FCO 21/494 China-watching in Hong Kong

YEAR

STAMP

1968/9

SECUREY GRADING.

N.B

276

INE

The 2:

SECRET

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH DEPT.

OFFICE

יו

...

Contents checked

for transfer to

D.R.O.

(Sgd.)

Date

FAR EASTERN

FILE No. FEC 13/13

426 art

יו-יו

}

TITLE: CHINA INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION:

CHINA-WATCHING

REFER TO

NAME

(and dept, when necessary)

DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY

RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. OR PLA.

FILE No.

PART

Av. CH.... Rouvon

No Boyd

SEE:

IN HONG KONG

DATE

when nece

REFER TO

NAME (and dept. when necessary) SEE:

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Registry Address

Room Mo. Z.-7..!

King Charles Street.

YEAR STAMP

1968/9

•

Reference.

Mr. Furness (Personnel Policy Department)

The question of establishing a China-watcher in Hong Kong has now been discussed in Hong Kong by Sir Leslie Monson and with the Governor of Hong Kong in London. On both occasions it was argued that our original proposal to second an FCO officer to the Political Adviser's staff in the Hong Kong Government would be embarrassing. The Governor of Hong Kong has now put forward new proposals in his minute (attached) and I should be grateful if you would say whether they are acceptable from the Personnel administration point of view. They are in brief that

Kal

the officer would be en poste in Hong Kong and not on secondment to the Hong Kong Government, as-is the case with the staf I DI 218 1litičal Adviser's Offians-

(b) he would be paid from the FCO vote;

we would need to supply a confidential secretary;

(☎ he would probably be housed in the Secretariat building although this remained to be decided, if this turned out to be the case we would be expected to pay rent for his accommodation;

(e) the Political Adviser would unofficially

supervise his activities.

Wilson

(C. Wilson)

Far Eastern Department

December, 1969

Mr. S.W Etharti (Personnel Ops)

minute

We have agreed - principle to the establishment of the China. Watcher post i Hong Kong- and points : 8) and c) above have alwmp been understood to apply, whatever was decided about the location of the. office. But our agreement was dependant on an not be able to effort to find compensatory savings elsewhere the conform our

most obvious place being Peking. We shall agreement until

2. I notice that the for Eastern Dept. paper of 25, that every effort November below suggests that the Political Adviser's has been unde) staff in Hong Kong are underemployed. Since they are to effect tike

on secondment to to H.K. Gout, there is to

we are convinced

savings.

interest

interest for tampare Section - this; but you many word to conside whether the individuals tied up there could

not be used elsewhere.

W. Chantill

12412.

China Watcher

On further reflection, I fear I mut Cenfirm my unease

unease at this officer bring associated dividity with the Hary Kiry Government. As such, be would be

a curstant object of suspicion to Unofficial thumbers, the Press and perhaps the Chinese.

لله

2. 1

suggut

The

the following

solutur

officer to be called the (Foreign Office - or it, if preferred) Far East Publications Qualypis officer.

Reasons:

ана

(of "For East." dissociates him from

Hny King

་་

(6) "Publicaturis Analysis.

(i) does not disguise that at least part of his job - & abrindly the major part- is china watching

Игар

(ii) avoids the implication of

covert operations inherent wow

in wurd's like

Co-ordination.

་་

Research",

Liaison"

(ii) suggests to the Chirichs (in

видрий Publications") that be is Concerned with overt intelligence

only.

His salary, recurrent ete custo

and

should be paid

directly by FCO

We world encravant

се

pride him with office space,

but there

may be of finding him space bere, and I would really paper he operated from elsewhere. Personally, I would have Muught that if he had an

practical difficulties

жин

office in reasonably secure curtside Анимал

prendes leg a bank building) with

a safe for wildly classified

еш

good energh on the understanding that

popers, this would

papus graded scout or

ск

over

(snoely be would not have many?

were kept in our Top Secret

алг

Maistry.

6. But if the is found

grunt

office, I would with a mutal to

ко

be paid for it - not for Masino of inmey hub so the Kigislative (& the Auditor) could be satisfe that we were not spending

чила

HIL funds at

concone

who

лу

was nothing to do with us. ?. He will presumably sued an expatriate Crifidential Recortary. This we could not cupply - we are instantly under auspicion for employing expatriat Confidential stoff and posts have to be rigoroundly Kypt down. We are therefor

short.

-x of

до

8. PA, if desired, could porsche buy gueral supenision

supenision & resiver course help quer ally - but this cametrin would have to be kept covest. Hunch.

870

Sir S. Tomlinson

CONFIDENTIAL

I am afraid

Kis n't get far

this!

27/1

CONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOVERNOR OF HONG KONG

25 November, 1969

"China-Watching" in Hong Kong

I attach a paper about "China-watching" in Hong Kong.

A copy is going to the Governor,

The paper itself summarises the background.

The recommendation is:-

"We might therefore ask the Governor if he would be

prepared to enjoin on to the Political Adviser, for a

trial period, the additional responsibility of collating

information available in Hong Kong about affairs in

China and reporting to him periodically, copying his

reports as appropriate to the Foreign and Commonwealth

Office."

Copies to:

Sir L. Monson

Mr. Wilford

Mr. Carter

When

you

Ваши гласу

(James Murray)

25 November, 1969.

have had yo

yond four thous das urssion with the Sucuar about Misis,

soe might wild to Mr Maddocks

explaining has the unauthis stands.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Rukay

5retwon the pps. as the Common has made some proposal, dinet

to Sur 5 Tomlinson which may

now have reached you.

Lose

Mr Carptes.

عدم

Nor.

The new profurce in was Machine. At insider it will the cdown.

affelforate, put of a soft later to the Thave wody

26/11 departmenty work.

CONFIDENTIAL

ONSULTATIONS WITH THE GOVERNOR OF HONG KONG

25 November, 1969.

"China-Watching" in Hong Kong

Hong Kong is the best source of information outside

China about affairs in China. Our "China-watching" effort

in Hong Kong is however to some extent fragmented and lacks

co-ordination. We have considered therefore that there

might be a requirement for a "China-watcher", to co-ordinate

information from official sources as well as from non-

governmental organisations, specialist foreign journalists

and foreign missions concerned with 'China-watching" in Hong

Kong.

2. We were in principle ready to provide (and pay for)

an officer of First Secretary rank from the F.C.0. Chinese

cadre, supported by a P.A. to do the job, if this were

acceptable to the Hong Kong authorities.

3. It seemed to us that the best place from which to do the

job was the Office of the Political Adviser. The prestige

of the Political Adviser's office would assist in developing

contacts with non-official agencies, and the officer concerned

could provide a useful "China-watching" service for the Hong

Kong Government. He could, moreover, assist with the

staffing of that office when one of the two existing members

was on leave.

Alternative locations were open to objection:

the Regional

/ Information

CONFIDENTIAL

Information Office, because this would identify the work

of the "China-watcher" too closely with the propaganda rôle

of the R.I.O.; the Joint Services Intelligence Staff, because

too close an association with military intelligence might

prejudice relations with non-official "China-watching"

institutions; and the British Trade Commission, because the

appointment there of an officer with overt (and they would

have to be overt) political responsibilities might reinforce

the idea that the British Trade Commission was in some sense

a separate political instrument of Whitehall in Hong Kong.

5. The Hong Kong authorities have however represented to

us that the reinforcement of the Political Adviser's staff

by an extra officer would be bound to attract attention in

Hong Kong and might lead to undesirable speculation particu-

larly among unofficial members of the Executive and Legislative

Councils and from local journalists about the whole function

of the Political Adviser's Office.

When we first went into the matter in 1968 we thought

that the Political Adviser himself and the Assistant Political

Adviser (a member of the F.C.0. Chinese cadre) were both too

occupied with the regular work of the office to undertake this

additional responsibility. Now that the situation is quieter

in Hong Kong this may no longer be the case.

7. We might therefore ask the Governor if he would be

prepared to enjoin on to the Political Adviser, for a trial

period, the additional responsibility of collating information

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2

/ available

[

CONFIDENTIAL

available in Hong Kong about affairs in China and reporting

to him periodically, copying his reports as appropriate to

the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

After a period of, say, six months, a review could be

undertaken in consultation with the Political Adviser about

the usefulness of the task, and what it involved. Renewed

considertation could if necessary be given then to the

reinforcement of the Folitical Adviser's staff, or other

means of coping with the matter.

Far Eastern Department,

25 November, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3-

Peronda Sewer

Der Michael.

Maanda

GOVERNMENT HOUSE

HONG KONG

Plagan speal

ایک کارکن انا ہے

The Wolfnet.

24 Our 1919

des

you for your

latter of 17 Barber door hen wetting.

Artfur Raddocks and I had

bill with High Nomen Wilber 15-any

and Arthur wit be woning of cont is to

Пирон

James Munny. Hugh wis

wh a was to a fines descuin

also write to this Govenor who a new

2 The main posit that came out was that the tankment of be bound to attmar

Curwis

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ctt

qui rith a par

a wither or withers

even about The P.A.),

3 Hugh Norman - Wilmer

die in the last ditch if

online * #!79.

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выше на

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hot ba

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in braally "auto" bo when wo himself

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рав

view of the bust paragraph of your letter I and not pack

kit at mis stage Icones piers him hurt

Я слива 4 I have her Arthur Muddocks have

let

apent, rom my vron double (pucx 2)

Depir bergand note to assunt mise in his reply. Дере

on juice. ( Arthur Maddocks hen not rean

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уть

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is)

Ireton

дно

Leshi Misri

PERSONAL & SECRET

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

17 October, 1969.

Dear Leslie,

China-watching in Hong Kong

2. We realise that Sir Hugh will probably wish to discuss the proposal with the Governor before making a final decision but we hope that he can be persuaded to take a favourable view of it and to brief the Governor accordingly so that we can discuss it with him when he comes to the Office for discussions later during his leave.

3. In arguing the case with Sir Hugh Bunny Carter has suggested that the points in paragraphs 5 (c) and (d) in the background note are likely to carry the most weight with the Hong Kong Government, provided of course that the general question of principle can be resolved. In correspondence with the Political Adviser, Arthur Maddocks, we have never obtained a precise statement of their objections to the idea although we believe that paragraphs 6 and 7 of the background note are a fairly accurate interpretation of Maddocks' feeling of "embarrassment". It will be useful for our later discussions with the Governor if you could get them to spell out any objections in greater detail.

4. I should perhaps add that this matter has only been presented to me in detail with the arrival of this letter in draft. I must therefore admit to you that I am not yet wholly convinced that there is a real need for a China watcher of the kind proposed or, if there is, that the task can be carried out by one officer. Nor am I wholly convinced that the Secretariat would be the right place for him. In this perhaps my own experience leads me to take Maddocks' expressed objections more seriously than does everyone else. However it is obviously right that we should take advantage of your presence in Hong Kong to discuss the issue with the Colonial Secretary with a view to getting at least a statement of no objection from him to the proposal that the man should be put in the Secretariat if that is what we ultimately decide is the right

solution.

Sir Leslie Monson, KCMG, CB,

c/o Government House,

HONG KONG.

Yours ever,

Michael hilfig

PERSONAL & SECRET

(.. Wilford)

NFIDENTIAL

3ir S. Tomlins

; the 13/11

CONSULTATIONS LITH THE CO72503 (

25 Kovember. 1969

"China-Watching" in Hong Kong

I attach a paper about "China-watching" in Hong Kong.

▲ copy is going to the Governor.

The paper itself summarises the background.

The recommendation ist-

· Fe right therefore ask the Governor if he would be

prepared to enjoin on to the Political Adviser, for a trial period, the additional responsibility of collating information available in Hong Kong about affairs in China and reporting to him periodically, copying his

reports as appropriate to the Foreign and Commonwealth

office.

Copier to: Sir L. Monson

Mr. #ilford

Mr. Carter

pla

INA 3/12

(James Kurray)

25 November, 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

25.

CONFIDENTIAL

CAU CA KIT THE JOVEL:TOR 03 HONG KONG

25 November. 1969.

"China="atching" in Hong Kong

Hong Kong is the best source of information outside

China about affairs in China. Our "China-watching" effort

in Hong Kong is however to some extent fragmented and lacks

co-ordination. Te have considered therefore that there

might be a requirement for a "China-watcher", to co-ordinate

information from official sourose as well as from non-

governmental organisations, specialist foreign journalists and foreign missions concerned with China-watching in Hong

Kong.

2. We were in principle ready to provide (and pay for)

an officer of First Secretary rank from the F.C.0. Chinese

cadre, supported by a P.A. to do the job, if this were

acceptable to the Hong Kong authorities.

3. It seemed to us that the best place from which to đo the

job was the Office of the Political Adviser.

The prestige

of the Political Aiviser's office would assist in developing contacts with non-official agencies, and the officer concerned could provide a useful "China-watching" service for the Hong

Kong Government. He could, moreover, assist with the

staffing of that office when one of the two existing members

was on leave.

Alternative locations were open to objection:

were open to objection: the Regional

/ Information

CONFIDENTIAL

Information Office, because this would identify the work

of the "China-watcher" too closely with the propaganda rôle

of the R.1.0.; the Joint Jervices Intelligence Staff, becauB (

too close an association with military intelligence sight

prejudice relations with non-official "China-watching"

institutions; and the British Trade Commission, because the

appointment there of an officer with overt (und they would

have to be overt) political responsibilities might reinforce

the idea that the British Trade Commission was in some sense

a separate political instrument of Thitehall in Hong Kong.

5. The Hong Kong authorities have however represented to

ns that the reinforcement of the Political Advisor's staff

by an extra officer would be bound to attract attention in

Hong Kong and might lead to undesirable speculation partiou-

larly among unofficial members of the Executive and Legislative

Councils and from local journalists about the whole function

of the Political Adviser's Offics.

6. Then we first went into the matter in 1968 we thought

that the Political Adviser hinsself and the Assistant Political

Adviser (a member of the F.C.0. Chinese cadre) were both too

ocoupled with the regular work of the office to undertake this

additional responsibility. Now that the situation is quieter

in Hong Kong this may no longer be the ease.

7. Te night therefore ask the Governor if he would be

prepared to enjoin on to the Political Adviser, for a trial period, the additional responsibility of collating information

CONFIDENTIAL

/ available

CONFIDENTIAL

available in Hong Kong about affairs in China and reporting

to him periodically, copying his reports as appropriate to

the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

8. After a period of, say, six months, a review could be

undertaken in consultation with the Political Adviser about

the usefulness of the task, and what it involved. Kenewed

considertation could if necessary be given then to the

reinforcement of the Political Adviser's staff, or other

seans of coping with the matter.

Far Eastern Departaent,

25 November, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE SEOUL

TELEGRAM NUMBER 169

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

11 NOVEMBER 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 169 OF 11 NOV.

FOR LT COL. GRIFFITH.

YOUR TEL NO. 139 REPLACEMENT OF DEFENCE ATTACHE.

ON HIS RECORD OF SERVICE THE OFFICER CONCERNED SEEMS

SUITABLE. BUT VERY MUCH HOPE THAT I SHALL NOT REPEAT

NOT BE ASKED TO ACCEPT HIM IF FOR MUCH ( I SUSPECT THE

GREATER PART) OF HIS TOUR HE WILL BE UNACCOMPANIED.

LETTER FOLLOWS BY NEXT NON CONFIDENTIAL BAG,

MR. TRENCH

FILES:

MIL.ADVISER F.EASTERN D.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

COPY TO:

MSSB, M.O.D., STANMORE.

DDDDD

CONFIDENTIAL

CS. 41A

2600077

5,000-2/69-870130

CONFIDENTIAL

Este @

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT LOWER ALBERT ROAD

HONG KON

RIF. SCR 2/4841/69

Dear Wilson

ENOV 1759

辰

FEC 13/13

China Watching in Hong Kong

29 October, 1969.

Thank you for your letter FEC 13/13 of 17

October about the possibility of sending a Diplomatic Service officer to Hong Kong to study China.

We discussed this subject with Sir Leslie Monson on 24 October. He will be letting you know his views. He asked me to set out in writing two points which we made to him.

The first is that in our view there is no chance of the appointment of a China Watcher to the Political Adviser's office being kept secret From the Unofficial Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils or from the local journalists. The Political Adviser's office is an unusual part of the Hong Kong Government machinery. Many people, including the local communists, take an interest in it, because they suspect the Political Adviser is in direct touch with Whitehall and may be used as an agent of the U.K. Government. arrival of another First Secretary from the Diplomatic Service, raising the size of the Political Adviser's office by 50% would, we think, not be overlooked.

The

The second point concerns the posting of a political officer in à Trade Commissioner's office. In Hong Kong it would not be a new development to have a political officer in a Trade Commission.

The Australians

and Canadians already follow that practice. The head man comes from the Department of Industry and Trade whilst the Department of External Affairs has to be content with having the No.3 place in the hierarchy.

There is no secret about the fact that these External Affairs representatives are engaged in political and not trade activities and that the political activities are mainly China Watching.

Admittedly the British Trade Commission is not the same as the Australian and Canadian Trade Commissions. There might be some objection to the expansion of the

C. Wilson, Esq.,

Far Eastern Department,

Foreign & Commonwealth office,

LONDON, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

/contd...

CONFIDENTIAL

British Trade Commission but that is a point that could be put to the Governor if you decide that the Trade Commission is the best place for the China Watcher. From the point of view of the Hong Kong Government it is easier to accept than the addition of a China Watcher to the Political Adviser's office.

The above does not represent the whole of our discussion with Leslie Monson but just the two points he asked me to set down.

Your

ever

Aother Mach

(A.F. Maddocks)

Dofera wis

In Lemme Homon's

He commbadation

exclusion

मे

On te slike

hoala ا

stał presswaj the Public Adison officer Trade Commission (= $.5.15.

воле

M.. Mumay My bid fare

we statedfechas

our Chise butter in

sting

высла роза кад

Hunt 13

S think it in the Unofficial Members' reactions [2ut" worry Hong Kong most and of there is a real danger thod-this posting wandet comproment the Martin of the PA's fu

in Thame Sagrer

we must die for to the objection vanid.

eyez

12m

154 12/10

CONFIDENTIAL

A.A

FEC 13/13

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

(23

espatched

хора

17 October, 1969.

17/0

You will remember your long drawn-out correspondence with James Murray about the question of establishing

■ China-watching unit in Hong kong, which rests with your letter SCR 2/4841/69 of 27 May,

2. Personnel Department have now agreed in principle to the establishment of such a post in Hong Kong and we have therefore decided to have another look at the question. This letter is by way of a warning that Sir Leslie Monson will probably raise it with Sir Hugh Norman-Walker during his visit next week. We have provided him with a note on the history of the proposal, setting out the measure of agreement which was reached amongst those concerned on the purpose auch a unit would serve, the size of the establishment required and the problem of its location. If Sir Leslie obtains a favourable reaction we would hope to discuss it further with the Governor when he comes into the Office for talks later during his leave.

(0. Wilson)

Far Eastern Department

A. F. Maddooks, Esq.,

Office of the Political Adviser,

HONG KONG,

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

р.

Puze! 13

PERSONAL & SECRET

Depadany

17/10

17 October, 1969.

Br.

China-watching in Hong Kong

You will remember that Far Eastern Department promised to let you have a background note on the question of establishing a China- watching unit in Hong Kong. This is attached. You had kindly agreed to raise this matter with Sir Hugh Norman-Walker during your visit. But it was felt that until Personnel Department had given their approval in principle for the establishment of the post it would be premature to raise the matter. They have now done 80. 2. We realise that Sir Hugh will probably wish to discuss the proposal with the Governor before making a final decision but wo hope that he can be persuaded to take a favourable view of it and to brief the Governor accordingly so that we can discuss it with him when he comes to the office for discussions later during his leave.

3. In arguing the case with Bir Hugh Bunny Carter has suggested that the points in paragraphs 5 (c) and (4) in the background note are likely to carry the most weight with the Hong Kong Government, provided of course that the general question of principle can be resolved, In correspondence with the Political Adviser, Arthur Maddocks, we have never obtained a precise statement of their objections to the idea although we believe that paragraphs 6 and 7 of the background note are a fairly accurate interpretation of Maddocks' feeling of "embarrassment", It will be useful for our later discussions with the Governor if you could get them to spell out any objections in greater detail.

14. I should perhaps add that this matter has only been presented to me in detail with the arrival of this letter in draft. I mat therefore admit to you that I am not yet wholly convinced that there is a real need for a China watcher of the kind proposed or, if there is, that the task can be carried out by one officer. an I wholly convinced that the Secretariat would be the right place Nor for his. In this perhaps my own experience leads me to take Kadlocks' expressed objections more seriously than does everyone else. However it is obviously right that we should take advantage of your presence in Hong Kong to discuss the issue with the Colonial Secretary with a view to getting at least a statement of no objection from him to the proposal that the man should be put in the Secretariat if that is what we ultimately decide is the right solution.

Bir Leslie Monson, KCMG, CB,

c/o Government House,

Hot foun

(K.M. Wilford)

PERSONA

(ORD) DA. 371999 1,500 2/69 H..

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DRAFT

To:-

Top Secret.

Secret.

16/10

CodfricaTLEL

Restricted.

Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

-----ו-יזוי

In Confidence

PERSONAL

SECRET

Sir Leslie Monson, K.C.M.G.,

c/o Government House,

HONG KONG,

C.B.,

Type 1 +

From

Mr. Wilford

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

China-watching in Hong Kong

You will remember that Far Eastern Department

promised to let you have a background note on the

question of establishing a China-watching unit in

{ This is attached.)

Hong Kong. You had kindly agreed to raise this

matter with Sir Hugh Norman-Walker during your visit.

But it was felt that until Personnel Department had

given their approval in principle for the establishment

of the post it would be premature to raise the matter. They have now

$-0.

This be may best obtinet and I should be grateful

therefore if you wouli speck to Siz Hugh on the lines

of the enclosed. background note.

2. We realise that Sir Hugh will probably wish to

discuss the proposal with the Governor before making a Cinal decision, but, we hope that he can be persuaded to take a farmaskóla visio je k

accordingly)

fair wind, and to brief the Governor/so that

we can discuss it with him when he comes to the Office

for discussions later during his leave.

3. In arguing the case with Sir Hugh Bunny Carter in Hong Kong Apartment has suggested that the pointa 5 (c) and (d) in the background note are likely to carry

mart weight with the Hong Kong Government, provided of course that the general question of principle can be

PERSONAL

SECRET

/ resolved

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

PERSONAL

SECRET

resolved. In corres ondence with the

Artis

Political Adviser,

Kaddocks, we have never

obtained a precise statement of their objection:

to the idea although we believe that paragraphs

6 and 7 of the background note are a fairly

accurate interpretation of Maddock's feeling

It will be useful for our

of "embarrassment".

later discussions with the Governor if you

could get them to spell out any objections in

greater detail.

My mom

In this perhaps

Therefore ritme leass me to take Maddock's' exprene $bjections } seriously then doco every me aloe.

J 4.

should

ра

this matter

perhaps add that

mly been presented to

in detail with the arrived of this better

} manet

in traff. Hay-f

Hal- there is

therefore admit to you

not yet wholly conniced

scal

need for

China watcher of the kind propect or, if

there is, that the tank c

Tack con

Nova

be cond

mimolly

the Secretariat would

mt by one Sfficer. At convinced that

be the

the right place for him. (Stowered

are should

it is obviously right Hat take advantage of your presence in Hong Kong to discuss the issue with the Colonial Secretory with a new

getting h

at least a

min

that the

Af me objection from

the man should be put in the

if that is what we

Secretariat if that is

ultimately decide is the right solutio

Mw/x

SECRET

Background Note

CHINA-WATCHING IN HONG KONG

Problem

To establish a China-watching unit in Hong Kong

preferably attached to the Political Adviser's Office.

Background

2. The proposal to establish a China-watching unit in

Hong Kong has been under discussion for almost a year and

a wide measure of agreement has been reached between Peking,

the Political Adviser'in Hong Kong and FCO Departments

concerned as to the purpose such a unit would serve and

the size of the establishment required. The following

are our general observations and conclusions.

(a) The importance of obtaining accurate information on

developments in China in view of our interests in the

Far Eastern and South-East Asian area and in particular

because of our position in Hong Kong.

(b) The need to keep under review our methods of information-

gathering to ensure that they are adequatü and

comprehensive.

(0) The importance of Hong Kong as the best source of

information about China outside the Mission in Peking;

an importance enhanced by the shortage of source

SECRET

/ material

material obtainable in Peking.

(a) The fragmentation and lack of co-ordination in our

China-watching effort in Hong Kong.

(●) Peking, the Political Adviser in Hong Kong and

ourselves are agreed that there is a requirenent to

collate and co-ordinate information from official sources

as well as non-governmental organisations, specialist

foreign journalists and foreign missions concerned with

China-watching in Hong Kong. Its purpose would be to

complement rather than duplicate the work of our Mission

in Peking.

(f) The establishment of an officer of First Secretary rank

from the 700 Chinese cadre supported by a P.A. should be

sufficient to do the job.

(g) Personnel Department have given their agreement in

principle to tay qutablishment of the post.

Argument

3. The one outstanding problem is to decide upon the location

of the unit. There are four possible locations:-

(a) the Regional Information Office (RIO) which is

administered by Information Research Department of the

PCO and is concerned with distributing information

material on China;

(b) J.S.I.s. (Joint Services Intelligence Staff) run by

the Kinistry of Defence and concerned primarily with the

cellation of intelligence about China through the

/ interrogation

SECRET

ان الاثبات

interrogation of refugees;

with the promotion of British exports to Hong Kong;

(d) the Political Adviser's Office.

Our main objection to (a) was that it would be inappropriate

to identify the work of the unit too closely with the

information and propaganda role of the RIO. As for (b) there

is a danger that the unit would become political advisers to

the military in Hong Kong. We also fear that too close an

agaociation with military intelligence might prejudice their

relations with non-official China-watching institutions. In

the case of (o) we consider that to put a political analyst

in a trade office might seem odd to outsiders and suggest

that it was a cover for another kind of operation. There

are also problems of space and security storage in the case

of (a) and (0) although no domat thyse could be overcome.

5. We conoluded that the Politicu! Adviser's Office was the

best location for the following reasons:-

(a) it is not linked with any of the existing specialist

China-watching units in Hong Kong;

(b) the prestige of the Political Adviser's Office would

assist in developing contacts with non-official agencies;

service for the Hong Kong Government;

(d) it would assist with the staffing of that office when

one of the two existing members is on leave.

SECRET

3 -

/ 6.

6. In opposition to this proposal Mr. Maddocks has argued

that it would be embarrassing for him to have within the

Hong Long Government an officer working for the U.X.

Government over whom the Governor had no control.

recognise that there is a problem here and do not wish to

arouse suspicions of U.K. intervention in the local adminis-

tration of Hong Kong. In order to meet Mr. Maddocks*

objections we proposed that the officer should be seconded,

like himself, to the Hong Kong Government (thus overcoming

the constitutional problem), that his reports on China would

be available to the Hong Kong Government (thus overcoming

the arguement that he is only working for London) and that

HMG should meet the financial cost of the unit. We pointed

out that we had agreed to not too dissimilar arrangements

whereby officers representing the interests of Hong Kong were

posted to our missions overseas. This has turned out to be

not altogether a good argument since in practice relations

between the Hong Kong representatives and our missions in

one instance have not run smoothly. Mr. Maddocks and his

colleagues in the Hong Kong Government remain unhappy with

our proposals and have suggested dropping the whole idea of

a China-watching unit for the time being.

7. We still feel there is a requirement for such a unit

and that our proposals do provide the basis for a satisfactory

arrangement with the Hong Kong Government. In establishing

the unit it would seem important to ensure that any

SECRET

/ arrangement

arrangement should not embarrass the position of the

Diplomatic Service officers staffing the Folitical Adviser's

Office on secondment or raise suspicions in the minds of the

unofficial members of the Governor's Councils that it

represents a form of U.K. intervention in Hong Kong affairs.

Far Eastern Department,

16 October, 1969.

SECRET

[

Mr. Wilford

SECRET

Flag A

Flag B &

Flag C

선

CHINA-WATCHING IN HONG KONG

In my submission of 10 October I promised to prepare

a background note on the question of establishing a China-

watching unit in Hong Kong for use by Sir Leslie Konson

during his visit to Hong Kong. Unfortunately it was not

possible tó give it to him before he left but there is

still time to send it to him in Hong Kong before he leaves

on 25 October. There is a classified bag to Hong Kong

on Saturday, 18 October, arriving on Wednesday 22 October.

The question is not unfamiliar to 3ir Leslie since he has

already discussed it with Mr. Murray and Mr. Carter. In

the background note attached I have not spelled out in

detail the contents of earlier correspondence on the subject

since a wide measure of agreement has been reached by those

concerned on the purpose of the unit and the size of its

establishment.

2. When I mentioned this question to you recently you seemed

somewhat sceptical about its usefulness and you may care

therefore to read in addition my minute of 9 September

to Personnel Department and related correspondence.

3. I attach a letter from you to Sir Leslie Konson.

Hong Kong Department concur.

but we build qu

a dir

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40.17/1

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spoted/acouts

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SECRET

Atomy. Mr"/>

itsoz

(C. Wilson)

16 October, 1969.

SOHYIDENTIAL

COVERING SECRET

Fing

Flag 1

Mr. Filford

3ir Leslie Konson

Sir Leslie Mossomis visit to Hong Kong

October, 1969: Extern.' Affairs

Sir Leslie may care to look at the attached background

papers on developments in China and the Sino-Soviet dispute

on which he will no doubt be expected to express views when

he visits Hong Kong. The papers attached are the briefs

which were prepared for our consultations on China with the

Americans in Washington.

The only new development in the

Bino-Soviet dispute has bean the Chinese agrement to begin

talks with the Russians on the border problem as foreshadowed

în paragraph à of ear spesking notes.

2. As regards Sino-British-Hong Kong relations the

position remains as set out in our savingram No. 2 of

22 August. Then the dust has settled on the Grey case and

Chinese intentions become clearer towards the twelve British

subjects still detained in Chins and towards the remaining

'confrontation' prisoners in Hong Kong we shall be reviewing

our tacties. This is a subject which will be discussed with

the Governer of Hong Kong when he is in London. A particular

concern of the Hong Kong Jovernment is the possibility that

the Chinese will now bring pressure to bear on us to release

the Chinese prisoners and Sir Leslie will no doubt hear a

great deal about this when he is in Hong Kong. He night

therefore care to refresh his memory on the pros and cons

CONFIDENTIAL

COVERING SECRIT

/ of the

CONFIDENTIAL

COVERING SEORET

of the argument as set out in Er. Murray's submission

of 21 August.

3. I hope to submit a separate brief on the problem of

appointing a China-watcher in Hong Kong about which

Kr. Hurray has already had preliminary discussions with

Sir Leslie. Te are awaiting Personnel Department's

approval in principle for the establishment of a post.

Copy to: Hong Kong Dept.

(C. Filson)

10 October, 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

COVERING 3FORET

see flas

же

is Cradock's

し

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference. FBC 13/13

Copied: IEM 2/1/Hong Kong

XEM2/1/ Peking.

China watching in Hong Kong

Although there is a sible station in Tokyo with a close interest in the subject, several British Agencies (including I.R.D. and the J.S.I.S.) already devote staff to it in Hong Kong, and we trade information with the Americans and others, I think we should accept the requirement for a First Secretary post at Grade 5 level, as proposed in Mr. Wilson's minute of 9 September.

As I read the papers, the job would be one of political reporting and the incumbent,would be required to liaise with the other parties in Hong Kongo cover the subject, sash from their own standpoint.

These papers speak of a First Secretary with "supporting staff", I can see no real need for the supporting staff to amount to more than a U.K.-based P.A. I think we should require "our" man to take advantage of his co-China watchers clerical staff to the extent that this may be necessary (and, indeed, possible).

4. Mr. Wilson mentions bas-fast that our Paking Mission's main sources of information have virtually disappeared during the last kissä ylikas in justification for a new post in Hong Kong Although writing from Peking on 31 December, 1968, Mr. Cradock

argued that the task in Hong Kong should be regarded as "complementary" to that performed in Peking, and said he could not accept the argument that the Hong Kong post could only be provided at the expense of a matching reduction, In view of Mr. Wilson's remarks in paragraph 3 of his minute, I think we should nonetheless press for some form of compensating saving from Peking.

Apart from the Chargé d'Affaires, so far as I am amaze the only staff concentrating on political work are the First Secretary and Head of Chancery (Grade 5A) and an R.A.2 Officer of Second Secretary rank, I would suggest that this should be the post to be given up in emhange for a new post at Grade 5A and 32/3 level)in Hong Kong.

6. Sir L. Monson proposes to discuss this question with the Governor of Hong Kong in mid-October. If this discussions lead to a solution of the problem of where to house the new officer, I propose that we should then lobe no time in approaching Paking about some form of compensating saving. On the basis of Mr. Wilson'a minute, there would presumably be no difficulty in enlisting support from the Far Eastern Department,

S.R Cowhi

(J.R. COWLING) 22 September, 1969.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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Mr. F. Mills (Personnel (Policy) Department)

(17

China-watching in Hong Kong

I attach correspondence with Hong Kong and Peking about the possibility of improving our China-watching activities in Hong Kong. We had hoped to have cleared our lines with those concerned before putting a proposal to you but we have run into some problems over the location of a China-watching unit in Hong Kong. As it seems unlikely that these can be resolved at the level of Political Adviser in Hong Kong, Sir Leslie Konson has agreed to take up the question with the governor of Hong Kong when he visits the colony in October. However, before he does so we should like to have your approval in principle for the proposal.

There is perhaps no need for me here to argue in : detail the importance which we attach to obtaining accurate information on developments within China. Our position in Hong Kong and our other interests in the area require that we should be capable of

į producing forecasts of political trends inside China.

China-watching will therefore continue to be an important activity in our diplomatic work.

3. But during the last twelve months, with the phasing out of the Cultural Revolution, our ability to gather information inside China has considerably diminished, Supplies of Red Guard posters and broad- sheets, the Chinese ban on the sale of provincial newspapers to foreigners, have meant that our Mission's main sources of information during the last three years have now disappeared. The Mission's principal sources of information are two or three permitted newspapers and journals and the exchange of information with other foreign colleagues in Peking who, of course, are in a similar position. The position has in fact got worse since this corres- pondence was initiated some nine months ago and it is unlikely to improve in the short term.

This strengthens the argument for looking elsewhere for additional information on China.

4. Hong Kong is clearly the best available source, although a case could possibly be made out for Tokyo The fact that many governments, of which the United States is the beat example, have chosen Hong Kong as their China-watching centre is evidence of this. In addition Hong Kong is the centre for a good deal of private research on developments in China and the international press corps is largely composed of China specialists. Our own effort, however, is very fragmented. IRD have an office there but its main concern is to produce locally information material for use by the press and to distribute IRD's own China output. The Ministry of Defence have an intelligence gathering organisation, J819, concerned largely with the interrogation of refugees from the mainland. Although the Political Adviser's Office may well have had a China-watching brief at one time, it is now fully occupied with the political problems of Chinese-Hong Kong-British relations and it could not

/be expected

Flag A

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I be expected to take on additional work.

5. It was these considerations which prompted Mr. Maddocks, the Political Adviser, in his letter of 2 December to propose making more use of Hong Kong's unique situation for collecting information on China. Departments in Whitehall considered his proposals and in paragraphs 5 and 6 of his letter of 29 January Mr. Murray examined in detail the nature of the problem and the possible terms of reference of a China-watching unit in Hong Kong, Both Feking and Hong Kong have subsequently agreed with this analysis of the problem.

6. As regards the size of a China-watching unit the Political Adviser recommended in his original letter a fairly large establishment of three or four officers. We are of the opinion that an officer of First Secretary rank with supporting staff would be capable of handling the material in the first instance. However, I understand that officers of Grade 5A are in short supply. Provided therefore that the officer was a Chinese speaker, with previous experience of China- watching, I can see no objection to either a Second Secretary or an officer of more senior rank filling the slot.

For the moment we have been unable to agree with Mr. Maddocks the location of a China-watcher in the Hong Kong set-up. For various reasons we ruled out the Regional Information Office and the Trade Office (see paragraph 8 of Murray's letter of 29 January and his letter of 14 May to Haddocks). In the event we felt that the Political Adviser's Office would be most suitable and suggested a stratagem that we thought would satisfy Hong Kong susceptibilities on the employment of UK Government officials. Mr. Haddocks has now replied that his colleagues in the Hong Kong Government are unhappy about our proposal. His reasons are set out in his letter of 27 May. In general we do not find his objections very convincing. But clearly we have taken the correspondence as far as we can at this level and if we wish to pursue it further our proposals must be put direct to the Governor.

8. In this Department's submission of 30 July, 1968 on, the future of our Mission in Peking the question of our China-watching capability was touched upon.

It was suggested that the Political Adviser's Office in Hong Kong might well be the most suitable place from which to view Chinese affairs. We also drew attention to the importance of finding useful employment for the FCO cadre of Chinese speakers and it was our impression that Personnel Department was conscious of this problem and would be sympathetic to any proposals which we might make, on this question. The importance of this subject was endorsed in subsequent minuting on the submission. I realise that we are now under great pressure to economise and that any proposal to create an additional slot must be looked at with particular care. Nevertheless, China, according to Duncan, is to be regarded as an area of special effort and we need to keep a careful watch on our information gathering arrangements to see that we are making the most of our opportunities.

19.

Copy to:

Mr. Day

(Personnel Operations Department)

Reference...

9. In short, there is a requirement for a China- watching officer in Hong Kong. We believe that the job could be done by a Chinese-speaking officer of First Secretary rank. I should be grateful to have your views and those of Kr. Day, to whom I am sending a copy of this minute.

bifrom

(C. Wilson)

Far Eastern Department

9 September, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Murray

China-Watching in Hong Kong

We spoke yesterday about Mr. Carter's minute of the 1st August of which you had already had a copy.

2. I told you that I would, if it was so desired, be ready to raise this matter with Sir Hugh Norman-Walker who will be administering the government of Hong Kong during the Governor's absence on leave at the time I have in mind to visit the Colony, viz, about 15th October. I would not however propose to write to Sir Hugh in advance of my visit.

3. I understood this would be acceptable to you. In that event I would be grateful if nearer the time of my departure I could have some speaking notes on the basis of which I could talk to the O.A.G.

wow?

(L. Monson)

5th August, 1969

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CONFIDENTIAL

4/5

Sir L. Monson

CONFIDENTIAL

China-Watching in Hong Kong

As I understand this correspondence, Hong Kong has raised

two principle objections to our proposal :-

(a) Lack of accommodation. This is valid for the present,

(b)

but as Mr. Maddocks says at (14) it could probably be

overcome when new Government offices are completed towards

the end of the year.

It would lend fuel to local suspicions (e.g. among

unofficials on the Councils) that the Political Adviser

is working for the U.K. rather than for Hong Kong. This

would seem to be what is meant by the passage at (8)

which reads:

it would be a disadvantage, and

possibly some embarrassment, to be responsible, even

theoretically, for an officer working for the U.K.

Government."

The point is made with greater clarity in

the sidelined passage of paragraph 2 at (14). That

these suspicions exist in a Colony that has throughout

its history been touchy about U.K. intervention in local

administration has to be taken into account however

unreasonable they may be. A practical consideration is

that if these suspicions gained ground unofficials on the

Standing Finance Committee might be disposed to query

Hong Kong's responsibility for meeting the entire cost of

the Political Adviser's office. For the same reason it

would not be wise tazas to make much play of the argument

that, because of the constitutional position, there must be

U.K. participation in the conduct of Hong Kong's external

relations.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 2.

CONFIDENTIAL

2. I might add that I think there is also an element of some general distaste (even unease) that there should be within the Hong Kong Government machine an officer working for another

government over whose activities neither senior Hong Kong officials

nor the Governor would have any control. We would, I am sure, encounter the same feeling in this office if I were to ask, for

example, on Hong Kong's behalf, whether they could post one of their officers to this department to oversee the affairs of the Hong Kong Chinese community in the U.K., with access to relevant papers held by this department and possibly Migration and Visa department. The first reaction would be to question why such an officer could not be accommodated within the Hong Kong Government Office;

would be expressions of urease on security and other grounds.

would rate my chances of getting agreement on this at much less

than 50: 50. And if the outcome were successful I have no doubt there would be restrictions such as (we have been sharply reminded) are apparently imposed on the Hong Kong man in Brussela.

there

3. I am sorry now that I suggested using the comparison with Hong Kong appointments in Brussels, Washington and Geneva. I still

think it is a valid point. But I am afraid we have opened

ourselves up to the barbed rejoinder about the "arms length" treatment of the Hong Kong representative in Brussels see paragraph 4 at (14). I had heard reports about this, but it is only in the last week that

I had confirmation in a letter from the Brussels Embassy that this attitude has been taken up as a matter of "deliberate policy".

I think this is a pity;

U.K. officers representing Hong Kong in Geneva and Washington and of the Hong Kong officer in Brussels must be a little hurtful. I do

the contrast between the treatment of the

not know whether there is anything we can do about it.

14.

4..

CONFIDENTIAL

40 I still hold to the view that our proposal should be put

direct to the Governor at a reasonably high level, despite

Mr. Maddocks' expectation that the Governor would be even less

likely to look favourably upon it. If the crux of the matter is

the effect our proposal would have on the Political Adviser's

position, we should I think have the Governor's own assessment of

this and of his chances of being able to handle any criticism or

side-effects the appointment might give rise to among his unofficial

advisers. Whether the approach is made now by letter or can wait

until you visit the Colony in October must depend to some extent

on the urgency of the proposed appointment.

It could be a

combination of both, if you were to write to the Governor now in

fairly brief terms concluding that this is one of the matters you

would like to discuss during your visit. On the whole I am

inclined to favour this course. Unless Sir David Trench has quite

firmly made up his mind (which I doubt in this case), my own

experience is that you will find his much more ready to be persuaded

in discussion that on paper.

5. It seems to me that, subject to the views of Far Eastern and

other interested departments, there is one carrot we could dangle

namely, that this officer would be available (at a pinch and by

agreement) to help out in an awkward staffing situation in the

Political Adviser's office, such as we have now made provision to

meet next year. Both Mr. Maddocks and Mr. McLaren (his deputy)

are due to follow each other on leave next year,

lengthy period with only one officer en poste.

that an officer who is due to go to a S.E. Asia post later in the

year should fill the gap in Hong Kong for part of the time before

taking up his other appointment, Hong Kong paying salary,

This means a

It has been agreed

It may not always be

allowances and outward passage costs.

CON

TIAL

/ possible

CONFIDENTIAL

possible to make such arrangements.

If the China-watcher coulä

occasionally fill a shortish gap, it might be represented to Hong

Kong that they would have a relief on the spot and that there should

be economies in expenditure as a result.

1 August, 1969

b. 5. Carter

сал

(W. 8. Carter)

Hong Kong Department

Copy to:

Mr.Murray

CONFIDENTIAL

Sur A. Galsworthy.

24/5

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CONFIDENTIAL

1:2 1

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REF.SCR 2/4841/69

- 6 JUN 1969

Dear Jank

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT LOWER ALBERT ROAD

HONG KONG

27 May, 1969.

раброе

FEC 1215 face para 2 sawasted oddel

Fastime it with Sur A. Gulwulling from leave.

Thank you for your letter FEC 13/13 of 14 May

about China Watching in Hong Kong.

80. 18/

I have not consulted the Governor but I have taken the opinion of Geoffrey Hamilton, Mike Clinton and Alastair Todd on the suggestion that the China Watcher should be part of my office. All three dislike the suggestion.

Their reasons are those set out in paragraph 4 of my letter of 11 March. The administrative problems could no doubt be overcome, especially when a new Government building is completed here towards the end & of this year, but the other objection would remain. The heart

of the matter is that the Political Adviser, who comes here for a relatively short time after several years in the Diplomatic Service, is bound to be something of an odd man out in the Government Service here. Anything which emphasises the difference between him and other officers of the Hong Kong Government is to be avoided. The appointment under him of a Diplomatic Service officer who would be working only for London clearly falls into that category. The Hong Kong Government does not feel such an urgent need to improve its own information about China to make that disadvantage seem a reasonable one to accept.

I dare say you feel these objections to be rather exaggerated. One could argue the case with the Hong Kong Govern- ment and possibly modify the proposal to make it more acceptable. But I think the doubts of the Hong Kong Government would not be entirely removed. I should expect the Governor to feel rather more strongly on the subject than the three members of the Colonial Secretariat that I have consulted. I should therefore strongly prefer to drop the suggestion that a China Watcher should be part of my office.

I think the comparison with the Hong Kong officers in Brussels, Geneva and Washington is not conclusive because there vas no alternative method of installing officials with diplomatic rank (and in the case of Brussels I remember only too well that the U.K. insisted on keeping the Hong Kong officials at arms length).

I see the objections to attaching the China Watcher to J.8.I.S. and the practical and other difficulties in making him part of the Trade Commission or the Regional Information Office. I think we have therefore reached the conclusion that

J. Murray, Esq., CMG,

Far Eastern Department,

Foreign & Commonwealth Office,

LONDON, S.W.1.

CONCLUS

/contd.

CONFIDENTIAL

for the time being at least there is no chance of posting a China Watcher to Hong Kong. The situation might change

if the Regional Information Office or the Trade Commission had to move into new offices.

I am sorry that I started a correspondence

that has proved unfruitful.

Your ever, title.

(A.F. Maddocks)

Copies to:

J.B. Denson, Esq., OBE, PEKING.

M.P.V. Hannam, Esq., B.T.C.

A.C. Ashworth, Esq., OBE, R.I.O.

CONEAL

ROSLIVED IN REGISTRY No.50 14 MAY 1969

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CONFIDENTIAL

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14 May, 1969.

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Many thanks for your letter of 11 March about China- watching in Hong Kong.

2. I am glad that we agree on the nature of the problem and the size of establishment required. The outstanding question is to decide from where our China-watcher should operate.

3. In your letter you proposed that we might consider attaching him to J.S.I.5. Frankly, I am not happy with this suggestion for a number of reasons. As you commented in your letter there is a risk that he would become a political adviser to the military and spend a good deal of time polishing their drafta. J.3.1.3. is only one of the sources of information on which we would want him to draw. I wonder too whether his association with J.S.I.3. might prejudice his relations with individuals and organisations outside official circles. He might find it difficult to explain his position to academics and other bodies engaged in research on China. Equally, I still consider that the Region Information Office and the Trade Commission would be unsuitable. The Trade Commission in particular must seen to outsiders an odd place to put a political analyst and might appear to the suspicious sa à cover for a different kind of operation. I understand too that any change in the terms of reference of the Trade Commission would require further discussion with the Governor. At present these are strictly defined as the promotion of U.K. commercial interests in the Colony and the projection of U.K. interesta,

This brings me back to your own office. I fully appreciate the difficulty of incorporating an officer into your own staff who would be working for the U.K. Government and not responsible to the Hong Kong Government. It would be bound to raise a good deal of opposition. But I wonder whether there is not a way round this. Would it be possible to assign the China-watcher to the Hong Kong Government? could (as a Deputy Political Adviser) be formally responsible for keeping you, and thus the Hong Kong Government, informed about developments in China - and you or he could pass our requirements on to us. In this way there would be no conflict of loyalties and the constitutional proprieties would have been observed. Naturally we would not expect the Hong Kong

A. F. Maddocks, Esq.,

HON RONA

CONFIDENTIAL

- 1 -

ispatched

Aure 15/5

CONFIDENTIAL

Government to pay his salary. This would be paid froz the Foreign Office Vote. As you know, H.M.G. have agreed in the past to not too dissimilar arrangements whereby officers representing Hong Kong are posted to our Missions abroad. This is the case I believe in Brussels, Geneva and Washington. The officers in question are paid for by the Hong Kong Government. These arrangements seem to have worked well and there is no reason why this should not be the case in this instance too. I can also see some advantage to the Hong Kong Government in having available an expert China-watcher.

5. I realise that you would probably wish a proposal of this kind to be put formally to the Governor. We would be quite happy to do this, but would first want to clear our lines with Personnel and Establishment and Organisation Departments. In the meantime it would be useful before seeking authority here for our proposal if you could let me know informally whether you think this proposal is likely to be acceptable to the Hong Kong Government.

(Janes Hurray)

Copies to: J. B. Denson, Esq., 0.B.E., PEKING

I. P. V. Hannan, Esq., B.T.O., HONG KONG

A. C. Ashworth, B.I.D., HONG KONG.

CONFIDENTIAL

(100) DL 391999- 1,900 249 Hm.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.

Secret.

Confidential Restricted. Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

DRAFT Letter

To:-

A. F. Maddocks, Esq., HONG KONG

Type 1 +

From

James Murray

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

Floy of

Many thanks for your letter of 11 March about

China-watching in Hong Kong.

2. I am glad that we agree on the nature of the

problem and the size of establishment required. The

outstanding question is to decide from where our China-

watcher should operate.

In your letter you proposed that we might consider

attaching him to JSIS. Frankly, I am not happy with

this suggestion for a number of reasons.

As you

commented in your letter there is a risk that he would

become a political adviser to the military and spend a

good deal of time polishing their drafts.

JIS is only

one of the sources of information on which we would

want him to draw. I wonder too whether his association

with JSI3 might prejudice his relations with individ-

uals and organisations outside official circles. He

might find it difficult to explain his position to

academics and other bodies engaged in research on

Equity

China. Os fother hand, I still consider that the

Region Information office and the Trade Commission

would be unsuitable. The Trade Commission in particular

must seem to outsiders an odd place to put a political

analyst and might appear to the suspicious as a cover

for a different kind of operation. I understand too

that any change in the terms of reference of the Trade

/Commission

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

( Casa Mifuky Alichoul Adres)

He could be formally

refusible for

Laufsing you,

مسار

Kare the H. ti. germant,

informant, asento constant in China

вторат

could

pass

фото

My must do's

on to we

Commission would require further discussion

with the Governor. At present these are

strictly defined as the promotion of UK

commercial interests in the colony and the

projection of UK interests.

4. This brings me back to your own office.

I fully appreciate the difficulty of

incorporating én officer into your own staff

who would be working for the UK Government and

not responsible to the Hong Kong Government. It would be bound to raise a good deal of

opposition, But I wonder whether there is not

a day round this. Would it be possible Fer

émemplo to assign the China-watcher to the

Hong Kong Government? In this way there would

be no conflict of loyalties and the constitu-

tional proprieties would have been observed.

Naturally we would not expect the Hong Kong

Government to pay his salary. This would be

paid from the Foreign Office Vote.

know, RMG have agreed in the past to not too

dissimilar arrangements whereby officers

representing Hong Kong are posted to our

Missions abroad.

As you

This is the case I believe in

Brussels, Geneva and Washington.

The officers

in question are paid for by the Hong Kong

Government.

These arrangements seem to have

worked well and there is no reason why this

should not be the case in this instance too.

I can also see some advantage to the Hong Kong

Government in having available an expert China-

watcher.

5. I realise that you would probably wish

a proposal of this kind to be put formally to

the Governor. We would be quite happy to do

this, but would first want to clear our lines

with

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

WEBDL 51-7406

with Personnel and Establishment and Organisa-

tion Department. In the meantime it would be

seful before seeking authority here for our

íet

proposal if you could let me know informally

whether you think this proposal is likely to

be acceptable to the Hong Kong Government.

6. I am sending copies of y letter to the

recipients of yours.

Judiarany.

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference

Mr. C. Wilson,

Far East Department

I can see the difficulties in, and the objections to, attachment to the J.S.I.S., the Trade Commission and the R.1.0. Attachment to the Political Adviser's Office would clearly seem to offer the most appropriate niche; and Mr. Murray's proposal (paragraph 4 of your minute) may provide the basis for terms that Hong Kong will find satisfactory (for the reasons given in paragraph i of Mr. Gaminara's minute I do not think we could fit this appointment into the personnel exchanges we hope to organiae).

2. We shall, I feel sure, encounter a great deal of opposition in Hong Kong to taking into their

Government machine an officer who is not working for and responsible to them. I have little doubt that we would be equally reluctant to agree to a similar arrangement in Whitehall if asked. We have, however, agreed to not too dissimilar arrangements whereby officers representing the interests of Hong Kong are posted to our embassies and missions in Brussels, Geneva and Washington and are paid for by the Hong Kong Government

3. I do not think it would be fair to Mr. Maddocks to ask him to take this matter further; nor do I think we would get anywhere by doing so, I think his letter at (8) was written after he had taken soundings of his colleagues' views. I suggest that a draft letter from Mr. Moreton to the Governor might be prepared:

(a)

putting to him the case for a China-watcher in Hong Kong (not omitting some reference to the dividend for Hong Kong);

(b) indicating the possibilities we have

examined and the reasons why they are unsuitable;

(c)

(a)

suggesting Mr. Murray's proposal (and possibly referring to its similarity to arrangements for the Hong Kong posts at Brussels, Geneva and Washington);

offering, if the proposition is acceptable in principle, to discuse any problems re- lating to the definition of the officer's functions and his relationship with the Hong Kong Government when Mr. Moreton visits Hong Kong with Lord Shepherd in early June.

bos. Carter

(W. S. Carter)

Hong Kong Department

|15 April. 1969

Love

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CONFIDENTIAL

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Reference.

You asked me for my views on the matters dealt with in this file.

Of all the proposed solutions to the problem, I cannot help feeling that despite Mr. Maddocks' objections the best place for the proposed China watcher would be in Mr. Maddocks' office. I must confess that I share Mr. Wilson's fears about the outcome if he were assigned to JSIS: it seems to me that in this event he would become little more than a drafting officer who would spend a lot of his time dealing with JS18 material and such an arrangement would, I feel, cut across the main purpose of his function which, as I see it, would be the co-ordinatio of material derived from a number of different

sources.

If he were attached to the Trade Commissioner's office, he would presumably be responsible to the Trade Commissioner and this would not be at all appropriate. You will recall that we have been very careful to ensure, in consultation with the Governor, that the terms of reference of the Trade Commissioner's ataff (I am thinking particularly of the Information Section of the office) should be confined to United Kingdom trading interests and projecting the United Kingdom image in that sphere.

4. Mr. Wilson mentions the possibility of in some way grafting this scheme on to our proposed exchange of Chinese-speaking personnel as between HMG and the Hong Kong Government. However, the whole idea of that scheme is based on a straight exchange of personnel as between the two Governments so that each officer would work for the other Government. I doubt therefore whether this proposal is a starter.

I can only suggest that Mr. Maddocks be asked to discuss the whole matter with the Hong Kong Government who might be able to propose an alternative niche for the China watcher, always on the strict understanding that all expenses incurred in

connexion with the appointment would be met by HMG.

26 March, 1969.

(A. W. Gaminara) Hong Kong Department

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.

LJIL-.--

Mr. Carter (Hong Kong Department)

I should be grateful for your views on Mr. Maddocks' proposals for a China Watching establishment in Hong Kong.

2. Frankly I am not happy about his suggestion that we should place our China Watcher in the J.S.I.S. set-up. I think there will be a real danger that he would become political adviser to the organisation and spend a great deal of his time knocking their assessments into shape. As we see it, the output of J.S.I.S. is only one part of the information pool which we would expect him to co-ordinate. I am also afraid that the J.S.I.S. tag might well prejudice his relations with non-Government organisations in Hong Kong concerned with research on China (academics, specialist journalists and private research organisa- tions). It is our intention that he should be able to move freely in these circles and he might find his association with J.S.I.S. a handicap.

3. We have already considered the possibility of placing him in the Regional Information Office and rejected it and I think you would agree that the Trade Commission would also be unsuitable. It would look

too much like a cover for a different kind of

operation.

Flag AC placing him in Information

4. Mr. Hurray has suggested that we might, to meet the constitutional proprieties, consider assigning our China watcher to the Hong Kong Government as a second Deputy Political Adviser while still paying him from F.C.0. funds. We could hardly expect the Hong Kong Government to subsidise an officer working primarily for the U.K. Government although to some extent they would benefit from his work, I should

be grateful for your views on whether this would be acceptable.

When we were discussing this subject today, you mentioned that you were examining with Personnel Department the possibility of arranging an exchange achame with the Hong Kong Government by which their

/officers

CONFIDENTIAL

officers were seconded to the F.C.0. and vice

versa. I understood that the object of this

scheme was to enable the Chinese language cadre

in the F.C.0. to keep their hands in.

When you have had a chance to read the papers attached you

will be able to see whether our scheme could be

grafted on to yours. Alternatively, you may be able, from your knowledge of the set-up in Hong Kong, to suggest another slot from which our China

Watcher could work.

lation

(C. Wilson)

Far Eastern Department

21 March, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

C.S. 4LA

10.000-2/

CONFIDENTIAL

RECENS

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT

LOWER ALBERT ROAD

HONG KONG

REF. SCR 2/4841/69

21 maa

FEC 10/13 Rear James,

11 March, 1969.

ре

ile speak.

Mr Wilson 213.

118 Marle

Thank you for your letter of 29 January about the possibility of doing more China Watching in Hong Kong.

I agree with the analysis in your letter of the kind of material which could be exploited by a China Watcher from the Diplomatic Service.

I also agree that it is reasonable to start with one officer, probably of 1st Secretary rank, and see whether he justifies his keep.

The difficulty is to decide where he should be put in Hong Kong. I said in my letter of 2 December that he should not be attached to my office but to one of the existing U.K. offices. It is true that both the Trade Commission and the Regional Information Office would have difficulty in providing him with office space, secretarial assistance and secure arrangements for his papers. But some of these administrative problems apply to my office too, for example, there is no spare room in the Secretariat's offices. In addition there is the important point that I am working for the Hong Kong Government whilst the China Watcher would be working for the Government of the U.K. The difference might seem small in Whitehall but it is important here. There would be no difficulty in giving the China Watcher access to information originating in the Hong Kong Government wherever he is put. It is not necessary for him to be attached to me or any other part of the Hong Kong Government in order to have that access. From my point of view it would be a disadvantage, and possibly some embarrassment, to be responsible, even theoretically, for an officer working for the U.K. Government. I hope therefore that some other solution can be found.

We have just had a visit from Brig. Willison (Brig., General Staff (Intelligence), Ministry of Defence), who suggested that the China Watcher should be accommodated

J. Murray, Esq., CMG,

Far Eastern Department,

Foreign & Commonwealth Office,

LONDON, S.W.1.

/contd.

CONFIDENTIAL

in the barracks with the Joint Services Intelligence Staff. That would certainly be a happy solution to all the administrative problems. He would have adequate offices, secretarial assistance, clerks, archives, security, etc. The barracks are located in the centre, not far from the Government offices, the U.S. Consulate-General, etc. He would be welcomed by the military who are conscious that they lack expertise on the Chinese political scene and would value his independent advice on their assessments. John Denson remarked to me two weeks ago that the Far Eastern Department has some times had some difficulty in Whitehall in correcting errors of opinion sent to the Ministry of Defence by the Joint Services Intelligence Staff. There would be some advantage in having an officer in Hong Kong who might correct some of these errors at an early stage and improve the quality of J.S.I.S. output. But that, of course, is not the purpose I had in mind when I wrote on 2 December. There is an obvious danger that if a Diplomatic Service officer vere supplied and were installed in the barracks he would be submerged by the much larger Service intelligence establishment there and would find it difficult to do the independent reporting to you which originally justified his establishment. I am not sure hov serious that danger would be. It would depend to some extent upon the strength of mind of the individual. there are difficulties about installing a China Watcher elsevhere in Hong Kong you might think that J.S.I.S.'s offer is the best solution.

I think the only alternative would be to put him in the Trade Commission. The security problem could be overcome by using the facilities of the Economic Survey Section for storage of classified papers overnight. there would be a need for more office space and a secretary/archivist.

But

On the whole I suggest that the J.S.I.S. offer should be accepted. It is certainly cheaper.

Copies to:

Youn

ever

(A.F. Maddocks)

J. Denson, Peking, M.P.V. Hannam, B.T

B.T.C., A.C. Ashworth, R.1.0.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVEDY INJ ARCHIV

1 8 FEB 03

The 131

Leras James, or

Office of the British Charge

d'Affaires

Peking

11 February, 1969

Thank you for sending me a copy of your unnumbered

letter of 29 January to Maddocks on the subject of increasing

our China-watching strength in Hong Kong.

I agree with your proposal.

I am sending copies of this letter to Arthur

Maddocks, Michael Hannam and Tony Ashworth in Hong Kong.

James Murray, Esq., C.M.G.,

Far Eastern Department,

FCO.

Your

wees

Ласи валом

(Percy Cradock}

Aby 4

в тре

79/2.

бала

The 26 Fale

CONFIDENTIAL

FEC

29 January, 196

I am grateful ter your interesting latter 93/2 of 7 December in which you put forward proposals for improving Buy coverage of devels,ments in China from Hong Kong, må subsequent correspondence on the rubject from laman nat Ora4oak.

2. Fa looked >t this question some time age esazidaring the future of the Mission in Poking. ex-m nẳng specifieslly the possibility of outablishing alternɑtive vantage point from which to observe China it was agreed than that Hồng Kông had special advantages not sharaf by other post Its continuing valus se ra-arvoir of information expertise on Chinese developmenta is astorted by the fact that so many foreign governments have akoses to seal thins istehere so their Casmulär posts in the Delony.

3. As your 379,20%ls were of interent to a number of Fhitehali departments, either engaged in studying Chiness developmenta sp pangoneible far organisations involved in similar work in Hong Kong, I thought it would be nesful before replying reactione, ongeställy from the Zesearch dejurtnauš, I. the Finistry of Defense. I was particul.rly smoszoed to their viewe" on your sugge Opportuni 1100

thit là sinh ra trin missing liber their orgmis

that

si am in the Jolamy could do more to help. these points were diaremaad at a meeting in the Dep-ztuan1. It svog brenne eleur Mat moết ɔf thêủa organisations in Hong Kong are fully sccupied with their existing verk which follows fairly narrowly defined

inoć requiremente laž, low by the parent ozgamiestions in

It would be difficult to adapt them tó a jolitical reporting role without redrafting their terms of referande. X appreci...te that your office is in a similar jonitiɔm. Although you may have had a limited China-ustoking brief at one stage, policy questions now take up so much of your time that I commot ves you being ɑbis to bake additional respon- sibilities in the foreseeable future without faarvase ià staff.

We then toủa a eloss lock at the information now ailable to un from neuroes in Hong Kong,

all sonoerned at the threstoned reduction in the muz,ly information with the diony;cazones of "Red Buurd" nateri :

A. 7. Nadiosks,

Colonial Secretaría

Lower Albert Real,

wati

forum...

CO. TIDSTIAL

posters and provincial newspapers, This is a serious loss to our research effort. However, then we examined the sources of information available in Hong Kong, it was generally agreed that not a great deal was escaping the net and that most of it was coming fairly quickly to one or other department in Whitehall. I set out below the position as we see it and would be grateful for your comments,

5. We receive at the moment information on China colleated in Hong Kong from travellers, immigrants and various secret sources. It was thought, however, that the following additional sources might well repay further scrutiny:-

(a) Publications. Non Communist comment and reports on

Chinese affairs may be of some interest provided they can be summarised briefly, Our experience in dealing with Chinese Nationalist publications has been none too happy, however, An examination of Hong Kong Communist newspapers and other publications may also throw some useful light on Chinese affairs.

(b) jondonion, and Russialist. Foreign Correspondents.

It would be useful for someone to maintain contact with academics and research institutes. (The Union Research Institute, China News Analysis, University Departments, etc.) with a view to reporting any infor- sation or views of special interest. Specialist correspondents, both foreign and local, might yield some information.

Although a number

of Departments may well have information on develop- ments in China, we feel that this would be of more interest to J.Ï‚B. and have less value for political work,

(a) Foreim Consulates.

Contacts with members of Consulates

In Hong Lông sharing this rather specialist interest and through them possibly with foreign visitors to China, would probably yield some useful reports. We must remember, however, that we are already exchanging asses5- ment with the Americana, Canadiana and Japanese and would not want to duplicate this work.

6. These additional sources are not going to yield a great deal of new information. But clearly there is a useful job to be done scanning all available information for its political content with a view to letting us have important items quickly. As Cradock stated in paragraph 3 of his letter the job would be essentially to liaise with a wide variety of organisations and to co-ordinate their output, We would not want to ressive voluminous and detailed assesments since we and other Whitehall departments concerned have some difficulty in coping with those we already het.

CONFIDENCIA

CONFIDENTIAI

7. In your letter you suggested that an appropriate size for a China watching organisation of this kind night be three or four officers. We are inelized to think that in the first instance at any rate we would have great difficulty in obtaining apį reval for more than one person with supporting staff. In earlier discussions with Personnel Department on the useful employment of the FCO Chinese cadre, we got the impression that they would look fairly sympɑthetically at a proposal for the employment of an additional officer in Hong Kỡng" if şie falt there was a requirement. Naturally they would not wish to see the creation of an artificial slot for one of our Chinese speakers, but they are anxious to maintain a strong-cadre of Chinese speakers, and this is the kind of job which would enable an officer of Mrat Secretary rank to keep his hand in.

The

8. Provided, ther fore, that our proposal is accepted, we would then have to decide where he should operate from in Hong Kong. I agree with Hannan that the Trade Office would be inappropriate. But this really only leaves the R.1.0. and your own office. R.1.0. offers certain obvious advantages. It has already developed contacts with a number of the organisations and groups referred to above, albeit for different purposes. In addition the 1.1.0. possesses the necessary archive and biographical material which a "China watcher" would require. However, I understand that it would be difficult for the R.1.0, to accommo- date any more staff, Furtherezore, I can see disadvantages in identifying the officer too closely with the information Image Q the 1.1.0. It is possible that some of his contacts, e.g. foreign Consulates, would not be as forthcoming with information if they felt that it might emerge in one of the 1.1.0.'s publications. Xy fears may be unjustified, but olearly if this turned out to be the case, it would restrict his usefulness to us. On these grounds I m inclined to feel that it would be better to make the officer a member of your own staff. In this way he would not be waneeted with my existing "Chine-watching" operation in Hong Kong and there would be less dầnger of crossing wires. On the other hand, he would enjoy the prestige of your office both within the Hong Kong Government and "Sutside örganisations. Xo doubt arrangements could be made for him to draw on the facilities of the Z.I.D.

If you and the recipients of this letter agree with my proposals I would go into the matter further with E.& 0, and Personnel Departments. I am sending copies of this letter to Cradook in Peking, and Hannan and Ashworth in Hong Kong.

CONFIDUITIAL,

(J. MURAY)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

BENZIE VERWAN

CONFIDENTIAL

Letter

Type 1+1

Registry No.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret

Secret.

Confidential 23/1

Restricted. Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

DRAFT

To:- F

Mr. A. Maddocka

In Confidence

From

Mr. J. Murray

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

FED

4.223/1.

Mo Candiely Packag The Hay, H.K. No Adamantly, W.K

Copes 15.

20.

H.K.

Mr Brewery H.. Steven on 1.0. Lile. Pearse 1.0.0

I am grateful for your interesting letter 93/2 of

7 December in which you put forward proposals for

improving our coverage of developments in China from

Hong Kong, and subsequent correspondence on the subject

from Hannam and Cradock.

2. We looked at this question some time ago when we

vere considering the future of the Kission in Peking.

We were examining specifically the possibility of

establishing an alternative vantage point from which to

observe China and it was agreed then that Hong Kong had

special advantages not shared by other posts. Its

continuing value as a reservoir of information and

expertise on Chinese developments is attested by the fact

that so many foreign governments have chosen to sand

Chinglé batér" to their Consular posts in the Colony.

As your proposals were of interest to a number of

Whitehall Departments, either engaged in studying Chinese

developments or responsible for organisations involved in

badan raflag ung

similar work in Hong Kong, I thought it would be useful

have

we prendly

to sellest their reactions, before sopiying. I refer

Luma Ree

Read befut

particularly to I.R.D. and the Ministry of Defence.

I was particularly concerned to have their views on your

muisti be

suggestion that we are missing opportunities in Hong Kong

and to see whether their organisations in the Colony

could do more to help. These points were discussed at a

Boon

meeting in the Department. It/became clear that most of

these organisations in Hong Kong are fully occupied with

/their

CONFIDERMINAL

WEBDL 51-7406

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

their existing work which follows fairly narrowly

defined requirements laid down by their parent

organisations in London, and it would be difficult to

adapt them to a political reporting role without

redrafting their terms of reference. I appreciate that

your office is in a similar position. Although you may

have had a limited China-watching brief at one stage,

policy questions now take up so much of your time that I

cannot see you being able to take on additional

responsibilities in the foreseeable future without an

increase in staff.

He then took a close look at the information now

zvailable to us from sources in Hong Kong. As you can-

sufpheme

imagine we are all concerned at the threatened

reduction in the supply of information with the

disappearance of "Aed guard material, wall poaters and

provincial newspapers. This is a serious loas to our

research effort. However, when we examined the sources

of information available in Hong Kong, it was generally

agreed that not a great deal was escaping the net and

that most of it was coming fairly quickly to one or

other department in Whiteball. I set out below the

position as we see it and would be grateful for your

commente.

We receive at the moment information on Chira

collected in Hong Kong from travellers, immigrants and

kamna

various secret sources. but it was thought/that the

Sowned

following additional estegories-might well repay further southing

study.

(a) Publications

Non Communist comment and reporta

on Chinese affairs may be of some interest provided they

can be summarised briefly, Our experience in dealing

with Chinese Nationalist publications has been none too

happy, however. An examination of Hong Kong Communist

newspapers and other publications may also throw some

useful light on Chinese affairs.

/(b)

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

WEBL 51-2406

CONFIDENTIAL

Inji miner Sprandial ilmest

all available

information

rate love

would how sunt

duffrandtg Stains wins afferral Ar man then

(b) Academics

and Specioust foreign comerforded's

It would be useful for someone to

maintain contact with academics and research institutes.

(The Union Research Institute, China News Analysis,

University Departments, etc.) with a view to reporting

Specivest any information or views of special interest. Comerfordert's both foreign cond local rights gird soms information. (e) Hong Kong Govezieht Departments Although a

yida

number of Departments may well have information on

developments in China, we feel that this would be of

more interest to J.I.B. and have less value for

political work.

(d) Foreiz Consulates

Contacts with members of

Consulates in Hong Kong and through them possibly with

foreign visitors to China, would probably yield some

useful reports. We must remember, however, that we

are already exchanging assessments with the Americans,

Canadians and Japanese and would not want to duplicate

this work,

6. These additional sources are not going to yield

a great deal of new information. But clearly there is a

useful job to be done scanning these and existing

ક

SOLTERA NË "İnformation for their political content with a

view to letting us have important items quickly. ¿A

Cradock stated-in paragraph 3 of his letter the job

would be essentially to liaise with a wide variety of

organisations and to co-ordinate their output. We would

not want to receive me voluminous and detailed

assasaments since we and other Whitehall departments

concerned have some difficulty in coping with those we

get. already reboire.

7. In your letter you suggested that an appropriate

size for a China watching organisation of this kind

might be three or four officers. We are inclined to

Mink

Fool, that in the first instance, there would only bi

enough wopic for one person with supporting staff. In

earlier discussions with Personnel Department on the

CONFIDENTIAL

/useful

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

WIEN 51-7405

CONFIDENTIAL

useful employment of the CC Chinese cardes, we got

the impression that they would look fairly

sympathetically at a proposal for the employment of an naditiona

/officer in Hong Kong if he felt there was a

requirement.

دست تان کا

Personnel Department are anxious to

maintain a strong cadre of Chinese speakers.) Naturally

-invention of oveating an artificial slot for

Ond

one of our Chinese speakers hat this is the kind of job

which would enable an officer of First Secretary rank

his Incandes.

to maintain his expirstoo. keq

Provided, therefore, that our proposal is

accepted, we would then have to decide whether he

should operate from Hong Kong. I agree with Hannam

that the Trade Office would be inappropriate. But this

really only leaves the R.I.O. and your own office. The

R.1.0. offers certain obvious advantages.

It has

already developed contacts with a member of the

organisations and groups referred to above,albeit for

different purposes. In addition the R.I.O. possesses

bigophers

the necessary archive and bibliögraphical material

which a China watcher would require. However, I

understand that it would be difficult for the R.1.0.

to accommodate any more staff. Furthermore, I can see

disadvantages in identifying the officer too closely

with the information image of the R.1.0. It is

possible that some of his contacts, e.g. foreign

Consulates, would not be as forthcoming with information

if they felt that it might emerge in one of the R.1.0.'a

publications. My fears may be unjustified,

but clearly if this turned out to be the case, it would

tus.

restrict his usefulness on these grounds ei I am

inclined to feel that it would be better to make the

officer a member of your own staff. In this way he

would not be connected with any existing China-watching

/operation

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

WOEL FE7406

CONFIDENTIAL

operation in Hong Kong and there would be less danger of

crossing wires. On the other hand, he would enjoy the

preatige of your office both within the Hong Kong

attuda ngang entire

معلمة

Government and amongst non-Government China-vatehing

organisations. No doubt arrangements could be made for

him to draw on the facilities of the R.1.0.

If you and the recipients of this letter agree with

woeder en into the waithir forth with

my proposals I shall put them to E. & 0. and Personnel

Departments.

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CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Murray

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference

RECEIVED IN 3

*P. HIVES TIK 31

31 JAN 1969

Flog A

I held a meeting of the various Whitehall Departments concerned with developments in China to discuss this correspondence on improving our coverage of developments in China from Hong Kong. As you can see it was generally felt that Kr. Haddocks was exaggerating the amount of new information available in Hong Kong. In this connection it is information not views which are likely to be in short supply in the near future. In the circumstances the size of his suggested China watching establishment is a bit inflated.

2. I have not discussed this yet with Personnel or E. & 0. Department but on the last occasion the question was raised with Personnel Department they made sympathetic noises (see paragraph 11 of our submission of 30 July, 1968), and I do not foresee that they will raise difficulties provided the Maddocks agrees our assessment and our fairly moderate proposal

@ Witsom

(G. Wilson) 24 January 1969

Masz Ja

CONFIDENTIAL

James,

RECEIVED I ARCHIVES SALO).

24 JAN 1969

FE43/13

Office of the British Chargé d'Affaires,

PEKING.

31 December, 1968,

China Watching in Hong Kong

1968 for 3/2.

I have seen a copy of Arthur Maddocks' letter of 2 December to you on the possibility of developing our China- watching capacity in Hong Kong. I agree there is a case for this. There is valuable material to be gained in Hong Kong which we do not at present get, not because it is not available but because there is no-one to collate it. Our position in Hong Kong is, from an intelligence point of view, greatly envied by other China-watching powers and it is certainly a pity that we do not use it to the full.

This said, I wonder whether the sort of establishment suggested in paragraph 5 of Maddocks' letter is not rather larger than would be necessary. It seems to me that one good officer of first or second secretary rank with Chinese language training supported by a secretary, could probably do the job, which, after all, would be essentially one of liaison among all the China watching bodies in Hong Kong. The best arrangement would seen to be for him to be attached to the Regional Information Office as suggested by Haddocks in his paragraph 5.

3. I should perhaps anticipate the possible argument that we should not duplicate our China-watching work in Peking and Hong Kong. The kind of work we have in mind for an officer in Hong Kong would be complementary to that we are at present doing in Peking. He would not have to do the basic work which we do here, but would try to collate in a meaningful way the useful information and opinion which is available in Hong Kong. He might also collect for us some of the publications which appear in Hong Kong and which no-one at present has time to look for. In addition he would of course have available to him material which for security reasons we do not see here.

4. I should also stress that I see this post as supplementary to our establishment here. I could not accept the argument that if we want someone in Hong Kong we must provide him from our strength in Peking. We have already greatly reduced our diplomatic strength here; indeed for the last six months have had to work at well below acceptable levels of staff. Any further reduction here would make the post scarcely worth maintaining.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Michael Hannan, Arthur Maddocks and Ashworth in Hong Kong.

Janes Murray, Esq., C.M.G.,

Far Eastern Department.

Yours wer

Васи касалом

(Percy Cradock)

CONFIDENTIAL

ference:

You Perence:

93/2

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH TRADE COMMISSION IN HONG KONG 7th Floor, Shell House, Queen's Road, Central, Hong Kong Mail Address: P.O. Box No. 528, Hong Kong Cable Address: "Uktrade Hongkong"

{ARCHIV 2024

24 JAN 1969

F243/13

Dear James,

Telephone- 230176

7th December, 1968

Lee.

Mr Wilson for yo 17e Boga.

이고

China Watching in Hong Kong

Arthur Maddocks has sent to me a copy of his letter of 2nd December to you advocating the stationing in Hong Kong of two or three Diplomatic Officers to do China watching work.

2. It is not within my province to comment on this suggestion, "but Haddocks mentioned in para. 5 of his letter that these officers might perhaps be attached to the Trade Commission. I should perhaps point out that the Trade Commission at present is not equipped with normal strong room facilities such as would be needed to house the documents these officers would handle, nor do we have a home based archivist trained in handling confidential documents. The comparatively few security graded letters we handle in my office at the moment are in the care f my locally employed P.A., but the advent of political officers of the type suggested would impose too much of a burden on her.

3. You are, of course, aware that the Economic Survey Section are housed with me, and it may well be that the proposed Diplomatic Service China watchers could be anal- gamated with them. The Economic Survey Section has, of course, got strong room facilities, but we would still need an home based archivist.

4. I am copying this letter to Arthur Maddocks.

J. Murray, Esq., C.M.G.,

Lowes ever Michae

(H.P.V. Hannak ) Principal Trade Commissioner

Head of Far astern Department, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, S,W,1.

CONFIDENTIAL

livery ofført u made to ensure that the information gives herein se secuenta, but no legal responsibility to accepted for any errors an sione in that information and no responachility la accepted in regsed to the standing of any firmu, comperim, er individual mentione

SECRET & PERSONAL

4/504/68

RECEIVED IN MIUIDINY

10 DEC1963

OFH 36/157/48

Regional Information Office, 501 Ridley House,

2 Upper Albert Road, PONG KONG.

5 December, 1968.

مد

l03/2

3/2.

You will no doubt be seeing Arthur Maddocks' letter, 'China Watching in Hong Kong' of 2 December, 1968 to James Murray.

As you will see, he is proposing the setting up of a small establishment of two or three Diplomatic Officers of 1st or 2nd Secretary rank with supporting staff for the purpose of sending regular China Watching reports to London. The idea is that this small unit should collate China Watching information from the many sources that exist hers.

Personally, I am not entirely convinced of the need for such an establishment and neither is my friend, However, I shall take the opportunity of discussing the proposal with Roy Crook during his visit and will keep you informed of developments at this end.

You a

log Armando

(A.C. Ashworth)

J.L. Stevenson Esq.,

Information Research Department,

Riverwalk House,

Millbank,

LONDON, S.W.1.

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for th

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проводов

FD10/12.

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Wien/ FOD (12/12.

SECRET & PERSONAL

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of of Marchwachys butter)

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C.S. 41A. 2600077

REF.

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CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

24 JAN 1969

FECIBLE

Dear Jam

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT

LOWER ALBERT ROAD

HONG KONG

2nd December, 1968.

saule a

defertorted view

this for discussion with Grondo. Jeft

'China Watching' in Hong Kong

lo que

Mo Wille. The Rap

When you were here in November we discussed briefly the possibility of doing more China watching in Hong Kong. It seems to me that there are opportunities here which are not being taken by the Diplomatic Service, and now that the fund of information from Peking has been reduced we ought to consider making fuller use of our unique position here. The main question, which can be decided only in London, is to what extent China watching is a useful way of using Diplomatic Service manpower.

At the moment there is no China, watching done in Hong apart from Kong by Her Majesty's Diplomatic Service/ Robin McLaren and I

are on secondment to the Hong Kong Government.

I am in no sense a China watcher and Robin McLaren, who is qualified to be one, is occupied to a large extent in the regular work of the Hong Kong Government.

Tony Ash-

worth's

office.

There are, of course, other departments of the U.K. Government with representatives in Hong Kong who produce information and reports on China, for example, Joint Services Intelligence. There are also agencies of the Hong Kong Government, above all Special Branch, who produce useful information. But these various organisations are producers mainly of basic intelligence. If they do report on Chinese policy and developments as a whole, it is usually from a specialized point of view, e.g. the military. They are not trying to do a Diplomatic Service job.

Hong Kong provides special advantages for China watching. For example, various departments of the Hong Kong Government such as the Commerce & Industry Department, the Marine Department and the Railways administration acquire in the ordinary course of business information which throws some light on events in China. There are various semi-academic bodies such as the Union Research Institute. There is also a body of expert China watchers in some of the Consular missions here, especially the Americans and the Japanese, and a body of other foreign observers such as journalists. In addition, there are various residents of Hong Kong who have useful contacts with China. There is a good deal of written material in Chinese available, some of it from Taiwan Bources. At the moment, no one is exploiting these sources with the interests of the F.C.0. mainly in mind.

/Contd...

J. Murray, Esq., CMG,

Head of Far Eastern Department, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, LONDON, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

I think a modest establishment of, say, two or three diplomatic officers of lat or 2nd Secretary rank supported by one shorthand typist would be sufficient to produce worthwhile reports. If it were decided to go ahead, I suggest that the staff should not be attached to my office but to one of the existing U.K. offices, possibly the Trade Commission, but alternatively the Regional Information Office. My idea is that there would be a small group serving the interests of the F.C.O. It might be that the Hong Kong Government would want to have some part in it. I have no doubt they would find the products useful but I have not taken up the matter inside the Hong Kong Government. It will be time to do that if you decide that my proposal merits detailed examination.

The main question is whether China watching is thought to be of sufficient interest and the advantages of Hong Kong to be sufficiently great to justify the allocation of those manpower and financial resources at a time when the main trend must be towards economy. The problem of relations with China is likely to occupy the attention of Ministers frequently over a long period. The staff we deploy at considerable expense and inconvenience in Peking is fairly small. If we are seriously interested in following Chinese affairs, it seems ridiculous to ignore the openings in Hong Kong.

It seems to me to be not an excessive burden on the resources of the Diplomatic Service to deploy an extra three or four officers in Hong Kong. I regard myself as entirely disinterested in this question, since I would never qualify to join the proposed group and do not suggest that it should be part of the Political Adviser's Office. I write as a member of the Diplomatic Service, not as Political Adviser. I am confident that however much they dislike the prospect of new burdens, E. & 0. Department will examine my proposal seriously since they know that in my last post I took the initiative in abolishing at least that number of posts. It also seems appropriate to raise the matter now because the Duncan Committee is engaged in thinking about the future shape of the Service, which implies expanding in some places as well as reducing in others.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Percy Cradock, Michael Hannam and Tony Ashworth.

Your

ever.

Authm.

(A.F. Maddocks)