FCO 21/80 UK consideration of actions to be taken against Chinese mission and New China News Agency (NCNA) in London

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File No.

FC3/20

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FAR EASTERN

TITLE: CHINA - POLITICAL AFFAIRS (FEXT.)

U.K.

BILATERAL RELATIONS wrand

ACTION AGAINST CHINESE IN. U.K

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DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY

RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. OR P.A.

FILE

CLOSED

FILE No.

FC3/20 B

OPENED

25.8.67.124 11.67.

SECURITY GRADING

N.B. The grading of this file must be the same

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highest graded document contained in It. slip must be affixed whenever necessary.

The appr

CLOSED

CONFIDENTIAL

REC APCHTE.

2 CHOV 1967

FZ-31/20

125

Mr. de la

• 20 Mare has seen

Private Secretary

RELAXATION OF RESTRICTIONS ON THE CHINESE MISSION

IN LONDON

The Secretary of State may wish to know that, as already

agreed, the travel restrictions on members of the Chinese

Mission in London reverted to the pre-22 August 35-mile radius

as from today. At the same time the extra police and Special Branch guard on Chinese offices and houses was also withdrawn. Normal police surveillance, of a kind afforded to all diplomatic

missions, will contime. The press were told this in answer

to questions at today's briefing.

2. Mr. Hopson gave the Chinese advance warning of our inten-

tions on 14 November, making it clear that we hoped that relaxation in London would make it possible for the Chinese

to take reciprocal action in Peking. So far there has been no sign of any move by the Chinese, but this could not be expected before restrictions had actually been relaxed here. We may have to wait some little time yet before we can judge

whether our act of faith has been justified.

3. The requirement that members of the Chinese Mission and

other Chinese officials in Britain must have erit vigas

issued by the Foreign Office before leaving this country

remains.

We also told the Chinese after the burning of our Mission

on 22 August when our wireless equipment was put out of

/action,

CONFIDENTIAL

action, that permission to operate their diplomatic wireless

in London was withdrawn. They ignored the ban. We have

successfully restored wireless communication with Peking

án a somewhat reduced scale and have been operating for

some weeks. In these circumstances, there seemed nothing

to be gained by a formal lifting of our ban, and we have

therefore not referred to it in any communication to the

Chinese.

Copy to:

Mr. Smart, Newa Department

John Denson

(J. B. Denson) 21 November, 1967.

ра

CONFIDENTIAL

FC 3/20

لا

B G

124

20/11

The Foreign Office presents its compliments tɔ the Office of the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires and, with reference to their Botes Nos. FC 3/3 of 24 August and PC 21/6 of

12 Cotober, have the honour to inform them that, as from

21 November it will be necessary to notify the Foreign

Office 48 hours in advance only of any journey bayond a

radius of 35 miles from Karble Arch and not five miles as

stated in those Notes. In all other respects the require-

ments and sonditions set out in the Notes under reference

rerain in force.

The Chinese Xinistry of Foreign Affairs in Peking

bave been informed.

Foreign Officos, 3.7.1.

20 November, 1967.

124

Registry No.

F23/20

Top Secret. Secret.

Confidential.

Restricted.

Open.

Draft. Hote

office of the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires

Copies to:

Peking

Flag

Flag E

to: Sent A.C.

long dong

Washington

Kr. Jazes,

Hose office

Mr. Whitney,

Cox 500

Insert Telephone No. & Ext when appropriate.

1le Foreign Office presents its compliments

to the Office of the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires

and, with reference to their lotes Nos. FC 3/3

of 24 August and 30 21/6 of 12 October have

the honour to inform them that, as from 21

November it will be necessary to notify the

Foreign üffice 48 hours in advance only of

any journey beyond a radius of 35 iles from

Marble Arch and not five miles as stated in

those Notes. In all other raspects the

requirements and conditions set out in the Notes

under reference remain in force.

The Annien Mority of Foseyn

Azzants

Perming howe

bun

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

in forme.

r. de la

for

CONFIDENTIAL

ARCHIVES No 31

..JV 1967

FC 3/20

123

Problem

CHINA RELAXATION UP RESTRICTIONS

We have still to notify the Chinese Mission here that

with effect from 21 November we are lifting the travel

restrictions imposed on them last August, and returning to

the 35-mile travel limit.

Recommendation

2. I recommend that a Note is delivered to the Chinese

Mission on 20 November in accordance with the attached draft.

The Legal Counsellor concurs with the draft.

Arkument

3. When we decided to impose the restrictions last August

we formally notified the Chinese Mission in a Note dated

24 August (copy attached). We must now, therefore, send

another Note modifying the regulations.

4. In my submission of 10 Noverber I proposed that we should

decide in the light of Mr. Hopson's report of his démarche

whether to summon Kr. Shen P'ing, the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires,

to receive the Note, or simply to send it round by hand. Then

Mr. Hopson informed Mr. Hsueh of the Chinese kinistry of Foreign

Affairs about the relaxation on 14 November, Mr. Hsueh's

reaction was fairly reserved, and he reverted to the question

of Hong Kong. Given the temperament of Mr. Shen P'ing, he is

unlikely to react with any particular grace to a personal

/intimation

CONFIDENTIAL

intimation that the restrictions are to be relaxed;

and

I doubt if any useful purpose would be served by stressing

to him what we expect from the Chinese in return for our

gesture. In any case, he would seem bound to revert to the

question of Hong Kong. kr. Hopson has already made it

abundantly clear to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs

what is expected from them. I think therefore that the Note

should simply be sent round by hand.

5. 3 nce our original Note did not refer to the question

of police surveillance, it would be inappropriate for this

present follow-up Note to do so. In any case, it will be

obvious to the Chinese Mission here on 21 November that the

surveillance has in fact been lifted.

Copies to:

Kr. Samuel

Mr. Haydon

Huny

(James Lurray) 17 November, 1967

Fat hote to inve

pala

issue

20/11

CONFIDENTIAL

FC 3/20.

RESTRICTED

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO PEKING

Telno 997

21 November 1967 (F)

RESTRICTED

News of relaxation of restrictions on Chinese in London has already leaked to the Press. News Department have therefore followed the agreed line in answering questions.

SOSFA

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.E.D.

News Dept.

J.I.P.G.D.

VVVVV

ре

RESTRICTED

122

Registry FC3/20

No.

Top Segret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Open

Draft.

BMERGEN IMMEDIA? PRIORITY

with

without DÉFERRED

nority

*Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should

reach addressee(s

(Date)

Despatched

[Security classification

if any

[Codeword-if any]........

Telegram 16:-

9 9 7

Address to

PEKING

(Date...telegram No.

And to:-

Repeat to:-

122

вытекаю

------hakkkymu N

PEKING

repeated for information fo

(date)

ANANAIMHIER HARIHARAAN

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

En Clair.

News of relaxation of restrictions

on Chinese in London has already leaked

to the press. News Department have

therefore followed the agreed line in

answering questions.

24/41

1830

21/11/67

Code

Cypher

Distribution:

Departmental

F.E.D. News Dept. J.I.P.G.D.

Copies to:-

(4535) Wt.45573/46 200m 2/64 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.363

RESTRICTED

RECEIVED IN CAP #VES No 31

2 NOV 1967

CYPHER/CAT A

FC3/20

FOREIGN OFFICE/MONWEALTH OFFICE TO CERTAIN MISSIONS

PRIORITY

GUIDANCE NO. 298

20 NOVER, 1967

(IPG)

RESTRICTED.

of 23/x

ADDRESSED TO CERTAIN MISSIONS TEL RAM NO. GUIDANCE 298 OF

29 NOVEMBER.

RESTRICTIONS ON THE CHINESE MISSION DON.

SINCE 22 AUGUST, WHEN THE BRITISH MISSION IN PEKING WAS SACKED BY A MOB, MEMBERS OF THE CHINESE MISSION AND ALL OTHER CHINESE OFFICIALS IN LONDON HAVE NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO TRAVEL FURTHER Thin FIVE MILES FROM MARBLE ARCH WITHOUT PRIOR NOTIFICATION (SEE VERBATIM NO. 357). A POLICE GUARD HAS BEEN PLACED ON THE MISSION AND THE CHINESE HAVE BEEN FOLLOWED TO MAKE SURE THAT THEY DID NOT INFRINCE THESE REGULATIONS. THE CHINESE HAVE ALSO BEEN TOLD THAT THEY MUST HAVE EXIT VISAS ISSUED BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE BEFORE LEAVING THIS COUNTRY. IN FACT THEY HAVE MADE NO APPLICATIONS FOR SUCH VISAS. 2. IN PEKING MEMBERS OF OUR MISSION HAVE BEEN RESTRICTED TO THE AREA OF THE BLOCK OF DIPLOMATIC FLATS IN WHICH THEY LIVE TOGETHER WITH THE MISSION BUILDING AND THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES RESIDENCE AND A SHORT DISTANCE OF ROAD BETWEEN THESE TWO POINTS. TO GO ELSEWHERE, EVEN TO VISIT DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES, THEY HAVE HAD TO ASK PERMISSION IN WRITING AND THIS HAS BY NO MEANS ALWAYS BEEN GRANTED.

3. WE HAVE NOW TOLD THE CHINESE THAT, AS FROM 21 NOVEMBER, THE TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS IN LONDON WILL REVERT TO 35 MILES (1.E. THE SITUATION BEFORE 22 AUGUST) AND THAT POLICE SURVEILLANCE WILL BE WITHDRAWN. IN TELLING THE CHINESE THIS, IT HAS BEEN MADE CLEAR THAT WE EXPECT RECIPROCAL RELAXATION BY THEM. OUR MOVE IS HOWEVER AN ACT OF FAITH AND WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN THAT IT WILL PRODUCE THE RESPONSE WE WISH FROM THE CHINESE.

4. NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE MADE ABOUT THE RELAXATION OF RESTRICTIONS HERE BUT WE EXPECT THAT THE NEWS WILL LEAK OUT AND, WHEN IT DOES, NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINES. (A) THERE HAVE BEEN INDICATIONS OF A DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE CHINESE TO RETURN TO A MORE NORMAL STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES. OUR ADDITIONAL RESTRICTIONS WERE IMPOSED AT A TIME WHEN THERE WAS COMPLETE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE FUTURE WELL-BEING OF OUR MISSION. WE NOW THINK IT TIME TO RETURN TO A MORE NORMAL STATE OF AFFAIRS.

/(8) WE

RESTRICTED

FOREIGN OFFICE/COLL.ONWEALTH OFFICE GUIDANCE NO. 298

- 2 -

(B) WE HOPE THAT THIS WILLINGNESS ON OUR PART WILL BE MATCHED BY A CORRESPONDING WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF THE CHINESE AND THAT THERE WILL BE AN EARLY IMPROVEMENT OF THE CONDITIONS FOR OUR MISSION IN PEKING. IF PRESSED WE SHALL HOWEVER HAVE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE SHALL IMPOSE THE RESTRICTIONS AGAIN IF THERE IS NO RESPONSE FROM PEKING OR MORE TROUBLE THERE.

(C) OUR BEST HOPE OF SETTLING OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES WITH THE CHINESE E.G. THE DETENTION OF THE REUTERS CORRESPONDENT MR. GREY, LIES IN RE-ESTABLISHING MORE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. 5. THE ASCHE IS PRIMARILY FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION AT PRESENT. IF THE STORY JOES BREAK, YOU SHOULD NOT SEEK TO INITIATE PUBLICITY BUT, .F ASKED, SHOULD SPEAK ON THE LINES OF PARAGRAPH 4 ABOVE.

SCS?./CROSEC

BY LEGRAPH:

U.K.MIS. NEW YORK B.I.S. NEW YORK WASHINGTON

BANGKOK

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

J.I.P.G.D.

DJAKARTA

POLAD HONG KONG RANGOON

POLAD SLIG.PORE

[ALL PRIORITY]

DELHI

3. PINDI

OCLO.50

BEC SINGAPORE

RESTRICTED

(PC 3/20)

고..

CONFIDENTIAL

H.G.

22/11

FOREIGN OPPICE, S.W.1.

22 November, 1967.

Thank you for your letter 38779/67 of 9 November to James Lurray (who is at present in Tokyo) about the possi- bility of imposing delays on gooda despatched by the Chinese Office.

Reluctantly 10 are forced to agros with you that there seems to be no practical way in which we could at will impose effective delays on goods exported by the Chinese office. In fact the problem is now less acute than when Murray "rote to you, žince the Chinese are bahaving slightly more reasonably towards our Mission in Peking and we hope that things will stay thin way. Should they get worse in Poking, we may have to think again about methods of harassing the Chinese here, but for the moment I agree that we should let the matter rest.

3. Thank you for looking into the problem in such detail.

rele

H. A. O'Neill, Esq.,

(J. B. Denson)

Far Eastern Department

!!.M. Custama and Excise,

King's Bem ilouse,

Mark Lane,

London, E.C.3.

CONFIDENTIAL

120

Our reference: Your reference:

104

Dear Murray,

CONFIDENTIAL

HOME OFFICE

Horseferry House, Dean Ryle Street, LONDON S.W.1

Telephone: Victoria 6655, ext.

Telex: 24986

ivo 31

-UV 1967

FC3/201

119

15th November, 1967

We have now heard from the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis with reference to paragraph 6 of your letter of 9th November about police surveillance of Chinese officials ending on 21st November.

As you know, the Commissioner has a special responsibility for the protection of all foreign embassies and missions, and while the situation remains difficult he will be ensuring, from 21st November, that all police beats in the vicinity of the Chinese Mission are kept fully manned. The officers on duty will be able to call on mobile and other reserves as of police manpower, as necessary.

Yours sincerely,

RA Jannes

To de los Mane 6/4

J. Murray, Esq.

The Dean

A Welsen

This is satisfactory

16 NN.

br. de

ONFIDENTIAL

岬

VFD IN

No.31

1 NOV 1967

зро

118

China : Relaxation of Restrictions

Problem

The Prime Minister has approved the relaxation of the

restrictions on the Chinese Mission in London on the assump-

tion that the Home Secretary is in agreement. Mr. James of

the Home Office has confirmed to me by telephone that the

Home Secretary welcomes the relaxation.

The problem is how

we should announce our decision to the Chinese and explain

it publicly.

Recomendations

الاتيه

acken bey Laiteen Seperates

feline

My recommendations are these:

(a) The Chargé d'Affaires in Peking should be instructed

to inform the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs

on 14 November that we have decided to relax the

restrictions with effect from 21 November. A draft

telegram is attached.

(b) Thereafter the Chinese Mission in London should

be informed by Note. We should decide in the light

of Mr. Hopson's report of his démarche whether to

summon the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires to receive

the Note or simply send it round by hand.

attached draft telegram.

News Department concur.

/Background

CONFIDENTIAL

Background and Argument

The background is set out in detail in my submission

of 2 November and summarised in the Secretary of State's H↑

Flag J3) minute to the Prime Minister of 7 November.

Flag

3. Given the temperament of Mr. Shen P'ing, the Chinese

Chargé d'Affaires here, he is unlikely to react with any

particular grace to a personal intimation that the restric-

tions are to be relaxed. It may be, however, that in the light

of Mr. Hopson's report of his démarche there will be points

A call by which we could usefully stress to the Chinese.

Mr. Shen P'ing would provide an opportunity.

that a decision on this should be postponed until after we

have had Kr. Hopson's report.

I think, however,

4. The Chargé d'Affaires in Peking has emphasised that the

relaxation of the restrictions should be done as quietly as

possible, since in this way there is the best hope of attracting a corresponding gesture from the Chinese. Unfortunately there

is a Parliamentary Question down for answer on 13 November

about the prospects of improving our relations with China.

Any reference to the fact that we had informed the Chinese

of our decision to relax restrictions would certainly attract

publicity. It is best therefore to postpone Mr. Hopson's démarche until 14 November. It seems unlikely that the

Chinese on their side will make public our decision to relax

restrictions before it is put into effect. If they do, the

line in the second draft telegram should, I hope, still be

relevant. There is of course the horrid possibility that

/they

CONFIDENTIAL

←

they might make it public in terms which indicated that

much more is expected of us, e.g. over Hong Kong, before

there could be any return to normal in our relations.

this is a risk we shall have to accept.

зари

ひ

Janne Munay.

(James Lurray)

10 November, 1967

But

E.f.delman

10/11

A copy of the submusion has now

to Mr Rodgers.

Алеми.

M+ Densonf Mr. Wilson. I

Enter

Sove

CONFIDENTIAL

FLAG A "13

SECRETARY OF STATE

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No 51

1967

| Fc3/20

The Prime Minister has seen your minute of

7 November about the relaxation or restrictions on

Chinese in London and fully agrees with the proposal in that minute. He assumes, (correctly) that the

Home Secretary would welcome some relief from the

burden placed upon the police.

117

2. On this assumption, the Prime Minister sees no

need to bring this matter berore your Cabinet colleagues

and suggests that we should now go ahead on the basis

set out in the minute.

3. There is therefore nothing in your Cabinet

folder on this item. The department will now set the

necessary wheels in motion.

allen

J).m.) ay

8 November, 1967.

See ili ilurray andersson of 10 November

pc.

13/

CONFIDENTIAL

116

PRIME

MINISTER

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear back,

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No 31

1 5NCV 1967

FC3/20

10 Downing Street Whitehall

November 8, 1967

As I told you, the Prime Minister has seen the Foreign Secretary's minute PM/67/100 of November 7 about proposed relaxation of restrictions on the Chinese Diplomatic Mission

in London.

He agrees with the action proposed by the Foreign Secretary. On the assumption, which he draws from the final paragraph of Mr. Brown's

minute, that the Home Secretary is also in agreement, the Prime Minister sees no need for Mr. Brown to put these views orally to Cabinet, as proposed in paragraph 6 of his minute, unless he sees any compelling reason to do só.

Чита

www.

سلام

Michael (PALLISER)

M. de la Mare. Gq/4

The

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already met.

D. Day, Esq.,

Foreign Office. *

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لله

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9 In rehnal

CIBAR,

Love

( See S. 45's comment

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CONFIDENTIAL

VES

1(115

113

Secretary of State

Now se

Fe3/201

il Daiji

of 8. Nacubes.

p.a.

China: Lifting of Restrictions

13/

Following our discussion this morning

قامات

I asked Burke Trend what he thought would be

the best way for you to consult your colleagues.

He agreed that in view of likely criticism

in Parliament you should at least inform your

Cabinet colleagues. He thought the best way

might be to send a minute to the P.M. setting

out your proposal and suggesting, subject to his agreement, that you raise this in Cabinet

on Thursday.

شيد

2. I attach a minute to the P.M. (I have

had it done in final form to save time but

please do not hesitate to change it if you

wish). If the P.M. agrees to this tomorrow,

we might circulate your minute to your Cabinet

colleagues for their information. You could

then raise the question orally at Thursday's

Cabinet.

Minull

rand

to No. 10

.).) M11

J.m. Jay. (for fonald Martland)

7 November, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. de la Kare

CONFIDENTIAL

ARCHIVES NE !

TEADY 1987

FCM/1/20

1k+

Flag 9

112

CHINA : RELAXATION OF RESTRICTIONS

The Secretary of State has decided that he should

inform his colleagues about the recommendations for the

relaxation of restrictions on the Chinese officials in

this country.

2. The Secretary to the Cabinet has told the Private

Secretary that, in his view, the best way for the Secretary

of State to consult his colleagues would be by raising it

in Cabinet on 9 November; but that first the Secretary of

State should send a minute to the Prime Minister explaining

the proposal.

3. I attach a draft minute from the Secretary of State

to the Prime Kinister.

Imati semalam.

Now

luney

James T. Lumay

(James Kurray)

7 Noverber, 1967

A.f. de belan

See The Thailand

Mist of 7 Nm

p.a.

15/1

76/41

CONFIDENTIAL

ELBİS 2 L..

PW/87/100

F23/1/201

CHINA:

FLEVIL

bokies save 10: -

7 An Rodgas

Pus

Ind Allen

F.E.D. cit

113

P.M. agreed.

pa.

hu ole la hare 5 head of Personnel Defoe. 6 Planing staff.

JAYAMION OF BESTRICTI NS

You wi'l recall that as a result of the sucking

of our office . 'eking list uust we imposed

aditional extrictions on the members of the

Chinese Miaciun here. They were forbidden to travel

mo. a thin 5 miles from Central London without

advance notifia.t.on,

N e uired (by an Order-in-

Council) to h ve xit poimils for leaving; the

country. These restrictions were enforced by police

surveillance. The inese, who even bufore the

8.ckin, of tiv. office nid by adrinistrative means

prevented som, of our people from leaving, riported

by confinin, our lesion to the very limited area

of their dwellin 8 and offices, and by : efusing exit

permits. Since then a schoulchildren and two

premart

ivor bv

been allowed out.

2. On 2ctober the Chinese inistry of Forei,n

'ffairs indicated to pur Char é d' ́ffaires,

T. H ̧son, that to me would be no easing of the

present Chinese restrict.ons until we had lifted

our suurt rertrictions, completely disregarding

/the suckin,

IHE

the sacking of cur 18816, they porversely a. ¿ued

that since we were tha irst to 1.pose widit.onal

restrictions, we ust be the first to relax them.

r.opron is convinced that the Chinese will not

tudge from this position and that the could not be

brought to negotiate a procedure of reciprocal

relavation18,

Jạ thinks, nowever, that if we were

to decide on a unilateral and substantial relaxation

and give the Chinese .dvw.ce notification, they

would respond with act.cn on their art; and that

this was wh. they were in off ct conveying to him.

3. Our &nctions squins: the hinese are not, and

ca.ot be, of such severity and eToctiveness as to

force a change in olity on the Chinese. They could

sit things out indefinitel.. Te cunot, he a not

reasonably ..ak our "ission to put up indefinitely

with their present trials. One of the wives has

already had a severe breakdown - and been refused

en exit urba oreover, as lon; s unis issue

persiɛts, we can ot hope to pro ress towards more

norwl dealin's with the lines on e.¿. trade,

I think, therfore, that we should now make some

relaxation of our restrictiune unil terally. Now

would seen a good time for un attempt towards a

Mutual Aismantling of restrictions: the "poderates*

seem to be gainin' control in "eking, and would

LJKITFAL

/presumably

bre....bly IC..

norality in bl...

opens on 15

Potum to

nton .r. Fir

5.1... ich

OVU.LGT.

"e sift clearl it....11.

I. reukiroment for

་་

oxit je pritr. we could, however, relax the travel

restrictions eluhr:

(5)

1. retumi.. to DIYe-'. ust Zilə

travel 11 it; or

(b) l kind

1 - le lit, this being the

Course (b) weil (avo u

DING WO ISTA, TOUT

J'UN irrion in Teking.

the satisfaction of

POÇ.

has pres .d stran 1, fo, coure (4), arguing that,

since courɛu (1) did not ra refent full return

to the mak 19, it would e milkely to elicit

a full ref rise from the

*AG UT!

'iteit reluctantly,

I have come to the lion t' t this is corr ct.

If we were to rei x UN

21 tertrictions, "e

would alle uuspense in the

unikuter 1 re

act of faith in d.

produce results f...

lice surveillance.

14 of course be un

0 rt it would

the unino: è side. ́ut standing

all not

...ter; and ' think

cu. C an wuld be folle tot in llament.

und eisowhere if we

auit ei ar that if there was

no ref

Lule there, we

/should

should again impose the restrictions. We might al80 say that our best hope of settling other outstanding isɛus with the Chinese, e... the detention of the keuters correspondent, lay in the general improvement of atmo: here which a mutual relaxation of restrictions

might bring about.

6. If you agree, I propose to put there views

orally to my colleagues in Cabinet on 9 November, 7. The Home Secr try has already drawn to my

attention the burden which surveillance of the

Chinese is "lacing on the

etropolitan Police Force

and expressed te hope that there will be some early

relief from the strain.

G. A. DROWN

7 Moverbor. 1967.

COFFIN MVIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry

No./67/100

Top Secret. Secret. Confidential

Restricted. Open.

Draft. Minute

Prime Minister

from

Secretary of

State.

Insert Telephone No. & Ext. when appropriate.

CHINA : RELAXATION OF RESTRICTIONS

You will recell that as a result of the

sacking of our Office in Peking last August

we imposed additional restrictions on the members

of the Chinese Kission here They were forbidden

(from Cental honoton >

to travel more than 5 miles sithout advance

notification, and required (by an Order-in-Council

to have exit permits for leaving the country.

These restrictions were enforced by police

surveillance.

The Chinese, who even before the

sacking of the Office had by administrative

means prevented some of our people from leaving,

riposted by confining our Kission to the very

limited area of their dwellings and offices,

and by refusing axit permits. Since then only

schoolchildren and two pregnant wives have been

allowed out.

2. On 20 October the Chinese Ministry of

Foreign Affairs indicated to our Chargé d'Affaires my_Hopton,

that there would be no essing of the present

Chinese restrictions until we had lifted our

August restrictions. Completely disregarding

the sacking of our Kission, they perversely

argued that since we were the first to impose

additional restrictions, we must be the first

to relax them. Kr. Hopson is convinced that

the Chinese will not budge from this position

and that they could not be brought to negotiate

CONFIDENTIAL

a procedure of reciprocal relaxations.

thinks, however that if we were to decide on a

unilateral and substantial relaxation and give

the Chinese advance notification, they would

respond with action on their part; and that this

Convert Lang

was what they were in affect seving to him.

3. Cur sanctions against the Chinese are not,

and cannot be, of such severity and effective-

ness as to force a change in policy on the

Chinese. They could sit things out indefinitely.

Te cannot. We cannot reasonably ask our Hission

to put up indefinitely with their present trials.

ne of the wives has already had a severe

breakdown and been refused an exit permit.

Koreover, as long as this issue persists, we

cannot hope to progress towards more normal

dealings with the Chinese on e.g. trade. I

think, therefore, that we should now make some

relaxation of our restrictions unilaterally.

Now would seem a good time for an attempt towards

a mutual diamantling of restrictions:

"moderates" seem to be gaining control in Peking,

and would presumably welcome some show of a

the

return to normality in time for the Canton Trade

новый трект

November. Fair

4. Te must olearly retain the requirement for

exit permits. We could, however, relax the

travel restrictions either;

(a) by returning to our pre-August 35-mile

travel limit; or

(b) by imposing a 12-mile limit, this

being the pre-August limit for our

Kission in Feking.

CONFIDENTIAL

/Course (b)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

Course (b) Guld give us the satisfaction of

insisting on exact reciprocity. But Ir. Hopson

has pressed strongly for course (a), arguing

that, since course (b) would not represent a

full return to the status quo, it would be

unlikely to elicit full respnse from the

Chinese. Albeit reluctantly, I have come to

the conclusion that this is correct. I we

were to relax the travel restrictions, we would

also dispenso with the police surveillance.}

5. A unilateral relaxation would of course

be an act of faith as we cannot be sure that

it would produce results from the Chinese side.

But standing pat will not produce results

either; and I think our action would he

defensible both in Farliament and elsewhere

if we made it clear that if there was no respons

from Paking or more trouble there, we should

again impose the restrictions. We might also

say that our best hope of settling other out-

standing issues with the Chinese, e.g. the

detention of the Reuters correspondent, lay in

the general improvement of atmosphere which a

mutual relaxation of restrictions might bring

about.

6. If you agree,

propose to put these

views orally to my colleagues in Cabinet en

9 November.

7. The Hore Secretary has already drawn to

my attention the burden which surveillance of

the Chinese is placing on the Metropolitan

Police Force and expressed the hope that there

will he some early relief from the strain.

CONFIDENTIAL

(12

RECEIVED

ARCHIVES NA

Mr. Rodgers

FC3/20

Restrictions on the Chinese

I agree that we should make the first,

unilateral gesture.

2. Intellectually one has a preference for Course B in paragraph 10 of Mr. Muttay's minute. It would be satisfactory to say to the Chinese that we would be prepared unilaterally to go back to their pre-August procedures. But I agree with the Department in thinking that the Chinese, with a perverse logic, would argue that the equivalent of their pre-August procedures in Peking would be our pre-August procedures in London. Like the Department I am less confident than Mr. Hopson that this offer will produce results, but I think we must take some action in the slightly more favourable climate that has ensued, and I would hope Ministers would feel that Course C would be sufficiently defensible in the circumstances.

I therefore support the recommendation in favour of Course C.

I dicklin by P.v.5. and diged

(P.H. Gore-Booth) 3 November, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRETARY OF STATE

CONFIDENTIAL

I agree that we should take a chance and

that any gesture should be significant.

We can

hold it in Parliament and elsewhere if:

(1) we don't make a fuss about it (and

ensure that the Home Office don't

do so either);

(ii)

we make it clear, if pressed, that we

shall impose restrictions again if

there is no response from Peking or

more trouble there;

(111) we don't appear to become complacent

about Grey. It would be reassuring

if Mr. Hopson turned his mind to his

plight and came up with some suggestions.

While appreciating the morale problem, it

wouldn't look too good if the staff of

the Mission were living it up on week-end

/trips

CONFIDENTIAL

trips to the Great Wall while Grey

languishes and perhaps goes quietly

out of his mind.

pp. Kgasense

William Rodgers

6 November, 1967.

Copied to:

Permanent Under-Secretary Mr. de la Mare Mr. James Murray

Shope

bonday

18 right about this.

Правил

9'4 butter in from think Comarques füer

Opps 3

Far East Dapt :

Sir B. Frand thought the bast

way for the S.gs. to commult colleagues would be

by raising this in

Cabuust

he thought Mt Brown should sand

Buck frost

The war day.

minute to that

P.M. Explanning the proposal and suggesting that he

CONFIDENTIAL

inform

inform his

Cabnist Mangues on Thursday,

смотрият

the P.M. har

140

Bjaction.

This has been done.

1- P.il. of 7 November.

p.a.

Afalmaitrand

Se munte

3.0.

CONFIDENTIAL

See further munkei

on 112

ра pa los

RECEIVED N

•RCHIVES No 31

kr. de la Karš~

FC3/201

CHINA: RELAXATION OF RESTRICTIONS

Problem

The Chargé d'Affaires in Peking has recommended that

it is time for a unilateral relaxation of the restrictions

on the Chinese Lission here, and that such relaxation, if it

is to be effective in securing some reciprocal relief for

our kission in Peking, must be substantial. The problem is

to decide if Mr. Hopson's assessment is correct and if so

what form our relaxation should take.

Recommendations

I recommend that

(a) the time has now come for a unilateral relaxation;

(b) relaxation should take the form of lifting the

travel restrictions (and the accompanying surveillance)

imposed on the Chinese kission last August and a

return to the 35-mile travel limit with effect from

12 November.

advance and express the hope that this indication

of our willingness to work back to a more normal

state of relations will be matched from the Chinese

side.

Background and Argument

Before the sacking of our office, the treatment accorded

to the respective Missions was this:

CONFIDENTIAL

/(a)

CONFIDENTIAL

(a) Chinese regulations and practice required

advance permission (difficult to obtain

and frequently refused) for travel beyond 121

miles (except to certain historical sites);

exit permits.

(b) British regulations and practice required

advance notification for travel beyond 35 miles,

and permission rarely refused;

no exit permits.

Thus the reciprocity was by no means exact.

Consequent upon the sacking we imposed additional restric-

and the Chinese (who even before the

tions on the Chinese;

sacking of the Mission had in effect instituted the exit "freeze"

by claiming that there were no available seats in transport out

of Peking) riposted by a further tightening of restrictions on

our Mission to the point of making its work practically

impossible. The present position is this:

(a) British regulations and practice involve

advance notification for travel beyond 5 miles,

enforced by police surveillance;

exit permits.

(b) Chinese regulations and practice involve

- advance permission (sometimes refused) for travel

beyond the area of the Mission's dwellings and

temporary offices;

- refusal of exit permits (except for some school-

children and two pregnant wives).

CONFIDENTIAL

15.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3-

Flag A

Mr. Hsueh, Deputy Head of the West European Department

of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has indicated to

Mr. Hopson that there can be no easing of their present

restrictions i.e. in practice no exit visas

until we

have lifted our August restrictions (Peking telegram No. 166).

They thus completely disregard the reason for cur additional

restrictions, the sacking of the Office, and argue that since

we were the first to impose additional restrictions in August,

we must be the first to relax them. This is of course an

infuriating half-truth, but rational argument is not going to

dislodge the Chinese from this position.

Flags B & C 6. In his telegrame No. 193 and No. 194 (prompted by Foreign

FLAG D Office telegram No. 916), Mr. Hopson himself strongly sustains

the view that there is no prospect of relief for the Mission

until we have taken the initiative in making a unilateral

relaxation of the restrictions. He thinks that the present

is a good time for a move towards a mutual dismantling of

restrictions: the "moderates" seem to be gaining control in

the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chinese would

presumably welcome some show of a return to normality in time

for the Canton Trade Fair due this month. He seems convinced,

on the basis of his conversation with Mr. Hsueh, that the

Chinese have as good as indicated that if we were to take the

initiative in starting the process of relaxation, the Chinese

would match our action. He argues, however, that this

favourable situation may not laat and that we must take

advantage of it now. His tone suggests that he is somewhat

/concerned

CONFIDENTIAL

concerned at the state of morale in the kission in the face

of our continued failure to make any progress towards more

normal conditions. He is sure that the Chinese could never

be brought to negotiate a procedure of reciprocal relaxations;

but he considers that if we were to decide on the first step

and give the Chinese advance notification, they would

if our

action was substantial enough

part.

respond with action on their

7. I would not wish to take serious issue with the main lines

of Kr. Hopson's argument. Our restrictions are not, and cannot

be, of such severity and effectiveness as to force a change of

policy on the Chinese. They could sit things out indefinitely.

We cannot. I share kr. Hopson's view that we must now get

things moving, and that only a unilateral relaxation will

achieve this. I am perhaps less confident than he appears to

be that such a step on our part would be matched on the Chinese

side; but he has had the advantage of direct contact with the

Chinese authorities on this.

8. What should be the scope of our relaxation? We cannot

dispose of the requirement for exit permits. We must now, and

in the foreseeable future, have powers to prevent Chinese

officials from leaving the country if we wish to do so even

taking account of the bolt-hole through southern Ireland.

Any

relaxation must therefore relate to travel restrictions.

9. (Surveillance presents a special problem. It is not a

it is a means of enforcing restrictions. There

seems little doubt that the Chinese would accept that less

/intensive

restriction

CCHFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5-

intensive surveillance would be a significant gesture on our

part; but they would not, I am sure, accept that it was in any

way to be regarded as a relaxation of the restrictions we

imposed in August. If we extend the travel limit beyond the

present 5 miles, the Home Office would expect us to dispense

with surveillance and to return to the system in operation

when the 35-mile limit was in force, i.e. to rebuke the Chinese

Chargé d'Affaires if any breaches of the notification procedure

came to our notice. I think that we should accept this.)

10. Any relaxation of travel restrictions could be in respect

either of the categories of officials to whom the restrictions

apply or of the distance. But there are only three practical

possibilities:

(a) We might lift the travel restrictions in respect of

the Chinese commercial and banking officials only,

leaving it in force for the "political" members of

the Mission and the staff of the New China News

Agency. This is open to the objection that we

would appear to be moved by purely commercial con-

siderations and not by the welfare of our kission

and of the remaining British community in China as

a whole. Moreover, it would be difficult for the

Chinese to devise a reciprocal move; it might mean

that they would grant exit permits for members of

our Commercial Section only, which could be

embarrassing.

(b) We might increase the limit to 12 miles, plus

certain historic sites, the pre-August limit in

/Peking

CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

11.

Peking. We could justify this figure as

establishing exact reciprocity with the normal

Chinese regulations in Peking. The Chinese

might well reject this as unsatisfactory, in

that it was not a return to the status quo

ante. They might imply that we were not sincere

in our protestations of wishing to return to

normality in that we had used the events of last

August to impose additional permanent restrictions.

of these three courses, the objections to (a) seem to me

to be conclusive. The choice between (b) and (c) is not easy.

Course (b) has considerable advantages. Reciprocity is a good

position on which to take a public stand.

Moreover, it gives

us some flexibility in that if the Chinese go some way but not

far enough in their first response, we have something left in

reserve. Also it might be easier to justify to people with

doubts about the prudence of removing completely the August

travel restrictions until we have had some response from the

Chinese side. However Kr. Hopson, whom we consulted, thinks

that only (c) will elicit a full response from the Chinese,

and that there is little point in prejudicing the success of

the operation by taking it in two stages. (Foreign Office

Flags E & F telegram No. 942 and Peking telegram No. 208.) I agree with

him that course (c) holds out the best hope of a speedy improve-

ment in the conditions of the Mission. My choice is therefore (c). I fully recognise that it is an act of faith (in which

/Mr. Hopson's

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Hopson's faith is possibly stronger than ours) to expect

the Chinese to respond to our action; but their possible

failure to do so is a risk that I think we shall have to

accept unless we are to remain indefinitely in the present

deadlock.

12.

Would such a relaxation be interpreted as a sign of

weakness and lack of resolution which would encourage the

Chinese to increase the pressure on other fronts? I doubt it.

Mr. Hopson argues that the Chinese have as good as told us

that in the matter of Missions they would like to revert to

normal. He argues that the questions of Mr. Grey (a hostage

for the N.C.N.A. journalists in Hong Kong) and Inspector Knight

(a lever in border negotiations with the Hong Kong authorities)

are and must be kept separate. (I think that this is possibly

But we may

in accord with the Chinese view of the situation.

have difficulty in persuading public opinion here that action

with regard to restrictions on the Chinese in London is unlikely

to affect the fate of Mr. Grey or Inspector Knight one way or

the other.)

13. Indeed the strongest practical objection to the course

recommended is perhaps the difficulty of presenting it in

convincing terms to the public here. I agree with Mr. Hopson

that there should be no public announcement of any decision

to relax the restrictions; but it is bound to come to public

attention almost immediately. Our line with the press and in

Parliament might then be that we had seen indications in

Peking of a desire on the part of the Chinese to return to a

CONFIDENTIAL

/more

CONFIDENTIAL

.8 -

more normal state of affairs in their dealings with foreign

countries. The decision to hold the Canton Trade Fair and

in particular the invitations to British business firms,

were further evidence of this. Our additional restrictions

were imposed at a time when there was complete uncertainty

about the future well-being of our Mission. By keeping them

in force for almost three months, we had shown our concern at

the unhappy events of last August. We now thought it time to

demonstrate our readiness to return to a more normal state of

affairs.

14. A consideration that is relevant but not, in my view,

in any sense determining is the desire of the Home Office for

early relief of the present burden on the police.

81 officers,

uniformed and plain clothes, are at present engaged in the

enforcement of our present restrictions, a burden which the

Commissioner of Police is claiming to the Home Office is

intolerable.

مسلمة

Даши Наму

(James Murray)

2 November, 1967

Copies to:

P.U.S.

Sir D. Allen

Mr. Rodgers

I agree with this recommendation.

It is an act of faith,

for our only evidence that the Chinese will respond with

CONFIDENTIAL

/equivalent

CONFIDENTIAL

9 -

FLAG B

equivalent relaxation is a hint given to Mr. Hopson by a

Chinese official. We must also be very careful not to give

the public impression that we are more concerned with the

welfare of our officials than with that of non-official British

subjects held by the Chinese. I therefore do not agree with

the suggestion in paragraph 3 of Mr. Hopson's telegram 193 that

the question of relaxation of restrictions against officials

can be dealt with entirely separately from that of other

British subjects. Mr. Hopson also has his facts wrong in

paragraph 2(b) of that telegram. I have sent him a private

message putting the record straight.

2. But if we are to attempt to get our relations with Chine

back to something like normal one side must be prepared to take

the first step and it seems clear that the Chinese will not.

We must therefore do so. As long as we keep the restriction

that the Chinese concerned cannot leave this country without

an exit visa we can without damage to ourselves lift the police

surveillance and restore the limit of their free travel from

five miles from Marble Arch to thirty-five, as it was before

the sacking of our Mission in Peking. If we start the process

of relaxation, and the Chinese reciprocate, we shall have

created a better atmosphere in which to try to secure the release

of Mr. Grey and others. If the Chinese do not reciprocate we

shall not have lost anything of substance and our public

position will have improved, for we will have shown without any

possible doubt that we are willing to be sensible and that it

/is the

CONFIDENTIAL

- 10 -

is the Chinese who are unwilling.

You may wish to discuss this with Mr. Murray and myself.

We are at your disposal.

3. John Lohman

(A.J. de la Mare)

3 November, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Ar. Rodgers.

I ajith

En Clair

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 239 14 November, 1967

RECEIVED IN [ARCHIVES No.31 1.NOV 1967

110

TOTO ABPY

UNCLASSIFIED

[F21/14 (210)

Your tele grams Nos. 972 [Relations with China] and 974 [Restrictions on the Chinese Mission]

Instructions carried out today.

(106,

Mr. Hopson

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION ADVANCE COPIES SENT

F.O. F.E.D.

S.E.A.D.

News Dept

J.I.R.D.

DSAO Personnel Dept

ऋ

Spoken & πr denson. We

броки

Should now

ঠ

Beck

The Chinese here

a mote

bbbbb

CONFIDENTIAL

pa.

Our reference:

Your reference!

CONFIDENTIAL

HOME OFFICE

PRISON DEPARTMENT

Horseferry House, Dean Ryle Street, LONDON S.W.1

RET&tphonet Victoria 6655, ext.

RCHIVES No 31 14 NOV 1967

10th November, 1967

104

109

Dear Murray,

Thank you for your letter of 9th November reporting the Prime Minister's

agreement to police surveillance of Chinese officials ending on 21st November.

I can confirm that the Home Secretary greatly welcomes this. The Commissioner

of Police of the Metropolis has been informed and gu soon as we have his views on

what you say in paragraph 6 of your letter, I will write to you again. We fully

agree with the line proposed in paragraph 5 as regarda publicity and our press

office is being told about this.

As you know, the Home Office has a separate interest (i.e. not a police

interest) ip the exit permit requirements.

We may have to get in touch with you

later about the difficulties these requirements raise for us.

Yours sincerely,

R.A. James.

J. Murray, Esq.

We shall have to be from colour. the exit sement quants.

The de lave 10/11

По

Ms Wife

Mri

from May

to Not.

No further action

at the moment

ра

Please address any reply to

THE SECRETARY

quote: our référence:

Our Ref:

FC 3/20 38779/67

H.M. CUSTOMS AND EXCISE

King's Beam House, Mark Lane, London Ę.Cig

Telex: 262861

Telephone: MANsion House 1515, ext.

Ipt reply

20. 9821

2.134

VED IN SVES No.31

108

F23/201

9th November, 1967.

J. Murray, Esq.,

Far Eastern Department,

Foreign Office,

London S.V.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

Alas. I am

force to ague with the last

вил

sentence. But in perherfs bus infutant word.

Ale

ww.

Mr W

Dear Murray,

I write with reference to your letter dated 13th October, 1967, regarding the possibility of imposing delays on goods despatched from the Office of the Chinese Mission.

Te note that you indicate the possibility of enlisting the help of the pelice in order to give a warning when despatch of goods from the Chinese Mission was likely. In view of the vast quantities of export goods dealt with our Shipping Officers would need not merely a warning but full information before they would be able to locate the goods. They would need to know the port or place of exportation, the name of the ship or the airline operator, and the identifying marks on the package. For exports in general we have no legal powers to detain unless (a) the goods are brought to a quay or loaded in a place or manner contrary to our regulations, or (b) there is some contravention of Exchange Control or Board of Trade export licensing regulations,

As regards any attempt to apply your proposal to exports by parcel post it would obviously be necessary to seek the oo-operation of the Post Office. The problems of identification and the problem of carrying out a scrutiny without delaying other mail are only too clear. Here also the only legal grounds for detention would be contravention of Post Office, Exchange Control, or export licensing regulations.

On the personal export side there is no requirement that personal or house- hold effects should be pre-entered. By this we mean that no entry is required to be presented before exportation. Our only delaying tactic here would be to specially examine effects to see whether there were included any goods the export of which was prohibited without a licence, but we should certainly need full and timely information to do this. Registered and other baggage sent in advance of the owner is controlled very selectively at Victoria Station and the ports. In view of the Home Office Restriction on Kabarkation Order of 1967 relating to Chinese Nationals it seems highly improbable that any such baggage or effects will be presented for clearance. On being advised of any permitted smbarkation of a Chinese National I do not see how our Officers could employ anything more than a "work to rule" tactic, unless of course an Exchange Centri or Export licensing offence was discovered.

CONFIDENTIAI

- 2 -

J. Murray, Esq.

9th November, 1967

I think it must be concluded that with our necessarily selective controls, it is doubtful whether we could achieve the sort of effective sanction you have in wind.

Yours sincerely,

You will

(H. A. O'Neill)

CONFIDENTIAL

F23/20

CYPHER/CAT.A AND BY BAG

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORY FOREIGN OFFICE TO PEKING

107

TOP COPY

TELNO. 975

10 NOVEMBER 1967

(FED)

106

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO EKIN

ADDRESSED TO PEKING TELEGRAM NO 975 OF 10 NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO HONG KONG AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON AND PARIS. M..P.T. RESTRICTIONS ON THE CHINESE MISSION.

IN EXPLAINING OUR DECISION WE SHALL TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINE. (A) THERE HAVE BEEN INDICATIONS OF A DESIRE ON THE PART OF THE CHINESE TO RETURN TO A MORE NORMAL STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES. OUR ADDITIONAL RESTRICTIONS WERE IMPOSED AT A TIME WHEN THERE WAS COMPLETE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE FUTURE WELL-BEING OF OUR MISSION. WE NOW THINK IT TIME TO RETURN TO A MORE NORMAL STATE OF AFFAIRS.

(B) WE HOPE THAT THIS WILLINGNESS ON OUR PART WILL BE MATCHED

BY A CORRESPONDING WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF THE CHINESE AND THAT THERE WILL BE AN EARLY IMPROVEMENT OF THE CONDITIONS FOR OUR MISSION IN PEKING. IF PRESSED WE SHALL HOWEVER HAVE TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE SHALL IMPOSE THE RESTRICTIONS AGAIN IF THERE IS NO RESPONSE FROM PEKING OR MORE TROUBLE THERE.

(C) OUR BEST HOPE OF SETTLING OTHER OUTSTANDING ISSUES WITH THE CHINESE, E.G. THE DETENTION OF MR GREY, LIES IN RE-ESTABLISHING MORE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

SOSFA

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.0.

F.E.D.

SSSSS

CONFIDENTIAL

Copies to: TRD +

TN Dept.

14/Vi

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.

DEPARTMENT

3120

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION PRIORITY MARKINGS

Top Sacrac Secret Confidential "Lestricted

Unclisted

Emergency) • Immediate Priority Rooting

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram shoukl

reach addressee(s)

(Date)

Despatched

-Br Chir

Gode Cypher

Draft Telegraph to:-

PEKIG

975

(Date) 10/11

And to:-

Repeat to:-

trong đường

Saving Le

2301

Ala

41 S

Security classification -if any

[Codeword-if any)

Addressed to

telegram No..........

And to.........

CONFIDENT TAL

Peking

9.75

repeated for information to

Saving to

__(date)

·TETTE. But mott. ....

13/11

Над кажд kung

Washington Pari.

k.i.p.t.

חידויווו

Restrictions on the Chinese Mission

In explaining our decision we shall take the

following line:

(a) There have been indications of a desire

on the part of the Chinese to return to a more

noxmel state of affairs in their dealings with

Our additional restrictions

were imposed at a time when there was complete

washgan foreign countries.

મ

VAQ-5 taju

174 So uncertainty about the future well-being of our

179

Distribution:-

Copies to:-

Kission. By keeping than in force for almost-

three months we have shown our concern et-the

unhappy events of last August. We now think it

time to return to a more normal state of affairs.

(b) We hope that this willingness on our

part will be matched by a corresponding willingness

on the part of the Chinese and that there will be

an early improvement of the conditions for our

honeyw

Kission in Peking. If pressed we shal

ahall have to

make it clear that we shall impose the restrictiona

again if there is no response from Peking or more

trouble there.

CONFIDENTIAL

/(0)

with the Chinese, e.g. the detention of Mr. Grey, lies in

re-establishing more normal diplomatic relations.

Awww.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

(0224) (2) 300M 18/63 SA

F23/20

CYPHER/CAT.A AND BY BAG

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO PEKING

TELNO. 974

10 NOVEMBER 1967 (FED)

robi

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO PEKING TELEGRAM NO. 974 OF 10 NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO HONG KONG AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON AND PARIS.

F222/720

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 166: RESTRICTIONS ON THE CHINESE MISSION.

PLEASE SEEK AN INTERVIEW WITH THE CHINESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON 14 NOVEMBER AND INFORM THEM THAT WITH EFFECT FROM 21 NOVEMBER WE ARE RETURNING TO THE 35-MILE LIMIT WHICH OBTAINED BEFORE LAST AUGUST AND THAT THE POLICE SURVEILLANCE WILL ALSO RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE. IF ASKED, YOU SHOULD SAY THAT, ALTHOUGH THE REQUIREMENT FOR EXIT PERMITS WILL CONTINUE, THIS SHOULD PRESENT NO DIFFICULTY IN PRACTICE. (IN VIEW OF THE DESIRABILITY OF AVOIDING PREMATURE PUBLICITY WE DECIDED TO DELAY ACTION WITH THE CHINESE UNTIL AFTER A PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION WHICH IS UP FOR ANSWER ON 13 NOVEMBER).

2. YOU SHOULD ADD THAT OUR DECISION IS INTENDED AS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF MY DESIRE TO SET BOTH COUNTRIES ON A BETTER COURSE IN THEIR RELATIONS AND THAT I HOPE THAT THIS WILLINGNESS ON OUR PART WILL BE MATCHED ON THE CHINESE SIDE. WE WOULD LIKE TO GET BACK TO NORMAL WORKING CONDITIONS FOR YOUR MISSION AND THE CHINESE MISSION IN LONDON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE: IN PARTICULAR WE WOULD LIKE NORMAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TRANSFER OF STAFF AND THE REGULAR ISSUE OF EXIT AND ENTRY VISAS TO BE RESUMED.

3. WE SHALL BE NOTIFYING THE CHINESE MISSION HERE OF THE CHANGES AFTER YOU HAVE TAKEN ACTION.

14.

Now se

CONFIDENTIAL

Copies to: IRD +

in Dept.

13.

ра

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 974 TO PEKING

4. WE DO NOT INTEND TO MAKE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT THE RELAXATION, EITHER IN ADVANCE OR WHEN IT COMES INTO EFFECT, AND WE WOULD HOPE TO BE ABLE TO PLAY THE ISSUE AS QUIETLY AS POSSIBLE. WE THINK IT UNLIKELY THAT THE CHINESE WILL PUBLICIBE OUR DECISION BEFORE IT IS PUT INTO EFFECT, BUT IT WILL BE IMMEDIATELY OBVIOUS WHEN THE SURVEILLANCE IS LIFTED, THEREAFTER WE SHALL HAVE TO CONFIRM PUBLICLY THAT THE RESTRICTIONS HAVE BEEN RELAXED AND EXPLAIN OUR ACTION TO THE PRESS AND IF NECESSARY PARLIAMENT,

5. GEE M.I.F.T.

BOSTA

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

7.0.

7.8.D.

ERV

CONFIDENTIAL

श्री

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.

DEPARTMENT

√3/20

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION PRIORITY MARKINGS

Top Secret Secret

Confidential Restricted

Unclassified

Emergency Immediate ! Priority Routing

(Date)

Despatched

· Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should,

reach addressee(s)

106)

er Clair Gode

Cypher

Draft Telegram To:-

FELING

974

(Bate) 10/11

And to:-

Security classification -if my

[Codeword-if any)

| CONFIDENTIAL

Peking

974 (date)

Addressed to

telegram No......

10/11

And to.....

repeated for information to

Hong Kong

Repeat to:-

HONG HONG

2300

Saving to

Washington and raris

Your telegram No. 166 of 20 October7 :

//trictions on the Chinese kission.

4-0

to:

Saving to:

ASHTAUTUN

PAKIS

179

Sar

Distribution:-

Departmental

F.E.D.

Coples to:-

Please seek an interview with the Chinese

Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 14 November and

inform them that with effect from 21 Noverber we

are returning to the 35-mile limit which obtained

before last August and that the police surveillance.

will also return to the status quo ante.

although

asked, you should say that the requirement for

exit permits will continue, but that this should

present no difficulty in practice. (In view of

the desirability of avoiding premature publicity

we decided to delay action with the Chinese until

after a Parliamentary Question which is up for

answer on 13 November.)

2. You should add that our decision is intended

as further evidence of my desire to set both

countries on a better course in their relationa

and that I hope that this willingness on our part

will be matched on the Chinese side. We would

like to get back to normal working conditions for

/your

CUR PIDENZIAL

your Mission and the Chinese Lission in London as soon as

possible; in particular we would like normal arrangements for

the transfer of staff and the regular issue of exit and entry

visas to be resumed.

3. We shall be notifying the Chinese Kission here of the

changes after you' have taken action.

4. We do not intend to make a public announcement about the

relaxation, either in advance or when it comes into effect, and

we would hope to be able to play the issue as quietly as possible.

We think it unlikely that the Chinese will publicise our

decision before it is put into effect. But it will be immediately

obvious when the surveillance is lifted. Thereafter we shall

have to confirm publicly that the restrictions have been relaxed

and explain our action to the press and if necessary Parliament .

Seạ m.i.f.t

lo Nos.

(13907) (2)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

HOME OFFICE

Horseferry House, Dean Ryle Street, LONDONS.W.1

Telephone: Victoria 6655, ext.

Telex: 24986

Our reference: QPB/59. 50/13/9

Your reference:

Dear Murray,

8th November, 1967

This has been aw-taken by en 5.

پر

And paw.

I wrote to you on 20th October about reductions

in the present requirements for keeping Chinese officials

under surveillance.

The Commissioner of Police of the

Metropolis has asked us again about this and we should be grateful if you could now let us have a reply.

Yours sincerely,

R. A. James

J. Murray, Esq.

p.a.

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.31

1 NOV 1967

FC3120

9/11

KONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN OFFICE, 8.5.1.

9 November, 1967.

The Foreign Secretary has come to the conclusion that it is now time to relax the restrictions on the Chinese officials in London. He proposes that there should be a return to the 35 mile travel limit in fores before August, and that the Police surveillanos should be removed. The requirement for exit permits sust, however, be retained. Details are given in his minute of 7 November to the Prime Minister, nopy of which is attached.

2. The Prime Minister ruled that, on the assumption that the Home Becretary was in agreement, there was no need for the matter to go to Cabinet.

3. I assume from your letter QPB 20/3/3 of 20 October that the Home Escretary will in fast welcome this development, but I should be glad if you could confirm thië to be by telephone.

We propose that the rednotion in restrictions should take effect from 21 November and that the Chinees Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be nor inforsed on 14 Lovember. (*s should prefer not to take action with the Chinese before a Parliamentary question down for anser on 13 November is dealt with).

ron The purpose of a week's delay between telling the Chinese and satuslly relaxing the instructions is to give them the opportunit. to take sobe matching measures more or less sixultaneously with our own - always on the assumption that our sat of faith is justified.

5. We shall not be making a public announcement in advance of the satwi rälazation of restrictions and would not expect the Chinese to do so either. Once relaxation has been put into effect, it will be immediately obvious and we must be ready to deal with press queries. But it is our intention to make as litšle fuss about the relaxation as possible, and we should be grateful if your spokesman and the police could also play the issue sa quietly se possible.

1. A. James Esq.,

Home Office,

Horseferry House,

Deen Kyle Street,

1.4.1.

16.

10+

CONFIDENTIAL

6. Though the surveillance measures adopted last August can now be dropped, you will no doubt wish to consider whether any special security arrangements are still desirable in the vicinity of the Chinese Mission itself, I should welcome your

views on this point.

(Janes Hurray)

OUPIDENTIAL

[Alm enteral Ex/L (47)].

Fzz1/6

میکشید

Fc3/20

6142

D&D

་

103

The Foreign Office wish to draw to the attention of the Office of the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires a serious incident which occurred on Sunday, the 6th of Cotebor. A motor car carrying Liu Chih-sing, a representative of tho China Cosan Shipping Company attached to the Commercial Section of the Chargé d'Affaires' Office, Yu lang, a correspondant of the Few China Rows Agancy, his wife, Lin Ch'ing, and driven by Wang Tuan-sheng, a driver frem the N.C.H.A. Office, deliberately went beyond the limit of five ciles from Marble Arch laid down by the Foreign (2rios as perziscible in the absence of prior application. The car did not immediately stop when instructed to do nɔ by the police; and when eventually obliged to do so, the occupanto claimed that they were unaware that the five-nila travel restriction applied to thom. A representative of the Chinezo Nission leter telephoned to the Zoreign Office and claimed that the travel restrictions imposed on pembers of the Chiness Office were "illegal" and that they did not in any caco apply to those concerned in the incident ca the 8th of üctober.

As the Office of the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires is woll aware, the travel restrictions imposed by the British Government are a direct consequence of restrictions placed ca British diplomatic and official parachnol in China and of the curtailmont of the narzel diplomatic functions of the British Mission in Poking caused by wilful Chinese action,

The restrictions imposed by Hor Kajesty's Government have at all times boon lesa covers than those imposed in Toking by the Chinese authorities. The Foreign Office consider that such travol restrictions do nothing to promote good relaticas between the United Kingdom and China. Thoy

рафа

fore

are prepared at any time to discuss with the Chinese Government reciprocal measures to reduce or remove all such restrictions. They also roserve the right to imposa further restrictions in London to bring them directly in line with those imposed on the Eritish Kission in Zeking.

The Foreign Office take this opportunity to point . out once again that all officials of the Chinese Viszion (including sil officials of the Commercial Section and ' officials attached to it), all expatriate otaff of the London Office of N.C.K.A. and the London Office of the Bank of China, togather with all Chinese officials who rezain in this country for a period longer than threa rontha and the families of all these categories of persons, ere required to notify the Foreign Office 48 hours in advance if they wish to travel beyond a radius of five miles from Karble Arch. The office of the Chinano Chargé d'Affaires are keld fully responsible for ensuring that thece regulations are complied with and for all consequences arising from any attempt to infringe them.

Poroica Office, S.E.1,

12 Cotober, 1967.

Kr. Murray

Reference...

FC 3/20(102)

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

Surveillance on the Chinese

- SNOV 1967

F23/201

Mr. James of the Home Office telephoned this morning to say that three members of the Bank of China, who since the burning of the Mission in Peking had been living in the Mission at Portland Place, had now moved back to their house in Hampstead. This would necessitate detaching additional police officers (nine in all) and a vehicle in order to maintain surveill- ance. Did we think this was necessary? I replied that we sympathised with the burden placed on the police. I understood you had spoken to him about the possibility of removing surveill- ance from the Bank of China. We did however con- sider it necessary, before putting the matter to Ministers, to consult our Chargé d'Affaires in Peking. We hoped to be in a position to give hin a definite reply this week.

Bd (1436)

Mo elf la Mare

1/11

Mo Watsu

John Jenson

(J. B. Denson) 30 October 1967.

Janne May

оч

庇

pa 100.

31 Out-

Kr. de la fare

CONFIDENTIAL

how seen.

WLD I、

ARCHIVES No.31

- 6 NOV 1967

FC3/20

101

Flag A(100

Flag B

Surveillance of Chinese

The Secretary of State has told the Home Secretary

that we will examine the possibility of easing the present

burden on the police who are keeping Chinese officials under

surveillance. In addition Mr. James of the Home Office has

written to me to the effect that the Secretary of State has

agreed on a reduction in the present requirements for the

police and immigration service and aaking where these

reductions can be made. (I have explained to Mr. James that

the Secretary of State committed us only. to an examination

of the problem.)

Recommendation

2. I recommend that we inform the Home Office that the

police need no longer keep the premises of the Bank of China

and the private house where the Bank staff live under sur-

veillance.

Argument

3. There are at present 81 officers, uniformed and plain

clothes, employed in surveillance duties (42 at the Mission,

19 at the New China News Agency staff house in Hampstead,

14 at the Bank of China staff house in Spaniard's Close, and

6 at the Bank of China.) The Commissioner of Police has been

pressing the Home Office strongly for some relief from this

burden. He points out that we are moving into the time of

/year,

CONFIDENTIAL

year, the Christmas shopping period, when police duties are

in any case heavy; and that the Vietnam demonstrations and

industrial unrest at the docks and at Fords at Dagenham

have been making extra calls on his resources.

Moreover,

officers employed in surveillance have very little to do

since the Chinese are making few trips; and boredom is bað

for morale.

4. The surveillance is not intended in itself to be a

sanction against the Chinese. It is our means of enforcing

the five-mile limit which we imposed on the Chinese immediately

after the sacking of our Office in Peking.

There is every

indication that if we did not enforce it in this way the

Chinese, who have described the restriction as illegal, would

simply disregard it. On 8 October, three members of the

N.C.N.A. and one from the Chinese Ocean Shipping Corporation

attempted to do so to visit the s.s. Hangchow at Tilbury

docks and were turned back. To have imposed this restriction

and not to enforce it would simply make us ridiculous in the

eyes of the Chinese and expose us to criticism from public

opinion here.

5. We are engaged in a review of our restrictions on the

Chinese here in relation to Chinese restrictions on our

Mission in Peking. But it is almost certainly too soon for

a unilateral modification of our restrictions, including the

five-mile limit. Such a modification, if it were to be

decided on, would have to be part of a carefully thought out

programme which afforded reasonable expectation that a removal

/of

CCKFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

· 3-

This would in any case

of restriction on our side would be matched by improved

treatment for our Office in Peking.

take time to work out. It will not therefore give the early

relief for which the police ask.

6. If therefore we cannot contemplate an immediate lifting

of our five-mile limit, can we accept less than 100% effec-

tive enforcement? As long as the restriction applies, we

must be seen at the diplomatic Mission itself to be in a

position to apply it effectively. Any thinning out at

Portland Place would rapidly come to the attention of the

British press who would require some explanation and justi-

fication. I doubt also if we can accept anything less than

complete enforcement in the case of N.C.N.A. They have

already shown that they are ready to flout the restriction;

they are the propagandists and the principal troublemakers,

and they would be ready to take the maximum advantage of any

slackening on our part.

7. It is, however, clearly desirable that we should try to

go some way to ease the police burden. I suggest therefore

that we tell the Home Office that the police need no longer

keep the Bank of China officials living at Spaniard's Close

and the Bank of China premises under surveillance. This

would mean a saving of 20 policemen out of a total of 81.

As far as we know the Bank of China officials have stuck to

their commercial business. Moreover, it is unlikely that

the removal of surveillance on them would attract public

The Home Office could be asked to ensure that

attention.

the ordinary uniformed police on the beat made some show of

CONFIDENTIAL

/keeping

CONFIDENTIAL

keeping both the office and the private house under some

measure of surveillance.

8. We are unlikely to get any credit from the Chinese for

this partial removal of surveillance which they will not

regard as an easing of our restrictions. But it would help

our relations with the Home Office whose co-operation we

shall continue to need in this respect. To judge from my

conversations with Mr. James, they would probably be satisfied

with it as showing our appreciation of the difficulties under

which the police are working.

The

Mr. Burley of the Immigration Department of the Home

Office has not taken up Mr. James's suggestion to get in

touch with me about relief for the immigration service.

only additional task the immigration services have undertaken

as a result of our restrictions is to provide immigration

officers with a list of the Chinese who are not allowed to

leave the country without special authority. There can be

no question of our relieving them now or in the immediate

future of this not very considerable burden.

for Humay

(James Kurray)

26 October, 1967.

Now overtaken key events on which sefante su Sansion has been prefame.

مهر

ра

The > N.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTI AL

Far Eastern Department

Chinese in Britain

RECEIVED IN AR: FIVES No.31

1967

1 FC 3/201

When he called on the Foreign Secretary this morning the Home Secretary asked if we would consider easing the present burden on the Police who were keeping very many Chinese under surveill- ance. He asked in particular whether surveillance could be removed from the N.C.N.A. staff house in Hampstead and the Bank of China.

100

2. Mr. Brown said he would have this question examined urgently. He certainly did not wish to prolong um.ecessarily the extra work the Police had to undertake. The Secretary of State commented to me afterwards that he would see dfficulty about the N.C.N.A. staff house, but he would like the depart- ment to see whether the number of Police watching this house and the Bank of China could in any way be reduced. Was it still necessary, for example, to keep a 24-hour watch.

Please submit on this.

c.c. P.S. to Mr. Rodgers

P.S. to P.U.S.

Mr. Hohler

Aformaitrand

(D.J.D. Maitland) 20 October. 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

O.C.

P.S. to P.U.S.

безро

FC 3/20 (w.100 Retained for Min. below-

CONFIDENTIAL

Far Eastern Department.

Chinese in 2 itain

When he called on the Foreign Secretary this morning the Home Secretary asked if we would consider essing the present burden on the Police who were keeping very many Chinese under surveill- He asked in particular whether surveillance could be removed from the N.C.N.A, staff house in Hampstead and the Bank of China.

ance.

2. Mr. Brown said he would have this question examined urgently. He certainly did not wish to prolong unnecessarily the extra work the Police had to undertake. The Secretary of State commented to me afterwards that he would see difficulty about the N.C.N.A. staff house, but he would like the depart- ment to see whether the number of Police watching this house and the Bank of China could in any way be reduced, Was it still necessary, for example, to keep a 24-hour watch.

Please submit on this.

(D.J.D. Maitland) 20 October. 1967.

See 10

ра

P.S. to ir. Rod, ers P.S. to P.US Mr. Hohler

FED you

ды

sither

Surely for

'surveillek

don't (cf.

CONFIDENTIAL

care

Maclear)

пись

22/1

Our reference: QFB.20/13/3

reference:

HOME OFFICE

Horseferry House, Dean Ryle Street, LONDON S.W.I

Telephone: Victoria 6655, ext.

RECEIVED IN

20th October, 1967

Dear Murray,

*ARCHIVES No.3

1967

FC3/201

I think you will know that the Home Secretary discussed with the Foreign

Secretary this morning how the burden on the police and the immigration service

could be reduced. (The attached note indicates the extent of the polics

commitment and I think you know of the additional responsibilities placed on the immigration service.) The outcome of this talk was that the Foreign Secretary

agreed that the present requirements for the police and immigration services should be reduced and I have been asked to get in touch with you immediately to ascertain where the reductions in police strengths can now be effected.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Burley in order that he may, necessary, give you further details relating to the immigration service.

Yours sincerely,

ŔH James

J. Murray, Esq.

E.R.

FC3/20 w.99

Surveillance of Chinese Officials

Surveillance is being undertaken by the Metropolitan police as follows:-

(a) Diplomatic Mission,

49 Portland Place, W.1.

(b) Private House, 3 Spaniards Close,

N.W.11.

Chinese

Involved

Special Branch

Uniform

Branch

26 Ferncroft Avenue, N.W.3

Six Special Branch officers are also employed on duties connected with the Bank of China in Cannon Street.

2. The total police strength is therefore 94 officers; the Commissioner 74 is withdrawing 13 uniformed officers from duty at the Mission, thereby reducing the total strength to 81.

-'3

3. The duties at the private house are particularly negative as the four Chinese are followed in the morning to the Bank of China where they work and escorted back in the evening. Surveillance of the Chinese at the news agency is particularly irksome as they move within central London quite frequently. If the police could be relieved of both these duties, 33 officers (including 12 from Special Branch) would be released. Further savings could be achieved if there was less strict surveillance of the Mission.

Cypher/Cat A

FLASH PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 208

CONFIDENTIAL

2 November 1967

Your telegram No. 942.

Following for de la Mare.

CONFIDENTIAL

1967

FC-3/201

Fespo

3/2

Am still strongly in favour of alternative (b). Alternative (a) risks spoiling the ship for a ha-porth of tar. My reasons are as follows:

(1)Reciprocity in terms of conditions of life is really not

obtainable as between Peking and London and we have for a number of years accepted this as unavoidable;

(11)Course (a) would still not represent a full return to status quo

ante and therefore would be unlikely to elicit a full response from the Chinese;

(111)Course (a) would still be represented by the Chinese as

discriminatary whereas treatment in course (b) would bring them into line I suppose with other Communist Missions;

(iv)In the end what matters is not so much the extent of Chinese travel in England as retentions by us of ultimate control of exit visas;

(v)In my case there is no real reciprocity at present and for

presentation to public opinion at home it would in fact seem simpler to go for a return to status quo rather than to construct artificial copy of Chinese restrictions here;

(vi)Whatever we do, although we have reasonable expectations of a Chinese response, this is in fact as act of faith. There

seems little point of prejudicing its success by taking it in two stages.

2. In any event I presume it is intended that level of police surveillance should also revert to status quo ante. This is an essential part of the gesture as it has apparently caused disproportionate resentment on the part of the Chinese.

Mr. Hopson

FILES

F.o. Ha. F.E.D.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

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P.U.S.S.(kr. Rodgers reciprocity. By lifting

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Sir D. Allen

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CONFIDENTIAL Saperah Subation

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CONFIDENTIAL

FC-3/20 (97)

TOP COPY

Cypher/Cat.A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE

elno. 942

CONFIDENTIAL

Your telegram No. 194.

TO PEKING

1 November 1967 (F.E.D.)

Following from de la Mare.

In the light of your views we are on the point of recommending to Ministers that the time has now come for a fairly substantial relaxation of restrictions on our part.

There remains the question of what form it should take. We might:-

(a) extend the present 5-mile limit to 12 miles (plus certain holiday attractions), i.e. the restrictions pertaining in Peking before the sacking of the Mission;

(b) return to our previous 35-mile limit.

3. Course (b) would minimise further controversy with the Chinese and would be the most likely to prompt some gesture on their part. However course (a) would be an attempt to show that we expected exact reciprocity and, as such, good ground on which to take our stand both with the Chinese and public opinion here. gives some flexibility in that if the Chinese go some way but not far enough in their initial response we have something left in rescrve Moreover it may be easier to justify to people here who may have some doubts about the wisdom of removing completely the August travel restrictions until we have had some response from the Chinese side. Our preference is therefore for course (a). If however you have strong views on this, I should be glad to have them by 10 a.m. G.M.T. tomorrow.

3. We must of course retain the requirement for exit permits.

SOSFA

Sea -98 вес

FILES

F.E.D.

SSSSS

CONFIDENTIAL

1850 1/6)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.

DEPARTMENT F.E.D.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

FC3/20

PRIORITY MARKINGS

(Date)

⚫ Date and time (G.M.T.) lelegram should

reach addresson(s)

yu..

Despatched £330

Top SetTer Secret

Confidential

Boutine

CoreTMTMTM

Cypher

Prafi Telegram to:-

XX FEKING

No.

(Date)

And to:-

9.42

1/4

Security classification -if any

[Codeword-if any]

Addressed to

telegram No.

And to

repeated for information to

- SILP

CONFIDENTIAL

- -

(date)

LIE-JUIM

take p

DIVI DIE

Repeal to:-

Saving to:-

Distribution:-

FILES

Kr. de la Kare

P.E.D. Copies to:-

Saving to

Your telegram No. 194.

Following from de la Mare.

In the light of your views we are on the

point of recommending to Kinisters that the time

has now come for a fairly substantial relaxation

of restrictions on our part.

There remains the question of what form it

should take. We right

(a) extend the present 5-mile limit to

12 miles (plus certain holiday

attractions), i.e. the restrictions

pertaining in Peking before the

sacking of the Mission; or

(b) return to our previous 35-mile limit.

3. Course (b) would minimise further controversy

with the Chinese and would be the most likely to

prompt some gesture on their part. However

course (a) would be an attempt to show that we

exact

expected¿reciprocity, and, as such, good ground

on which to take our stand both with the Chinese

and public opinion here. It gives some flexibility

/in

CONFIDENTIAL

in that if the Chinese go some way but nor far enough in their

initial response we have something left in reserve,

Koreover

it may be easier to justify to people here who may have some

doubts about the wisdom of removing completely the August travel

restrictions until we have had some response from the Chinese

wide. Our preference is therefore for course (a). If however

on this,

you have strong views/I should be glad to have them by 10 a.m.

G.X.T. tomorrow.

We must of course retain the requirement for exit permits.

Files Dista

Mis

Nar.

(2) D

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.$1

1967

| PC-3/20

FLAG

FLAG B

PLAG

FLAG D

FLAG A

Ir. Denson

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference

196

Please see the Note of 10 October from the Office of the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires which requests an extension of stay in Britain for Mr. Wang Tuan-sheng of the N.C.N.A.

2. Our position on the question of granting extensions of stay to similar people was explained by Mr. Bolland to Kr. Burley of the Home Office in the former's letter of 20 September.

3. On Mr. Bolland's submission of 26 September Mr. Hohler approved the granting of similar applications to members of the ex-patriate staff of the Bank of China.

The annex to Mr. Murray's submission of 3 October lists measures in force against British Subjects in China and against the Chinese in London and gives possible lines of further action.

Until the general position is reviewed I do not think a decision on the individual application can be made.

Mr Murim

Калам

(E.J. Sharland) 20 October, 1967

9 agree.

Lov in consider in

the

context of restrictimis

While

Jon Pensa

25x

When Mr Burly was here at a

Ance

ace turg

eacher this month, cliel we not agree

that extensions of stay shantel be granted

laimited percool.

His point was

Chament

that it was unchstable that Chinese

should be in this country "llegally"

For

My Mundung

MrBenson

CONFIDENTIAL

A 2600.

I have spoken to Mr. Builey who has

MuY

bem mitending to write to

you

ami

asks

me hm.

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на деловой

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AÉSTRICTED

32.1Q

RCEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.311

3-HCV 1967

Mr che le Mya

Mr. Dengon

E.3/20.

Mr. Mufray

~Fei/27 (c)

Flagiti

Flag3.

F21/2(5

A...

Reference.

...................... - -- -- ---

FC 2/2095

The Handling of Chinese Foreign Policy

The attached two lettera are of considerable interest and very relevant to our own problema with the Chinese. The new regulations about dealing with Foreign Missions (FCI/27) make it clear that more moderate elements in the Chinese leadership have taken a firm grip on the conduct of foreign relations and intend to make this known. The decrease in influence of Yao Teng-shan points in the same direction (FC1/2).

2. I think these lettera add force to what Peking have recently been saying about finding some way out of the present impasse, The trouble is that, although the moderate elements in the leadership are taking a grip on the affairs there is no particular reason why they should go out of their way to be friendly towards the British and many reasons why they should be cautious of doing so. This means, I think, that it is up to us to make some moves which will force the Chinese to reciprocate, It is quite possible that the atmosphere in Peking is still such that the Foreign Ministry will be unwilling to enter into anything seeming like negotiations with us. The best method of reducing restrictions on both sides may therefore be to put proposals to the Chinese and they only need to answer by deed rather than in words.

سنا

of Wong Li and

be hitched to

(D.C. Wilson) 27 October, 1967

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(FC 3/20)

RESTRICTED

Fc.3/20 1941

FOREIGN OFFICE, 8.W.1.

1 November 1967

Thank you for your letter of 24 October saying that you had not yet received a copy of the Note we sent to the Chinese here about travel restrictions. I think it must have been one of the pieces of paper we avoided sending you in the days when we thought that bag services were likely to be interrupted for a long time and there would be nowhere to put material, even when a bag did arrive,

I am now enclosing a copy of the Note in question, dated 24 August. As you will know from our telegram No. 879 of 13 October, we sent a further Note to the Chinese on 12 October setting out in rather more detail the categories of persons to whom the travel restrictions applied.

3. I will try to make sure that you are sent copies of any further Important Notes. You will probably have noticed that we have recently been sending the text of most of our Notes en olair to you in Peking so that the Chinese have the opportunity to read them without relying on the good offices of their Mission here,

P. Cradock, Esq., PEEING.

مع

RESTRICTED

(D. C. Wilson)

Far Eastern Department

Cypher/Cat.A

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

1- NOV 1967

(93

F2.3/20

Tèlno. 194

30 October 1967

NFIDENTIAL

fee -192

My immediately preceding telegram.

p.a.

Following for de la Mare.

To lift surveillance on China's staff would be so slight a Concession as to be meaningless. We have no analogous agency here. Nearest parallel is Bank staff in Shanghai who are not (repeat not) under surveillance. With greatest goodwill Chinese

Absence of

would be hard put to find a reciprocal gesture. overseas trade on the part of Bank staff is an odd and misleading criterion for distinguishing between them and their compatriots. Discrimination in favour of Bank may give Chinese misleading impression that all we are concerned about are our commercial interests whereas I take it our object is to relieve this Mission from an intolerable situation and lead the way to a general détente.

2. For reasons given in my immediately preceding telegram concession must be substantial enough to have meaning to Chinese and to point the way to reciprocal concession affecting this Kission. The only worthwhile move would be to relax movement restrictions on all (repeat all) official Chinese staff. We would retain ultimatum but there is no [2 grps. undec.). If that is impossible we might as a bad second lift the movement restrictions on staff of Bank and commercial office. This might again leave impression all we cared about were our trading interests but it would have bearing on our Mission and might lead to the release of e.g. the Peters family as well as the Igrp.undec.] in Shanghai. If even this is ruled out we must at least lift movement restrictions not just surveillance, on the Bank staff.

As regards modalities, lifting of surveillance alone is just not worth telling the Chinese about. If, as I earnestly hope, we are able to offer a substantial concession we must recognize that there is no (repeat no) hope of thereby engaging the Chinese in a discussion on a mutual lifting of restrictions. They will never explain themselves in rational terms. The only way is to inform them of our decision and await a reciprocal move. In order to shorten the interval between our gesture and any response I suggest that we inform them several days in advance of the actual lifting of restrictions. There should be no public announcement.

I agree that in view of your problem with Shenping it would be better to make main moves in Peking merely keeping Shenping's office informed. I could obtain an interview with Mr. Hsueh and in reporting our decision I could add we hoped this would lead to a return to more normal relations.

Mr. Hopson

FILES

F.0. Hd. §.E.D.

P.S.

P.S. Dept.

P.U.S.

Sir D. Allon Fr. de la Mare

Sir C. Crowe

Hr. I.E. Allen

P.U.S.S. (Mr. Rodgers) Hd. Personnel Dept.

CONFIDENTIAL

SSSSS

CONFIDENTIAL

her/Cat A

IMMEDIATE PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 193

CONFIDENTIAL

F23/20/91

Your telegram No. 916.

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

192

1- NOV 1967

Fe-3/20

"Taken with accous.

бившевной Seperate Subeefsion

30 October 1967

pay

·FC. 3/20/89.

You

Following for de la Mare.

Your telegram under reference which crossed my telegram No. 189 about implications of Sino Indonesian settlement has caused me deep disappointment and concern. I am disappointed at the meagre proposal put forward which seems to me almost worthless as it stands and concerned at its apparent lack of comprehension of our situation and its urgency. Nor do we draw jointly from knowledge of the episodes partly motivated by a shortage of policemen in London.

I will not repeat here all arguments I have already advanced by letter and telegram in favour of a unilateral and general lifting of British representative restrictions in London, but salient facts are as follows:

(a) Her Majesty's Government imposed new movement restrictions

and police surveillance on Chinese in London immediately after attacks on our Office in Peking;

(b)

It was only then that the Chinese retaliated by imposing much more severe movement restrictions on us, cancelling existing exit visas and instituted a freeze on exit visa applications;

and 2 pregnant wives the Chinese Foreign Ministry have so far refused all other exit visa applications even on urgent medical grounds and had made it clear that the freeze will continue until restrictions in London are lifted;

(d) Her Majesty's Government have so far felt inhibited from

making a unilateral gesture of this magnitude "in present circumstances" (reference is made to Grey, Watt and Knight none of whom are directly related to our problem see paragraph 3 below). But the situation has now changed and present circumstances are more favourable i.e. apart from Chinese hint that they would favour relaxation of restric- tions providing we make first move there is a general return to reason in Chinese internal and external policies, need for cala with Canton fair impending, departure of Hangchow from London;

/(c) [sic] Unless

CONFIDENTIAL

PEKING TELEGRAM NO. 193 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Unless we grasp the nettle now we therefore face prospect of sitting it out here indefinitely with our women folk and small children some of whom are in need of urgent evacuation on medical grounds (Blishem family) with morale inevitably falling and possibility of a reversion to disorder here and therefore of opportunity of settlement slipping through our fingers.

I hope these considerations have been fully explained to Minister. Detention of Grey is as you know specifically related to Journalists in Hong Kong. Watt is Sui Generis and (for your own information) may have been doing local trafficking of some kind. Knight is to be subject of separate talks on Hong Kong border. It is important that we should keep all these problems separate from that of the normalisation of our own position. If we try to solve everything at once we shall probably solve nothing. But in all these cases any détente in Anglo Chinese relations is likely to help rather than hinder.

In the light of above I hope you will reconsider your whole approach to this problem. The real "straw in the wind" is that Chinese have as good as told us how to get out of this situation and revert to normal, Are we really going to ignore their signal? It is no good expecting any prior relaxation from Chinese side. They can afford to sit it out more or less indefinitely if necessary. We cannot. I realise that it sticks in our gullets to make first move but hard fact is that unless we do so deadlock will continue and may get worse.

What it boils down to is a choice between:

(a) Seizing present favourable opportunity to make a sub-

stantial concession in the reasonable expection that it will lead to a thaw or

(b) embarking on a contest of force for which we are ill-

equipped with its attendant risks that the opportunity will be lost and with its serious implications for health and morale of our staff,

open.

If we choose second course I hope we do so with our eyes

/6. Comments on your

CONFIDENTIAL

PENG TELEGRAM NO. 193 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

6. Comments on your report of the Chinese proposal are in my immediately following telegram.

Mr. Hopson.

FILES

F.0. Hd. F.E.D.

P.S.

PSD.

P.U.S.

P.U.S.S. (Mr. Rodgers)

Sir D. Allen.

Mr. de la Mare.

Sir C. Crowe.

Mr. M.E. Allen.

Hd. Personnel Dept.

DDDDD

CONFIDENT IA L

Vr. Denso

Mr. Murray

Wurz

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference...

Fe 3/20 w.91

Flag (91)

Sino-Indonesian Relations

I think Mr. Hopson is correct in saying in his telegram No. 189 of 30 October that the way in which the Chinese have handled the closing of their Mission in Jakarta shows that less "revolutionary" and more pragmatic and subtle elements are again operating in the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

2. The events connected with the sending of ■ Chinese air- craft to Indonesia to pick up Embassy staff are further evidence to support this thesis. The Chinese had previously made two demands that they should be allowed to send an air- craft to Jakarta to fly back members of their Embassy staff who had been wounded. On both occasions the Indonesians refused. The Indonesians finally said that members of the Chinese Wission would only be allowed to leave Jakarta when they received assurances that Indonesian diplomata from Peking had left China. We do not know how it was finally arranged to send a Chinese aircraft to Jakarta carrying the remaining staff from the Indonesian Babassy, but it looks as though this could only have been a suggestion from the Chinese side. If so, it is a move which they would almost certainly not have taken at any time during the revolutionary fervour of the last few months. It provided a shếc way out for the Indonesiana (which they hardly expected) and it made sure that no incidents should occur at airports before the Indonesians left China.

3. The way in which the Chinese have handled this affair is encouraging from our point of view and suggests, I think, that it may be possible to arrange some carefél bargaining for the exchange of both Mr. Grey and Inspector Knight.

ساد۵

(D. C. Wilson)

1 November 1967

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John Densen

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CONFIDENTIAL

zw.

3038 1/1

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat..

IMMEDIATE -EKING

Telno. 189

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

30 October 1967

seperate mefist

My telegram No. 187.

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31.

30 OCT 1967

√x: FC 3/20

Chinese acceptance of suspension of diplomatic relations with Indonesia and mutual withdrawal of diplomatic staffs is of obvious interest with reference to our present position.

This decision must have been highly unpalatable to Chinese who will seem to be abandoning their large overseas community in Indonesia but became almost inevitable after attack on Chinese Embassy in Djakarta on 1 October and wounding of most of Embassy staff.

2. That is encouraging in the sense that it indicates Chinese Foreign Ministry is once again able to take difficult decisions and is apparently trying to restore some order in foreign relations even when it entails a tactical retreat. We should however be unwise to draw more general conclusions and apply them to our own case.

3. The Indonesians in fact gained their objective by extreme violence leaving Chinese virtually no choice in the matter unless they were willing to abandon their Embassy staff to mercy of Indonesian mobs, Such weapons are not available to us. Secondly yhr Indonesian objective goes beyond ours; They wanted complete suspension of relations whereas it is our interest to restore normality as far as possible.

I trust therefore that the Indonesian example will not be understood as arguing for increasing pressure on the Chinese in London. We do not have the means to make this effective. The Chinese would further limit our activities here. And the final result of this mutual escalation would be to make any solution except a total suspension of relations extremely difficult.

5, As I reported in my telegram No.166 the Chinese have as good as told me the way out 1.e. by lifting restrictions in London. They have a technical point in that these were imposed before they announced the present restrictions on us in Peking. This indicates that they wish to get off the hook themselves. I have already emphasised that the present moment, with the Canton Fair impending and the general trend of Chinese policy returning to reason and normality is particularly favourable to a settlement. But this favourable period may not last. Nor should we assume Chinese leadership is united on these issues. Moderates will require encouragement in the shape of gestures from us.

/6. I do not think

CONFIDENTIAL

Peking telegram No. 189 to Foreign Office

- 2.

I do not think further correspondence would help. Ch-en Yi has not replied to your letter. He has been ill and

out of things for some time. This is a case where actions are likely to be more effective than words thus avoiding mutual

polemics about incidents over which I suspect the Chinese leaders would like to draw a veil.

Mr. Hopson

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

F.E.D.

SSSSS

CONFIDENTI AL

a bavid

FC 3/20110

office of the British

Charge d'Affaires,

PEKING.

24 October, 1967

-FC-3/3/119.

We received in the last ag a copy of the Foreign Office Note of 23 August to the Chinese Office in London on the subject of exit permits. We do not seem to have received a copy of the Note restricting their movements in London. It would be helpful if you could let us have this and copies of any similar communications.

Yours wer

•FC. 3/3/121. Lace

ім

(P. Cradock)

F. Div. Please locate

D. C. Wilson, Esq., Far Eastern Department, FOREIGN OFFICE.

allache (12

F.D.

Dft

reply, pleqy copy of -121.

pelgo

The.

.35

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21.

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* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should

reach addressee(s)

Registry No.

DEPARTMENT

SECU

FI€3/20

CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret Scoret Confidential

PRIORITY MARKINGS

(Date)

}

Priority

Despatched

COPY

NOTHING TO BE WRitten in THIS MARGIN

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

EXCiatt.

Cypher

Draft Telegram to:-

No,

PEKING

916

[Security classification] -if any

Privacy marking --if any

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CONFIDENTIAL

------ri

JJILLIII. PPLAND

...amman temPRO

...

[PEKING

Addressed to

telegram No...

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(Date) 27/10 repeated for information to

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SIGNATURE

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Your telegram 166.

awation

1. http|P-

Following from de la Mare.

F222/7/30 Cat official lively

We have for some time been considering the possibility of a quiet unilate lifting of the

restrictions against the Chinese in London.

Your

unilaterally

letter of 20 October also refers. There is → think no question of our being able to get agreement to relax the restrictions on the mission proper

ind on NCNA, evonifat

to-propose, this which

Teu para 3 below)s

"k-devel we wished

not prepared to do.

=of

the moment. But the Home Office have been representing to us the cost to cum in(manpower maintaining surveillance over all the official

are. Chinese here and we have been considering the

possibility of taking the

Ro Burveillance off

the members of the Bank of China [bon st their

rosić

in Hampstead and at the office.

/would

This

INL002009

would release about a quarter of the total

police force now engaged on these duties.

2. Our reason for picking the Bank of China

Refficials se our first possible step in

relaxation is that we consider them to be on a

rather different footing from the mission proper and the NCNA in that They have shown no overt sign of animosity, have made no

trouble

and give the appearance of wanting

to be left in peace to get on with their

legitimate business laetivities]

Our own

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

170072711.2

business interests have been representing

to us forgoma time that we should ease

the restrictions on them.

Therefor

3. Ihad some time ago) suggested to

Ministers that the policy we should aim at in-relation to the Chinase was reciprocity by

relaxation rather than by escalation, but although this was accepted as a general

principle it was thought too early to put it into practice in the light of the Grey, Watt (and Knight)cases and of the stringent

now

restrictions still placed upon you and your

staff.

I am considering advising that the matter

* be reviewed. A possible straw in the

wind on the Chinese side is that after a

long-silence they are now letting it be known

to certain United Kingdom business firma that

they will be welcome at the Canton Fair (full- details of this as soon as available wil""

be telegraphed to you). Although this can

hardly be construed as a Chinese relaxation

it could be used as the occasion for us to

show a little "give". We cannot yet show.

/this

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

013004 Gp.25.1

consider

going

this to the commercial members of the mission

proper but we could withdraw pelic surveillance

مدله

on the Bank of China officials and at the

same time-let them know that any applications

by them to travel outside the five mile

radius would be sympathetically considered,

We should have of course to maintain the visa

requirement for exit from this country.

5. If Ministers are prepared to proceed "

with this how do you think that we should put

it to the Chinese? One possibility is simply

to remove the police restrictions and say

nothing.

Another is to tell the Chinese.

will

that we are doing so,, explain that we can go

further it

no sleuing, ub they show some sign

reaprouty

of willin mese to relax their own restri

tione, and repeat the offer which I have already

made on several occasions to the Chinese

mission here to discuss the diamantling of restrictions in general Eas

I am not in favour of the first

alternative because I think that the Chinese

would simply take the concession as a right

I am by no and give us no credit for it.

means sure that they will give us any credit even if we adopt the second alternative. But I think at least that we should try to

get the thought into the Chinese offici ? mind that we are prepared to be Bensible and

that if they want to be sensible too we ein

make some headway, vde mutual retraži

If Qizving testdod ta withdr

the Bank of Thing af

were to say anything to the Chinese do you think it better to say it here or in Feking?

1710 71.2~

/The

PHL033009 (36.843

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

The problem about saying it here is as you

know that it has so far been impossible to

have any rational business discussion with

Shen P'ing. Do you think that you night

fare better at your end?

8 If all this is agreed, and you will

understand that it is subject to ministerial

approval, I would not propose to make any public announcement, although the fact that we

had withdrawn our surveillance on the Bank

of China would almost immediately become

public knowledge. Our objective would be not,

repeat not, to give too open an impression

that we were trying to capitalise on the

concession we had made, but at the same time

but

in answer to questions, whather in the prees cast qualismanty to inject the thought that the matching of a little sense on one side

Could

with

a little sense on the other or did up

to a lot of sense in the end.

27/10

►

Files Xerox + 9

FED

In Me & Mave

I the Bodling

1 2144 SADR

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.

DEPARTMENT

FE. FE3/201

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION PRIORITY MARKINGS

Top Secret

(Date).......

• Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should

reach addressec(a)

Despatched

Confidential

Priority

Unaided

100

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

EXLITH.

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Draft Telegram to:-

PEKING

No...

916

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11/20

PILIJJILL.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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IIJJLI ----. 11 TROPI

IL-LILI

(Date) 27/10 repeated for information to

And to:-

LIILI LII LIII TIL

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Saving to:-

Your telegram 166.

Following from de la Mare.

at official level

We have for some time been considering the

possibility of a quiet unabateret lifting of the

restrictions against the Chinese in London.

Your

unilaterally

letter of 20 October also refers. There is ♣

thimic no question of our being able to get agreement

to relax the restrictions on the mission proper

on NCNA, evenit:

Distribution:- Files

Mu de la Mare FE.D.

Copies to:-

steveż we wished

this which 1 a... 1

"not prepared to do a

(see porn 3 below)

the mos

7 But the Home Office have been

representing to us the cost t

(manpower) ir

maintaining surveillance over all the official

are

Chinese here and we have been considering the

possibility of taking those surveillance off

the members of the Bank of Chinasboth at timpang ga

EXAMINED AT /3400/27/10 residence in Hampstent ant at the office. 1720777192

SIGNATURE

/would

This

Tof

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

DL033009 Gr.343

would release about a quarter of the total

police force now engaged on these duties.

2. Our reason for picking the Bank of China

Dèfficials as our first possible step in

Jí

palexation is that we consider them to be on a

rather different footing from the mission

proper and the NCNA in that They have shown

no overt sign of animosity, have made no

trouble, and give the appearance of wanting

to be left in peace to get on with their

legitimate business (eetivities) Our own

business interests have been representing

to us to pee that we should ease

the restrictions on them.

Therefore

I//some time ago suggested to

Kinisters, that the policy we should aim at

in-relation to the Chinese was reciprocity by

relaxation rather than by escalation, but

although this was accepted as a general

principle it was thought too early to put it

into practice in the light of the Grey, Watt

and Knight) cases and of the stringent restrictions still placed upon you and your

staff.

I am considering advising that the matter

be reviewed. A possible straw in the

wind on the Chinese aide is that top t

long silence they are now letting it be known

to certain United Kingdom business firms that

they will be welcome at the Canton Fair (full

details of this as soon as available will

be telegraphed to you).

Although this can

17907?7102

hardly be construed as a Chinese relaxation

it could be used as the occasion for us to

show a little "give".

We cannot yet show /thie

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

17A 71-3=

04.033009 G6363

Insider going

this to the commercial members of the mission

proper but we could withdraw pali surveillance

also

on the Bank of China officials and at the

sume time-let them know that any applicatione

by them to travel outside the five mile

would

radius w be aympathetically considered.

Glit

We should have of course to maintain the visa

requirement for exit from this country,

5. If Ministers are prepared to proceed

with this how do you think that we should put

it to the Chinese? One possibility is simply

to remove the police restrictions and say

nothing. Another is to tell the Chinese will

that we are doing so,,explain that we on SO

further it

"en" ddeung, w they show some sign

reciprocity

of willinfnene to palax their om rastrie

siese, and repeat the offer which I have already

made on several occasions to the Chinese

mission here to discuss the dismantling of restrictions in general, Emb

I am not in favour of the first

alternative because I think that the Chinese

would simply take the concession as a right

and give us no credit for it. I am by no

means sure that they will give us any credit

even if we adopt the second alternative.

But I think at least that we should try to

get the thought into the Chinese s

mini that we are prepared to be sensible and

that if they want to be sensible too we can

our mutual relationes)

If Дhaving decided to w

make some headway, Em

-on the Bank of

were to say anything to the Chinese do you

think it better to say it here or in Peking?

/The

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

DL133009 GA.143

The problem about saying it here is as you

know that it has so far been impossible to

have any rational business discussion with

Shen P'ing. Do you think that you might

fare better at your end?

8 If all this is agreed, and you will

understand that it is subject to ministerial

approval, I would not propose to make any

ic announcement, although the fact that we

had withdrawn our surveillance on the Bank

of China would almost immediately become

public knowledge. Our objective would be not,

repeat not, to give to open an impression

that we were trying to capitalise on the

concession we had made,but at the same time

in answer to questions, whether in the grees

pandiamanty to inject the thought that

be matching of a little sense on one side with

could be a little sense on the other hat 311 up

to a lot of sense in the end.

Files Xerox + 9

hin

27/10

FED

K. De és Have

เ

I the Badlig

1 Rug SADR

F2.3/20/89

CONFIDENTIAL

AMENDED DISTRIBUTION

31 OCTOBER,

1967

Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO PEKING

Telno 916 27 October, 1967 (F.E.)

CONFIDENTIAL

Your telegram No. 166.

Following from de la Mare.

We have for some time been considering at official level the possibility of a quiet lifting of the restrictions against the Chinese in London. Your letter of 20 October also refers. There is no question of our being able to get agreement unilaterally to relax the restrictions on the mission proper or on NCNA, (see paragraph 3 below). But the Home Office have been representing to us the manpower cost of maintaining surveillance over all the official Chinese here and we are considering the possib..... ility of taking surveillance off the members of the Bank of China. This would release about a quarter of the total police force now engaged on these duties.

Our reason for picking the Bank of China is that we consider them to be on a rather different footing from the mission proper and the NCNA. They have shown no overt sign of animosity, have made no trouble, and give the appearance of wanting to be left in peace to get on with their legitimate business. Our own business interests have been representing to us that we should ease the restrictions on them,

3. I therefore suggested to Ministers some time ago that the policy we should aim at was reciprocity by relaxation rather than by escalation, but although this was accepted as a general principle it was thought too early to put it into practice in the light of the Grey, Watt (and now Knight) cases and of the stringent restrictions still placed upon you and your staff.

4. I am considering advising that the matter be reviewed. ▲ possible straw in the wind on the Chinese side is that they are now letting it be known to certain United Kingdom business firms that they will be welcome at the Canton Fair (full details of this as soon as available will be tale- graphed to you). Although this can hardly be construed as à Chinese relaxation it could be used as the occasion for us to show a little "give". We cannot yet show this to the commercial members of the mission proper but we bould withdraw surveillance on the Bank of China officials and

CONFIDENTIAL

/also

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign Office telegram No. 916 to Peking

-2-

also let them know that any applications by them to travel outside the five mile radius would be sympathetically considered. We would have of course to maintain the exit visa requirement.

5. If Ministers are prepared to proceed with this how do you think that we should put it to the Chinese? One possibility is simply to remove the police restrictions and say nothing.

Another is to tell the Chinese that we are doing so, to explain that we will consider going further if they show some sign of reciprocity and to repeat the offer which I have already made on several occasions to the Chinese mission here to discuss the dis- mantling of restrictions in general.

6. I am not in favour of the first alternative because I think that the Chinese would simply take the concession as a right and give us no credit for it. I am by no means sure that they will give us any credit even if we adopt the second alternative. But I think at least that we should try to get the thought into the Chinese mind that we are prepared to be sensible and that if they want to be sensible too we can make some headway.

7. If we were to say anything to the Chinese do you think it better to say it here or in Peking? The problem about saying it here is as you know that it has so far been impossible to have any rational business discussions with Shon P'ing. Do you think that you might fare better at your end?

8. If all this is agreed, and you will understand that it is subject to ministerial approval, I would not propose to make any publio announcement, although the fact that we had withdrawn our surveillance on the Bank of China would almost immediately become publio knowledge. Our objective would be not, repeat not, to give too open an impression that we were trying to capitalise on the concession we had made, but at the same time, in answer to questions, to inject the thought that the matching of a little sense on one side with a little sense on the other could add up to a lot of sense in the end.

SOSRA

FILES

F.0. Head F.E.D.

Sir D.Allen

P.S.

P.8.D.

P.U.S.

bbbbb

Hr.de la Mare Sir.C.Crowe

Mr.M.E.Allen

P.U.8.9.(Mr.Rodgers) Head Personnel Dept

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFILLATIAL

(FC 3/20)

ද

20/10

ро

POREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

20 October, 1967.

pa the

You wrote to de la Mare on 11 October about an approach which Frank Kearton of Courtaulda had made on the possible desirability of relaxing our restraints on the Chinese ia London.

2. On Learton's instructions, Savill and Lambert, two senior members of the Courtaulės group, called on me on 17 Cetobar to discuss the problem. They made very much the same points cearton had made to you. They put the possible extent of Courtaulda' business in fibres and chemicals with China et about 13 millions for next year. They were, however, rather more specific than Kearton about their anxieties. They reported that their Chinese guests at luncheon had said that as a result of our restraints it had become impossible for the Chinese Gʻrice to do business; and that so long as it remained impossible to do business they could not negotiate Courtaulds' business for next year. Javill said that the Chinese were particularly irked by what they regarded as the "seige" of their office in Portland Pluce. He went on to question whether our five-mile limit was in any sense en effective sanction. He naked whether, even if we retained it, it was still necessary to have police surveillance on the present scale. He suggested that, since our policy of restraints was not producing satis- factory results, we might consider whether a relaxation on our part would bring some corresponding relaxation by the Chinese. He was, however, honest snough to admit that at no time in their conversation had the Chinese given any firm indication that this would be the case.

3. In the course of a fairly long and detailed conversation I made the following principal points:

(a) H.M.G. were most enxious that there should be no unnecessary impediments in the way of Anglo-Chinese trade and that conditions should be brought back to normal as soon as possible. We understood Courtaulds' concern about thei: business which was valuable n.t only to them but also as a contribution to our export figures. But Anglo-Chinese trade was only one aspect of Anglo-Chinese relations. The problem of restraints had to be viewed in the context also of the treatment of our Mission in sking and the situation in Kong Kong.

/(6)

G. J. NeoMahon, Esq., C.B., C.M.O.,

Board of Trade,

↑ Victoria Street, 8.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

Alen

26/0

•

CONFIDENTIAL.

- 2 -

(b) Conditions for our Mission remained intolerable. They were subject to restraints of a severity in no sense comparable to the restraints we imposed on the Chinese. Koreover a number of exit visas, applied for on medionl grounds, were being withheld. There was also the matter of Gray, the Reuters correspondent in detention in Peking. had only a very limited armoury with which to try to induce the Chinese to behave more correctly. Restraints on the Chinese kission were the only available sanction directly related to the treatment of our Mission in Peking.

It was understandable that we should wish to have reasonable grounde for expecting some relief for our Mission before we could contemplate removing the restraints on the Chinese Mission here.

(o) No doubt the Chinese found our surveillance at Fortland Place irksoze, and were determined to extract the naximm propaganda value from it. On the other hand I felt sure that for many people in this country the surveillance was welcome as evidence that we were not acquiescing in the treatment being meted out to our kission in Peking.

(d) If the five-mile limit were to be effective it had to be enforced; and we had good reason for believing that if they were not under surveillance, the Chinese would dis- regard it.

(e) Once restrictions had been relaxed it would be difficult to reimpose them even if there had been no Chinese response. Reisposition would be described by the Chinese as a new provocation and inke the situation worse than before.

די

(f) Chinese behaviour certainly did not facilitate our making concessions. Public opinion would, for example, find it difficult to understand any announcement of relaxation in restraints just after we had had to complain to the Chinese about the abduction of a British police inspector in Hong Kong.

(a) e accepted that our policy of restraints would not result in a public climb-down by the Chinese. But they had only to indicata by sysading up the grant of exit visas that they wanted a return to a more normal state of affairs, and we would be quick to respond. I hoped that when the Chinese complained to British businesssen about our restrictions, british businessmen would point out how easily the situation could be remedied.

(h) Our policy of restraints was under constant review in relation to the objects we wished to achieve.

Since Savill played up the warmth of the welcome which had been granted to their technicians who had recently gone to Lanchow, I thought it right to tell him that a British

/engineer

CLAYIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

engineer from another firm was at present under arrest in Lanchow and that we had been refused either information about him or consular acoses. (Lambert interrupted to say that he had heard about the trouble Viokers-Zinner were having.) I remarked that Courtaulds' approach to us right have been on different lines if they had bad the misfortune to have one of their engineers arrested and kept incommunicado for what was possibly no more than indiscretion. Savill emið that he fully understood this.

5. The whole conversation was cordial and I hope that I successfully steered a middle course, without on the one hand appearing to underestimate the importance of our trade, and in particular Courtaulds' trade, with China, and on the other under-playing the other aspects of which H... had to take account. (I admit however to a little irritation at one point at the implication that there was no need for undue concern about the treatment of our staff in Peking since this was an occupational hazard!) I expressed the hope that Savill and Lambert would assure Kearton that we were fully aware of the importance of their problem and ware constantly seeking ways out of the present impasse in our relations with China.

asked that they keep us in close touch with any developments in their own dealings with the Chinese Office here.

(Jansa Kurray) fur Zestern Lesartzent

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

27 OCT 1967

pla

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Dear de la Mare,

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.31

27 UCT 1967

F23/20

BOARD OF TRADE

1 VICTORIA STREET

LONDON S.W.1

CHINA

11th October, 1967

See -88

(86

Frank Kearton telephoned this morning. He began

He began by reminding me of Courtaulds very substantial interests in China, which involved not only participation in the acrylic fibre plant at Lanchow but also trade in fibres, chemicals etc. which is currently running at a rate of 22 million a year. He went on to say that two members of the Chinese Mission at Portland Place came to lunch with them at Celanese House yesterday. Courtaulds had

invited then two or three times recently, but this was the first time they had accepted. The two were (i) a man whose name sounded like "She" and who, according to Kearton, described himself as "Assistant Commercial Attache" but appeared to be of higher status, and (ii) "one of the Mr. Wangs". They were accompanied to and from the Celanese door by two plain-clothes men.

The Chinese had been invited to a friendly, non-business lunch and this is exactly what it was. They were very friendly non-polerical. There was no criticism of the restraints put on them, but only a rueful shrugging of the shoulders about the ways thing had developed. They did, however, leave Kearton with a strong impression that they would resat kinily if the restraints on them were quietly dropped, and it was this that Kaarton wanted to pass on to us. He thought that if they were dropped, things would soon return to normal at Portland Place.

I reminded Kearton (who did not need reminding) that the Chinese treatment of our people in Peking was incomparably worse than the restraints imposed on the Chinese in London and asked if the Chinese had given any indication that an easing-up in London would be reciprocated in Peking. He said he thought this would very likely happen, but he did not mention any statement made by the Chinese yesterday to support this view, He told me that after he had decided a few weeks ago to send to Lanchow the technicians who were then due to go he heard that this had been very well received in Peking, and he pointed out that almost immediately afterwards the Chinese agreed to release the children whose return to the U.K. had been delayed. (He did not claim that the two things were connected but pointed out that they might be.)

I thanked Kearton for letting us know of this, and told him I would pass on to you the information he had given

Kearton said the men they sent to Lanchow were very well treated on the long journey across China to Lanchow and in Lanchow since their arrival. Another ma 13 will be going out next week,

A.J. de la Mare, Esq., C.M.G.,

Foreign Office,

LONDON S. *. 1.

/I asked

I asked Kearton whether the Chinese were still doing business with Courtaulda. He said they had been told by the Chinese in London a few weeks ago that they were under instructions from Peking not to discuss any new business but at yesterday's lunch, after one of his colleagues had mentioned the question of new business and he had himself said the lunch was not for business taka, his guests had said that they would like to talk business but appreciated the opportunity for a friendly get-together and the business discussions could follow on a later occasion. Kearton also told me that the Lanchow project, which is a very big one, is going ahead very smoothly and when payment of 21.75 million fell due recently it was paid on the dot by the Bank of China. He added that Gourtaulds have fallen a bit behind themselves on some deliveries now due and are receiving quite normal communications from the Chinese asking them to hurry up.

I should be interested to know if you yet see any signs of a possible disentanglement with the Chinese. I realise, of course, that it takes two to make a peace (although only one can make a quarrel, as China has shown) and that the businessman's natural desire to see a return to normality so far as his own affairs are concerned is very far from being the whole story.

Yours sincerely,

Gereed

tas kushon.

G.J. Mackahon

Reference. VEDY INT

・中

臨85

·ARCHIVES No.31

1 OCT 1967

Fc 3/20

For BREACH OF TRAVEL

RESTRICTIONS

BY CHINESE

IN CONNECTION WITH THE

"HANGCHOW"

SEE FC21/6

folio 21 et seq.

し

E4 (4206)

FOR INFORMATION

FC 3/20

No. PC 10/8/2 T

The Foreign Office presents its

compliments to the Office of the

Chargé d'Affaires of the Feople's

Republic of China in London and has

the holour to acknowledge receipt of

their lote Ro. 10 34/67 of the

10th of October, 1967, enclosing the

Passport of Er. Tuan-Sheng WATG, which

is receiving attention.

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W-1-

10 October, 1967.

?PA

中華人民共和國駐英國代辦處

Office of the Chargé d'Affaires

of the People's Republic of China, London

No.ML034/67

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.31

12 JCT 1967

PC10/8/2 T SDIO/294

FC 3/28

49 Portland Place,

London, W.1.

Tel: LANgham 8951

The Office of the Chargé d'Affaires of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to the Foreign Office and has the honour to request that the enclosed passport be endorsed with extention of stay in Britain

for Mr. Wang Tuan-sheng, staff member of the Heinhua News Agency, who is working in London.

1967

Foreign Office, 85 Whitehall,

London, S.W.1.

中华人民

民共

代办处

↓

●/Cat

Co/Cat A

Copies

also enterest:

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY FELING

FENING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 146

13 October 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

FD13/8 FC22/7 (8

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

OCT 1967

! FC3000

по

Addressed to Foreign Orfice telegram No. 146 of 13 October. Repeated for information to Hong Long.

egram

Đang hong No. 1501 & gesture or amnesty by nong kong Government would be difficult at any time-end particularly so at present moment. The recent Chinese protest and accompanied publicity in Chinese Press reinrorces this point. I think we must wait in hope something in thin line may be possible it propitious moment annives.

dongchow incident also makes it less advisable to attempt any immediate relaxation or movement restrictions in London, By taking inititive now we might seem to be giving was to Chinese pressure and contact between Chinese Lubaɛay and Chinese ships Light lead to further trouble. Again it would seem better to wait until temperature has fallen slightly before asking a move.

3. In the meartime we saɛil continue to nomina the Chinese ca outstanding applications for exit visas on medical grounds. It may be hat they will allow women and children out in small numbers over a period. There is nowever a possibility that they may prefer to play the game as if the burning nad never occured. un this nypothesis tnes would be unreceptive to visa applications simply for women and children bes-gy grans exit visas for time- expired members of staff and their families if replacements were offered. See my immediately following telegram (not to all) for details. I do not think that the time as quite arrived for this last garbit but I think we should now be considering possible replacements so that we would be ready to day it at short No

Foreign Office pass to Hong Kong 51.

kr. nopsÛZ

bent 07202 13 October Neod 12092 13 October

[Repeated as requested)

YO/CC/H. DISERIBUTA

F.b.D.

Fersonnel Dept.

E.&O.D.

VELE

CONYIMANTIAL

3/20 (70·4/14)

OCKFIDENTIAL

D= PA Gali

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.V.1.

13 October, 1967.

Egotores

Offisial

You will be aware that a short while ago Protocol Department of the Foreign Office asked your Department to impose administrative delays on goeds being imported into Britain by the Office of the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires. The object of the exercise was to impress upon the Chinese that we regard their privileges here as being dependent upon similar facilities being available to our own Mission in Peking. There is the parallel question of sanctions against the export of goods by the Chinese Mission, in retaliation for the prevention by the Chinese authorities of the export of the personal affects of former members of our Kiasion in Peking.

2. Te are enquiring of the Home Office if it would be possible for the police to keep a watch for the despatch of goods from the Chinese Mission, so that we could warn you when such despatch was likely. If it were considered desirable, would it be possible for your Department to detain such goods, replying to any enquiries from the Chinese that your action was at our request?

I am sending a copy of this letter to James in the Home Office.

H. O'Neill, Esq.,

(James Murray) Ter Festera Pepartment

I.X. Čustoms and Exoies,

Port and Privilege ŝestion,

King'a Beam House,

10.3.

Mark Lane, R.C.3.

FIDENTIAL

19/10

CONFIDENTIAL

3/20 (20 4/14)

FOREIGN OFFICE, 8.#.1.

13/10

13 October, 1967.

Resiaroon) Restrictions on Chinese Personnel London

You will know from your conversations and correspondence with my predecessor that we are concerned to establish the principle of resiprosity in the treatment accorded to Chinese officials in London and our own in Peking. No progress has been made towards the packing or movement of the personal affacts of former members of the staff in Peking since the ban imposed by the Chinese Transportation Company in Kay, In consequenos we are looking into the feasibility of pre- venting the Chinese Mission here from exporting goods, should this be considered desirable. We are asking Customs whether they could hold such goode, provided that they know when they were about to be despatched. Would it be possible for the police, in the course of their watch on the various Chinese offices, to note the removal of any goods, either towards ports or sirfields, or to packing or shipping companies, so that the Customs could be informed?

2. I am sending a copy of this letter to O'Neill in H.M. Castoms and Sroise.

R. A. James, Esq.,

Horseferry House,

Dean Hyle Strest,

London, 9.7.1.

(Jonas Marray)

For Easter. Be-artment.

CONFIDEST

Mr. Denson

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference

RECEIVED I

HIVES No.31

1 OCT 1967

FAZEN

Flag A

Flag B

(para 6.)

Mr. Hupfag

FC3/20

Personal Effects held up in Peking and Pos8-

ible Retaliatory Action

Please see Mr. Cradock's letter of 20 September, in reply to a letter I wrote after receiving enquiries from individual officers.

2. No progress has been made towards the movement or packing of the personal effects of former members of the staff in Peking since the boycott of the Chinese Transportation Company on consignments leaving China by sea or land. Apart from the hardship caused to the Diplomatic Service personnel involved, our prestige vis-à-vis the Chinese is concerned, since Mr. Bolland specifically mentioned these goods when he saw Counsellor Ma on 11 September, and said that we would take similar action in London unless they were released. On the practical counts, therefore, action to prevent the official Chinese in London from exporting goods by sea is desirable. From the polit- ical side also such action would be a logical contin- uation of our policy of reciprocity, as far as poss- ible, between London and Peking, although it is not likely that the Chinese would be greatly affected, Since, so far as we know, they have little in the way of personal or official baggage which they might wish to export from Britain.

3. The great problem arises over the mechanics of physically preventing the Chinese from exporting goods. Protocol Department confirms that Customs Department do not normally check outgoing goods, and that the Office of the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires are not in the habit of informing Protocol Department, as a courtesy, before they ship goods. So long as the present situation lasts, however, and the police continue to keep a watch on the various Chinese Office in London, it should be possible for the police to see when any goods are moved for possible export. They could then warn Customs, who could impose delays and refer any queries from the Chinese to Far Eastern Department. Should the Chinese pursue their enquiries they could be informed that reciprocity was being applied.

Lan I attach draft letters to Mr. Janes in the Home Office and Mr. O'Neill in the Board of Customs and Excise to enquire whether the above would be practical and a draft telegram to Pexing to confirm that they regard it as desirable.

Mark A. Hall

P.P. (3. 3. Sharland)

please refer to M. Wilm

5 October, 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Cradock's letter of 20 September to 3arland listed

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2. We are enquiring of the Home office and

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Would you favour such action

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CONFIDENTIAL

Feziz

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1:1300 19987

RELATIONS WITH CHINA

FE:3/22

PROBLEM

After the burning of our Office in Peking on 22 August

certain restrictions were placed on the Chinese Mission in

London. In retaliation, restrictions on our Mission in Peking

were made more stringent.

Since then, though the atmosphere

in Peking has improved a little, the restrictions remain and no progress has been made in evacuating women and children or other members of the staff in need of medical attention.

All members of the staff and their families, with the exception

of five schoolchildren on holiday, who have been allowed to leave, are in effect being held as hostages. We have to decide whether and at what stage action ahould be taken to

try to break the impasse. The immediate problem is whether to tighten restrictions on the Chinese in London, to relax

them, or to leave them as they are.

RECOMMENDATION

I recommend:-

(a) It would be premature to take a decision now on changing the restrictions on the Chinese in London. If present trenda continue, the matter

should be brought up for review in the week

beginning 23 October.

(b) In view of our failure to gain access to Mr.

Anthony Grey, the Reuters Correspondent under

CONFIDENTIAL

/house

rn?

CONFIDENTIAL

house arrest in Peking, the agreement of the

should

Hong Kong Government/be sought to suspend

further visits to members of the New China

News Agency (N.C.N.A.) in prison in Hong Kong.

ARGUMENT AND BACKGROUND

Restrictions

There has

3. The annexe to this submission gives details of the

measures in force against British subjects in China and

against the Chinese in London, together with possible methoda

of tightening or relaxing pressure on the Chinese.

been some improvement in our position in Peking in that

Queen's Messengers have been allowed in and out without

difficulty, and mail addressed to the Mission through the

open post is arriving. Restriction on movement, however,

remains very severe and the Chinese are deliberately dis-

criminating in this against Mr. Hopson. In general, life

remains extremely unpleasant and our staff in Peking are far

worse off than the Chinese staff in London. Mr. Anthony Grey,

the Reuters Correspondent, remaine incommunicado under house

arrest and persistent efforts to gain consular access to him

have failed. A British engineer, Mr. Watt, who is working on

the Vickers/Zimmer project at Lanchow, has been arrested, charged with "illegal activities outside the contract" and

is being held at Lanchow.

4. In the wider context, the situation in China seems to

be developing in a direction which may be favourable to us.

The Secretary of State's message to the Chinese Foreign Minister

delivered on 2 September has not been rejected or castigated

/in the

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3-

in the official press and the Chinese have thus so far

avoided making the acceptance of their demands over Hong

Kong a formal condition for an improvement in relations.

There is strong evidence to indicate that the Prime Minister,

Chou En-lai, and Chiang Ch'ing (Mrs. Mao Tse-tung) have both

condemned the burning of our Mission, though their condemnation

may be no more than an ex post facto attempt to dissociate

the Chinese Government from an action, the consequences of

which they have found embarrassing • Chou En-lai has also

reportedly taken direct charge of the running of the Foreign

Ministry and may be exerting some moderating influence on

Chinese policy in general. At the same time, the leaders of

the Cultural Revolution are making strenuous attempts to bring

the campaign under more control. In Hong Kong the situation

has calmed down The Chinese National Day has passed off

without very serious incident; and the Chinese have, in

accordance with their contract, restored the water supply

from the mainland to the Colony. There is good evidence that

an influential section of the local communist leadership,

probably reflecting more rational elements of the leadership

on the mainland, wishes to turn from the present policy of

violence to a longer-term propaganda campaign. If this trend

continues, there is therefore some hope of a gradual improve-

ment in our relations with China.

5. In such circumstances, women and children and those

requiring medical attention, and thereafter the rest of the

staff, might be allowed to leave Peking though there is no

/indication

CONFIDENTIAL

indication of how long this might take. A tightening of

restrictions on the Chinese in this country or other forms

of pressure against China would be likely to retard rather

than accelerate this process. In any case, action against

the Chinese Mission in London would be unlikely to affect

the Chinese Government except in the direction of making

life for our people in Peking still more unpleasant. Other

forms of pressure, e.g. economic sanctions or the blocking

of Chinese sterling in London, would be very difficult to

carry out and unlikely to be helpful.

The

Admittedly, if further measures were taken against us

in Peking, tougher measures here would become essential.

least objectionable from the point of view of our Mission in

Peking might be to P.N.G. some of the Chinese. The Indonesians

did so, and the Chinese responded by expelling two of the

Indonesian Mission in Peking; but we cannot be sure this

would happen to us.

7. On the other hand, if we are right in our deduction that

the trend, both on the mainland and in Hong Kong, is now more

favourable, a relaxation of restrictions might be better

calculated to secure our most important objective of freedom

of exit for our staff in Peking. It would be very welcome to

the Home Office, since nearly 90 members of the uniformed and Special Branches are employed on surveillance and allied tasks,

this being the minimum necessary for effective functioning.

We understand that the Home Secretary may shortly approach us

about a reduction in police duties. A relaxation would also

/be

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5-

Flag ▲

be welcome to businessmen. The Chinese have already

claimed (without real justification) that police restric-

tions are making it difficult for their Commercial Office

to function and are implying to British businessmen that a

drop in Sino-British trade would be attributable to this

cause. Any immediate unilateral relaxation of restrictions

would, however, be very difficult to justify in Parliament

and before public opinion. In his letter of 20 September,

Kr. Hopson has argued that we should now tell the Chinese

that we had decided on a relaxation but on the strict under-

standing that reciprocity would be given in Faking. There

is the objection that, if there was no reciprocal relaxation

in Peking, we might even so have difficulty in persuading

the Home Office to agree to a re-imposition of measures.

any case, I consider that relaxation at this time would be

premature. We should first await the result, if any, of

the approach of the Pakistan Minister of Information to the

Chinese leaders about the release of our women and children,

which he is making at the Secretary of State's request; and

we should allow ourselves a little time to see whether the

present trend of events in China and Hong Kong continues.

For this reason it is recommended that, except in the parti-

cular case of Mr. Grey, and in a minor matter concerning Chinese nationals in this country (discussed below), no

action to tighten or relax restrictions should be taken

pending a further review in about two weeks time.

/Mr. Grey

CONFIDENTIAL

- 6-

Mr. Grey

Representations have been made on a number of occasions

to secure consular access to Mr. Grey. The latest followed

a visit to an N.C.N.▲. journalist imprisoned in Hong Kong

by his wife and two colleagues. Mr. Hopson has recommended

that in the absence of any progress over Mr. Grey, future

visits to N.C.N.A. personnel under detention in Hong Kong

should be stopped. This may involve some change in the regu-

lations as, normally, sentenced prisoners are entitled to

monthly visits. We could ask the Hong Kong Goverment to

suspend visits for the time being, but the decision will have

to rest with them in the light of local conditions. Mr. Rodgers

has invited Mr. Grey's mother to call on him on 19 October.

Mr. Chipp of Reuters, who will himself deliver the invitation

to Mrs Grey, will explain the present position and say that

we consider publicity in this country on her son's behalf

might be harmful to him. Mr. Chipp will also speak to the

local newspaper in Norwich (where Mr. Grey used to work) on

the same lines.

Mr. Watt

9. Mr. Hopson has already asked for information and for

consular access to Mr. Watt (paragraph 3 above). Unfortunately,

on past form, it is unlikely that he will obtain either. It

is still not clear why Kr. Watt has been arrested. The most

likely reason is that when his wife left China recently, the

Chinese Custome found in her possession various private letters from engineers in Lanchow, a report from the leader to the

/firm

CONFIDENTIAL

- 7 -

firm, and some photographs of Lanchow Airport. Mr. Deckart,

a German engineer, also working on the project, was arrested

some weeks ago for "suspected espionage". Vickers/Zimmer

are asking the Chinese State Corporation concerned (Techimport)

to intervene with the authorities on behalf of Messrs. Watt

and Deckart. We do not consider that any retaliatory action

against Chinese nationals in this country would be likely to

help Mr. Watt's position. We are, however, asking the Home

Office to request Chief Constables in the course of their

Autumn census of foreign nationals to see how many Chinese

they have on their books, against the possibility of future

action against Chinese nationals as a whole.

Love Murray.

(James Murray) 3 October, 1967

aper generally,

dis lum.

پز هنر

but the Rodgers may

are some pointi on which I think we might consider some relaxation, and other in which a

approach may be needed.

Mr Samuel,

My beat & Must be

от

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for anoth fortir, it

b.f. dhe lakman

3/10

althen! Kling surveillone of & Chinese Momen

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し

compatible sitt istening to confire rentactions

CONFIDENTIAL

Mi. Wilder

Бла

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX

RELATIONS WITH CHINA

easureb in force against British Subjects in Chipa

(a) The British Office

Our office buildings in Peking were almost totally

destroyed, although it is still possible to use the

diplomatic wireless equipment. The Chargé d'Affaires'

house was also ransacked but some rooms are being

repared for use by the Chinese staff of our Mission.

The Mission itself is now operating from one of the

residential flats in a large diplomatic compound

about a quarter of a mile from the Office buildings.

Our Office compound and buildings in Shanghai have

been acized.

(b) Kovement

The members of our Mission are restricted to

the area of the diplomatic compound and the Office

Block together with the road connecting the two places. To go anywhere outside this area (including to other foreign diplomatic missions) they must ask

permission 48 hours in advance.

Some of their

requests have been approved but many others, including social calls on foreign ambassadors, have been refused. All the members of the Mission require exit visas from

the Chinese Government before leaving the country. Applications for visas for all members of the staff (and later for women and children and for ten individuals on medical grounds) have been made, but

the only exit visas granted since the events of

/22 August

CONFIDENTIAL

22 August have been for five schoolchildren who vare

spending their holidays in Peking.

Since May the Chinese have refused to pack or

transport the belongings of any members of our

Mission. There has, however, been no serious delay

to incoming goods.

(d) Reuters

The Reuters correspondent in Peking has been under

house arrest since 21 July and incommunicado since

19 August. Our Office in Peking have made a number

of requests for accesa, the latest shortly after a

New China News Agency journalist imprisoned in Hong

Kong had been visited by his wife and representatives

of the Agency but there has so far been no reply.

(e) Engineers

One British engineer (Mr. Watt) working for

Vickers, who are building a plant in Lanchow (north-

west China) is being held under arrest by the Chinese

in Lanchow pending investigation into letters and

documents which the Chinese say that his wife was

trying to snuggle out of China. (A German engineer

working on the same Vickers plant is also being held

for alleged "illegal activities".)

(f) Banks

The Shanghai Branch Office of the Hong Kong and

Shanghai Bank has been having difficulties about exit

and entry visas for some time but their problems do

not seem to have worsened recently.

CONFIDENTIAL

/2.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3-

With the exception of exit visas, which the Chinese have

required for many years, the restrictions placed on our Mission

were said by the Chinese to be in retaliation for those which

we placed on the Chinese in London on 22 August. These

restrictions and a generally uncooperative attitude make life

for our Mission in Peking extremely hard, but their station

does not seem to have worsened appreciably since the end of

August. The position of the Reuters correspondent has likewise

remained unchanged for over a month. Mr. Watt's position has,

however, worsened. He was detained in Peking from 7 September;

on 26 September he was taken to Lanchow "under arrest for

illegal activities outside the contract".

Measures in force against the Chinese in London

3. (a) The Chinese Mission

On 22 August the Chinese Charge was told that the

following restrictions would be applied immediately:

(1) No Chinese officials would be allowed to

leave this country without obtaining exit

visas from the Foreign Office.

(11) The movement of Chinese officials would be

restricted to an area of five miles radius

from Karble Arch.

To travel outside this

area it would be necessary to inform the

Foreign Office 48 hours in advance.

(111) The Chinese Mission should cease immediately

using its diplomatic wireless facilities.

(b) N.C.N.A.

All members of the N.C.N.A. office are subjected

to the restrictions at (1) and (11) above.

Since July

/wo

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4·

we have also postponed approval for any new entry

visas for members of the N.C.N.A. office and have also

Those

given no response to applications by three members of

the Office to renew their residence permits.

concerned are, however, still in this country.

Expatriate officials of the Bank of China are also

subjected to the restrictions at (1) and (ii) above.

We have also postponed approval for entry visas for the Manager and Deputy Manager of the Bank of China (both

of whom were in China on leave) in retaliation for

difficulties created by the Chinese over entry and

exit visas for the Manager and Deputy Manager in

Shanghai of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank.

Enforcement of the restrictions applied against the

Chinese has put a heavy burden on the strained resources of

the Special and the Uniformed Branches of the police.

A total of 88 police and Special Branch officers are employed

full time on watching and protecting the Chinese Office.

New Measures which could be applied against the Chinose

5. The following are some measures which we could apply

against the Chinese if we wished to tighten our restrictions,

together with an indication of the difficulties involved.

(a) Movement

We could either confine the Chinese to their

respective office buildings or to certain specific

streets between their offices and residences, thus

bringing them into line with the restrictions on our

CONFIDENTIAL

/people

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

people in Peking.

Such restrictions would be no harder

to enforce than the present ones.

(b) Baggage

We could delay indefinitely Customs clearance for

all incoming Chinese baggage. It would be administratively

harder but possible to do the same for outgoing baggage,

although it is unlikely that the Chinese have much of

this.

We might be able to evict the Chinese Commercial

department from its office building in retaliation

for their confiscation of our Office in Shanghai.

This building is on Crown lease. All their other

buildings are, however, leased privately from different

landlords and there would be insuperable administrative

and probably legal difficulties in curtailing the leases.

It would also probably be necessary to force an entry

and physically eject the Chinese in order to dispossess

them. To do so would first require a withdrawal by legislative procedure of the personal immunity ɗ those

concerned. Even were this done, the Chinese would not

accept it and a violent incident similar to or worse

than the "Battle of Portland Place" would probably occur.

(d) Expulsion

We could declare P.N.G. some or all of the Chinese

Mission, selecting if necessary the six major culprits

of the "Battle of Portland Place" on 29 August. It is

unlikely that those declared P.N.G. would refuse to go

but, if they did, and took refuge in the Chinese Mission,

CONFIDENTIAL

/we

CONFIDENTIAL

· 6-

we would be faced with the problem of ather leaving

them there, or removing them by force or expelling them

by force if they ever emerged from the building.

(e)

Harassment of Ordinary Chinese Citizens in the

United Kingdom

There are about 2,500 Chinese in this country with

Chinese People's Republic passports, who are registered

as aliens with the police.

It would be possible to

trace all such persons, to arrange for the police to

call on them and even possibly require them to report

to a police station. The labour involved in tracing

them would be considerable, while calling on them or

requiring them to report at police stations would add

a further burden to police duties. The Home Office

are most reluctant to do any preliminary work unless

we wish to propose some specific move against Chinese

citizens as a whole. They might, however, be prepared

to ask Chief Constables in the course of their annual

autumn census of aliens to see how many Chinese they

have on their books. Action against ordinary Chinese

citizens in this country would be unlikely to influence

the Chinese Government to treat British subjects in

China more reasonably; indeed it might cause them to

be more unpleasant to businessmen and others. For this

reason and because we are likely to encounter strong

Home Office opposition, we do not think that harassment

of the kind referred to would be worthwhile.

(f) Sterling

The Chinese use sterling for much of their foreign

trade,

At present they hold about £10 million in sterling

CONFIDENTIAL

Лin

CONFIDENTIAL

- 7

in London, but the figure fluctuates and is sometimes

much higher.

Theoretically we could freeze these sterling

holdings, but in practice there are very strong reasons

against doing so. To act against Chinese sterling holders

would affect the confidence of other sterling holders

and also their trade, in sterling with China. It

would require the use of special legislation which the

Treasury are only permitted to call into play when

there is a threat from the country concerned to British

economic interests.

6. An additional and major problem involving all further

restrictions on the Chinese here is the effect this would have

on our Mission in Peking. In almost all cases this would make

their position even worse than it is at present. Realising

this, Mr. Hopson has advised strongly against further restric-

tions. The only exception is (d) which might well cause the

Chinese to act similarly against an equal number of our staff

in Peking. By expelling the Chinese Chargé and another diplomat

from Djakarta, the Indonesians secured the expulsion of their

Charge and a member of his staff from Peking.

Possible Wave of Relaxing Pressure on the Chinese in London

(a) Travel

We could increase the travel limits either to the

direct equivalent of former Chinese practice in Peking,

1.e. 12 miles, or to the previous London limit of

35 miles.

This could also be done selectively by

e.g. first relaxing the restriction on the Bank of China

or N.C.N.A.

(b) Diplomatic wireless

We are now able to use our own diplomatic wireless

CONFIDENTIAL

/in

CONFIDENTIAL

- 8 -

in Peking again and there is no particular reason why

the theoretical restriction on the Chinese here

should remain.

that the Chinese have never ceased to use their

diplomatic wireless, we could make a magnanimous

gesture by reinstating their permission to operate.

Although we know perfectly well

We could approve entry visas for several out-

standing applications for members of the N.C.N.A.

Office or the Bank of China. We are not at present

withholding approval for any new visas for the Chinese

Mission itself.

(a) We could withdraw the police guard on the Chinese

Office either progressively or in toto. We could also

tell the police and Special Branch not to tail Chinese

cars any more. If we did this we would, however, have

no guarantee that the Chinese would obey the movement

restrictions placed on them, although we would still

be able to ensure that they did not leave the country

without exit visas.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT.A.

CONFIDENTIAL

FE3/20

TOP COPY

FOREKIN OFFICE TO PEKING

TELNO. 861

6 OCTOBER, 1967

(F)

FC3/20

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO PEKING TELEGRAM NO. 861 OF 6 OCTOBER REPTD FOR INFMN TO HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 109.

YOU WILL HAVE NOW SEEN FROM COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 2047 TO THE GOVERNOR OF HONG KONG THAT LORD SHEPHERD INTENDS TO DISCUSS WITH THE GOVERNOR WHAT WOULD BE INVOLVED IN MAKING SOME SMALL GESTURE TO THE CHINESE AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME.

2. WE AGREE THAT THE RECIPROCAL REMOVAL OF RESTRICTIONS MAY BE THE

KEY TO PROGRESS. IT MAY STILL HOWEVER BE SOMEWHAT PREMATURE TO TAKE

AN INITIATIVE HERE, WE SHALL BE SEEKING YOUR VIEWS ABOUT POSSIBLE ACTION SHORTLY.

SENT 2012Z 6 OCTOBER

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

BOSPA

P.0.

C.O.

FAR EASTERN DEPT.

HONG KONG DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

مهامم

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.

DEPARTMENT

• Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should

reach addressee(s).

60/1017

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

(Date)...

Deata theat

Top Secret

Secret

Confidencial

Restricted

Unclassified

Flash

Immediate }"

Priority Routine

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

En Clair. Code Cypher

Draft Telegram to :----

No.

FEKING

(Date)

861..

- A

And to:-

6/10.

'Security classification"

if any

[Secu

[

Privacy marking -if any

[Codeword-if any}

Addressed to

telegram No.

And to

T--I‒‒‒JI LIJE L

Peking

♡61

--- -- - -- -➖➖➖➖ ➖➖➖➖ ------TILLL. I

CONFIDENTIAL

TYYAT TIFT

(date)

6/10

repeated for information to Hong Kong (Personal for Governor)

Saving to

ALL-

110- 10-NkhotzetikHHHatut d

Repeat to:-/2056

HONG LONG

(Flag B

Chef home,

stramme)

Saving to:-

Distribution:

As for ref.

Your telegram No. 109 of 2 October

You will have now seen from Commonwealth

Office telegram No. 2047 of 5 October]

the Governor of Hong Kong that Lord Shepherd

intends to discuss with the Governor what would

be involved in making some small geature to the

Chinese at the appropriate time.

It may

2. We agree that the reciprocal removal of

restrictions may be the key to progress.

still however be somewhat premature to take an

Cubeut perutti cation initiative here. We shall be seeking your views

shortly.

Copies to:-

ん

Flom

Mr. de la Váre

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES N. 31

10 OCT 1967

F2.3/20

Anglo-Chinese Relations

As an indication to our Mission in Peking that their

problems are being kept constantly in mind, I suggest that

we might send an interim reply to Mr. Hopson's telegram

No. 109 of 2 October.

I submit a draft.

Вили Грану

(James Murray) 6 October, 1967

pales

Resou

SECRET

kir de la Kare

Folice Surveillance of Chinese Fren izes

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

2. 1967

FC 3/20

The Secretary of State will wish to be told of the

following approach by the Home Office before Cabinet tomorrow.

2. Mr. James of the Police Division of the Home Office

telephoned this afternoon to convey to us a request on behalf

of the acting Metropolitan Police Commissioner that we should

review the need for continued surveillance of Chinese premises

and staff in London. He said that the Home Secretary might

raise this matter with the Secretary of State before Cabinet

tomorrow.

Those on

3. At present 89 uniformed and Special Branch officers are

engaged on surveillance while 12 uniformed officers are engaged

in maintaining public order round Chinese premises.

public order duties can be reduced provided that there are no

further incidents. But if adequate surveillance is to be main-

tained, including the restriction of the Chinese to the five-

mile limit laid down on 22 August, all 89 will be required.

The burden is particularly heavy on the Special Branch, which

le is a small service. Many of its officers have been taken off

other necessary duties in order to watch the Chinese.

4. We told the Home Office that we sympathised with their

difficulties and would look into the question. In present

circumstances, however, with very severe restrictions being

/imposed

SECRET

Flag A

imposed on the British Lission in Peking, in the absence

of a reply to the Secretary of State's message to the Chinese

Foreign Minister and of any sign of grace from the Chinese,

apart from the release of the five schoolchildren, Ministers

might well feel unable to agree to any relaxation of restric-

tions on the Chinese.

5. I attach the latest report from Peking on the application of the restrictions there (Peking telegram No. 45). This shows

that, with few exceptions, our staff are still being restricted

to their flats and movement between them and the Office and

Residence which are a few hundred yards away.

Copy to Kr. Samuel

Slland

(E-Bolland)

13 September, 1967

Povali fecerban

I afee. If 9

ари

it would help in cutting

down the police manpower required if we inade I'm survecliance less conspicuous

would see no

objection to that, but

The Home office say that would not

reaily math and differen

SECRET

се

a.f. de lulan

13/9

| The

Mr. de la Man 14/9

Mr. Ballyd.

The

S.AS.

has

commented:

Serry.

don't

thent

can

hold

et.

Well

try.

J... Jas

I have again spoken to ofre James

of the Home Office. See my

дра

ruly.

ment of 19 September.

свя

ala

PM?

Cypher/Cat A

PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

SECRET

FC.3/20.

TOP COPY

Tolno 109 2 October, 1967

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.109 of 2 October, Repeated for information to Hong Kong (Personal for Governor).

Fr. Bolland's letter of 25 September.

Idea of expelling some members of Chinese Office in London in hope that Chinese would retaliate in kind had also occurred to us.

This might have attractions for Chinese as it would allow them to claim that we started it. But it would be a blunt weapon as Chinese could select for expulsion key members of our staff and thus cause us great inconvenience. In any case

it seems improbable that we could get more than a limited number of people out on this basis. I think therefore it is a cord to

keep in reserve for the time being.

2. Meanwhile it looks as if we are in for a period of relative calm both generally and in Hong Kong. No mention whatever has been made of latter in National Day speeches or slogans, the water is flowing again, and the Canton Fair opens on 15 November. This may however be only a tactical lull and could

tactical lull and could end with Canton Fair on 15 December. In my view therefore it is vital to seize the opportunity which this lull presents of solving problems connected with our representation here as we may find ourselves back in chaos in the New Year. -

3. At present we are waiting to see whether Chinese will make any reply to your letter to Ch-en Yi, and hoping Pakistani intervention may help. I think we must wait a little longer but should be thinking of any initiatives we could take to get things moving. The most effective gesture on our part may be some concession over Hong Kong. The Chinese seem to be making real efforts to damp things down there and though this is no doubt mainly for their own reasons they may think we owe them something in return. Would a partial amnesty, covering journalists at any rate, be possible? This would most likely do the trick,

4. Action to remove mutual restrictions on movements though a separate subject might also be the key to the puzzle. I have suggested in a letter to Mr. Delamare that we should consider taking initiative in London. The semi closure of Chinese trade office possibly presents a suitable context.

Foreign Office please pass Hong Kong 36.

Mr. Hopson

Sent 01402/3 October Recd 07502/3 October

[Repeated as requested]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.E.D.

88888

SECRET

ha.

Ed (1636)

Kr. Derson

Reference

FC3/253

Police supervision of Chinese offices

The Chinese have clearly decided to make as much propaganda as they can out of the police watch on their Offices.

2. Mr. Jay, of Vickers Zimmer, has been in touch with Mr. Ho,t the Chinese Commercial Office, who is now apparently in residence in Portland Place, about visas for engineers going to Lanchow. Mr. Ho, having produced the usual spiel about atrocities in Hong Kong, informed Mr. Jay that the Chinese were finding it imposs- ible to do any commercial work on account of the police who are surrounding their offices.

Land.

E. J. Sharland) 13 September. 1967

Mr Br

Dan Denson

FC3/20

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN OFFICE, 8.N.1.

27 September, 1967.

Thank you for your letter IMG/67 222/1053/1 of 20 September about extensions of stay for four smployees of the Bank of China.

I fear that there may have been some misunder- standing about our policy towards entry visas and extensions of stay for members of the various Chinese organisations in London. We asked you not to approve entry visas for the Manager and Deputy Manager of the Bank of China, who were returning here from leave. for the specific reason that the Chinese were creat- ing difficulties over exit and entry visas for the Manager and Deputy Manager in Shanghai of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Wank, We also saked that no approval should be given to entry visas for replacements to the N.C.N.Ã, office in London and that approval for extensions of stay for those members of the N.C.H.A. now in London should be delayed because of the way in which the Chinese have been using the .C.X.A. as a propaganda wespen to promote terrorism in Hong Kong and, more specifically, because the Chinese have placed under house arrest the Reuters correspondent in Peking. It was not our intention at the time that all viens should be refused or all applications for extensions of stay be deferred,

3. For a number of reasons, we consider that wo should not defer approval for the present applications any further, Providing you agree, I should be grateful therefore if the applications for the four concerned could now be approved, and I should also be grateful if you could let us know as soon as possible if you receive any further applications for extensions of stay for members of the Bank of Chim or any other Chinese official organisations in this country.

I. I. R. Rogers Esq.,

Home Office,

Princeton House.

zzlie

(D. 0. Wilson)

Zer Kantern Denartámi

11. (3746)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.

Secret.

Confidential,

Resincted.

Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT

Type 1 +

Letter

To:-

From

K. E. R. Rogera Esq., Home Office.

D. C. Wilson

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

Thank you for your letter I#/6722/1053/1

of 20 September about extensions of stay for

four employees of the Bank of China.

I may have been I misunderstanding

2. I fear that there has been some confuled on

about our policy towards entry visas and exten-

met bers if sions of stay for the

Zihe various Chinese organis-

ations in London. We asked you not to approve

entry visas for the Manager and Deputy Manager

of the Bank of China, who were returning here

from leave, for the specific reason that the

Chinese were creating difficulties over exit

and entry visas for the Manager and Deputy

Manager if Shanghai of the Hong Kong and Shanghai

Bank. We also asked that no approval should be

given to entry visas for replacements to the

N.C.N.4. office in London and that approval for

extensions of stay for those members of the

N.C..A. now in London should be delayed because

of the way in which the Chinese have been using

the N.C.N.A. as a propaganda weapon to promote

terrorism in Hong Kong and, more specifically,

Vecause the Chinese have placed under house

arrest the Reuters correspondent in Peking. It

was not our intention at the time that all visas

should be refused or all applications for

/extensiona

CONFIDENTIAL

extensions of stay/be deferred.

3. For a number of reasons, we consider that

we should not defer approval for the present

applications any further. Providing you agree,

Should

e grateful therefore if the applications

for the four concerned could now be approved,

and I should also be grateful if you could let

cas soon as possi

us know if you receive any further applications

for extensions of stay for members of the Bank

of China or any ther Chinese official organis-

ations in this country.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Kr. Hohler

Hobye

CONFIDENTIAL

↑ RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No 31

2... 1967

F( 3/20

Extensions of Stav for Chinese Employed in the

London Branch of the Bạnk of China

Flag A

Problem

The Home Office have been delaying approval for exten-

sions of stay for four expatriate staff of the London Office

of the Bank of China. One of these applications has been

outstanding since 26 July. We must now decide our policy

towards these and similar future applications.

Recommendation

2. I recommend that these and future applications for

extensions of stay for the expatriate staff of the Bank of China should be approved. Draft letter to the Home Office

attached.

Background and Argument

Two

3. The Home Office have just told us that they have been delaying approval for four applications for extensions of

stay for Chinese staff of the Bank of China in London.

of those who have applied have service passports, the other two ordinary passports. One of these applications was made

as long ago as 26 July.

members of the Bank of China of whom three are travelling

There are at present seven expatriate

service passports.

4. The Home Office seem to have assumed that we would wish

approval for these applications to be deferred. It is perhaps

not unreasonable that they should have done so since we have

/already

CONFIDENTIAL

already asked them to delay approval of entry visas for

the Manager and Deputy Manager of the Bank returning from

leave in China. We have also asked them to delay approval

for visas for any replacement members of the N.C.N.A. Office

in London and to delay approval for the renewal of residence

permits for members of the N.C.N.A.

5. The cases of entry visas for the two Bank of China

officials which have been delayed and the treatment of the

N.C.N.A. as a whole are, however, quite separate from the

problem of residence permits for Bank officials now in this

country. Visas for the Manager and the Deputy Manager of

the Bank were deliberately delayed because the Chinese had

created difficulties over an exit permit for the Branch

Manager of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank in Shanghai and

an entry visa for the new Deputy Manager in Shanghai. The

N.C.N.A. visas and residence permits were delayed because of

the way in which the N.C.N.A. has been used to incite terrorism

in Hong Kong and also, more particularly, because of the

treatment of the Reuters correspondent in Peking -

6. I do not think that we can achieve anything by entering

into a general residence permit war with the Chinese. Indeed,

to do so detracts from the value of taking action in selected

cases in retaliation for Chinese actions against British

subjects in China. I therefore consider that the present

applications should be approved. In addition, by doing this,

/we

CONFIDENTIAL

· 3-

we may help to unfreeze the issue of exit visas for members

of our Mission in Peking.

Mr Bolland

hello Wo Zieme

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d. A.. No of Denta

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(Er Bolland)

26 September, 1967

agree.

چلن

郝

27/17

CONFIDENTIAL

RINGET. 1,200 pula 1867, 7. A 5. Gμ990142 391954. 1,000 juli 167, 7.2 1. 09.999FLAT.

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[Date]

[Priority] Pfter 17/ PRIGHT't

28 SEP 1967

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CONFIDENTIAL

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FOREIGN OFFICE, S.7.1.

25 September, 1967.

Following the "Battle of Portland Place" on 29 August we made attempts to identify from photographs those members of the Chinese Kission who were most seriously involved in the violence against the police. Te have been able to identify nearly all those concerned and to pick out six who were particu- larly vicious. The most "revolutionary" and adept axe swinger was Lu Tsung-nin, a clerk from the Chargé's office, who has also been a leading light in other mass quotation sessions on the steps of the Chinese Office. All those involved in the violence were, like him, junior officials and the only Chinese of diplomatic rank to be present through the "Battle" was a Second Secretary, Chao Tse-nin, who stood most of the time with his arms folded and a mandarin expression on his face.

2. It is not of course possible to take legal action against any of those involved since all are covered by personal immunity at the least and there can be no doubt that, even were this not so, it would in practice prove impossible to bring them before (r) court. Te did, however, consider the idea of declaring at least some of the six P.N.G. in the hopes that the Chinese would retaliate and that we would thus ensure the exit of some of your staff. One possible complication of such a course would be what to do if the Chinese then refused to leave this country and took shelter in the Mission. Their diplomatic immunity would of course have been removed and the police could grab and expel them by force if they left the Mission building. Should this happen, however, it is all too likely that the Chinese would similarly remove the immunity from some of your staff and I suspect that their subsequent action, which would not necessarily end in expul- sion, would be a great deal more unpleasant.

3. We are not following up the P.M.G. idea since we think it better for the moment to keep things as cool as possible in the hope that the Secretary of State's message may yet achieve some results and that the more moderate influences which may now be at work in the Foreign Ministry, will operate to our advantage. We still have it in mind however as a possible future ploy if the freeze on exit permits continues or things get worse for you in Peking. I should be very interested to have your views on the idea and its possible repercussions on you in Peking. Perhaps the way in which the Chinese react to the expulsion of two of their people in Djakarta will give a few pointers.

D. C. Hopson, Esq., C.M.G., D.8.0.,

Peking.

(E. Bolland)

M.C., D.,

CONFIDENTIAL

TELEGRAM SECTION Room 124 K.C.S.

Communications Department

7. 8. D

FC3120

* Please send copies of the following telegram

YTC/1

Copy/ies of the following telegram has/have been sent

[*delete as applicable

820

to PEXING

22/sept/67

TO:

Sterlini

Home office

Room

(Initials)

(Signed)

(Department)

(Date)

619

Horseferry Hse.

Dean Ryle St.

w./

Action taken in Communications Department ;

(Date)

25/9/67

AFTER ACTION THIS FORM SHOULD BE SENT TO

THE APPROPRIATE ARCHIVES DIVISION FOR RETENTION

E3/20

RESTRICTED

FC 3/20

TOP

Cypher/Cat A

FOREIGN OFFICE TO PEKING

Tel No.820 22 September 1967 (F)

RESTRICTED

Pe10/2/11

Your telegram No. PC 104: Visas for Chinese Couriers.

You should also mark all future Courier visas "valid for exit from United Kingdom". We shall try to ensure that Couriers have no difficulties here.

SOSPA Sent 2110Z 23 September

FILES:

F.E.D. P.C.D.

RESTRICTED

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Registry No.

DEPARTMENT

FC3|20

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION PRIORITY MARKINGS

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Top-Secret Secret

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(Date)

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Visas for

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Couriers.

all future

You should I mask all

Cousies visas valid for exit from UK.

and we shall try to

couriers have

ensure

that

difficulties here.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Distribution:-

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Copies to:- The Sterlyni 18002 Home Alice

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CONFIDENTIAL

HOME OFFICE

Princeton House, 271 High Holborn, LONDON WC.

Telephone: CHAncery 8811, ext.

Our reference: IMG/67 222/1053/1

a_ferences

Telex: 261867

Euler.

357

F23/20

20 September, 1967.

Dear Wilson,

Further to our telephone conversation of 18th September when I raised with you the question of our continuing to withhold facilities from employees of the Bank of China, I am now writing, as you requested, to set out the position of the individuals concerned.

In addition to having taken no action on the visa applications in respect of Iang Hui-Chi and Yang Shu Ping, we have been holding applica- tions on behalf of the following for extensions of permitted stay to continue in the Bank's employ:-

Miss Chin Min-Shu (Madame Wang Min-Shu)

2. Mr. Haia Cheng-Chih and wife Miss Chen Hsing-Li (Madame Hsia Hsing-Li)

Application lodged 26th July 1967.

Application lodged 14th August 1967.

and

3. Mr. Sung Kuo-Rua

Application lodged 5th September 1967.

I cannot see from our files that we had previously consulted you about the extensions of stay: I can only say that in view of recent events we had assumed that your request to delay action on the two visa applications implied a similar delay on our part in dealing with applications for extensions of stay of Chinese employees of the Bank.

Perhaps you would now let us have your current views on all these applications.

D. C. Wilson, Esq. Foreign Office

(Far East Department)

Downing Street

LONDON 1.1

Yours faithfully,

Как подно

See seperti submission.

CONFIDENTIAL

(PC 3/20)

A.C.

zila

FOREIGN OFFICE, 3.7.1.

20 September, 1967.

_noted.

Bu. 20 ofr. for reply

6/4

You will remember that is the Foreign Secretary's minute P3 67/72 of 14 August (paragraph 3) he mentioned the problem of the extension of the residence permit of one member of the R.C.N.A. London Office (Li Pu). Since that date we have also received an application for the renewal of residence perzita for two other members of the 1.C.N.A. Office (Tu Hang and his wife Lin Ching).

2. on the first case, it was agreed at the meeting which you attended with John Denvon here on 8 August that no reply should be made to the Chinese application at least until 21 August when it was thought that we would be clear about the lines of Chinese retaliation for the treatment of M.C.N.A. correspondents in Hong Kong. The form of this retaliation is now all too clear and it is also clear that the problems of our Mission in Pering and of Mr. Grey, the Reuters correspondent, are likely to be with us for some time.

3. fe now have to decide what should be done about these applications for renewal of residence permits. Your Minister of state's reply to the Foreign Secretary's zinute on 22 August did not specifically take up the problem of residence permits but it implied that the Rome Office zight wish to study this problem further, together with that of re-entry visas for Chinese residents here.

I very much hope that you can agree to continuing to delay any reply to the Chinese on these applications. There have recently been further cases in Hong Kong involving members of the N.C.N.A. Office there and it is quite likely that others will follow in the future. Kr. Grey is still under house arrest and incommunicado although, as far as we know, unharmed. There remains the strong possibility that the Chinese may take further action against Kr. Grey in retaliation for events in Hong Kong. In these circumstances, I think it would be very unwise to grant extensions of stay for three members of the N.C.N.A. Office is London, both from the point of view of public opinion in this country and as a tactical nove vis-à-vis the Chinese. I am sure that our best line is to give no answer to the Chinese and thus keep hanging over their heads the threat that they may at any moment be expelled. I hope that you can agree to this and, if so, I suggest that we should then review the problem at least every month, or more frequently if any particular new factor crops up.

8. H. X. Jurley, Esq., Home Office.

(I. Bolland)

COFFIE" TJAL

kr. Hohled

CONFIDENTIAL

The New China News Agency

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31 ARCHIVES

2. SEP 1967

F23/201

Problem

Three members of the expatriate staff of the New China

News Agency (N.C.N.A.) in London have applied for extensions

to their permits to stay in this country. The first application

was received in July, and the other two on 31 August. So far,

at the request of the Foreign Office, no reply has been given

to the Chinese. The Home Office are, however, reluctant to

delay approval for such applications indefinitely. We now have

to decide whether the Home Office should be asked to continue

to delay approval for all these applications, despite their

reservations, or whether they should now be approved.

Recommendation

2. 1 recommend that we should write to the Home Office on the

lines of the attached draft seeking their agreement to continue

delaying authorisation for the three residence permits concerned.

Background

3. There are at present five expatriate staff of the N.C.N.A.

in London. All have residence permits, which are renewable

annually. One of those concerned (Li Fu) applied for an exten-

sion of stay on 6 July since his residence permit was due to

expire on 12 July. Two others (Yu Hang and his wife, Lin Ching)

Their present residence

Flag A applied for extensions on 31 August.

Pc 10/25/5

permite expire on 24 September.

CONFIDENTIAL

14.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2

Flag

4. At the request of the Foreign Office the Home Office

The

Flag B) agreed to delay approval for the first application until

21 August when it was thought that the trial of an N.C.N.A.

correspondent in Hong Kong would have been completed and it

would have become clear whether the Chinese intended to take

further retaliatory action against hr. Grey, the Reuters

correspondent in Peking - It was, however, clear at the time

that the Home Office were extremely reluctant to refuse this

application for renewal or even to delay it indefinitely.

Flag D3 minute from the Secretary of State to the Home Secretary of

14 August about retaliation against the Chinese in Britain

raised this problem, but the Home Office Minister of State

replied on 22 August making no specific comment on this point.

He did, however, say that the question of refusing re-entry

visas for Chinese residents in this country (which in Home

Office eyes is a problem similar to that of renewing residence

permits) would need further study by officials.

5. The reaction of the Chinese to the trial of N.C.N.A.

correspondents in Hong Kong (and closure orders against other

communist papers) is now of course very clear. It was the

ultimatum of 20 August followed by the destruction of our

Mission on 22 August. At the same time the Chinese have imposed

further restrictions on Mr. Grey by outting off his telephone

and all other contact with foreigners in Peking •

So far as we

know, Kr. Grey has however remained in his house and is unharmed.

CONFIDENTIAL

16.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

The problems facing our Mission in Peking and Mr. Grey

are far from finished and there is a strong possibility of

further trials in Hong Kong of N.C.N.A. personnel. In these

circumstances I think it is useful to have the potential

threat of expulsion hanging over the heade of some N.C.N.A.

officials in this country. In order to do this our best course

is, in my opinion, to make no reply to this or future applica-

tions for renewal of residence permits. We should, however,

express our willingness to review these cases at, say, monthly

intervala.

Ellan (E-Bolland)

20 September, 1967

Copies to:

Kr. Samuel

kr. Vallance, Passport Control Department

사

I agree

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20/17

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to go on

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CONFIDENTIAL

тво

CONFIDENTIAL

VIVED IN →VES No.31

1 SEP 1967

| F23/20

Sir Lenia @foenhill

You reported recentl, that Mr. Rodgers had raised Le gaestion whether we should not try to take a leaf out

1.6 Chinese book by anticipating occasions involving members of the Chinese Legation in Portland Place with the object of exploiting them to our propaganda advantage, just as the Chinese themselves have beer, exploiting the goings on we have been witnessing for the past ten days or so in Portland Place. You mentioned as a possible example the impending departure of some of the Chinese from the hospital to which they had gone for treatment and suggested that we should arrange for photographs to be taken of the pants shaking hands with the matron, so that these could be broadcast to the world .8 illustrations of British friendliness and good sense triumphing over political animosity.

I held a mecting on 6 September to discuss this and related questions with reprezentatives of J.I.P.0.D. (Mr. Cook, Hiss Stowe and Kr. Lewis), Fur Eastern Depa taent (Mr. Denson), I.R.D. (Mr. Wilson) and News Department (kr.Swart).

le Boʊn căne to the conclusion that, for a number of remona, we could not expect to earn any very substantial krująanda bomises from the inautes of Portland Place, Being prepared to break the rules, they hold a tactical advantage; indeld, tley hold it even without breaking the rules. A case in point is the one you mentioned about the hos,ital. Two of the left on 5 September, but although "they were apparently quite polite and friendly when the, took their leave of the staff, they took very good cure not to show this within pange of any Camera; 11 the public got w-o the ludicrous scene of the two men being assisted out of the building.

In other words,

the Chinese were aule to see to it that we did not set the obvious profɛande advantage from this particular episode, and unless they lose their self-control it seems likely that they will always be in this position. They can also, of course, if they choose, put our side in the position of having to use force or restraint against than. This i mat to say that we have

in necessarily lost all the propaganda tricks on these occasions, since the Chinese tend to overplay their hand and it hardly needed the huspital's import on the atriu health of the twe men to bring home to sensible people at home and abroad the fact tail they were acting a charade. (The point is well made in the attached cartoon by Giles.) 80 lung, but only so lung, za these soines on are newsworthy, they will hit the headlines and the picture pages;

we will do our best to turn them to our advantage. For example, we can sou to it that the TV crews etc. register helpful facte which they might not think of reporting by the- selves, e.g. that the policemen in Portland Place carried no fireurne, that the Chinese "victizs" vore ready with cameras, etc. atc. We were fortunute to be able to buy an excellent film of the Portland Place incident to which we live added our own comment- ary and which we hope will in due course be seen by TV viewers all over the world.

CONFIDERNI.L

CONFIDENAL L

The discussion then turned to what other newBUTES we might take in support of our case and to discredit the Chinese. It was agreed that we had not much hope of influencing the Chinese in China except negatively, by avoiding unnecessary provocations which might make it more difficult than it is anyway to achieve what I assume is our primary objective of lowering the temperature and achieving tolerable conditions for our people in Peking without kow-towing over Hong Kong. This led to consideration of the main propaganda targets, the inhabitants of Hong Kong and of South East Asia generally, including the overseas Chinese, and the rest of the non-Communist world. Mr. Littlejohn-Cook pointed out that we could not make much further progress in this field until a decision had been made about whether the Secretary of State's message tô Chên Yỉ would be published. We are making or considering other plans, such as the distribution of Hong Kong newspapers and other 'non-Communist material to Chinese seamen working in ships plying in the Par East, and a campaign to counter possible defe tisz about Hong Kong in the U.S.A., Western Europe (including the U.K.), Latin America and Africa, which are all markets for the Colony's products. A proposul by the Embassy in Tokyo is also being put to Personnel Department that a Japanese speaker from Japan be seconded for service in Hong Kon, to help Japanese journalists.

Other possible measures of a more ephemeral kind were discussed, such as an appropriately stage-managed welcome for returning members of the Peking staff (ir and when they do return), and inspired pieces in the TV or the Press, about the schoolchildren. But the general feeling was that this sort of thing could easily boomerang and in the end do us more harm than good.

Finally, it was agreed that another meeting should be held to review the situation when the Chinese have replied to the Secretary of State's message.

My de la Mare,

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F.E Dept will keep the info. Depts informed

of occasions on which the Chumme could get up

to save of their tricks.

Cc.

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Cell 18.9

10. 20 Greaulull

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(C.L.King).

12 September, 1967.

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Actually, this one only came in to be measured for free spectacles."

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Flag J

Mr. D

Mr. Bolland

ך?"

Reference FC3/20

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.31

1 5 SEP 1967

FC3/20

Further to Mr. Boyd's minute, the Chinese Chargé's Office telephoned me at approximately 10.45 this morn- ing. They enquired about their ten cases of film and box of invitation cards, which are held up in Customs. I confirmed that their message of Friday had been conveyed to Mr. Bolland and said that the matter was under consideration and that I would inform them when a decision was taken.

They then asked that Counsellor a should call on Mr. Bolland at 5 p.m. this afternoon, I promised to let them know whether this would be convenient.

3. Although they did not say that the call was connected with the packages of film etc., I think it may well be, since they were concerned to get my answer to the first question before mentioning the Counsellor's wish to call.

(R. J. Sharland) 11 September. 1967

P.A.

mil

J 149.

SECRETARY OF STATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Benf

стра Fatir P.A.

ак

1379

VED IN

IS NOTSE

SEP 1967

FC3/20

Mr. Samuel-

Far Easton Sept.)..)

Musi

At the end of your Ministers Meeting this

morning we touched on a question of reciprocity

concerning our relations with the Chinese. In particular you expressed concern that members of

the Chinese Mission should not slip through our fingers.

2. This arose from my reference to a visit of a

Chinese ship, the "Hangchou", to Liverpool.

The

position is that we were informed on 5 September that

three members of the Chinese Commercial Office

intended to travel to Liverpool to visit the ship.

We made clear that permission would be granted only

if we received a prior guarantee that British officials

in Peking would be allowed to visit British ships in

Chinese ports. They made the strongest protest

against this and repeated their intention of sending

three officials to Liverpool.

However they did not do so, and we later

intercepted a message that suggested that three members

of the crew would come to London. In fact

12/9

five members

five members of the crew travelled to London on

Friday night, and returned to Liverpool on Saturday.

They were under police surveillance all the time

and the police are satisfied that the same Chinese

re-joined the ship as left it.

4. The "Hangchou" is due at London Docks towards

the end of this month. We shall follow the same

procedure on this occasion and with any other Chinese

ships. Members of the Mission will not be free to

visit them until we are given an undertaking about

the same freedom for our people in Peking.

also continue the strictest surveillance of any

crew members who visit the Chinese Mission.

We shall

5. On one matter there has been a slight

relaxation in reciprocity. On 18 August we

approached Customs and Excise in order to impose

"administrative delays" on Chinese baggage in view

of difficulties experienced with consignments

/addressed

addressed to our Mission in Peking. Since then

there has been an effective delay which appears to

have caused the Chinese some considerable irritation.

6. However, we have made a small gesture by

releasing the baggage that we have been delaying in

the hope that this may lead to some slight

relaxation in Peking. If this does not of course

happen, we can quite easily impose longer delays

on the next Chinese consignment.

WTR

William Rodgers

11 September, 1967.

Fe 3/20.

TOP COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

THE GREATEST CARE SHOULD BE TAKE NOT TO MAKE KNOWN MORE THAN NECESSARY THE FACT THAT SUCH MESSAGES ARE BEING TRANSMITTED TO AND FROM PEKING ON OUR BEHALF.

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO FEKING

TELNO FOPEX 20

12 SEPTELBER 1967

(FED)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO PEKING TELEGRAM NO FOPEK 20 OF 12 SEPTEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO HONG KONG AND POLAD SINGAPORE AND SAVING TO WASHINGTON.

THE CHINESE COUNSELLOR, MA CHIA-CHUN CALLED ON BOLLAND ON 11 SEPTEMBER AT HIS OWN REQUEST TO PROTEST ABOUT DELAYS IN THE RELEASE OF PARCELS OF FILMS AND INVITATIONS CARDS ADDRESSED TO THE OFFICE OF THE CHINESE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN LONDON. MA SAID THAT THESE MEASURES HAD FOLLOWED THE BLOODY ATROCITIES'' COMMITTED BY THE POLICE, SPECIAL BRANCH AND THUGS AGAINST STAFF OF THE CHINESE CHARGE'S OFFICE AND WERE INTENDED TO DISRUPT NORMAL DIPLOMATIC WORK. HE DEMANDED THE RELEASE OF THESE GOODS AND A GUARANTEE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO REPETITION

OF SUCH **VICIOUS INCIDENTS' IN FUTURE.

2. BOLLAND REJECTED THE PROTEST. HE REMINDED MA THAT THE PEKING AUTHORITIES HAD MADE DIFFICULTIES ABOUT GOODS DESTINED FOR YOUR MISSION AND ABOUT THE PACK ING AND DESPATCH OF PERSONAL EFFECTS OF YOUR STAFF LONG BEFORE WE HAD ACTED HERE. WE HAD ALREADY DECIDED TO RELEASE THE CHINESE CONSIGNMENTS. WE WOULD HOWEVER EXPECT YOUR MISSION TO RECEIVE SIMILAR TREATMENT. IF IN FUTURE THE CHINESE DELAYED CONSIGNMENTS ADDRESSED TO YOU WE WOULD HOLD UP CONSIGNMENTS ADDRESSED TO THEM.

CONFIDENTIAL

يعهم

Helix

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. FOPEK 20 TO PEKING

ATROCITIES'

3. MA LAUNCHED INTO A VIOLENT ATTACK ON THE 'FASCIST

COMMITTED BY THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES IN HONGKONG. AT THIS POINT BOLLAND BROUGHT THE INTERVIEW TO AN END, WHEREUPON MA AND HIS INTERPRETER, HSIA, BEGAN TO SHOUT AND BRANDISH THEIR FISTS. THEY CONTINUED TO RAVE IN ENGLISH AND CHINESE AS THEY WERE ESCORTED OUT.

4. PLEASE TELEGRAPH IMMEDIATELY DETAILS OF ANY CONSIGNMENTS ADDRESSED TO YOU AND YOUR MISSION BEING HELD UP BY THE CHINESE SO THAT, IF NECESSARY, WE CAN REIMPOSE DELAYS ON GOODS ADDRESSED TO THE CHINESE HERE.

SOSFA

5. WE HAVE NOT, REPEAT NOT, TOLD THE PRESS OF THIS EXCHANGE.

SENT 08012/13 SEPTEMBER 1967.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.O. F.E.D.

PROTOCOL AND CONFERENCE DEPT.

C.O. H.K. & W.I.D. "C"

FFFFF

CONFIDENTIAL

▪ Date and time (G.M.T.) telegum guld reach addresses(a).

Registry No.

DEPARTMENT

703/20

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret

Secrec

Confe

PRIORITY MARKINGS

(Date)

Flach-

-İnantediace

Priority

}

Despatched

...

کان

ייר

12/5

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

En Gloir

-Code

Cypher

Draft Telegram to:-

[Security classification

if any

Privacy marking -if any

[Codeword-if any]

Addressed to

on]

CONFIDENTIA

]

DOLJELIII `ILLIDOLIZIOLNJE

NAPA

----------¶¶-LII

I‒‒ILLI

++ A ITIL AirIII

------ ALLAŞIMA kasa

Peking

Am avu‒‒‒‒‒‒

EK 20 telegram No. FOPEK 20 (date)

FOPE

(Date)

And to:-

12/9

And to

700

12/9

repeated for information to D2 Aong, ECAD Singapore

----

Tinimbitýrinhoudbru

Repeat to:-

ONG KONG|87%

24/1876

FOLAD SINGAPORE

Saving to:-

WASHINGTON

2833 ben.

Distribution:- Departmental

P.3.D.

Protocol

C.0.- Kr. Carter

D.T.D. Copies to:-

rejected the

potent. He

Saving to

Masington.

The Chinese Counsellor, Ka Chia-chun called on

Bolland on 11 September at his own request to rece

rotest about delays in the release of

cels of films and invitations cards addressed to

the Office of the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in London.

a said that these measures had followed the "bloody

atrocities" committed by the police, special branch

and thugs against staff of the Chinese Chargé'a

Office and were intended to disrupt normal diplomatic

The

work. He demanded that the Custom be instructed-to-

release these goods and that

guarantee thet there would be no repetition of such

"vicious incidente" in future.

нал

reminded MA Hal Bollandgasid that my but been very reluctant to

impose these delayerHowevus, the Peking authorities had rede difficulties about goods destined foryour Kission in and about the packing and despatch

CONFIDENTIAL

/of

CONFIDENTIAL

despatch of personal effects of your staff ling

before we had acted here.

decided to

Lissionė

Lission

release.

We had already

Chinese

the latt

consignments

ie would however expect your

to receive similar treatment.

If in future the Chinese delayed consignments

addressed to

You Doking we would hold You Dakine

Them.

up consignments addressed to the

kaza until those in Peking-=

Ja Bollandsejected the zterents about bloody

atrocities" in London, reminded Ma of the violent

treatment meted out to you and your staff during

the attack on our Office in Feking and also

rejected the protest about delaying the clearance

of Chinese goods here. Heaked for a

guarantee that our people in Peking would be

treated sensibly and in accordance with normal

cfplcnutie practice.

3. Ka refered to

into any die sion but violent

jdonnintay launched into a kerstarting attack on the

"fascist atrocities"

committed by the British

authorities in Hong Kong. At this point Bolland

brought the interview to an

whereupon end, a and his

interpreter, Hsia, began to shout and brandish

their fists. They continued to reve in English

out.

and Chinese as they were escorted se tam jest

4. Please telegraph inmediately details of any

consignments addressed to you and your kission

are being held up by the Chinese so that,

if necessary, we can reimpose delays on goods /addressed

(1438) Did.833246 600mm 9/66 G.W.B.L" QONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

addressed to the Chinese here.

We have not, repeat not, told the prese

of this exchange.

CONFIDENTIAL

Flag

Ardelia

CONFIDENTIAL

5- 5 -

ARCHIVES NO.31

→ SEP 1967

| 123/20

While my submission of 8 September was being considered,

Mr. Ma of the Chinese Office asked to call, clearly with the

intention of protesting about our delay in releasing their

S8) goods being held by Customs. I attach a record of the inter-

view which, as you will see, was no more than an exchange of

statements by Er. Ka and myself, ending in an outburst of

shouting and brandishing of fists when I told Mr. Ma that I

did not want to hear any more about "fascist atrocities" in

Hong Kong and brought the interview to an end. I attach a

Flag E (fo) draft telegram to Peking -

2. Meanwhile, Protocol Department have been instructed to

release these consignments of goods. When Peking have reported

whether consignments of goods addressed to them are being held

up or not, we will decide what further action to take here.

Tel to move.

Iland

(E. Bolland)

12 September, 1967

No publicity

per

12/9

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN RCHIVES No.31

1 SEP 1967

Езро

Record of a Call by the Chinese Counsellor

on 11 September

Ma Chia-chun called at his own request on Mr. Bolland

at 5 p.m. on 11 September. He was accompanied by Mr. Hsieh,

an interpreter.

2. Mr. La said that recently serious incidents had occurred

in that goods and mail addressed to the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires

ad interim and to his office had been unwarrantedly detained

and delayed by the Customs and the Post Office.

(i) A box of invitation cards addressed to the Office

of the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires arrived in London

on 17 August and although the formalities were

completed by the Chargé's Office on 22 August

(application form No. P32-67) the cards had not

yet been released.

(11) Ten cases of film addressed personally to the

Chinese Chargé d'Affaires ad interim arrived in

London on 1 September and although, under British

regulations, no formalities are required for goode

addressed personally to Heade of Mission, the

Customs had refused to release them.

. (111) Also several articles of mail, mostly printed matter,

had been delayed by the G.P.0.

Enquiries made of the Customs authorities elicited the

information that they could not release the goods without

Foreign Office approval.

The Chinese Chargé d'Affaires' Office

CONFIDENTIAL

/had

CUNFIDENTIAL

had accordingly made representations four times by telephone

to Protocol Department and the Head of Protocol Department

and had been informed that Protocol Department could not

release the goods without authority from Far Eastern Depart-

ment. On 7 September representations were made to Kr. Bolland

by telephone, when it was demanded that Mr. Bolland give an

immediate reply and instruct the Customs authorities to release

the goods. No reply was received. The goods had not been

released.

Following the "bloody atrocities" in which police,

special branch and thugs had beaten up the staff of the

Chinese Chargé's Office, there was a continuing police watch

on that Office and members of the staff were tailed when they

left the premises. Additional illegal measures and unwarranted

restrictions were placed on members of the Chinese Office.

Now the Foreign Office was deliberately detaining goods and

mail in order to disrupt normal diplomatic work. The ugly

features of the British authorities and their hostility to

the Chinese people were clearly revealed in the above measures

and Mr. Ka lodged a most urgent and strong protest. He demanded

that Customs be instructed to release the goods and that a

guarantee that there should be no repetition of such vicious

incidents should be given. Otherwise the British Government

must accept the consequences.

5. Br. Bolland said that we had been extremely reluctant

to impose delays on goods destined for the Chinese Chargé's

Office. Mr. Ea however would know as well as he did that the

/Peking

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3-

Peking authorities made difficulties about goods destined

for our Mission in Peking and about packing and despatch of

the personal effects of our staff. Such delays had been

known in Peking long before there were any delays in London.

6. Before Mr. Ma called it had been decided to inform him

that we would release all the consignments he had mentioned

and give the necessary instructions to Customa. We should

however expect that our Mission in Peking would receive similar

treatment. If similar consignments in Peking were interrupted

in the future or if the Chinese continued to refuse assistance

in the packing and despatch of the personal effects of the

members of our staff, we should take similar action in London.

7. We would much prefer to expedite all consignments,

however, and would see that this was done provided that the

same was arranged in Feking.

8. Mr. Bolland rejected the statements about the "bloody

atrocities" in London. We knew quite well what had happened

here and in Peking. Only today he had read an account of the

happenings in Peking when women as well as men were beaten

and our Mission was burnt by an invading mob. He also rejected

the protest about the delay in clearing the Chinese gooda.

9.. Mr. Bolland asked for a guarantee that our people in

Peking would be treated sensibly and in accordance with

diplomatic practice.

10. Kr. Ma accepted that we would now release the goods but

complained that we should have done so long ago.

We had no

reason to detain them in the first place. This was a new

/restriction

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

restriction showing further hostility and attempting to

disrupt their normal activities. We would not succeed

in any attempts by quibbling to disguise the vicious deeds

of holding up goods and other actions against the Chinese

people.

11.

Our Kission and its staff in China must observe the

regulations of the Chinese Government. Uur saying that mobs

in Peking invaded the Xission was a slander and Mr. Ma

protested against it.

12. kr. Bolland attempted to interrupt to ask if kr. Ea

approved of the burning of our Mission. Mr. Ma continued

saying that we must be aware of what atrocities were being

perpetrated in Hong Kong where British authorities were

arresting, beating up and torturing Chinese compatriots.

Towering crimes were being committed in Hong Kong by the

British authorities.

13. At this point Mr. Bolland rose and declared the meeting

closed. He led the way to the lift reserved for Under

Secretaries and was accompanied by a shouting and gesticulating

kr. ka and his interpreter, who continued to rave about

atrocities and fascist actions being performed by the British

authorities in Hong Kong. When the lift arrived and Mr. Bolland

tried to show kr. ka into it, the latter did an about turn and

marched towards the lift to the main entrance, closely followed

by his interpreter and Kr. Sharland. No further word waa

exchanged.

COLFIDENTIAL

Kr. de la Kare

Problem

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES Nn 31

13 SEP 1967

in the Clearance of Cobafermenty for fice of the Chinese Cher

in London

C'Affaire

F23/20

A consignment of films and certain other items addressed

to the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires are being held at London Airport pending Foreign Office agreement to their clearance.

The Customs authorities inform us that administrative reasons

can no longer be given for the delay and if the consignments

are not to be released the Foreign Office will have to make it clear to the Chinese that they are being held for political

reasona, i.e. in retaliation for actions by the Chinese against our Mission in Peking. We have to decide whether to release

the consignments and what action to take on future consignments.

Recommendation

2. I recommend that the present consignments be released but that we tell the Chinese that if similar consignments addressed

to the Office of the British Chargé d'Affaires in Peking are delayed, we shall hold up consignments addressed to them until those in Peking are released. Joint Conference and Protocol

Department concur.

Argument and Background

Flag A(28)3.

In his minute of 17 August Kr. Rodgers agreed the recom- Flag B(27) mendation in paragraph 2(c) of Mr. Denson's submission of 11

Bmendation

August that we should write to the Customs and Excise asking

CONFIDENTIAL

/them

CONFIDENTIAL

2 -

them to impose "administrative delays on Chinese baggage".

Flag C2 Kr. Denson did so on 18 August, pointing out that the Chinese

were making difficulties about clearing supplies for our

Mission in Peking and over packing the personal effects of

members of the staff due to leave China. After discussion

with the Customs, it was agreed that the correct procedure

was for the Foreign Office to hold up applications from the

Office of the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires for the clearance of

incoming consignments. A number of outstanding applications

were returned to Protocol Department at the Foreign Office,

this is why the present delay has occurred. Since the attack

on our kission, we have not had an opportunity to ascertain

whether any consignments addressed to our kission in Peking

have been cleared. In the atmosphere prevailing there, it

seems unlikely. We know, for example, that a suitcase bought

for a member of our staff by the wife of a British businessman

was seized by the Chinese when she was taking it to him. So

far as we know, there has been no progress in the packing of

personal effects. No members of the staff are in any case

being allowed to leave.

4. We have to decide whether in present circumstances, when

we are trying to open a dialogue with the Chinese about the

future of our Mission in Peking, it would help this objective

or secure better treatment for our Mission if consignments

are held up. Pending the receipt of the Chinese Foreign

Minister's reply to the Secretary of State's message sent on

/30 August

CONFIDENTIAL

30 August, it is not clear whether the Chinese will be willing

to negotiate about our Mission. In the meantime, we have

decided to continue to enforce but not tighten existing

restrictions on the Chinese here. In the present circumstances,

I think the right course and the one most likely to ensure

that Mr. Hopson will be reasonably treated over such matters

as private letters, newspapers, etc. would be for us to release

consignments now being held. But, in line with our policy on

other matters, we should tell the Chinese that we expect that

any items consigned to our Office in Peking or any item which

we wish to send out will in future be cleared expeditiously by

the Chinese authorities. If they are not, we shall take

counter-measures against the Chinese Office here. We can then

inform Mr. Hopson of the action taken and ask him to report

on the position in Peking.

5. I have just heard that the Chinese say that they will be

receiving a bill for storage charges for some of their delayed

packages and that they will send this to the Foreign Office

for payment. If they do, I suggest we return it reminding

them of the infinitely greater claims we have against them for

the damage caused to our Mission in Peking.

Bollan

سماج

(E. "Bolland)

8 September, 1967

/I agree

CONFIDENT IAL

CONFIDENTIAL

I agree with the recommendation.

On a strict basis of

reciprocity we should continue to delay clearance of this

consignment since the Chinese have made difficulties for us in

Peking over the clearance of our effects, etc., and the present

delays which we have imposed here are merely retaliation

against action taken against us by the Chinese.

But if you

accept the proposition which I put up on other papers yesterday

that we should try to combine reciprocity with relaxation,

rather than to make reciprocity the argument for ever-increasing

controls, I think that in this case we should act as Mr.

Bolland proposes. If the Chinese do not respond to this small

gesture then we should impose longer delays on the next Chinese

consignment here than we have done on this one. But in the

meantime we should arrange for it to become known to the

Chinese both here and in Peking that in the interests of

common sense and orderly diplomatic practice we will expedite

the handling of Chinese consignments here if they will do the

same at their end. If you agree with this I shall do the

necessary to get the idea put across to the Chinese.

in Rodgers

W.J. de kahram

(A.J. de la Mare) 8 September, 1967

al to

OK: hat it must be so for with sharetien citent seciprocity. Houng make our Jestars in mot steal firm. No pellect, I test??

11/9

LTR 11.9.6)

Mile

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Den on

Reference

RECEIVED IN

+SEP 1967

Fc3po

Mr. Howland of Glen Line telephoned yesterday afternoon. He was worried about the restrictions on Chinese nationals. Olen Line ships are normally crewed by Chinese holding C.P.R. passports and Mr. Howland wishes us to confirm that his crews will not be held in port. Also, some thirteen C.P.R. nationals will shortly be going ashore in London to go to Newcastle to take delivery of a new Glen Line vessel. I promised to confirm to Mr. Howland that there will be no question of Glen Line's employces being held up and that the restrictions are only being applied at present to holders of diplomatic and official Chinese pass- I ports.

Can

for adrise, plan?

I halour

(E. J. Sharland) 31 August, 1967.

Immigration offices have

advised only to

bem

act agunt chuim

Sticians Seama win north

affertes.

Mr Sharlant

Jom Dins |||

I have informed

M Hoa Lanot

mot of the above

the above und

paman sade

& give

him advares samming of

Chawen

ва

to stand the intrictions to atten

妙

Chailand

CONFIDENTIAL

MINISTER OF STATE

FOREIGN OFFICE

Juizzen

HOME OFFICE"

WHITEHALL - $.W.I

22nd August, 1967

RECE ARCHIV.

31 AUG 12...

Fc3/20

Retaliation against the Chinese in Britain

This is a reply to the Foreign Secretary's minute of 14th August. and to a minulé of 2k Auqurc

We have deferred the issue of a visa for a Chinese coming to replace

one of the N.C.N.A. staff and I see no great difficulty in continuing to

refuse visas. But the question of refusing re-entry visas for Chinese

resident here will need further study by officials.

Immigration officers will co-operate in the Foreign Office system of

diplomatic exit visas to the extent of (a) drawing a departing traveller's

attention to the need to have a diplomatic exit visa endorsed in his passport

before leaving and (b) informing the Foreign Office they have done so, but

without in any way impeding departure. This co-operation cannot extend to

travellers for Ireland: there is no immigration control of the Irish traffic.

As to expulsion of the N.C.N.A. staff here we consider that, in view of

the wholly exceptional circumstances, this would be justified in the event of

the Chinese taking further and more drastic action against Mr. Grey, Reuter's

representative in Peking; but that in the event of the Chinese action being

directed against our Mission in Peking the appropriate counter-action should

be directed at the Chinese on the diplomatic list here, which would fall within

the Foreign Office sphere.

CONFIDENTIAL

/Any

CONFIDENTIAL

Any N.C.N.A. staff whom it was decided to expel would be given 48 hours

Nothing would be said to them about a right to make

to leave the country

representations to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate. If they were to purport

to exercise this right, we would deny them an extension of stay for this purpose.

The C.M.M. representation procedure is not apt for a case where deportation is

proposed for political purposes.

شما

DAVID ENNALS

CONFIDENTIAL

Has seen

Mr. Thomsoд

CONFIDENTIAL

enter

GARCHIVE:

31 AUG 1967

Fe 3/201

Relations with the Chinese:

Action

decided upon at your Meeting last night

Exit from the United Kingdom

The Home Office agreed to send out instructions that

holders of passporta of the Chinese People's Republic should

not be permitted to leave the country. They said that it

was possible to make these arrangements for holders of

ordinary and official passports under the Aliens Order but

there were two difficulties:

(i) they could not prevent holders of

diplomatic passports from leaving, even if

they had not complied with the requirement,

communicated to the Chinese Mission on the

morning of 22 August, that they needed an

Exit Permit issued by the Foreign Office

before they could leave the country. If

a holder of a diplomatic passport were

found attempting to leave the country without

this visa the Immigration Officer could draw

his attention to the requirement but could not

detain him;

(11) the Irish gap. The Republic of Ireland

is within the "free travel area" and no

restrictions are placed on movement between

the United Kingdom and Ireland.

Chinese

/could

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Cannot be done.

could thus leave the United Kingdom through

Ireland.

It was agreed to draft an amendment to the Aliens Act to cover

these two contingencies: the cooperation of the Irish

authorities would be required on the second.

2. This morning however the Legal Advisers have come to the

conclusion that it is impossible to amend the Act to deal with

the exit of diplomats since they are covered not by the Aliens

Act but by the Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act.

The Legal Adviser is in consultation with the Solicitor-

General as to ways and means to get round this.

Restriction on the N.C.N.A.

41 A

3. The five members of N.C.N.A. (three men and two women)

are being notified that they must report to the police twice

daily at 11 a.m. and 6 p.m. and must not change their residence.

This order should be issued today.

4 It was agreed not to expel N.C.N.A. for the present because

we needed Chinese hostages here to compensate for our own people

being held hostage in China.

C Restrictions on the Chinese Mission

5. It was agreed that freedom of movement of members of the

Chinese Mission without authority would now be restricted to

five instead of $5 miles from Marble Arch.

6. It was also agreed that the Chinese Mission should be

instructed that they were to cease using their diplomatic

wireless transmitter until it was possible for our own

/mission

CONFIDENTIAL

· 3-

mission in Peking to use theirs.

You informed Mr. Shen Ping, the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires

of these restrictions when you saw him at 11 p.m. last night.

C.f. de lub

(A.J. de la Mare) 23 August, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.

CONFIDENT IAL

理學

Fa1153

མ མ ་ཎྞ་པ་ཡ་

1967

FC 3120

Lord Dunrossi

Dungeet

Mr. R. V. T. Pryor of the GPO's External Telecommunications Executive (Tel. HEAdquarters 3691) telephoned to say that the GPO thought it was an opportune moment to remind the Foreign Office of the services they were providing for the New China Newadgency. These are:

(1) The provision of a telegraph circuit

between the Agency's offices in Hampstead (26 Ferncroft Avenue, N.1.3.) and their offices in Neuilly sur Seine, near Paris (there is a similar telegraph circuit provided by the French and Swiss PTT between Neuilly sur Seine and Geneva).

(2) The OPO listen in to a daily radio

transmission from Peking. Normally two pictures a day are received over this circuit and these are taken straight off the radio receiving set and passed by land line to the NONA's premises in Hampstead.

He said that the GPO could, if the Foreign Office wished, moniter both these services.

2. After having discussed this with you I telephoned Mr. Pryor and thanked him for this timely reminder. I said that we would let him know in the fairly near future whether we wished action to be taken on these lines, but meanwhile the GPO should continue to provide these services to the NCNA.

Mi Parnami

(B. V. WHITE) GENERAL DEPARTMENT 30 August, 1967.

FED.

زیر

spoke.

You wire be letting

in know if anything fartha weads to be sand to

Ave

/we

Junmovil

CONFIDENTIAL

3078

We might consider action agamise N.C.N.A.

by the interruption of

родны

then saving f

no progen s

ŵ made over

wannatri fun

Pekny

A.. Day

agore

we do most-

wrt

Jim Denon

مه

318

tj po

lim.

Wanal-

ti güve

Chien an

with on

cut communications with

dinia. If they do the fir

구시

might well

cul N.C.N.A.'s links.

Afatis

SECRET

Reference.

Mr. Bolland

JLr 1967

F23/201

Lord Dunrossil informed me today that the General Post Office had told his Department that if we wished by could interfere with the telephone com- munications of the New China News Agency's house at Hampstead. I said that for the moment we were not intending to impose further restrictions on the Chinese but were grateful for the offer, which we might like to take up at a later stage if the Chinese became more difficult in Peking.

2. We have also learnt from secret sources that the N.C.N.A. are probably operating a walkie-talkie from the house in Hampstead to the Chinese Mission in Portland Place. If this is so they are in breach of some law of regulation of broadcasting. The authorities could on the basis of this enter the premises and take action to neutralise the set. We have told those concerned that for the moment we wish no action to be taken.

John Denson

(J. B. Denson) 30 August. 1967

Copy to:

Mr. Wilson

I agree.

Если

Entire P.A.

P.4. C

SECRET

Correspondence to this address must be unde Louble goyer.

The quter envelope should be addressed

CRET

The Secretary. Box 500, PARLIAMENT STREET B.O., LONDON, S.W.1.

and not to any individual.

Telephone Nos. 01-734 6050 Ext.....

01-930 6789 Ext...

778

Our Ref.: SF 84/China/4/D4/1MMT

Your Ref.:

BOX No. 500.

PARLIAMENT STREET B.O..

LONDON, S.W.1.

30th August, 1967

prosin

مل اله

For the attention of Mr. David Wilson, Far Eastern Dept.

De auto'ss facte,

As requested on the telephone today, I attach photographs of Chinese Officials at the C.D.M., c.c.o., N.C.N.A. and Bank of China, as set out in the list sent to you on 23rd August. (We have no photograph of LIU CHIH MING.c.0, SUNG KUO HUA, Baue of Chima

I also attach a note of two names which were omitted from that list.

Your siml.

си

whank

M.M. Lachlan

Miss E.G. Forsyth,

P.U.S.D.,

Foreign Office.

Enos; ML/GV

RECEIVED IN

VEG Nr 31

SECRET

31 AUG 1967

FC3/20

Additions

Chinese Commercial Office 4-7 Gloucester Gate, N.W.1.

FENG CHEN CHUAN

7458/2182/3123

S 017348

WENG TU HSU (Wife of HUANG CHIEN MO) S 001372 5040/0960/1645

CONFIDENT LAT

Reference

RECEIVED 4......

ARCHIVES No 31

Mr. Ders

FC3/20

Exit Pézmits for the Chinese in Britain

On instructions I spoke to Mr. bu of the Chinese office this evening. I told him, at dictation speed, that "as from 6 p.m. today 22 August all members of the Office of the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires would require exit permits before leaving Britain. The same would apply to all members of official Chinese organisations in this country such as the N.C.N.A., the Bank of China, Trading Corporations resident in London etc. These exit permits could be obtained by applying to Far Eastern Department, A note explain ing this in detail would be sent as soon as possible", I also repeated the important parts in Chinese.

2. Mr. Du (who clearly had someone at his elbow) replied by saying that this was yet another political provocation against the Chinese Mission in London against which he strongly protested. I told him that if he wished to protest the Foreign Office rejected his protest in view of what mobs ofChinese hooligans in Peking had done to the British Mission there. I said that if he wished to know the reason for this measure he should listen to the B.B.C. of any other news this evening.

I attach

the Chinen.

は

Note

seur.

ра

ewik

(D. G. Wilson) 22 August 1967

draft note t

应

ん

CONFIDENTIAL

Your Ref: FC 3/20

Our Ref: 38779/67

CONFIDENTIAL Pse submit

H.M. CUSTOMS And Excise AND EXCISE

**KING'S beam house, MARK LANE

LONDON E.C.3

MANSION HOUSE ISIS

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.31

ZO AUG 1967

F23/1/20

urguth

with popr.

? PA. plea

29th August, 1967.

시

Dear Denson,

In view of Ashford's absence on leave, I am replying to your letter dated 18th August regarding the possibilities of our co-operation with you in retaliatory action against the Chinese Mission in London.

When diplomatic privilege is claimed at importation, whether on unaccompanied baggage or on supplies for the mission or for individual diplomats, application has to be made to the Protocol and Conference Department of the Foreign Office who pass on the application to us so that we can issue instructions to our Officers to release the goods. If your Protocol department can be instructed not to send us applications from the Chinese Mission we shall not be able to proceed in respect

of these importations. There is one such application at present on hand (TPP1/110/31) and perhaps you would say whether the Protocol Department

would like it to be returned to them,

regards exports, provision exists for the Protocol Department

to notify us of baggage exportations with the object of facilitating the movement, although there is no pre-entry requirement for unaccompanied baggage. At present notifications are often not received until after exportation has taken place, and in these circumstanoesit does not seem that any delaying procedure by the Protocol Department would have much practical effeot.

J.B.Denson Esq., 0.B.E.,

Foreign Office,

London, S.T.1.

Yours sincerely,

Homill

(H.A. O'Nedll).

CONFIDENTIAL

花

CONFIDENTIAL

пр.с

MR. DE LA MARE

ساء

SECRETARY OF STATE

48.

RECEIVED IN {ARCHIVES No 31

2. AUG 1967

FC3/201

FC 3/1/20

ACTION AGAINST MEMBERS OF NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY

I discussed this matter (Mr. Denson's

Minute attached) with Mr. Thomson. His view

is that our principal objective should be to

make it as difficult as possible for the N.C.N.A.

to function here, but if possible to avoid

action which would simply call down Chinese reprisals against either Mr. Grey of Reuter or our own people in Peking. The best outcome would

be if the N.C.N.A. staff were in practice kept

confined to their house under a sort of

voluntary house arrest (corresponding to Mr. Grey's situation) through the presence of a police guard

outside. If the notices are served and the

N.C.N.A. members disregard the order to report to the police the law might then have to take its course and this could lead to their summonsing and sertancing to imprisonment. This might simply

lead to the imprisoning of Mr. Grey.

Subject to the Secretary of State's views,

/the

CONFIDENTIAL

the Minister of State thought that we

should try to get the Home Office to

proceed on these lines.

Denis Allen.

(Denis Allen)

25 August, 1967

The Secretary of State Youd

Mi-Dula Maic

he agrees with the view in the first paría grape of Sur D. Alleria minite. I have spoken to the

Home Office who

have mistructed the price

accordingly.

John Denson

25 Anguri

No moricio have bem served.

Jon Denton

HA"

CONFIDENTIAL

28 Angan.

Mr. de la Hare

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN ¿ARCHIVES No.31

2. AUG 1967

FC3/20

I was informed this morning by Mr. Burley of the Home Office that yesterday the police tried to serve notices on the five members of N.C.N.A. requiring them to report twice daily to a police station. They were denied entry to the houses where the N.C.N.A. personnel live but were able to read out the notice to one of the women. She said that the N.C.N.A. had no intention of complying with the notice and that any communication should in future be made through the Office of the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires. Kr. Burley tells me that under the Aliens Order the police have no right to force an entry into the premises. They will now try to intercept the N.C.N.A. if they leave the houses to go to the Chinese diplomatic Mission or for any other purpose and serve the notices on them in the street. This is obviously a chancy business.

2. Kr. Burley told me that the matter was being referred to Home Office Ministers. One course of action would be to summons the N.C.N.A. personnel for obstructing a police officer in the course of his duty. They could then be brought before a magistrate and presumably sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Alternatively, if the police succeed in serving the notices in the street and those concerned ignore them, they could also be summonsed and, subject to the case being proved, sent to prison. To send them to prison would obviously go beyond what had been contemplated originally, which was merely harrassment, and we would no doubt wish to consider its political consequences. Mr. Burley will be in touch with me again after the Home Office have given the matter further consideration.

Copied to: Private Secretary.

Sii D. After

John Denson

(J. B. Depson) 24 August, 1967.

we await H ног

See Sind. Alleni mwate

& 25 Anguer.

further reas

Af.de Whan

24/0

pe.

CONFIDENTIAL

Far Eastern Department

From: THE PRIVATE SECRETARY

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.31

25 AUG 1967

Dear Mr. Day,

HOME OFFICE

WHITEHALL, S.W.1

23rd August, 1967.

F.E.

I have

have the

Fel t

Rome

I attach the cable about which I spoke

M23/

to you on the telephone. I would be grateful if you could see that it is sent to Rome

urgently.

I telephoned the Minister, Mr. Scott, this

morning and he has arranged for the cable to

be taken on to Salerno.

Yours sincerely,

M.A. dayla

D. Day, Esq.

(MISS) M. A. CLAYTON

autê

пре

не

E.R.

Cable to Secretary of State

Following action taken against Chinese in retaliation:-

(a) Certain holders of Chinese passports to be refused

leave to embark under Aliens Order. Order being amended

to-day by Order-in-Council to cover travel to Ireland,

despite difficulty of enforcement.

Purpose of move is

retention of hostages until safety of our people in

Peking is assured. No question therefore of

deportations at this stage. Restriction would be

enforced against diplomats, journalists and certain

other classes.

(b) Restriction orders under Aliens Order imposed on

five New China News Agency staff requiring twice-daily

reporting to police etc. in retaliation for action

against Reuter's correspondent.

not to be granted.

Visas for replacements

Chinese diplomats, and they are being kept under

surveillance by the police,

This is all that can be done in Home Office sphere at

present. We see nothing here making it necessary for you to

consider returning, but thought you should know of action

which has been taken on Prime Minister's directions.

F2 3/20

CONFIDENTIAL COVERING SECRET

25 August, 1967.

I undertook to let you know the details about the system of exit viene which we are imposing on Chinese nationals helding diplomatic and official passporta.

Lantern

2. A copy of the Note dated 23 ingust which we have addressed to the offics of the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires has already been sent to your Department. I now snelose a list of Chinese" to whom the new system will apply. The procedure we propose to adopt is that the Chinone will be required to send their passports to Far Easter Department of the Foreign Office at least forty-eight hours before they wish to leave. They will be required to specify the date of their departure, the method of travel and point of departure. Far Eastern Lepartment will then decide whether a visa is to be granted. If so, Passport Control Department will be responsible for affixing an appropriate stamp in the passport and returning it to the Chinese öffion. The stamp would be in the following ternai- "Seen at the Foreign office and valid for departure via

within a period of months."

3. As I understand it, under the new Order in Council, Inmigration Officers will be empowered to prevent non-fiplomatio Chinese nationals from anbarking. In the event of a diplomat (who would be exempt from the provisions of the order) trying to leave the country without an exit visa, we hope that it will be found possible to detain him by administrative means until the Foreign Offies has had time to take action with the Chinese Mission.

(J. B. Danson)

p.a.

8. H. I. Burley, Esq.;

Immigration and Ratioanlity Department,

Home Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy (with enclosure) to: Mr. Mitchell, P.C.D.

14. 0744

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.

FZ-3/20

DRAFT Letter

To:-

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret. Secret.

Confidentl

Restricted

Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

To Confidence

S.H.E. Burley, Esq.,

Immigration and

Nationality Department,

Home Office,

Princeton House,

271, High Holborn,

London, W.C.1.

Type 1 +

From

J.B. Denson.

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

I undertook to let you know the details

about the system of exit visas which we are imposing on Chinese nationals holding diplomatic

and official passports.

A copy of the Note dated 23 August which we

have addressed to the Office of the Chinese

Chargé d'Affaires has already been sent to your

Department. I now enclose a list of Chinese to

enclope

whom the new system will apply. The procedure

In my dos us, we propose to sdopt is that the Chinese will be

PP.CO.

Fine.

(Hm.

25/8

Far

required to send their passports to Far Eastern

Department of the Foreign Office at least 48 hours.

before they wish to leave. They will be required

to specify the date of their departure, the

method of travel and point of departure.

Eastern Department will then decide whether a

visa is to be granted. If so, Passport Control

Department will be responsible for affixing an

appropriate stamp in the passport and returning

would be in

it to the Chinese Office. The stamp witÌxbEx¤¤ the following terms:- fattasxx "Šeen at the Foreign Office and valið

for departure via

months."

within a period of

As I understand it, wonder the new

1. teful

/for

ᎤᏗ

Order in comment, Immigration officers

for the

-operation of your Immigration

Officers in checking that the Chinese

personnel concerned possess the requested

exit vise and informing us if they do not

I who wond

exempt from th

provisimo pone Onded)

will be emproced to prevent

non. Di promatri

Chime nationauto

враго

from embarking,

In the event of a

дерьмон duplomon tryi

та темите ужи

comity without

your visa,

We hope that

17. um be

forum porsion to detain mini

By administrative,

win the

have

Fasujin Fornjin my hus

hai

Trine to

YWthe artin uw

Mu Mism.

etim

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN TË THIS MARGIN

SECRET

F23/20 (45)

1. Chinese Diplomatic Mission

49 Portland Place, W.1.

SHEN PING

3088/1627

TA CHIA CHU

7456/1367/7486

TSAO LI 2580/5408

CHAO TSE KIN 6392/3419/3046

CHEN SZU CHUN 7115/1835/5028

CHENG YUEH

6774/6885

HSIEH CHT MEI 6200/0796/5019

XU HSIN (F) 7357/2450

Counsellor

D 000534

Counsellor

D 000536

Wife of MA CHIA CHUN

D 000537

2nd Sec. (Press)

D 001165

Attaché (Consular)

D 000550

3rd Sec. (Cultural)

D 005743

3rd Seo.

D 000544

Wife of WU HSIN AN

D 002113

1st Sec. (Returned

to Peking on 11.7.67.)

LI HUI TING

2621/2585/1016

Functionary

$ 007185

LI TIEN CHANG 2621/3013/2490

Clerk (Press)

S 000143

LIU CHENG HSUEH

Clerk

8 013863

0491/2417/1331

LIU JU TSAT

Clark

S 000158

0491/3067/2088

LU TSUNG MIN

Clerk

S 000144

0712/5115/2404

LUNG ESENG TIN

Clark

S 002090

7893/1073/3944

MENG HSIEN YING (F) Clerk

S 002354

1322/2009/5391

SUN CHIA SHEN 1327/2535/3234

Clerk

S 017433

ESING CHING YU 2582/1987/0327

Clerk

S 017452

WANG CHUNG HSU 3769/1504/4872

Clerk

S 002169

YANG TE SHUAN 2799/1795/0356

YU SHEN CHI

0060/1957/1807

Cook

S 017220

Driver

$ 013843

SECRET

2. Chinese Commercial Office

4-7 Gloucester Gate, N,W,2.

CHANG LUNG KEN

Clerk

$ 000132

1728/7893/2704

CHANG PET TU (F)

Clerk

S 000128

1728/0160/3768

CHAO CHIN KAO

Clerk

$ 017349

6392/0193/5399

CHIN MEI SHENG

Clerk

S 007599

6855/2734/3932

HO WEN CHT

Clerk

S 000130

0149/2429/5282

HOU CHIN CHING

Clerk

S 007292

0186/6651/7230

HSIA YUN FU 1115/0336/6346

HSIEH TA TUNG 6200/1129/0681

Clark

S 000141

Clerk/Seo.

S 007310

HOANG CHILEAN HỌ

Clerk

S 000134

7806/1696/6206

KO PAO CHIA 5514/0202/1367

Clerk

S 009883

LI MSI JUI

Driver

$ 007255

2621/6932/3843

LI HUNG TU 2621/1347/0956

LI I PIAO

2621/5030/5903

LI SHENG CHANG 2621/3932/4545

LIU CHIH MING 0491/1807/2494

LU HSING PAO 7120/5281/1405

SHIH SUNG SHENG 2457/2646/3932

WANG CHEN PU

3769/2182/2528

WANG CHING NU 3769/6945/2976

YIN HUI PI

1438/6540/3880

Clerk

Clark

S 007031

Clerk

S 015565

Functionary/

S 007256

Attendant

S 016117

Trade Attaché

S 000154

5 000151

Functionary

S 007051

S 023795

Clark

S 000139

SECRET

3. New China News Agency

26 Ferncroft Avenue, N.W.3.

YU HANG 0060/2635

LIN CHING (7) 2651/7230

LI FU

2621/1381

CHING HUI CHIN (F) 2529/1920/3830

WANG TUAN SHENG

3769/4551/3932

Correspondent

S 008627

Wife of YU HANG S 008568

Clerk and T/P S 025101 operator

T/P operator

Seo/Clerk and

S 023418

S 001371

Driver

4. Bank of China

111 Cannon Street, E.C.4.

SUNG XUO HUA

1345/0948/5478

LI YU HIN 2621/5940/3046

CHIU MIN SHU (F) 6726/2404/1204

Sub-Manager

S 008555

Sub-Manager

$ 005535

Sub-Manager (wife of

WANG WET TSAI Aating Kanager now in China)

$ 010826

SECRET

14 CH20)

Mr. Denson

Den's

Copy to:

Reference

CONFIDENTIAL

I'm

Private Secretary Sir D. Allen Sir F. Vallat Mr. de la Mare

Mr. Stow.

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31

25 AUG 1967

FC3/20.

кс

I told you that Mr. Thomson had told me that the following action by us had been agreed at the Prime Minister's meeting this morning.

We and the Home Office were to agree a list of those Chinese to whom the ban on exit from this country applies. Mr. Thomson commented to me that this presumably meant all Chinese State Servants here. You told me that you had already prepared a list to give to the Home Office.-

We should look at the Vienna Consular Convention, which is of course a schedule to the Diplomatic Privileges Act, to see whether there might be anything else we could at some point withdraw from the Embassy on the basis of lack of reciprocity which could be done by Order-in-Council. I am trying to get in touch with Mr. Stow separately about this.

Arsuthull

(H.J. Arbuthnott)

23 August. 1967

X I have now spoken to Mr Hendby who

is looking into 2).

ра

223/2

CONFIDENTIAL

To auto.

SECRET

(43

Fe3/20.

24 August, 1967.

I am returning herewith, duly signed by the Forein Secretáry, the Statutory Instrument which you

enclosed with your letter to me of 23 August.

Miss M.A. Clayton,

Private Secretary,

Home Office.

SECRET

'S¿.. M. Day

See

-/43

From the Private Secretary

(42)

SECRET

Dear Mr. Day,

| RÉCEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.31 2 5 AUG 1967

Fc3/20

HOME OFFICE

WHITEHALL

S.W I

23rd August, 1967

At the meeting at No.10 this morning it was agreed that an Order in Council should be made to enable the Government to impose immigration restrictions on aliens travelling between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man.

The enclosed Statutory Instrument, which I mentioned to you on the telephone, applies the restrictions allowed by the

For new Order to Nationals of the People's Republic of China. obvious reasons, the Statutory Instrument must be signed as soon as possible and I would therefore be grateful if you could

It obtain the Foreign Secretary's signature to it tonight. must not, of course, be signed before the Order-in-Council has been made and I will therefore telephone you as soon as we hear that the Privy Council (which I understand is meeting at 6 p.m.) have agreed to it.

The Home office

have

confeined

that

the

Order her

been

made.

1-1=3/2

Yours incerely,

M.A.

clayton

(MISS) M.A.CLAYTON

да

Mr. Denso JB Mr Billow/or The Thicken

D. Day, Esq.

F.Div. Copy

ре

Pcd. ДС

and Ihr Anderson

Legan Halviser

ん

W.42

FZ3/20 (W.L

STATUTORY

INSTRUMENTS

1967 No.

ALIENS

EMBARKATION

The Aliens (Embarkation) (Restriction) Order 1967

Made

23rd August 1967

In pursuance of the powers conferred on me by the Aliens Order 1967(a), I hereby make the following Order:-

1. Notwithstanding anything in Article 3(1) of the Aliens Order 1953(b), the restrictions imposed by Article 1 of that Order relating to embarkation shall apply in respect of any alien, being a national of the People's Republic of China, in relation to embarkation in a ship or aircraft bound for a place

within the common travel area.

2. Notwithstanding anything in paragraph (5) of Article 7 of the said Order, the requirements in paragraphs (1) and (2) of

and that Article relating to the documents to be produced by,

the examination of, persons embarking or seeking to embark in the United Kingdom shall apply in the case of any person in whose case an immigration officer requires the production of any such document by, or requires to examine, that person in order to determine whether that person is an alien to whom Article 1 of

thia Order relates.

3. This Order may be cited as the Alien? (Fabarkation)

(Restriction) Order 1967.

One of Her Majesty's Principal Secresdries of State

23rd August 1967.

(a)

(b) 8.I. 1953/1671 (1953 I, p.94).

EXPLANATORY NOTE

wis Note is not part of the Order.)

This Order prohibits nationals of the People's Republic of China from embarking in the United Kingdom in a ship or aircraft bound for a place in the "common travel area" (the United Kingdom, the Channel Islanda, the Isle of Man and the Republic of Ireland) without the leave of an immigration officer.

{