(Date) _34/6.

And to:-

CYPHER

[Security if any

Security classification

[ Privacy marking

[Codeword-if any)

Addressed to

]

telegram No. 207

And to

Hi, shu-M JAA

CLLLLLLLLLL

repeated for information to

Routine to

CONFIDENTIAD

PEKING

24/6

----- 17

(date)

11-1----11י

WASHINGTON,

Labbat------as, crass banque: +

RONG KONG

POLAD SINGAPORE

PRI LA LA LA Spa Ho▬▬▬DIL DILJOJILLLOJ

Repeat to:-

WASHINGTON POLAD SINGAPORE

Saving to:-

Distribution:- FCO/WHI

FED

HKD

CONSULAR DEPT. NEWS DEPT. IRD

Copies tack- IFD

Saving to

Anthony Grey.

Grey's latest letter to his mother

contains the following passage:

"I am so happy to tell you that some changes were

made in my daily life on. May 30th.

On that day,

-----וי

I was told that for an hour and a half each morning

and afternoon, I could leave my room, in which I

am living, and go to either the courtyard or to

three rooms upstairs; I could also have my

portable radio, and access to all my books.

addition I was told I could close the door of the

root in which I spend the majority of my time.

The periods in which I am allowed to go outside

or upstairs are 10.30 a.m. to midday, and ↳ pim. to 5.30 p.m. My walking in the courtyard is now

not entirely supervised, so I am in the yard on my

own, and this is more relaxing. And listening to

CONFIDENTIAL

the radio too, makes a very big difference to my

daily life."

He indicated that he was listening to "pop"

music and had heard the commentary on the Derby.

We assume therefore that he is listening also to

the BBC news bulletins.

This is good news and marks a considerable

improvement in Grey's conditions of confinement.

From the cheerful tone of the rest of the letter it

is clear that the changes have improved his morale.

We must hope that the Chinese will progressively

relax the restrictions on Grey's freedom as his

release approaches, on the lines envisaged in

paragraph 2 of Hong Kong telegram No. 2258 of 11

December 1968 (hot to all). As the Chinese

decision follows the announcement of the reduction

of Yong Chak's sentence and Moreton's interview with

the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires, it would appear that

the Chinese have taken the point that all the

newsworkers will be out by early October and are

themselves preparing for the release of Grey.

In view of the Grey family's past indiscre-

tions with the press and in order to avoid a

dramatic presentation of the letter, Reuters persuaded

Mrs. Grey to allow them to release the information in a

quietly worded statement.

This was issued today.

Juan Jone

(24

Juwe

0327 17 E.W.A 5.,LIO. 164M 3-67. CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

MR. MURRAY

With the Compliments of the

Political Adviser

Hong Kong

130

The 11 "Newsworkers" : earliest dates of discharge

Ini iration provided by Commissioner of Prisons 6th June_1969

September 3rd 1969

W Tai Chau

LI Siu Hung

CHAK Nuen Fai

POON Wai Wai

CHAN Yim Kuen (female))

LAW Yuk Wo

WONG Yat Lau

CHAN Chi Fung

NG Choi Shing

10. WONG Ling (female)

September 6th 196P RECEIVED IN

IR G 12/N9.50 26 JUN 1969

FC 130/1

September 12th 1969

October 3rd 1969

11.

WONG Chak

A.F. MADDOCKS Political Adviser 9th June, 1969

Distribution

H.E.

Hon.C.S.

D.S.

Hon.A.G.

P.A.(2)

A.P.A.(4)

H./A.R.G.

P.A.C.S.(S)

C.of P. C.P. D.S.B.

F.C.O. London

PEKING

WASHINGTON

D.I.S.

R.1.0.

Ялгобиле.

S. J. Foleston $y 2016

Mo Carter 2576

To Warfon 2016. To Boyd/

По

力

Enci (sary)

----

Reference.

По Пукан

(841) - (842).

The internal evidence in

Thera

reports ( particularly the reiterated

question

1. Why

braved wi

Ihm mattere

Hong Kong shout or have

The negotiation

through the Jay channel) points strongly,

9 think, 1

a deduction

12 and

thoroughly piqued Jay (and

possibly Le Cho-chih) who

and puzzled

are Surfine of

an of

not Peking.

detention

The relaxation of Grey's conditions of

out-

that Pekmą got the menage

the end of Ray indicate

the manage clearly

enough

and appreciated firewicly why

Live

bo ove d

and in

L... Ch 25/6/65

See also 857

адне

that the inforore mont

dim 17o Svey's

constitions is endince that the Chamese sd.

Светиль

Ral

•

the wage. But. Many wrong

Bur. May may nevertheles have

была разваль бу

facture of making

"concussion"

whats this claiming it was any

teal thing crad

replaining for attempting to obtain any immediate

counter-concussion from the Churnet

AIR. Mughay Ref para 4. If we have inclsess

puzzled the Chinne by the resturation of

Wong Chad's sonhance, they

have more succscaled in

116

sugghing me!

My 18 Joe

REF. With the Compliments of the the Sither

N 1969 Political Adviser

7 Boga itos

FEC Well

TSX.4/68

Hong Kong

Sur J. Johvatim

To Morton 0.r.

Political Adviser

SECRET

On Tuesday, 3rd June, Mr. I.C. Jay telephoned to say that he was anxious to see me "within the next day or two", Accordingly I made arrangements to see him at 12.15 p.m. on Vednesday, 4 June.

Jay started by saying that although he intended speaking ti me only briefly on this occasion, nevertheless he would appreciate an opportunity of a "very long discussion" in the near future.

Jay said that although he had no specific message to pass to me from "the other side" he had been mulling over in his mind the desirability or otherwise of informing me of a meeting he had had recently with LI Cho-chih and POON Ching-on (Jay's comment on the latter i "a vorse communist thần even l ́as -- he is a real capitalist"); after some days' reflection Jay thought it advisable to inform me of the discussion and to seek advice.

Apparently Jay was invited to the Bank of China to see a fils on the 9th Party Congress: he had serious doubts as to whether he should attend as he was not aware whether this was to be a showing for several people or simply a private one for himself: in the event, it was a private showing but Jay was "very courageous" and decided to stay on without making excuses to leave early. Before the film show Jay had the opportunity for a short discussion with LI: LI apparently was most agitated - he had received a communication from Peking which had indicated that they vere most puzzled by the H.I.G.'s action in reducing the prison terms of 11 confrontation prisoners including that of VỌNG Chak: it seemed to LI and to POON that the H.K.G. vas acting in a strange manner; perfectly reasonable request had been made by Peking for negotiations over Anthony Grey and the imprisoned nevsvorkers and the H.K.G. had responded with a firm negative: yet later they had taken action in regard to the confrontation prisoners which seened to indicate that in spite of earlier denials, it was possible to take action along the fines previously suggested by Peking. LI wondered whether this was meant to be an indication that the H.K.G. was in fact nov prepared to negotiate. Jay claimed that he repeated to LI the precise message which I had given him recently on the decision to reduce the prison terms of the 11 confrontation prisoners, but then apparently their discussion was interrupted by the arrival of POON. The conversation thereafter, although still on the same subject, vas left mainly in the hands of POOŇ. The question was raised whether the H.I.G. realised the serious embarrassment which their recent action had caused Prime Minister CHOU En Lai, particularly as it came as a fait accompli without any previous warning whatsoever, that consideration was being given to the possibility of reducing prison terms. CHOU was in a very difficult position in Peking and it was important for his future that he should be able to show that his more moderate policies were successful, or at least stood more chance of success than those being put forward by the more militant members of the Central Comittee who vere in the majority. The question was also raised as to whether the H.K.G. was still keen to use the Jay/Cater channel - perhaps the recent action was meant to indicate to Peking that the H.K.G. was prepared to negotiate but not through the present channel. I broke in at that point to assure jay in the strongest possible teras that his

SECRET

/contd.

SECRET

was the one and only channel through which the H.K.G. vas prepared to work and asked that he should make this absolutely clear to LI and, if he thought it appropriate, to Paking. I also reassured Jay at great length that the H.K.G. was in no way trying to be "tricky" or devious but that the position was precisely as I had

id it was in previous meetings.

Jay claims that, during the discussion with LI and POON, he referred to the question of Anthony Grey and said that he assumed that Grey would be released at least at the time when the last of the newsworkers had been released from prison: he vent further and said that in a recent communication with Peking he had strongly advised that now it was known that the newsworkers would be released definitely and legally in September/October, it would be politic if Peking vere to consider releasing Grey earlier, possibly in July or August. LI enquired whether he might pass this view back to Peking also along his channel and Jay said he saw no objection to this being done. There seemed to be some misunderstanding as to when the newsworkers would be released from prison - POON had mentioned November as being the month when VÒNG Chak would be released: I informed Jay that I would obtain for him the exact dates when all 11 newsworkers were due for release.

Jay said that LI and FOON had than shoved considerable interest concerning senior Government officers: he specifically Fentioned H.E., the C.S. and myself. Jay said that the questions mainly concerned his personal view of hose mentioned and the views of their friends, colleagues and acquaintances. Jay claims that be was unable to speak at any length on his personal knowledge of H.5. and the Colonial Secretary but passed on general comment which had been made by his personal friends in UMELCÓ. As for myself, he said that he was questioned in great detail as to who my friends vere, my career to date, etc. etc., and particularly what I would be doing in the future. In a rather diffuse discussion Jay said that LI and P001 vere particularly interested in a "course" which I had recently taken: he came back to this on two further occasions in which he referred to this as being "a conference" and then "a briefing". Meanwhile I said nothing about this particular point but right at the end I asked whether he had any idea to what course/conference/briefing LI and POON were referring: Jay was unable to be specific at all on this but it was clear that he him- self was fishing for something. I left this topic of conversation with Jay still holding rod and line. Jay also said that the Financial Secretary had been mentioned briefly and LI and POON had asked whether it was true that Sir John Cowperthwaite would be staying with the H.K.G. for a further period after next April.

Just before the interview broke up Jay mentioned the problem of the Bank of China in Singapore. He thought that matters vere now proceeding fairly well and that he did not expect any serious problems to arise. He said that he had held discussions on this with Mr. Martin Scott of the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank and that he was confident that the H.X. à š. Bank would do what it could to assist in this matter.

/contd..

SECRET

As I was leaving the office Jay said that he was very concerned now at the moves being made by local communists to infiltrate their views into the local population:

until very recently the communists had been unsuccessful but Jay now felt hat they were beginning to make gains and that the situation required careful watching.

6th June, 1969.

C.C.

Mr. J. Murray, CMG (F.C.o.) Mr. J.B. Denson, OBE (Peking) D.S.3. M./A.R.G.

E.8.8.

el.

(J. Cater)

SECRET

MR. MURRAY

Маш

Wife

175 Baya M

5° With the Compliments of the

Ir Canter.

Political Adviser

767

FEC 130!!

TSX.4/68.

Enci

Hong Kong

مسال

SECRET

Political Adviser

As a result of a meeting with H.B. on the morning of Monday, 26th May, I arranged to see Mr. K.C. Jay later the same day.

(1)

(2)

I had two main points to put to Jay:-

South China Iron Works land. I spoke to Jay along the lines of the attached notes. I emphasised that normally a purchase of this type would assume vacant possession but told Jay that in the circumstances Government would be prepared to accept transfer of the land as it now stands. Also, as agreed with H.E.. I said that the very top rate, bearing in mind the doubts of the status of some of the land, would be between $ 51 M. and $6 M.

Jay noted this down but expressed great surprise at the figures given for building land. Be vas quite convinced that conversion of the agricultural land had already taken place and claimed that he had seen a receipt for money paid to this end. Jay had no doubt whatsoever that the industrial land held by the S.C.I.V. vas of the order of 500,000 sq.ft. In the circumstances ve agreed that he should make further enquiries as to the exact position as seen by Johnson, Stokes & Hasters. When these enquiries were complete he would hold further discussions with me. (please see paragraph 3(3) below.)

WOLF Cho Gan, WONG

Referring back to our discussion of 2nd Hay, 1 informed Jay that WONG had now written a letter to Government which could be interpreted as being a request for permission to visit the premises of the Yu Hua School. I said that H.E. was now giving consideration to permitting WONG to visit the school four times each year, with a limit of three hours for each visit: if vong wished to make further visits outside of these, then he would have to make special application to the Director of Education. Jay thought the proposals to be reasonable. He confirmed that after my meeting with him on 2nd May he had passed back the varning that WONG should be careful not to contravene the provisions of the ordinance as it affected him. jay believed that the proposals now made would show VỌNG

d the local communists that Government was prepared to be fair in matters such as this and clearly had taken into consideration VONG's position as owner of the building. He did give one word of varning, howev to the effect that once the rulings on visits had been

laid down it was very important that the H.K.G. should stick to them: be knew WONG to be a difficult person who was likely to try and take advantage of the situation and visit the school more often than allowed.

/contd.

SECRET

Jay had a few items of information to pass to me:-

(1) CHOU En Lai. Jay repeated auch of what he had said on previous occasions, to the effect that CHOU's position had been somewhat eroded as a result of the Party Congress, but reiterated that it was the general opinion both in communist circles in Hong Kong and in Peking that CHOU would re-assert his position in the not too distant future.

(2) Anthony Grey/levsworkers. Jay said that Peking had expressed pleasure at the information given on 9th May to the effect that the sentences of 11 confrontation prisoners (including that of WONG Chak) vere to be reduced. Surprise, however, had been expressed that this move on the part of the H.K.G. had been taken outside of the "negotiations for the release of Anthony Grey". I again explained to Jay that this had never been, and could not be, part of a political deal and that our action had been taken solely on the grounds of justice, being of course yet another indication of the H.K.G.'s desire that relations return to normal. Jay said that, whilst he understood the position, he very much doubted whether Peking could see it in this light. In a recent communication Jay claims that he had proposed to CHOU En Lai that, as it was now known that the 11 newsworkers would definitely be released legally and at the latest by October of this year, he saw good reason from Peking's point of view to effect the release of Grey in the near future. Jay himself was optimistic that Grey would now be released before September although he cautioned that with the more militant elements in pover in Peking they might wish to abide by the original statements on Grey that he would not be released until all the newsworkers were freed in Hong Kong.

(3) South China Iron Works. Suddenly and in the context of our discussion on trey, Jay expressed the opinion that it was most important in terms of good will and mutual understanding that this question of the purchase of the S.C.I.V. land should be resolved: he hastened to add that there would be no question of considering this as part of a deal for Grey but at the same time felt that Peking would see it as a gesture of friendship and might even consider that they had some obligation to repay.

(4) Bank of China, Singapore. Jay said that Peking was now taking action to ensure that ample funds were avalable in Singapore for the bank to seet any obligations to depositors: he was aware that within the past few days some Straits $20 M. had been transferred to Singapore. Referring to our discussion on à May when I had expressed personal concern that there sight be repercussions here in Hong Kong if the singapore Government decided to apply for attachment on funds held by the Bank of China in Hong Kong, Jay said that he had made some enquiries. He now thought it highly unlikely that there would be "any repercussions either in Hong Kong or in London; that as a result of the transfer of funds to the Bank of China in Singapore there would be ample money available to cover not only with- draval of deposits but also the small fine of $129,000.

SECRET

/contd...

SECTET

further understood that the legal position was that if the Bank of China refused to pay the fine, then the Singapore Government would first have to take all possible steps (including, Jay suggested, even the seizure and sale of the Bank of China building) before they could reasonably take action against branches in, say, Hong Kong or London. He was quite confident that the Singapore Government/Bank of China squabble would not spill over into Hong Kong.

30th May, 1969.

ее

(J. Cater)

C.C. Mr. J. Murray, CMG (London)

Mr. J.B. Denson, OBĖ (Peking)

D.S.B. H./A.R.G. B.5.5.

Enclosure.

SECRET

al Building lond 175,669 51, 15.

Foi cultural land. 572,378 sq ft.

(a) at $25 p.s

$4,391,725.

(b) Garden & Myston

at dit pin.

572 378

4,964,103

Leccow of sum doubt about. The

statio of a portion of the laust, other

$52 m. would appear : fuis.

If it was all values

ao indentaid

tand, it wons to worth $105 Ṁ ad

taan of chauped wwer: but to change ferasi

The inver

trowel cost approx SM-

which fali 110 take to mylly 157M

This comms vocant pissedion, which they casert pira

[

}

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP Curi

Rt. IN

REGISTRY M 12

20 JUN 1969

Jh ber

En Clair

FEC 120

IZZEDIATE HONG KONG

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

24/6

Telno.493

20 June, 1969

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to FCO Telno.493 of 20 June. Repeated for in-

formation to Peking.

Your Telno.405:[Grey]

No comment.

241

Sir D. Trench

FILES

F. EASTERN DEPT. H.K.D.

NEWS DEPT.

CONS. D.

SIR J. JOSTON SIR A. GALSWORTHY

GGGGG

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

CONFIDENTIAL

•

TEC Fec 1341

COVERING SECRET

19 June, 1969.

pakonyb

L? HK 416.

To keep you in touch with the latest developmenta

5. Kewrary's. in the Grey case, I am enclosing a copy of a submission (9) June) commenting on Lord Shepherd's initial report by telegram of his discussions with the Governor. We now have the Governor's appraisal referred to in paragraph 5 of the telegram and will be submitting on it in the next few days in the light of Lord Shepherd's own comments on his return from his visit to the Far East.

2. Next instalment by next bag!

7/6/69.

J. B. Denson, Esq., 0.8.I.,

PRKING.

(C. Wilson)

COVERING SECRET

Lespatched

1916 AR.

Mr. Murray

Sir Arthur had occasion to come

out of his meeting to take a

telephone call so he has dealt with

these telegrams.

He has made one

or two amendments and if you agree

with them the telegrams may issue.

6.6. Shumpion

18th June, 1969.

The tets she came.

работель

Платина.

With the compliments of

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH

OFFICE

LONDON, S.W.1

1886.

Sir J. Johnston

Sir A. Galeworthy

CONFIDENTIAL

COVERING TOP SECRET

Mr. Anthony Grey

Mr. Molloy has put down for answer on 23 June the

following question:

"To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and

Commonwealth Affairs, when he now expects the release

of the British journalist, Anthony Grey, and the

British subjects illegally detained by the Chinese

Government; and if he will make a statement."

Recommended Reply

I propose that the reply might be on the following lines:

"The Chinese have indicated that if certain newsworkers

in prison in Hong Kong are released they will restore

Mr. Grey's freedom. Under normal circumstances all

the newsworkers in question will be released with full

remission by early October. The Chinese have given no

indication of their intentions about the other British

subjects, some of whom they allege have violated Chinese

law,"

Argument

I had hoped that we would have been able to avoid commenting publicly on the release date for Mr. Grey at this

stage. The question comes at an awkward moment before

Lord Shepherd has had an opportunity of reporting to the

CONFIDENTIAL

COVERING TOP SECRET

(840)

Flags A B and

CONFIDENTIAL

Secretary of State on his discussions with the Governor of

Hong Kong about the Grey case.

keep the position open.

Our answer therefore must

You will remember that during discussions with

Mr. Moreton on 19 May, the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires stated

that "If all patriotic journalists were released, Grey's that

freedom of movement would be restored. The Chinese

Government means what it says." Although I regarded this

as an unequivocal and formal assurance that the release of

the eleven newsworkers would result in Mr. Grey's release, we

decided not to make this statement public since we wished to

avoid committing ourselves publicly as to whether it should

be regarded as a firm assurance or not. However, I did

envisage at the time that we might eventually have to make

some use of it in answer to a Parliamentary Question. The

Chinese might think it rather odd if in answering a question

on this subject we appeared to ignore entirely Ma's conver-

sation with Mr. Moreton. In addition, I see some advantage

in pinning the Chinese down to this position in public.

will then be more difficult for them to change their ground

later. The reply therefore follows closely the words of

Mr. Ma which we believe were carefully chosen for him by his

Government. At the same time we must avoid being drawn in

supplementaries on our interpretation of his statement.

5. In drafting the second sentence of the answer we have

not in effect precluded the possibility of the premature

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Flag D

عليكم

CONFIDENTIAL

release of the newsworkers.

But lest the Governor should

interpret it as meaning that the Secretary of State has

already decided that the newsworkers should be left to

serve out their sentences until September/October, it would

be well to make it clear to him that a final decision has

not yet been taken.

In view of the strong views expressed by the Governor

of Hong Kong in his telegram No. 478of 13 June on the question

of the newsworkers, I propose that we ask by telegram for

his comments on the proposed answer.

should issue today if possible.

I attach drafts, which

Jann Unnay.

(James Murray)

18 June, 1969.

Copy to: Mr. Carter

squee, but we add before the last sentence often reply "Despite repenter requests....

ANS.

7/6

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

186

829

SECRET

twem pa kozolo

Mr. Hupray

Buy 16 June.

Kr. Anthony Grey of Reuters

I agree generally with the conclusions in your minute of

11 June in respect of the implications for the Grey case of a

bargain with the Russians over Brooke, though I think our chief

defence if we come under pressure over the Grey case must be based

on the considerations of security and public confidence in

Hong Kong I would not for example be very anxious to draw the

distinction that Mr. Brooke faces the prospect of a new and

longer prison sentence, which might suggest to the Chinese that

if they chose to invent a charge against Mr. Grey they could

twist our arm more effectively.

For the moment, however, a final decision has not yet been

taken whether or not to accept the latest Soviet proposal about

the Brooke case,

and until this is done we can make no firm

plans for handling any repercussions over Grey.

The only thing that is clear is that, come what may, it is

quite impracticable, given the views of the Governor, to

contemplate that the Grey case could be disposed of by 1 July,

I understood from you this afternoon that the Governor's

promised assessment is now in and that you are making the

necessary preparations to review the whole matter with

Lord Shepherd on his return on 19 June.

JB&rheaton

(J.B. JOHNSTON) 13.6.69.

23 N 1969

ᅥ

KEL 15C/1

wele

Copy to:

Private Secretary

Mr. Baker

Miss Deas

Sir T. Brimelow

Sir A. Galsworthy Hr. Giffard

Mr. Carter

SRÖRET

Flag A

Sir J. Johnston

SECRET

Буджендъ

men for 2076

Enter apa Lecado

(899)

MR. ANTHONY GREY OF REUTERS

PROBLEM

In Hong Kong telegram No. 466 of 7 June, Lord Shepherd

has informed the Secretary of State that he is deferring his

recommendation on the future handling of the Grey case until

his return on 19 June, by which time we are promised a

further full appraisal by the Governor of Hong Kong. Lord

Shepherd doubts if this appraisal will differ greatly from

the arguments already put forward by the Governor and

summarised in the telegram. Lord Shepherd has evidently

been impressed by these arguments, since he goes on to

suggest that it would be very desirable to defer public

knowledge of any deal over Mr. Brooke until after October,

since otherwise Mr. Grey's chances of early release might be

affected adversely.

2. East European and Soviet Department on 9 June put

forward a recommendation that we should accept the latest

Soviet counter-proposal about the Brooke case which, if

adopted, would mean that by 1 July at the latest it would

become public knowledge that we had made a bargain with the

Russians over Mr. Brooke. What are the immediate implications

of this for the Grey case?

SECRET

CONCLUSIONS

3. My conclusions are these.

(a) While from the point of view of the Grey case it would

suit us best if the September timing envisaged earlier

could be maintained in the Brooke case, the timing of

the latter need not be a decisive factor in the timing

of the former. Thus the Grey case of itself does not

(b)

seem to me to require us to press for delay in the

Brooke case.

Even if a bargain about Mr. Brooke is to become publicly

known by 1 July, this does not require us to try to

settle the Grey case before that date by the release of

the convicted newsworkers in Hong Kong.

Indeed it

would be both impracticable and undesirable for us to

attempt to do so.

Grey case can await Lord Shepherd's return.

(a)

If thereafter the decision on the merits of the Grey case

is to let things take their course in Hong Kong until

October, developments in the Brooke case should not

prevent us from going through with this.

ARGUMENT

There is much force in the case the Governor has put to

There are, however, two points with which I

Lord Shepherd.

would take issue.

(a) I do not agree that it is "by no means certain that the

earlier release of the newsworkers would expedite

Mr. Grey's release". If, on the basis of the recent

SECRET

assurances by the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires we accept

that the release of all the newsworkers by October will

secure the release of Mr. Grey, then it seems to me as

certain as anything can be in dealings with the Chinese

that the earlier release of the newsworkers would result

in the earlier release of Mr. Grey.

(b) I am firmly opposed to "cover stories" as a means of

justifying the release of the newsworkers. It was right

that an arrangement was contrived to bring Wong Chak on

to the same basis as the other ten newsworkers, and we

were able to achieve this without excessive public

embarrassment.

But if we were now to try to contrive cover

stories for the premature release of the others (and of

Wong himself), credibility would be strained and I should

have thought the Hong Kong authorities would be made to

look foolish. If therefore the eleven are to be released

prematurely it would in my view have to be on the basis of

a "flat political deal" which we would have to do our best

to present, not as giving way under pressure but as a

gesture of conciliation stemming from strength.

However, my view is that the Governor has in effect made a

powerful case for letting matters take their course in Hong Kong

until October.

5. The complicating factor is the present state of the Brooke

case. On the two arguments which Lord Shepherd advances for

deferring public knowledge of any deal over Mr. Brooke until

the Grey case has been settled, I have the following comments.

SECRET

- 3-

SECRET

(a) Knowledge of a bargain with the Russians over Mr. Brooke

would clearly lead to pressure from those directly

involved in the Grey case (i.e. Reuters, certain sections

of the press, and the Grey family) for a bargain with

the Chinese over Mr. Grey. But I am by no means certain

that public opinion generally would come to the conclusion

that because we had in very special circumstances made

concessions to the Russians about the Krogers we should

necessarily follow this up by caving in to the Chinese

over the convicted newaworkers. Moreover there are

important and relevant differences between the Brooke case

and the Grey case, which it should not be too difficult

to put across to the public. Mr. Brooke faces the

prospect of a new and long prison sentence;

should, on the terms the Chinese have declared to us,

be out of detention in October.

Krogers, but eleven neweworkers.

Mr. Grey

There are only two

The Krogers are in a

very special and restricted category of prisoners,

whereas the newaworkers are eleven among over 200

communists who are serving sentences in Hong Kong for

offenses arising out of the 1967 troubles.

The bending

of the law in favour of the Krogers does not involve the

same considerations of security and public confidence for

the future as would similar action in Hong Kong.

(b) The Chinese are bound to draw their own conclusions from

our willingness to bend the law in respect of the Krogers

particularly in the present sour climate of Sino-Soviet relation and/contrast it with what has been said to them about the

SECRET

· 4.

Flag B

SECRET

impossibility of prematurely releasing convicted

prisoners in Hong Kong.

This may well lead to further

pressure by them on us in the matter of the whole problem

of convicted prisoners in Hong Kong. We must accept

that there is some risk that they might put up their

price for Mr. Grey to include convicted prisoners other

than the newsworkers. But I personally doubt if they

will do so, in view of the firmness with which they have

established the link between Mr. Grey and the newsworkers.

On 5 May the Prime Minister commented that the prospect

of an early deal over Mr. Brooke made it desirable that we should

get the Grey case out of the way first. If knowledge of a deal

over Mr. Brooke is now to become public by 1 July I doubt if it

is practicable to try to get the Grey case out of the way

beforehand. We could of course try to persuade the Governor

that a "flat political deal" in advance with the Chinese about

Mr. Grey would be the best way of avoiding the dangers to which

Lord Shepherd has drawn attention. But I am reasonably sure

that the Governor would argue that because it had been

considered necessary to accept the Russian terms over Mr. Brooke,

this was no justification for taking what he continued to regard

as unjustifiable risks for the future of Hong Kong. Moreover

with so short a time remaining before 1 July a deal now with

the Chinese over Mr. Grey would no longer meet what may have

been some of the Prime Minister's preoccupations at the

beginning of May. Knowledge of concessions to the Chinese

over the newsworkers followed almost immediately afterwards by

SECRET

- 5-

SECRET

public knowledge of concessions to the Russians over the

Krogers is likely to increase rather than diminish our

problems with opinion in this country. Hence my conclusion

that it is both impracticable and undesirable to try to settle

the Grey case before 1 July.

Copies to:

Jaun

Private Secretary

Mr. Baker

Miss Deas

Sir T. Brimelow

Sir A. Galsworthy

Mr. Giffard

Mr. Carter

Wwway.

(James Murray)

11 June, 1969.

BECRET

- 6 -

CYPHER/CAT A

SECRET

Head of Far Eastern

COPY NO.3

enter

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

IMMEDIATE HONG KONG

TELEGRAM NUMBER 466

7 JUNE 1969

SECRET

FOR SECRETARY OF STATE FROM LORD SHEPHERD.

GREY.

RECEIVED

RIC

13 JUN 1969

བཉྩེ ༽༦༠༦

Ker 1010 $ f. 19.6.

KEL 134/1

Paylo

bas

I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH GOVERNOR ON BASIS OF YOUR INSTRUCTIONS. HIS

INITIAL REACTIONS WERE AS FOLLOWS.

2. HE HAD BEEN TRYING FOR LAST 18 MONTHS TO FIND A MEANS OF RELEASING

THE ELEVEN NEWSWORKERS PROVIDED A GOOD COVER STORY COULD BE FOUND.

WITH THIS IN MIND HE HAD EXAMINED THEIR FAMILY BACKGROUND, HEALTH

AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF EACH OFFENCE AND SENTENCE AND HAD EVEN

CONSIDERED THE MOST EXTREME POSSIBILITIES. AS A RESULT HE HAD BEEN

ABLE TO HIT ON THE DEVICE OF REDUCING WONG CHAK'S SENTENCE SO THAT

ALL WOULD BE OUT BY EARLY OCTOBER, BUT THE LATTER EXERCISE HAD

STRETCHED CREDIBILITY TO THE LIMIT. ALREADY THE CHINA MAIL ON 3

JUNE HAD GIVEN FRONT PAGE HEADLINES TO A LETTER FROM 80 PRISONERS

ACCUSING THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF BEING PARTICULARLY PARTIAL TOWARDS

LEFT WING PRISONERS. THE FULL REPERCUSSIONS WERE NOT YET OVER SEMI-

COLON AND IF THE LAW WERE SEEN TO BE BENT FURTHER IN FAVOUR OF THE NEWSWORKERS HE GENUINELY FEARED THE POSSIBILITY OF SERIOUS RIOTS

AND TROUBLES IN THE PRISONS, MANY OF WHICH WERE 'OPEN

3. THE GOVERNOR CONSIDERED IT WAS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT THE EARLIER RELEASE OF THE NEWSWORKERS WOULD EXPEDITE GREY'S RELEASE.

HE BELIEVED THERE WAS AT PRESENT THE NEAREST APPROACH TO A DEAL THAT GREY WOULD BE OUT IN OCTOBER. EXPERIENCE HAD SHOWN THAT A FURTHER MOVE BY US NOW MIGHT ONLY CONFUSE AND PUZZLE THE CHINESE, OCTOBER WAS NOT FAR OFF AND IN THE MEANTIME HE WOULD DO HIS BEST

/TO ENSURE

SECRET

-2-

TO ENSURE THAT NO ACTION WAS TAKEN BY THE HONG KONG AUTHORITIES

WHICH THE CHINESE MIGHT REGARD AS PROVOCATIVE OR USE AS A PRETEX?

FOR UPSETTING THE DEAL.

4. THE GOVERNOR SAID THAT HE WOULD CERTAINLY CONTINUE TO SEARCH

FOR A DEFENSIBLE MEANS OF EARLIER RELEASE BUT IN THE ABOVE

CIRCUMSTANCES HE WOULD BE LESS THAN HONEST IF HE DID NOT SAY

THAT THE PROSPECTS WERE NOT GOOD. HE COULD NOT AGREE TO A FLAT

POLITICAL DEAL WITHOUT AN ADEQUATE COVER STORY SINCE THIS WOULD

REPRESENT A FUNDAMENTAL REVERSAL OF OUR POLICY TOWARDS CHINA OVER

HONG KONG, NAMELY THAT OF NOT GIVING WAY UNDER PRESSURE SEMICOLON

THIS WOULD HAVE INCALCULABLE CONSEQUENCES. BUT HE WOULD EXAMINE ALL

MEANS SHORT OF THIS.

5. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE GOVERNOR WOULD REEXAMINE EVERY ASPECT AND

SEND A FULL APPRAISAL BY MY RETURN ON 19 JUNE.

5. I DOUBT IF THE GOVERNOR'S FINAL ASSESSMENT WILL DIFFER GREATLY

FROM ABOVE. HOWEVER I WILL DEFER MY RECOMMENDATION UNTIL I HAVE

SEEN IT.

7. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BROOKE CASE FOR GREY ARE HARDER TO

ASSESS FROM HERE, BUT IT WOULD CLEARLY BE VERY DESIRABLE TO DEFER

PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF ANY DEAL OVER BROOKE UNTIL AFTER OCTOBER SINCE

(A) IT WOULD STIMULATE EXTREME PUBLIC PRESSURE FOR ACTION OVER

GREY AND

(B) IT MIGHT CAUSE AN ADVERSE REACTION IN PEKING SINCE WE HAVE

REPEATEDLY TOLD THE CHINESE THAT WE COULD NOT AS A DIRECT BARGAIN

RELEASE CONVICTED PRISONERS IN HONG KONG IN EXCHANGE FOR GREY.

BOTH OF THESE WOULD, IN MY VIEW, AFFECT ADVERSELY GREY'S CHANCES OF

EARLY RELEASE.

SIR D. TRENCH

PRISEC

XXXXX

SECRET AND PERSONAL

子

Fre

isalı

20 May, 1969

pekooló

In your letter of 5 Hay you reported that the Prime Minister thought that an early initiative should be taken on Grey, particularly in view of the way the Brooke case was develo, ing.

As you will have seen from the press there have been recent developments in Hong Kong relevant to the Grey case. On 9 May the Hong Kong Government announced the first results of a review of the sentences on long-term prisoners convicted for offences arising out of the troubles in 1967. Those who had their sentences reduced included Wong Chak, one of the eleven imprisoned newsworkers whom the Chinese have linked with Grey. Wong Chak had his sentence reduced from five to three years, which means that he should be released with full remission on 4 October. The other ten newsworkers are already due out at various dates in September. By the first week in October therefore all eleven will be out of prison. In their statement last December, the Chinese said that "since the Hong Kong British authorities continue to keep 13 now 117 patr.otic Chinese journalists in jail, the Chinese Government is fully justified in continuing to restrict Grey's freedom of movement". Thus the release of the eleven will deprive the Chinese of the only justification they themselves have advanced for detaining Grey. We cannot of course be certain that they

/in turn

E. Youde, Esq., C.M.G., M.B.C.,

10 Downing Street.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

in turn vill release Grey. But there are good grounds for expecting that they will. (Bank of China officials in London have let it be known privately that they expect to see Grey released when the newsworkers are freed.) The Chinese authorities have never attempted to relate the case of Grey to developments in Hong Kong other than those affecting the local communist press. They have made considerable use of their December statement throughout the world in justifying their position. We have had various indications that Grey's continuing detention has been an embarrassment to them, particularly in those countries whose esteem they want. They would not find it easy now to change their ground and advance a new justification for detaining him.

I turn now to the possible implications of the Brooke case for the Grey case. As soon as it becomes known that we are prepared to make a bargain with the Russians over Brooke we shall certainly be under increasing pressure from sectors of opinion in this country to try to make a bargain with the Chinese over Grey. But if arrangements to obtain the release of Brooke in return for a concession on the Krogers do not become known until September or later (as is envisaged at present) these arrangements need not have any direct Implications for the Grey case." In September we shall be able to say (with precise dates) that all the eleven newsworkers whom the Chinese have linked with Grey, will be out of prison within a matter of days; and we should at that time have little difficulty in convincing the public here that we had done or were just on the point of doing all that we properly could to facilitate Grey's release. Thus if we can hold to the September timing in the Brooke case, we can in the meantime continue to handle the Grey case on its merits.

Even so, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary by no means rules out the possibility of some initiative over Grey. Broadly speaking three courses have been under consideration here:-

/(a)

[

SECRET AND PERSONAL

(a) to let matters take their course in Hong Kong;

(b) to propose to the Governor that he should remit

the sentence of at any rate ten of the newsworkers a matter of weeks before their due release dates; and

procedure which would ensure the release of all the eleven newsworkers in the immediate future.

Each of these courses has its merits and disadvantages. The Governor of Hong Kong has hitherto considered that the premature release of the newsworkers in Hong Kong carried unacceptable risks for the wellbeing of Hong Kong, both now and in the future; and we have supported him in this. His reluctance to do so has, understandably, been reinforced by the fact that the Chinese have already rejected an exchange of Grey for the eleven newsworkers. They want the latter released unconditionally in Hong Kong itself for maximum political effect. However, the Foreign and Consonwealth Secretary has directed that Lord Shepherd, who is visiting Hong Kong between 1 and 7 June, and the Governor should carefully weigh all the issues involved with a view to assessing whether the time has not come when the risks of premature release are acceptable. It may be that the Governor will strongly maintain his objections; in which case the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary vill wish to reconsider the matter in the light of these objections. You will readily understand the unfortunate effects it could have in Hong Kong if the impression were to be created of a serious divergence of view between the Hong Kong authorities and ourselves on a watter pertaining to the security of Hong Kong.

SECRET AND PERSONAL

(118281) D4. 391399 1,500μ 2μ9 Hw.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret

Secret,

Confidential,

Restricted Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

SECRET & PERSONAL

DRAFT

Letter

Type 1 +

To:-

E. Youde, Esq., C.M.G., M.B.E. No. 10 Downing Street, S.W.1.

From

Private Secretary

Telephone No. & Ext.

Copy to: D. G. Jonés, Esq..

Cabinet office.

Department

Lotar despitenes by Private Sacratary's Ded

20 MAY 1969

In your letter of 5 May you reported that the

Prime Minister thought that an early initiative should

be taken on Grey, particularly in view of the way the

Brooke case was developing.

2. As you will have seen from the press there have

been recent developments in Hong Kong relevant to the

Grey case. On 9 May the Hong Kong Government

announced the first results of a review of the sentences

on long-term prisoners convicted for offences arising

out of the troubles in 1967. Those who had their

sentences reduced included Wong Chak, one of the

eleven imprisoned newsworkers whom the Chinese have

linked with Grey. Wong Chak had his sentence reduced

from five to three years, which means that he should be

released with full remission on 4 October. The other

ten newsworkers are already due out at various dates in

September. By the first week in October therefore all

eleven will be out of prison. In their statement last

December, the Chinese said that "since the Hong Kong

British authorities continue to keep 13 now 117

patriotic Chinese journalists in jail, the Chinese

Government is fully justified in continuing to restrict

Grey's freedom of movment". Thus the release of the eleven will deprive the Chinese of the only justification

SECRET & PERSONAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

SECRET & PERSONAL

they themselves have advanced for detaining Grey

We cannot of course be certain that they in turn

will release Grey. But there are good grounds

for expecting that they will. (Bank of China

officials in London have let it be known

privately that they expect to see Grey released

when the newsworkers are freed.) The Chinese

authorities have never attempted to relate the

case of Grey to developments in Hong Kong other than

local communist

those affecting the/press, They have made

considerable use of their December statement

throughout the world in justifying their

position. We have had various indications that

Grey's continuing detention has been an

embarrassment to them, particularly in those

countries whose esteem they want. They would

not find it easy now to change their ground and

advance a new justification for detaining him.

3. I turn now to the possible implications of

the Brooke case for the Grey case. As soon as

it becomes known that we are prepared to make a

bargain with the Russians over Brooke we shall

certainly be under increasing pressure from

sectors of opinion in this country to try to

make a bargain with the Chinese over Grey.

But

if arrangements to obtain the release of Brooke

in return for a concession on the Krogers do

or later not become known until September (as is envisaged

at present) these arrangements need not have any

direct implications for the Grey case. In

September we shall be able to say (with precise

dates) that all the eleven newsworkers whom the

Chinese have linked with Grey, will be out of

prison within a matter of days; and we should at

that time have little difficulty in convincing

SECRET & PERSONAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

WIBIL 51-7406

SECRET & PERSONAL

the public here that we had done or were just

on the point of doing all that we properly

could to facilitate Grey's release. Thus if

we can hold to the September timing in the

Brooke case, we can in the meantime continue

to handle the Grey case on its merits.

4. Even so, the Foreign and Commonwealth

Secretary by no means rules out the possibility

of some initiative over Grey.

Broadly

speaking three courses have been under

consideration here:

to let matters take their course in Hong

Kong;

to propose to the Governor that he should

remit the sentence of at any rate ten of

the newsworkers a matter of weeks before

their due release dates; and

to ask the Governor to try to devise some

procedure which would ensure the release

of all the eleven newsworkers in the

immediate future.

Each of these courses has its merits and

disadvantages. The Governor of Hong Kong has

hitherto considered that the premature release

of the newsworkers in Hong Kong carried

unacceptable risks for the wellbeing of Hong

Kong, both now and in the future; and we have

supported him in this. His reluctance to do

so has, understandably, been reinforced by the

fact that the Chinese have already rejected

an exchange of Grey for the eleven newsworkers,

They want the latter released unconditionally

in Hong Kong itself for maximum political

effect.

However, the Foreign and Commonwealth

SECRET & PERSONAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

WEBL 51-7406

SECRET & PERSONAL

Secretary has directed that Lord Shepherd,

who is visiting Hong Kong between 1 and 7

June, and the Governor should carefully weigh

all the issues involved with a view to

assessing whether the time has not come when

the risks of premature release are acceptable.

It may be that the Governor will strongly

maintain his objections; in which case the

Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary will wish

to reconsider the matter in the light of

these objections. You will readily

understand the unfortunate effects it could

have in Hong Kong if the impression were to

be created of a serious divergence of view

between the Hong Kong authorities and

ourselves on a matter pertaining to the

security of Hong Kong.

١٩

SECRET & PERSONAL

SECRET

Flag A

Ит. Моторбо Mr. Họ

PROBLEM

Puvalé Sey

Secretary of State.

I gue

MUS

MR ANTHONY GREY OF REUTERS

8:1A

On 5 May Mr. Youde wrote to the Private Secretary

reporting that the Prime Minister thought that "it would

be better to get the Grey case out of the way before the

arrangements to obtain the release of Brooke in return for

a concession on the Krogers come to a head and become known".

I have delayed submitting a reply against the possibility

of a more precise indication of timings in the Brooke case. But further delay would seem undesirable. RECOMMENDATION

2. I recommend that a reply be sent in the terms of the

attached draft. Hong Kong Department and, in respect of

the Brooke case, Sir T. Brimelow concur.

BACKGROUND

3. The background is to be found in the papers beginning Flag Bh with my submission of 6 May and ending with the Secretary

1 of State's minute of 9 May.

Jane Wing гру

(James Murray)

16 May, 1969.

ipa hoole

Copies to:

Mr. Baker

Sir J. Johnston

Mr. Carter

1975

SECRET

Dift to isme

ге

PRIME

MINISTER

SECRET AND PERSONAL

Dear Jahny.

F.E. DefF Ce: Sofs

PUS.

Aufl. babae.

A16 R

10 Downing Street Whitehall

Sist. Bi hay 5, 1969 Suis J. Johnsten

pako 6/6

I told the Prime Minister this afternoon of the Parliamentary Question which the Foreign and

Commonwealth Secretary answered today on Gerald Brooke.

2440

The Prime Minister commented that the Press reports over the weekend on the case of Grey in Peking had confirmed his belief that an early initiative should be taken on Grey. Action to achieve the release of Brooke is bound to raise pressure for similar action in the case of Grey who, unlike Brooke, is entirely innocent. It would be better to get the Grey case out of the way before the arrangements to obtain the release of Brooke in return for a concession on the Krogers come to a head and become known.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Gruffydd Jones (Cabinet Office).

J.A.N. Graham, Esq.,

Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

You

сим

Modely Goude

COVERING SECRET

Thank you. 18216

Private Secretary

ivat

(without exclosure), I aber apelo 2/62

8289

Mr. Anthony Grey of Reuters

I attach a selection of recent papers on the

case of Mr. Grey which I understand the Secretary of

State wishes to take with him to the CENTO meetings

in Teheran.

wifson

RI T.

- 3 JUN 1969

isclı

(C. Wilson)

22 May, 1969.

COVERING SECRET

Mr. Moreton

Frlis tent

erface.

CONFIDENTIAL

BILAN, GROM

prizo 2/6

1238

Arrangements have been made to summon the Chinese Chargé

¿'Affaires ad int win on the morning of Monday 19 May to

discuss the cases of all British subjects detained in China

(including Mr. Grey). These representations will furnish the

answer to Kr. Lewis' question. We do not expect any new

developments from this nesting.

Members who follow the Grey case closely can be expected

to be aware that following the announcement by the Governor of

Hong Kong on 9 Kay that he had accepted recommendations from a

Review Board to reduce the sentences of certain long-term

"confrontation" priso..ers in Hong Kong, there is some hope

that this autumn may see an end to Mr. Grey's ordeal.

As a

result of the announcement, Wong Chak, one of the newsworkers

to whose imprisonment the Chinese have linked their detention

of Mr. Grey, is now due for release, with normal remission of

sentence for good behaviour, in early October. The other ten

newsworkurs aro due for release during September. However,

it is important to avoid giving any impression that there is

any direct connexion between the Governor's decision to set

up the Review Board and Mr. Gray's case.

· 1

30 MIMATEL

CONDIDAS PIAL

On Monday 12 May a delegation of Hr. Grey's relatives,

including his mother, net Mr. Foley and presented a petition

asking the Government to start negotiations with the Chinese Government to procure Kr. Grey's release "even to the extent

Mr. Foley of releasing the thirteen imprisoned journalista". summarised the action taken on Mr. Gray's behalf and carefully

explained the significance of the announcement of the

reduction of sentences in Hong Kong. Kr. Foley expressed the

"reasonable expectation" that Mr. Gray would be set free once

the last of the newsworkors was released from prison.

Although one newspaper, "The Daily Express", reported that

Hra. Grey went away from the meeting more depressed than before", this was not the impression given at the meeting, nor

by reports in other newspapers.

1. I attach a draft reply to Mr. Lewis' question together

with a list of previous Parliamentary references and a

background note on the case.

Mumay

(James Kurray) 16 May, 1969

SOLTID. TIA

CONFIDENTIAL

BACKGROUND NOTE

British Subjects Detained in China

Mr. Anthony Grey

Following the arrest of a New China News Agency corres-

pondent in Hong Kong, Hsueh P'ing, Mr. Anthony Grey was put

under house arrest in Peking on 19 July 1967. On 22 July

1967 the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that "in view of

the Hong Kong British Authorities' unreasonable persecution

of the correspondents of the Hong Kong branch of the N.C.N.A.

and other patriotic newsmen, the Chinese Government had

decided to limit the freedom of movement of the British

Reuter's correspondent in Peking until further notice".

the release of Hsueh on 16 November 1968 all the newspapermen

covered by this announcement had completed their prison

sentences and been released.

With

Subsequent to Mr. Grey's detention, another N.C.N.A.

correspondent, Lo, and several other communist newspaper

workers were convicted and are still serving their sentences.

They number eleven at the present time. On 28 December 1968

the New China News Agency said that the continued imprisonment

of these men made the Chinese fully justified in continuing

to detain Kr. Grey However, the N.C.N.A. carefully refrained

from committing the Chinese Government to release Mr. Grey

should the newspaper workers be freed.

3. Subject to maximum remission of sentence for good

behaviour in all cases, the last of the eleven news workers

will be released by early October 1969. He is Wong Chak

whose sentence has been reduced by the Review Board which

/is currently

CONFIDENTIAL

is currently reviewing all cases of "confrontation" prisoners

originally sentenced to four years or more imprisonment.

The review ostensibly has no connection with Mr. Grey's case.

A public announcement in Hong Kong on 9 May stated that the

review had been begun on the instructions of the Governor

following the lifting of many of the Emergency Regulations

introduced during 1967.

4. Mr. Grey has been visited twice by officials from our

Mission in Peking (in April 1968 by Sir D. Hopson and in

November 1968 by Mr. Cradock). Both of these visits have

been in exchange for special visits to a number of Chinese

journalists and news workers in prison in Hong Kong.

Repeated representations have been made to the Chinese

in London and Peking demanding Mr. Grey's release and normal

consular access to him. Mr. Cradock made strong representa-

tions to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 9 December

requesting improvements in Mr. Grey's conditions and, at the

same time, demanding his speedy release. Kr. Cradock also

took up the question of Mr. Grey's health. Subsequently

Mr. Grey reported by letter to his mother that he had received

a thorough medical examination; and on 8 March Mr. Denson was

told by the Chinese that Mr. Grey now had direct access to his

books. On 9 January Lord Shepherd summoned the Chinese Chargé

d'Affaires and made further representations on behalf of

Mr. Grey and other British subjects detained in China.

6. On 14 January Mrs. Grey called on Lord Shepherd to

discuss her son's detention.

After the meeting she told the

- 2

CONFIDENTIAL

/press

CONFIDENTIAL

press that she was satisfied that the Government were

doing everything possible in the present circumstances to

secure Mr. Grey's release. However, on 12 May a petition

for the release of the news workers, signed by 53 of

Mr. Grey's relations, was delivered to the Foreign and

Commonwealth Office. Mr. Foley met the delegation.

- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Terence Boston, M.P.

231

HOUSE

COMMONS

21 May, 1969.

Maurice Foley, Esq., M.P. Under-Secretary of State,

Foreign and Commonwealth Office,

S.W. 1.

Dear Maurice,

Far Eastern Dept No reply required

Premer p.co

Goo

Thank you very much for your letter of 16th

May, 1969, about the problem of Mr. Anthony Grey, raised by my constituent Mr. C. Davis of Sheppey.

し

RECE V DR REGISTRY

зани 1969

Fee

276

palep

Enter spa coo

*715

お子

Private office

RECEIVED IN

REGISTRY ! :0

28 MAY 1969

FEC 13011

Mr. Murray has asked me to pass on to you the attached record of a meeting with Mr. Gerald Long, General Manager of Reuters, on the Grey case.

Subsequent to his meeting Mr. Murray had passed on to Kr. Long the gist of the Chinese Charge d'Affaires remarks on the Grey case at his interview with Mr. Moreton on 19 December, which was the subject of Mr. Kurray'a submission of 20 May.

3. I note that in paragraph 7 of his note Mr. Murray refers to an outstanding reply to an earlier letter of Mr. Long which

would now seem to have been overtaken by these recent

conversations. Perhaps you would advise me whether you consider a reply is still required.

wifson

(C. Wilson)

Far Eastern Department

22 Kay. 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

Eater sploo 27/5

235

KOWES OF A

MONY CHLY OF REUTERS

KOTING METH WR. GIRALD LUTA,

GAMPAL KAVIGER OF ROUTERS ON 16 NẠY

Mr. Long called on me on 16 May for one of his periodic reviews of the Grey case. He showed his usual sympathetic understanding of our difficulties.

2. He again expressed the view that the eleven newsworkers imprisoned in Hong Kong should be released immediately. But he admitted that he was speaking very much for the record as General Manager of Reuters, and acknowledged that, had he responsibilities for the wellbeing of Hong Kong, he would not necessarily look at the situation in exactly the same way" =

3. he had some discussion about the reactions of the public

here to the Grey affair. He took the initiative in saying that

many people would unlike himself be opposed to concessions to the Chinese. I read him out paragraph 5 (b) of my cubmission of 6 Kay (attached) which included a comment that "we should fine public opinion here, if they had the issue squarely put before them, would by no means unanimously favour concessions to the Chinese". He said that he must acknowledge

the paragraph

Selled to him a very fair summing up of the situation, though it did not suit the case that he himself was

pleading.

that

4. Kr. Long said that his principal concern now was about the situation with which we would be confronted if we released the

eloven and the Chinese did not respond by releasing Kr. Grey.

There would be then absolutely nothing we could do to influence the Chinese to let him out. This was one of the reasons why he

would wish us to give favourable consideration to releasing the elevan now. For the present we could still offer the Chinese the concession of premature release, which concession might be a necessary part of their price for Mr. Grey. When the prisoners had reached their due dates for release, we would thereafter have nothing to offer the Chinese. I replied that I remained reasonably confident that when all eleven had been

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy to:

released, even if this were not until the beginning of October, the Chinese would still release Wr. Grey. They had never

attempted to relate Nr. Grey to developments in Hong Kong other than those affecting the local communist preas. They had made considerable use of their December statement throughout the world in justifying their position. We had had various Indications that Mr. Grey's continuing detention had been an embarrassment to them, particularly in those countries whose cateam they wanted. They would not find it veus/in October to change their ground and advance a new justification for cetaining him. Even if the prisoners were not released prematurely the Chinese could still represent the Grey affair as a "victory", in that they had proved their point by holding on to Mr. Grey until we had "stopped the persecution of patriotic Chinese journalists",

5. Mr. Long expressed the hope that the Hong Kong authorities were aware that if in the meantime circumstances arose in

Hong Kong resulting in the imprisonment of another communist journalist there, this would represent a grave setback for

Grey's prospects of release. I replied that the Hong Kong authorities were well aware of this.

6. By the end of our discussion Hr. Long seemed to incline to

the view that in the broadest context, the best course might be the release of the eleven shortly before their due dates, then release could hardly be interpreted as an act of weakness, but would still represent something of a gesture on the part of the Hong Kong authorities. (This, however, should not be quoted against him in Tuture.)

In conclusion I said that I knew that a reply was still

outstanding to his

Recent letter to the Secretary of

State. He said that he was not in the least concerned about

this since he knew what the reply would be! His interest had

been to keep the matter on the record.

Private Secretary

Kr. Koreton

Kr. Havdon

Jauns Telemary.

(James Murray) 19 Kay, 1959.

ONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

SECRET

ROUTINE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 341

SECRET.

TUP COPY

TO HONG KONG

22 MAY 1969 769 (FE)

pakowals

1/548/1

ADDRESSED TO HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO 341 OF 22 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PEKING, BANGKOK (FOR LORD SHEPHERD)

MY TELEGRAM NO. 180 OF 23 MAY: GREY.

(53

FEC

284

MA WAS READING FROM A PREPARED TEXT AND WE MUST CONCLUDE THAT HIS WORDS HAD BEEN CAREFULLY CHOSEN FOR HIM BY HIS MASTERS. WE THINK THEREFORE THAT WE WOULD BE JUSTIFIED IN REGARDING HIS STATEMENT AS A FORMAL ASSURANCE THAT GREY WILL BE RELEASED WHEN THE ELEVEN NEWSWORKERS ARE RELEASED.

2. UNLESS WE WERE BEING OVER-CAUTIOUS IN ASSUMING THAT THE CHINESE HAD CAREFULLY DRAFTED THEIR DECEMBER STATEMENT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO AVOID A FIRM COMMITMENT, IT IS A MATTER FOR SPECULATION WHY THEY SHOULD NOW HAVE CHANGED THEIR MINDS. THE PRESUMPTION MUST BE THAT THEY WANTED TO EDGE US TOWARDS THE EARLY RELEASE OF THE ELEVEN NEWSWORKERS. THE MOST FAVOURABLE INTERPRETATION OF THEIR MOTIVES IS THAT, KEEN TO GET THE GREY AFFAIR OUT OF THE WAY, THEY ARE RESPONDING TO THE INDICATION GIVEN BY THE REDUCTION OF WONG CHAK'S SENTENCE THAT WE ARE READY TO PLAY OUR PART IN SETTLING THE AFFAIR BY OCTOBER AT THE LATEST. EQUALLY, THEY MAY JUDGE THAT AN UNEQUIVOCAL ASSURANCE OF THIS KIND, IF IT BECOMES KNOWN, IS LIKELY TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON US FOR THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE ELEVEN, BUT IN ANY CASE, IT IS HELPFUL TO HAVE THIS ADDITIONAL REASON FOR CONFIDENCE THAT GREY WILL BE RELEASED WHEN THE ELEVEN HAVE BEEN RELEASED.

3. AS FAR AS THE PUBLIC IS CONCERNED WE INTEND TO TREAT THE STATEMENT UNSPECTACULARLY. THE PRESS HERE HAVE GENERALLY INTERPRETED THE DECEMBER STATEMENT AS A FAIRLY FIRM INDICATION OF CHINESE INTENTIONS. THOUGH WE HAVE STRUCK A NOTE OF CAUTION WITH THOSE DIRECTLY CONCERNED, WE HAVE BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO EMPHASISE OUR DOUBTS IN PUBLIC. IF WE NOW GIVE PROMINENCE TO MA'S

/ STATELENT

SECRET

2 -

STATEMENT WE SHALL CERTAINLY BE ASKED WHETHER WE ACCEPT IT AS A FIRM ASSURANCE OR NOT: AND IN REPLY WE SHOULD IN COMMON PRUDENCE HAVE TO MAKE SOME RESERVATION WHICH THE CHINESE MIGHT CHOOSE TO REGARD AS CASTING DOUBTS ON THEIR GOOD FAITH, WE PROPOSE THERE- FORE IN REPLY TO QUESTIONS IN PARLIAMENT ABOUT CHINESE INTENTIONS TO COMFINE OURSELVES TO A GENERAL STATEMENT THAT THE CHINESE HAVE INDICATED TO US THAT THEY WOULD RELEASE GREY WHEN THE NEWSWORKERS WERE RELEASED IN HONG KONG, WE PROPOSE, HOWEVER, TO INFORM MRS. GREY THAT MA'S VISIT HAS REINFORCED OUR CONFIDENCE ABOUT THE EVENTUAL RELEASE OF HER SON, AND TO EXPLAIN THE CIRCUMSTANCES FULLY TO LONG OF REUTERS.

STEWART

FCO DISTRIBUTION:

FAR EASTERN DEPT

SECRET

155521 20/5/69

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.

DEPARTMENT

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret 20/5

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

PRIORITY MARKINGS

Figth

Inmediate}

Priority Routine

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram shou

reach addressme(s).

MILILIILILJ

CPHER

Despatched

וזז

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

En Clair. Code Cypher

Draft Telegram to:-

No. it!

(Date) -15 ग्गड

And to:--

[Sec

Security classification" -if any

ity classifica. tion]

[ Privacy; any

Privacy marking

[Codeword-if any].

Addressed to

telegram No.........

And to

Pri

DALLA

repeated for information to...

Saving to..

SECRET

HONG KONG

(date)

PEKING

I-IL-------

22 May

2. MAY

PETTATAMENTE=====

BANGKOK (for Lord

Shepherd)

Repeat to:-

Peking

Saving to:-

Distribution:-

f.c.o.

(FED).

Copies to:-

My telegram No. 180 of 20 May: Grey.

Ma was reading from a prepared text and we

must conclude that his words had been carefully chosen

for him by his masters. We think therefore that we

would be justified in regarding his statement as a

formal assurance that Grey will be released when the

eleven newsworkers are released.

2. Unless we were being over-cautious in assuming

that the Chinese had carefully drafted their December

statement in such a way as to avoid a firm commitment,

it is a matter for speculation why they should now

have changed their minds, The presumption must be

that they wanted to edge us towards the early release

of the eleven newsworkers. The most favourable

interpretation of their motives is that, keen to get

the Grey affair out of the way, they are responding to

the indication given by the reduction of Wong Chak's

SECRET

/SENTENCE

SECRET

sentence that we are ready to play our part in

settling the affair by October at the latest.

Equally, they may judge that an unequivocal

assurance of this kind, if it becomes known, is

likely to increase pressure on us for the immediate

release of the eleven. But in any case, it is

helpful to have this additional reason for confidence

that Grey will be released when the eleven have been

released.

3. As far as the public is concerned we intend to

treat the statement unspectacularly.

The press

here have generally interpreted the December state-

ment as a fairly firm indication of Chinese intentions.

Though we have struck a note of caution with those

directly concerned, we have been careful not to

emphasise our doubts in public.

If we now give

prominence to Ma's statement we shall certainly be

asked whether we accept it as a firm assurance or

not; and in reply we should in common prudence

have to make some reservation which the Chinese

might choose to regard as casting doubts on their

good faith. We propose therefore in reply to

questions in Parliament about Chinese intentions to

confine ourselves to a general statement that the

Chinese have indicated to us that they would release

Grey when the newsworkers were released in Hong Kong.

We propose, however, to inform Mrs. Grey that Ma's

visit has reinforced our confidence about the

eventual release of her son, and to explain the

circumstances fully to Long of Reuters.

SECRET

032717 E.W.GS.LM. 164m 3

que.

"221"

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

From the Editor-in-Chief

REUTERS

१०

13 May 1969

James Murray Esq CMG

Head, Far Eastern Department Foreign and Commonwealth Office London SW 1

1.30 20 MAY 1969

I have potom to the Gravesvaly,

who is willing

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I have inhomes To Harton accordingly, The will plove and whom the Sway to Lonction gamin arsh informa

and

-Dear Mr Murray

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with 20 1015

17+ 5

Mrs Grey visited us yesterday after seeing you and mentioned that she would like to meet Mr Cradock. I understand that Mr Cradock has now returned to this country. I wonder if you would like to arrange a meeting and let me know so that I can advise Mrs Grey. I think it might be better if we arranged the meeting because I understand from Mrs Grey that the Daily Express have offered their services in this matter, for reasons which you will probably understand.

Yours sincerely

Brain Horton

Boppe

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Mr Ow

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Leo 2015

Brian Horton Reuters Limited 85 Fleet Street London EC4 Telephone 01-353 8060

Sir A Reds father

Mr. lozofon

SECRET

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MR. ANTHONY GREY OF REUTERS

RECEIVED IN

REGITRYN TO

27 MAY 1969

FEC

13c1

STATEMENT BY THE CHINESE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ON 19 MAY

In the course of discussion at the Office on 19 May

about British subjects, Ma, the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires,

said that "if all the patriotic journalists were released

Gray's freedom of movement would be restored. The Chinese

Government means what it says. It is now up to the British

Government". This is on the face of it an unequivocal and

formal assurance that the release of the eleven newsworkers

will result in the release of Mr. Grey, and thus goes beyond

the Chinese statement of last December. What is its signi-

ficance for the handling of the Grey case and in particular

what public use should we make of it?

CONCLUSIONS

2. I think that for practical purposes we can regard the

statement as a formal assurance that Mr. Grey will be released

if we release the eleven newsworkers. As far as the public

is concerned however I think we should merely treat it as a

confirmation of the basis on which we have already been

handling the case. We have so far tried not to involve

ourselves in public controversy about the meaning of the

December statement, which the public have tended to interpret

as a firm statement of a price for Mr. Grey. Since, however,

SECRET

- 1 -

232

SECRET

we have in the past expressed some reservations about the

December statement both to Mr. Long of Reuters and to

Mrs. Grey, I think that we might explain to them that Ma's

recent visit has reinforced our confidence that Grey should

be out by October at the latest. I attach a draft telegram

on these lines.

ARGUMENT

3. From the delay on which Ma insisted between the summons

and his visit, I think that we can conclude that he was in

urgent touch with his Government for instructions.

He was

reading from a prepared text; and I think we must conclude

that his words had been carefully chosen for him by his

masters.

Interpreted literally, they mean merely that

Mr. Grey will be allowed to move about Peking; but I consider

that if the Chinese do remove the restraints on Mr. Grey they

are most unlikely to withhold an exit visa. All in all, I

think that, though Ma's statement is perhaps less authoritative

than would have been a government statement published in

New China News Agency we are justified in treating it as a

firm assurance by the Chinese Government that Mr. Grey will

be allowed to leave China when the newsworkers are released.

4. The N.C.N.A. statement of last December was: "Since the

Hong Kong authorities contrive to keep thirteen now eleven 7

patriotic journalists in jail, the Chinese Government is fully

justified in continuing to restrict Grey's freedom of

movement." We noted at the time that it was carefully short

SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

of a commitment. Either we were being over-cautious, or

the Chinese, for their own purposes, have now decided to

move from a position of some equivocation to a considered

declaration of readiness for a bargain. The former is

doubtful since particularly on an issue like this the

Chinese could be expected to choose their words with care.

If the latter case, the presumption must be that they wish

to influence us towards the early release of the eleven

newsworkers. The best interpretation to be put on their

motives is that, keen to get the Grey affair out of the way,

they are responding to the indication given by the reduction

of Wong Chak's sentence that we were ready to play our part

in settling the affair by October at the latest. Leas

charitably they may judge that an unequivocal assurance of

this kind, if it becomes known, is likely to increase

pressure on us to release the eleven immediately.

5. If as I think we must

we accept the assurance at its

face value, there are two implications of substance for our

handling of the Grey affair.

a) The statement provides an answer to the argument put

forward that while the premature release of the eleven

might in the past have secured the release of Mr. Grey or

might even do so now, we should not conclude that their

release on their due dates in September and October

would necessarily be regarded by the Chinese as an

adequate "concession" for the release of Mr. Grey.

SECRET

•

SECRET

(There may well still be a case for the premature

release of the eleven, but now it can be properly

based only on the desirability of shortening Mr. Grey's

ordeal or of making some general gesture of readiness

for accommodation in Hong Kong.)

b) The statement should help to allay the apprehensions

which the Governor of Hong Kong has understandably

expressed in the past about the situation with which he

would be confronted were he to release the eleven

prematurely and the Chinese were not to match this by

the release of Mr. Grey. (However the Governor has in

practice accepted, in part as the result of a communication

through the covert channel last February, that the release

of the eleven was a firm price for Mr. Grey.)

In short, the statement has facilitated our handling of the

case in that whether the decision is to let matters take their

course in Hong Kong until October or to press for the premature

release of the eleven, we can proceed on either course in a

somewhat easier frame of mind.

6. As far as the public is concerned I think we should treat

the statement unspectacularly. In press criticism of our

handling of the case, the December statement has been generally

interpreted as meaning that the Chinese would release Mr. Grey

if the eleven were released. Though we have struck a note of

caution with those directly concerned we have been careful not

to emphasise our doubts in public. If we now give prominence

to Ma's statement we shall certainly be asked whether we accept

SECRET

it as a firm assurance or not; and since with the Chinese

one should certainly not be sure of anything we should

probably have to make some reservation which the Chinese

might choose to regard as casting doubts on their good faith

(cf. Ma's defensive remark that "the Chinese Government means

what it says"). Accordingly in commenting in yesterday's

Parliamentary reply and to the press on Ma's visit, we have

not let it be known there was any new development; and I

would propose that when in future we are asked by the press

or in Parliament about Chinese intentions we should confine

ourselves to a general statement that the Chinese have

indicated to us that they would release Mr. Grey when the

newsworkers were released in Hong Kong. I think however

that we should inform Mrs. Grey prefereably by telephone that

Ma's visit has reinforced our view that the Chinese will let

her son out on the release of the eleven; and that we should

explain the circumstances fully to Mr. Long of Reuters.

Humay

(James Murray)

20 May, 1969.

Copies to:

Mr. Baker

Sir A. Galsworthy

Mr. Carter

Mr. Haydon

SECRET

- 5-

に

адке.

Governor

A draft letter from the

P.U.S. &

6 14

also thing straited.

Vlarch

215.

Private Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

MR. ANTHONY GREY OF REUTERS

Recent Developments in Hong Kong

Entrapa

2016/5

As requested, I attach a defensive speaking note

for possible use by the Secretary of State in Cabinet

tomorrow, and brief background.

Copies to: Miss Deas

Mr. Moreton

еу

вати James Umay

(James Murray)

14 May, 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

236

CONFIDENTIAL

Les 2015

MR. ANTHONY GREY OF REUTERS

Recent Developments in Hong Kong

731

SPEAKING NOTE (Defensive]

On 9 May the Hong Kong Government announced the

first results of a review of the sentences on long-term

prisoners convicted for offences arising out of the

troubles in 1967. Those who had their sentences reduced

included Wong Chak, one of the eleven imprisoned news-

workers whom the Chinese have linked with Mr. Anthony Grey,

the Reuters correspondent detained in Peking. Wong Chak

had his sentence reduced from five to three years, which

means that he should be released with full remission on

4 October. The other ten newsworkers are already due out

Thus by the first week in

at various dates in September.

October all eleven will be out of prison, and the Chinese

will have been deprived of the only justification they

themselves have advanced for detaining Mr. Grey. We cannot

of course be certain that they in turn will release Mr. Grey.

But we can be reasonably hopeful that they will.

Nevertheless we must continue to do all we can to shorten

his ordeal. Probably this could only be achieved by the

premature release of all eleven newsworkers in Hong Kong

through the exercise of the Governor's discretionary powers

of remission. It has so far been considered that such a

CONFIDENTIAL

concession to Chinese pressure would have most damaging

effects for Hong Kong.

of State (Lord Shepherd)

However, I have asked the Minister

who will be visiting Hong Kong in

the first week of June, to weigh all the issues carefully

with the Governor.

colleagues again.

Thereafter I shall be reporting to my

Ar Eastern Department,

14 May, 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

· 2 -

CONFIDENT IAL

BACKGROUND

At the end of December 1968 the New China News Agency

published a statement which included the following:-

"Since the Hong Kong British authorities continue to

keep 13 now 117 patriotic Chinese journalists in

jail, the Chinese Government is fully justified in

continuing to restrict Grey's freedom of movement."

It will be noted that the N.C.N.A. carefully refrained from

committing the Chinese Government to release Mr. Grey should

the newspaper workers be freed. We are reasonably confident,

however, that they would. Our grounds are these. The

Chinese have made considerable use of the N.C.N.A. statement

throughout the world in justifying their position. We have

had various indications that Mr. Grey's continuing detention

has been an embarrassment to them, particularly in those

countries whose esteem they want. They would not find it

easy now to change their ground, and advance a new justification

for detaining him. But the possibility cannot be excluded,

particularly if they thought that we were losing our nerve and

could be pressed into paying a higher price for Mr. Grey in

terms of other "confrontation" prisoners.

2. By the time of Lord Shepherd's visit to Hong Kong, we

may have some indication of Chinese reactions to the recent

announcement in Hong Kong.

Far Eastern Department,

14 May, 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

Flag A

Private Secretary

Secreta

etary

COVERING CONFIDENTIAL

Enter

730

1) M= Murrzy 42015/5 Миту

равогов

Mr. Anthony Grey of Reuters

As previously arranged, a delegation of six members

of the family of Mr. Anthony Grey called on the Parliamentary

Under-Secretary yesterday to present a petition (attached)

for the Secretary of State.

Press treatment of the

2. F.C.O. telegram No. 168 of 12 May to Peking describes

and comments on the meeting.

meeting has been reasonably restrained, and seems unlikely

to increase the pressure on us over the Grey affair.

must however expect something of a splash in "The People"

next Sunday.

3. No further action would seem to be necessary about

the petition.

James Vermany.

(James Murray)

13 May, 1969.

Copies to: Miss Deas

Mr. Moreton

Pay thanks. The Secretary

of State has seen the telegram and the fress. It seems to have gue as well as could possibly be exfected.

COVERING CONFIDENT 1.

CONFIDENTIAL

BACKGROUND NOTE

British Subjects Detained in China

Mr. Anthony Grey

Following the arrest of a New China News Agency corres- pondent in Hong Kong, Hsueh P'ing, Mr. Anthony Grey was put under house arrest in Peking on 19 July, 1967. On 22 July, 1967, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that "in view of the Hong Kong British Authorities' unreasonable persecution of

the correspondents of the Hong Kong branch of the N.C.N.A. and

other patriotic newsmen, the Chinese Government had decided to

limit the freedom of movement of the British Reuters' corres-

pondent in Peking until further notice", With the release of

Hsueh on 16 November 1968 all the newspapermen covered by this announcement had completed their prison sentences and been

released.

2. Subsequent to Mr. Grey's detention, another N.C.N.A.

correspondent, Lo, and several other communist newspaper workers

were convicted and are still serving their sentences. They

number eleven at the present time. On 28 December 1968 the New

China News Agency said that the continued imprisonment of these

men made the Chinese fully justified in continuing to detain

Kr. Grey. However, the N.C.N.A. carefully refrained from

committing the Chinese Government to release Mr. Grey should

the newspaper workers be freed.

Provided maximum remission of sentence for good behaviour

is granted in all cases, the last of the news workers will be

released by early October, 1969.

SONFIDENTIAL

/4.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Grey has been visited twice by officials from our

Mission in Peking (in April 1968 by Sir D. Hopson and in

November 1968 by Mr. Cradock). Both of these visits have

been in exchange for special visits to a number of Chinese

journalists and news workers in prison in Hong Kong.

5. Repeated representations have been made to the Chinese

in London and Peking demanding Mr. Grey's release and normal

Consular access to him. Mr. Cradock made strong represen-

tations to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 9

December requesting improvements in Mr. Grey's conditions and,

at the same time, demanding his speedy release.

also took up the question of Mr. Grey's health.

Mr. Grey reported by letter to his mother that he had received

a thorough medical examination; and on 8 March Mr. Denson was

Mr. Cradock

Subsequently

told by the Chinese that Mr. Grey now had direct access to his

books. On 9 January Lord Shepherd summoned the Chinese Chargé

d'Affaires and made further representations on behalf of Mr. Grey

and other British subjects detained in China.

6. On 14 January Mrs. Grey called on Lord Shepherd to discuss

her son's detention. After the meeting she told the press that

she was satisfied that the Government were doing everything

possible in the present circumstances to secure Mr. Grey's

release. However, on 12 May a petition for the release of the

news workers, signed by 53 of Mr. Grey's relations, was delivered

to the Foreign and Commonwealth office. Mr. Foley met the

delegation.

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

WEBL 517

CONFIDENTIAL

SPEAKING NOTES

Hr. Anthony Grey of Reuters

You are already aware of our deep concern

about Mr. Grey and our anxiety to do all we

reasonably can to secure his release. Lord

Shepherd told Krs. Grey about this when she

called on him on 14 January. He has aaked

be to say how sorry he is to be unable to meet

you today. He has kept me informed about

developments.

Until last autum I had

responsibilities for Far Eastern affairs and

had already made clear to Chinese officials

in London our views about their deplorable

treatment of Mr. Grey.

Representations

It is

2. We have made repeated representations to

the Chinese about Mr. Grey both here in

London and in Peking. We have tried to secure

his release; and failing that, some ameliora-

tion of his conditions of confinement.

disappointing that there has been so little

progress. But we may have managed to bring

about some small improvement in his conditions

When Mr. Denson, our Charge d'Affaires in

Peking, saw the Chinese on 8 March, he was

told that Mr. Grey had now access to his books

upstairs.

Prisoners in Hong Kong

3. The Chinese have attempted to draw an

equation between the release of Mr. Grey and

news

release of the eleven communist/workers

remaining in prison in Hong Kong. I should

CONFIDENTIAL

/1ike

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

WYBL 515

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

like to make several points on this:-

(a) A comparison between Mr. Grey and

the eleven communist newaworkers is

misleading:

(1)

Unlike Mr. Grey who has done

nothing wrong, the eleven news

workers were sentenced for

specific crimes committed

during the communist-inspired

disturbances in Hong Kong in

1967.

(ii) Unlike Mr. Grey, not all the

communist news workers are

bona fide Journalists.

(b) We are responsible for the security

of Hong Kong. The security of the

Colony depends upon proper respect

for the law. It could have grave

consequences for the future main-

tenance of order if the Hong Kong

Government were seen, as a result of

Chinese pressure, to be ready to

bend the law when the Chinese

demanded it. This is what the pre-

mature release of the eleven news

workers in Hong Kong might mean. If

we were to yield to Chinese pressure

tactica of this kind, it would grave-

ly impair the future value of prison

sentences as a deterrent.

Communist

wrong-doers would not take them

seriously, since they would hope that

we would again yield to pressure

CONFIDENTIAL

/from

Hi།, 51-2-29*

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

from the Chinese authorities, and

release or rescind the sentences.

All this would immediately be inter-

preted in Hong Kong as a sign of

weakness.

The local people would

lose faith in our determination to

resist, on their behalf, presaures

exerted on Hong Kong by the Chinese.

Bubjects:

(1) The attempt to secure the

(11)

release of the news workers

by holding Mr. Grey is a

cynical case of the Chinese

attempting to obtain ransom.

If the Chinese are successful

in these tactics they will be

encouraged to try the same

methods towards other British

subjects in future.

(111) Apart from the Chinese, other

governments may also come to

the conclusion that they can

exert pressure on us by similar

methods. This could have

serious consequences for Britis

subjects and especially the

press in many countries.

Hopes for Mr. Grev's Release

14. What now are the proposals for Mr. Grey's

release? Ten of the eleven news workers are in

any case due out with full remission in

September.

As you will have seen from Saturday s

/press

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

WEBSL 51-2406

CONFIDENTIAL

-4-

press, the Governor of Hong Kong has accepted

a recommendation from his Review Board of long

term sentences that the sentence of the

eleventh newsworker should be reduced from five

to three years. He should thus be out with

full remission in the first week of October.

Thus all eleven news workers will be released

by the first week of October. If we accept

that the Chinese regard the eleven news workers

and Hr. Grey as equivalent we can be reasonably

hopeful that Mr. Grey's ordeal should end about

the same time at the latest.

Tribute to Mr. Grey

5. I would like to say how deeply impressed

I have been at the strength of character which

Mr. Grey has shown under these appalling con-

ditions. Mr. Grey has in a sense been bearing

single-handed a large part of the burden of

safeguarding the wellbeing of the millions in

Hong Kong for whom we are responsible. We have

been in the difficult situation of having to

ask him to make the sacrifice of his own

liberty for a very long period without being

able to consult him or to explain to him the

significance of his privations. But all this

will have been wasted and to no purpose if his

release were secured in circumstances in which

the Chinese could claim effectively to the

people of Hong Kong that they had forced the

Hong Kong Government to do their bidding.

/Supplementary

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-5-

Supplementary Walking Points

Might the Chinese change their ground, as they

have done before?

6. The original Chinese announcement about

Mr. Grey's detention referred to eight Hong

Kong news workers. When the last of these was

released in November last year we had some

hopes that Mr. Grey might be set free. However,

they proceeded to link his continuied detention

to further news workers arrested in Hong Kong

after the start of Mr. Grey's detention.

would still be possible for them to find a

similar excuse for prolonging his ordeal after

the last of these men is released in early

October, but we think this unlikely.

Would not the release of the newsworkers only

a short time before the end of their sentences

be a harmless concession?

The Hong Kong authorities must think of

the future. They would still be interfering

with the judicial processes for political

reasons. Confidence in their ability to with-

atand communist pressure would be undermined.

If the Hong Kong authorities were seen to be

ready to yield to Chinese pressure, this might

encourage the Chinese to put up their price

for Mr. Grey.

Retaliation against N.C.N.A.

We have considered the possibility of

retaliation against the New Chine News Agency

in the United Kingdom. The possibility

remains open However, it is our judgement at

present that this will do nothing to secure the

/release

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CONFIDENTIAL

-6-

release of Mr. Grey. It would only make his

chances of early release worse as well as

damaging the chances of other British subjects

detained in China,

Mr. Grey's Health.

Naturally, we remain deeply concerned

about Mr. Grey. However, although he must

obviously be bitter about his long detention

by the Chinese, it is not our impression that

his health or mental equilibrium have

Buffered. We know that he had proper medical

attention for his throat condition during

the winter

Access to his books upstairs

should make life somewhat more bearable.

Nevertheless, we shall continue to watch this

aspect carefully.

Further Visit to Mr. Grey

10.

We do not rule out the possibility that

the Chinese will allow a further visit to

Mr. Grey in the fairly near future.

CONFIDENTIAL

•

229

SECRET.

SECRET

SECRETARY OF STATE.

hr. Anthony Grey of Reuters.

You will know that I and the department

have been giving deep and anxious thought to

the problem of Mr. Anthony Grey and how best

we could obtain his release without risking

or prejudicing the security and stability

of Hong Kong. I have also had an

opportunity of discussing this with Mr.

Cater and Mr. Cradock.

Both Mr. Cater and Mr. Cradock

believe that the Chinese are determined

that Mr. Grey will not be released until

the eleven journalists are released from

prison.

As you will see from the submission,

the departmental advice is that in the

interests of Hong Kong we should in general stand on our present position whereby the ten

journalists would be released in September

SECRET.

on/

SECRET.

SECRET

on the completion of their sentences and

Wong Chak, the remaining journalist, whose

sentence the Review Board has recently

shortened, would be released early in

October. The official view is that this

should meet the Chinese demands and should

obtain the release of Mr. Grey shortly after

Wong Chak's release.

In addition to this course, (a),

there are two other possible courses, (b) and

(c), which I have considered and discussed

with the department

Course (b) is that the Governor

should at his discretion and exercising his

prerogative release the ten journalists in

July leaving Wong Chak only in prison until

October. The official advice in the

submission is that I should discuss this

with the Governor when I am in Hong Kong

when we could take into account the reactions

of the Chinese following the announcement

SECHET.

of/

SECRET.

SECRET

of the reduction in Wong Chak's sentence (on May 9)

and other local factors.

On this possible course

I would make the comment that I think that

the Governor will be loth to agree.

Personally

I think it might make it more certain that the

Chinese would release Mr. Grey, although I do

not believe they would release him until Wong

Chak was released in October. Whilst all

the latest information is that the health of

Mr. Grey is good and we have no reason to

believe that he could not withstand confinement

until then, particularly if news of steps taken

in Hong Kong became known to him, I feel I

should mention my misgivings about a course of

action which would leave him in detention until

October. But I do accept that from the

presentational point of view in Hong Kong there

is much to course (b), It seems to me,

however, that when it becomes known that while

we were ready to release ten of the journalists

but were insisting that Wong Chak remained a

prisoner/

SECRET.

SECRET

prisoner until October which means the

continued confinement of Mr. Grey we might

be confronted with press and parliamentary

clamour.

So far we have been able to hold

this within limits. It may however become so

great that the Chinese might either feel that

they could not be seen to be releasing Mr.

Grey as a consequence of public criticism, as

I suspect might have been the case in 1968,

or they may feel that the pressure on us is

such that the original price for Mr. Grey is

too low and make more difficult demands as the

price for his release. One does not wish to

exaggerate this risk. I am however especially.

conscious of the proposed petition to be

delivered by Mr. Grey's family. If, as is

likely. this is delivered in the glare of T.V.

and the press, it could well spark off the

pressures which we know to be there but which

have been deliberately restrained in the

interests of Mr. Grey.

SECRET

6./

SECRET.

SECRET

Course (c) is the earlier release of

Wong Chak to coincide with that of the other journalists at the earliest date possible. If this were to be the decision, clearly it would place the Governor in a very difficult position in that he has just accepted the Review Board's recommendation to reduce the sentence to three years instead of five and will be justifying this as a normal review procedure quite unconnected with the Grey case. It would be hard to explain, although not impossible, if the Governor by exercise of his prerogative went beyond the

recommendation of the Review Board so soon

after he had accepted it and released Wong Chak with the other prisoners at an earlier date. I do not think however there is any doubt that this course provides the best opportunity of getting the release of Mr.Grey and will avoid the risks which I have mentioned above of a release by stages as envisaged in course (b).

SECRET.

7./

SECRET.

Course (c), if you agree, could also be

discussed by me with the Governor.

I am not

however due in Hong Kong until about 1 June. And in the meantime circumstances may arise which you may think require a decision

before then.

To come to a decision on this finely balanced problem in which conjecture must carry as much weight as logic, since there is no firm evidence on how the Chinese may react, is very difficult. This is more so in view

of the consistent and well-argued advice of the Governor and officials. My own feeling, which is the one I expressed to you on 3 April when I talked over the submission by the department of that date, is that while we must take no steps which would place at risk Hong Kong, we should ask the Governor to try to devise some procedure to mitigate any risk but ensure the release of the eleven

journalists during June or at the latest July.

Like Mr. Long, I do not believe this step would place at risk the security or

stability/

SECRET

stability of Hong Kong though I do see that it

would involve difficult and embarrassing

administrative problems. I accept however

that it would probably be right for us to

defer a final decision if possible - until

I have had an opportunity of weighing the issues

fully with the Governor and in any case until

after we have had the reactions to the

reduction of Wong Chak's sentence.

The period

of delay worries me and if we adopt this course,

I think it necessary that I have a directive from

you to make a decision so as to avoid further

delay which may prejudice Mr. Grey's release.

10. In view of the fact that I am leaving

for an overseas visit tomorrow I felt it right

to record my views, although we may have an

opportunity of discussing this matter today.

CC:

Mal?

(//EPHERD)

8 may, 1969.

Sir John Johnston Sir A. Galsworthy

Mr. J.0. Moreton

Mr. R. Baker

Mr. J. Murray Mr. W.S. Carter.

SECRET.

SECRET

Far Eastern Department

Mary.

The Secretary of State saw the submission of 6 May on the case of Mr. Anthony Grey together with Lord Shepherd's minute of 8 May on the same subject. He has minuted on this as follows:

"Lord Shepherd and I spoke about this. I have great sympathy with Mr. Grey, and even more with the Governor, whose handling of a difficult situation I greatly admore. Weighing it all up. I conclude that Lord Shepherd, when he is in Hong Kong should urge the Governor most strongly to follow course (c) in Lord Shepherd's minute; and that unless the Governor is able to convince Lord Shepherd, personally, that this would be wrong, Lord Shepherd should say that course (c) is my decision".

urin

C.C.

Sir A. Galsworthy Sir J. Johnston Mr. Moreton

Hong Kong Department P.S. to Lord Shepherd

SECRET

(A. D. Brighty) 9 May, 1969

4 JUN 1969

后

FEL 1321

Beli

1228

S&S.

Farkusten Defartment

would rather let to manais ansencement stand. They

acceft that

you may well

•for the release Wing Chake in July, with

the rest, and that in that they and the Gremer

Cash

such

　will have to embarrassment

manage

may arise

from the terms of the amoen emat -morrow. In firm it merely nounces the Review Brands decision and has no bearing Os exarise botte Cravemois)

Geverner's prerogative.

Долоо

int Shoffend

spice but the SECRET

I have great symfeitly with th, Gay, and ever more with the jeveros, whose handling of a difficult situation I greatly admiri. Sin Toby Jolestar Weighing it all up. I conclude that had Shopiand,

The is in Hery Kory should urge the Governor

Mr. Moreton

•when he is in

must

strongly to folour come (<) in had Shepland) rinkt; and thr

Governor is able to convins hood Shapland, parantly, th inless Mr. Anthony Grey of Reuters

hand Sheffend started

started Snap

Smy that cause (c) is

decision

is my

MS,

(9 Mary)

PROBLEM the world be wray,

For some time we have been proceeding on the

assumption that we could not now expect the release of Mr. Grey until all eleven Communist newsworkers in prison in Hong Kong had been released, but that thereafter the

Chinese would release Mr. Grey. Ten of the newsworkers

are due out with remission in September. The Governor of Hong Kong on about 9 May will be announcing his acceptance

of a recommendation of the Review Board that the sentence of

the eleventh, Wong Chak, should be reduced from five years to three years, with the result that the latter will be out with remission on ↳ October. Thus there is a reasonable expec- tation that Mr. Grey will be out in October. Is it right

to let matters take their course until then?

RECOMMENDATION

2. I recommend that Lord Shepherd during his forthcoming visit to Hong Kong should discuss with the Governor the feasibility of the release of at any rate ten of the prisoners about the end of July. We might give the Governor advance

notice. But it might be best to wait about a week after the

announcement covering Wong Chak on 9 May, so that we can take

account of any reactions to it. Hong Kong Department concur.

ARGUMENT

3. We have hitherto seen four dangers in the premature

release of convicted prisoners in Hong Kong.

We believed that it would damage public confidence in the Colony. It would be interpreted by the local communists as the "kowtow" the Chinese had been seeking. We should thus be tacitly acknowledging their ability to influence events in the Colony at their whim. Mr. Long, General Manager of Reuters, on the other hand has argued that release of the newsworkers could equally be presented as an act of strength demonstrating that the Governor, successful in his "confrontation" policy, had sufficient

SECRET

-1-

SECRET

confidence in the security situation to regard the

risks of release negligible. But it is not so much the immediate security situation that concerns the Governor as long-term confidence. Any action which might lead the inhabitants of Hong Kong to conclude that we have lost our nerve could quickly be disastrous. We cannot afford to mis-calculate and must give due weight to the arguments of the Governor who is better placed than we are to make judgement. Admittedly the closer we get to the due release dates of the prisoners, the less their premature release will be a concession to the Chinese and the less the danger.

By providing a precedent of willingness to disregard the courts in a flagrant manner and for a political purpose, premature release would impair the future credibility of the sanction of imprisonment. Admittedly there is a time element in this also, since a brief curtailment of imprisonment might not be very damaging in this respect. On the other hand since we have taken a firm stand in Hong Kong on the principle of non- interference with the judicial process it might be undesirable to compromise that principle simply in the hope of settling the Grey affair a matter of months

earlier.

Success in their ransom tactics could encourage the Chinese to adopt similar tactics in future to the detriment of other British subjects. There have been those who have argued that if the Chinese decided in future to take hostages they would do so whatever our

action in this particular case. There is воде force in this argument. But the Grey case is especially important in that it is the first, as far as I am aware in which the Chinese have acknowledged the taking of a

political hostage.

SECRET

We were concerned lest the Chinese, so far from seeing premature release as a gesture of compromise on our part, might take it simply as proof that we were susceptible to pressure and conclude that by hanging on to Mr. Grey indefinitely (and possibly even beyond October) they might bring us to further concessions in the matter of other convicted prisoners.

Reviewing these objections I continue to conclude that the premature release of the newsworkers will continue to be to some degree damaging in Hong Kong, but that the degree of damage will be the less the closer we approach the due release dates in September and October.

5. We have fully recognised, however, that there were risks in accepting the Governor's view that we must let matters take

their course until the due release dates.

a) The prolongation of his ordeal may seriously affect

Mr. Grey's health. Present indications (including his latest letters to his girl friend) are, however, that

he should be able to bear the strain until October.

We may face difficulties with Parliament and public opinion in this country. The editor of "The People" has come out strongly in favour of the release of the news- workers in exchange for Mr. Grey. We are apparently to receive from the relatives of Mr. Grey a petition on the same lines. Mr. Long has pressed the Secretary of State privately for such an arrangement. But I think that we should find that public opinion here, if they had the issues aquarely put before them, would by no means unanimously favour concessions to the Chinese. We have so far refrained from using to the full the strong arguments for refusing to pay ranson in Hong Kong, lest this would only exacerbate controversy with the Chinese to the detriment of Mr. Grey. It is difficult to predict how public opinion might move in the coming weeks. Once it is public knowledge (about 9 May) that all eleven

SECRET

· 3 -

SECRET

newsworkers will be out by early October, it should become progressively easier to hold the situation as the end of the tunnel approaches.

We have taken account of the possibility that if we

simply let the eleven newsworkers out in September and October the Chinese will not regard this as any concession on our part, and that we should have thus lost the opportunity of giving the Chinese the relatively harmless "victory" which they may regard as a pre-requisite for their acceptance of a modus

vivendi in Hong Kong. However, our experience of the Chinese suggests that they will not be at a loss to present the release of the eleven, whenever it comes,

as a victory. They will have prevailed to the extent of having held on to Mr. Grey until we have stopped "the persecution of patriotic newsworkers in Hong Kong". 6. In short none of the foregoing considerations seem to me to constitute an overriding objection to letting matters take

their course until October unless we were to be faced with

Grey's health and consequently

a marked deterioration in Mr. increasing public anxiety here. However, since the risks involved in the premature release of the newsworkers become less the nearer we approach their due release dates it is for consideration whether we might ask the Governor to use his discretionary powers of remission say at the end of July. If he were to remit the remaining sentences of all eleven, this would almost certainly shorten Mr. Grey's ordeal by

about two months. It would be a mild "kowtow" towards the Chinese (see paragraph 5 c) above), which might in turn be a useful insurance against the possibility of their attempting to force further concessions before releasing Mr. Grey. But there is a snag. We might reasonably ask the Governor to remit the sentences of the ten. But to suggest to him that he might remit Wong Chak's sentence also would be in

effect to ask him to make a nonsense of the careful

SECRET

explanation he will have given to the Hong Kong public that the reduction of Wong Chak's sentence from five years to three years resulted from normal review processes and was in no way connected with the Grey case. He might well consider that this would not merely have a damaging effect on the credibility and prestige of the Hong Kong authorities but would seriously impair confidence within Hong Kong. If however ten only were to be released, and this was not judged sufficient by the Chinese, we should face a very trying time until the release of Wong Chak in October. These seem to me very real difficulties. It might be best if a decision on them were postponed until Lord Shepherd has had an opportunity to weigh the issues fully with the Governor during his visit beginning 31 May. By then the Governor will have had an opportunity to assess the reactions of the public in Hong Kong and of the Chinese authorities (through the covert channels) to the reduction of Wong Chak's sentence.

James Munay

(James Murray)

6 May, 1969.

Copies to: Mr. Godden

Mr. Baker

Sir J. Johnston

Sir A. Galsworthy

Mr. Carter

SECRET

- 5-

in my

view

SECRET

(226

In my view the arguments against releasing the

newaworkers (whether ten or eleven) in July are overriding.

We should be sacrificing a principle and placing the future

in Hong Kong at risk to an extent out of all proportion to

the advantage of possibly securing Ir. Grey's release a couple

of months earlier. Clearly however Lord Shepherd will wish

to satisfy himself when in Hong Kong that there are no other

defensible courses open to us to advance Mr. Grey's release.

The Governor has done his best to be flexible it was he

personally who devised the means of securing the reduction

of Wong Chak's sentence. I hope that in the last analysis

his judgement on what is tolerable in regard to public

confidence will be accepted.

(J. 0. Koreton)

7 Lay 1969.

Grey has in a sense been

Though it has been involuntary, Mr.

bearing, single-handed, a large part of the burden of safeguarding

the liberty and freedom of the millions in Hong Kong for whom

we are responsible.

tribute to this in due course. We have been in the agonising

situation of having to ask him to make this sacrifice of his

own liberty for a sustained period without being able to consult

him or explain to him the significance of his privations. I

hope these can be made clear to him the moment he is a free man

again. But they will all have been wasted and to no purpose if

his release is secured by a suspension of the rule of law in

/Hong Kong

I hope we shall be able to pay public

SECRET

Hong Kong in circumstances in which the Chinese can claim

effectively, to the people of Hong Kong, that they have forced

the Hong Kong Government to do their bidding

the more so

if they can achieve this result after a prolonged struggle

in which we have repeatedly said to them that we will not

suspend the rule of law in respect of the "newsworkers",

is this situation which it will be most valuable for

Lord Shepherd to discuss personally with the Governor; and

which on present evidence seems to me to make the release

of the "newsworkers" in July premature in terms of the trial

of will between ourselves and the Chinese.

SECRET

Bodrumaton

(J.B. JOHNSTON)

8.5.69.

You will know

CYPHER/CAT A

RESTRICTED

ROUTINE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 167

RESTRICTED

TOP Cor:

PEKING

10 MAY 1969

205

(FED) Do

134/1 12/5

ADDRESSED TO PEKING TELEGRAM NUMDER 167 OF 10 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO HONG KONG.

BRITISH PRESS COVERAGE OF NEWS OF SENTENCE REDUCTIONS IN HONG KONG.

COVERAGE IN TODAY'S PRESS IS AS RESTRAINED AS COULD BE REASONABLY

EXPECTED, ALTHOUGH HEADLINES EMPHASISE QUOTE GREY : NEW HOPE OF RELEASE UNQUOTE (QUOTE FINANCIAL TIMES UNQUOTE). ALL REPORTS CARRY OFFICIAL DENIAL OF ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE REVIEW BOARD'S

RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE GREY CASE. ALL PICK OUT WONG CHAK: AND MOST

DRAW THEIR OWN CONCLUSIONS THAT THE NEWS QUOTE COULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR PEKING TO SET MR. GREY FREE UNQUOTE (QUOTE GUARDIAN UNQUOTE) AS QUOTE ALL NINE (SIC) WILL BE FREE BY THE AUTUMN AND CHINA WILL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY MR. GREY'S CONTINUED DETENTION AFTER THAT TIME UNQUOTE. (QUOTE THE TIMES UNQUOTE).

2. ONLY THE QUOTE SUN UNQUOTE (LEAPMAN) IS PARTICULARLY POINTED : QUOTE THE BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE WERE AT PAINS YESTERDAY TO DENY

THAT THE REDUCTION IN SENTENCES WAS INSPIRED BY A DESIRE TO SEE MR. GREY FREED. IT IS HARD, THOUGH, TO ESCAPE THIS INTERPRETATION UNQUOTE.

3. ALTHOUGH THE FACTS ARE REPORTED MORE OR LESS ACCURATELY BY ALL, PRESENTATION IN THE QUOTE GUARDIAN UNQUOTE (PRITTIE) IS SOMEWHAT

MISLEADING. ITS HEADLINE - QUOTE BRITAIN TO FREE CHINESE UNQUOTE IS FIRST GLOSSED BY : QUOTE BRITAIN HAS ANNOUNCED THE IMPENDING

RELEASE OF ALL CHINESE JOURNALISTS IMPRISONED IN HONG KONG UNQUOTE. HOWEVER, REPORT PROCEEDS TO SAY THAT THERE IS QUOTE NOTHING DRAMATIC UNQUOTE ABOUT THE ANNOUNCEMENT AS TEN OF THE NEWSWORKERS

WERE IN ANY CASE DUE FOR RELEASE IN THE AUTUMN.

RESTRICTED

/4. THE

RESTRICTED

- 2 -

4. THE QUOTE TIMES UNQUOTE INCLUDES FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH 1

THE ANNOUNCEMENT CAME AS A SURPRISE. OFFICIALS HAVE CONSISTENTLY RULED OUT ANY MOVE OF THIS SORT BEFORE PEKING HAD GIVEN SOME CLEAR INDICATION THAT IT WOULD RECIPROCATE. THE DECISION HAS STARTED FRESH SPECULATION THAT THE AUTHORITIES MAY HAVE BEEN HOLDING PRIVATE TALKS WITH COMMUNIST REPRESENTATIVES OR THAT THE BRITISH MISSION IN PEKING HAS AT LAST HAD SOME RESPONSE TO ITS REPEATED REPRESENTATIONS

ON MR. GREY'S BEHALF.

5. REACTIONS OF MRS. GREY, WHO WILL BE WITH A DELEGATION DUE TO I SEE MR. FOLEY ON MONDAY 12 MAY (IN ORDER TO PRESENT A PETITION,

SIGNED BY 53 OF MR. GREY'S RELATIVES, ASKING FOR THE RELEASE OF THE NEWSWORKERS) ARE VARIOUSLY REPORTED OF THE NEWS THAT HER SON MIGHT

BE FREED SOON :

QUOTE I SHALL BELIEVE IT WHEN I SEE HIM, MY HOPES HAVE BEEN RAISED

SO MANY TIMES IN THE PAST. THEY SAID HE WOULD BE RELEASED AT CHRISTMAS AND HE WAS NOT UNQUOTE (QUOTE THE TIMES UNQUOTE).

QUOTE IT SOUNDS HOPEFUL, BUT THERE IS ALWAYS THE NAGGING WORRY THAT THEY MIGHT NOT RELEASE HIM AND WANT SOMETHING MORE UNQUOTE (QUOTE DAILY EXPRESS UNQUOTE).

STEWART

FILES

FAR EASTERN DEPT.

HONG KONG DEPT..

NEWS DEPT.

FFFFF

RESTRICTED

Registry No.

DEPARTMENT

FED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top-Saccat

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Restricted

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PRIORITY MARKINGS (Date)

Flash Immediate

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Date and time (G.M.T.)elegram

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PETARIE AND M

PRIVACY MARKING

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En Clair. Code Cypher

Draft Telegram to:-

PEKING

No.

(Date)

And to:-

[Secu

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[ Privacy marking

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[Codeword-if any]

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PL-10 ~~~ ------------'ILLONILI ■ Than 'I pl. ------------ PIRLOTTELIJ

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British Press Coverage of news of sentence reductions in Hay Kay

WONG CHAK

SIITTIME

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Coverage in tring's press is as restrains? as could be resourally expected, although testleres emphasise: "Grey; new hope of release" ("F mancial Times"). All reports carry official serid of any connection between the Review Fos doard's recommendations and the Grey case. All

છે pick out Wong Chake; and most drow their own conclusims that The news "could make it easier for Peking to rebent grey in the free' antare ("Guardian") as "All nine (sic) will be free by the autumn and China will find it difficult to justity Mc Gray's untinue? detection after that time." ("The Times").

set ME

2. Only the "Sun" (Leapman) is particularly painted: "The British F reign office were at paired yesterday to deny that the reduction in sentences was inspired by a desire to see M= grey freed. It is hard, though, to excope this interpretation."

reported Although the facts are wart i lass accurately by all, presentation in the " guardian" (Prittie) is somewhat misleading. it's theadline - "Britain to free Chinese " - is first glossed by: "Britain was announced the imperting release of all chinese

LOVER

journalists in prismat in Hong Kong." However, report proceeds to say that there is "nothing dramatic" about the announcement as ten of the news workers were in my case due for release in The autumn.

4. The Time

holes following paragraph!

The announcement came M surprise. Cher's have conse

roled mut sm

sort before Peking had given some clear indication that it would reciprocate. The decision has started fresh speculation that the authonties may have been hold- ing private talks with communist representatives or that the British mission in Peking has at last had

Mr.

5. Reactions of Mt Gray, who with be with the delegation Ove

to see Mo Foley on Monday 12 Mays, are varinoly reported:

of the news that her son might be freat som: "I still be there it when I see # heim. My hopes have been raised to many waing times in the past. They said he would be relaxed at Christmas and the was not." ("The Times")

It sounds hopeful, but there is always the nagging

that they might not relase him and want Something more." ("Daily Expres")

wany

* (in orter to present a petition, signal by 53 of Mr Gray's

relatives, asking to the lease of the news wate4,5)

Files Distr

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(USIM) D4.392077 300m 10/49

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CONFIDENTIAL

Lood Shephard (away)

Si 7. John's

Mr. Noreton

Mr. Anthony Grey of Reutera

PROELEM

FEC

My submission of 28 March drew attention to two recent

developments: the failure of our offer to the Chinese to

release to China for the remainder of their sentences the

eleven convicted newsworkers in return for the release of

Mr. Grey; and the review procedure whereby the sentence of

the eleventh newsworker, Wong Chak, is likely to be shortened,

with the result that it should become public knowledge in the

course of May that all eleven newsworkers should be out of

prison in September.

confronting us was:

I concluded that the choice in practice

(a) to bring the Governor of Hong Kong to agree now

to the immediate release of all eleven newaworkers

in return for appropriate assurances that this would

result in the release of Mr. Grey; Or

(b) to let matters take their course in Hong Kong with

the reasonable expectation that Mr. Grey would be

out in September, but almost certainly not before.

And I argued in favour of the latter.

2. In a conversation with the Secretary of State on 1 April,

Mr. Long, the General Manager of Reuters, while grateful for

the prospect that the affuir would be settled in September,

asked whether the date of release of the eleven might not be

advanced somewhat in order to shorten Mr. Grey's ordeal.

Secretary of State undertook to consider this.

The

рив

pus 1215

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

RECOMMENDATION

3. I recommend that I be authorised to inform Mr. Long

that for the present we think that we must continue to stand

firm in Hong Kong; but we fully sympathise with his desire

to shorten Mr. Grey's ordeal, and if nearer September it seems

that the prisoners could be prematurely released in Hong Kong,

without serious consequences for Hong Kong in the short or

long term, we shall certainly consider this.

ARGUMENT

4. We have hitherto seen three dangers in the premature

release of convicted prisoners in Hong Kong:-

(a) We believe that it would damage public confidence

in the Colony. It might also be interpreted by

the Communists as the'kow tow'which the Chinese

have been seeking. We should thus be tacitly

acknowledging their ability to influence events in

the Colony at their whim. Mr. Long has argued

that the release of the newsworkers could equally be

presented as an act of strength demonstrating that

the Governor, successful in his "confrontation"

policy, had sufficient confidence in the security

situation to regard the risks of release as negligible.

But it is not so much the immediate security situation

that concerns the Governor as long-term confidence.

Any action which might lead the inhabitants of Hong

Kong to conclude that we have lost our nerve could

quickly be disastrous, We cannot afford to

CONFIDENTIAL

miscalculate, and must give due weight to the arguments

of the Governor who is better placed that we are to

make a judgment.

(b) By providing a precedent of willingness to disregard

the courts in a flagrant manner and for a political

purpose, it would impair the future credibility of

the sanction of imprisonment.

Admittedly there is

a time element in this since a brief curtailment of

imprisonment might not be very damaging in this respect.

tactics in future to the detriment of other British

subjects in China. Mr. Long has argued that if the

Chinese decide in future to take hostages they will

whatever we do in this particular case. There

But the Grey case

do so,

is some force in this argument.

is specially important in that it is the first, as

far as I am aware, in which the Chinese have acknow-

ledged the taking of a hostage;

in other cases

where they have imprisoned foreigners, effectively

us hostages, it has always allegedly been for some

personal misdemeanour.

I remain therefore of the view that the immediate release in

Hong Kong of all eleven newsworkers

particularly when we have

not only been pressed openly by the Chinese to do this, but

have recently made clear to them that this course would be quite

unacceptable to us would be highly damaging.

I do not underestimate the difficulties of letting matters

CONFIDENTIAL

take their course in Hong Kong until September:

(a) The effects on Mr. Grey's health of this prolongation

of his ordeal.

Present indications are that he

should be able to bear the strains until September.

But this is a matter which we must keep under constant

review, on the meagre evidence available to us.

(b) Possible difficulties with parlamentary and public

opinion in this country. I think, however, that we

should find that public opinion here is by no means

unanimously in favour of concessions to the Chinese.

We have so far refrained from using to the full the

strong arguments for refusing to pay ransom in Hong

Kong, lest this would stimulate indignation against

the Chinese and lead to increased pressure for

unhelpful measures against them in this country

pressures which Mr. Long explained to the Secretary

of State he had had to cope with in Fleet Street,

It is difficult to predict how public opinion might

move in coming weeks. Once it becomes public know-

ledge in May that all eleven newsworkers are due to

be released in mid-September, it may become progressively

easier to hold the situation as we approach that date.

to make what they would regard as any significant

gesture towards them over the Grey case. Mr. Cradock

has in the past argued from Peking that if we simply

let the eleven newsworkers out in September the Chinese

CONFIDENTIAL

will not regard this as any concession on our part,

and that we should have thus lost the opportunity

of giving the Chinese the relatively harmless

"victory" which they may regard as a pre-requisite

for their acceptance of a modus vivendi in Hong

Kong. However, our experience of the Chinese

suggests that they will not be at a loss to present

the release of the eleven, whenever it comes, 36 a

victory. They will have prevailed to the extent of

having held on to Mr. Grey until we have stopped

"the persecution of patriotic newsworkers in Hong

Kong".

We have re-examined the possibility of an intermediate

position, i.e. commuting the sentences of the newsworkers

only a short time before their normal release date, say in

mid-July. Such a course would have this in its favour:

(a) It should shorten Mr. Grey's ordeal by about two

months.

(b) It would be a very mild"kow tow" towards the Chinese

of the kind for which Mr. Cradock argued (paragraph

5(c) above) and would be a further demonstration

of our flexibility in trying to reach an accommo-

dation with them;

on our part towards Mr. Grey at a time when, on

the eve of the recess, Parliament will be taking

particular interest.

CONFIDENTIAL

(a) In that we should be insisting on the prisoners

serving all but two months of their normal

sentences with remission, we could fairly easily

rebut charges of flabbiness in the face of Chinese

pressure.

There are, however, strong arguments against it:- (a) Since we have taken a firm stand in Hong Kong on

(b)

the principle of non-interference with the judicial processes, it might be undesirable to compromise that principle simply to settle the Grey affair

two months earlier.

So far from seeing our act as a gesture of compromise the Chinese might take it simply as proof that we were in the final instance susceptible to pressure and

that by hanging on to Mr. Grey beyond September, they might bring us to further concessions in the

I do not matter of other convicted prisoners.

think this risk is great, but regard it as by no

means negligible.

by critics here and in Hong Kong about any measures

we had taken to ensure that our gesture would in

fact result in the release of Mr. Grey.

(a)

We should have to contend with tiresome criticism

as indeed we could along the lines that if a

gesture of clemency were possible in July, why

could we not have spared Mr. Grey suffering by

making the gesture in January.

CONFIDENTIAL

I do not

These disadvantages of the intermediate course seem to

me to outweigh the advantages. As things stand now, I continue to hold the view (reluctantly from the humane aspect) that to

let matters take their course in Hong Kong until September

would now be the wisest way of coping with the Grey affair,

taking broad account of both our short and long-term interests. I think, however, that were circumstances to change (e.g. a

marked deterioration in Mr. Grey's health and increasing anxiety by the public here) we should be ready to consider the

however, intermediate position discussed above.

consider that we should consult the Governor at this stage:

we could hardly expect him to give us a firm commitment for July, and we would be handicapped if he took up a position of

rigid opposition at the outset. (Moreover, our pincipal

concern with him at present is that he should as quickly as possible complete the review procedure covering Wong Chak.) It is, however, important that we should continue to convince

Mr. Long that we share his anxiety to terminate Mr. Grey's

ordeal at the earliest feasible date. I suggest therefore

that our views be put to him in the terms of the Recommendation

at paragraph 3 above. From such conversation as I had with him

after his meeting with the Secretary of State, I think that he

would probably accept this.

Janu

Zennay.

(James Murray) 3 April, 1969

Copies to:- Kr. Godden

Mr. Baker

Sir A.Galaworthy Sir J.Johnston Mr. Carter

CONFIDENTIAL

- 7 -

19.

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thats

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at present.

Ehwal

3/4.

Baton

3/4

SEORET

Private Secretary to Secretary of State

On the understanding that the review referred

to in paragraph 6 of the submission is now under way

and that prisoners to be released under the review

will be informed of the decision before the end of

May (Mr. D. Murray has confirmed that this understanding

is correct), Lord Shepherd agrees with the recommendation.

(C. H. Godden) 1 April. 1969.

DECRET

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Fac isill

Leaks

223

SECRET

COVERING TOP SECRET

Minister of State

In view of the time factor Sir John Johnston has asked

me to send this direct to you. Both he and I agree with the

In support of it there are the additional

recommendation.

argumenta:

(1) We have only recently re-affirmed, in the current

probe, that we could not agree to the release of the

news workers in Hong Kong; if we were now to do so it would thus be even more damaging.

(ii) The eleven news workers probably represent the last

stage in the battle of wills following confrontation. It seems most unlikely that once they have been cleared out of the way (by September) the Chinese would then campaign for the release of the remaining

confrontation prisoners in whom they have so far shown

almost no interest.

SECRET

COVERING TOP SECRET

(J. 0. Koreton) 31 Harch 1969.

[add]

palasings

On the

SECRET

w.Golden.

minute

Nr. Moreton

UR. ANTHONY GREY OF REUTERS

1224

Flag A

PROBLEM

FEL well

My submission of 28 February envisaged a review of

the problen of Mr. Grey in the latter part of this month. Ir the meantime we have made no progress towards his

release.

An offer to the Chinese through covert channels

in Hong Kong to release to China for the remainder of their

sentences the eleven convicted news workers whom the Chinese

have linked with Mr. Grey, has not been taken up. We must

assume therefore that the Chinese intend to keep Mr. Grey until the news workers have been released in Hong Kong. Barring unforseen circumstances, all eleven should now be

out of prison by mid-September. The alternatives at

present before us are:

(a)

to ask the Governor of Hong Kong to arrange the

immediate release in Hong Kong of the eleven news

workers; or

(b)

to let matters take their course in Hong Kong with

the reasonably confident expectation that Mr. Grey

will be let out shortly after the release of the

news workers in September, but almost certainly

not before.

RECOMMENDATION

I recommend alternative (b). Hong Kong Department

concur.

/ BACKGROUND

SECRET

BACKGROUND

3. On 28 December the New China News Agency in Peking

published a report openly linking Mr. Grey with the

communist news workers (then thirteen, now eleven) serving

prison sentences in Hong Kong. The report said that

'since the Hong Kong British authorities continue to keep

the thirteen patriotic Chinese journalists in jail, the

Chinese Government is fully justified in continuing to

restrict Mr. Grey's freedom of movement", Shortly there-

after the Chinese resumed their covert contacts with the

Hong Kong Government about Mr. Grey, describing the N.C.N.A.

statement as "the proposed swap for Grey" and indicating

that they expected a reply to their "proposal".

here concluded that the release of the news workers in Hong

Kong itself raised such difficulties as to be highly

undesirable.

Ministers

However it was decided that we should,

through the covert channel, repeat an earlier offer to the

effect that we would be ready to release the news workers

to China for the remainder of their sentences in return

for Hr. Grey.

4. Our offer has been discussed by Mr. Cater, the Hong

Kong representative, with his Chinese contact in a series

of meetings beginning on 27 January. In messages which

the contact has said he was relaying from Peking, the

Chinese have insisted on release in Hong Kong. We have

had a virtual admission that they would be unable to

persuade the news workers to return voluntarily to the

/mainland.

- 2 -

SECRET

mainland. We have modified our original proposal to the

extent of offering release in Macao, Mr. Cater, however,

has kept insisting that release in Hong Kong itself is

out of the question, in the hope that if we could convince

the Chinese of our determination on this point, they might

retreat from their intransigence. But to no avail; and

I think that we must now conclude that our offer has been

rejected.

Aspects of the covert discussions are, however,

relevant to our future decisions.

In a message supposed

to emanate from Chou En-lai the Chinese offered, in return

for a settlement of the Grey case, unspecified improvements

in Sino-British relations extending both to other British

subjects in China and to trade.

Balancing the benefits,

another message contained a veiled threat: if it was our

intention to release the ten of the news workers in due

course in September and then try to trade Mr. Grey for the

eleventh, these tactics would not work.

ARGUMENT

6. If we conclude that our offer has been rejected, we

must now proceed on the basis that the Chinese intend to

hold on to Mr. Grey until all eleven news workers have

been released. Ten of them are due for release with

remission next September. The eleventh, Wong Chak,

(sentenced to five years imprisonment in September 1967)

is not due out with full remission until February 1971.

But the Governor has now agreed to set in motion an exercise

/designed

- 3 -

SECRET

designed to ensure his release by September of this year

without appearing to bend the law in a flagrant manner.

Essentially he plans to review all the cases of prisoners

sentenced to terms longer than four years. All being

well, this should result in a reduction of Wong Chak's

sentence, though it may be some weeks before this can be

made public knowledge. We are, however, justified in

proceeding on the assumption that all eleven news workers

will now be out by mid-September.

We accept that the immediate release of all the news

workers would almost certainly result in the release of

Mr. Grey. Will this still be the case in September?

might be argued that they are a declining asset; that

their value to the Chinese diminishes as September approaches;

and that their release then would therefore be regarded by

the Chinese as of practically no value. However, our

experience of the Chinese suggests that they will not be

at a loss to present the release of the eleven, whenever

it comes, as a "victory".

extent of having held on to Mr. Grey until we have "stopped

the persecution of patriotic news workers in Hong Kong".

While there has been some variation over numbers the Chinese

have always justified their detention of Mr. Grey exclusively

in the context of the treatment of their news workers in

Hong Kong. We think it unlikely that they would start,

after the release of the news workers, to hold him against

a wholly different category of prisoner.

They will have prevailed to the

- 4-

SECRET

18.

SECRET

8. I conclude therefore that the choice in practice

confronting us is:

(a) to bring the Governor to agree now to the immediate

release of all eleven news workers in Hong Kong in

return for appropriate assurances that this will

result in the release of Mr. Grey; or

(b) to let matters take their course in Hong Kong with

the reasonable expectation that Kr. Grey will be

out in September.

The dangers of the first course are clear. The

Governor has throughout opposed the premature release of

convicted prisoners in Hong Kong, We agree with him that

such a move would damage public confidence in the Colony;

would be interpreted by the communists as an indication

that we lacked firmness; and, by providing a precedent

of willingness to disregard the courts in a flagrant manner

and for a political purpose, impair the future credibility

of the sanction of imprisonment. The likely encouragement

to the Chinese to adopt a similar policy again, if they now

succeed, must also be taken into account.

10. The difficulties in the way of the second course are

also formidable:

(a) Will Mr. Grey's health stand up to this prolong-

ation of his ordeal? This is a point we continue

to watch very carefully. Though his conditions

of detention remain highly unpleasant, there has

been a slight improvement recently to the extent

/that

- 5-

SECRET

that he is now allowed upstairs to his books.

Careful medical examination by Chinese doctors

in December appears to have relieved his mind

about his physical health; and his recent

letters to his mother, while critical of H.K.G.,

have been relatively cheerful and extremely

balanced.

(b) Can we convince Parliament and the public that

our refusal to accept what is now generally

believed to be the Chinese price is justified?

Much must depend on Reuters. Mr. Long, the

General Manager, while fully sympathetic to our

difficulties in Hong Kong, has been pressing us

privately for the immediate release of the news

workers. But he has said that Reuters would not

wish to embarrase us by taking up this position

publicly. It is difficult to predict how public

opinion might move in coming weeks.

As we

approach September it should be easier to hold

the situation

provided that there is a reasonable

expectation that the affair will be settled by

September at the latest. (For this reason the

sooner the judicial process referred to in

paragraph 6 above is completed and it becomes

public knowledge that all eleven news workers will

be coming out in September, the better). Meantime

we are not without ammunition to meet public

/criticism.

- 6 -

SECRET

11.

criticism.

For tactical reasons we have not

wished to stimulate indignation against the

Chinese lest this would lead to increased

pressure for unhelpful measures against them in

this country. We have therefore refrained from

using to the full the strong arguments for refusing

to pay ransom in Hong Kong. We have, however, a

good case and could deploy it if necessary. More-

over, if need arose, we could make public the

continuing refusal of the Chinese to entertain

the idea of a reasonable solution through deport-

ation of the news workers to China.

be likely to result in a hardening in their policies

towards Hong Kong? We do not know what precisely

is happening among the top leadership in Peking.

There are some indications of serious policy

differences.

However, since the beginning of

1968, even at moments of extreme internal agitation,

there has been no indication that the leaders were

prepared again to jeopardise their chances of

recovering their following in Hong Kong or, more

important, their large foreign exchange earnings

from the Colony by further radical initiatives.

We do not suppose that they would take such a risk

now.

Despite the difficulties therefore, my conclusion is

/that we

- 7 -

SECRET

that we can probably hold the position until September.

If this is so, what we have to decide is whether the

risks of the premature release of the eleven news workers

in Hong Kong continue to outweigh the advantages of an

immediate settlement of the Grey affair. It may be felt

that the argument has laid undue stress on the factor of

public confidence in Hong Kong. It is always difficult

to pronounce with certainly on the likely effect of any

particular action in Hong Kong. Nevertheless we must

leave ourselves a margin of error since any action which might

lead the inhabitants of Hong Kong to conclude that we have

lost our nerve could very quickly become disastrous.

Admittedly there would be much to be said for taking risks

in Hong Kong and indeed for swallowing a lot of our pride

if we could really settle all outstanding cases of British

subjects not only Mr. Grey. But the prospects of this

are remote. There is little to indicate that the remaining

British subjects are being held as hostages. They, like

the majority of other foreigners in trouble in China, are

held for a variety of alleged misdemeanours on their part.

Their cases would only be resolved slowly and with difficulty.

If we were to try to extend negotiations for the release of

Mr. Grey into a comprehensive bargain covering other British

subjects as well, I am sure that this would not help the

latter and would impede any progress over Fr. Grey. (This

is not to rule out the possibility that the solution of the

Grey problem might lead to some slight improvement in the

/atmosphere

- 8 -

SECRET

atmosphere of Sino-British relations, which could in the

longer term enhance the chances of other British subjects;

but we should not expect any early results). Thus the

only immediate dividend we can expect from the release of

the news workers is the release of Mr. Grey; and,

important though it undoubtedly is on humanitarian grounds

to terminate his ordeal as soon as possible, this does not

seem to me to justify our pressing the Governor to take

what he regards as an unacceptable risk in Hong Kong.

Copies to:

Kr. Godden

Mr. Baker

Sir A. Galsworthy

Sir J. Johnston

Mr. Carter

Jan May

James Murray

28 March, 1969

− 9 -

SECRET

In view

RESTRICTED

рут

$220,

Far Eastern Department,

( 13 C/1)

6 May, 1969.

B.B.C. and Grey

Please refer to Arthur Maddocks' letter of 20 March to Colin Wilson about the Berger broadcast. For the record you will want to know that we did speak, energetically, to the B.B.C. on 27 March.

(J. D. I. Boyd)

R. J. T. McLaren, Esq.,

HOW KONG.

RESTRICTED

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

་་

WEL 51-7406

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from for

RJT Mc Laren Esq

Home Kms

BBC and Grey.

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celûr of

! 20 March to Colin

Wilson: about

The Berger

broadcast. For in read you

will want to know

that

we did speak, energetically,

15 The BBC

on 27 March. A

6/5

Private & Confidential

The Rt Hon Michael Stewart CH MP Secretary of State for Foreign and

Commonwealth Affairs

Foreign and Commonwealth Office London SW1

REUTERS

29 April 1969

Extere pe retum

6s 3014

FEDENN FE Dent for diff. reply from 5/state Ase.

Dear Mr Stewart

FEC 130|1

When you received me on April 1 you encouraged me by saying that you wished to give consideration to the idea that the Chinese newspaper workers imprisoned in Hong Kong should be released in an attempt to free Anthony Grey.

I write to inquire whether you have come to any conclusion on this point.

I have, since seeing you, become more than ever convinced that the Chinese in Hong Kong must be released before September if Grey is to be helped. It seems likely that the Chinese wish for some gesture. To release the prisoners at the end of their sentence will not be a gesture and I doubt if the small concession you suggested might be made in September would be sufficient.

No doubt you saw a report in yesterday's Daily Telegraph suggesting that the defection of a number of Chinese to Hong Kong last Saturday could affect Mr Grey's situation. I think that such speculation is unfortunate but it nevertheless remains that the longer Mr Grey is held the greater is the danger of incidents producing fresh Chinese demands and fresh pretexts for continuing to hold Mr Grey, I believe that there is urgency in moving to bring about Mr Grey's release and I ask you once again to persuade the Governor of Hong Kong to release the imprisoned Chinese.

Yours sincerely

Casts Log

Gerald Long General Manager Reuters Limited 85 Fleet Street London EC4 Telephone Fleet Street 6060

From the Editor-in-Chief

RI EVO IN

James Murray Esq CMG

218

REUTERS

24 April 1969

497

Head, Far Eastern Department

Foreign and Commonweal uppgice

London SW 1

Dear Mr Murray

FEC 13/1

Ms Boy

MM 20 Mure

Grein

Many thanks for your letter of April 21 about Mr Lan. I do not suppose that there is much to be made out of his suggestions.

Mr Long is travelling in the United States at present but when he gets back I have no doubt that he will be in touch with you to see whether there is any further news since his talk with Mr Stewart on April 1.

Yours sincerely

вый нолой

ہیں

Brian Horton Reuters Limited 85 Fleet Street London EC4 Telephone 01-353 6080

りょ

CYPHER/CAT A

FROM ROUTINE HONG KONG

TELEGRAM NUMBER 325

SECRET

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

APRIL 25/1969

RECEIVED IN

R*..

palo 5/5

Ke 130

207

ADDRESSED FCO TELEGRAM 325 OF 25 APRIL RFI PEKING.

PERSONAL FOR GALSWORTHY,

MY TELEGRAM 232: GREY.

4428

YOU WILL BE GLAD TO KNOW THAT THIS EXERCISE IS PROCEEDING SATIS- FACTORILY SO FAR AND COMMITTEE YESTERDAY RECOMMENDED REDUCTION OF WONG CHAK'S SENTENCE TO 3 YEARS, 1.E. ENABLING HIM TO BE RELEASED ON 4TH OCTOBER WITH REMISSION. REDUCTIONS FOR ABOUT A DOZEN OTHERS

WERE ALSO I UNDERSTAND RECOMMENDED.

2. I AM NOW URGENTLY CONSIDERING DETAILS OF HOW TO PROCEED ON MATTERS COVERED IN PARAGRAPHS 6 - 9 OF MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE AND INTENTIONS WILL BE CONVEYED TO YOU AS SOON AS THEY ARE FULLY WORKED

OUT. THIS IS A QUICK PROGRESS REPORT ONLY.

FCO PLEASE PASS ROUTINE TO PEKING.

SIR D. TRENCH

FILES

F.E.D.

H.K. DEPT.

SIR J. JOHNSTON

MR. MORETON

SIR A. GALSWORTHY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

SECRET

0 130/1

216

Enteropa

ko22/4

21 April, 1969.

I now have the information about Mr. Lan, a letter from whom you attached to your letter of 19 March.

2.64

It appears that he has been in the habit of corresponding with prominent publie figures and Government officials on a wide range of matters in which he feels he can sake a contribution. In Hong Kong he has claimed to have special relations with local Communiste which would make him useful as an intermediary. However, on past occasions when he has made upscific suggestions about matters in Hong Kong it has been evident that his local contuota were perhaps not as close as he makes out.

The points which he makes in his latter of 14 Karch to Gerald Long about a general settlement echo a major theme of Communist propaganda in Hong Kong. For the present we have no indication that an acceptable settlement could be achieved using the channels suggested by Mr. Lan and be would certainly not be a reliable intermediary with local Cornuists.

On the case of Tony Grey we have nothing new to report to you since the Foreign and Commonwealth secretary's talk with Gerald Long on 1 April.

(Janes Murray)

par

Head, Far Eastern Department

Brian Horton, Esq.,

Editor-in-Chief,

RETERS LTD.,

85 Fleet Street,

LONDON, F.C.A.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret

Secret,

Confidential.

Restricted Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

DRAFT Letter

To:-

Brian Horton, Esq.,

Editor-in-Chief, Reuters Ltd.,

85 Fleet Street,

London, K.C.4.

Type 1 +

From

James Murray

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

On the call,

of Tony Svang

I, now have the information about Mr. La

altuations to yhan

letter from shema

you asked for in your letter of 19 March.

which

£. It appears that he has been in the habit of

corresponding on a wide range of matters in which he

feels he can make a contribution/with prominent public

figures and Government officials, In Hong Kong/he

claimed to have special relations with local Communists

which would make him useful as an intermediary,

However, on past occasions when he has made/suggestions

about matters in Hong Kong it has been evident that his

core portabas

local contacts are not as close as he makes out.

2. The points which he makes in his letter of 14

Cavalot Long

March to Mo.-karig about a general settlement echo a

major theme of Communist propaganda in Hong Kong. At

present

the moment we have no indication that an acceptable

settlement could be achieved using the channels

suggested by Mr. Lad and he would certainly not be a

reliable intermediary with local Communists,

As you will forms from cartier discanime which we have heat the only concesions on our part which would be likely to help Toy Grey would be the premature release of the news water. This world undoubted by remain in any more general arrangement. It would be nly by further major concesions, at present unacceptable, a on "Confrontatiom' hammers wale prismes in Hay Kang, that

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Mr.

I attach a draft reply from you to Horton's letter of 19 March.

2. The relevant information about M2 Lan is contained in 11=

Fly B (609) Slavin's Memorandum of 22 June, 1968

Fains. Our

(I. C. Orr) 18 Apr. '69

The que

C.S. 4C

2600079

30.000-1/67-B52117

No.

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CONFIDENTIAL

423

Entrapano 2014

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT,

LOWER ALBERT ROAD,

HONG KONG.

3 April, 1969.

Dear Jones 134/11

Thank you for your letter

HWB 3/2 of 25 March about Mr. D. R. Lan. I think the enclosed copy of a

memorandum of 3 July 1968 from Special Branch tells you all you want to know about him. It is plain that he has no particular insight into communist policy and need not be taken seriously.

You

ove

Athe

(A.F. Maddocks)

пред For chaft reply now

Io Haton's letter of 14 Real

James Murray, Esq., CMG, Far Eastern Department,

Foreign & Commonwealth Office,

LONDON, S.W.1.

Encl.

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CONFIDENTIAL

to M. Harten

Reply to M.

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CONFIDENTIADENTIAL

From

Commissioner of Police (D.S.B.)

Ref. (18) in GEN/PC/1029

Tel. No.

Date

234011 Ext. 291

3rd July, 1968.

MEMO

To....

Defence Secretary

(Attention: P.B, Williams, Esq.,)

Your Ref. (64)

doted

L'I

......

CR 17/3371/67

22nd June, 1968.

L'II

KR. D.R. LAN

This gentleman has for some years been in the habit of corresponding with both prominent public figures and Government officials on matters of interest in which he feels he can make a contribution. These range from letters to President Lyndon Johnson and other U.S. officials suggesting solutions to the Kashmir, Vietnam and China problems, to letters to police in Hong Kong 'on how to solve the riots and bomb planting incidents in Hong Kong.

Kr. Lan contacted Kr. Bernacchi in late 1967 in an effort to interest him in his proposals for a settlement of confrontation in Hong Kong. As a result, Mr. Bernacchi contacted Special Branch

After in March 1968 seeking advice on how to deal with Mr. Lan, consultation with the Folitical Adviser, it was tactfully suggested to Mr. Barnacchi that he advise Fr. Lan to forward his proposala

Memoranda reference GEN/PC/1029 of 12th March, direct to Government.

1968 and SCR.15/67 of 21st March, 1968, refer.

This Mr. Lan has apparently done and, having returned to tell Kr. Bernacchi about it, the latter is now repeating the

Yr. Lan apparently feals information to the Colonial Secretary, strongly that a delegation of leading Kaifong and Chinese Manufacters Association sent to Canton with the tacit approval of the Hong Kong Government would be able to negotiate with the mainland communists a settlement of the confrontation by offering the release of prisoners

He is confident of being able to arrange and other concessions.

for this delegation to visit Canton through his personal contacts with Hong Kong Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee member.. consider that Kr. Ian's connections with the local communiste are not as close as he would have us believe and I have absolutely no indication that any attempt to use him as any form of intermediary would meet with any encouragement from the Chinese authorities. is worth recalling that . Lan made a similar proposal to the Waterworks Department to solve the water supply crisis in July, 1967, offering, to arrange unlimited supplies of water from China, and although two Watercorks officials (and a police officer from Special Branch) gave him the opportunity to outline his proposals in detail

He was reluctant at a meeting, he was very vague in his suggestions. also to specify what contact he had with the APSC although he did mention the names of two ordinary zombers, neither of whom are very

The meeting ended prominent communists, whom he claimed he knew. inconclusively and those attending it were of the opinion that Mr. Lan was no more than a sincere but ineffective well-wisher,

GISTRY

/4....

AFE CA

A. 2180

6.7.68

AWARDS

LETTU

CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Page 2.

While Mr. Lan's points regarding release of prisoners

and reinstatement concur with the current major themen of communist propagande, I feel that there is little point in allowing the correspondence to develop further and Mr. Lan should not be given the slightest encouragement from Government.

(B.F. Slevin)

Director of Special Branch

for Commissioner of Police

0.0. Political Adviser (Ref. (6) in SCB.15/67) ||

GAB/mbi

CONFIDENTIAL

ᅥ

(P30 130/1)

Far Eastern Department,

21 April, 1969.

Please refer to my letter of 26 March in which I suggested that you might like to meet Mr. Garside, the officer in Peking who deals with consular massa and who is now on leave, to discuss the detention of Mr. Anthony Grey. I understand from Mr. James Murray that the afternoon of either 30 April or 1 May would be convenient to you and have accordingly arranged your appointment for 4.30 p.m. on Wednesday, 30 April.

I shall be grateful if when you come to the Main Entrance of the Foreign Office off Downing Street you will ask to see me rather than Nr. Garside as he of course has no permanent office in London.

Miss 8. McGuinn,

57 York Street,

London, .1.

(E. J. Sherland)

gla

FEC130/1

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Far Eastern Department,

10 April, 1969.

212

I enclose a number of press cuttings about another canard by Krs. Grey. I am afraid that she has become an easy pray for any journalist looking for a story,

2. As far as we are aware, there is no real evidence to support Ers. Oray's assumption that the Chinese have held up her letters to Grey. According to Reuters, who spoke to her about her statement to the press, hạr deductions were based on a message to her enclosed with Gray's latest letter to Minn KoĢuinn, This letter, dated ↳ March, arrived towards the end of the month. In this note to his mother, Grey asked whether she had received his January letter. was the letter which caused us some trouble. concluded that because Grey has not received her reply to his January letter that the Chinese must therefore be holding up her mail. However, Reuters understand that Hrs, Gray's reply

If this was the case, it was not despatched until mid-February.

This you remember Mrs. Grey has

is unlikely that Grey would have received it before he wrote his tter to Miss McGuinn at the beginning of March, Reuters also cemented that they feel that Mrs. Grey has a tendency to exaggerate the number of lettere she writes.

3. Reuters telephoned the Managing ditor of the "Sketch", which was responsible for the report in the first instance, to warn them to treat Hre. Grey's statement with some caution. Unfortunately the story was already out and as you can see vas

Heuters have erches tra ted by the rest of the British press. again spoken fairly firuly to Mrs. Gray about giving interviews of this kind but I fear that it is not likely to have much effect. I am sending a copy of my letter to Arthur Maddocks in Hong Kong.

7. B. Densen, Esq., OBE,

FKING.

(C. Wilson)

RESTRICTED

Mr. Baker

Bayer

SECRET

2012

100 1014 pa

Flag A

Flag B

Mr. Anthony Grey of Reuters

I attach a copy of my submission of 28 March about future

action in the matter of Mr. Grey. In paragraph 11 I have tried

to take account of the P.U.S.'s minute on my earlier submission

of 10 March that we ought to be prepared to swallow a lot of our

pride if we could really get a liquidation of all the outstanding

cases notably Mr. Grey. But you may find it helpful if I

develop the argument at greater length.

2. I emphatically agree that if we could secure the release

of Mr. Grey and also the other detained subjects in exchange

for the release in Hong Kong of the eleven imprisoned news

workers, we should do well to consider such a bargain carefully ·

though the Governor of Hong Kong would still expect us to take

account of the risks there. But in my view the prospects of a

bargain of this kind are very remote; and I would have the

greatest reservations about attempting to put it to the Chinese.

(a) The case of Mr. Grey and the imprisoned workers is

sui generis. Mr. Grey was detained as an act of

retaliation for the "persecution" of the Communist

press in Hong Kong. The Chinese Government presumably

hoped by his detention to prevent the Hong Kong

authorities taking further action against their

important propaganda machine in Hong Kong.

The Hong

Kong authorities were not, in the event, deterred from

so doing and the eleven newsworkers at present in prison

were all arrested and convicted after Mr. Grey was

SECRET

(b)

detained. We are virtually certain of the price

for Mr.Grey 's release. Were we prepared to

pay it, we could have him out quickly. But there

are grave objections to paying this price now

(paragraph 9 of my submission of 28 March). The

Chinese would, however, firmly reject any attempt

to introduce the other British subjects into the

equation, maintaining that the latter have all

offended against Chinese law.

The cases of the other British subjects are wholly

unlike the case of Mr. Grey. They are not simply

hostages against the good behaviour of the authorities

in Hong Kong. Few or none of the persons involved

have entirely clean slates. They can be grouped

as follows:-

(1) The Vickers-Zimmer engineer (Mr. Watt)

(11)

(iii)

already sentenced to three years imprisonment

for alleged espionage and unlikely to be

released prematurely.

A ships' officer (Mr. Crouch) arrested on

similar grounds.

A Bank Manager (Mr. Johnston) who may have

committed acts of indiscretion or who may

be held as a hostage because of a financial

dispute between the Chartered Bank and the

Bank of China in Singapore.

(iv) A group of persons who have worked for the

SECRET

Chinese propaganda machine in Peking and

who are known to have become too deeply

implicated in internal Chinese politics (the

Gordons, the Crooks, Mrs. Young, Mrs. Epstein).

(v) Two persons (Mr. Barrymaine, Captain Will)

who committed acts of folly which were bound

to bring trouble on them in the circumstances

of the Cultural Revolution.

(vi) Two British members of a group of yachtsmen

of various nationalities who sailed without

permission and against the advice of the

Hong Kong authorities through waters well

known to be claimed by the Chinese.

The Chinese are likely to solve these cases on their merits

and over a considerable period of time, We believe that the

settlement of the Grey case might improve the atmosphere of

Sino-British relations and might thereby contribute to the

swifter solution of some of these cases. But there is no

evidence of any direct link between the cases in the minds of

the Chinese authorities and I fear there is no practical

possibility of linking them with Mr. Grey in any successful

deal. If we persisted in trying to establish the link, we

should merely give the Chinese the satisfaction of having us

eat our words when in the final instance we released the eleven

newsworkers (as we shall have to do) without any commitment on their

part about British subjects in detention.

I should add that the Chinese have in recent weeks granted

SECRET

long overdue exit visaa to members of the banking communi-

ties in Shanghai (the Croziers and Mrs. Johnston) despite

the continuing problem of Mr. Grey.

Copy to Mr. Moreton

Jann May.

(JAMES MURRAY)

1 April, 1969

Thank

you

I agree that you are

име the right lines

SECRET

ZONE

v. much.

waking

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Mr Wilsay full Ms Boyd.

SECRET

Mr. Moreton

MR. ANTHONY GREY OF REUTERS

PROBLEM

Flag A

Me Bakar

paka 1614

My submission of 28 February envisaged a review of

the problem of Mr. Grey in the latter part of this month.

In the meantime we have made no progress towards his

release.

An offer to the Chinese through covert channels

in Hong Kong to release to China for the remainder of their

sentences the eleven convicted news workers whom the Chinese

have linked with Mr. Grey, has not been taken up. We must

assume therefore that the Chinese intend to keep Mr. Grey

until the news workers have been released in Hong Kong.

Barring unforseen circumstances, all eleven should now be

out of prison by mid-September. The alternatives at

present before us are:

(a) to ask the Governor of Hong Kong to arrange the

immediate release in Hong Kong of the eleven news

workers; or

(b) to let matters take their course in Hong Kong with

the reasonably confident expectation that Mr. Grey

will be let out shortly after the release of the

news workers in September, but almost certainly

not before.

RECOMMENDATION

I recommend alternative (b). Hong Kong Department

concur.

SECRET

/BACKGROUND

SECRET

BACKGROUND

3. On 28 December the New China News Agency in Peking

published a report openly linking Kr. Grey with the

communist news workers (then thirteen, now eleven) serving

prison sentences in Hong Kong. The report said that

"since the Hong Kong British authorities continue to keep

the thirteen patriotic Chinese journalists in jail, the

Chinese Government is fully justified in continuing to

restrict Mr. Grey's freedom of movement". Shortly there-

after the Chinese resumed their covert contacts with the

Hong Kong Government about Mr. Grey, describing the N.C.N.A.

statement as "the proposed swap for Grey" and indicating

that they expected a reply to their "proposal".

here concluded that the release of the news workers in Hong

Kong itself raised such difficulties as to be highly

undesirable.

Ministers

However it was decided that we should,

through the covert channel, repeat an earlier offer to the

effect that we would be ready to release the news workers

to China for the remainder of their sentences in return

for Kr. Grey.

4. Our offer has been discussed by Mr. Cater, the Hong

Kong representative, with his Chinese contact in a series

of meetings beginning on 27 January. In messages which

the contact has said he was relaying from Peking, the

Chinese have insisted on release in Hong Kong. We have

had a virtual admission that they would be unable to

persuade the news workers to return voluntarily to the

/mainland.

SEUPET

SECRET

mainland. We have modified our original proposal to the

extent of offering release in kacao. Mr. Cater, however,

has kept insisting that release in Hong Kong itself is

out of the question, in the hope that if we could convince

the Chinese of our determination on this point, they might

retreat from their intransigence. But to no avail; and

I think that we must now conclude that our offer has been

rejected.

Aspects of the covert discussions are, however,

relevant to our future decisions.

In a message supposed

to emanate from Chou En-lai the Chinese offered, in return

for a settlement of the Grey case, unspecified improvements

in Sino-British relations extending both to other British

subjects in China and to trade. Balancing the benefits,

another message contained a veiled threat: if it was our

intention to release the ten of the news workers in due

course in September and then try to trade r. Grey for the

eleventh, these tactics would not work.

ARGUNENT

6. If we conclude that our offer has been rejected, we

must now proceed on the basis that the Chinese intend to

hold on to Mr. Grey until all eleven news workers have

been released. Ten of them are due for release with

remission next September. The eleventh, Wong Chak, (sentenced to five years imprisonment in September 1967)

is not due out with full remission until February 1971.

But the Governor has now agreed to set in motion an exercise

- 3 -

ARAPET

/designed

[

SECRET

designed to ensure his release by September of this year

without appearing to bend the law in a flagrant manner.

Essentially he plans to review all the cases of prisoners

sentenced to terms longer than four years. All being

well, this should result in a reduction of Wong Chak's

sentence, though it may be some weeks before this can be

made public knowledge. We are, however, justified in

proceeding on the assumption that all eleven news workers

will now be out by mid-September.

7. We accept that the immediate release of all the news

workers would almost certainly result in the release of

Mr. Grey. Will this still be the case in September?

might be argued that they are a declining asset; that

their value to the Chinese diminishes as September approaches;

and that their release then would therefore be regarded by

the Chinese as of practically no value. However, our

experience of the Chinese suggests that they will not be

at a loss to present the release of the eleven, whenever

it comes, as a "victory". They will have prevailed to the

extent of having held on to Mr. Grey until we have "stopped

the persecution of patriotic news workers in Hong Kong".

While there has been some variation over numbers the Chinese

have always justified their detention of Mr. Grey exclusively

in the context of the treatment of their news workers in

Hong Kong

We think it unlikely that they would start,

after the release of the news workers, to hold him against

•

a wholly different category of prisoner.

- 4-

ORDET

18.

SECRET

8. I conclude therefore that the choice in practice

confronting us is:

(a) to bring the Governor to agree now to the immediate

release of all eleven news workers in Hong Kong in

(b)

return for appropriate assurances that this will

result in the release of Kr. Grey; or

to let matters take their course in Hong Kong with

the reasonable expectation that Mr. Grey will be

out in September.

9. The dangers of the first course are clear. The

Governor has throughout opposed the premature release of

convicted prisoners in Hong Kong. We agree with him that

such a move would damage public confidence in the Colony;

would be interpreted by the communists as an indication

that we lacked firmness; and, by providing a precedent

of willingness to disregard the courts in a flagrant manner

and for a political purpose, impair the future credibility

of the sanction of imprisonment. The likely encouragement to the Chinese to adopt a similar policy again, if they now

succeed, must also be taken into account.

10. The difficulties in the way of the second course are

also formidable:

(a)

Will Mr. Grey's health stand up to this prolong-

ation of his ordeal? This is a point we continue

to watch very carefully. Though his conditions

of detention remain highly unpleasant, there has

been a slight improvement recently to the extent

/that

- 5 -

SECRET

י.

[

SECRET

(b)

that he is now allowed upstairs to his books.

Careful medical examination by Chinese doctors

in December appears to have relieved his mind

about his physical health; and his recent

letters to his mother, while critical of H.M.G.,

have been relatively cheerful and extremely

balanced.

Can we convince Parliament and the public that

our refusal to accept what is now generally

believed to be the Chinese price is justified?

Much must depend on Reuters. Mr. Long, the

General Manager, while fully sympathetic to our

difficulties in Hong Kong, has been pressing us

privately for the immediate release of the news

workers. But he has said that Reuters would not

wish to embarrass us by taking up this position

publicly. It is difficult to predict how public

opinion might move in coming weeks.

As we

approach September it should be easier to hold

the situation

provided that there is a reasonable

expectation that the affair will be settled by

September at the latest. (For this reason the

sooner the judicial process referred to in paragraph 6 above is completed and it becomes.

public knowledge that all eleven news workers will

be coming out in September, the better). Meantime

we are not without ammunition to meet public

/criticism.

- 6 -

SCOSET

SECRET

criticism.

For tactical reasons we have not

wished to stimulate indignation against the

Chinese lest this would lead to increased

pressure for unhelpful measures against them in

this country. We have therefore refrained from

using to the full the strong arguments for refusing

to pay ransom in Hong Kong. We have, however, a

good case and could deploy it if necessary.

More-

over, if need arose, we could make public the

continuing refusal of the Chinese to entertain

the idea of a reasonable solution through deport-

ation of the news workers to China.

be likely to result in a hardening in their policies

towards Hong Kong? We do not know what precisely

is happening among the top leadership in Peking.

There are some indications of serious policy

differences.

However, since the beginning of

1968, even at moments of extreme internal agitation,

there has been no indication that the leaders were

prepared again to jeopardise their chances of

recovering their following in Hong Kong or, more

important, their large foreign exchange earnings

from the Colony by further radical initiatives.

We do not suppose that they would take such a risk

now.

11. Despite the difficulties therefore, my conclusion is

- 7 -

SEDARI

/that we

SECRET

that we can probably hold the position until September.

If this is so, what we have to decide is whether the

risks of the premature release of the eleven news workers

in Hong Kong continue to outweigh the advantages of an

immediate settlement of the Grey affair. It may be felt

that the argument has laid undue stress on the factor of

public confidence in Hong Kong. It is always difficult

to pronounce with certainly on the likely effect of any

particular action in Hong Kong. Nevertheless we must

leave ourselves a margin of error since any action which ghs

lead the inhabitants of Hong Kong to conclude that we have

lost our nerve could very quickly become disastrous,

Admittedly there would be much to be said for taking risks

in Hong Kong and indeed for swallowing a lot of our pride

if we could really settle all outstanding cases of British

subjects not only Mr. Grey. But the prospects of this

are remote. There is little to indicate that the remaining

British subjects are being held as hostages. They, like

the majority of other foreigners in trouble in China, are

held for a variety of alleged misdemeanours on their part.

Their cases would only be resolved slowly and with difficulty.

If we were to try to extend negotiations for the release of

Mr. Grey into a comprehensive bargain covering other British

subjects as well, I am sure that this would not help the

latter and would impede any progress over Kr. Grey. (This

is not to rule out the possibility that the solution of the

Grey problem might lead to some slight improvement in the

- 8 -

SEQUET

/atmosphere

SECRET

atmosphere of Sino-British relations, which could in the

longer term enhance the chances of other British subjects;

but we should not expect any early results). Thus the

only immediate dividend we can expect from the release of

the news workers is the release of Mr. Grey; and,

important though it undoubtedly is on humanitarian grounds

to terminate his ordeal as soon as possible, this does not

seem to me to justify our pressing the Governor to take

what he regards as an unacceptable risk in Hong Kong.

Copies to:

Mr. Godden

Kr. Baker

Sir A. Galsworthy

Sir J. Johnston

Mr. Carter

James Hurray 28 March, 1969

- 9 -

SECRET

Mr. Baker

SECRET

COVERING TOP SECRET

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DAG 17/3

Grey.

Mr. Anthony Grey of Reuters

Since we may shortly be faced with hard decisions

about Mr. Grey, the Reuters correspondent detained in Peking,

the P.U.S. may care to look at my submission of 28 February

(attached) which contains a full review of the problem.

2. At his meeting with the Secretary of State on 27 February

Lord Shepherd duly expressed his misgivings about the present

state of the case. He voiced doubt whether we could resist

the pressure of criticism which would arise in Parliament and

the Press if we failed to settle the affair soon. He

expressed the view that the eleven remaining newsworkers were

a declining esset and that their release in September might

not be regarded by the Chinese as worth the release of Grey.

Accordingly he argued in favour of the early release of all

the eleven newsworkers. The Secretary of State simply

undertook to reflect carefully on the matter and to discuss

it further in due course.

3. Since then our efforts at a bargain through covert

channels with the Chinese in Hong Kong have made no progress.

Unless there is a surprising break in events we shall shortly

have to conclude that these efforts have failed. I would

propose in any case to submit on the matter again at the

end of next week.

び

James Velmang.

(James Murray)

10 March, 1969.

SECRET

COVERING TOP SECRET

Ed (5084)

Reference

209

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208

The Rt Hon Michael Stewart CH MP Seeretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

Foreign and Commonwealth Office Downing Street

London SW1

April 1 1969

| FEC 130|1|

4017/4

Dear Mr Stewart

I am most grateful to you for having seen me again today about Mr Anthony Grey, and for your great personal interest in this matter.

I feel, I must confess for the first time, some encouragement about Mr Grey's situation, since we ean now allow ourselves the hope of seeing him released in the not too distant future.

With all good wishes.

Yours sincerely

Beads!

Gerald Long General Manager Reuters Limited 85 Fleet Street London EC4 Telephone Fleet Street 6060

Reference...

162012/5

(207

Aumany Suery

Since we spoke I have had further thoughts.

I think it most important that we should avoid giving the impression that we are warning the BBC off Borger - or anyone else just because we don't like his politics. It is simply that on this subject Borger (an active member of The Society for Anglo-Chinese Understanding) is bound to be hopelessly parti-pris; and it is folly, and makes life harder for us, when the BBC present him as an independent consultant.

3. Having looked again at the script I must repeat that it is grossly misleading; 1.0. we object not just to the choice of man but also to the fact that his views want unchallenged. I would hope that you could also make that point.

In detail the programme was misleading for the following

TO280118:

(a) It wholly omite to mention that while Grey was detained and remains detained without the Chinesa even pretending that he had done anything wrong, the eleven remaining news workers were tried before a court of law and sentenced for specific orimes.

(b) It implies that the judicial system of Hong Kong is the administrative plaything of the FCO. But in fact what the Chinese are asking is that we should monkey around with the sentences passed in courts of law simply to meet administrative convenience. The implications of this for the principle of respect for the law in Hong Kong are obvious.

(c) It suggests a widespread resentment in the House of Commons against the judicial system of Hong Kong. In fact the interest has been confined to a rather small group of MP's and gave something of the impression of an organised campain.

(d) it suggests that the judicial system as a whole in Hong Kong is "Totalitarian". In fact, the only area remotely open to question on these grounds is the existence of certain emergency regulations brought into force in the emergency of 1967. These will be de-activated just as soon as the security situation permits. Heanwhile, only four men remain detained without trial under these regulations. They have nothing to do with the øloven convicted news workers with whom the Chinese authorities have linked Grey.

I shall be delighted if you feel like making any of these points to your contact. I do hope you can at least suggest the strength of our feeling on this subject. It can only encourage the Chinese in their hostage game if through the ABC they get the impression that their propaganda hes us on the run.

JoBut

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27 Kar. '69

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2/4/69

209

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SECRET

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Private Secretary MB 31/

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Mr. Anthony Grey of Reuters

The Secretary of State has agreed to see Mr. Gerald Long,

General Manager of Reuters, at 4.0 p.m. on 1 April. The

Secretary of State last saw Mr. Long on 12 November, 1968.

I attach speaking notea.

The General State of the Case

Flag A 2. I attach a copy of my submission of 28 March in which I

have recommended that we should not press the Governor of Hong

Kong for the immediate release of all eleven news workers in

Hong Kong; but should let matters take their course there with

the reasonably confident expectation that Mr. Grey will be let

out shortly after the normal release of the news workers in

September, but almost certainly not before. The Secretary of

State may, however, prefer not to make up his mind about this

recommendation until after his talk with Mr. Long.

The Probe in Hong Kong

3. Mr. Long is familiar with the attempt we have been making

through covert channels in Hong Kong to secure the release of

Mr. Grey in return for the release to China of the eleven newsworkers. I had obtained authority to tell him of it in general terms during

my Conversation of 28 February, before his departure on tour. A

Flag B record is attached. It remains to inform Mr. Long that in our

judgment the probe has been a failure and that the Chinese have

no interest in a compromise arrangement.

SECRET

Flag C

The Problem of the Eleventh Newsworker

4. We have endeavoured throughout to take Mr. Long as far

as possible into our confidence. On this occasion we shall

wish to give Mr. Long an indication that we now expect all

eleven newsworkers to be out of prison by September in the

normal course of events and that we thus see September as the

terminus ad quem of the Grey affair. This is, however, a

matter of some delicacy.

The Secretary of State will presumably

wish to avoid giving Mr. Long a categorical assurance at this stage

that we see the way clear to the release of the eleventh man;

and will also wish to avoid going into the details of how we

should hope to achieve this result.

Mr. Grey's letter of 7 January

5. Mr. Long is likely to refer to a letter of 7 January from

Mr. Grey to his mother, the contents of which were widely

publicised in the British press. I attach cuttings. The

letter expressed Mr. Grey's understandable dissatisfaction with

the lack of success of our efforts to secure his release.

believe that the Chinese saw this letter as a possible means

of bringing pressure to bear on H.M.G. and gave it rapid passage

to this country. Although Mr. Grey's letter was bitter, it was

however well argued and suggested that his mental faculties

remain unimpaired.

Representations to the Chinese

6. Since Mr. Long's last call, we have made representations

to the Chinese authorities on behalf of Mr. Grey on the following

occasions: during the call of the Chinese Charge d'Affaires on

SECRET

Lord Shepherd on 9 January;

at an interview at the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs in Peking by our outgoing Charge d'Affaires,

Mr. Cradock on 11 February;

and at the initial interview of his

successor, Mr. Denson, with the West European Department of

the Ministry on 8 March. On the last occasion the Chinese

told Mr. Deneon categorically that Mr. Grey now had access to

his own library on the first floor of his house.

Visite

7. Mr. Long may raise the question of a further exchange of

visits (by the Charge d'Affires in Peking to Mr. Grey and by

representatives of the New China News Agency in Hong Kong to

the eleven imprisoned news workers).

Clearly we cannot rule

out a further exchange of this kind. But the following points

have to be borne in mind:-

(a)

Each

We wish to keep auch exchanges within bounds.

visit by the N.C.N.A. representatives in Hong Kong

to the convicted news workers provides the communista

with a propaganda victory; suggests that we are ready

to discriminate in favour of certain categories of

prisoner; and reinforces in quasi-consular standing

of the N.C.N.A. in Hong Kong.

(b) A further visit to Mr. Grey will inevitably generate

a new wave of public concern for his plight. In the

glare of publicity it will be harder to m ke the discreet

arrangements proposed by the Governor for shortening the

sentence of the eleventh news worker.

SECRET

we are in a position to give him a broad hint

that we are confident that his ordeal will end

in September.

The timing of any visit must

therefore depend on the speed with which the Governor

of Hong Kong completes his review of the relevant

prison sentences. We have impressed on him the

desirability of rapid progress.

Hunay

Jauns Money

(J. MURRAY)

31 March, 1969

Copiis to: Me Soddew

Sir J. Johnston.

CONFIDENTIAL

SPEAKING NOTES

Anthony Grey, your correspondent detained in Peking,

continues to be very much on my mind. The Head of Fer

Eastern Department has been keeping you in touch with develop-

ments. I am glad to have the opportunity of re-emphasising

my personal interest.

The Probe in Hong Kong

2. You already know of the existence of a probe through

covert channels in Hong Kong aimed at securing the release

of Mr. Grey in exchange for the release to China for the

remainder of their sentences of the eleven newsworkers

remaining imprisoned in Hong Kong. We were not sanguine

about the chances that such an exercise might succeed.

Nevertheless, we thought that we owed it to Mr. Grey to try;

and we made every attempt to accommodate Chinese susceptibilities

during the negotiations. Unfortunately the result is as we

feared. The Chinese have simply attempted to beat us down

further. They have showed no sign of willingness to accept

this very reasonable compromise solution, but have simply

returned again and again to their insistence on the premature

release in Hong Kong of the eleven remaining convicted news

workers. It would appear that a solution as such is not what

they desire. They are holding out for a solution which will

give them the maximum propaganda advantage and do greatest

damage to our interests in Hong Kong. Our offer has now been

on the table for two months. I think we must conclude that it

has failed.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Problem of the Eleventh News Worker

3. I fear that this brings me to the conclusion that there

may be nothing, short of conceding a highly damaging outright

victory to the Communists over this issue, that we can do

until September of this year. In September, as you know, ten

of the eleven remaining newsworkers will be due for release (with remission of sentence) in the normal way. We should

have in the meantime to consider what to do about the eleventh

who would not normally be due for release until February,

1971. If Mr. Grey has still not been released by this

September I should very much hope that we shall find a way

to effect the release of the eleventh man at that time simul-

taneously with the other ten. I should underline that this is

a hypothetical situation. While I am confident that we shall

man,

find a way I should not wish you to take this comment as a

formal commitment.

I should also like to emphasise that it

is made in the strictest confidence.

Mr. Grey's letter of 7 January

4. We must take account of Mr. Grey's health and his state

of mind.

His letter of 7 January to his mother, which was

shown to us by Mr. Horton of Reuters,

he is understandably bitter about his

suggests that while

long detention, his

general balance remains unimpaired. This is something which

must be kept constantly under review on the meagre evidence at

our disposal. Meanwhile I have been encouraged by the fact

that our new Charge d'Affaires in Peking, Mr. Denson, was told

at his initial interview with the West European Department of

CONFIDENTIAL

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Mr. Grey now has

access to his own books upstairs.

Mr. Grey's doubts about

his health seem also to have been set at rest.

Co-operation of Reuters

5. Our handling of this case will continue as hitherto to

depend greatly on your own co-operation. I hope that what

I have told you will satisfy you that I am anxious to do all

I can to secure the release of Mr. Grey, short of taking

measures which in my considered judgment would be highly damaging

in Hong Kong, I have instructed the Head of Far Eastern

Department to continue to keep you closely informed of develop-

menta. Even if we foresee little prospect of progress before Sepgember, this does not of course imply that we shall cease

in the meantime to keep up pressure on the Chinese, particularly

as regards the detailed conditions of Mr. Grey's detention.

Consular Access:

Further Exchange of Visits (if Mr. Long raises the

point)

6. Naturally I do not rule out consideration of a further

exchange of visits, by our Charge d'Affaires in Peking to Mr. Grey

and by representatives of the New China News Agency in Hong Kong

to the eleven news workers; but we should have to choose our

time with care. I have in mind the difficulty of taking measures to solve discreetly the problem of the eleventh news

worker in the glare of publicity that a consular visit to Mr.Grey will inevitably provoke. And following on from this, it might be best not to have a visit to Mr. Grey until we are in a position to give him a broad hint that we have reasonable grounds for expecting that his ordeal should end in September.

CONFIDENTIAL

Lory ON

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PERSNAL AND COMFIDENTIAL

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Mr Wilson

Dear James,

Office of the British Chargé

d'Affaires

Peking

25 March, 1969

isl

Thank you for your letter of 13 Karch enclosing

a copy of John Moreton'a report on his discussions in Hong Kong about detainees and convicted prisoners (Saigon Telegram No. 140 of 7 March).

48+

We have now received Hong Kong Telegram No. 242 of 21 March which indicates that the Governor intends to follow the time-table on releasing detainees set out in paragraph 1 of Moreton's telegram. I am grateful for the

efforts which I know you have made to bring about the releases sooner but I am well aware, from my own experience in Hong Kong, of what the difficulties are. It so happens that the first release on 2 April will come shortly after the departure of Mrs. Johnston (assuming that this takes place as planned). The Chinese might regard this as a response which would, in my view, be no bad thing provided that the two events are not directly linked in public.

Hak fie

It was ironical that the news of Kra. Johnston's exit visa reached us at exactly the same time as your telegram reporting the News Department statement of 19 March, We are inclined to think that the Chinese were not aware of the statement and that the delay in the grant of the visa was caused by delays in the Chinese bureaucracy. In any case, we think that the statement did no harm probably the reverse and we agreed with its terms, subject to the one reservation made in my telegram No. 204 of 20 March,

FEC

I had a talk this morning with Sultan Hyder, the Manager of the Pakistan International Airlines office in Shanghai who was speculating that the grant of an exit visa to Mrs. Johnston might indicate that investigation of Johnston's case had revealed nothing substantial against him and they might shortly let him go. It would be unwise to build on such a theory but the fact that, according to Cannings, the Chinese are to allow Johnston to receive letters from his family is a good sign. This privilege has not to my knowledge been granted to anyone else under detention with, of course, the exception of Anthony Grey. But we mist wait and see if it in fact happens.

I hope that the releases of detainees, together with the possible action on detained prisoners foreshadowed in Hong Kong Telegram No. 232 will be sufficient to enable us to maintain some momentum in our exchanges with the Chinese

James Murray, Eaq., C.M.G..

Far Eastern Department,

PCO

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

巛

(my Telegram No. 170). You will no doubt let us know when you intend next to summon the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in London. If time permits, we should be glad to have an opportunity to comment on the line which you propose Lord Shepherd should take.

Yours

ever,

John

(J.B. Derson)

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

FEC 13c1 (HEP-3/2)

25 March, 1969.

203

Thank you for your letter of 19 March enclosing a letter from a Professor Lan.

Ve here had not previously heard of Professor Lan; but I am trying to find out about him, and hope to be in touch with you again shortly.

Head, Far Eastern Department

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Brian Horton, Esq.,

Editor-in-Chief,

REGTERS LTD

85 Fleet Street,

London, E.C.4.

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From the Editor-in-Chief

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19 March 1969

James Murray Esq CMG

Far Eastern Department

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Foreign and Commonwealth Office Building

Downing Street

London SW1

Dear Mr Murray

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We have received a letter, a copy of which is attached, Professor Lan, suggesting a course of action in connection with Tony Grey. Have you any comment on the writer or his suggestion?

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Brian Horton Reuters Limited 85 Fleet Street London EC4 Telephone 01-353 8080

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