PART
A (FLT)
File No.
FC3/20
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FOREIGN OFFICE
MILE:
U.K.
SECRET
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·
CLOSED.
DEPT. FAR EASTERN
- BUTICAL AFFAIRS (EXT.) BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH-
ACTION AGAINST CHINESE IN U.K.
REFER TO
DEPT.
NAME
DATE DEPT.
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DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY
RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. OR P.A.
FILE
OPENED
CLOSED
7.8.67 258.67.
SECURITY GRADING
FILE
N.B. The grading of this file must highest graded document contained In slip must be affixed whenever necessary
PART
FC3/20 AG
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Mr. Bolland
ECEIVED 'N
Reference tIVES No 31 4E
+
F2.3Q
I telephoned Mr. Hsieh at the Chinese Office on the afternoon of 7 September to enquire what business he had wished to raise in attempted tele- phone calls to Mr. Bolland.
2. Mr. Heich said he was instructed to tell me the following:
3.
※
(a) Ten packages of film addressed to
Shen P'ing had arrived in London on 1 September by air. They were addressed to the Head of the Chinese Mission and should therefore be released automatically. So far the Customs had failed to release them. The Customs officials had said they had received no instructions from the Foreign Office to release the goods. The Chinese had phoned Protocol Department four times. Protocol Department had said they were not in charge of the matter and had referred the Chinese to Far Eastern Department.
(b) One box of invitation cars addressed
as above had arrived in London on 17 August. An application had been handed in to the Foreign officegoh 22 August (No. P32-67) but so far the goods still had not been released.
(0) A certain amount of printed matter was being detained by the Post
office.
Mr. Haieh demanded that the Foreign Offite give immediate instructions to Customs to release the gooda and also to the Post office.
4. Mr. Hsieh said that the Mission were exempt from import duty and customs examination. He asked whether the delay in releasing the goods was a deliberate act by the British Government. He repeated the demand for inmediate release of the goods and mail otherwise "we must make a report on this serious matter to the Chinese Government and the British Government will be responsible for all the consequenc Mr. Haich said that the Chinese awaited Mr. Bolland reply and hoped he would act promptly.
5. I told Mr. Haish that he should not assume that the British Customs and Post Office were run by the Foreign Office, let alone Far Eastern Department.
6. Mr. Haleh retorted that even 3.0.A.C. were now complaining about the delay, they and other bodies had all referred the Chinese to the Foreign Office and the Protocol Department had referred them to Far Eastern Department.
Anand
D. I. Boyd)
8 September, 1967
JQ Band
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cofu Mayall about * above.
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2.
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will do likewise.
Jovi
18
esta
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See lataj submona
pa.
SECRET
FC3/20
Mr. de la Mare
THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEE'· RETAINED
+
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNC ....; SECTI 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958
JAIMING THE CHINESE DIPLOMATIC WIRELESS
I have now had further discussions
the
Diplomatic Wireless Service and Government Communications Headquarters. The upshot is that it would be technically possible to jan the Chinese wireless on a narrow band, provided that this were done from a position close enough to the Chinese premises. I understand that this could be arranged and that there would be no interference with transmissions from other sources.
2. The Director of the Diplomatic Wireless Service and the Director of G.C.H.Q. both recommend, however, that we should not resort to jamming because the Chinese might retaliate against our diplomatic wireless in various posts in South East Asia. This could not apparently be done very quickly nor is it clear how effective it would be, but in principle there is strong objection to starting a jamming war.
3.
The
While I see the force of these objections, jamming is surely much preferable to breaking into the Chinese diplomatic premises. It would not necessarily have to be permanent end might be a very useful bargaining counter against the restoration of our wireless facilities in Peking. Diplomatic Wireless Service say that a complete replacement unit for Peking has already been packed and could be despatched immediately if the Chinese agreed to let it in. Any decision to start jamming could be preceded by a warning to the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires on the lines suggested in my minute of 24 August. I think that we should be more likely to secure an eventual restoration of our own facilities by jamming rather than by entering the Chinese diplomatic premises as this could produce an ugly incident with consequences far more far-reaching than merely preventing the restoration of facilities in Peking.
4. You will have noted from Mr. Hopson's most recent telegram today that some emergency D.W.S. equipment has survived. He is presumably not using it because he knows that it would be Monitored by the Chinese, who otherwise would have no knowledge of its existence. It could, of course, be used in extremis. Otherwise it would seem beat to continue to use the French facilities and possibly to try to send some traffic in cypher through commercial channels if the Chinese will allow it.
Jon Denson
(J. B. Dengon) 25 August, 1967.
I discussed this with the 6.15 at Dorney wood on 25 August. He said that if it were possible
to sam on a maum Hand
مه ماه
моит
without undure complications we should but he did not want anything done at this stage which would increase tension.
Please see what in the Chanine are suit
using their transmitter, then til ur further before any action is latter
Mr Boliafd
I spelen & off to for.
The Chinese
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THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION S) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958
Sir Denis
jen
CONFIDENTIAL
For Eas.....
Esenter.
41C
RECEIVED IN ARCH
31 AUG 197
1FC3/19
Counter Leusures against
zasures of the Chinese Diplomatic
It is useful to have Sir Francis Vallat's review of the possibilities. I gather there is no immediate intention to make an Order. Before making an Order it will be necessary carefully to consider the probable extent to which the removal of immunities from the Chinese Mission and personnel in London will adversely effect the position of their British counter-parts in Peking. So far the Chinese have not "removed" or denied the right to immunity of our Hission end personnel in Peking, although their actions are blatant infringements of that immunity.
C. HENSBY)
A just, 1067
I agree generally. Let us certainly take retaliatory action but, needless to say, nothing that would make the plight of our people in Peking worse than it is.
LIME Stow
(G. K. F. STOW)
23 Agust, 1967
Copies to:
Sir Francis Vallat Mr. de la Mare
p.
Par Eastern Department
Arbuthnott
Now overtaken.
pela ik
We shobe.
ни
Mr. Thomson already has the
minute by fix F. Vallat
To be' enter. I
301 Far Eastern
24
ঠ Dr."/
with Sir F Vallal.
CONFIDENTIAL
hr. de la Xar
4 B
SECRET
0.3:
SU AUG 1967
CHINESE DIPLOMATIC WIRELESS
On 21 August Er. Thomson told the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires that Chinese diplomatic wireless facilities would be suspended until such time as our facilities in Peking were restored. We know from G.C.H.Q. that the Chinese are, in fact, transmitting. G.C.H.Q. do not wish to jam the transmissions as this would involve jamming other transmitters. Moreover, they are afraid that the Chinese might retaliate by jamming transmissions from Hong Kong. As the Chinese have their own generator there would be no point in cutting off the electricity supply. The only alternative, therefore, seems to be to enter the Chinese premises and remove the transmitter.
/)2.
In his minute of 23 August (attached) Sir F. Vallatt points out that in view of what has happened in China there would probably be sufficient legal basis for the withdrawal of a number of privileges and immunities conferred on Chinese diplomats by the Diplomatic Privileges Act, 1964. Article 22 of this Act deals with the inviolability of the premises of the Kission, including the property thereon. If Kinisters decided, therefore, that the wireless transmitter should be removed we could find legal justification for doing so. It would, however, require the agreement of the Home Office if the premises were to be entered by the police. The Chinese would certainly resist and a struggle might ensue involving violence, if not bloodshed. Recent experience has shown that arms are often held in Chinese diplomatic Missions.
3. If we contemplated taking this kind of action a first step might be to tell the Chinese that we knew that they had ignored our instruction to cease transmitting and that if within a given period our own facilities in Peking were not restored we should take whatever measures were necessary to stop them from tranmitting. They could be told at the same time that they would be allowed to transmit messages through commercial channels provided that we were allowed to do so in Peking. It is, of course, possible that even if the Chinese were to agree to our facilities being restored in Peking this could not take place immediately as the equipment has probably been irreparably damaged.
2mm Denson
(J. B. Denagh) 24 August, 1967.
Copy to: Private Secretary.
/I think
SECRET
SECRET
Sir D. Allen
I think that the first step is to summon the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires and tell him that we know that they are continuing to use their transmitter although they have been instructed not to do so. I would add that if they do not voluntarily comply with these instructions we intend to take steps to prevent the use of the transmitter but that, as soon as our own D.W.S. facilities in Peking are restored the instructions banning theirs will be lifted. I would also remind him (although he must be quite well aware of the fact) that he is at liberty to send telegraphic messages to Peking by ordinary commercial channels.
2. If you agree I think that I should tell Shen P'ing tonight that I should wish to see him tomorrow morning suggest at 9 a.m.
I agree that
ん
-
I
W.f. de la han
(A.J. de la Mare)
24 August, 1967
that we should tell then Pin
know he is still transmitting. If
Ping
we
wt
further
مرو
we must be clear what steps we intend to take.
I think myself that we should not enter the
Chinese premises
without first withdrawing, by
Order in Council, their privilege of inviolability. Such action might cause the Chinese to remove
be worth) the inviolability (for what little that may of M. Hopson's news premises in Peking.
Until we have prepared
and are ready to use it
am Broker in Council
only
I should, warn then Pling
that we expect him to comply with one instructiones and to communicate by commercial channels; if he does not he must face the consequences.
SECRET
The next step, if and when we are
ready to art, might be to tell him if he still was his windlers that he will lose
We might prefere an
his immunity.
Order in Council
to cover perhaps aho
Lü
the post in the last paragraphe of Sir F.
Vallat's minute as well an
Article 22
of the
1964 Pct.
But we should have to
be cautions about deciding to enact it.
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Denis Allen. "/8
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Sir Denis Allen
CONFIDENTIAL
4|A)
ACER ༥ ARCHIVES N 31
Counter Measures against
members of the Chinese Diplomatic Mission ---
FC3RQ
This morning Sir Kenneth Jones, Home Office, telephoned to say that, in his view, an amendment could not be made to the Aliens Order 1953 to make the provisions regarding permission to leave the United Kingdom applicable to members of a foreign diplomatic mission. The reason is that the exclusion of diplomatic persons is provided by Section 14(1) of the Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act 1919 as amended by Section 5(1) of the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964. In other words, the privilege to leave the realm is statutory and cannot be amended by Order in Council.
2. We have considered whether, notwithstanding the provisions of the 1919 Act, this privilege could be restricted by Order in Council under Section 3(1) of the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964. However, that
provision is limited to the withdrawal of privileges and immunities conferred under the 1964 Act. It does not, in our view, extend to a privilege enjoyed under the 1919 Act.
3. These views have been put orally to the Attorney-General who, after consultation with the Solicitor-General, has, at least provisionally, agreed that they are right.
of discussion
4. In the courag, the Attorney-General pointed out that the with- drawal of privileges under Section 3(1) of the 1964 Act need not coincide exactly with the reduction of privileges and immunities accorded to the British Mission in China. He thought (and I respectfully agree) that what had happened in China would provide sufficient legal basis for the withdrawal of a number of privileges and immunities conferred by the 1964 Act. It may be desirable to consider whether any such action should be taken, even though it would not include withdrawal, by Order in Council, of the right to leave the United Kingdom. It may be noted, in this connection, that an Order under Section 3 of the 1964 Act could be brought into force without delay although, by Section 6(1), it would be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
5, The relevant privileges and immunities are stated in the Articles of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations set out in Schedule 1 to the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964. I have examined these Articles and think that the following are those most worthy of consideration in the present connection,- Articles 22, 24, 27, 29, 30, 31, 36, 37 and certain parts of 39. For convenience of reference a copy of the Act is attached.
6. Briefly, the subject matter of those Articles is as follows:-
Article 22 deals with the inviolability of the premises
of the mission, including property thereon and the means of transport of the mission.
Article 24 provides for inviolability of the archives
and documents of the mission.
CONFIDENTIAL
/Article 27
CONFIDENTIAL
Article 27 deals with freedom of communication.
Articles 29 and 30 provide for the inviolability of the
person of the diplomatic agent and his residence and papers.
Article 31 provides for the immunity from jurisdiction
of a diplomatic agent.
Article 36 concerns customs privileges and inspection of
personal baggage.
Article 37 provides for the extension of privileges and immunities to members of the family of a diplomatic agent and other members of the staff of a mission.
Article 39 calls for special comment. It does not expressly confer a right to leave the country. What it does is to provide for the continuation of the privileges and inmunities until the persons affected actually leave the country or until the expiry of a reasonable period in which to do so. It may be desirable to make an Order which would make it clear that, on the termination of any diplomatic status, a member of the Chinese Mission would immediately lose all his privileges and immunities, i.e. that he would lose the benefit of the "expiry of a reasonable period" in which to leave the country. This would reinforce the position if it were decided to terminate the diplomatic status of any member of the Mission who tried to leave the country without an exit visa.
Fain Vallar
(Francis Vallat) 23 August, 1967.
Copy to:
Mr. de la Mare
Far Eastern Dept.
Protocol Dept.
Airlin bein When
other ph
ん
25/8
CONFIDENTIAL
MON
DIEU
DRO
FZ 3/10w41
Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964
CHAPTER 81
ARRANGEMENT OF SECTIONS
Section
1. Replacement of existing law.
2. Application of Vienna Convention.
3. Restriction of privileges and immunities.
4.
Evidence.
5. Consequential amendments.
6. Orders in Council.
7. Saving for certain bilateral arrangements.
8. Short title, interpretation, commencement, repeal and saving.
SCHEDULES:
Schedule 1-Articles of Vienna Convention having the
force of law in the United Kingdom.
Schedule 2-Enactments repealed.
Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964
CH. 81
1
ELIZABETH II
DIEL
1964 CHAPTER 81
An Act to amend the law on diplomatic privileges and immunities by giving effect to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and for purposes connected therewith.
[31st July 1964]
B
E IT ENACTED by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:-
1. The following provisions of this Act shall, with respect Replacement to the matters dealt with therein, have effect in substitution of existing for any previous enactment or rule of law,
law.
2-(1) Subject to section 3 of this Act, the Articles set out Application in Schedule 1 to this Act (being Articles of the Vienna Conven- of Vienna tion on Diplomatic Relations signed in 1961) shall have the Convention. force of law in the United Kingdom and shall for that purpose be construed in accordance with the following provisions of this section.
(2) In those Articles
agents of the receiving State" shall be construed as in- cluding any constable and any person exercising a power of entry to any premises under any enactment (including any enactment of the Parliament of Northern Ireland);
"national of the receiving State" shall be construed as
meaning citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies
A 2
2
Restriction of privileges and
immunities.
CH. 81
LI
Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964
Ministry for Foreign Affairs or such other ministry as may be agreed" shall be construed as meaning the department of the Secretary of State concerned: and, in the application of those Articles to Scotland, any reference to attachment or execution shall be construed as a reference to the execution of diligence, and any referend co the execution of a judgment as a reference to the enforce at of a decree by diligence.
(3) For the purposes of Article 32 a waiver by the head of the mission of any State or any person for the time being performing his functions shall be deemed to be a waiver by that State.
(4) The exemption granted by Article 33 with respect to any services shall be deemed to except those services from any class of employment which is insurable employment, or in respect of which contributions are required to be paid, under the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Acts 1946 to 1964, the National Insurance Acts 1946 to 1964, any enactment for the time being in force amending any of those Acts, or any corresponding enactment of the Parliament of Northern Ireland, but not so as to render any person liable to any contribution which he would not be required to pay if those services were not so excepted.
(5) Articles 35, 36 and 40 shall be construed as granting any privilege or immunity which they require to be granted.
(6) The references in Articles 37 and 38 to the extent to which any privileges and immunities are admitted by the receiving State and to additional privileges and immunities that may be granted by the receiving State shall be construed as referring respectively to the extent to which any privileges and immunities may be specified by Her Majesty by Order in Council and to any additional privileges and immunities that may be so specified
3.-(1) If it appears to Her Majesty that the privileges and immunities accorded to a mission of Her Majesty in the terri- tory of any State, or to persons connected with that mission, are less than those conferred by this Act on the mission of that State or on persons connected with that mission, Her Majesty may by an Order in Council withdraw such of the privileges and immunities so conferred from the mission of that State or from such persons connected with it as appears to Her Majesty to be proper.
(2) An Order in Council under this section shall be dis- regarded for the purposes of paragraph (a) of the proviso to 11 & 12 Geo. section 4 of the British Nationality Act 1948 (citizenship of
children of certain persons possessing diplomatic immunity).
6. c. 56.
Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964
CH. 81
4. If in any proceedings any question arises whether or not Evidence. any person is entitled to any privilege or immunity under this Act a certificate issued by or under the authority of the Secretary of State stating any fact relating to that question shall be conclusive evidence of that fact.
3
نيا
(1) In section 14(1) of the Aliens Restriction (Amend. Consequential ment) Act 1919 (saving for diplomatic persons) for the words amendments.
head of a foreign diplomatic mission or any member of his 9 & 10 Geo. 5. official staff or household" there shall be substituted the words c. 92. "member of a mission (within the meaning of the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964) or any person who is a member of the family and forms part of the household of such a member
13
LE
14
(2) In paragraph (a) of the proviso to section 4 of the British Nationality Act 1948 for the words from " possesses such immunity to His Majesty there shall be substituted the words "is a person on whom any immunity from jurisdiction is conferred by or under the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 or on whom such immunity from jurisdiction as is conferred by that Act on a diplomatic agent is conferred by or under any other Act".
6.-(1) No recommendation shall be made to Her Majesty Orders in in Council to make an Order under section 2 of this Act unless Council, a draft thereof has been laid before Parliament and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament; and any statutory instrument containing an Order under section 3 of this Act shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
(2) Any power to make an Order conferred by the foregoing provisions of this Act includes power to vary or revoke an Order by a subsequent Order.
7. (1) Where any special agreement or arrangement Saving for between the Government of any State and the Government of certain the United Kingdom in force at the commencement of this bilateral Act provides for extending-
(a) such immunity from jurisdiction and from arrest or detention, and such inviolability of residence, as are conferred by this Act on a diplomatic agent; or
(b) such exemption from customs duties, taxes and related charges as is conferred by this Act in respect of articles for the personal use of a diplomatic agent;
to any class of person, or to articles for the personal use of any class of person, connected with the mission of that State. that immunity and inviolability or exemption shall so extend. so long as that agreement or arrangement continues in force.
Arrange- ments.
Short title,
CH. 81
Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964
(2) The Secretary of State shall publish in the London, Edinburgh and Belfast Gazettes a notice specifying the States with which and the classes of person with respect to which such an agreement or arrangement as is mentioned in subsection (1) of this section is in force and whether its effect is as mentioned in paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of that subsection, and sim 11 whenever necessary amend the notice by a further such no. ¿t and the notice shall be conclusive evidence of the agreement or arrangement and the classes of person with respect to which it is in force.
8. (D) This Act may be cited as the Diplomatic Privileges interpretation, Act 1964.
commence-
ment, repeal and saving.
(2) This Act shall be construed as if Southern Rhodesia were a State.
(3) This Act shall come into force on such day as Her Majesty may by Order in Council appoint.
(4) The enactments mentioned in Schedule 2 to this Act are hereby repealed to the extent specified in column 3 of that Schedule.
(5) Any Order in Council under the Diplomatic Immunities 4 & 5 Eliz. 2. Restriction Act 1955 which is in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall, so far as it could have been made under section 3 of this Act, have effect as if so made.
c. 21.
Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964
CH. 81
S
SCHEDULES
SCHEDULE 1
ARTICLES OF VIENNA CONVENTION HAVING THE FORCE OF LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
ARTICLE 1
For the purpose of the present Convention, the following expres- sions shall have the meanings hereunder assigned to them;
(a) the "head of the mission" is the person charged by the sending State with the duty of acting in that capacity: (b) the "members of the mission" are the head of the mission
and the members of the staff of the mission;
(c) the "members of the staff of the mission" are the members of the diplomatic staff, of the administrative and technical staff and of the service staff of the mission:
(d) the "members of the diplomatic staff" are the members of
the staff of the mission having diplomatic rank;
H
H
(e) a "diplomatic agent is the head of the mission or a
member of the diplomatic staff of the mission: (the "members of the administrative and technical staff
the members of the staff of the mission employed in the administrative and technical service of the mission:
L
are
(g) the members of the service staff" are the members of the staff of the mission in the domestic service of the mission: (h) a "private servant is a person who is in the domestic service of a member of the mission and who is not an employee of the sending State:
(i) the "premises of the mission" are the buildings or parts of buildings and the land ancillary thereto, irrespective of ownership, used for the purposes of the mission including the residence of the head of the mission
ARTICLE 22
The agents
1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.
2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appro- priate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.
3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution.
ARTICLE 23
1. The sending State and the head of the mission shall be exempt from all national, regional or municipal dues and taxes in respect of the premises of the mission, whether owned or leased, other than such as represent payment for specific services rendered.
Section 2.
SCH. I
CH. 81
Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964
2. The exemption from taxation referred to in this Article shall not apply to such dues and taxes payable under the law of the receiving State by persons contracting with the sending State or the head of the mission.
ARTICLE 24
The archives and documents of the mission shall be inviolatile at any time and wherever they may be.
ARTICLE 27
1. The receiving State shall permit and protect free communica- tion on the part of the mission for all official purposes. In com- municating with the Government and other missions and consulates of the sending State, wherever situated, the mission may employ all appropriate means, including diplomatic couriers and messages in code or cipher. However, the mission may install and use a wireless transmitter only with the consent of the receiving State.
2. The official correspondence of the mission shall be inviolable. Official correspondence means all correspondence relating to the mission and its functions.
3. The diplomatic bag shall not be opened or detained.
4. The packages constituting the diplomatic bag must bear visible external marks of their character and may contain only diplomatic documents or articles intended for official use.
5. The diplomatic courier, who shall be provided with an official document indicating his status and the number of packages con- stituting the diplomatic bag, shall be protected by the receiving State in the performance of his functions. He shall enjoy personal inviolability and shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention.
6. The sending State or the mission may designate diplomatic couriers ad hoc. In such cases the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Article shall also apply, except that the immunities therein mentioned shall cease to apply when such a courier has delivered to the consignee the diplomatic bag in his charge.
7. A diplomatic bag may be entrusted to the captain of a com- mercial aircraft scheduled to land at an authorised port of entry. He shall be provided with an official document indicating the number of packages constituting the bag but he shall not be con- sidered to be a diplomatic courier. The mission may send one of its members to take possession of the diplomatic bag directly and freely from the captain of the aircraft.
ARTICLE 28
The fees and charges levied by the mission in the course of its official duties shall be exempt from all dues and taxes.
Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964
CH. 81
7
ARTICLE 29
The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.
ARTICLE 30
The private residence of a diplomatic agent shall enjoy the same inviolability and protection as the premises of the mission. 2. His papers, correspondence and, except as provided in para- graph 3 of Article 31, his property, shall likewise enjoy inviolability.
ARTICLE 31
1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of: (a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission; (b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir of legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State
(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions.
2. A diplomatic agent is not obliged to give evidence as a witness.
3. No measures of execution may be taken in respect of a diplo- matic agent except in the cases coming under sub-paragraphs (@). (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of this Article, and provided that the measures concerned can be taken without infringing the inviolability of his person or of his residence.
4. The immunity of a diplomatic agent from the jurisdiction of the receiving State does not exempt him from the jurisdiction of the sending State.
ARTICLE 32
1. The immunity from jurisdiction of diplomatic agents and of persons enjoying immunity under Article 37 may be waived by the sending State.
2. The waiver must always be express.
3. The initiation of proceedings by a diplomatic agent or by a person enjoying immunity from jurisdiction under Article 37 shall preclude him from invoking immunity from jurisdiction in respect of any counter-claim directly connected with the principal claim.
4. Waiver of immunity from jurisdiction in respect of civil or administrative proceedings shall not be held to imply waiver of immunity in respect of the execution of the judgment, for which a separate waiver shall be necessary.
SCH. 1
SCH. 1
CH. 81
Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964
ARTICLE 33
1. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 of this Article. a diplomatic agent shall with respect to services rendered for the sending State be exempt from social security provisions which may be in force in the receiving State.
2. The exemption provided for in paragraph I of this Article shall also apply to private servants who are in the sole empl a diplomatic agent, on condition:
(a) that they are not nationals of or permanently resident
in the receiving State; and
(b) that they are covered by the social security provisions which may be in force in the sending State or a third State.
3. A diplomatic agent who employs persons to whom the exemption provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article does not apply shall observe the obligations which the social security provisions of the receiving State impose upon employers.
4. The exemption provided for in paragraphs and 2 of this Article shall not preclude voluntary participation in the social security system of the receiving State provided that such partici- pation is permitted by that State.
5. The provisions of this Article shall not affect bilateral or multilateral agreements concerning social security concluded previously and shall not prevent the conclusion of such agreements in the future.
ARTICLE 34
A diplomatic agent shall be exempt from all dues and taxes, personal or real, national, regional or municipal, except:
(a) indirect taxes of a kind which are normally incorporated
in the price of goods or services;
(b) dues and taxes on private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission: (c) estate, succession or inheritance duties levied by the receiving State, subject to the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article 39; (d) dues and taxes on private income having its source in the receiving State and capital taxes on investments made in commercial undertakings in the receiving State:
(e) charges levied for specific services rendered;
(f) registration, court or record fees, mortgage dues and stamp duty, with respect to immovable property, subject to the provisions of Article 23.
ARTICLE 35
The receiving State shall exempt diplomatic agents from all personal services, from all public service of any kind whatsoever, and from military obligations such as those connected with requisi tioning, military contributions and billeting,
Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964
CH. 81
9
ARTICLE 36
1. The receiving State shall, in accordance with such laws and regulations as it may adopt, permit entry of and grant exemption from all customs duties, taxes, and related charges other than charges for storage, cartage and similar services, on:
(a) articles for the official use of the mission:
(b) articles for the personal use of a diplomatic agent or members of his family forming part of his household. including articles intended for his establishment.
2. The personal baggage of a diplomatic agent shall be exempt from inspection, unless there are serious grounds for presuming that it contains articles not covered by the exemptions mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article, or articles the import or export of which is prohibited by the law or controlled by the quarantine regulations of the receiving State. Such inspection shall be con- ducted only in the presence of the diplomatic agent or of his authorised representative.
ARTICLE 37
1. The members of the family of a diplomatic agent forming part of his household shall, if they are not nationals of the receiving State, enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in Articles 29 to 36.
2. Members of the administrative and technical staff of the mission, together with members of their families forming part of their respective households, shall, if they are not nationals of or permanently resident in the receiving State, enjoy the privileges and immunities specified in Articles 29 to 35, except that the immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving State specified in paragraph of Article 31 shall not extend to acts performed outside the course of their duties. They shall also enjoy the privileges specified in Article 36, paragraph 1, in respect of articles imported at the time of first installation.
3. Members of the service staff of the mission who are not nationals of or permanently resident in the receiving State shall enjoy immunity in respect of acts performed in the course of their duties, exemption from dues and taxes on the emoluments they receive by reason of their employment and the exemption contained in Article 33.
4. Private servants of members of the mission shall, if they are not nationals of or permanently resident in the receiving State, be exempt from dues and taxes on the emoluments they receive by reason of their employment. In other respects, they may enjoy privileges and immunities only to the extent admitted by the receiving State.
However, the receiving State must exercise its jurisdiction over those persons in such a manner as not to interfere unduly with the performance of the functions of the mission.
ARTICLE 38
1. Except in so far as additional privileges and inmunities may be granted by the receiving State, a diplomatic agent who is à
SCH. 1
10
CH. 81
SCH. 1
Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964
national of or permanently resident in that State shall enjoy only immunity from "jurisdiction, and inviolability, in respect of official acts performed in the exercise of his functions.
2. Other members of the staff of the mission and private servants who are nationals of or permanently resident in the receiving State shall enjoy privileges and immunities only to the extent admived by the receiving State. However, the receiving State must exée its jurisdiction over those persons in such a manner as not to interfere unduly with the performance of the functions of the mission.
ARTICLE 39
1. Every person entitled to privileges and immunities shall enjoy them from the moment he enters the territory of the receiving State on proceeding to take up his post or, if already in its territory, from the moment when his appointment is notified to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs or such other ministry as may be agreed.
2. When the functions of a person enjoying privileges and immuni- ties have come to an end, such privileges and immunities shall normally cease at the moment when he leaves the country, or on expiry of a reasonable period in which to do so, but shall subsist until that time, even in case of armed conflict. However, with respect to acts performed by such a person in the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission, immunity shall continue to subsist.
3. In case of the death of a member of the mission, the members of his family shall continue to enjoy the privileges and immunities to which they are entitled until the expiry of a reasonable period in which to leave the country.
4. In the event of the death of a member of the mission not a national of or permanently resident in the receiving State or a member of his family forming part of his household, the receiving State shall permit the withdrawal of the movable property of the deceased, with the exception of any property acquired in the country the export of which was prohibited at the time of his death. Estate, succession and inheritance duties shall not be levied on movable property the presence of which in the receiving State was due solely to the presence there of the deceased as a member of the mission or as a member of the family of a member of the mission.
ARTICLE 40
1. If a diplomatic agent passes through or is in the territory of a third State, which has granted him a passport visa if such visa was necessary, while proceeding to take up or to return to his post, or when returning to his own country, the third State shall accord him inviolability and such other immunities as may be required to ensure his transit or return. The same shall apply in the case of any members of his family enjoying privileges or immunities who are accompanying the diplomatic agent, or travelling separately to join him or to return to their country.
Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964
CH. 81
11
2. In circumstances similar to those specified in paragraph 1 of this Article, third States shall not hinder the passage of members of the administrative and technical or service staff of a mission. and of members of their families, through their territories.
3. Third States shall accord to official correspondence and other official communications in transit, including messages in code or er, the same freedom and protection as is accorded by the receiving State. They shall accord to diplomatic couriers, who have been granted a passport visa if such visa was necessary, and diplo- matic bags in transit the same inviolability and protection as the receiving State is bound to accord.
4. The obligations of third States under paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article shall also apply to the persons mentioned respec- tively in those paragraphs, and to official communications and diplomatic bags, whose presence in the territory of the third State is due to force majeure,
SCH. 1
12
CH. 81
Section 8.
Chapter
7 Anne. c. 12.
12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6. c. 41. 14 Geo. 6.
c. 14.
15 & 16 Geo. 6. and 1 Eliz. 2. c. 10.
15 & 16 Geo. 6. and 1 Eliz. 2. c. 18.
Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964
SCHEDULE 2
ENACTMENTS REPEALED
Short Title
Extent of Repeal
The Diplomatic Privileges The whole Act.
Act 1708.
| The Ireland Act 1949.
The International Organ- | isations (Immunities and Privileges) Act 1950. The Income Tax Act 1952.
The Diplomatic Immun- ities (Commonwealth Countries and Republic of Ireland) Act 1952.
& 5 Eliz. 2. The Diplomatic Immun- c. 21.
ities 1955.
Restriction
Act
5 & 6 Eliz. 2. The Ghana Independence
c. 6.
Act 1957.
c. 11.
9 & 10 Eliz. 2. The Diplomatic Immun- ities (Conferences with Commonwealth Coun- tries and Republic of Ireland) Act 1961.
Section 2(2).
In section 4(1) the words "and
rule of law ".
In section 119, subsections (3)
and (4).
Section 461 so far as it relates to members of mission as defined in Article 1 in Schedule 1 to this Act. In section 1, subsection (1), in subsection (2)(a) the words
(other than persons on whom immunity is conferred by the preceding subsection)", subsection (4), and in sub- section (5)(a) the words "by or"
" and the words from " on himself "to" staff, or " in the second place where those words occur. The whole Act.
In Schedule 2, in paragraph 2, the words from "and the proviso" to the end.
In section 1, in subsection (1)
the words " and rule of law and in subsection (4) the words from "a citizen of the United Kingdom
to "country shall", the word
be" where it first occurs and the words from " and the name to "* this subsection ".
++
10 & 1: Eliz. 2. The Commonwealth Im-In section 17, in subsection (1),
c. 21.
migrants Act 1962.
the words "whether under any rule of law or ".
(38498)
PRINTED BY SIR PERCY PAULKNER, KRE, CB,
Controller of Her Majesty's Stationary Office and Queen's Printer of Acts of Parliament LONDON: PUBLISHED BY HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICA
Price Is. 3d, net
PRINTED IN ENGLAND
Er. de la Kara.
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVE ENɔ 31
24 AUG 1967
FC3/20
Flag A
Problem
EUTERS AND THE NET CHINA NEWS AGENCY
H.M. Chargé d'Affaires in Peking reports in his telegram
no. 1116 that he was summoned to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
FD 13/8 Affairs on 20 August to be given a note demanding that all
Flag B
FC13/858
Flag C
FC13/360
Chinese journalists arrested in Hong Kong should be declared
innocent and set free, that the ban recently put on the three
Communist newspapers should be lifted and that law suits against
Communist papers should be called off. If these demands were
not met within 48 hours, H.M. Government would be "held responsible
for all consequences". He learned on the same day (Peking
telegram no. 1114) that a group of Chinese demonstrators had
broken into the house of Er. Grey, the Reuters correspondent who
has been under house arrest since 21 July, and that telephonic
communication between Kr. Grey's house and our Office had ceased.
The official at the Chinese Foreign Ministry indicated that if
the ultimatum was not complied with, further measures against
Er. Grey were to be expected. Kr. Hopson rejected the Chinese
note. He has reported that in addition to action against
Mr. Grey we may expect action against his own Kission, probably
including violence (Peking telegram no. 1118). Mr. Hopson has
aaked for severe pressure to be exerted on the New China News
Agency in London and recommended that the Chinese be warned that
if anything further is done to Er. Grey or to his Mission
N.C.N.A. operations in London will be suspended.
/Recommendation
E
CONFIDENTIAL
Recommendation
2.
I recommend:
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
(a) that Er. Hopson be instructed to inform the
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that if
further action is taken against Mr. Grey or
against his Mission, measures will be taken
against the N.C.N.A. in London;
(b) that in the light of any action taken in Peking
after the expiry of the ultimatum, i.e. about
1530 hours G.M.T. on 22 August, we inform the
Office of the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires here
that:
(1) N.C.N.A. must cease functioning and its
personnel must report at stated intervals
to the police; or if Chinese action
justifies it
(ii) all members of N.C.N.A. must leave London
(11)
within 48 hours. And in any case
(c) a system of exit visas for all Chinese officials in
this country
he instituted.
Home Office agreement will be required for (a) and (b) and
their co-operation for (c).
Argument and Background
3. This is the first time that the Chinese have issued an
ultimatum over Hong Kong. I think we must agree with Mr. Hopson
that action is likely, both against Mr. Grey and against the
British Mission. When Er. Grey was first put under house arrest
/on 21 July
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[
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-3-
Flac
FZ F2370 the possibility of taking certain action against N.C.N.A. in
on 21 July the Foreign Secretary raised with the Home Secretary
Flag E
F2 3/20R
Flag F
Fiz /20/2
London (see his minute of 19 July). The Home Secretary's reply
dated 1 August was unhelpful. What it amounted to was that the
Home Secretary had powers to harass non-diplomatic Chinese,
e.g. members of N.C.N.A., by ordering them to report to the
police ("restriction on residence") and to prevent them from
leaving the country or to oblige them to do so by withdrawing
their residence permits. He was, however, unwilling to exercise
these powers because he thought that it could not be justified
as "necessary in the public interest" to restrict residence or
"conducive to the public good" to deport. In the case of
leaving the country there was a loophole in that there were no
immigration controls for departure to Ireland via the West coast.
The Foreign Secretary minuted again to the Home Secretary
on 14 August, urging certain immediate action against N.C.N.A.,
i.e. the withholding of entry visas for new personnel and a delay
in the extension of the residence permit for one employee and the
institution of a system of exit visas. The Secretary of State
also pointed out that in certain circumstances if the Chinese
took further action against Mr. Grey there would be strong
parliamentary and public pressure to take immediate action
against the N.C.N.A. in London by expelling all expatriate
staff. He asked the Home Secretary to reconsider his position
on this (paragraph 6 of the Secretary of State's minute under
reference).
4.
CONFIDENTIAL
15.
CONFIDENTIAL
5.
Depending on what action the Chinese do take after the
expiry of the ultimatum I think that the time has come when
firm action must be taken against N.C.N.A. Quite apart from
the holding of Mr. Grey under house arrest and anything further
which may be done to him, he has been unable to function as
Reuters correspondent for the last month. We would therefore
be justified in taking reciprocal action against N.C.N.A. in
London. It could be argued action in Hong Kong would be more
appropriate as the N.C.N.A. are more heavily represented there.
Five staff members have in fact been arrested for illegal
assembly and incitement
another appears in court today although the full trial is not
likely to take place until September. In view of the
-
one is in prison for two years and
possibility of violent Chinese reaction against further
measures in Hong Kong, the Commonwealth Office strongly favour
action here and we agree.
In
6. The difficulty about stopping N.C.N.A. functioning is
that we cannot prevent the circulation of their bulletin unless
proceedings are instituted for, for example, criminal libel.
It is doubtful whether the Home Office would institute such
proceedings or whether a prosecution would be successful.
any case the process would be lengthy. We could, however,
inform the Office of the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires by Note that
N.C.N.A. must cease to function. At the same time the Home
Office could instruct the police to make N.C.N.A. report to
then, for example, daily. If either instruction were ignored
we could, with Home Office agreement, expel all expatriate
/members
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
-5-
members of N.C.N.A. providing that the Home Secretary was
convinced that this was "conducive to the public good". There
is a difficulty in expelling N.C.N.A., namely that any alien
resident in the United Kingdom for more than two years can
appeal to the Senior Metropolitan Magistrate against
deportation.
But we consider that in fact the Chinese would
not do so. So far the Home Secretary has expressed great
reluctance to act against the N.C.N.A. The time has, I think,
come to put maximum pressure on him to agree to do so if
necessary.
7. A system of exit visas, which would apply to members of
the Chinese Kission as well as to N.C.N.A. and the Bank of
China, would be an exact parallel to the system now applying
to members of our Mission in Peking. It is open to the objection
referred to in the last sentence of paragraph 3, but we consider
that if a Note were sent to the Chinese requiring an exit visa
for all Chinese officials, they would obey it. It would be
helpful if the Home Office co-operated by asking their
Immigration Officers to check that exit visas had been obtained
even though they had no legal powers to detain Chinese (e.g. diplomats) or were unwilling to exercise them in the case of
non-diplomats.
Copies to:
Sir D. Allen.
Private Secretary.
Mr. Samuel.
Kr. Curson, J.I.A.D.
kr. Carter, C.O.
مجھے
CONFIDENTIAL
John Denson
(J. B. Denson) 21 August, 1967.
G.f. de la mane
21/8
210
C
F.E. Desc to su
Ker
REC
F23/20
PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY
OF STATE. HONS
FB/GMT/67/74
OFFICE
REUTERS AND THE
to:
ворив деме- что:
7 hu. Rodgers O.R (40) e) mind. Allon
an of August, 1967.
4) An Haydon (Pasonal)
3) Namma Staff.
司
N.C.N.A.
We spoke today about the new and urgent situation created for us by the ultimatuň from the Chinese Government about Hong Kong which expires tomorrow afternoon. The following are the main point which I said I would put în writing to you.
The Foreign Secretary, in his minute to the Home Secretary of 14 August, asked for your agreement to the withholding of an entry visa for a member of the New China News Agency in London and the withholding of a residence permit for another. T au grāteful for the co-operation our officials have had from yours in these particular natters.
The Foreigu Secretary also sought your agreement to instituting a system of exit visas for all Chinese officials in the United Kingdom. In the final paragraph of the minute, he nuked that consideration bē given to taking certain other measures against the 'liew China News Agency 15 € the Chinese took further action against Kr. Grey, the Reutors correspondent, who is under house arrést in reking.
As you know an official of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 20 August summoned Her sa esty's Chargé d'Affaires and demanded that all Chinese Journalists arrested in Hong Kong be declared innocent and set free, that the Ban recently put on three Chinese Communist newspapers be listed and that law suita instituted against other Chinese newspapers be called off. If these demands were not met within forty-eight hours, Her Ma esty's Government would be held responsible for all consequences.
Before this conversation took place 200 demonstrators had already broken into 'r. Grey's house in Peking and telephonic communication from
/the
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDÙNTIÁL
2.
the house to the British Nission had been severed. The Chinese Foreign Ministry official indicated to r. Hopaqn that if the ultimatum were not met further action was to be expected against Hr. Grey. Mr. Hopson has reported that in addition he expects action to be taken against the British Hission, probably including violence. Clearly to capitulate before the Chinese demands would besides Feing legally unnɛnageable Le politically disastrous. The ultimatum expires at about 3.30 p.m. G.H.T. on 22 Augusb.
1
It was
This is the first time that the ChinaJe have issued an ultimatum of this kind and we agree with Her a osty's Chargé d'affaires that further, probably violent, action is to be expected against Fr. Grey and against the British "ission. ust sich circumstances which the Foreign Secretary contemplated when he asked the Home Secretary to reconsider his position on
retaliation against the New China News Agency. I am sure you will agree, as the Foreign Secretary pointed out, that if this does happen it would be indefensible before public and parliamentary opinion if we were obliged to admit that we had powera to act against the Chinese in this country but were unwilling to use them.
To have had no indication of the exact nature of the further measures the Chinese will take and on which any retaliatory measures would depend. It ia, I think, essential that we should be in a position to act swiftly once the Chinese have acted. I should therefore be glad to have jour
gree, ent to inform the Office öf the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in London if necessary that:
(a) the New China News Agency should
immediately cease functioning and its nembers should report at stated intervals to the police; of if this was pot complied with or if Chinese actions Lustified it,
(b) all members of the New China News
Agency should leave the country within förty-eight hours.
I understand that in theory (b) might not be possible if any members of the New China News
/Agency
CONFIDENTIAL
E
CONFIDENTIAL
3.
Agency staff who had been resident in the United Kingdom for more than two years decided to appeal to the Senior Metropolitan lagistrate against" a departation order. In practice, we think that the Chinese would be loth to acknowledge British "urisdiction in this way and would not avail themselves of this right.
Me should also be grateful for the co-operation of the House office in instituting a systen of exit visas which would apply to all Chinese officials in this country including newbers of the Chinese Diplomaticission, the New China News Agency and the Tank of China. We realise that the Home Office does not posse33 Bowers to enforce such a syate: on, for example, Chinese diplomats and that it can be circnventod if the Chinêsc dooide to leave the country by proceeding to Ireland via the West coast. Nevertheless, we consider that the system would be of value and we would be prepared repared to risk its being circ.vented providing that we could count on the co-operation of migration officers to infor: us if a Chinese tread to leave without an exit visa.
I should make it clear that it may not be necessary to enforce either of the measures referred to in paragraph 5 above. A decision would depend on what action the Chinese take in Peking and we would, of course, consult you before the Chinese Governent were officially notified.
peke
ре
(GEORGE THOMSON)
CONFIENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED:
ARCHIVE, 1: 3:
2+ AUG 1967
Fiz/20
Kr. de la e
REUTERS AND THE NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY
As agreed at the meeting with Mr. Thomson, I attach a
draft minute from him to Kias Bacon at the Home Office.
John Densen
(J. B. Denson) 21 August, 1967.
이후
ро
peled
£23/8
CONFIDENTIAL
I
64. (3746)
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN in this MARGIN
Registry ₤3/20
No.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
DRAFT Minute.
To:-
Einister of State, Home Office.
Type 1 +
w 39
From
Telephone No. & Ext.
Department
We spoke to about the new
The Foreign Secretary, in his minute to the
Home Secretary of 14 August, asked for your
reens schmariagreement to the withholding of an entry visa for
cried be
by the
سعی مقصد
veivisemm from no Chinese
Валетный австр
thian Home Mary Lepires Temena)
aflimon. The
Fullesing main pounds раство whose I sand
DESRATOREO
a member NGTER OF STATE'S
the REspadoneo pws Agency in London
e
and the withholding of a reFICE permit for .
frow fouligne has the cooperation our offiuole another, and for your do Uperation in
Fod from your in these paskontas maries x instituting a system of exit visas for all
also sought yous agreemand to Chinese officials in the United Kingdom. In the
to
final paragraph of the minute, the Foreign Secretary
also asked that gonsideration be given to taking
certain other méasi
measures against the New China News
Agency if the Chinese took further action against
in whing to you. Er. Grey, the Reuters correspondent who is under
house arrest in Peking-
As you
newspap
an
doubt
the official of the Chinese Ministry
of Foreign Affairs on 20 August summoned
H.K. Chargé d'Affaires and demanded that all
Chinese journalists arrested in Hong Kong t
be declared innocent and set free, that the ban
recently put on three Chinese Communist newspapers
verbd be lifted and that law suite instituted
against other Chinese newspapers should be called
off. If these demanda were not met within 48
hours, Her Majesty's Government would be held
/responsible
I
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
responsible for all consequences, NP Before this conversalém book place
H.M. Chargé
d'Afféires had already learned that 200
theady
demonstrators had broken into Mr. Grey's house
A
in Peking and telephonic communication from the
house to the British Mission had been severed.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry official indicated
to Mr. Hopson that if the ultimatum were not met
further action was to be expected against
Kr. Grey. Kr. Hopson has/reported that in
addition to this he expects action to be taken Cleally to capitulate
against the British Mission, probably including
violence The ultimatum expires at about
3.30 p.m. G.M.T. on 22 August.
7.
before the Chine demands won't besi. I Haging being legally. pimaningar
This is the first time that the Chinese have politienten
issued an ultimatum of this kind and we agree
with H.. Chargé d'Affaires that further,
,probably violent, action is to be expected
against Mr. Grey and against the British Mission.
M
the case of förny
the form
imprisonment on a trumped-up charge after a
public trial by the "masses", coupled with
humiliation and possibly physical peritreatment.
In the case of the Mission the Chinese could
drganise massive demonstrations against it
resout m
which might
to it being broken into,
official and private property in destroyed
and members of the staff "***z* nolested or
ted It was just such circumstances
which the Foreign Secretary contemplated when Le
askie the Home Secretary to reconsider his
/position
Jis astmon
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
1
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
of this um
not comiths wka;
position on retaliation against the New China
News Agency.
am sure you will agree, as the Foreign
Secretary pointed out, that if this does happen
it would be indefensible before public and
parliamentary opinion if we were obliged to
admit that we had powers to act against the
Chinese in this country but were unwilling to
use them.
exact X.
Te have had no indication of the nature of
the further measures the Chinese will take and Ar thick
any retaliatory measures would depend on this.
It is, I think, dort that we should be in
a position to act swiftly once the Chinese have
paxis.
I should therefore be glad to have
your agreement
in the light of my action taken
in Paking, to inform the Office of the Chinese
necessary
Chargé d'Affaires in London that:
(a) the New China News Agency should immediately
cease functioning and its members should
report at stated intervals to the police,
org if Chinese actions justified it
(b) all rembers of the N.C.N.A. should leave
The sound
bonden) within 48 hours.
I understand that in theory (b) might not be
possible if any members of the N.C.N.A. staff
who had been resident in the United Kingdom for
more than two years decided to appeal to the
Senior Metropolitan Magistrate against a
deportation order. In practice,we think that the Chinese would be loth to acknowledge British
jurisdiction in this way and would not avail
themselves of this right.
We should also be grateful for the
oo-operation of the Home Office in instituting
a system of exit visas which would apply to all
ANZIDENTIAL
/Chinese
CONFIDENTIAL
Chinese officials in this country including
members of the Chinese Diplomatic Kiasion, the
N.C.N.A. and the Bank of China. We realise
that the Home Office does not possess powera to
enforce such a system on, for example, Chinese
diplomats and that it can be circunvented if
the Chinese decide to leave the country by
decide
sxsviding proceeding to Ireland via the Fest
coast. Nevertheless, we consider that the
system would be of value and we would be
prepared to risk its being circumvented
providing that we could count on the co-operation of Immigration officers to inform us if a
Chinese tried to leve without an exit visa.
7. I should make it clear finally that it
may not be necessary to enforce either of the
measures referred to in paragraph 5 above.
A decision Yould depend on what action the
Chinese take in Peking and we would, of
cpurse,
course
Grovermore you
consult you before the Chinese were officially
notified.
CONFIDENTIAL
8
2448
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
SVRSTACY
7/72
$
'FD IN
No.31
1 AUG 1967
F23/20
FE Dept Kentin
Copia's sent t:
& A. Rodger
Retaliation against
Chinese
2) En D. Atten
Mr. de la Mane
Am. Haydon (Personal) 5) Planning Stat.
Sentani
I have now had an opportunity to study
your minute of 1 August about retaliatory action
against the Chinese in this country. As you
suggested there, our officials have also had
further detailed discussions on this problem.
2. I think the question of action against
the hinese nor falls into two categories: action
which should be taken immediately either as
retaliation against what they have done in China
or as an essential means of protection for our
own people there: and action which we should
consider and agree in principle now but which we
would hope not to have to take unless the
hinese take further action against our people
in China.
3. In the first category, I should like to see
action taken both against the New China Newɛ
Agency (N.C.N.A.) London "ffice and over exit
visag for Chinese officials in this country.
As I said in my earlier minute of 19 July, the
K...N.^., which is an orya', under the direct
CONFIDENTIAL
/control
*IDENT! L
control of the Chinese Government propaganda
machine, has been carrying out a vicious campaign
against Her Majesty's Government and the
Hong Kong Government, including incitement to
violence in Hong Kong - N.C.N.A. reporters in
Hong Kong have been involved in instigating
demonstrations.
One his already been sentenced
and three more are under trial or dus to be tried.
In retaliation the Chinese hive put the
Reuters correspondent in Peking under house arrest.
It is possible that if the three N.C.N.A›
reporters are santenced the Chinese will take
further action against the Reuters correspondent.
Until the results of the trial are movn we shall
not be in a position to decide bow savers
measures against N.C.N.A. In London should be.
I am glad, however, that your officials have
agreed that until then approval for the entry
visa of one replacement for the N.O.N.A. should be
withheld and likewise the extension of the
residance permit of another.
4. I realise the Jbjections you see in
principle to the sxwision of the N.C.K.A. all
together and to re'using to extend the residence
permits of N.C.N.A. personnel already in this
/country
COL IDENTIAL
country and I am willing not to press for this
I think our aim, at the present stage.
however,
should be to reduce the expatriate staff of the N.C.N.A. Office to one (the direct
in
equivalent of British press representation in Peking). I therefore hope that you will agree that when the trial of N.C.N.A. personnel Hong Kong is over, the application for an entry visa for a replacement in the N.C.N.A. Office should be refused, all future applications for replacements refused and that in addition application for re-entry visas by N.C.N.A. personnel in London
who wish to proceed on leave and then return
should also be refused.
I think this is the
least we can do and in certain circumstances
(paragraph 6 below) more may be necessary.
5. The reasons for imposing a system of exit visas on Chinese officials in this country are set out fully in the memorandum sent to your
I believe that such Department on 22 July.
a system would act as a deterrent against the holding of British subjects in China, official and otherwise, and would thus afford them vital
/protection.
COMPIDENTIAL
+
CONFIDENTIAL
protection.
Because the Chinese operate a
system of exit visas, they can at any time
hold foreigners hostage and
they have made
it quite clear that they are prepared to make full and unscrupulous use of their power.
For
this reason I would propose to inform the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires that all Chinese officials in Britain will in future require an
exit visa from the Foreign office before leaving this country. I fully realise that, if the Chinese disregard this instruction, we can take only diplomatic action against them and have
Nevertheless, I hope no powers of detention.
that you will feel able to instruct your Department to cooperate by asking Immigration officers to check that Chinese officials have Foreign Office authorisation before leaving this country and telling the Foreign office if there
The more are any infringements of the system. obvious they make thir checking, the more
effective the deterrent is likely ◊ be.
6. Your agreement to the above requests would meet our most urgent needs but I think that we
should also agree
feriain further action
/to be
to be taken, for example if the Chinese
retallated more strongly against the Reuters
correspondent in Peking by imprisoning him on a
trumped up charge or expelling him from China
after subjection to humiliation or maltreatment,
If this happened I think we should be under strong
parliamentary and public pressure to take positive
and immediate action against the H...2.A. în
London by expelling all their expatriate staff.
I believe this could be fully justified as
"conducive to the public good" and indeed that it
would not be understood if we had to admit that
we had power to take such action but were unwilling
to use it. I very much hope therefɔre that you
will feel able to reconsider your position and to
agree in principle that firm action will be taken
if the need arises.
(GEORGS
BROWN)
11 August, 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
(SPLE) "P
CONFIDENTIAL
Registry 3/20
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
Fs 67 72
Minute despatched by
Private Secret...y
DRAFT
Minute
Type 1 +
From
To:-
Home Secretary
2.
Secretary of State
Telephone No. & Ext.
Department
I have now had an opportunity to study
your minute of 1 August about retaliatory action
against the Chinese in this country. As you
suggested there, our officials have also had
further detailed discussions on this problem.
I think the question of action against
the Chinese now falls into two categories:
action which should be taken immediately
either as retaliation against what they have
done in China or as an essential means of
protection for our own people there; and
action which we should consider and agree in
principle now but which we would hope not to
have to take unless the Chinese take further
action against our people in China.
3. In the first category, I should like to
see action taken both against the New China
News Agency (N.C.N.A.) London Office and over
exit visas for Chinese officials in this
country. As I said in my earlier minute of
19 July, the N.C.N.A., which is an organ under
the direct control of the Chinese Government
propaganda machine, has been carrying out a
vicious campaign against Her Majesty's Government
/and
CONFIDENTIAL
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
DE 933009 GA 863
CONFIDENTIAL
-
- 2.
and the Hong Kong Government, including
incitement to violence in Hong Kong.
N.C.N.A. reporters in Hong Kong have been
involved in instigating demonstratione.
One has already been sentenced and three more
are under trial or due to be tried. In
retaliation the Chinese have put the Reutere
correspondent in Peking under house arrest.
It is possible that if the three N.C.N.A.
reportera are sentenced the Chinese will take
further action against the Reuters correspondent
Until the results of the trial are known we
shall not be in a position to decide how
severe measures against N.C.N.A. in London
should be. I am glad, however, that your
officials have agreed that until then approval
for the entry visa of one replacement for the
N.C.N.A. should be withheld and likewise the
extension of the residence permit of another.
I realise the objections you see in principle
to the expulsion of the N.C.N.A. altogether
and to refusing to extend the residence permits
of N.C.N.A. personnel already in this country
and I am willing not to press for this at the
present stage. I think our aim, however,
should be to reduce the expatriate staff of
the N.C.N.A. Office to one (the direct equi-
valent of British press representation in
Peking). I therefore hope that you will agree
that when the trial of N.C.N.A. personnel in
Hong Kong is over, the application for an
entry visa for a replacement in the N.C.N.A.
office should be refused, and all future
/applications
CONFIDENTIAL
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3-
applications for replacements refused and
that in addition applications for re-entry
visas by N.C.N.A. personnel in London who
wish to proceed on leave and then return
should also be refused.
I think this is
the least we can do and in certain circum-
stances (paragraph 6 below) more may be
necessary.
5. The reasons for imposing a system of exit
visas on Chinese officials in this country are
set out fully in the memorandum sent to your
Department on 22 July. I believe that such
a system would act as a deterrent against
the holding of British subjects in China,
official and otherwise, and would thus afford
them vital protection. Because the Chinese
operate a system of exit visas, they can at
any time hold foreigners hostage and they
have made it quite clear that they are
prepared to make full and unscrupulous use of
their power. For this reason I would propose
to inform the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires that
all Chinese officials in Britain will in
future require an exit visa from the Foreign
Office before leaving this country. I fully
realise that, if the Chinese disregard this
instruction, we can take only diplomatic action
against them and have no powers of detention.
Nevertheless, I hope that you will feel able
to instruct your Department to cooperate by
asking Immigration Officers to check that
Chinese officials have Foreign Office
authorisation before leaving this country and
/telling
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
CONFIDENTIAL
-
4
telling the Foreign Office if there are any
infringements of the system. The more
obvious they make their checking, the more
effective the deterrent is likely to be.
6. Your agreement to the above requests
would meet our most urgent needs but I think
that we should also agree on certain further
action to be taken, for example if the
Chinese retaliated more strongly against the
Reuters correspondent in Peking by imprisoning
him on a trumped up charge or expelling him
from China after subjection to humiliation
or maltreatment. If this happened I think
we should be under strong parliamentary and
public pressure to take positive and immediate
action against the N.C.N.A. in London by
expelling all their expatriate staff. I
believe this could be fully justified as
"conducive to the public good" and indeed
that it would not be understood if we had
to admit that we had power to take such
action but were unwilling to use it. I very
Buch hope therefore that you will feel able
to reconsider your position and to agree
in principle that firm action will be taken
if the need arises.
مجھے
198
८
FONELATIAL
14 August, 1967
RECEIVED IN ¦ARCHIV-5 No.31
1 5 AUG 1967
F23/20
Before he left for Norway this morning. the Foreign Secretary approved the enclosed minute to the Home Secretary about retaliatory action against the Chinese in this country. Te were unable to get this minute signed by
Mr. Brown before his departure. I am therefore
sending it to him unsigned with the assurance
모든
that it has the Foreign Secretary's approval.
D. 2. J. Dowler, Esq.,
Home Office.
(D. M. Day)
Private
Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTI AL
{ RECEIVED IN
HARCHIVES No.31
15 AUG 1967
جال
36
Mr de ka there 19/8
تقامة
F23/20 Date
た3720
Secretary of State
Retaliation against the Chinese
in Britain
e
раке
The submission and minutes below refer
to a Foreign Office system of exit visas for
Chinese officials in Britain. This proposal
is set out more fully in paragraph 5 of the
Fay draft minute to the Home Secretary below.
Despite the Home Office's hesitation about
this proposal, the department feel that such
a system could be made to work. If the
Chinese try to disregard the system, which
would be introduced by means of a note to the
Chinese Office, the "diplomatic action"
referred to in the minute to the Home secretary
could, for instance, take the form of a threat
to declare a member of the legation persona non
grata. The Home Office's reations to this
idea at official level are to be found at
paragraphs 7 and 8 of the record at flag D.
محمد
Dimorgonen
(D.I. Morphet) 11 August. 1967.
CONFIDENTIAL
مساء
Mü
SECRETARY OF STATE
CONFIDENTIAL
325
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
15 AUG 1967
F23/20
I have been discussing with officials what action
we can take in retaliation against Chinese nationals
in this country bearing in mind the position of
the Reuters man in Peking and the possibility of further
harassment, for example, of business men, technicians
and ships' crews.
2. On the wider issues discussion is continuing
with, amongst others, the Board of Trade.
One
question is whether travel restrictions should be
placed on the Chinese Commercial office and members
of trading corporations. For the present, however,
we should pursue the problem of the New China News
Agency in the light of the Home Secretary's minute
to you.
3. It seems clear that the Home Secretary will
not agree at the moment to turning out the
N.C.N.A. lock, stock and barrel.
Since his minute
/to you
2
to you, he has confirmed this in private
conversation.
I suggest, however, that we keep
up the pressure in anticipation or a situation
arising when there may be a public demand for drastic
action.
4.
Meanwhile, three other possibilities are open.
First, the Home office can refuse to renew the
residence permits of members of the N.C.N.A.
Second, the Home Office can refuse re-entry visas
for members of the N.C.N.A. leaving the country
Third, the Home Urfice can refuse
temporarily.
visas for newcomers.
5. I doubt whether we can budge the Home Secretary
on the first of these (although delay can be used
as effective harassment from time to time), but we
should go for the second and third. This would run
the N.C.N.A. down over a period. There might be
no publicity for this but we should have a
defensible position in Parliament.
6. We also propose a Foreign Office system of
weit
entry visas. We can do this on our own but
Home office co-operation would be necessary.
17.
3
7. I think it would also be wise to discover
the whereabouts and activities of the 2,500
Chinese nationals in this country. I would not
like to admit that we do not know when our own
subjects in China are exposed. Enquiries would
also alert them to our interest and represent a
mild form of harassment. However, officials are
not convinced on this and the Home Secretary might
be reluctant to set in motion the considerable
administrative action involved.
8. No firm decisions are required at the moment.
But a minute to the Home Secretary on the lines
attached will enable officials to continue their
discussions. We should then have a thorough
round-up on your return to the office after the
holiday.
WTR
William Rodgers
11 August, 1967.
Kr. de la Mare
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
15 AUG 1967
F23/201
4
Flag A
Flag B
Flag C
Flag D
Problem
Retaliation against the Chinese in Britain
The Home Secretary has replied to the Secretary of
State'a minute and the memorandum from the Department about
retaliation against the Chinese in Britain. Discussions have
also been held at official level. If progress is to be made,
a further approach to the Home Secretary will be necessary.
Recommendation
2. I recommend that the Secretary of State should send a
further minute to the Home Secretary on the lines of the
attached draft.
Background and Argument
3. The Secretary of State wrote to the Home Secretary on
19 July asking for his agreement in principle to take certain
action against the N.C.N.A. London Office if the need arose.
The Department also sent a memorandum to the Home Office on
22 July on the subject of exit visas for Chinese officials in
Britain. The Home Secretary's reply of ↑ August was, as the
Secretary of State has minuted, "not very helpful".
4. We have now held further discussions with the Home Office
at official level (see record attached). In some ways the
situation is worse than we thought. The Home Office have made
it clear that not only are they unwilling to expel members of
the N.C.N.A., but they are also unwilling to refuse to renew
residence permits (which is done on an annual basie) or even
/to
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
to refuse the automatic granting of re-entry visas if
these are applied for before the persons concerned leave
this country.
In effect, this means that the present members
of the N.C.N.A. Office can stay here for as long as they like
provided that they always apply for re-entry visas before
going on leave.
5. On other matters, such as refusing new visa applications,
delaying approval for residence permits and asking Immigration
Officers to check for exit visas, if we wish to introduce such
a system, the Home Office officials were as helpful as they
could be within the limitation imposed by the Home Secretary's
known views. They pointed out however (see paragraph 15 of
record) the considerable administrative labour involved in
obtaining details about the 2,500 non-official Chinese nationals
in this country and urged that they should not be pressed to
do so unless we contemplated asking the Home Secretary to take
action against this category of person. I see no advantage in
doing so, as it will have no effect on the actions of the
Chinese Government towards British subjects in China, and in
any case the Home Secretary would clearly be even more dis-
inclined to use his powers against such persons than against
official Chinese.
6.
We have told the Home Office at official level that we
will probably wish to return to the charge about agreement in
principle to expel members of the N.C.N.A. and to obtain the
agreement of the Home Secretary for the other action which we
/wish
CONFIDENTIAL
+
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
wish to take immediately.
To confirm undertakings at
official level and to press the Home Secretary for a
change of position on N.C.N.A. and co-operation over exit
vises, a further minute from the Secretary of State to
the Home Secretary is clearly desirable.
7. There are various other measures which we wish to
consider taking against the Chinese in this country which
do not, at this stage, involve the Home Office.
these is proceeding separately.
Action on
Jam Denson
(J. B. Denson) 10 August, 1967
ŵf. de lurkan
10/8
Saa Mr Rodgers' minuta below.
бы
CONFIDENTIAL
"
Fes/20
GOKFILESTIAL
33
FOREIGN OFFICE, 8.W.1.
23 August, 1967.
I attach a list of the Chinese et present in London, who are travelling en diplomatic er official passports. This list was produced at great speed and I am told that there my possibly be one or two people missing from it. This will be shocked and a revised list sent to you if necessary.
2. I understand that the Home Office has agreed to circulate this list to all the necessary Immigration Officers and to ask them to ensure that all those on this list have exit permits issued by the Foreign Office before leaving this country.
8. L. I. Burley Eng.,
Home Office,
(D. C. Wilson)
For Matern Department
Princetom Henso,
271-7 High Holborn,
F.C.1.
COFFIDENTIAL
1.
SECRET
Chinese Diplomatic Mission
49 Portland Place, W.1.
SHEN PING 3088/1627
VÀ CHIA CHI
Counsellor
Counsellor
D 000534
D 000536
7456/1367/7486
TSAO LI
Wife of MA CHIA CHUN
D 000537
2580/5408
CHAO TSE KON 6392/3419/3046
2nd
(Press)
D 001165
CHEN SZU CHUN 7115/1835/5028
CHENG YUEH 6774/6885
HSIER CHT KEI 6200/0796/5019
KU HSIN (F) 7357/2450
Attaoh (Consular)
D 000550
3rd/Sec. (Cultural)
D 005743
3rd Dec.
D 000544
Wife of WU HSIN AN
D 002113
1st Seó. (Returned
to Peking on 11.7.67.)
LI HUI TING 2621/2585/1016
Puretionary
S 007185
LI TIEN CHANG 2621/3013/2490
Clerk (Press)
S 000143
LIU CHING HSUEH
Clerk
8 013863
0491/2417/1331
LIU JU TSAT
Clark
S 000158
0491/3067/2088
LU TSUNG MIN
Clerk
S 000144
0712/5115/2404
LUNG TSENG TIEN
Clerk
S 002090
7893/1073/3944
MENG HSIEN YING (7) Clérk
1322/2009/5391
SUN CHIH SHEN 1327/2535/3234
TSENG CHENG YO 2582/1987/0327
WANG CHUNG HSU 3769/1504/4872
WH
S 002354
Clerk
S 017433
Cherk
S 017452
Clark
S 002169
YANG TE SHUAN 2799/1795/0356
Coble
S 017220
YU SHEN CHIN
Driver
S 013843
0060/1957/1807
SECRET
2.
SECRET
Chinese Commercial Office
4-7 Gloucester Gate, N.W.1.
CHANG LUNG KEN
1728/7893/2704
CHANG PET YU (7) 1728/0160/3768
Clerk
S 000132
IN
S 000128
CHAO CHUN HAO
Clafk
S 017349
6392/0193/5399
CHIN MEI SHENG
Clerk
$ 007599
6855/2734/3932
HO WEN CHU
Clark
$ 000130
0149/2429/5282
HOU CHIN CHING
Clerk
S 007292
0186/6651/7230
HSIA YUN FU 1115/0336/6346
KITH TA TUNG 6200/1129/0681
HUANG CHIEN MO 7806/1696/6206
KO PAO CHIA 5514/0202/1367
LI HSI JUI 2621/6932/3843
LT HUNG TU 2621/1347/0956
LI I PLAQ 2621/5030/5903
LI SHENG CHANG
2621/3932/4545
LIU CHIH MING 0491/1807/2494
LU HSING PAO 7120/5281/1405
SHIH SUNG SHING 2457/2646/3932
WANG CHEN PU
3769/2182/2528
WANG CHING WU
3769/6945/2976
YIN HUI PI 1438/6540/3880
Clerk
Vlerk
Clark
/Clerk
Clark
$ 000141
Clerk/Seo.
S 007310
C1ørk
S 000134
Clark
S 009883
Driver
S 007255
S 007031
$ 015565
Functionary/ Attendant
S 007256
S 016117
Årade Attachā
S 000154
S 000151
\Functionary
3 007051
S 023795
Clark
S 000139
SECRET
SECRET
3. New China News Agency
26 Ferncroft Avenue, N.W.3
YU HANG
0060/2635
Correspondent
S 008627
LIN CHING (F) 2651/7230
Wife of YU HANG
S 008568
LI FU 2621/1381
CHING HUT CHIN (F) 2529/1920/3830
WANG TUAN SHENG 3769/4551/3932
Clerk and P operator
S 025101
Seo/Clerk and T/P operator
$ 023418
Driver
S 001371
4. Bank of China
111 Cannon Street, E.C.4.
SUNG KUO HUA
1345/0948/5478
LI YU MIN 2621/5940/3046
CHIU MIN SHU (F) 6726/2404/1204
Sub-Kanegi
S CC3555
Sub-Manager
$ 005535
S 010826
Sub-Manager (wife of WANG WEI TSAT Acting/Manager now in China)
SECRET
Fez 120.
CYPHER/CAT A
CONFIDENTIAL
IMBUNATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO ROME
TEL. NO. 2284
Far East Divne
Dirnt32
CUPY NO......
23 AUGUST, 1967
(PS)
pol
CONFIDENTIAL.
FOLLOWING FOR SCOTT FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY.
2. THE HOME OFFICE HAVE ASKED IF YOU COULD ARRANGE TO TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO THE HOME SECRETARY IN SALERNO,
FOLLOWING ACTION TAKEN AGAINST CHINESE IN RETALIATION1- (A) CERTAIN HOLDERS OF CHINESE PASSPORTS TO BE REFUSED LEAVE TO EMBARK UNDER ALIENS ORDER. ORDER BEING AMENDED TO-DAY BY ORDER-IN-COUNCIL TO COVER TRAVEL TO IRELAND, DESPITE DIFFICULTY OF ENFORCEMENT. PURPOSE OF MOVE IS RETENTION OF HOSTAGES UNTIL SAFETY OF OUR PEOPLE IN PEKING IS ASSURED. NO QUESTION THEREFORE OF DEPORTATIONS AT THIS STAGE. RESTRICTION WOULD BE ENFORCED AGAINST DIPLOMATS, JOURNALISTS AND CERTAIN OTHER CLASSES. (B) RESTRICTION ORDERS UNDER ALIENS ORDER IMPOSED ON FIVE NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY STAFF REQUIRING TWICE-DAILY REPORTING TO POLICE ETC. IN RETALIATION FOR ACTION AGAINST REUTER'S CORRES- PONDENT, VISAS FOR REPLACEMENTS NOT TO BE GRANTED.
(C) FOREIGN OFFICE ARE RESTRICTING MOVEMENTS OF CHINESE DIPLOMATS, AND THEY ARE BEING KEPT UNDER SURVEILLANCE BY THE POLICE.
THIS IS ALL THAT CAN BE DONE IN HOME OFFICE SPHERE AT PRESENT. WE SEE NOTHING HERE MAKING IT NECESSARY FOR YOU TO CONSIDER RETURNING, BUT THOUGHT YOU SHOULD KNOW OF ACTION WHICH HAS BEEN TAKEN ON PRIME MINISTER'S DIRECTIONS,
SOSFA
PRISEC (F.0.)
SENT 17552/23 AUGUST
CONFIDENTIAL
1724
23/ije
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry No. F2 3/20
DEPARTMENT
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION PRIORITY MARKINGS
Top Jecres
Confidential
Emergency __Immediata
* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(s)
(Date) 23/
Despatched 15
32
+q 25l.
...
23/8
------TITPPP-P-P‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒T----------
-
W-HILI
HOOT----------------▬▬▬▬▬
Unclassified
Routine
En Slair. Code
Cypher
Draft Telegram to:-
ROME
Ng.. 2284
[ Security classification
-if any
[Codeword-if any]
Addressed to
telegram No.....
And to
ALATALI - - ZALJOELLP.----MOTO
(Date) 234 repeated for information to
And to:-
CONFIDENTIAL
(date)
Saving to
Repeat to:-
1TM
ווזrוזהי
POSTED ON A D
Saving to:-
Distribution:
PRISEC
Copies to:-
Mr. de la Mare
Far Eastern
Department
Following for Scott from
Private Secretary.
2. The Home Office have asked if
you could arrange to transmit the
following message to the Home
Secretary in Salerno. A to B
attached_7.
· (MO) - ) 23/2
PRISEC (FO).
No action
in Commmes
D
F3/20 4.32
A/
Cable to Secretary of State
Following action taken against Chinese in retaliation:-
Certain holders of Chinese passports to be refused
leave to embark under Aliens Order. Order being amended
to-day by Order-in-Council to cover travel to Ireland,
despite difficulty of enforcement.
Purpose of move is
retention of hostages until safety of our people in
Peking is assured, No question therefore of
deportations at this stage. Restriction would be
enforced against diplomats, journalists and certain
other classes.
(b) Restriction orders under Allens Order imposed on
five New Chinw News Agency staff requiring twice-daily
reporting to police etc. in retaliation for action
against Reuter's correspondent.
not to be granted.
Vises for replacements
(c) Foreign Office are restricting movements of
Chinese diplomata, and they are being kept under
surveillance by the police.
This is all that can be done in Home Office sphere at
present. We see nothing here making it necessary for you to
consider returning, but thought you should know of action
which has been taken on Prime Minister's directions.
~D
1.
B.
7
(FC 3/20)
CONFIDENTIAL
Foreign Office,
S.W.1.
3 August, 1967.
31
I think I should let you know that Ministers have been following developments in China closely, particularly in so far as they affect British subjects resident there and visiting businessmen, and we have been asked to keep in very close touch with fims affected, in consultation with the Board of Trade.
2. Earlier this week Harry Hohler (who was standing in for Arthur de la Mare while the latter was on leave) called in John Keswick. He said that, according to our information, China was now in a worse state of internal confusion than at any time since the communiat takaovar. There was growing evidence of clashes in many provinces and it was clear that the writ of the Central Government was no longer absolute in some places. There had also been manifestations in Peking of considerable anti-British feeling following the firm measures taken by the Government in Hong Kong. There was therefore a risk that any British subject in China might be liable to harassment by the Chinese, particularly if there had recently been some particularly tough action taken in Hong Kong. There was also a risk, although more remote, that a British subject might be detained as a hostage, as had happened in the case of Kr. Grey. Te were not giving formal advice that visits by businessmen or technicians should cease but we thought we" ware under an obligation to talk with those concerned with trade to China and we hoped that all those about to go to China would keep in close tõuch with the Department. So far as our own Mission in Peking was concerned we intended to stay on as long as possible, although there were of course ciromstances in which we might have to withdraw.
3. In reply John Keswick said that he considered that the only course open to British businessmen trading with China was to weather the storm as best they could. He himself would not advise against businesmen going to China if they had something definite to do. In his experience, the Chinese would only give entry visas if they were prepared to let the people out as well. He thought that the same applied to technicians working in China. As for shipping there was no doubt that the Chinese were highly sensitive at the moment and that it was therefore very important to try to avoid anything which they might classify as "political provocation". Although Jardinsa' ships had been involved in some incidents, it was noticeable that, by almost superhuman self-control, it was still possible to visit Chinese ports without incidents. During the course of the boycott in Hong Kong and Chinese support for it, it was however necessary to
D. C. Hopson, Esq., C.M.O., D.S.O., M.C., T.D.,
/čevise
Peking.
CONFIDENTIAL
devise a system under which British ships would not call at Chinese ports after viɛiting Hong Kong. Shipping companies were working on this (as you will have seen from Foreign office telegram No. 687). As to the desirability of keeping a Mission in Peking, John Kaswick thought very strongly that we should stay there as long as possible even though, so far as businessmen were concerned, it might now be necessary to revert to the former practice under which they contactad Chinese trading corporations directly rather than acting through the British Office, since he thought it likely that the British office would be under something of a cloud for some time to come.
John Keswick undertook to pass on the substance of this discussion to his colleagues on the Sino-British Trade Council. Apart from this I have also spoken myself to the three British companies which have technicians about to go to China, 1.e. I.C.I., Plesseys and Courtaulds. All of them seem to take a fairly relaxed view of the situation and have no intention at present of changing their arrangements.
5. For the moment we shall continue to talk to businesamon along those lines. The Board of Trade are most reluctant to do anything more formal. If, however, the situation deteriorates in any way and you think that we should give more positive advice to British businessmen e.g. by warning them not to visit China at present, I hope that you will let us know.
6. I am sending a copy of this letter to Michael Wilford in Hong Kong.
(J. B. Denson)
CONFIDENTIAL
/20)
F23/20
#·30
Her Majesty'a Principal Secretary of State for Forsign
Affairs presents his compliments to the acting Chargé d'Affaires
of the People's Republic of China and, with reference to his
predecessor's Notes No. FC 1895/37 of the 11th of November, 1954,
PC 1051/18/G of the 18th of Septembar, 1961, and FC 1051/1/G of
the 22nd of April, 1966, has the honour to inform his that the
terms of these notes apply to all meshers of the Bank of Chine in
London an2 to their families. He has the honour to request the
moting Chargé d'Affaires to ensure that such personnel notify the
Foreign Office of their intention to travel " distence of more
than thirty-five miles from Karble Arch "nd also of their address
if any overnight stop is involved. Fuch notification must be
received in the Poreign Office at lewat forty-eight hours before
the journey is dus to begin. Providing that these conditions
have been complied with and in the absence of notification by the
Foreign Office to the contrary, it may be assumed that there is
no objection to the journey.
Her Kajesty's Principal Secretary of Stats for Foreign
Affaire av¬ile himself of this opportunity of renewing to the
moting Chargé d'Affaires of the People's Republic of China the
assurunoss of his highest aonaidaration.
FOREIGN OFFICE,
3.4.1.
18 August, 1967.
(Be
The Whi 155 (ook 500
ria Past)
Copy is Whitty 512%.
p.a.
18/8.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
OHO TH
Type 1 +
From
Registry F£3/20 DRAFT Note
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret. Secret. Confidential.
Restricted. Unclassified.
PRIVACY MARKING
To:-
The Acting Chargé d'Affaires of the People's Republic
of China.
In Confidence
30
Telephone No. & Ex.
Department
A
Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments
to the acting Chargé d'Affaires of the People's
Republic of China and, with reference to his
predecessor's Notes No. FC 1895/37 of 11 November
1954, PC 1051/18/G of 18 September 1961 and
FC 1051/1/G of 22 April 1966, has the honour
to inform him that the terms of these notes
apply to all these members of the Bank of China
t in London wwe kelä official passporter and their
families. He has the honour to request the
acting Chargé d'Affaires to ensure that such
personnel notify the Foreign Office of their
intention to travel a distance of more than
35 miles from Marble Arch and also of their
address if any overnight stop is involved.
Such notification must be received in the Foreign
office at least 48 hours before the journey is
due to begin. Providing that these conditions
have been complied with and in the absence of
notification by the Foreign Office to the
contrary, it may be assumed that there is no
objection to the journey.
Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs avails himself of this oppor- tunity of renewing to the acting Chargé d'Affaires of the People's Republic of China the assurances of his highest consideration.
18}
CONFIDENTIAL
Copy Me Whitby
29
The Whitby Box 500 (via Puso)
гра
18 August, 1967.
(PC 3/20)
Sex Copy
As I think you know, we are very much concerned about the harassment by the Chinese of our Mission in Peking. You have probably read a good deal about some aspects of this in the press, but some other forms of harassment have never been mentioned there One of these is that Chinese packers (who are to all intents and purposes Government officials) refuse to pack and transport the belongings of the members of our staff (including the Chargé d'Affaires himself). This means, in effect, that those concerned are obliged to leave in leking all their personal possessions which they cannot carry in suitcases: furniture, household effects, books, gramophones, children's toys, cots and pererbulators, as well as their private motor cara. I need hardly emphasise the inconvenience and financial loss which this involves. Furthermore, the Chinese are deliberately delaying the clearance of baggage and stores (including food and other essential supplies) for our Mission. On occasion, the Chinese have oven obliged members of the staff to read quotations from the works of Xao Tse-tung before allowing goods through Customs. To cannot hope, nor would we wish, to retaliate în like manner against such puerile behaviour as this. But in the past the Chinese have sometimes responded to direct action against their own diplomats. I therefore think that they might be persuaded to desist from this sort of harassment and be deterred from doing worse if we were able to demonstrate that some retaliation was possible against the Chinese Mission in London.
2. We are already considering separately a number of measures which we could take. We should like to enlist your co-operation in the field of Customs examination. Would it be possible, for instance, to adopt "adrinistrative delay" to hold up the import and export of unaccompanied baggage by the Office of the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in London? We would not propose to tell the Chinese that this was happening, but we would hope that it could be done in such a way that they were left in no doubt that such delays were not accidental. I realise that action of this sort would involve your Customs Officers in some additional work and in the normal course of events you might feel reluctant to not against a diplomatic mission. But I trust that you will agree that the Chinese in their present mood are a special case and that anything we can do to counteract their uncivilised treatment of our own people and to keep up the morale of the latter in the frustrating and potentially dangerous circumstances now obtaining in Zaking would be in a good cause.
13.
A. R. Ashford, Esq., C.).G..
H.M. Customs and Excise,
Kings Beam House
Kark Lane,
London, B.C.3.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
3.
I very much hope you will find it possible to help in some
If you would prefer to discuss the problem I should be very glad to do so at any time.
Way -
(J. B. Denson)
CONFIDENTIAL
1/4 (2829)
TPPI/003
FE3/20
Mr. Things.
CONFIDENTIAL. (W.29)
Reference
Jout Porrow, Confum Department.
Unaccompanied Baggage of Aminu
Diplomatic Mission
20
31
Please see
the attached exchange of
LeRus
With
the
Duscom and Excisa.
I am sorty
that mi thu dwyk
we dis
заклу
MAN
show you
the traps.
In present ericunt wing,
2,
prease aste
Custom
couco yora
K
4 sekut
you
дожд
the import application. Com
Suggur any way of delaying out gossyj
baggage?
The Dandou
It Eastern Deft.
Jon Denson
3078
I have opken whe. O'Neill, There to no control excraised,
over the exp of assom fanced
impede its export. Sorwarding agent and required to fill
Jily, items / expported but this is purely for statistical purposes. The only practical way of delaying protating export to the cooperatio by recuing
would be
I
If forwarding agents scammer,
th
ta's
this would almost certainty complications and embarrassment,
Mr. O'Neill with avenge fr
Dunbar mentored although,
In blank the return of the import afflication
Ware Inconnemgroe
likely
all
worthwhile. However, it may
anced, the exercise to hardly
falans
The Chinely
Chinely becang
and possibly.
a
hakis appor
Anyare off what is
to reffect.
In answer to
angiaries, the
basyon will reset the inflarbers
of
the morty
of thaar geents
This Dept's Way has traditionally been to
to a vorst the Diplomatic Carpt and, and we ourselves defend autho roddurth of the Corps for functioning of the Department
Bostant twould be restent id see the Dept,
identified as directly responsible for simposing worlichais. D
Therepre
the Chimpse or their
I
день
Ayshme te in their to Fren Dept.
these matters,
FED
We up
I would, sexet, also, hat in that efflications fold up should be Devrewed at fortnightly mitowals.
m. Anyon
30%
I show howe
hoped
mak
Th
of the demonidst of the
Diplomatic Corps womi
Wound mor
mor hum
bun
Lafferri
Reference
affected by administrative delings
miposi
the
спийци годно
hame
so flagrantir disregarded an
diplomatre condunt. In any
whe
norm
any case,
Sinc
M
Chiren are putting all
of disbinottii ni
the way 1
the import and
export A pursand
Murs, grom vir
in
Petery, it count
Sally be munist which
that on
a bani
of seriprocity we
comed winpore delay
Поба
In me ent
LAM
mynd
to consuled waiving carran
privyn
Maal
стойкий
uniu
the
1964
(su sui F. Valimi's numuri 1 23
Angand commi
you Dupermus
In the meantime and
pening a
Jum
from Permy.
m
tom postmi
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пори
bur
A
an dung poserom
wm
Be
import
him.
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Euria Dem. mui dane
with
I'm
the
hope mat
you
w
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bur g
www fear abre
to
fem of enquis
私
no long
M
possib
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Am
Dense
3
I have spoken to be y
I explained that there wears lack Jasure
Estive to assist on the
West. However, since Berbung lepresentations would be that they'
the affligation for release from D.O., the Protond West would be approached next. It was wellthion that applications well monally Cat on Inddoed cleared within Itty hours; it was simply to say repeatedly that afflictio had been misleid, etc.
Don. could only left no Instand
They worl
The to
4877
a
mistuctaio
freond ther
закл
Jauch a
raply
would
Dr. Jenson accepts the position. to hopes howary, that the Report. aquested from taking with be available
But with be until then.
Tha
Fina
Type 1 +
27
From
(
J. B. Denson
Telephone No. & Ext.
Registry F./£o
No.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted. Unclassified.
PRIVACY MARKING
CONFIDENTIAL
DRAFT Letter
To:- A.R. Ashford, E. C.M.
Gill, Boqr
H.M. Customs and Excise
Kingsbeam House.
Mark have, E.c.3.
In Confidence
Department
J
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
As I think you know, we are very much
concerned about the harassment by the Chinese
of our Mission in Peking. You have probably
read a good deal about some aspects of this in
ofner the press, but some of the more tiresome minor
forms of harasement have never been mentioned
here. One of these is that Chinese packers (who
are to all intents and purposes Government
officials) refuse to pack and transport the
belongings of the members of our staff (including
the Chargé d'Affaires himself). Another is to leave in Peting the Chinese are deliberately delaying the all mai pusonant
This means
effect, that, those 3 concerns are voligud! пойдий
14. (740)
pasonal possessomi which they cameN Conting in smiřice
Smirum
Furthermore
clearance of baggage and stores (including food
and other essential supplies) for our Mission.
On occasion, the Chinese have even obliged members of the staff to read quotations from the works farming, homehow of Mao Tse-tung before allowing goods through
Customs. We cannot hope, nor would we wish, to
retaliate in like manner against such puerile
But wi the part the Man have to me wh
inputs, brom,
gramap mom,
cmiidium toys.
bhaufour me thisy I do, however, think that it
9 Musique Brosik that they might be persuaded perman tumataliept deter time Chinese from further action to desin from th Sory of Malasınuit ami and at the some time de
and puramow
DA
With ove
mu
private mirror
cars. I newth
hawty emphassa the incontin Hum
against ou
De actured from some wrise!
bing to buintein Shemale of our own
and frimmed won whi
(i miwum -
we were able to demonstrate that some
/retaliation
Hesponded to Derent activi
CURFIDENTAL agunt mut
own diplomats
CONFIDENTIAL
retaliation was possible against the Chinese
Mission in London.
2. We are already considering separately a
number of measures which we could take, iz London.
We should like to enlist your co-operation in the
field of Customs examination. Would it be
possible, for instance, to adopt "administrative
delay" to hold up the import and export of
unaccompanied baggage by the Office of the
Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in London? We would
not propose to tell the Chinese that this fas
happening, but we would hope that it could be
done in such a way that they were left in no doubt
accidental.
that such delays were not incidental. I
realise that action of this sort would involve
your Customs Officers in some additional work
and in the normal course of events you might feel
reluctant to act against a diplomatic mission.
Yoney
But I wore that you will agree that the Chinese
in their present mood are a special case and that
anything we can do to counteract their uncivilised
Po Rup m
AM)
treatment of our own people would be in
the
3.
thi
Motole of the latter latter
voy mun
mom
pornstar
in the friskick my and poruchal
you
www
I should be gauteful for your commenta on Apne π passion to hus in song Wony
would prefer to
in song you
discuss the problem
до до
I should be very glad to see you at any time.
Dangulum
criurns tamu mot
cricum
obrimming wi
Perry word boy
CONFIDENTIAL
प्रभु क
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Mr. Rodgers
CONFIDENTIAL
KFCEIVED IN
AR. HIVES No.31
22 AUG 1967
표3/20
R23/20
28
Subject to my marginal comment on paragraph 3(a)(ii) I
agree with Mr. Denson's recommendations.
2. On the inclusion of the members of the Bank of China in
the general travel restrictions, on which there is a draft note
to the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires' office, there is the point
that we may very soon be telling the Chinese that the area of
free travel is curtailed from 35 miles to 20 kms. from Marble
Arch, and it may be thought that we should not now draw
official attention to the 35 mile radius when we may be about
to restrict it. I do not think this matters: indeed it
would probably impress the Chinese more if we asked them now
to ensure that the members of the Bank of China observe the
present restrictions and then in a separate note later on
reduce, the free travel radius than if we did the two things
reduce
duce
at the same time.
3. On the question of the ordinary Chinese citizens in this
country (paragraph 3(d)) I think it would be useful to know
the whereabouts of these people so that we could take
administrative action against them at short notice if required.
But you may think that since it is going to be difficult enough to
get Home Office cooperation on those points on which we
urgently require it it would be tactically unwise to press them
now to undertake this extra chore which they are clearly
unwilling to do. If we get their agreement on the things we
/want
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 7-
want done urgently we might reopen the question of the
ordinary Chinese citizens with them, basing ourselves on the
argument that if our relations with China deteriorate further
considerations of national security will make it necessary to
keep close tabs on these potential enemy aliens.
Mo de la Mare The Deaso Дере
وع
A.J. de herhan
(A.J. de la Mare) 14 August. 1967
ok. The 2,500 Chinese can writ
Section did not wake-out cooperation
altter! # Hom
on this when 5
had a word with him. We showed them to screws
Litt & Hose Office
His and oth Batters
his
t
层
310 ill
Hong Kong a Parking Setrations wonen, if they do.
I would be inclined to Name all
Loved
lo offers of k
bout to restart them
Wien
they really try to discover whether be can
en five
restrictions
Case ?
CONFIDENTIAL
does it math of be have to power
The letter to Caston? Examine
the civilived of easy gous for
me!
LTR
A
TR 11.8.67 /
Spremne to
in eithe
little
+
+
Spoken to Mr. De in Mare. In the light of
Mr. Rodgus's views
9 have
to me office of the
to nichude QM
an member of the
amentw M
NIT
emmies Marzi d' Assaneni Атаный
Bank of China
in the Hawn notification system, and stiffend the Draft letter to mm Custoon. The draft telegram
me
dow mon requin amcridment.
ी
Ma Wikim pa.
कु
阬
Notect on
Vi
to Mr. Billa
Bailand
・on 24 Angurr.
عراس
الادو
Kr. de la Xar
1020 Kare minte
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
22 AUG 1967
FC3/20
27
Retaliation against the Chinese in Britain
Flag A
Flag B
Flag C
Problem
I have already submitted separately recommending that
the Secretary of State should minute to the Home Secretary
on the question of the N.C.N.A. London Office and on instituting
a system of exit visas for Chinese officials in this country.
There are various other acts of retaliation against the Chinese
which we should consider.
Recommendation
2.
I recommend that we should:
(a) send a telegram to Peking on the lines of the
attached draft about imposing further travel
restrictions on the Chinese here;
(b) send a note to the Chinese Office pointing out
that officials of the Bank of China are also subject
to the Travel Notification Scheme. A draft is
attached;
(c) write to Custome and Excise asking them to impose
"administrative delays" on Chinese baggage.
Background Argument
3. I held a meeting on 8 August with representatives from
the Home Office, the Board of Trade and Security Services to
discuss retaliation against the Chinese in London. A record Flag of
D
this meeting is attached. I had also asked a representative 18
/from
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
.2
from Customs and Excise to attend but none was able to do so.
Action is proceeding on N.C.N.A. and exit visas. This leaves
action still to be taken on the following points:
(a) Travel Restrictions
(1) The area of free travel allowed to our staff in
Peking is limited to a circle radius 20 km. from the
centre of Peking with extensions on an approved
route to the Valley of the Ming Tombs and the Great
Wall (approximately 50 and 60 km. from Peking
respectively). Our limits in London are much more
generous: 35 miles from Marble Arch. Despite the
imbalance between our two systems we have in the
past thought that further restriction on the Chinese
here would be unproductive and might lead to
retaliation against our Mission in Peking, such as
e.g. prohibiting them from travelling on the two
extensions outside Peking now allowed. Mr. Hopson
has in the past shared our view, but it is clear
that he is now beginning to change his mind. There
would be no difficulty about instituting a system of
direct reciprocity, but I think that we should first
have Peking's views on whether this might lead to
unacceptable retaliation against our Mission.
Laubside the allowed limit (ii) We now rigidly enforce a travel ban on all members
of the Chinese Mission except when they are on
commercial visits. Mr. Hopson has suggested that
travel by members of the Commercial Office should
also be banned, but not by the resident members of
CONFIDENTIAL
/the
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3-
But the pleasin would hank to be ours: we could not bind ounselors acceft My packshore's recomend ations jubetta for
Letter in a famsh
an
ассерь
the Trading Corporations.
The Board of Trade
have said that they do not think that a ban on
travel by the Commercial Office would have a
serious effect on trade. This may well be so,
but I am sure that if we do impose such a ban
there will be a strong reaction from British
businessmen encouraged by the Chinese. I do not
think that such a ban would cause the Chinese to
improve conditions for our Mission in Peking,
although it would be of some benefit to staff
morale to know that the position of the Chinese
in London was no better than their own in Peking.
On balance, I believe that we should take no further
action on banning travel by members of the Commercial
Office for the moment. We should, however, discuss
this question with Mr. Maclehose before he goes to
Peking in October, on the understanding that we
would be prepared to institute such a ban if he thought it important from the point of view of
morale in Peking.
(iii) We have clear information that officials of the
Bank of China in London are disregarding the Travel
Notification Scheme. It appears that they do not
consider themselves to be subject to it rather than
that they are deliberately breaking the rules.
Previous notes to the Chinese Office on this subject
referred to the "ataffs of Chinese commercial enter-
prises
and their householders" and there is no
CONFIDENTIAL
/doubt
CONFIDENTIAL
4
doubt that this should have been taken to include
the Bank of China, which is Government owned and
organised. One problem about the Bank of China
is that there are on its staff six Chinese officials
who worked for the previous K.M.T. Bank and have
been in Britain since before 1949 even though they
now have C.P.G. passports. There are also four
officials who have come direct from China but are
travelling on ordinary passports. The Home Office
have told us that the Foreign Office have no powers
to impose travel restrictions on either category.
The Home Office have the powers but quite clearly
would not use them. We thus have the choice of
sending a disingenuous note to the Chinese referring
to all the staff of the Bank of China and leaving
them to sort out who is exempt or sending a note
referring only to officials of the Bank travelling
on Service (official) passports. I think the latter
course is the better.
(b) Customs Harassment
Custome and Excise were unable to send a representative
to my meeting on 8 August. Since the Chinese have adopted a
number of measures against our Mission, e.g. refusing to pack
or despatch personal effects and making difficulties about
collecting stores, I think we are perfectly justified in trying
to use the only retaliation open to us, harassment through
Customs. Protocol Department and our legal adviser have
/somewhat
CONFIDENT IAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 5 -
somewhat reluctantly said that we would be justified in
doing so although they have made it clear that the Customs
may not be willing to play. I think we should now try
writing to the Customs at official level.
(c) Shipping
We discussed the possibility of taking action against
Chinese ships or seamen in this country.
It is clear that we
have the ability to do so although both the Board of Trade and
Home Office would in practice be reluctant to act. I do not
think further action is called for until and unless the Chinese
take any further action against British ships in Chinese ports.
(d) Ordinary Chinese Citizens
Mr. Rodgers has suggested that we should ask the Home
Office to locate the 2,500 Chinese on C.P.G. passports in this
country. As you will see from the record of our meeting, the
Home Office have pointed out that the number and whereabouts
of such people varies from day to day and have said that it
would be a considerable administrative task to locate them.
They are prepared to do so, if necessary, but think that it is
not worth the time involved unless we have definite plans to
take action against these people. Since we are not at present
considering such action I think there is force in the Home
Office arguments and recommend that we should take no further
action on this point for the moment.
CONFIDENTIAL
John Denson
(J. B. Denson) 11 August, 1967
/Subject [see-28]
C
Mr. Merry
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
22 AUG 1967
26
FC3/201
Retaliation against the Chinese in Britain
When this matter was discussed with Mr. Rodgers he
asked that we make a submission covering the whole range
of retaliatory measures against the Chinese. There are,
however, a number of points of information on which we still
await confirmation from other Government Departments. In
order not to delay submitting the draft minute from the
Secretary of State to the Home Secretary, I have therefore
dealt in the submission below only with matters which are
of direct Home Office concern, i.e. action against the New
China News Agency and the institution of a system of exit
visas. A further submission will be made tomorrow covering
other retaliatory measures. Mr. Rodgers may feel that this
need not be submitted to the Secretary of State.
John Deman
(J. B. Denbon) 10 August, 1967
कु
CONFIDENTIAL
Fe3/20
CYPHER/CAT,A.
FOREIGN OFFICE TO PEKING
TELNO. 763
25
CONFIDENT IAL
COPY
18 AUGUST 1967 (F. E.D.)
CONFIDENTIAL.
TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS.
WE ARE CONSIDERING REDUCING THE AREA WITHIN WHICH THE CHINESE
MISSION HERE ARE NOW ALLOWED TO TRAVEL FREELY.
2. THERE WOULD BE NO ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTY ABOUT ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF DIRECT RECIPROCITY. THUS WE COULD SAY THAT THE FREE LIMIT WOULD EXTEND FOR A RADIUS OF 20 KILOMETERS WITH A SMALL EXTENSION TO COVER HEATHROW AIRPORT, WE COULD ALSO ARRANGE TWO OTHER QUOTE LEGS UNQUOTE EQUIVALENT TO THE MING TOMBS AND THE GREAT WALL,
FOR EXAMPLE HENLEY VIA M.4 AND OXFORD VIA A40.
3. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT TIGHTENING RESTRICTIONS HERE WILL SECURE ANY RELAXATION OF THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON YOU BUT THERE MIGHT BE SOME VALUE IN AS MUCH DIRECT RECIPROCITY AS POSSIBLE. APART FROM THE FACT THAT WE CAN NEVER IN PRACTICE BE SURE OF ENFORCING RESTRICTIONS AS EFFECTIVELY AS DO THE CHINESE, ONE CONSIDERATION WHICH HAS PREVENTED US TAKING SUCH ACTION IN THE PAST HAS BEEN THAT IT MIGHT LEAD TO FURTHER RESTRICTIONS ON YOUR MISSION (THE POINT MADE IN YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 569). I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS ON THIS AND ON THE IDEA IN GENERAL.
SOSFA
BENT 1523 18 AUGUST 1967
FILES:
F.E.D.
D.D.& P.U.S.D.
CONFIDENTIAL
ра
23h
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry No. F3
120.
DEPARTMENT.E.D.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION PRIORITY MARKINGS
Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified
Flash
Immediace Priority Routine
}
(Date)...
* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(s)
Despatched .....
18
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
En Clair
ypher
Draft Telegram to:-
PEKING
No.
(Date)
And to:-
763
[Sect
ation]
Security classification" -if any
[ Privacy marking ]
any
[Codeword-if any)
Addressed to
telegram No.
And to...
CONFIDENTIAL
➖➖.........L-N LIJJOL
VISTIMPIL~---------
Peking
18 repeated for information to
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Repeat to:-
Saving to:-
Distribution:-
F.E.D.
F.U.S.D.
Copies to:~~
Travel Restrictions.
We are considering reducing the area within
which the Chinese Mission here are now allowed to
travel freely.
2. There would be no administrative difficulty
about adopting a system of direct reciprocity.
Thus we could say that the free limit would extend
for a radius of 20 kilometers with a small extension
to cover Heathrow Airport. We could also arrange
two other "legs" equivalent to the Ming Tombe and
the Great Wall, for example Henley via M.4 and
Oxford via A.40.
3. We do not believe that tightening the restric-
mesa) secute any relaxation tions will de anything sixpa ** to vo ex-the
restrictions imposed on you but there might be some
value in as much direct reciprocity as possible.
Apart from the fact that we can never in practice
/be
(8430) 14.033266 600m 9/46 0.3.B LIA.. Op 163
sure of enforcing any restrictions of
as effectively as do the Chinese, one consideration
which has prevented us taking such action in the
past has been that it might lead to further
restrictions on your Kission (the point made in
your telegram No. 569). I should be grateful for
04
your comments on this and the idea in general.
मऊ
18
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
With the Compliments
of
Mr. S. H. E. BURLEY
Home Office
(Immigration and Nationality Department)
271 High Holborn
London W. C. 1
Our reference:
Your reference:
CONFIDENTIAL HOME
HOME OFFICE
Ma Wi 24 Em
Princeton House, 271 High Holborn, LONDON C.I
Telephone: Chancery 8811, ext.
IMG/66 648/750/2
Dear Denson,
17th August, 1967.
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
1 7 AUG 1967
FC 3120
Thank you for sending me a copy of the note of the meeting at the Foreign Office last week about the Chinese in Britain.
I have only two comments to make. After "complied with" in paragraph 8(b) insert "and any check could not be applied to travallers to Ireland".
I fear that we may not have succeeded in conveying clearly that while we know approximately how many Chinese there are registered with the police we do not know how many Chinese are exempt from registration because of long residence or other reasons, The enclosed revise of paragraph 15 does this.
You might like to know that at the time of the last count in December 1960 of all Chinese in the country there were 740 liable to continue to register and 1,342 who immediately thereafter became exempt from registration; we cannot estimate how many there are now because the number changes on account of deaths departures, naturalisations and the arrival of certain close relatives exempt from registration on arrival, in addition to those who qualify for exemption on account of long residence.
I am sending copies of this letter and the revise to those who attended your meeting.
Yours sincerely,
Im Onde
I have annandment.
༼པེ.༤.
SHE Burby
The
J. B. Denson, Esq., 0.B.E. Far Eastern Department Foreign Office
Downing Street, S.W.1.
15/2
CONFIDENTIAL
Ordinary Chinese Citizens in Britain
15. The Home Office explained that there were about 2,500
Chinese in this country with C.P.R. passports and registered
as aliens with the police. This number fluctuated; the police
counted it each year at 31st December. It would be possible to
trace the aliens for a given date but the time involved would
The officer in charge of the Aliens Department
be considerable.
of the Metropolitan Police had estimated that it would take half
his total manpower two days to work through all alien registration
cards in the Metropolitan district in order to sort out the
Chinese. The Home Office would be able to enumerate forthwith
such Chinese in this country if it were really necessary, but
thought that the administrative effort involved was not
worthwhile unless some particular action was contemplated. If it
were desirable to find out how many Chinese were in Britain who
were exempt from registration an order would first be needed
requiring then to re-register with the police.
PC 3/20
FOREIGN CIFIC.
S.V.1.
23
CONFIDENTIAL
10 August, 1967.
I enclose e record of our meeting of 8 August at which we discussed possible retaliatory mensures against the Chinese in
thà this country. We are reporting the results of the discussion to Finisters.
I am sending copies of this letter to MacTavish at the Board of Trade and to Miss Lachlan.
pe
(J. B. Denson)
S. H. E. Burley, Esq.,
Immigration Department,
Home Offios.
CONFIDENT TAY.
pa
•
Mr. de la Mare
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED INU ARCHIVES No.31
1 4 AUG 1967
22
L
FC 3/20
Retaliation against the Chinese in Britain
I attach a record of the meeting I held on 8 August to
discuss retaliation against the Chinese in Britain.
2. I recommend that, at this afternoon's meeting, we should
seek Mr. Rodgers' approval to proceed as follows:
(a) Draft a minute from the Secretary of State to the
Home Secretary saying
(1) we want agreement to grant no new visas to
N.C.N.A. for the moment;
(ii) we want the application for renewal to resi-
dence permission for the one N.C.N.A. man at
present under consideration to be delayed at
least until after the trial of the N.C.N.A.
reporters in Hong Kong;
(iii) we think that the decision not to expel N.C.N.A.
and to put no obstacles in the way of renewing
residence permits must be reconsidered;
(iv) we wish to institute a system of exit visas
for the Chinese and require Home Office co-
operation to work it.
(b) Send a telegram to Peking asking if a reduction of
the Chinese limit in London to 25 miles or less
would have repercussions in Peking.
CONFIDENTIAL
/(c)
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
-
(c) Consider further banning all travel by members
of the Chinese Commercial Office (but not
trading corporations) although I am less snguine
than the Board of Trade that this would have no
effect on trade and cause no resentment amongst
British businessmen.
(d) Write to Customs and Excise asking them to use
administrative harassment against the Chinese
Office.
(e) Take no further action on shipping or locating
all Chinese nationals in this country unless and
until we have definite plans to act against the
latter, which I do not, in any case, think would
be productive.
Jom Jinson
(J. B. Denson) 9 August, 1967
Mr. de la Mate has agrew all the sibove action, Mi Rodget's absence. A further submission
will be made.
Su supmission of 10 Angoud and
ICHE
lettu to
Mr. Bulley, Hom Borin
CONFIDENTIAL
+
Xr. de la Xare
CONFIDENTIAL
Entert
RECEIVED Ihị
2
ARCH VLS No 31 14 AUG 1967
F23/1/20
Retaliation against the Chinese in Britain
At Er. Rodgers' request I prepared the attached submission
and covering memorandum as background for his talk with the
Home Secretary, with whom he had lunch on Saturday, 5 August.
2. Mr. Rodgers told me that he emphasised to the Home
Secretary, while he realised the latter's strong reluctance
to take new powers to enable us to retaliate against the
Chinese or indeed to exercise his existing powers, that it
was important for us to be in a position to take some action
against the Chinese and to be able to say in public that we
had done ao. For this reason the delay in the grant of visas
to N.C.N.A., the delay in extending residence permits and the
institution of a system of exit visas would be of considerable
value. It would also be useful if we knew the whereabouts of
the 2,500 non-official Chinese nationals in this country,
although there was no immediate intention to suggest action
should be taken against them. Mr. Rodgers gained the impression
that Mr. Jenkins would be sympathetic to proposals for action
within his existing powers though he was still opposed to
throwing out the N.C.N.A. altogether.
3. Mr. Rodgers has agreed that, subject to your views, we
should proceed with discussion at official level on the basis
of the memorandum. I have therefore called a meeting with
representatives of the Home Office and other interested
/Departments
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2
-
Departments at 12 noon tomorrow. I should be glad for your
agreement to proceed on this basis. Mr. Rodgers proposes
to hold a meeting at 5 p.m. on Wednesday, 9 August to discuss
the whole question before a submission is prepared which will
go to the Secretary of State on Friday afternoon.
John Denson
(J. B. Dengon) 7 August, 1967
Agred
Sir my supon Ani
A 9 Angart.
า
مجھے
मधु
1974
CONFIDENTIAL
L
Mr. Rodgers
CONFIDENTIAL.
M
Denson
RECEIVED 'N
ARCHIVES No 31
pe
1 4 AUG 1967
FC3/20
RETALIATION AGAINST THE CHINESE IN BRITAIN
There are four categories of Chinese in this country:
(a) Diplomatic staff of the Office of the Chinese Charge
d'Affaires.
(b) Non-diplomatic staff of that office, who hold
official passports.
(c) Members of Chinese Government organisations: N.C.N.A,
trading corporations and the Bank of China, most of whom
hold official passports.
(d) Non-official Chinese nationale holding ordinary
passports.
2. Any retaliation against categories (a) and (b) which
was not strictly on a par with Chinese practice in Peking
e.g. exit visas and travel restrictions, would probably
result in further harassment of our Mission there. The
ultimate sanction against a person in category (a) is
to declare him persona non grata, and in category (b)
to order him officially to leave the country. Such
/action
action would immediately provoke counter-action by the
Chinese which might end in our Mission being run down to
nothing.
3. Action against category (c) could provoke retaliation
respectively against journalists, businessmen an ech-
nicians and the staff of British banks in China. The two
last are still vulnerable as there are three groups of
technicians and the representatives of two banks in
China. But as Mr. Grey, the only British correspondent, i
already under house arrest some of the arguments against
action to restrict or expel members of N.C.N.A. no
longer apply.
4. Action against category (d) would be unlikely to
influence the Chinese.
5. The type of retaliatory action we might take against
the Chinese in this country can be classified under the
following headings:
(a) N.C.N.A. (b) exit visasă (c) travel restrictions
(a) Customs harassment (e) harassment of shipping (f)
harassment of non-official Chinese nationals.
6 The attached memorandum sets out possible courses of
/action
action under each heading and recommends which course
should be followed. Of the action possible, the most
eful from the point of view of protecting members of
our Mission in Peking would be the institution of a
system of exit visas. After this the most effective and
least damaging course would be action against the N.C.N.A.
7. It is proposed to hold an early meeting at official
level with the Home Office, the Board of Trade and the
Customs and Security Services, to discuss our
recommendations.
John Denson
(J.B.Denson)
5 August 1967.
CONFIDENTIAL
THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTIJENT UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958
REVED W
· No.31
1 AUG 1967
F23/20
Retaliation against the Chinese in Britain
A meeting was held in the Foreign Office on 8 August
to discuss possible action against the Chinese Mission and
nationals in Britain in retaliation for their treatment of
the British Mission and subjects in China. Those present
were:
Mr. Burley and Miss Coates (Home Office)
Mr. MacTavish (Board of Trade)
(9)
2.
Kr. Denson and Mr. Wilson (Foreign Office)
Mr. Denson explained that the Chinese had harassed our
Mission in Peking in a number of ways and were likely to
continue doing so. They had also put the Reuters correspondent
in Peking under house arrest and taken action against a number
of British seamen for alleged "political provocation". There
was a possibility that more serious incidents right occur in
the future. Because of this the Foreign Office wished to take
certain retaliatory action against the Chinese Mission and
Chinese Government organisations in London now and to heve
agreement to take further action in the future if the situation
in China deteriorated. The Foreign Secretary had already exchanget
correspondence with the Home Secretary on this subject. The
Home Secretary expressed doubts about using his powers in
some cases and in other cases had said that he did not have
the necessary power. He had suggested that further discussions
should be held by officials.
CONFIDENTIAL
13.
C
CONFIDENTIAL
2
3. Discussion continued on the following points. The
Foreign Office point of view was the line agreed in the
Memorandum attached to Mr. Denson's submission of 7 August.
N.C.N.A.
4. Mr. Denson said that the Foreign Office wished to continue
refusing visa applications for all N.C.N.A. replacements and
would also like to delay the renewal of residence permite at
least until 21 August when it was thought that the trial of
N.C.N.A. correspondents in Hong Kong now under arrest would
be completed. Thereafter our attitude would depend on Chinese
treatment of the Reuters correspondent in Peking but we thought
that, as a minimum, the N.C.N.A. expatriate staff in London
should be reduced to one by refusing entry visas and renewal
of residence permits, while if the Chinese expelled the
Reuters correspondent we should have the power to expel the
N.C.N.A. in toto.
5.
The Home Office said that:
(a) the Home Secretary was reluctant to use his powers
to expel N.C.N.A. from this country (this had been
explained in the Home Secretary's minute),
(b) they would be similarly reluctant to refuse to
renew residence permits of those who were already
well established in this country (this covered all
the present expatriate members of the N.C.N.A. office)
or even to refuse to grant re-entry visas if these
were applied for before those concerned left this
country;
CONFIDENTIAL
/(c)
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
6.
(c) they were however prepared to hold up approval
for the renewal of the one residence permit at
the moment under consideration until 21 August
when the fate of the N.C.N.A. correspondents in
Hong Kong should be known;
(d) they saw no problem about refusing entry visas
for new members of the N.C.N.A. if necessary.
Hr. Denson said that the Foreign Office understood the
Home Office's difficulties but we might well be under very
strong pressure from Parliament and public opinion if, for
instance, the Chinese expelled the Reuters correspondent or
took more drastic action against him such as e.g. imprisonment.
This was a problem on which we would probably have to ask the
Home Office to reconsider their views.
Exit Visas
7. Mr. Denson said that some system of exit visas for
Chinese officials in this country was essential if we were
to safeguard our own people in China.
8.
The Home Office said that:
(a) they themselves had no powers to impose a system
of exit visas on those travelling on either official
or ordinary passports;
(b) they would, however, be prepared to try to co-operate
if the Foreign Office instituted a system of their
own. The difficulty would be that there was no
sanction whatsoever if the Chinese disregarded this
system. Immigration Officers could not be expected
/to
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 4·
to prevent Chinese leaving the country by force
if they did not comply with Foreign Office regu-
lations and at times of great pressure it might
even be impossible for Immigration Officers to
check that the system had been complied with.
They would consider further this problem of
control.
Travel Restrictions
9. Kr. Denson explained that the travel notification scheme
was now rigidly enforced. The only journeys we were prepared
to authorise outside the 35-mile limit were for commercial
purposes. The Foreign Office had been told that members of the Bank of China were disregarding the travel restriction
scheme and we intended to send a note to the Chinese Office
about this. Our Chargé d'Affaires in Peking was, however, not
very happy about the limited nature of our present restrictions
and had suggested that we should now refuse permission for all
journeys by members of the Chinese Commercial Office.
Foreign Office had been reluctant to agree to this because
it might have an adverse effect on trade.
The
10. The Board of Trade said that they thought restrictions
on the Commercial Office alone would not have much effect on
trade providing that members of the Trading Corporations
resident in London were still allowed to travel.
11. The Security Services suggested that the present 35-mile
limit should be further reduced since the limit allowed in
Peking was only 121⁄2 miles.
CONFIDENTIAL
/12.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 5-
12. Mr. Denson said that we were at present producing a
short memorandum on the likely effects on trade with China
of, inter alia, restricting travel by the Commercial Office
in London. We would consider in the light of the conclusions
of this paper whether or not it would be feasible to restrict
travel by members of the Commercial Office. On reducing the
present 35-mile limit we had previously considered that such
action would probably cause further difficulties for our
Mission in Peking and might for instance cause the Chinese
to prevent them travelling to the two places just outside
Peking where they were now allowed to go (the Ming tombs and
the Great Wall). When we had last consulted Peking, their
view was similar to ours but we would consider asking them
again.
13. On sending a note to the Chinese about travel restric-
tions applying to officials of the Bank of China, the Home
Office pointed out that, properly speaking, the Foreign Office
had no right to impose restrictions on those here on ordinary
passports (there were six such people working in the Bank
of China at present together with four others who had ordinary
Chinese passports who had been in this country since before
1949). Mr. Denson said that we would now need to consider
this matter further and decide whether our note could only
refer to those on diplomatic or service passports.
Shipping
14. Mr. Denson explained that the Foreign Office was not
asking for action to be taken against Chinese ships or seamen
at present but there was a possibility that British ships
CONFIDENTIAL
/might
CONFIDENTIAL
.6.
might be impounded in China or further action taken against
British seamen. If this did happen we might wish to take
action against Chinese ships or seamen here. The Foreign
Office understood that it would be possible to do so by
administrative action against Chinese ships (since China
was not a signatory of some of the Safety at Sea Conventions)
or by harassing Chinese seamen through immigration procedures. The Board of Trade said that very few Chinese ships called at English ports (about six per year) and, although it might be
necessary to take this action, it was unlikely to be very
effective since the Chinese held so many more cards in this
particular game.
Ordinary Chinese Citizens in Britain
15. The Home Office explained that there were about 2,500
Chinese in this country with C.P.R. passports and registered
as aliens with the police. This number constantly fluctuated
since those who had been in Britain more than a certain time
were exempt from registration. It would be possible to trace all such people for a given date but the time involved would
be considerable. The officer in charge of the Aliens Depart- ment of the Metropolitan Police had estimated that it would take half his total manpower two days to work through all alien registration cards in the Metropolitan district in order to sort out the Chinese. The Home Office would be prepared
to enumerate such Chinese residents in this country if it were really necessary, but thought that the administrative
effort involved was not worthwhile unless some particular
action was contemplated.
/Customs
CONFIDENTIAL
E
CONFIDENTIAL
- 7-
Customs Harassment
16. Kr. Denson said that the Foreign Office wanted to apply
some form of administrative harassment to the Chinese Office
in London through Customs and Excise. The section responsible
in Customs and Excise was at present so under-staffed that
they had not been able to spare a man to attend this meeting.
The Foreign Office would pursue the matter with them
separately.
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN
V No.31
COM IDENTIAL.
Reference
14 AUG 1967
$43/20
Memorandum.
18
1.
RETALLATION AGAINST THE CHINESE IN DRITAIN.
Ed (1636)
See-22
N.C.N.A.
Present Situation
There are at present five China-based members
of the N.C.N.A. resident in London. The residence
permit of one (Li Fu) expired in mid-July. He has
asked for an extension and we have asked the Home
: Office not to agree to this until a decision has
been taken on our attitude towards the N.C.N.A. as
a whole. In a similar way we are also withholding
approval for the visa of one replacement for the
N.C.N.A. staff. The Home Secretary has made it
clear that he is very reluctant to take action
against the N.C.N.A. as a whole.
Possible Action
2. (a) To approve the visa application for one
· replacement and the extension of Li Fu's residence
permit and to take no further action against the
N.C.N.A. unless they take further action against
our Mission or Reuters in Peking.
(b) To give no reply on either the visa or
residence permit applications andthus keep Li Fu
here in limbo. In this case we would presumably
/decide
decide to act similarly with any further visa or
residence permit applications.
(c) To refuse the present two applications and
to act similarly with further applications. If we
did this we would have to decide on some final
objective, such as either reducing the N.C.N.A.
office to locally engaged staff plus one expatriate
(which would be the direct equivalent of British
journalistic representation in Peking).
Recommendation
3. I think a combination of (b) and (c) is the
best course of action. We would keep all visa and
residence permit applications in suspense until at
least 21 August when it will be possible to see
whether the Chinese are preparing to take further
action against the Reuters correspondent in Peking
in retaliation for the trial of the next batch of
N.C.N.A. correspondents arrested in Hong Kong,
which is due on that day. (The trial of the two
N.Ċ.N.A. employees set for 1 August has been post-
poned until 21 August). Providing that there were
no dramatic new developments by then, we would
refuse the present applications and all future ones
until N.C.N.A. expatriate representation in London
is reduced to either one or nil depending on
Chinese treatment of Mr. Grey. This process might
/take
Reference.....
त
Ed (1426)
take until the Spring of 1968.
EXIT VISAS
Present Situation
4. The Home Secretary has said his powers to
prevent aliens (i.e. non-diplomatic Chinese) from
leaving the country are not effective since it is
possible to leave the U.K. via Ireland without any
check being made by Immigration Officers. At
present he has no powers to prevent diplomats from
leaving. To take them would presumably breach the
Vienna Convention on diplomatic practice and could
be claimed to be ineffective for the same reason
as similar action against aliens.
Possible Action
5. (a) To urge the Home Secretary to take the
necessary powers to impose a system of exit visas
on all official Chinese in this country, both
diplomatic and non-diplomatic.
(b) To institute a system of exit visas on our
own responsibility only asking for the co-operation
of the Home Office in checking through Immigration
Officers that all official Chinese leaving this
country have been authorised to do so by the
Foreign Office.
Recommendation
6.I think that we should follow course (b). Hięce
we already have a travel notification scheme for
the Chinese, they cannot theoretically go to Ire-
land without our approval. It is perfectly true
that the only sanction we have against the Chinese
if they disobey a system of exit visas would be
to declare members of the Office of the Chinese
Chargé d'Affaires personae non gratae and deport
non-diplomats. This would defeat the object of the
exercise. The Chinese are however likely to obey
in being caught rather than risk the loss of face involved
obeying. (The French have instituted a system of
exit visas which apparently works efficiently and
has not caused their Mission in Peking to suffer
harassment).
TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS
Present Situation
ifs-
7. We have decided to refuse all applications to
travel by Chinese officials in the U.K. except in
cases where they are doing so for commercial rea-
sons. Mr. Hopson has recommended that we should
stop commercial visits also or at least those
undertaken by members of the Commercial Section of
the Charge's Office as opposed to members of Chin-
ese trading corporations in this country.
Possible Action
8.
(a)
Ed (1626)
3
Reference..
IIILIT‒‒
8. (a) To tighten the travel notification system
even further, either by refusing all journeys of
any sort or by reducing the present area in which
the Chinese are allowed to travel freely (1.e.
35 miles from Hyde Park Corner).
(b) To continue as at present.
Recommendation
9. I think we should follow course (b) as (a)
would probably damage trade and might cause trade
to be still further curtailed in China, making
for example the collection of supplies by our
Mission impossible.
CUSTOMS HARASSMENT
14.Present Situation
10. It has been agreed within the Office (although
with some reluctance by Protocol Department) that
! we would be justified in imposing some form of
administrative customs harassment on the Chinese.
We do not yet know whether Customs and Excise will
be prepared to help.
Recommendation
11. I think that we should discuss this with
Customs and Excise and suggest that they impose
administrative delays of up to one month on all
members of the Chinese Mission, until such time
/as
+
as the Chinese allow our Mission in Peking to have
their baggage packed and shipped in the normal way
HARASSMENT OF SHIPPING
Present Situation
12. The Chinese have over the past months detained
a number of British seamen because of alleged
"political provocation". They have also threatened
to take action against any ships which call at
Chinese ports after breaking the 'boycott at Hong Kong.
Possible Action
13. (a) We could use administrative excuses to delay Chinese ships at British ports almost in- definitely although in practievery few Chinese ships call here.
(b) If Chinese ships call at British ports we coulà detain members of the crew as "undesirable". Recommendation
14. I think that no further action should be taken unless the Chinese detain British ships or crews in China. As a precaution we could'sound out the Board of Trade on whether they would be prepared to go along with either (a) or (b).
NON OFFICIAL CHINESE NATIONALS IN THE U.K. Present Situation
15. There are about 2,500 Chinese in this country who hold passports issued by the C.P.R. Mr.Rodgers asked that we should find out where these people live and their occupation. We know from the Home office that this will be a lengthy administrative procedure.
Possible Action
16. (a) To restrict either the place of residence or occupation of some of these Chinese.
(b)To seek reasons for arresting some of them (doubtless they have infringed some regulation or other if one looks hard enough):
Recommendation
17. I think we should ask the Home Office to obtain details of all these Chinese, although we cannot expect an answer very quickly. I do not think that any action against such Chinese citizens
would be successful.in immung the chinese
TOP
CONFIDENTIAL
Cypher/Cat A
PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
lno 966
27 July 1967
72 3120 5
الان
RECEIVED IN BARCHIVES No.31
27JUL 1967
Fe 3/20
CONFIDENTIAL
My telegram number 847: Exit Visas.
During my meeting with the Deputy Head of Consular Department on 22 July, I raised question of Exit Visas valid for six months. I asked why our applications had been ignored whereas such Visas had been issued to the staff of the French Embassy and the Netherlands Office. After a great deal of tautological argument, Mr. Kao made it quite clear that we should not get Exit Visas valid for six months and he hinted that neither the French nor the Dutch might get sny more in
future.
2.
Present Chinese practice is to insist on knowing exact date of departure and then delay issuing the Exit Visa until
the eve of departure, thus causing maximum inconvenience and anxiety to the person concerned.
3. This strengthens case for taking action as recommended in my telegram under reference. I should be grateful for news.
r. Hopson
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
Far Eastern Dept.
Passport Control Dept.
Protocol & Conference Dept.
PPPPP
Sent 05152/27 July
Read 08302/27 July
Девой
Achon in porced
Seperality of
rescue
ex?
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viscie for Chence in Rriam See FC 3/20 (THE)
CONFIDENTIAL
ра
Do I to atro
Ento po
Now entant 3/20.
8.
PRIVATE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN !ARCHIVES No.31
- AUG 1967
FC3/20
16
New China News Agency
Your minute of 2 August recorded the Foreign Secretary's
comments on the Home Secretary's minute of 1 August about
the New China News Agency in London, and asked for advice
on how we should proceed.
2. Mr. Rodgers held a meeting yesterday at which it was
agreed that we should pursue the question of retaliatory
measures against the N.C.N.A. in London at official level
with the Home Office and other interested Departments. In
the light of their views, we should be in a position to put
forward specific proposals which would be submitted to the
Secretary of State, together with a draft reply to the Home
Secretary urging him to reconsider his position. The con-
sultative process will probably take some days. We would hope to be in a position to make a submission in time for the Secretary of State to sign a minute during the weekend of 12/13 August. Whether urgent action against the N.C.N.A. in London will be considered necessary and therefore make an
approach to the Home Secretary before the first week of September desirable depends on how the situation develops in China, e.g. whether further action is taken against Mr. Grey, Reuters oorrespondent in Peking, or against any other British subjects. If urgent action is thought necessary, the Secretary
of State might wish to consider asking another Foreign Office
Minister
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CONFIDENTIAL
2
Minister to press the matter with the Home Secretary.
We shall watch developments carefully and keep you
informed.
Copies to:
Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Wright
Kr. Samuel
John Denson
(J. B. Deraon) August, 1967
ME Dhurm:
Thank
you.
It would be
halfful if we could have
your submission
the
aftamom of
11 August.
бы
3
Max Wilson
Jl. 9 Tugust.
CONFIDENTIAL
14/Win
Far Eastern Department
15
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
- 9 AUG 1967
FC3/20
The Foreign Secretary has now seen the Home Secretary's minute about New China News Agency staff in London (1 August, 1967). The Secretary of State has commented as follows: "This is not very helpful. Tell him that in such a matter foreign policy must prevail. But I am willing to discuss It."
2. Could we please have your advice on how to proceed now - bearing in mind that the Secretary of State is now on leave for a week: we could not get him to sign a minute until the weekend of 12 August and he would not be available to discuss this with the Home Secretary until the first week in September.
P.M. Kally
(Miss P. M. Kelly)
2 August, 1967
Copies to: Mr. Rodgers
P.U.S.
Mr. Hohler
Your mumite
Mr. de la Kár
CONFIDENT IAL
Безро
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
- 7 AUG 1967
F23/20
Mr. Rodgers held a meeting on 2 August attended by
Mr. Hohler, Mr. Wilson and myself. It was agreed:
(a) that we should proceed as proposed in paragraph 3
'below)
of my submission of 2 August and try to find ways
in which we could harass or restrict N.C.N.A. and
other official Chinese personnel within the existing
powers held by the Home Secretary. When we had
worked out specific proposals these should be put to Ministers, together with a draft reply from the
Secretary of State to the Home Secretary's minute
of 1 August, urging him to reconsider his position, (b) that in the meantime we should enforce the travel
restrictions more rigorously by informing the Chinese Mission officially that the notification system applies also to the Bank of China, some of whose officials have been ignoring it. Thereafter
action could be taken if cases were discovered
where officials had travelled without the required
notificationĮ
(c) that we should arrange for the remaining Chinese
post-graduate students in this country to be visited
by the police in order to impress on the Chinese
that we had certain powers in respect of Chinese
aliens;
CONFIDENTIAL
/(a)
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2
(d) that an assessment should be made of the effects on
Sino-British trade of a decision to restrict travel
2.
by Chinese commercial representatives in this country,
both from the Chinese Commercial Office and from
trading corporations (which H.M. Chargé d'Affaires,
Peking has asked for) and/or a withdrawal of British
commercial officers from Peking and a cessation of
visits by British businessmen to China.
I am taking action on these four points.
An Desson
Thank
you.
Spoken.
John Denson
(J. B. Densch) 3 August, 1967
Please speak
छ
3/8
CONFIDENTIAL
Flag A
MR. HOHLER
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
- 7 AUG 1967
13
F23/20
12
Retaliation against the Chinese in London
The Home Secretary's reply (attached) is distinctly
unhelpful. What it amounts to is that the Home Secretary
has the powers to harass non-diplomatic Chinese (e.g. N.C.N.A.
etc.) by ordering them to report to the police and to prevent
them from leaving the country. He is, however, unwilling to
exercise these powers because, in the first case, he thinks
that it could not be justified as "necessary in the public
interest" and, in the second, he says that there is a loop-
hole in that it is possible to leave this country via Ireland
without going through the motions of seeking approval from an
immigration officer.
2. What the Home Secretary's minute does not appear to take
into account is the fact that we already have a system of
travel restrictions on all official Chinese in this country,
which was imposed by the Foreign Office. This system should
effectively prevent any Chinese from leaving the country via
Ireland without our knowledge. It is however true to say
that, if the Chinese disregarded these restrictions, our only
sanction is deportation and those of more than two years
residence in this country could presumably appeal. It is
however unlikely that the Chinese would ever disregard any
regulations we wished to impose or appeal against deportation
in a British court.
CONFIDENTIAL
13.
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- 2
3.
I think the only useful way we can now proceed is to
call a meeting at which the Home Office, Board of Trade,
Customs and Excise and Security Services would all be
represented in order to work out ways of retaliating against
the Chinese either to be used immediately or to be kept in
reserve in case the Chinese create further difficulties for
our Mission in Peking. I attach a short memorandum showing some of the types of retaliation which might be used and
From the tone of the outlining the difficulties involved. Home Secretary's reply I fear that we shall get very little active co-operation from the Home Office. Even so, I think we must try at the very least to institute a system of exit visas for the Chinese here, if necessary by sending a note
from the Foreign Office without asking for any co-operation
from the Home Office.
4. Until we have at least explored with other interested Departments possible retaliatory measures on the lines set out in the memorandum and are ready to submit specific proposals to our own Ministers, I doubt whether there would be any point in the Secretary of State returning to the
charge with the Home Secretary-
John Denson
(J. B. Denson) 2 August, 1967
Su forth munts of 3 August
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
WE
Retaliation against the Chinese in Britain
The following is a list of the possible lines of
retaliation we might take against the Chinese here pointing
out the difficulties involved in each case.
A.
Exit Visas
(1) A system of exit visas is an almost essential part
of retaliatory action against the Chinese in Britain. We could justify it on the grounds that the Chinese
apply such restrictions to our people in China.
(11) The difficulty is that the Home Office have no
powers to apply such a system. They say that diplomats are not covered by the Aliens Order.
Holders of Service passports (1.e. those below
diplomatic rank but not travelling on ordinary passports) are covered by most articles of the
Aliens Order (the Home Office are checking on
exactly which) and should therefore come under
the ruling which says that no aliens may leave
this country without authority of an Immigration
Officer. Such permission is, however, a pure
formality and never refused except in criminal
Cages.
(iii) One solution to this problem may be that the
Foreign Office could send a note to the Chinese
saying that all those travelling on Diplomatic
and Service passports will in future require an
exit visa before leaving this country. The Home
/office
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CONFIDENTIAL
2.
Office at official level have said that they
would co-operate by instructing their Immigra-
tion Officers to check all departing Chinese
to ensure that they had exit visas. The loop-
hole in the system would be that we do not
appear to have any legal powers to detain
diplomats if they then disputed our regulations
and, even if we detained holders of Service
passports, we might have difficulty justifying
the action if a case was taken to court. In
practice, however, one can be reasonably certain
that the Chinese would not be clever enough to
disregard such regulations issued by the Foreign
Office. If they did, we could of course take
diplomatic action against their Mission.
B. Restriction of Movement
(1) We do not appear to have any legal powers to
restrict the movement of diplomats. We could,
however, tighten even further the limits within
which the Chinese are allowed to travel freely
(at present 35 miles from Hyde Park Corner)
although in practice there would be little point
in so doing •
(11) Holders of Service passports (including expatriate
members of N.C.N.A.) can be restricted as to their
place of residence, or required to report regularly
to a police station. Such action would have to be
justified (both in the mind of the Home Secretary
and potentially in a court) as being "in the public
CONFIDENTIAL
/interest".
F
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
C.
interest".
Freedom of Communiostion
The Home Office have no powers to restrict the freedom
of communication of the N.C.N.A. London Office.
It might
be possible for the Post Office to delay or interfere with
the mail but, in practice, it would be very hard to persuade
them to do this.
D. Chinese Seamen
E.
(1) Foreign aeamen on ships visiting British ports do
not go through the normal immigration procedure.
The practice is for the Immigration Officer to give
permission to all members of the crew to land and
the way in which this permission is used is then
left to the Captain. The Immigration Officer can,
however, declare any person to be "undesirable"
and refuse him permission to land. Strangely
enough, he then has the power to detain that
It does person on shore until the ship sails. not appear that the Immigration Officer needs to
justify his action in any way.
(ii) Both the Home Office and the Board of Trade
would have to be consulted if this ploy was
used to detain Chinese seamen. Both would be
likely to have strong objections.
Chinese Ships
(1) It is only likely that we would wish to detain
a Chinese ship in retaliation for a similar act
CONFIDENTIAL
/against
CONFIDENTIAL
运
against a British ship in China. The only
method of doing so would appear to be for the
shipping company involved to obtain a Court
Order to detain the ship until bail was given
against a possible court action (c.f. the
Torrey Canyon's sister ship in Singapore).
(ii) There are other ways in which we could harass
Chinese ships in British ports since there are
a number of agreements on safety regulations
which the Chinese Government have not signed.
By applying rigorously the letter of such
regulations we could cause considerable delay.
There are, however, few Chinese ships which
call at British ports and we could expect
opposition from the Board of Trade if we tried
this tactic.
CONFIDENTIAL
·
i. D
HIVES NOT
- 7 AUG 1967′
FC32
ONFIDENTIAL Far Eastam Dapt.
FOREIGN SECRETARY
HOME SECIŲ
Flag B
Copiad to: (a) 5.4s. //
(b) Mr. Rody (c) P.U.S..
(0) Mr. Houkr.
12
You sent me a minute on 19th July inviting me to
agree in principle to the use of my powers under the
Aliens Order to expel the staff of the New China News
Agency in London, in view of the events in China and
Hong Kong. I realise that the position in Peking has
since worsened in that Reuter's representative there is
under house arrest. This, I understand, is an act of
retaliation for a sentence of imprisonment passed in
the Hong Kong courts on a member of the New China News
Agency for offences against the peace and good government of the colony. My officials have also
Flag C received a Foreign Office memorandum, dated 22nd July,
asking about our powers to prevent Chinese nationals
from leaving this country as a measure of retaliation
for similar steps taken in China.
1
COAMDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2. The possible action against Chinese in this
country, in increasing order of severity, might be
(a) refusal of extension of permission to stay;
(b) curtailment of permission to stay, with or without
notice; (c) deportation, with or without notice. If
any of these courses were adopted, deportation would be
the only effective sanction, and an alien with two
years' lawful residence here would have a right to make
representations to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate
unless we were to be in breach of our international
obligations.
one of these is the wife of a correspondent, appear to
have less than two years' residence.
Only two N.C.N.A. representatives, and
(One is time-
expired, but has four years' residence). The right to
make representations might not be exercised, but the
need to give a proper opportunity for its exercise
means that expulsion could not be summary where the
person has two years' residence. To be effective in
closing or hampering the N.C.N.A. the expulsion of their
ลง
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
correspondents would have to be accompanied by refusal
of visas for replacements and refusal of work permits,
to fill the posts, for Chinese already in the country;
and even this might not be effective in practice.
3. I have power under the Aliens Order to impose
special restrictions as to residence, reporting to the
police, occupation or employment where I consider it
necessary in the public interest. Without a fresh
Order in Council the power would not extend to travel
restrictions or to the equivalent of house arrest.
Deportation would be the only sanction for breach, and
here again there would be the right to make
representations.
4. As to stopping aliens from leaving the country,
this is a power already available to me under the
Aliens Order (although never exercised in recent times
except to prevent wards of court from leaving); but it
could not be effectively exercised in practice as there
3
CONFIDENTIAL
CON
AL
is no check on journeys within the Common Travel Area, including Ireland, and one could not be imposed. We might make ourselves look silly if we were to gamble on
the Chinese not knowing this.
5. The trouble is that my powers were not drawn up
If we
as instruments of foreign policy, and that they are not really apt for this kind of situation. deport aliens for the purposes you wish to achieve, can I maintain that I am doing so because the deportation of the people concerned is "conducive to the public good"? Would restrictions on residence really be
"necessary in the public interest"?
6. I see your difficulties, but at the same time I cannot see a clear way through mine. I suggest that our officials should continue the present intensive study of possibilities and should then submit reports
to us.
4
R
1st August, 1967
.:L
Mr. Samuel
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED I ARCHIVEŚ NO 31
31 JUL 1967
FZ
A
19
Flag A
16
Action against Chinese in Britain
You may like to have an interim report of the action
we are now taking, as instructed by the Secretary of State,
to secure the Home Office's agreement to our taking powers
which will enable us to take appropriate action against
Chinese resident in this country (Mr. Maitland's minute of
21 July to Mr. Denson).
2. I attended a meeting at the Immigration Department of
the Home Office this morning to discuss this question with
Mr. Fitzgerald, the Under Secretary in charge, and other
officials. I first asked them when the Secretary of State
could expect a reply to his minute to the Home Secretary of
19 July about possible action against the N.C.N.A. in London.
They said that they were now preparing a draft which they
hoped Kr. Jenkins would be able to send across tomorrow.
They could not tell me exactly what line Mr. Jenkine would
take, but I gathered that they were probably going to recommend
that officials of the two Departments should work out the
measures required so that, if a decision were taken, we should
be able to act immediately.
3. We then discussed the possibility of operating a system
of exit visas against Chinese wishing to leave this country,
On in order that we might detain them here if we wished.
Saturday, 22 July, we had sent a memorandum on this question
/to the
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2.
17
Flag
to the Home Office (copy attached) and I drew their attention
particularly to its last paragraph. It was clear from our
discussion that we could take action immediately against
Chinese non-diplomats under Article 1 of the Aliens Order
which empowered the Home Secretary to prevent them from
embarking. As for Chinese diplomats, a new Order in Council
would be required as they were exempt from the Aliens Order.
This would be subject to the negative procedure in the House
which means that we could apply it even when Parliament was
not sitting. They did, however, say that there would be a
major practical difficulty in enforcing a system of exit
visas, which we had never operated in this country in times
of peace, in that the Chinese would be able to get out through
the West coast ports to Ireland as we had no emigration control
at these ports. We agreed, however, that we could look into
this point.
4. I asked them whether the Home Secretary had powers to
subject Chinese residents here to house arrest. They said
that he had not, but that he could make a restriction order
restricting the movements of any specific person "as to
residence, reporting to the police, occupation or employment
as he considered necessary to the public interest". They
would, however, have to look further into this question with
their legal advisers.
5. I asked Mr. Fitzgerald to let me have a note as soon as
possible about exit visas and restriction orders as applied
/to
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3-
to the Chinese so that we would know what powers we had and
what new powers we would need to take if we wished to take
action against the Chinese in this country. They promised to
let me have this.
6. Apart from the N.C.N.A. official already sentenced to
two years in Hong Kong, there are two other N.C.N.A. officials under arrest and due to be tried on 1 August. It is presumably
If so, likely that they will also be given prison sentences.
our nationals in China may be subject to further acts of
retaliation. We are now considering what these could be and
will submit on this also. They could, I imagine, include a
trumped up charge against Mr. Grey, enabling the Chinese to
sentence him to a term of imprisonment.
7. We are also considering the possibility of deporting
the three N.C.N.A. officials, when the other two have been
sentenced. It is possible, however, that the Chinese would
ither refuse to accept these officials and return them to the Colony and, in any case, they might not consider it a sufficient quid pro quo on our part to cause them to release
We Kr. Grey who provides them with a very useful hostage. will also consider this point in our submission on the whole
question.
Iland.
(E. Bolland) 24 July, 1967
We should
CONFIDENTIAL
● We shred win at getting to options quite clear by Thandy of the beak. Iit that point, a fier docarion hitzen to Contay of State and to Home Seating Seems inexigible.
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CONFIDENTIAL
+
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
31 JUL 1967
F23/20
10
4
Exit Vigɔa for Chinese in Britain
The British Eission in Peking has recently been suffering a
great deal of harasszant from the Chinese authorities. In most
Ozcca thie harassment is of such a rature that we would not wich to
retaliate in Kird. There is, hozevor, one potential donger which ia
causing us concom and which we could offset by having the
necessary powers to take reciprocal action against the Chinese hare.
This is the case of exit vis25.
2. Since 1949 the Chánosa hayo operated a ayaton of exit vises which
applies to all foreignera in China, including diplomats. In the early days soon after the communist takeovor thera were difficulties over there exit visca but, in the last few years, the situation improved and our representatives and other British nationala havo not, to our knowledge, had any difficulties with the Chinese authorities on this coore. Recently, however, the Chinese have shown signs of
using oxit visas to harass our Office, Exit viens for the Hewitt family (who were severaly maltreated by the Chinose in Shanghai) vere
The Dutch suffered so delayed that they missed their plane hose, much more seriously when their Chargé d'Affaires was refused an exit
visa and kept in Poking for several months. In the present stute of our relations with China, and with the Chinose trying to harasa our
Vission in Peking in retaliation for events in Hong Kong, there is a very strong possibility that we will have serious trouble over exit vicas in the near future. It is, for example, possible that they may
/delay
CONFIDENTIAL
L
·
CONFIDE TIL
delay the departure of our Chargé d'Affaires who is due to leave next
Bonth.
3. At present we do not have any system of exit vises for Chinese
We fully realise in Britain, nor do we have the povers to impose one. that the Home Office may hɛve serious objections in principle to taking such powers in peeco-time but, in the precent exceptional circumstances, we have a duty to protect by every means possible our Eission in Peking and other British nationals travelling to China. In order to do this so think that we should seek the necessary powers to require exit visad fron all holders of Chinese Government passports wishing to leave this country. Only a few people will be involved and they will all be travelling with the approval of the Chinosa
Jovarasent. If wo had these powers wo very much hope that it would navar do necessary to use then. However, we are sure that the fact that we were known to possess the power to retaliate quickly against the Chinese in this country would go a long way to deter the Chinese from interfering with our own people in China,
4. Te hope the Home Office can agree that such action is necessary. If so, we should be grateful if you could advise us on the best and noat uzgent method of arming ourselves with the necessary powers.
+
FOREIGN QUSICE
22 July, 1967
COFFIDENTIAL
+
Mr. de la Maře
CONFIDENTIAL
FC22
RECEIVED IN
¡ARCHIVES No.51
31 JUL 1967
Exit Visas for Chinese in Britain
Problem
The Chinese have a system of exit visas for all foreigners
in China, including diplomats. Our staff in China have already
suffered some minor difficulties over the delay in granting
these exit visas and, in the present state of Sino-British
relations, it is likely that we will encounter more serious
difficulties in the future. We have no such system in this
country and it would require an Order in Council to institute
one.
Recommendation
2.
I recommend that we should urgently seek powers to impose
a aystem of exit visas for all those holding Chinese Government
passports in this country. I submit a draft letter from
Mr. Rodgers to Lord Stonham, Parliamentary Under-Secretary at
the Home Office. Our Assistant Legal Adviser concurs.
Background and Argument
3. Since 1949 the Chinese have had a regulation under which
all foreignere in China require exit visas before leaving the
country. Recently there have been one or two occasions when
the Chinese have used this system to delay the departure of
foreign diplomats (e.g. the Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires was
last year refused an exit visa and had to remain in Peking for
six months against the wishes of his Government) as well as /members
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2.
members of our own Mission. In the present state of our
relations with China there is a strong possibility that we
shall have to face more serious difficulties over exit visas
in the future. This is a problem which could affect not only
members of our Mission in Peking but also others, e.g.
businessmen or seamen visiting China and British bank officials
resident in China.
4. We have no system similar to that of the Chinese and
therefore no means of direct retaliation against them if they
caused difficulties over exit visas. Under the Aliens Order
no foreigner may leave Britain without the authority of an
emigration officer but, in practice, this power is only used
in criminal and wardship cases and diplomats are exempt from
the Order. To acquire the necessary powers to impose a system
of exit visas on the Chinese would require an Order in Council.
We know from discussions at official level that the Home Office
would strongly oppose such a move in principle on grounds of
administrative complication and because they believe that such
powers should never be used in peace time.
5. Despite the opposition we can expect from the Home Office
I think we must press strongly for the necessary powers to
take action against the Chinese. We would hope that it would
never be necessary to prevent the departure of any Chinese
from this country but the existence of such powers would help
to deter the Chinese from taking action against our Mission
or British subjects in China.
CONFIDENTIAL
/6.
CONFIDENTIAL
-3.
6.
There is always the risk that such a move by us would
lead to further difficulties for our Mission in China. We
could, however, make it clear that, in this case, we were
only bringing our own practice into line with that of the
Chinese. We know that the French recently instituted such
a selective system without apparently creating any reper-
cussions for their Mission in Peking.
7. I attach a draft letter to the Home Office.
Mr Rodgers.
+
блата
(E. Bolland) 21 July, 1967
д
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of encounters
we sharked pahass peep some ammunition in reserve.
A sails
Wif. de In man
CONFIDENTIAL
2117
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RECEIVED IN
FARCHIVES No.3 i 31 JUL 1967
·
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-
ret:llt.on : in t the 'iew Chinn Ne: agency
here for ti outr e. t..e Chinese hive committed
ainst our 13.ion in eking ami Chandai. I
underst id t. t you are reluct it to take action
in t t..e ....0.2.A.
:
abuse
The Cilnere c tinue their campel of abUBO
t up. with their inflammatory prop:... ada
e coura e viol: ce in Wong
otki. The
t.o.
incr inly firm tction the Tong Kong
Govern et re mom takin to lel with the
sit tion in the Colony coul result at any
mort in retezei abuse alm naru, aqubit of our
t fr in ekin
3.
I. t:1.
0 ww have to tko nction
11: tte Chino.e 1. c.on here.
ever, 9ûro:
i...re
..::9 y
+
e round not break
/orr
. I
*AL
PIA!
off rel tions wit.. China if this can be avoided.
Le could declare cert: in members of the Mission
here per ra nen trata, but I am advised that
if we did t.is the Jhinc:e would certainly
retaliate in like or stron er manner and, as
we are mo.. v iner le t n they are becaus
ke have foa Chine speakers to post to ́eking
while they have any ing ish speakers to send
to London, our resurces would run out long
before theirs.
4.
There is, ho over, a good case for taking
ction in. t the ,0,N.A. in London. It is
not t all a preus agency in our sense of the
-
term but the proj
Chitose Jovernment.
mi department of the
I feel sure that the
WO
public and reus would support us if we said
we ad had enough of this orgnisation.
would à ve no need to fer criticism that we
were interferin,, with the libert of the
pra......, for we could easily demonstr te that
what the
are utting out in t:.18
country is not f cts and fair comment, but
lion, distortion, buse and vilific: tion of
the grommest n ture,
/5.
MNĂ FIAL
NIAL
5. As you know, our policy is not to seek
any quarrel with the Chinese, or to provoke
then unduly. But developments in Hong・ ong
show that our op oments there, hving filed
in their tte it to roue the mastes ay inst
us, are now roporti to increased violence and
terrorism. This let thit in enforcing law
i
-
and order se call cl.ch with them more
stroly and pertaps more often than hitherto, T is in turn mean on post showing, that the
Chinese will ttu t to increage their
prescure against us wherever they can,
-
whether
in Hong Kong or a inst our Mission in eking
or our ships in Chin e morts.
ports. To counter
these pressures effectively we ourselves aust
bo re dy with our cằn measures
A committee
of offici 18 of the de rt ents concerned i
wer ing on tais, posting the necessary inter-depart ental clear nces, etc., so that any given med ure, once it is mini. teri lly aproved, can be t into effect without
delay. The lome office h ve so far not been
involved in t.is buc u e up to now the only
/mee sure
TAL
measure we have in ind which does involve you
18 "ction in tile country again. t the b
on t we need your personal
pproval
a fore we c.no any further.
to any further. I would
emphasize that we are not askin, for the
+
immedi te ex ulsion of .N.
indeed se
ay not us.. for it at all but we think it
import. nt to ensure how that we have areo ent,
Bc that we can t ́ke quick and decisive action
at the psychological moment.
6. That could curte soon. At our request
your Depart et are w. thholding visas for two
re lac. monts for the N.M.H.A. here. oking
arɩ baking threatening noise, about the delay and hinting that they may take action against
the Reuters corre. on et there. If they
should expel him it would mean that we had
no United Kinđell press agency corres ondent in
China, for he is the only one. I think it
would t..er. be r..cery for us,
stand up to the Unino. e at all,
expel all the five re: ining
t.1: country.
if we are to
immedi tely to
...A. men in
M.
COMPI STIAL
P
+
-
7. I ho you will ree that we should
+1
s se can ao ti.
e could the hom bly any action se hay
ecie on. If you tink a discussion would
be useful I would we nenpy to talk tuis over
with you..
TaLN)
19 July, 1967
JOAN NIAL
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
SU GHE
Wi
3
8
No.
Registry F2 3/3
DRAFT
MINUTE
Type 1 +
From
Top Secret. Secret Confidentist
Un
*5/677/58.
To:-
HOME SECRETARY
SECRETARY OF STATE
Telephone No. & Ext
Department
FLAG ★ C-
Minura dancinhand by Mvate Secretary
20 JUL 1967
Possible Action against the New Chine News Agency in London
I have seen Bill Rodgers' record of his
conversation with you on 25 May about possible
retaliation against the New China News Agency
here for the outrages the Chinese have
committed against our Mission in Peking and
Shanghai. I understand that you are reluctant
to take action against the N.C.N.A.
2.
The Chinese continue their campaign of
abuse against us. With their inflammatory
propaganda they encourage violence in Rong
Kong. The increasingly firm action the Hong
Kong Government are now taking to deal with
the situation in the Colony could result at
any moment in renewed abuse and harassment of
our staff in Peking.
There are,
3. If this happens we may have to take action
against the Chinese Mission here.
however, strong reasons why we should not break
off relations with China if this can be avoided.
We could declare certain members of the Mission
here persona non grata, but I am advised that
if we did this the Chinese would certainly
retaliate in like or stronger manner and, as
we are more vulnerable than they are because
we have few Chinese speakers to post to Peking
while they have many English speakers to send
to London, our resources would run out long
before theirs.
14. There
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
ܛܐ
There is, however, a good case for taking
action against the N.C.N.A. in London. It is
not at all a press agency in our sense of the
term but the propaganda department of the
Chinese Government.
I feel sure that the
1
public and press would support us if we said we
had had enough of this organisation.
We
would have no need to fear criticism that we
were interfering with the liberty of the press,
for we could easily demonstrate that what the
N.C.N.A. are putting out in this country is
not facts and fair comment, but lies, distortion,
abuse and vilification of the grossest nature.
5. As you know, our policy is not to seek
any quarrel with the Chinese, or to provoke
them unduly. But developments in Hong Kong
show that our opponents there, having failed
in their attempt to rouse the masses against
us, are now resorting to increased violence
and terrorism. This means that in enforcing
law and order we shall clash with them more
strongly and perhaps more often than hitherto.
This in turn means, on past showing, that the
Chinese will attempt to increase their pressure
against us wherever they can, whether in Hong
Kong or against our Mission in Peking or our
ships in Chinese ports. To counter these
pressures effectively we ourselves must be
A ready with our own measures. The committee
of officials of the departments concerned 18
working on this, getting the necessary inter-
departmental clearances, etc., so that any
|given measure, once it is ministerially
approved, can be put into effect without delay.
The Home Office have so far not been involved
/in
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
in this because up to now the only measure
we have in mind which does involve you is
action in this country against the N.C.N.A.,
and on this we need your personal approval
before we can go any further. I would
emphasise that we are not asking for the
immediate expulsion of N.C.N.A. indeed we
-
-
but we think it
may not ask for it at all
important to ensure now that we have agreement,
so that we can take quick and decisive action
at the psychological moment.
6. That could come soon. At our request
your department are withholding visas for
two replacements for the N.C.N.A. here.
Peking are making threatening noises about
the delay and hinting that they may take
action against the Reuters correspondent
there. If they should expel him it would
mean that we had no United Kingdom prese
agency correspondent in China, for he is the
only one. I think it would then be
necessary for us, if we are to stand up to
the Chinese at all, immediately to expel all
the five remaining N.C.N.A. men in this country.
7. I hope you will agree that we should
clear our lines as much as we can so that we
could take promptly any action we may decide
on. If you think a discussion would be
useful I would be happy to talk this over
with you.
19/7
FLAG A
Mr. Rodgers
CONFIDENTIAL
-
COVERING SECRET
Ayak. 18161 Прав
RECEIVED IN FARCHIVES No.31
31 JUL 1967
FC3/20
1-1917
1917
Possible Action against the New China
Nowa Agency in London
On 28 June I submitted talking points which the
95
Secretary of State might wish to use in discussion with Mr.
Jenkins aimed at getting his agreement in principle to the
expulsion of the New China News Agency in London if it became
expedient to do this. Because of the pressure of other
business, it has so far not been possible to arrange a meeting
between the Secretary of State and Mr. Jenkins.
2. On your instructions we have therefore prepared a letter
which the Secretary of State might wish to send to the Home
Secretary. This is attached immediately below.
3. As you know, with the approval of Sir Saville Garner and
Sir Paul Gore-Booth a committee of officials at Under-Secretary
level has been set up to work out interdepartmental positions
so that, if we are required at short notice to take retaliatory
action against the Chinese for their own activities against
us either in Hong Kong or in China this can be done without
delay. One of the points at issue is the expulsion of the
New China News Agency in this country.
No ministerial
decision has yet been taken to do this nor have we yet
recommended such a course to Ministers.
But we think that
the ground should be prepared so that if it becomes necessary
to take action we can do so at the moment when it will have
the most impact.
This means having a decision ready to put
CONFIDENTIAL
/into
CONFIDENTIAL
2
Над в
into effect, given ministerial sanction, without the delay
that interdepartmental consultation necessarily involves.
In the particular case of the N.C.N.A. we cannot get any
further with the Home Office until the Home Secretary himself
has given general approval in principle for the expulsion of
N.C.N.A. if the appropriate moment comes.
4. The object of this approach to Mr. Jenkins is therefore
to clear the decks. The Permanent Under-Secretary, yourself
and the Secretary of State have all agreed that we should be
so prepared.
Private Rafectary
Af. de la kan.
(A.J. de la Mare) 14 July, 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
FJ (2029)
|
¦
Kr. Repson
Reference. FC 22/4RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
CONFIDENTIAL
Depart
Passport Control Department
Mr. Nalled)
1 2 JUL 1967
Festp
Peking telegram No.84 /: Exit Vises for
the Chinese in Britain
I think this suggestion is a useful one from every point of view. Not only would it be useful to have a further possible means of retaliation against Chinese diplomate and officials in return for anything they may do to our people in Peking, but we may at some point need to retaliate against the Chinese if, for instance, they held British seamen in China.
2. The only problem is how to proceed. From the political point of view I can see no objection to discriminating against the Chinese and a ruling that they alone out of foreign diplomats and officials in Britain must have exit visas before leaving the
country. I imagine that we would need to consult the Home Office before making such a rule and lay on some machinery with the Security Services to ensure that it is observed. I should be grateful for the comments of P.C.D. on this.
3. When we have had a chance, to clear our own minds I think it would be a good idek to call a meeting of Far Eastern Department, Passport Control Department, the Home Office and the Security Services.
(D.C. Wils
11 July 1967
ん
!
б
Sinh
agree with the Wilson. I understand from Nortman Department that no alfangement exists for oral
comotio
lm
home whose Maths are
Communior
issua
normal l'yju usno valid for
кури
nummer of Jouinung
T
Jom Juven
a
до
Vớ
peso.
173
Ed (1627)
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
CONFIDENTIAL
Minutes
Reff F 22/4 wh
The Aliens Order provides that no foreigner may leave the UK without the permission of an immigration office
"M.DC. Wilson practice nothing is done to impede the
For Eastern Spr..
departure of a foreigner and the
In
formality is simply that of completing an Embarkation card so that there is an official record. Exceptione to this practice are rare and are normally confined to criminal and ward of court cases, but we would see little practical difficulty in bringing Chinese diplomata and officials into the net,given Home Office co-operation.
2. Members of the staff of the Chinese Chargé's office are statutorily exempt from most of the provisions of the Aliene Order but are still required to comply with identification procedures on arrival and departure, and are subject to the entry visa requirement. We see no reason, therefore, why an exit visa should not be introduced.
3.
To enforce such a procedure should not in our view be difficult because of the small number of persons involved and the fact that they are easily identifiable by their passports. Immigration Officers already have clear instructions to ensure that they report carefully the departure of Chinese diplomats and officials.
4. The exit visa could be simply a rubber stamp in the passport or on the embarkation card
Seen at the Foreign Office
Date
The stamp to be imposed by the Foreign Nationals Department of the Passport Office (who issue re-entry visas) after consultation with Far Eastern Department. There might be some advantage in putting the stamp on the embarkation card rather than in the passport as this would provide a surer means of checking that someone had not slipped away without an exit visa.
5. If, as appears to Chinese stipulate the
be the case, the point of departure, we could do the same thus making movements easier to control. (In 1952 the Russiana stipulated on their exit visas for
Chinese precisely where they should crose the frontier).
16. Presumably..
Minutes
6. Presumably the proposed exit visa requirement would apply to all Chinese citizens resident in the UK, i.e. Bank of China, NCNA etc, as well as members of the Chargé d'Affaires' office.
LA Mikin
(L.H.Mitchell) 12 July, 1967
Good. I have culo spoken of the Security Sencei
مراس
he
difficulty check
bou: Keeping
the system.
21 think
Hors
höld
a
we
should
meeting
with Je.D. (and the Secwily Sevicei
und
Hime Ettice it uncensory I have prepared a dratu
for his.
siebeession
15/i
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Mr. Denson
CONFIDENTIAL
Reference.
Mr. Bolland
EXIT VISAS FOR CHINESE
We have run into a major problem in trying to impose a aystem of exit visas for Chinese in Britain.
2. The Home Office have told us that they are not at present empowered to institute a system of exit permits for foreign nationals. The only possibility open to them at the moment is to refuse leave to embark under the Aliens Order from which those with diplomatic immunity are in any case exempt. To impose
a system of exit permits would require a new Order in Council. The problem was apparently discussed in 1951 (FC 1623/32) I am asking Library reference for these papers.
3. I think there is a strong case for going ahead and trying to arrange for a new Order in Council, which would enable us to take action against all hol- ders of Chinese passports coming to Britain. The Home Office have implied that they would probably oppose such a move. To do so will of course require a Ministerial decision probably in the form of a Minute from the Secretary of State to the Home Secretary.
11
If it is agreed that we shall do this I shall go ahead and prepare a draft sfibmission.
سیادت ہے
(D. C. Wilson)
18 Fulỹ, 1967.
Copy to:
Mr. Hallett (Passport Control Department)
9
адеми
We shouw seek the
neussum powers.
/we.
Ju Tensu
We do
CONFIDENTIAL
167
1
L
We do not have the papere
Peter
Ow
ang
I have oblamed cerpen from
bur
The Home Office (altached). They
tell us
little except
that the
Home Splice dislike the idea of a system of exit visas. 2 I have ales spoken o
д
Thin Coaler of the Home Slice who confirmed that the Home would be likely
ह्वे
ори
opper se
grounder of
бассе
the idea
on grounde
pricciple and
adminstrative
inconvenience. I have told her that despite this, we are anxioin &
we wri
that we
proceed and that
probably
be writing of Themisore
level.
|
Ralvii
Ed (1626)
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.
a
Ма. Важный
m
д
Im
Confidential
Minutes,
Exir Visas for Chinese
United Kingdom
I agree mat we should have
meeting with other interested Departments as proposed in Mr. Wilson's muite of 13 July at which the Draft's would form the basis for ɣisenssion. Before we procew to this stage, you may wish to discuss with Mr. de la Mate in
case he has any objection in principle of wight to submmi the
matter higher in my office befor
тани
other Departma
munth are brought in.
Jon Dunsonan
13/
Confidential
la
of deler for
Minutes.
I agree. I staine
we should
first discuss with the Home Offic
Isecure this
then submit.
agreement
We will
I'm
Mr. De la Mare has agrew is
loow you please I'm
a meeting.
hom
and act ange one
at 10.30am
Tuestem 18 dim lima. Bonan's
formy at which P.C.D., Home Odia and me Semnity Semin wari be represuri.
John Densm 1A)
Mr. Witam Fwolker
14
7
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.
C
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
(OSLO) "PA
Registry No.
DRAFT
Submission
Type 1 +
To:-
From
Mr. de la Mare
E. Bolland
Telephone No. & Ext.
DOW
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Soarer.
¿écret
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified. 12/7
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
Problem
Department
EXIT VISAS FOR CHINESE IN BRITAIN
Copy to:
Mr. Mitchell, Passport Control
Department.
e.w.
B/vii
X
The Chinese have always had a regulation
by which foreigners in China iluding diplomats)
require exit visas before
bel
Simpluding
aving the coɗntry.
ntry.
Should we now adopt the same system with the
Chinese in London?
Recommendation
2. I recommend that we should tell the Chinese
that exit visas will be required in future for
all holders of Chinese passports. I submit a
draft note to the Chinese Office.
Background and Argument
3. The Chinese have always insisted that all
foreigners in China, including diplomats, require
exit visas before leaving the country. Although
the Aliens Order in this country provides that
no foreigner may leave Britain without the
of an emigration officer, in practice nothing is
done to impede the departure of a foreigner
except in some criminal cases. We have no system
equivalent to that of the Chinese exit visas nor,
in the past, have we ever considered it necessary
to adopt one.
4. Mr. Hopson has now suggested that we should
/adopt
adopt a system of exit visas (Peking telegram
No. 847).
847). He has pointed out that, in any visa
war, we are at a distinct disadvantage since there
is one less hoop for the Chinese to go through
here than for us in China. So far there has in
fact been only one case of difficulty over exit
visas from China when Mr. Hewitt and his family
were made to miss their flight home from Moscow because
en the Chinese Ministry deliberately delayed
granting their exit visas. The Dutch however had
a more serious case when their Chargé was detained
for nearly six months before being allowed to
leave. In the present climate of Sino-British
relations there is always a strong possibility
that we may have further difficulty about getting
some of our people out.
Z
5. To make the Chinese subject to an exit
visa system would of course be to discriminate
against them. At the moment I see no disadvantage
We
in doing this. The Chinese have discriminated
against us on a number of matters in Peking.
have up to now avoided taking reciprocal action
since, in the cases which have come up so far,
we would inevitably be the losers. The present
case is different since the Chinese have already
it would
Flag A.
We might also have difficulties abour British
N
seamen бигуйеншем
Banding we have
ormad on Belves
#t
beforehand with ther poor to delay deportion of Chinen, we should, if
necessary, be able buse it and, hien
wit
NOTHẲNG
NG TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
ses that the Chinese authenting understand Why, explain that it is direct relatiation for the delays they on # have impond in some people.
insisted on exit vises and say not therefore difficult for them
to take further retaliatory action against us
6. The mechanics of the operation would be
quite easy. The exit visa could be simply a
rubber stamp on the passport with the words
"approved for departure by
valid for
/months".
メ
the particular case,
བས
The French have
on
already instituted a system
8 exti usm
السلام
mensen of andme
Emrowser in Pans wilmor apparent drawing
on th
furting distintzy im their
Mism in
Bethany
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
D4013009 Gp. 863
Months". This would be done by the Foreign
Nationals Department of the Passport Office
(who already issue re-entry visas) after con-
sultation with Far Eastern Department.
attach a draft note to the Chinese Office
I
on these lines.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
COME PE
Registry No.
DRAFT
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
To:-
Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted. Unclassified.
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
Chinese Chargé d'Affaires
Type 1 +
From
Telephone No. & Ext.
Department
Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments
to the Office of the Chargé d'Affaires of the
People's Republic of China and has the honour
to inform them that, as from 1 August 1967, all
those who travel on passports issued by the
Government of the People's Republic of China
will require an exit visa before leaving the
United Kingdom.
Applications for exit viass should be made
to the Foreign Nationals Department of the Pass-
port Office, Clive House, Petty France, S.W.1.
Applications for exit vieas should be accompanied
by the passports of those concerned together with
a note stating the point of departure for which
the exit visa is required. Such exit visas will
normally be valid for three months from the date
of issue,
Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs etc. etc.
CONFIDENTIAL
Cypher/Cat A
PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno 847 8 July 1967
Specte
CONFIDENTIAL
سيا
5
RECEIVED IN #ARCHIVES No.31
10 JUL 1967
FC3/20
We are at a permanent disadvantage at this post in that we have to get exit visas from Chinese authorities before being able to leave this country, whereas there is no parallel requirement in England. In any visa war, therefore, we are extremely vulnerable to Chinese pressure, as we can only withhold entry visas to the U.K. or Hong Kong, whereas they can not only refuse entry visas to China but can prevent us from leaving. I hope therefore that serious and urgent consideration may now be given to the possibility of instituting exit visas specially for Chinese in the U.K.
2.
You will recall that last year the Netherlands Charge d'Affaires was detained here for nearly six months before he was allowed to leave. In addition the wife of his First Secretary and her children had their exit visas withheld for over a month. Mr. Hewitt and his family were made to miss their plane home via Moscow by deliberate delay in granting the exit visas.
3. We are at present, in common with our French and Dutch colleagues, trying to reduce our vulnerability on this score by requesting exit visas for all our staff valid for all points of exit and for a period of six months,
We are feeding the passports in starting with the women and children. I have also put in my own passport in view of my impending departure. The French and the Dutch seem to be getting these visas regularly in batches within a week of asking. We have not so far received any reply, although the request for my own visa was made over two weeks ago. Telephone enquiries have produced a response that "the matter is being dealt with", We are therefore being discriminated against in this matter as in others.
The
4. The French Embassy tell me that they have instituted a special system in France about a year ago whereby the Chinese (alone among foreigners) now require exit visas. Indians have also done this. Experience has proved that reciprocal action is the one thing that the Chinese really understand. I hope therefore that the possibility of instituting some system in the U.K. whereby the Chinese have to ask our permission to leave the country can be urgently and seriously considered. I realise that this would be a considerable innovation and that it goes against our long tradition of liberalism. I also realise that some sort of legislation might be necessary, e.g. an Order in Council.
/In our
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Peking telegram No. 847 to Foreign Office
2
In our present vulnerable situation here, however, which is likely to endure for some time, I think my staff here deserve all the protection which they can be given. Such a measure would not only deprive the Chinese of one form of pressure which they can at present exert on us without fear of reprisal, but would also give a considerable fillip to the morale of my staff.
Kr. Hopson
Sent 0800Z/% July
Recd 13102/8 July
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.E. Department
P.C.D.
Protocol and Conference Department
CONFIDENTIAL
1017
Mr. de la Mare
CONFIDENTIAL
Covering Secret
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
13 JUL 1967 !
Fe3/20
Possible Action against the New China News
Agency in London
As the Secretary of State has not yet been able to
discuss this question with the Home Secretary, we should,
I think, let Mr. Jenkins have a minute setting out our views.
We are continuing to hold up granting a visa for a replace-
ment to the N.C.N.A. staff in London which was applied for
on 1 June and, with the continuing delicate situation in
Hong Kong, there is a very real possibility that our Mission
in Peking may at any time be subjected to fresh outbreaks
of demonstrations which could call for retaliation here.
2.
I submit a draft.
Mr Rooges.
Iland.
(E. Bolland) 7 July, 1967
مهم
hee submitted Lackling points on the seenelay of State's meeting with in senkins, but i's has been imposible to amange me meeting, and
mali office name
name suggested that we submit a
arap's letter
717
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
I would like to see the case rather mure
closely argued in to letu. Ž
+
dest litt t
Gagnon t Hot
占财
particula
it shred
; if we really home to take some action this will
insufficiently strong;
боле
appen
it will look like
бол
attack
F
press
which
in
the Home - elsolen
Our own
is vile resent
pren
Respecto, to xotin petki opiscin
May not carry too much beight lift # Home Secretang
ве
Renets to oth and boxed le mo
Akely to on
his support
Aur de la chare
Bolland
Mar 13
LTR. 11.2.4
I have amended the draft minute to take into account Mr. Rodgers' points and also to bring it up to date since I first drafted there has been renewed violence in Hong Kong (para. 2) and the Chinese have now applied for a second visa to replace another member of the N.C.Ñ.A. staff here (para. 8).
Slland
K. Bolland) ~~~> 13 July, 1967 -
"the%
-
CONFIDENTIAL
Flag F
The Chinese have now raised with our Office in Peking the question of our delaying the visa for the first replacement for their N.C.N.A. London staff and made an implied threat that they might retaliate against the Reuter correspondent in Peking if we did not grant it (Peking telegram No. 885). We must refer to this threat, I think, in the Secretary of State's minute and draw the conclusion that if the Chinese renew it we shall have to make it clear to then that if they carry it out we shall be compelled to expel the remaining N.C.N.A. officials. I have amended paragraph 8 of the draft accordingly.
Boa
السعاده
(E. Bolland) 13 July, 1967
Graft letter, amanded, submitted
p.a
14/7
CONFIDENTIAL
18/7
FLAG E
Private Secrétury retury
M
CONFIDENTIAL
covering Secret
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No,3 ¡
31 JUL 1967 : F23/20
Only paragraphs 2 and 6 of the talking points need
amendment. I attach a redraft.
2.
On the new par graph 6 I asked the Home Office not to
grant a visa for an N.C.N.A. replacement until the Secretary
of State had discussed the whole question with the Home
Secretary.
3. We must face the possibility that the Chinese may
retaliate. They could cause difficulties for the Reuters
correspondent in Peking or take action against one of our
diplomatic staff. But even so, while the Chinese continue
their abusive propaganda campaign I do not think that we
should allow N.C.N.A. to reinforce their present staff of five.
h.f. delakan
(A.J. de la Mare)
28 June, 1967.
See mo
CONFIDENTIAL
minali of 7 July.
ناس
ра
CONFIDENTIAL
covering SECRET
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31,
1 8 JUL 1967 +
Private Secretary Thank you
H2216
FC3/10
1417
China New China News "Agency
-
On my submission of 26 May, which came to the conclusion
that for the time being we should take no action against the
New China News Agency, the Secretary of State commented that I
had earlier been in favour of action and asked whether I had
in fact "come round"
2. As explained in that submission the following considerations
caused us to conclude that immediate action against N.C.N.A.
was neither imperative nor indeed possible:
(a) public morale in Hong Kong swung heavily in
H.M.G.'s favour. The Governor, who previously
had urged H.M.G. to do all in their power to
help him keep up morale by maintaining a strong
attitude towards China, now recommended that, AB
the situation had developed unexpectedly in our
favour, we should not take any action against
China which might cause new pressure against
the Colony. He therefore specifically advised
against the expulsion of N.C.N.A... ¡
(b) the public demand in this country for retaliation
against China, which Ministers had expected, did
not materialise and Mr. Rodgers no longer felt that,
from that point of view, immediate action against
the N.C.N.A. was required;
CONFIDENTIAL
/(c)
CONFIDENTIAL
2
(c) the Home Secretary was unwilling to act.
3. While, however, Mr. Rodgers and I both thought that the
above factors had changed the situation since we discussed it
with the Secretary of State before he went to Moscow, and I
submitted accordingly, we are aware that it may again change
in that further outbreaks of Chinese hostility against us may
still focus public and parliamentary attention on this issue,
and we may be asked why we have accepted humiliation so
supinely.
We have concluded that, lest this happen, we should
seek now to remove the main obstacle to our taking action
against the F.C.N.A., which is the Home Secretary's
unwillingness to act.
The submission below has been prepared accordingly.
Mr. Rodgers has seen it in draft and has minuted: ' "I think
that it is wise to put this to the Secretary of State".
5. Since the submission was drafted two new factors have
arisen:
(a) although the situation in Hong Kong is for the
time being in hand, inflammatory and subversive
propaganda is still being put out there by the
local office of N.C.N.A and the Governor, on his
own initiative, is now thinking of taking
action against N.C.N.A. Hong Kong on the same
lines as we proposed the Secretary of State
should discuss with Mr. Jenkins for possible
action against N.C.N.A. fere;
CONFIDENTIAL
/(b) the
CONFIDENTIAL
· 3-
(b) the Chinese have already applied for a visa for
a new N.C.N.A. man here to replace one of the
three who left voluntarily on 26 May. I have
asked the Home Office to ensure that this visa
is not granted pending the Secretary of State's
consideration of the attached submission.
Cf.
de la kuam
(A.J. de la Mare)
6 June, 1967
Copies to:
Mr. Rodgers P.U.S.
Sir D. Allen F.E.D.
CONFIDENTIAL
See now
-192.
CONFIDENTIAL covering SECRET
Reference
FC.3/20 W. Z
Mr. de la Mare
:
r
The Secretary of State saw your submission of 5 June before his departure for New York, but was unable to speak to the Home Secretary before he left. You
· indicated at Sir D. Allen's meeting this morning that you did not think that this matter was of sufficient urgency for another Minister to take it up in the Secretary of State's absence.
2. We shall, on the Secretary of State's return, try to arrange for him to speak to the Home Secretary. I should be
grateful if you could let me know whether the Talking Points prepared earlier need any revision.
Ja tas
:)
(D.M. Day) 22 June, 1967.
Bd (1626)
CONFIDENTIAL covering SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
யஅ
Fz 3/20 (w.2
Hag D.
W
TALKING POINTS
I have seen Mr. Rodgers' record of his conversation with
you of 25 May and I understand your difficulties about taking
action against the N.C.N.A.
INSER
2. I am concerned however that, if the Chinese continue their
campaign of abuse against us public opinion in this country
us!
will get restive and accuse us of accepting supinely anything
which the Chinese care to dish out.
3.
I do not want to break off relations with China, if that
can be avoided. I have thought of declaring certain members
of the Chinese Mission here persona non grata, but I am advised
that if we did this the Chinese would certainly retaliate in
like or stronger manner and that we are more vulnerable than
they are because we have few Chinese speakers whom we could
post to Peking whereas they have many English speakers whom
they could post to London. Our resources would run out long
before theirs.
4. I know that if we acted against the N.C.N.A. the Chinese
might retaliate not only by expelling the Reuters correspondent
in Peking but also perhaps by expelling diplomatic members of
our Mission, so that the dangers I have just referred to could
ariee. But while we may not want to risk this at the moment
we must, I think, be prepared to risk it if the Chinese campaign against us continues and public opinion demands retaliation.
FLAG C 5. I understand that there are now five N.C.N.A. members
resident here, and that their residence permits will all come
up for renewal within the next year. In the face of a public
outcry it would seem timid and inadequate action merely to
CONFIDENTIAL
/announce
CONFIDENTIAL
announce that these permits will not be renewed when they
expire. Whether this were sufficient would depend on the
gravity of any further Chinese provocation. But it would at
least be something to know that you would agree in principle
even to that.
6. Three members of N.C.N.A. left of their own accord on
26 May.
We do not yet know whether applications will be made
to replace them, but if so I suggest you again consider the
possibility of refusing such applications if made.j
7. I should say here that I do not think parliament and
public are fully aware of the virulence of the campaign of
abuse which the N.C.N.A. are conducting against us in this country.
Mr. Rodgers gave you some examples. Do you not think that if
this were more widely known public support for action against
the N.C.N.A. would be assured? Freedom of speech is all very
well, but the public will surely take into account that it is
this campaign of lies and hate which has instigated Chinese
mob action against our representatives in China. We cannot
stop that campaign in China, but will not the public at least
expect us to stop it here?
8. I hope you will look again at all these considerations.
But beyond that I think also that if public opinion gets
aroused we may have to face a demand to expel the N.C.N.A.
forthwith, lock, stock and barrel. We should, I suggest,
at least take the decision in principle that we shall do this,
and do it quickly, if we come under pressure in the House and
with the public.
CONFIDENTIAL
NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY
разрови
The following is a list of the Chinese staff of
the N.C.N.A. in London.
1.
Yu Hang
arrived 24.9.65.
2.
Lin Ching
#
24.9.65.
3. Ching Hui-ch'in
3.4.64.
.
4.
Li Fu
"
12.7.63.
5. Wang Tuan-sheng
13.11.64.
I
DA NEWS AGENCY
15 May
-
BULLETIN
Statement of Chinese Foreign Ministry of 15 May.
"On the afternoon of May 6, 1967, Chinese workers
of the Hong Kong Sanpo Kong Artificial Plastic Flower
works launched a struggle against intensified capitalist
exploitation. To shield capital and suppress labour,
the British authorities in Hong Kong brazenly turned
out on the same day more than two hundred armed policemen
and "riot police," sanguinarily suppressing the workers
of the factory and other Chinese residents, beating and
wounding many of them and arresting twenty-one persons.
Afterwards, they also arrested the President of the
Federation of the Rubber and Plastic Trade Unions and
Workers' Representatives, who went to a Hong Kong police
atation to protest. On the afternoon of the 11th, the
British authorities in Hong Kong carried out another
sanguinary suppression on an even bigger scale by turning
loose on the bare-handed workers, representatives of
various circles and young students large numbers of armed troops, policemen and "riot police" totalling more than 1,000, who repeatedly attacked then with clubs, riot
guns and tear bombs and even turning out military vehicles
and helicopters. Many persons (including newsreel camera-
men and journalists) were arrested. After the 12th, the
/British
-2-
British authorities in Hong Kong atill continued large-
scale arrests of the demonstrating masses. By the
morning of the 14th, more than 400 have been arrested.
At present, the situation is still being aggravated.
It must be pointed out that these large-scale
sanguinary atrocities perpetrated by the British author-
ities in Hong Kong are the result of long premeditation
and are a component part of the British Government's
scheme of collusion with U.S. imperialiam against China.
On the one hand, in co-ordination with the U.S. imperialist
war escalation in Vietnam, the British Government is
continuing to provide the United States with Hong Kong
as a base for aggression against Vietnam in disregard of
the repeated solemn warnings of the Chinese Government,
and on the other, it is steadily stepping up various hostile
measures against China in Hong Kong. Particularly since
the unfolding of the great proletarian Cultural Revolution
in China, the British authorities in Hong Kong have carried
out repeated military and police manoeuvres hostile to China
and aimed at the sanguinary suppression of Chinese residents
in Hong Kong, vainly attempting to exclude the great influ-
ence of China's great proletarian Cultural Revolution by
high-handed tactics. The persecution of Chinese residents
and workers by the British authorities in Hong Kong by
making use of the labour-capital dispute of the Artificial
Plastic Flower works is a big exposure of this criminal
plan of sanguinary suppression. Their Fascist atrocities
have aroused boundless indignation among the Chinese
/residents
-3-
residents in Hong Kong and the entire Chinese people.
The Chinese Government hereby lodges the most urgent
and the strongest protest with the British Government
against these atrocities.
The sanguinary atrocities wholly perpetrated by
the British authorities in Hong Kong show that they
mortally fear and bitterly hate China's great proletarian
Cultural Revolution. This great revolutionary movement
which is without parallel in history has dealt a telling
blow to imperialism, modern revisionism and world reaction,
completely shattered their dream of counter-revolutionary
capitalist restoration in China and greatly encouraged
and impelled the liberation struggles of the oppressed
peoples and oppressed nations of the whole world. In
particular, this great revolutionary movement has caused
our Chinese compatriots in Hong Kong to love still more
ardently the thought of Mao Tse-tung and they are vigorously
unfolding the movement of creative study and application
of Chairman Mao's works. Armed with the ever-victorious
thought of Mao Tse-tung, the masses of our patriotic com-
patriots are more militant than even in fighting imperialism.
Frightened out of their wits by this, the British author-
ities in Hong Kong vainly attempted by violent suppression
to restrict the influence of Hao Tse-tung's thought and
to maintain their control, and thus committed the barbarous
Fascist atrocities."
/16 May
-4-
16 May
Following is the full text of a commentator's
article in the "People's Daily" on May 15, entitled
"The British Authorities in Hong Kong Must Rein in on
the Brink":
"The British authorities in Hong Kong have in the
past few days turned out large numbers of troops, police
and "riot police" and carried out bloody suppression
and frantic persecution of Chinese workers, representatives
of various circles and young students in Hong Kong.
As
a result, over 400 patriotic Chinese in Hong Kong were
arrested or brutally beaten up, and one of them died from
his injuries.
Boundless indignation and the most vehement protests
have been voiced by our Government and our entire people
at these Fascist atrocities perpetrated by the British
authorities in Hong Kong.
The sanguinary outrages staged by the British author-
ities in Hong Kong are carefully deliberated, organised
and planned atrocities, and they represent an insensate
provocation of the Chinese people on the part of the British
Government. Over the recent period, the British Government,
ignoring our Government's repeated warnings, has been
intensifying its efforts in the service of the U.S. aggressive
war against Vietnam, making available the use of the British
military installations in Hong Kong. It has also put into
effect many measures hostile towards our country and, trail-
ing in the wake of the U.S. imperialism, has carried out
/unbridled
-5-
unbridled anti-China activities.
In daring to set
itself up against the 700 million Chinese people and
serving as an anti-China hatchetman of U.S. imperialism,
the British Government can achieve only one end: that
ia, to lift a rock only to drop on its own feet."
24 HAT British Hong Kong Authorities perpetrate new
Fascist Atrocities in Hong Kong and Kowloon:
"At least 200 Chinese compatriots were killed or
seriously wounded in Hong Kong and Kowloon on May 22 as
the British authorities sent thousands of "riot police"
into the streets to slaughter workers and staff of Chinese
organisations in Hong Kong and compatriots of various
circles.
Many more suffered light injuries in the new bloody
Fascist atrocities. According to greatly minimised atat-
istics issued by the British authorities in Hong Kong on
the morning of May 23, 363 personnel of Chinese organis-
ations in Hong Kong and other compatriots were unreasonably
arrested on May 22. Nearly 200 of them were secretly
arrested by British Hong Kong special agents in the small
hours.
Arthur
The May 22 bloody incident occurred the day after
the British Government sent three big-shots
Galsworthy, Deputy Under-Secretary of State in the Common-
wealth Office; W. S. Carter, Head of the Hong Kong
Department of the Commonwealth Office, and E. Bolland,
Head of the Far Eastern Department in the Foreign Office
/to
-6-
to Hong Kong on May 21 to "discuss" the present
situation in Hong Kong with the British Hong Kong
'governor" David Trench. The British Government and
the British Hong Kong authorities can never evade
their responsibility. They are fully responsible for
the bloody incidents since May 4 including those of
May 6, May 11 and May 22, and for all the grave consequ-
ences arising therefrom",
May 24
-
Peking Rally Condemns British Fascist
Atrocities in Hong Kong:
"About 100,000 revolutionary people of all circles
in Peking held a rally on the afternoon of May 18 to
condem the British Government and the British author-
ities in Hong Kong for their fascist crime of bloody_
suppression of Chinese compatriots in Hong Kong. The
rally voiced resolute support for the May 15 statement
issued by the Chinese Foreign Ministry.
Thunderous shouts of "The British imperialists must repay their blood debts!", "We pledge to give powerful
backing to the patriotic compatriots in Hong Kong!",
"Strike down anyone who dares to oppose the patriotic
compatriots in Hong Kong in studying and propagating
Mao Tse-tung's thought!", and "Those who oppose China will
come to no good end!", filled the Peking Workers' Stadium
throughout the rally,
The atrocities of the British Hong Kong authorities
in suppressing patriotic Chinese in Hong Kong by armed
/force
-7-
force have aroused tremendous anger among the
revolutionary masses in the Chinese capital.
More
than a million Peking residents demonstrated before
the British Chargé d'Affaires' Office in Peking during
the past few days.
Today's mass rally sternly warned the British
imperialists that they would come to no good and in
their collusion with U.S. imperialism and the Chiang
Kai-shek gang to oppose China, and that they would
never succeed by using violence in limiting the influence
of the great thought of Mao Tse-tung."
20
Reference
FC 313
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I alled a dratt bein
I
سان
NCIA replacement. I have also
the NCIA
suggerlezt
alleration
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pencil
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Mr. Wate
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26
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In the Talking Printi dap.
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28
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
THE GOMA
Registry No.
DRAFT
Submission
Type 1 +
To:
From
Mr. Bolland
Top Secret. Secret.
Couldential.
Restricted Unclassifed.
Mr. de la Vare
Note
Telephone No. & Ert
Department
ACTION AGAINST THE N-W CHINA NELS AGENCY
1
Hag
K
Off. de in More's
5 June
sched submission/deals with the
problem of whether or not to take action
against the London Offices of the New China News Agency (NCNA), The Secretary of State
has alread, agreed to talk to the Home
Secretary about this as soon as possible.
Since that submission was written a more
CHEB
immediate roblem has arisen.-
is dis-
cussed below.
Problem
2.
کہ
The Chinese applied for a visa for
Chinese
a few member of the NCMA office in London
has been I June A decision on this visa as held
in suspense while waiting a ministerial
decision on the whole question of the NČNA
Office in Londón. It has already been recom-
mended that in talking to the Home Secretary,
the Secretary of State should seek his
agreement to take urgent action against the
NONA Office if necessary but no immediate
action is foreseen. We must now decide
what to do about the one visa application
hich is pending.
Recommendation
I recommend that the visa should be
Karm-11
3.
Japore of
approved sithouch
further two weeks.
+
further period of
/news
two
Ske,
Background and Argueent
4.
The number of Chinese staff working
at the London Office of NCNA at the beginning
or May
ty was eight. Three of these left for
Peking on
26
May On I Finge
we received a
vise application for one replacement. A
decision on this was held up since Ministers
were then discussing the question of whether
to take action against the NCNA Office as a
whole.
5.
In dealing with this visa application
there are three possible lines of action:
(a) we can refuse to grant the visa;
(b) we can grant it after a further
6.
delay; M
(c) we can grant the vise immediately.
If we refuse to grant a visa we are
not obliged to give any reasons to the Chinese
but it would be the first occasion on which we
the
had done so for many years and we could
expect the Chinese to retaliate in some way
They might either cause difficulties for Reuters correspondent resident in Peking
(e.g.suspending his residence permit or
refusing to grant an exit permit etc.) or they
might take action directly against one of our
diplomatic staff. In such a situation there
is a strong possibility that we would become
involved in a battle of visa refusals out of
which we would be the most likely losers since
our staff in Peking, with its limited number
of Chinese speakers, is more vulnerable than
the Chinese here. There is also the possibility
/that
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is greed, the S-of S
many with to refer
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it in his walk with
fof Jenkin. Pragnyly of the Talking Poin
redraftend
evor this question.
that such a visa battle might spill over into
other spheres and cause farther administrative
harassment for our office in Peking.
7. If we impose a further delay
approving or
this via the Chinese may
before
again reciprocate/in some fay against/our
Vission in Péking but are likely to do so (in a len drastic farther.
One advantage of/delaying
would be that it will indicate Дuite clearly
to the Chinese
we have our eye on the
NONA office in London and is activities.
I doubt if this will cause much difference
flady to the
맛다.
material o put out by
the NCNA since this brazdy produced
1 Peking for world-fide distribution,
at least
but it willen ndicate that such
eeftus of the Chinese Government are
vulnerable
8.
For these reasons quä aina
F
organs
I do not think that we should embark
on a vise war. Nor do I consider that we
should allɗw a new NCNA man in without
further marking our displeasure of the NINA
I donsider therefore that the wisest course
would be to approve the vise but imposs
sayy
further administrative delays twote
weeks,
>
In
Wil
Mr Bollantil
COVERING SECRET
RECEIVE ARCHIVES No90 5.
JUL 1967
F23/201
I attach a record of the meeting between Mr. Rodgers and the Home Secretary about the possible expulsion of the New China News Agency.
Richard Sammel
(R.C. Samuel) 30 May, 1967.
ce Mode la thane
it Bolland
Av. Denson
Pl. attach the
M.
and
in preparing the latest Submimmi
ん
like into accant
بولی
31,
thei
pe.
SECRET
RECENE WH
ARCHIVES NE31
3 JUL 1967
F23/1/2010
Possible expiusion of New China News Agency
Discussion between Mr. Rodgers and Mr. Jenkins
Those Present:-
Mr. Roy Jenkins, M.P. Mr. John Harris
Officials
Mr. Willian Rodgers, M.P.,
The meeting took place in the Home Office at 5.30 p.m. on 25 May,
Mr. Rodgers explained that we wished to consider expelling some or all of the staff of the New China News Agency from London as retaliation for the outrages recently commited by the Chinese.
2.
Mr. Jenkins said that the Home Office had never so far expelled journalists from London for political reasons; the then Home Secretary had declined à request from the Commonwealth Secretary some years previously to expelt a Greek journalist who had been writing stories which amounted to incitement to violence in Cyprus. If, as ne assumed, our expulsion of the N.C.N.A. was intended as a public relations exercise, he considered that the Government would get a very bad press. Mr. Jenkins thought that the press would take a poor view of journalists being ejected rather than diplomats, when the reason was basically a diplomatic
one.
3. Mr. Rodgers pointed out (i) that we needed to consider appropriate measures against the Chinese which would make clear our indignation at their recent activities. But we did not wish to do anytning which would have unacceptable consequences for our Mission in Peking or for Hong Kong. Expulsion of Chinese dipomats from London would, we thought, escalate and we should be the losers; (ii) that recent N.C.N.A. propaganda had been unacceptably abusive; it went far beyond the proper activities of a news agency; and the completely false report of 200 deaths in the Hong Kong disturbances had almost certainly contributed to the violent treatment of the British diplomats in Shanghai.
/^.
SECRET
SECRET
4.
Un (i) above, Mr. Jenkins asked if we could be sure that only the Reuters representative in Peking would be expelled as counter-retaliation. Was there not a danger
that expulsion of N.C.N.A. would escalate anyway? Mr. John Harris pointed out that the Reuter's man in Peking was very highly thought of and that the reaction to his removal as a result of Britisn Government action would probably be strong. On (ii) Mr. Jenkins said he was dubious about the value of expelling Chinese journalists from London when the places affected by the recent distur bances had been Shanghai and Hong Kong.
5. An official then pointed out another difficulty which the Home Office saw in expelling members of the N.C.N.A. in London. If our aim was to stop the operation of the agency, we nad to face the fact that the Home Office had no powers to close it down as such; and there would be nothing to stop the Chinese from recruiting more staff from the 2,500 Chinese resident in England.
6. Mr. Jenkins asked if our purpose would not be served by expelling the Information Officer or some other diplomat from the Chinese Mission here. Mr. Rodgers repeated our view that the danger of "diplomatic escalation" was unacceptable. Mr. Jenkins then argued (on the lines of the Times leader of 25 May) that our best posture would be to play the thing cool. Would not expulsion of the N.C.N.A. be a rather inadequate gesture? He then reiterated the difficulties that might be created for us by appeals against expulsion to the London magistrates.
7. There was then some discussion about the possibility of not renewing the permits of N.C.N.A. officials when they were due to be replaced. The problem here was that we needed to be able to make a quick gesture if we were to do anything at all. When the time eventually came for the Home Secretary to justify his refusal to renew a permit for a Chinese journalist the case would have become stale and justification would be that much more difficult.
8. Mr. Jenkins asked what damage expulsion of the N.C.N.A. from London would do to Peking. Mr. Rodgers described the importance to them of their operation in Africa which was largely controlled from the London office. Mr. Jenkins's point about "playing it cool" Mr. Rodgers
On
SECRET
/said
SECRET
1
said we should bear in mind the damage the Portuguese had done to their position in Macao by not reacting with sufficient firmness to Chinese provocations.
9. Mr. Jenkins asked for Mr. Rodgers's views on a possible time-table if it was decided to pursue the idea of expelling N.C.N.A. staff in spite of the difficulties he had outlined. Mr. Rodgers said it would depend on the view the Secretary of State took of the situation when he returned from Moscow. If there were no further Chinese outrages it was possible that he would not wish to take any action for the moment. If there were, Mr. Brown would probably wish to move quickly.
<
Richard Jamuel
(R.U.Samuel)
26 May, 1967
la
see later
later submis
SECRET
led
14/2