FCO 21/871 International future of Hong Kong

2/2

FILE No

FEH

PART.

STAMI

YEAR

1971

SEC

NB. UP

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed when ever necessary.)

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPT.

H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

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FILE No. FEH 2/2

(Part )

TITLE: INTERNATIONAL FUTURE OF

HONG KONG

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(and dept, when necessary)

SEE:

DATE

(and dept. when necessary)

SEE:

FCO 21/8/71

CLOS

UNTIL

002

427

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed when ever necessary.)

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry Address

Room No...871

King Charles Street.

YEAR STAMP

1971

'CS. 41A

2600077

15,000-4/71-806-423

NZEF.

TS 7/1162/46 IV

J AL Morgan Esq FED

FCO

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN

[REGISTRY No.51 - 5 JAN 1972

FEH $19

Dear John,

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT

LOWER ALBERT ROAD

HONG KENG

28 December, 1971

Паважува

Ence

17. Morgan Is. No Crown in Mr Hervey

Mar 141

The bannyworn to see

Torea with

THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG

uphy

torby's dats ALMugan

Thank you for your letter HKK 4/1 of 3 December. 12 (

So far as ve can see the news of what CHOU En-lai told Malcolm MacDonald is leaking out in any case on the initiative of the Chinese Government. For example, you will have seen the little report in 'Nevsveek' of December 13 (copy enclosed). I therefore think, and the Governor agrees, that we should leave moderately well alone and mount no specific leaking operation of our own, In this particular respect Chinese leaks are so much more credible than our own.

On the other hand ve see every advantage in telling Shell, in strict confidence, what transpired between Chou and MacDonald. From our point of view for Shell to invest in a refinery would be a great creator of confidence far more than leakage of Chou's remarks, so I suggest that with Shell you need not be quite so cagey.

I think we stand to gain most from leaving some haze over what precisely Chou said. It will no doubt occur to you that while its implications for the moment are good, those for 1997 are not. Young people here are already disturbed about the end of the lease and we certainly do not want to disturb them further by giving too precise currency to a statement that they might read to mean that the Chinese Government has decided to change the status of the Colony by 1997.

The source of Shell's information may be Sir Douglas Clague to whom I gave a brief account of CHOU E n-lai's remarks to Malcolm MacDonald on this subject. Clague did not react with any surprise. He said that what CHOU En-lai had said was what he had always understood. The Governor thinks that he too probably indicated when he lunched at Shell House in London, and the question of the refinery came up, that the omens vere as good as they had ever been, and that MacDonald's talk with Chou had confirmed this.

LAST PAPER

cc R C Samuel Esq Peking

Your

Aller:

~n ever

(A F Maddocks)

CONFIDENTIAL

THE PERISCOPE

STRUGGLE ON THE SKI SLOPES

Next year's Winter Olympics in Japan may lack Its star attractions, the world's topilight Alpine skiers. Avery Brundage, 84-year-old head of the International Olympic Committee, has restated his adament opposition to "subsidized" skiers, Last summer, when he lifted a ban no ten top skiers (for working as paid instructors), the ski world read it as a clear track. A new letter from Brutninge changed things. Such French aces as Jean-Noel Augert and Isabelle Mir, as well as Austrie's Karl Schranz (whose "amateur" salary is put at $80,000 a year), now appear out, and the Fédération Internationale de Ski is planning a meet in Europe to rival the Olympics.

NORTH KOREA'S OPENING DOOR

North Korea, like China, appears ready to re- open its doors to American newsmen. President Kim 11 Sung has told his officials that when the talks with South Korea escalate to the full-dress stage (so far only Red Cross-sponsored meetings with Scout have been held), North Korea will have to admit some US, and other Western newsmen to cover them in Pyongyang

PRICES AND POLLUTION

Some industrialists seeking above-the guideline price hikes will soon have an unexpected ally, President Nixon's antipollution chief William Ruckelshaus. He is expected to lobby the Price Commission for increases needed to pay for new antipollution programs and equipment.

MORE EGYPTIANS IN RUSSIAN COCKPITS

The Russians have finally yiekled to Cairo's pleading und will train Egyptian pilots on the missile-armed TU-16 Soviet bombers. A score of the planes have been in Egypt for some time, and more were fown in this month. The Russians, however, intended them as a counter to the United States' Méditerranean-based Sixth Fleet and insisted on full control. The hombers in Egypt rny Egyptian markings but have been manned by Russian pilots.

X SOFT WORDS FROM PEKING

A Hong Kong businessman has come back from China with a soothing message. A Chinese official whose rank insures that he had prior approval from Peking tokl the businessman that no moves would be made against Hong Kong or Taiwan for a long time to come, even though the Mao gov- ernment claims both. Hong Kong, China's main

Newsweek, December 13, 1971

source of foreign exchange, is apparently too im portant economically. The Chinese official re- peated Chou En-lai's statements that Taiwan would be liberated, but "peacefully." Diplomat. think this reflects the Chinese view that waiting. no matter how long, is better then hasty action. It may also indicate a wish to avoid, in some dis- tant, post-Chiang Kai-shek era, a move by the Taiwanese to set up an independent country.

TIGHTENING UP AT THE SEC

Staff members at the Securities and Exchange Commission, long rated among the most free- wheeling bureaucrats in Washington, are keeping a wary eye on their chairman, William Casey. When he arrived last spring, Casey was appalled at what he considered lack of organization. Ile has been recruiting a "whiz kid" tearn of Wali Street lawyers to lighten up the agency.

BUTTONING THE STIFF UPPER LIP

British forces in bomb-racked Northern Ireland have received quiet orders from London to stop claiming successes against the Irish Republican Army guerrillas. The "victory" statements have been producing fresh waves of IRA bombings and sniping to disprove them. The high command decided the casualties and darnage to British credibility weren't worth the effort.

ANOTHER CONNALLY ON THE HORIZON

The political world will soon have another Texas Connally to reckon with. With Treasury Secre- tary John already a power in Washington, young- er brother Wayne, a state sennlor in Austin, plans to run for lieutenant governor. John opposed the move but will back it because, as one Texas politico put it: "He can't let Wayne loše."

WHO TALKS AT WHOSE SUMMIT

Despite President Nixon's oft-repeated word that he will speak only for the U.S. in Peking and Moscow, at least one U.S. ally is taking no cliances. Lendon has told the White House pri- vately that while the British will give him their views freely in his pre-China summit meetings, they want to emphasize that they will do their own talking at their own sumimits.

LBJ WRITES AGAIN

With his Presidential memoirs out of the way, Lyndon Johnson plans another book. This one, he tells friends, will cover his years as a wheeling-dealing star in the House and Senate.

HKK 4/1

A F Maddocks Esq HONG KONG

CONFIDENTIAL

Dessakred

3 December 1971

3/12

the

THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG

1. The Regional Director of Shell (Mr Hughes) has told me that he has heard from a reliable source in Hong Kong (which he would not disclose) that Chou En-lai had given Mr MacDonald certain assurances about the future of Hong Kong. He asked whether I could confirm this as it would greatly affect their decision on whether to invest in a new refinery. I replied that I understood the subject had been mentioned and that Ir MacDonald would be referring to it in the articles he intended writing for the Sunday Times.

2. You will recall that I telegraphed to Peking (POO Tel No 750) saying that we would see considerable advantage in his including the full wording but he replied that he would only like to do ao in general terms (Peking Tel No 1094).

3. On 29 November I asked Kr MacDonald about his articles. He said that they were not yet completed and that he might not have time to do so before he left for Afrios (where he will be until before Christmas). He said that he intended saying staply that the Chinese had indicated that they did not intend raising the question of the Kowloon lease until 1997.

It may be that when we have seen the form of words he decides to use we would wish to consider letting the exact wording given to me by P'ei (PCO Tel No 772) become disore- tely disseminated. I should be grateful for your preliminary thoughts on this and should you consider it worthwhile, what method we could use. In any event we should clearly need to handle it very carefully. We do not wish to foros the Chinese to take the public stand. I should, incidentally, be grateful for any indication you may have of what might have been Shell's source.

J▲ L Morgan

Far Eastern Department

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy toi RO Samueć Eng

PEKING

PRIORITY

CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

FM HONG KONG 239410Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 875 OF 23 NOVEMBER INFO-PEKING.

FEC3/548/3

PEKING TELNO 1172 TO YOU, PARA 6 LAST SENTENCE: SINO-BRITISH

RELATIONS.

I SEE LITTLE ADVANTAGE IN SEEKING FROM THE CHINESE ASSURANCES MORE FORMALLY BINDING THAN THOSE GIVEN TO MR MACDONALD

AND SERIOUS DISADVANTAGE IN INTRODUCING ANY HONG KONG ISSUES IN

THE PRESENT DISCUSSIONS.

FCO PASS COPY TO HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE LONDON.

MACLEHOSE

¿COPIES SENT TO PRIVATE SECRETARY NO 10 DOWNING STREET/

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

FED

NNNNN

RECEIVED IN

REGISTRY No. 51

25 NOV 1971

HKKY/1

CONFIDENTIAL

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2 SCIFIENTIAL

CONFIDENT LAL

INWARD SAVING TELEGRAM

FROM SINGAPORE TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(Office of Commissioner-General for South-East Asia)

By Bag

Keep a copy on file

copy

each to

R.M.K+ Paling with

hikovering letter

FOREIGN OFFICE AND EKITERALL DISTRIBUTION

Lord Selkirk

No 12 Saving

November 12, 1962

CONFIDENTIAL

R. November 14, 1962.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.12 Saving of November 12. Repeated for information Saving to:

Washington Delhi

Peking Hong Kong

Following from Malcolm MacDonald.

Both Chen Yi and Chou En-lai spoke to me at length about British-Chinese rulations. They remarked that these are quite good and friendly, and that they hope for a steady further improvement in the relations. They never hesitated to criticise to me British policies in the past and present with which they disagreed, but they said that we British are experienced and realistic people who understand better than other Western nations what is happening in the world in the Twentieth Century and who in many ways have pursued wise policies.

2. They expressed appreciation of our vote again this year in favour of China's admission to the United Nations. But they expressed the "resentment" of the Chinese people at our reservation about Taiwan, They said that so long as we adopt this attitude towards a territory which is by rights a part of China, they cannot regard our relations as entirely good, and they cannot agree (for example) to an exchange of Ambassadors.

Nevertheless, they said they are not too bothered about Taiwan. Chou En-lai said that this problem has an internal and an external aspect. Internally, Taiwan is part of China, and it is nobody else's business how the Chinese deal with it. It is a matter for settle- ment between the Goverment in Peking and Chiang Kai-shek and his colleagues in Taiwan, The Chinese Government have a perfect right to deal with Chiang Kai-shek in whatever way they think proper. The external aspect of the problem has been created by the Americans' intervention in Taiwan, and by their support for Chiang Kai-shek. The Chinese Government does not propose to settle this issue by force. They have been discussing it and other matters with the Americans for seven years in inter-Ambassadorial talks, with no results whatever so far; and they are prepared to continue these talks if necessary for another seven years. They will be patient because they believe that the majority of the Taiwanese wish to be re-united with China, and that they will express that wish effectively in due course, In the meantime, let the talks with the Americans go on. But the Chinese cannot deprive themselves of their right to take whatever action, including force, they deem right in their dealings with Chiang Kai-shek, since this is an internal question for themselves to decide.

A The Chinese

CONFIDENTIAL

apore telegram No. 12 Saving to Foreim Office

-2-

The Chinese are grateful to Britain and France for having made it clear that they will not support or approve any attempt by Chiang Kai-shek to invade the mainland. I pointed out to Chou E- lai and Chen Yi that they have recently received assurances from the Americans also that they are using their influence in Taiwan to discourage Chiang Kai-shek from any unprovoked attempt, and that they are telling him that he will receive no support from them in such circumstances.

5. Both Chou En-lai and Chen Yi said that one expression of the good relations between Britain and China is the peaceful relation- ship between the Chinese authorities and the authorities in Hong Kong. Chou En-lai spoke appreciatively of the Hong Kong Government's efforts to stop representatives of "the Chiang Kai- shek olique" from using Hong Kong for improper, violent, purposes against China.

6. They expressed some interest in Greater Malaysia, but in a way which indicated that they are not particularly concerned about developments there, Malaya is rather remote from their immediate pre-occupations. They expressed great concern about developments on the Indian-Chinese border, and in Laos, South Viet Nam, Korea and Japan (as well as Taiwan), saying that the Americans are in all those places in one military form or another, and that in them all they pose a threat to Chinese national security. said that he would not refer to American policy in the Philippines Chou En-lai and Malaya, which were further away. Chinese in Malaya and Singapore, he stated tha Peking's policy is But as regards the Overseas the same as it is towards those Chinese in Cambodia, Indonesia and other countries. The Chinese Government have told the Overseas Chinese in those lands that if they wish to remain Chinese, they must take no part whatever in the politics of Cambodia, Indonesia and the other countries respectively. On the other hand, if those Chinese wish to become citizens of those lands, they should be loyal citizens, obeying the laws of their country of adoption, and ceasing to be Chinese nationals in any way.

7. I have already reported in Hong Kong telegram No. 53 what Chou En-lai said to me about trade between Britain and China. I need only add that during that part of our talk he used expressions which indicated resentment against the Russian limita- tions of aid to China, and a consequent determination by the Chinese that they will not become dependent on Russia in trade matters. They would like to expand their trade with other countries with whom they can usefully make exchanges,

8. I have already reported in Hong Kong telegram No. 54 what Chou En-lai and Chen Yi said to me about Britain's attitude to . the Sino-Indian dispute.

0-0-0-0

CONFIDENTIAL

PM 2/2

A F Maddooka Esq ECG IOTA

CONFIDENTIAL

し

Despatched

197/1

16 November 1971

CHOU M-LAI'S REMARKS ABOUT HONG KONG

1. Many thanks for your letter of 29 October.

2. My thoughts had been very much on the same lines as yours on this when we had the first account. P'ei's remarks (FC0 tel No 772 to Peking) have, I think, most usefully cleared up some of the doubts about what Chou En-lai sotually said.

3. The statement, volunteered by P'ei, was noted verbatim by Hugh Davies as follows.

"Hong Kong is a place which will be returned to China, but the Chinese Government had not raised this and it would not be raised for a long time. The Lease of Kowloon expired in 1997. Chian wished to assure the British Government not to think of this in connexion with Taiwan."

I do not think we should read too such into Chou's use of the word "Kowloon". It seems to me simply the shorthand description of the New Territories Lesne. I do not think that we can draw any useful conclusions about the Chinese attitude to the seded Territories.

I now snolose a copy of Singapore telegram No 12 Saving of 12 November 1962, reporting Malcolm MacDonald's conversations with Chou In-lai and Chen X1.

Incidentally, I have since said to P'ei that Maloola KaoDonald's notes on the interview were not very full and if the Chinese wished to let us have a fuller account I should be very happy to receive it.

Copy to: Richard Samuel Enq

PEKING

r Laird, HKD7

JAL Morgan

Far Eastern Department

Ino

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

Ex. 2/2

A P Maddeoker Esq FONG KO

FEL

Jespatified

FEH 2/2

3/11

3 November 1971

3/500/3

CHINA'S ATTITUDE TO HONG KONG

After Chou En-lai's comment to Mr Maloola MacDonald on 19 October (Peking tels Nos 1075 and 1076) and Pal's comment to me on 28 October (paragraph 4 of FCO tel No 772) about China's attitude to Hong Kong, we looked again at previous Chinese statements. I enclose a minute by Research Department. Michael Wilford has since pointed out that it did not include Chen Xi's 1965 remarks about American use of Hong Kong. I am, therefore, also enclosing a copy of the relevant extract. Bir M MacLehose did not see the latter and you may wish to show it to him at some stage.

Copied to:

RC Samuel Esq, PEKING (with enos)

Encat 2

RESTRICTED

J AL Morgan

Far Eastern Department

ENPHER CAT A

RI PLKING 198830Z

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE FCO TELHO. 1875 OF 19 OCTODER,

Jest to

ADVANCE COPY

PS to uld. Rey

ری در

Ad. FED

Hd. UND

PERSONAL FOR VILFORD FROM DEDISCH

MY TELNO, 1975: OR MACIONAL'S MEETING WITH CHOU EN-LA!.

MR MACDONALD HAS GIVEN ME A FULLER ACCOUNT THẬN THAT RECORDED IN HIS TELEGRAM TO JOHN MORGAN (MION I DISCOVER ON CHECKING WILL STILL DE OUT OF THE OFFICE). CHOU EN-LAT INDICATED THAT THE CHINESE THOUGHT THAT 19 MAINTAINING TO THE STATUS OF TAIWAN WAS UNDETERMINED VE NIGHT (A) WISH TO BE FREE.TO RECOGNISE AN QUOTE INDEPENDENT UNQUOTE TAIWAN WHICH MIGHT BE SET UP BY THE US AIR JAPAN AFTER THE EXPULSION OF THE NATIONALISTS FROM THE UN SEMICOLON (8) VỀ MIGHT FOLR THAT IF WE ACKHOLLEEGED CHINA'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER TA

FEAR

IWAN THIS WOULD HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE STANDING OF HỒNG KÔNG, D'PHATICALLY THAT THERE WAS NO, REPEAT NO,"MARALLEL TO BE DRAWN DETWEEN TAIWAN AND HONG KONG, CHINA HAD.NO INTENTION OF SEEKING TO GET HONG KONG BACK UNTIL THE EXPIRY OF THE NEW TERRITORIES LEASE. PR MACDONALD SAID SPEAKING PERSONALLY THAT HE DID NOT THALIK THAT QUINA'S FEARS ABOUT OUR POSSIBLE FUTURE ATTITUDE TO TAIWAN VERE JUSTIFIED AND ALSO DISCOUNTED ANY CONNECTION IN DRITISH MINDS BETWEEN THE POSITION OF TAIWAN AND HONG KONG,

CHOU SAID

2. MR HACDONALD GAVE AS HIS STRONG PERSONAL ALYICE THAT TO CHEN." SHOULD GO AHEAD ON THE BASIS OF TIG ACRESKELT SO MAR REW.

YOULD HAVE. SKYTRAL

PAT

DE IN THE GOLF

NOT

■ PROGRESS. THE SVITCD OF THE VOTE AND WITHDRAWAL OF OUR GILATE MILE THE ASSØKLY WAS 14 SESSION WOULD HAVE A POWERFUL EFFECT ON OPINION WITHIN THE UN WHICH COULD ONLY WORK TO CHERA'S ADVANTAGE, IT WOULD REPACSEK

IT WOULD REPACSCHT A SERIOUS BLOW TO TAIWAN ́S CLAIM TO APRESENT THE VHOLE OF CHINA AND AGATO SPEAKING PERSONALLY HE DID ROT THINK THAT HAVING REMOVED THE CONSULATE THE BRITISH, GOVERNMENT WOULDEVER THINK OFGENDING IT BACK AGAH.

J.. I THINK THE LINE MR MACDONALD TOOK WAS MOST HELPFUL, LET US HOPE IT WILL DO THE TRICK. IT IS NOW UP TO THE CHIKESE TO SUMION ME AGAIN AND I SEE RO-ADVANTAGE IN OUR MAKING ANY MOVE BEFORE THEN. IF AT THE NEXT MEETING THEY MAKE ANOTHER, 'ATTEMPT TO GET US TO CHANGE

·CUR POSITION OR TO GIVE THE SORT OF PRIVATE ASSURANCE WHICH IT WILL NOT BE IN OUR POWER TO HONOUR, E.0. THAT WE WILL SAY NOTHING OUT PUBLIC ARCUT OUR LEGAL VIEW, I ASSUME THAT YOU WOULD WISH HE TO TAKE A VEPY ROBUST LINE, TO DEPLORE WHAT APPEARS TO BE A HARDENING IN THE GUTHESE POSITION SINCE THE LAST MEETING AND TO URGE SETTLEMENT ON

THE PRESEIT TAMMS. IF THE CAPIESE RAISE THE QUESTION OF WHAT CUR

ATTITUDE MOULD DE TOVARDS AN INDEPENDANT TAIWAN I COULD REPLY. THAT THIS IS A PWOTHETICAL QUESTION BUT. I WOULD RAISE THE MATTER WITH YOU. WOULD WE IN FACT BE PREPARED TO GIVE ANY INDICATION OF WHAT OUR POSITION MIGHT BIZ THE QUESTION OF MIY INDEPENDENCE IS A HATTER WHICH S CLEARLY VERY VORRYING TO THE CHINESE. A POINT I COULD MAKE TO THE CHINESE 13 THAT IF THE TALKS BREAK DOWN, WE SHALL BE OBLIGED TO INFORM PARLIAMENT AND THAT THE QUESTION OF THE STATUS OF TAIWAN IS DOUND TO COME UP. THIS DAY RAVE THE EFFECT OF AIRING THE IDEA OF AN INDEPENDENT TAIWAN EVEN IF IT IS NOT INTENDED TO, WHICH IS PRECISELY WHAT THE CHINESE WANT TO AVOID.

DEN SO!!

GS UA

15,000-4/71-396483

TS 7/1162/46 IV

J AL Morgan Esq

FED

P CO

CONFIDENTIAL

enter asubmit

(M.

COLONIAL SEGRETARIAT

LOWER ALBERT ROAD

HONG KONG

Dear John

Fal

MALCOLM MACDONALD AND CHOU EN LAT

HONG KONG

29 October, 1971 seen by me

Kofori

I met Mr. Malcolm MacDonald at the border on 25 October and took him to the airport for his flight to Kuala Lumpur. I was particularly interested to try to find out from him whether Chou En Lai had said any more to him about Hong Kong than was reported in Peking telegram No. 1076 to the PCO of 19 October.

260

Ес

忱

Mr. MacDonald soon got on to this subject. He said that Hong Kong had come up only once apart from a brief reference at the end of his talk (see paragraph 5 below). Mr. MacDonald said that Chou En Lai had done no more than re- affirm what he had said to him in 1962. I said I was not aware of any record of his conversation of 1962 with Chou En Lai. Mr. MacDonald expressed some surprise and then said that perhaps he had reported those remarks only orally. find on returning to the Secretariat that we do indeed have no record of that conversation which must have taken place in October 1962 because Mr. MacDonald mentioned that it had occurred two days before the Chinese launched their attack on the Indians.

Mr. MacDonald said that Hong Kong had come up (as described in paragraph 1 of Peking telegram No. 1076) because Chou En Lai vas explaining that HMG had no cause to think that the current discussions about the status of Taivan had any adverse implications for Hong Kong. Chou En Lai said that Taiwan and Hong Kong were entirely different cases, When China had liberated Taiwan it did not follow that she would immediately want to do something about "Kowloon", There was no hurry so far as Kovloon vas concerned.

I asked Mr. MacDonald whether this reference to Kowloon meant that China was thinking of taking back the leased territories in 1997 (Mr. MacDonald had in fact used "1998" throughout) leaving us with the ceded territories. Mr. MacDonald replied that in his view China would feel obliged to take back the New Territories when the lease expired and that the remainder of the Colony would no longer be able to exist on its own.

/Contd...

CONFIDENTIAL

I asked Mr. MacDonald whether 1997 had been mentioned and if so by which party. He replied that it had come up towards the end of the conversation when he said to Chou that he would like to return in 1998 to see how Chou was then getting on with these matters. Chou replied that he

must come back before then because he could not guarantee to be Prime Minister in 1998; he could guarantee he would be Prime Minister only for the next five years. I am not positive that this was the only reference to 1997 in the conversation but I was left with the impression that it was and that the date had been mentioned originally not by Chou En Lai but by Mr. MacDonald.

I have had a discussion on the conversation with Sir Hugh Norman-Walker who knew Mr. MacDonald in Africa whilst I met him on October 25 for the first time. It has been Sir Hugh's experience that Mr. MacDonald at least in his African days approached interviews with certain expectations of what the other party might say and occasionally reported the views he expected to hear rather than those which were in fact expressed.

There seems no doubt that Chou did make two important remarks relating to Hong Kong:-

(a)

(b)

that China was in no hurry to do anything about Hong Kong; and

that after the return of Taivan to China it would not necessarily follow that China would want to do anything about Hong Kong.

Unless Mr. MacDonald can be pinned down more specifically than I managed to do on October 25 it seems probable that Chou En Lai did not say anything definite about 1997. It seems more likely that Mr. MacDonald, who himself believes 1997 is the date when the whole Colony will in fact have to be returned to China, interpreted Chou's other remarks as confirmation of his view.

Mr. MacDonald will be writing up his conversation from notes which I fear are rather scrappy. When he eventually returns to London after his brief stops at Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and Djakarta you might be able to put to him the two questions which, it seems to me, might clarify Chou's remarks:-

(a)

(b)

Did Chou En Lai actually say anything about 1997 or was it mentioned only in your own closing remarks?

What exactly was the significance of the use by Chou En Lai of the word "Kowloon" instead of Hong Kong? Was there any implication that the return of the leased territories in 1997 would not be accompanied by the demand for the return of the ceded territories?

ever

Your

Arthur.

cc J B Denson Esq OBE (Peking)

(A F Maddocks)

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Morgan

UNCLASSIFIED

Reference

125

SIH YI's REMARKS ABOUT HONG KONG

1. I have had a copy of the passage put on our files and copied to Research Department. I was not previously aze of whe booklet or of Ch'en Yi's remarks about

Arterioчn use of Hong Kong. You may wish to send the

attached copy to Sir Icehose to complete the picture.

28 October 1971

II 1 Davies

UNCLASSIFIED

DD 737719 557664 500M 2/7) GH 360372

-2-

Khrushchov said that, instead of liberating Hong Kong and зcao herself, China was acting other Asians and Africans fight inyerialism and colonialism and pull chestnuts out of the fire for China. This is a malicious "rovocation. Khrushchov wanted to lictate China's policy. Our reply ia: China's policy must be decided by China herself and not by the Khrushchov revisionists.

Extract from For igu Languages "ress Booklet printed in

kin

titled "V - reuior Ch'en Yi Answer questions put by Corr ispunilantos 19 Daptube 1. 10/15)

On the w

of Hong Kong no a base for its Aggressiva Jur in

Vienam.

pargo 21-23

Ans:pring .41;ion put by the correspondents of the loué Kon; "Chong

Hong Ju 20", "T: Tồng Kông Evening Newn"" and "The Global Digest" about the use of ing Kông by the United States in its war of aggression against Viet an, Vie Iremier Chen Yi ogid:-

The facht Britain and the Hong Kong authoriting nllo the Unised 3tité : 1o use Hong Kong na a hoe for agresion againes Vietnam han vauged the anxiety of the local inhabitants. The Chinese Government.c mig the question not only one of using long long an base for aggre ion against Vietnam but also of rearin; to use it in future anal for reunion against China.

bus

The Chi 100€ Government 1: firmly opponeil to this. This etion of the Briti: a Government 1: nous chujid. We hope that it will chose a viner course in tao. 1 ilere sta. Other ise, China 111 bake na mures when necessary a

The US ilful ex ausion of its war of aggression in Vigt iam and Britain's 'co ir ẻ of notion in regard to "lalnyoin" all this lo· curțini, no: verily directed against Vietitvi or Inioneula bat against Chines melli US imperialism had never concealed it: global atrategy, wh claim it the domination of the whole worll. Ja troops ar: coing to Tong Kong not simply for vacation.

Mr Wilson, the British rime Minister, has declare that Britain is not :iving up ay of it: strongholde and military boons enst of Sues. 1he US and British' ku erialists are not in full agreement on soue co icrcte measures in hệ Vietnam war, but they have no fundamental dif 'ercnce when it come to the question of consolidating the world colo dial oyota.: It i posible that the United States pay extoul th: war to China'am i là d. In that event, what grounds are there for thining tha the "ritish and other in orialista will not ret rn to thei: förber coloni in Asia and Africa? That is why the nzuggles of the peopl of the world against imperialion and colonialis, and particularly at US imporialis ani its followers, ford a

interal ho 2. The people of the worl·l, should maintain clar: vigilance and (upport ach other in those strugglen.

The hard

rule of the Vietnamese people is not ro y their own ffair, ut n'coilribution to the orlaide struggle agai.at impeciali: 1 ni colonidlion. If war should spread to Ching, he vill put ip staun h resistance and will be determined to defeat ÚS inpe-iali:.

با

Chinn er not just the question of Taiwan, the uention of long Kong and the mention of non, ench on its om; what we see is the global straty of U imperialism. One must be prepared to uge a worldwide at uggla before US imperialian can be ðasantai. "11 the impe 1alita allo the socialist countries in hutera urope nd the Soviet & ion to live in necurity? The Khrushchov rovioi niots place implic t trust in what US imperialism onya, and they will sooner or later com o rif for it.

/...

-F

-2-

Khrushchov avid that, instead of liberating Hong Kong and Tacao herself, hina wag aking other isiana and Africans fight in erialian and colonialism and pull chestnuts out of the fire for China. This is a malicious provocation. Khrushchov wanted to lictate China's policy. Our reply ia: China's policy must be lecided by Chin: "herself and not by tile Khrushchov revisionists.

Ꮀ

exter op. 425

RESTRICTED RC.

ایک

27.10

Siru faclebose Hakym

4. 26/10.

270017971

FEHǝ/2

CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS HONG KONG

1. four minute of 19 October to Crowson, who is now on leave.

You may be interested in the attached minute by Research Department vaich sets out the most recent Chinese references to Hong Kong. You will see that the attitude to which you refer was made public in 1963. It has not, to our knowledge, been reiterated since then.

You have already seen what Chou En-lai said to Hr Malcolm MacDonald. He said that "China had no intention of seeking to get Hong Kong back until the expiry of the New Territories lease".

SALMaçon

J A L Morgan

Far Eastern Department

25 October 1971

Copied, with enclosures, to:

Sir 3 Tomlinson

Mr Wilford

RESTRICTED

Sir M MacLehose

RESTRICTAD

CHINA'S ATRITUDS POWARDS HONG KONG

Your minute of 15 October to ir Croneo, who is no. on leave.

You may be Lnterested in She attached ainute by Viran201 De artent which sets out the most recent Chiese refe • ..30. Hong Kong. You :11 see that the attitude to which von va?. vao made public in 1963. It has not, to our knowledge, been reiterated since then.

You have almaly biel. has Chou h-lai cald to ir Haleo? ilacDo..ald. Je sail th. "Jina kad no intention of using jet liong Kong back until the expiry of the w 'ertitor. Ian

பு

25 October 1971

Copied, with enclosures,

Sir 3 Tomlinson

Mr Wilford/

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to:

J AL Morgan

Far astoru Depart ent

The 1967

1967 statement

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out the height of

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P.22

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27/x

Sir M MacLehose

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UNCLASSIFIED

FRANK ROWERTSON'S ARTICLE ON HONG KONG : DAILY TELEGRAPH

14 OCTOBER 1971

We have consulted Research Department about your question. They do not have full records of all NONA pronouncements on Hong Kong but are reasonably certain that no such sentiments have teen published in CA since 1969. Mr Davies who studied NONA daily in Peking since the beginning of 1969 confirms this.

2. From the tone of the passage quoted it seems likely to dato from 1967 or 1968. Recently NOWA hus even taken to wentioning "the Hong Kong British authorities" in straight- forward news items from Hong Kon; The most recent example of this was a report of attendance at National Day celerations in Hong Kong. The passage quoted by Frank Robertson is therefore far from being typical at present.

18 October 1971

Mi Gravom.

R.b. horson.

R Crowson

Far Eastern Department

This is

but Mi Rutertom

reassuring.

refering

definition of th C. P. G's attituck tweaks H.K...

itat

Hay Kay

• Macan

which will th sitthal

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int until the the status quo. will to mantamil.

for the part

night when wo auch in statant work with mady?

UNCLASSIFIED Ú

* * Jan

Min The

19/10.

PUER

DAILY TELEGRAPH

:14 OCT 1971

Colony in the dragon's mouth

FRANK ROBERTSON considers Hongkong's future and the Treaties that

that created

STR

OR DAVID TRENCH'S rẻ- he forced to live in an impos--

tirement next week as "sibly restricted area. Governor of Hongkong marks the end of an cra, for he was the last official ap pointed to this post by the former Colonial Office. Sir Murray Maclchose, his suc cessor, is a career Foreign Office man with China service,

At this tursing-point, how does the future of Britain's last important colony look? While vast new long-range investment projects, boll public and private, are being avidly under- i written, Hongkong's money men know well that they can enjoy i their remarkable prosperity only

so long as China wills it.

For Peking. fervidly jealous of all its prerogatives, regards the British colony as Chinese territory which sooner or later must revert to the homeland, "Sooner or later? There's the crux of the astonishing Hong kong gamble.

I The colony's legal position is regulated by three treaties, a

all regarded by Peking "uisequal" and therefore not binding. The first of these, signed under the mouth of British guns at Nanking by Manchu otlicials in 1842, states:

10.J

It being obviously necessary and desirable that British gubi "a jects" should have some Port wherent they may curren and reft their Ships,

when quired, and keen Stores for that purpose, His Majesty the Emperor of China cedex to Her L Majesty the Queen of Great

Hritain, etc., the island of Ilong kang, to be possessed in per petuity by Her Britannic Majesty, Her Heirs and Suc

cessors

This dealt only with long kong Island. In 1860 the Con- vention of Peking was signed, granting Britain the tip of Kow- Joon Peninsula on the facing *mainland-nceded to ensure the flow of supplies from China, and to control pirates operating

· from that side of the port.

On June 9, 1898, ■ second convention was signed in Peking (it came into force on July 1, 1898) extending British territory on the mainland, and to nullving

• inlands, under lease for 99 years. These are the New Territories, which should revert la China on June 30, 1997.

Without these added lands longkong's four million (a figure that presumably will be increased greatly by 1897) would

More than that, the colony would lose much of its reservoir water supply, most of the northern side of the narrow harbour would be in potentially national airport might well be hostile hands, and even the inter- claimed by China.

Clearly China can strangle Ilongkong quickly and quite legally in 1997. But will Peking | act before then? Every couple of years the Chinese restale their attitude towards liongkong,

In the last auch reference the Peking People's Daily territory since "Hongkong has been Chinese ancient times. This is a fact known to every- body in the world, old and young. More than a century ago British imperialism caine to China in pirate ships and pro voked the criminal "opium war!" massacred numerous Chinese prople and occupied the Chinese territory of Hongkong... This is an enorminus blood debt British imperialism owes to the Chinese prople. Sooner or later The Chinese people with make a thorough-going liquidation of this debt."

Declining role

Dow

Certainly Peking is still mak- Ing a lot of money from long- kong, bul,

that China is being rapidly opened up to direct foreign trade, this i brcoining less import 'nt to the Mainland.

"Since the Chinese Commun. its always seek pretexis to justify, for their party history books, the political correct. ness" of any major politicat clian, in Hongkong's case they would certainly claim mistreat ment of the colony's Chinese subjects.

Not that Peking really needs to justify action against The colony, for the Chiness know that neither Britain not the United States would try to defend Hongkong.

kang's prospects by the Hoover An American study of Hong- Institution of Stanford Univer sity has predicted that China could move against the colony predicated on the basis of A as early as 1974, but this is vinirnt power struggle following the death of Chairman Mao.

kong are disturbed by such pre- If the money men of long- dictions of disaster they are careful not to show it.

EE.D

Is this recant or

Inferences

C. Mitha

16/1

RESTRICTED

سأ

Reference.

Mr Davics, Far Eastern Department.

CHINA/HONKONG

As you are aware, the Chinese regard liong Kong as part of China, and refer to the "compatriots" of Hong Kong. Specific references to the status of Hong Kong are, however, few.

2) On 8 March 1963, the People's Daily published an editorial entitled "Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party of the U.S.A." Although nominally directed at the American Communist Party, this was in fact a reply to Khruschev's attacks on the Chinese position over the Cuban crisis. Khruschev, in the course of his attacks, had made somewhat disparaging references to China's failure to end the colonial status of Hong Kong and Kacao. The Chinese in reply, stated that: "With regard to the outstanding issuco, which are a legacy from the past, wo have always held that, when conditions are ripe, they should be settled peacefully through negotiations and that, pending a settlement, the status quo should be maintained. Within this category are the questions of Hong Kong, Kowloon and Macao..

3) Although Soviet propaganda occasionally returned to the subject of Hong Kong and Macao in subsequent years, the Chinese do not appear to have paid much attention to such references. However, the Chinese delegation to the World Youth Forum held in Moscow in September 1964 did protest strongly at a resolution which called for the independence of various Asian colonial territories, and included Hong Kong and Macao in the list of such territories. The Chinese insisted that Hong Kong and I acao were different from the other colonies because they were Chinese territory, taken by unequal treaties.

4) During the disturbances in Hong Kong in the summer of 1967, there were several Chinese references to the position of the colony. While those were often delivered in somewhat militant language, they acomod to indicate, at least obliquly, that the 1963 atatement in the People's Daily still hold good. Thus a Teonle's Daily editorial of 3 June 1967 called upon the

וד

patriotic compatriots" of Hong Kong to unite against "British imperialism". It went on "The fate of Hong Kong will be decided by the patriotic compatriots there, by the 700 million Chinose people, absolutely not by decadent British imperialism." Šimilar sentiments wore expressed by Chi Pea-yu, then a member of the Cultural Revolution Group under the Central Committee, at a meeting of the Afro-Asian Writers 'Bureau on 5 June, He also said, as a warning to British imperialism, "The old debt you owe us for launching the dirty Opium War and forcibly occupying Hong Kong by taking advantage of the corruption in the Ching court is not yet repaid.'

נו

that

RESTRICTED

/ 5)

RESTRICTED

There were other newspaper items in similar style in the following weeks, but the most explicit statement on the position of Hong Kong came in

an article by the People's Daily "Commentator" entitled "Hong Kong is Chinese Territory", published on 20 August 1967. This rejected claims, allegedly being made in the Hong Kong press and radio, that Hong Kong was British territory.

IŲ L

Hong Kong has been Chinese

territory from time immemorial.This is known all over the world.More than a hundred years ago, British imperial -ists sailed to China in theiypirate ships and unleashed the criminal Opium War in which they massacred countless Chinose people and,morcover forcibly occupied our territory of Hong Kong.This was followed by their annexation of our Kowloon and' the seizure of our New Territories. This is a heavy debt in blood which British imperialism owes to the Chinese people. The Chinese people will sooner.or lator completely settle this account with British imperialism." "Commentator" also asked : "Is it conceivable that Hong Kong will for ever remain under British rule?" replied, "Of course not, a thousand times no, ten thousand times no!"

and

"Commentator" repeated some of these themes in another article on "Baring British Imperialism's Crafty Features", which appeared on 21 August, but thereafter, references to the Hong Kong disputo became less and less frequent and were usually confined to details of specific "struggles" carried out by the "patriotic' compatriots." As far as wo. can trace, the Chinoso do not appear to have referred to the status of Hong Kong nor to its eventual takeover by China until Chou En-lai did so with Kalcon KacDonald,

22 September 1971.

ཀ་ཨྠ བར

RESTRICATI

J. Hoare

Far Eastern Section, Research Department.

入

Sir M MacLehose

انا

UNCLASSIFIED

FRANK ROBERTSON'S ARTICLE ON HONG KONG : DAILY TELEGRAPH

14 OCTOBER 1971

1. We have consulted Research Department about your question. They do not have full records of all NONA pronouncements on Hong Kong but are reasonably certain that no such sentiments have been published in XCHA since 1969. ir Davies who studied NCNA daily in Peking since the beginning of 1969 confirms this.

From the tone of the passage quoted it seems likely to date from 1967 or 1968. Recently NCNA has even taken to wentioning "the Hong Kong British authorities" in straight- forward news items from Hong Kon;. The most recent example of this was a report of attendance at National Day cele.rations in Hong Kong. The passage quoted Ly Frank Robertson is therefore far from being typical at present.

18 October 1971

R.b. horson

Crowson

Far Eastern Department

This is

reassuring.

definition of It C. R. G's attituck

It C. P. G's attituck

but Mi Riterton

trowds H.K..

refeiring

I thought this

ttt

Hy ky

• Macan

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for the past

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NJA

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right then as such is stteant must recyth maky

ल् wife ht

UNCLASSIFIED CMM. The

म

* J.

19/10.

DAILY TELEGRAPH

14 OCT 1971

Colony in the dragon's mouth

FRANK ROBERTSON considers Hongkong's future and the tregties that created it

IR DAVID TRENCH'S 14. as

Stirement next wees

Governor of Hongkong marks the end of an era, for he was the last oficial ap pointed to this post by the former Colonial Office. Sir Murray Maclchose, his suc- cessor, is a carcer Foreign Office man with China service.

At this turning-paint, how does the future of Britain's last important colony look? Whule 'vast new long-range investment projects, both public and private, are being avidly under written, Hongkong's money men know well that they can enjoy their remarkable prosperity only so long as China wills it.

For Peking, fervidly jealous of all its prerogatives, regards the British colony as Chinese territory which sooner or later must revert to the homeland, *Sooner or later? There's the crux of the astonishing Kong kong gamble.

The colony's legal position is regulated by three treaties, all regarded by

Peking "unequal" and therefore not binding. The first of these, sigued under the mouth of British guns at Nanking by Manchu oficials in 1842, slates:

It being obviously necessary and desirablo that British gubi 1 Jerta "should have same Port whereat they may careen and refil their Ships, when To quired, and keep Stores for That purpose, His Majesty the Emperor of China redes to Rer Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, eir, the Island of Ilone kong, to be possessed in neg petuity by lier Britannic Majesty, Her leirs and Suc

Cossory

+ +

This dealt only with long kong Island. In 1860 the Con+ vention of Peking was signed, granting Britain the tip of Kow- Joon Peninsula on the facing 'mainland-needed to ensure the Now of supplies from China, and to control pirates operaling

· from that side of the port.

On June 2, 1838, a second convention was signed in Peking I came into force on July 1. 1898) extending British terntory on the mainland, and to outlying islands, under lease for 99 years. These are the New Territories which should revert to China on June 30, 1997.

Without these added lands lfongkong's four million (a Agure that presumably will be Increased greatly by 1997) would

he forced to live in an Impos sibly restricted area.

More than that, the colony would Jose much of its reservoir water supply, most of the northern side of the narrow harbour would be in potentially national airport might well ba hostile hands, and even the inter claimed by China.

Clearly China can strangle Hongkong quickly and quite legally in 1997. But will Peking act before then? Every couple of years the Chinese restate their attitude towards Hongkong.

•

Peking People's Daily said: In the last such reference the

territory since "inngkong has been Chinese ancient times. This is fact known to every: bady in the world, old and young. More than a century ago British imperialism camē China in pirate ships and pro- raked the criminal opium war." massacred Numerous people and occupied the Chinese Chinese

territory of Hongkong ... This is an enomnious blood debt British imperialism owes to the Clunese people. Sooner or later the Chinese people will make a thorough-going liquidation of this debt."

Declining role

Cerlainly Peking is still mak. ing a lot of money from long- kong, bul, is being rapidly opened up to now that China

direct foreign trade, this is: hecoining less important to the mainland.

་

correct.

Ists always seek pretexis to Since the Chinese Commun. justify, for their party history books, the political ness of any major political action, in Hongkong's case they would certainly claim inistreat- ment of the colony's Chinese subjects.

Not that Peking really needs to justify action against the colony, for the Chinese know United States would try to That neither Britain nor the defend Hongkong.

kong's prospects by the Honver An American study of Hong- Institution of Stanford Univer sily has predicled that China could move against the colony predicated on the basis of a as early as 1974, but this is violent power struggle following the death of Chairman Mao.

kong are disturbed by such pre- If the money men of Hong dictions of disaster they are careful not to show it.

6 6. d

Is this

recont

tyj

reference

Ethitha 16/10

RESTRICTED

Reference...

Mr Davies, Far Eastern Department.

CHINA/HONKONG

1) As you are aware, the Chinese regard llong Kong as part of China, and refer to the "compatriota" of Hong Kong. Specific references to the status of Hong Kong are, however, few.

2) On 8 March 1963, the People's Daily published an editorial entitled "Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party of the U.S.A." Although nominally directed at the American Communist Party, this was in fact a reply to Khruschev's attacks on the Chinese position over the Cuban crisis. Khruschev, in the course of his attacks, had made somewhat disparaging references to China's failure to and the colonial status of Hong Kong and Macao. The Chinese in reply, stated that: "With regard to the outstanding issues, which are a legacy from the past, we have always held that, when conditions are ripe, they should be settled peacefully through negotiations and that, pending a Bettlement, the status quo should be maintained. Within this category are the questions of Hong Kong, Kowloon and Kacao...

3) Although Soviet propaganda occasionally returned to the subject of Hong Kong and liacao in subsequent years, the Chinese do not appear to have paid much attention to such references. However, the Chinese delegation to the World Youth Forum held in Moscow in September 1964 did protest strongly at a resolution which called for the independence of various Asian colonial territories, and included Hong Kong and Kacao in the list of such territories. The Chinese insisted that Hong Kong and Macao were different from the other colonies because they were Chinese territory, taken by unequal treaties.

During the disturbances in Hong Kong in the qummer of 1967, there were several Chinese references to the position of the colony. While these were often delivered in somewhat militant language, they seemod to indicate, at least obliquly, that the 1963 statement in the People's Daily still hold good. Thus a Teople's Daily editorial of 3 June 1967 called upon the

patriotic compatriots" of Hong Kong to unite against "British imperialism". It went on :- "The fate of Hong Kong will be decided by the patriotic compatriots there, by the 700 million Chinese people, absolutely not by decadent British imperialism." Šimilar sentiments were expressed by Chi Pen-yu, then a member of the Cultural Revolution Group under the Central Committee,at a meeting of the Afro-Asian Writers 'Bureau on 5 June. He also said, as a warning to British imperialism, that "The old debt you owe us for launching the dirty Opium War and forcibly occupying Hong Kong by taking advantage of the corruption in the Ching court is not yet repaid."

RESTRICTED

/ 5)

RESTRICTED

There were other newspaper items in similar style in the following weeks, but the most explicit statement on the position of Hong Kong came in

an article by the People's Daily "Commentator" entitled "Hong Kong is Chinese Territory" August 1967. This rejected claims, allegedly being made

published on 20 in the Hong Kong press and radio, that Hong Kong was British territory.

"Hong Kong has been Chinese-·

territory from time immemorial. This is known all over the world.More than a hundred years ago, British imperial -iats sailed to China in theippirate ships and unleashed the criminal

Opium War in which they nassacred- countless Chinese people and,norcover forcibly occupied our territory of Hong Kong. This was followed by their annexation of our Kowloon and'the seizure of our New Territories.This is a heavy debt in blood which: Britishı imperialion owes to the Chinese peopl The Chinese people will sooner.or

later completely settle this account with British imperialism."

"Commentator" also asked : "Is it conceivable that Hong Kong will for ever remain under British rulo?", and replied, "Of course not, a thousand times no,ten thousand times no!"

became

6) "Commentator" repeated some of these themes in another article on "Baring British Imperialism's Crafty Features", which appeared on 21 August, but thereafter, references to the Hong Kong dispute less and loss frequent and were usually confined to details of specific "struggles" carried out by the "patriotic' compatriots." As far as we can trace, the Chinoso do not appear to have referred to the statua of Hong Kong nor to its oventual takeovor by China until Chou En-lai did so with Halcom MacDonald.

22 September 1971.

Klizare.

J. E Hoare

Far Eastern Section, Research Department.

RESTRICTED

PRIN PITY CYPHER CAT A

FM PEKING 220400Z

CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP CUP

จ

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 1094 OF 22 OCTOBER INFO PRIORITY HONG KONG.

YOUR TELNO 7501 FUTURE OF HONG KONG.

FEH 2/2

I HAVE SPOKEN TO MR MACDONALD WHO SAYS THAT HE DOES NOT

WISH TO INCLUDE THE STATEMENT AS IT STANDS AND ASCRIBE IT TO CHOU

EN-LAI AS HIS MEETING WAS OF AN ENTIRELY PRIVATE CHARACTER AND HE

HE WILL. IS SURE THAT THE PREMIER WOULD NOT WISH TO BE QUOTED,

HOWEVER, INCLUDE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE STATEMENT AND SAY THAT HE

CONSIDERS THIS IS THE ATTITUDE OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

DENSON

[REPEATED TO HONG KONG]

FILES:

FED

HKD

DTGD

PS TO MR. ROYLE

SIR L. KONSON

JIR S. TOMLINSON MR. VILFORD

CONFIDENTIAL

INDIATE

CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 291645Z

[FCH 2/2]

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 753 OF 20 OCTOBER INFO HỒNG KÔNG.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 1976: FUTURE OF HONG KONG.

1. PLEASE PUT IT TO MR MALCOLM MACDONALD THAT WE WOULD SEE CONSIDERABLE ADVANTAGE IF HE COULD INCLUDE IN HIS ARTICLE FOR THE SUNDAY TIMES CHOU EN-LAI'S STATEMENT THAT CHINA HAD NO INTENTION OF SEEKING TO GET BACK HONG KONG UNTIL THE EXPIRY OF THE NEW TERRITORIES LEASE**.

2. MR MACDONALD WILL NO DOUBT BE ABLE TO ASSESS WHETHER ITS INCLUSION WOULD CAUSE ANY OFFENCE TO CHOU EN-LAT.

DOUGLAS-HONE

FILES

FED

HND

JIR I KADUN SIR S TOMLINSON PS TO MA. ROYLE

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry No.

DEPARTMENT

FED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret JALM

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

PRIORITY MARKINGS

(Date)

Despatched

20/13/immed late.

Routine

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should

reach addressct(s).

20/10/1

1944

CONFIDENTIAL 2016452

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIÍ

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

En Clair.

[Cypher

Draft Telegramlo:-

PEKING

No.750 (Date) 20/10

And to:-

ation]

'Security classification' -if any

[ Privacy marking

[Codeword-if any]

PEKING

Addressed to

telegram No.

720 (date)

2040

And to

HONG KONG

Repeat to:-

HONG KONG

Saving to:-

HKD

repeated for information to

Saving to

BALLIA LLOGA

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1076: FUTURE OF HONG KONG

1. Please put it to Mr Malcolm MacDonald that we would

see considerable advantage if he could include in his

article for the Sunday Times Chou En-lai's statement that

China had no intention of seeking to get back Hong Kong

until the expiry of the New Territories Lease".

2. Mr MacDonald will no doubt be able to assess whether

its inclusion would cause any offence to Chou En-lai.

Mwv.2%

Distribution:-

FILES Sil Monu

FED

Su S, Torben

P.S. BS/Mhhop

Copies to:-

[Si M. Machahma

wruns]

1648948748

CONFIDENTIAL

ર

enter & fex

S.M

Mr sixford

221√

CONFIDENTIAL

Sir S Tomlinsonlarina

in Marya

Могда

I agree that

Azi ei

A very

important statement. R. Marthe home R.M. Marthe home + H. K

Mr Logan

will b

FEH 2/2

THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG

Peking telegram No 1076 reports that Chou En-lai

told Mr Malcolm MacDonald that

"China had no intention of seeking to get Hong Kong

back until the expiry of the New Territories Lease."

2. This is the first such categorical statement by any

Chinese leader that their attitude to the future of Hong

Kong is linked to the Lease.

While theoretically it could be argued that this would

leave it open to the Chinese to prolong the Lease, in my view

it is more probable that the Chinese would feel themselves

obliged to take possession of the Colony. This is, of course,

on the assumption that the Chinese leadership at that time

had the same basic policy as at present.

19 October 1971

Copies to:

SALMugan

J A L Morgan

Far

Eastern Department

This is a very important state wit

Private Secretary But everything

Mr Daunt

Sir L Monson

Hong Kong Dept

Sir M MacLehose

But everything will repaid upon Govt wilt which we

China

the sevk of

reaking in

the date for the Tammistion

Ки

of the lease approves Ker

CONFIDENTIAL

laatu. H.R.

مواد

CYFHER/CAT A

EK PERING

CONFIDENTLİL

1908302

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO. 1076 OF 19 OCTOBER.

PERSONAL FOR WILFORD FROM DENSON

MY TELNO. 1875:

1075 MR MACDONAL'S MEETING WITH CHOU EN-LAI

MR MACDONALD HAS GIVEN ME A FULLER ACCOUNT THAN THAT RECORDED IN HIS TELEGRAM TO JOHN MORGAN (WHOM I DISCOVER ON CHECKING WILL STILL BE OUT OF THE OFFICE). CHOU EN-LAI INDICATED THAT THE CHINESE THOUGHT THAT IN MAINTAINING THAT THE STATUS OF TAIWANI WAS UNDETERMINED WE MIGHT (A) WISH TO BE FREE TO RECOGNISE AN QUOTE INDEPENDENT UNQUOTE TAIWAN WHICH MIGHT BE SET UP BY THE US AND JAPAN AFTER THE EXPULSION OF THE NATIONALISTS FROM THE UN SEMICOLON (B) WE MIGHT FEAR THAT IF WE ACKNOWLEDGED CHINA'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER TA

IWAN THIS WOULD HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE STANDING OF HONG KONG. CHOU SAID EMPHATICALLY THAT THERE WAS NO, REPEAT NO, PARALLEL TO BE DRAWN BETWEEN TAIWAN AND HONG KONG.

CHINA HAD NO INTENTION OF SEEKING TO

GET HONG KONG BACK UNTIL THE EXPIRY OF THE NEW TERRITORIES LEASE. MR MACDONALD SAID SPEAKING PERSONALLY THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT CHINA'S FEARS ABOUT OUR POSSIBLE FUTURE ATTITUDE TO TAIWAN WERE JUSTIFIED AND ALSO DISCOUNTED ANY CONNECTION IN BRITISH MINDS BETWEEN THE POSITION OF TAIWAN AND HONG KONG.

2. MR MACDONALD GAVE AS HIS STRONG PERSONAL ADVICE THAT THE CHINESE SHOULD GO AHEAD ON THE BASIS OF THE AGREEMENT SO FAR REACHED. THIS KOULD HAVE SEVERAL ADVANTAGES FOR CHINA IF THE ANNOUNCEMENT WERE MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE NEXT FEW DAYS WHILE THE UN DEBATE WAS STILL IN PROGRESS. THE SWITCH OF THE VOTE AND WITHDRAWAL OF OUR CONSULATE WHILE THE ASSEMBLY WAS IN SESSION WOULD HAVE A POWERFUL

CONFIDENTIAL

/ EFFECT

CONFIDENTIAL

EFFECT ON OPINION WITHIN THE UN WHICH COULD ONLY WORK TO CHINA'S ADVANTAGE. IT WOULD REPRESENT A SERIOUS BLOW TO TAIWAN'S CLAIM TO

REPRESENT THE WHOLE OF CHINA AND AGAIN SPEAKING PERSONALLY HE DID

NOT THINK THAT HAVING REMOVED THE CONSULATE THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WOULD EVER THINK OF SEIDING IT BACK AGAIN.

3. I THINK THE LINE MR MACDONALD TOOK WAS MOST HELPFUL. LET US

HOPE IT WILL DO THE TRICK, IT IS NOW UP TO THE CHINESE TO SUMMON ME AGAIN AND I SEE NO ADVANTAGE IN OUR MAKING ANY MOVE BEFORE THEN.

IF AT THE NEXT MEETING THEY MAKE ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO GET US TO CHANGE

OUR POSITION OR TO GIVE THE SORT OF PRIVATE ASSURANCE WHICH IT WILL NOT BE IN OUR POWER TO HONOUR, E.G. THAT WE WILL SAY NOTHING IN

PUBLIC ABOUT OUR LEGAL VIEW, I ASSUME THAT YOU WOULD WISH ME TO TAKE A VERY ROBUST LINE, TO DEPLORE WHAT APPEARS TO BE A HARDENING IN THE CHINESE POSITION SINCE THE LAST MEETING AND TO'URGE SETTLEMENT ON THE PRESENT TERMS. IF THE CHINESE RAISE THE QUESTION OF WHAT OUR ATTITUDE WOULD BE TOWARDS AN INDEPENDANT TAIWAN I COULD

REPLY THAT THIS IS A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION BUT I WOULD

RAISE THE MATTER WITH YOU. WOULD WE IN FACT BE PREPARED TO GIVE WIY INDICATION OF WHAT OUR POSITION NIGHT BE? THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE IS A MATTER WHICH S CLEARLY VERY WORRYING TO THE CHINESE. A POINT I COULD MAKE TO THE CHINESE IS THAT IF THE TALKS BREAK DOWN, WE SHALL BE OBLIGED TO INFORM PARLIAMENT AND THAT THE QUESTION OF THE STATUS OF TAIWAN IS BOUND TO COME UP. THIS MAY HAVE THE EFFECT OF AIRING THE IDEA OF AN INDEPENDENT TAIWAN EVEN IF IT IS NOT INTENDED TO, WHICH IS PRECISELY WHAT THE CHINESE WANT TO AVOID.

SEXSON

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

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BAX DEPT

FLANKING STAFF RES DEFT (FE SEC)

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POD

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

-UNCLANSIRIED

Sir MoLohose

Desp. 19/10

! FEM 2/2

PRALA RO" KTSON'S ARTICLE ON HONG KONG : DAILY T 1GRAPH

14 OCTOBKA 1971

1. We have consulted Research Department about your question. They do not have full records of all NCNA pronouncements on liong Kong but are reasonably certain that no such sentiments have been published in NCNA since 1969. Mr Davies who studied KCNA daily in Peking since the beginning of 1969 confirms this.

From the tone of the passage quoted it seems likely to date from 1967 or 1968. Recently NOWA has even taken to Zentioning "the Hong Kong British authorities" in straight- forward news itens from Hong Kong. The most recent example of this was a report of attendance at National Day celebratione in Hong Kong. The passage quoted by Frank Robertson is therefore far from being typical at present.

18 October 1971

R Crowson

Far Eastern Department

UNCLASSIFIED

PUER

DAILY TELEGRAPH

.14 OCT 1971

Colony in the dragon's mouth

FRANK ROBERTSON considers Hongkong's future and the treaties that created it

STR

(IR DAVID TRENCH'S re forced to live in an impos

tirement next week; as-Sibly restricted area. Governor of Hongkong marks the end of an era, for be was the last official ap pointed to this post by the former Colonial Office, Murray Maclehose, his suc cessor, is a career Foreign Office man with China service.

Sir

At this turning-point, how does the future of Britain's last important colony look? While vast new long-range investment projects, both public and private, are being avidly under- written, Hongkong's money men know well that they can enjoy their remarkable prosperity only so long as China wills it.

For Peking, fervidly jealous of all its prerogatives, regards the British colony as Chinese territory which sooner or later must revert to the homeland. -Sooner or later? There's the crux of the astonishing Hong kong gamble.

The colony's legal position is regulated by three treaties, all regarded

by Peking

unequal" And therefore not binding. The first of these, signed under the mouth of British guns at Nanking by Manchu officials in 1842, states:

It being obviously necessary and desirable that British sub Jeeta "should have some Port whereat they may careen and refit_their_~ Ships, when ΓΕ quired, and keep Starex for that purpose, His Majesty the Emperor of China redes to Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, etc, the Island of Hong- kong, to be possessed in pe: petuity by Her Britannic Majesty. Her Heirs and Sue

cessori

This dealt only with Hong kong Island. In 1860 the Con- vention of Peking was signed, granting Britain the tip of Kow Joon Peninsula on the facing mainland needed to ensure the now of supplies from China, and control pirates operating from that side of the port.

On June 9, 1898, a second convention was signed in Peking (it came into force on July 1, 1898) extending British territory on the mainland, and to outlying islands, under lease for 99 years. These are the New Territories. which should revert to China on June 30, 1997.

Without these added lands Hongkong's four million (a Agure that presumably will be increased greatly by 1997) would

Clearly China can strangle Hongkong quickly and quite legally in 1997. But will Peking act before then? Every couple | of years the Chinese restate their attitude towards Hongkong,

In the last such reference the Peking People's Daily said:

Hongkong has been Chinese territory since ancient times. This is fact known to every- body in the world, old and young. More than a century-ago British imperialism came to Ching in pirate ships and pro- voked the criminal 'opium war," massacred Dumerous Chinese people and occupied the Chinese territory of Hongkong... This is an enormotis blood debt British Imperialism owes to the Chinese people. Sooner or later the Chinese people will make a thorough-going liquidation of this debt."

Declining role Certainly Peking is still mak- ing a lot of money from Hong kong.

but, now that China is being rapidly opened up to direct foreign trade, this is becoming less important to the Mainland.

Since the Chinese Commun ists always seek pretexts to justify, for their party history books, the political correct- ness of any major political would certain claim mistreat- action, in Hongkong's case they ment of the colony's Chinese subjects.

Not that Peking really needs to justify action against the colony, for the Chinese know that neither Britain nor the United States would try to defend Hongkong.

kong's prospects by the Hoover An American study of Hong- Institution of Stanford Univer sily has predicted that China could move against the colony predicated on the basis of a 25 early as 1974, but this is

violent power struggle following the death of Chairman Mao.

If the money men of Hong- kong are disturbed by such pre- dictions of disaster they are careful not to show it.

FE.D

Is itis Recant or

Inference

typied

C. M. Malchu 16/10

ร

Sir M MacLehose

UNCLASSIFIED

FEH 2/2

FRANK ROBERTSON'S ARTICLE ON HONG KONG : DAILY TELEGRAPH

14 OCTOBER 1971

1. We have consulted Research Department about your question. They do not have full records of all NCNA pronouncements on Hong Kong but are reasonably certain that no such sentiments have been published in NCNA since 1969. Mr Davies who studied NONA daily in Peking since the beginning of 1969 confirms this.

2. From the tone of the passage quoted it seems likely to date from 1967 or 1968. Recently NONA has even taken to mentioning "the Hong Kong British authorities" in straight- forward news items from Hong Kong. The most recent example of this was a report of attendance at National Day celebrations in Hong Kong. The passage quoted by Frank Robertson is therefore far from being typical at present.

R.b. Gr

RB Crowson

Far Eastern Department

18 October 1971

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UNCLASSIFIED

19/10

FIF

P3/4

Putr

DAILY TELEGRAPH

.14 OCT 1971

Colony in the dragon's mouth

FRANK ROBERTSON considers Hongkong's future and the treaties that created it

STR

NIR DAVID TRENCH'S rẻ be forced to live in an impos

tirement next week asbly restricted area. Governor of Hongkong marks the end of an era, for he was the last official ap pointed to this post by the Former Colonial Office. Sir Murcay Maclehose, his sue cessor, is a carcer Foreign Office man with China service.

At this turning-point, how does the future of Britain's last Important colony look? While vest new long-range investment projects. both public and private, are being avidly under- wrillen, Hongkong's money men know well that they can enjoy their remarkable prosperity only so long as Ching wills it

For Peking, fervidly jealous of all its prerogatives, regards the British colony as Chinese territory which sooner or later must revert to the homeland, "Sooner or later? There's the crux of the astonishing Hong kong gamble.

The colony's legal position is regulated by three treaties, all regarded by Peking *unequal" and therefore not binding. The Arst of these, signed under the mouth of British guos at Nanking by Manchu officials in 1842, states:

It being obviously necessary and desirable that British gubi jects should have anme Port whereat they may careen and reft their Ships,

when quired, and krep Staves for That purpose, His Majesty the Emperor of China redes to Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, etc, the Island of Hour kong, to be possessed la per petuity by Jer Britannic Majesty, Her Heirs and Suo

Cessore.

This dealt only with Hong, kang Island. In 1860 the Con- vention of Peking was signed, granting Britain the tip of Kow loan Peninsula on the facing mainland-nerded to ensure the Now of supplies from China, and to control piratex operating from that side of the port.

On June 9, 1898, a second convention was signed in Peking it came into force on July 1. 1898) extending British territory on the mainland, and to outlying Islands, under lease for 99 years. These are the New Territories, which should revert to China on June 30, 1997.

Without these added lands Hongkong's four million (a figure that presumably will be Increased greatly by 1997) would

More than that, the colony would lose much of its reservoir water supply, most of the northern side of the narrow harbour would be in patentially national airport might well be bostile hands, and even the inter- claimed by China.

Clearly China cap strangle Hongkong quickly and quite legally in 1997. But will Peking act before then? Every couple of years the Chinese restate their attitude towards Hoogkang,

In the last such reference tha Peking People's Daily said: territory since ancient times. "Hongkong has been Chinese

This is a fact known to every- body in the world, old and young. More than a century-ago British imperialism came China In pirate ships and pro- voked the criminal 'opium wark massacred Aumerou Chinese people and occupied the Chinese Territory of Itongkong ... This 15 an enormous blood debt Aritish Imperialisın owes to the Chinese people. Sooner or later the Chinese people will make a thorough-going liquidation of this debt,"

Declining role

now

Certainly Peking is still mak- ing a lot of money from Hong- kong, but,

that China Is being rapidly opened up to direct foreign trade, this is becoming less important to the muxinland.

Since the Chinese Commun- Ists always seek pretexts to justify, for their party history books, the political 14 correct- ness of any major political action, in Hongkong's case they

would certainly claim mistreat- ment of the colony's Chinese subjects.

Not that Peking really needs to justify action against the colony, for the Chinese know that neither Britain nor the United Slates would try to defend Hongkong.

kong's prospects by the Hoover An American study of Hong- Institution of Stanford Univer sity has predicted that China could move against the colony predicated on the basis of as early as 1974, but this is violent power struggle following the death of Chairman Mao,

if the money men of Heng- kong are disturbed by such pre- dictions of disaster they are careful not to show it.

EE.D

Is this

kecant

nference

typicł

16/10

RESTRICTED

Reference

(3A

Mr Davies, Far Eastern Department.

CHINA/HONKONG

[FEH 2/2 :

As you are aware, the Chinese regard Hong Kong as part of China, and refer to the "compatriots" of Hong Kong. Specific references to the status of Hong Kong are, however, few.

2) On 8 March 1963, the Feople's Daily published an editorial entitled "Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party of the U.S.A." Although nominally directed at the American Communist Party, this was in fact a reply to Khruschev's attacks on the Chinese position over the Cuban crisis. Khruschev, in the course of his attacks, had made somewhat disparaging references to China's failure to end the colonial status of Hong Kong and Macao. The Chinese, in reply, stated that :- "With regard to the outstanding issues, which are a legacy from the past, we have always held that, when conditions are ripe, they should be settled peacefully through negotiations and that, pending a settlement, the status quo should be maintained. Within this category are the questions of Hong Kong, Kowloon and Macao...

Although Soviet propaganda occasionally returned to the subject of Hong Kong and Macao in subsequent years, the Chinese do not appear to have paid much attention to such references. However, the Chinese delegation to the World Youth Forum held in Moscow in September 1964 did protest strongly at a resolution which called for the independence of various Asian colonial territories, and included Hong Kong and Macao in the list of such territories. The Chinese insisted that Hong Kong and Lacao were different from the other colonies because they were Chinese territory, taken by unequal treaties.

4) During the disturbances in Hong Kong in the summer of 1967, there were several Chinese references to the position of the colony. While these were often delivered in somewhat militant language, they seemed to indicate, at least obliquly, that the 1963 statement in the Feople's Daily still held good. Thus a People's

aily Daily editorial of 3 June 1967 called upon the

T patriotic compatriots" of Hong Kong to unite against "British imperialism". It went on :- "The fate of Hong Kong will be decided by the patriotic compatriots there, by the 700 million Chinese people, absolutely not by decadent British imperialism." Similar sentiments were expressed by Chi Pen-yu, then a member of the Cultural Revolution Group under the Central Committee, at a meeting of the Afro-Asian Writers 'Bureau on 5 June. He also said, as a warning to British imperialism, that "The old debt you owe us for launching the dirty Opium War and forcibly occupying Hong Kong by taking advantage of the corruption in the Ching court is not yet repaid."

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/ 5)

RESTRICTED

5) There were other newspaper items in similar style in the following weeks, but the most explicit statement on the position of Hong Kong came in

an article by the People's Daily "Commentator" entitled "Hong Kong is Chinese Territory published on 20 August 1967. This rejected claims, allegedly being made in the Hong Kong press and radio, that Hong Kong was British territory.

Ħ Hong Kong has been Chinese

territory from time immemorial. This is known all over the world.More than a hundred years ago, British imperial- -ists sailed to China in theippirate ships and unleashed the criminal Opium War in which they massacred countless Chinese people and, moreover forcibly occupied our territory of Hong Kong.This was followed bytheir annexation of our Kowloon and the seizure of our New Territories. This i is a heavy debt in blood which British imperialism owes to the Chinese people. The Chinese people will sooner or

later completely settle this account with British imperialism,"

"Commentator" also asked : "Is it conceivable that Hong Kong will for ever remain under British rule?", and replied, "Of course not, a thousand times no, ten thousand times no!"

became

6) "Commentator" repeated some of these themes in another article on "Baring British Imperialism's Crafty Features", which appeared on 21 August, but thereafter, references to the Hong Kong dispute less and less frequent and were usually confined to details of specific "struggles" carried out by the "patriotic compatriots." As far as we can trace, the Chinese do not appear to have referred to the status of Hong Kong nor to its eventual takeover by China until Chou En-lai did so with Malcom MacDonald.

22 September 1971.

Kultowe

JE Hoare

Far Eastern Section, Research Department.

RESTRICTED

CS. 41A

2600077

15,000-4/71-B26483

REF.

BY BAG

SCR 4/3571/62 v

UNCLASSIFIED

RECEIVED IN

REGISTRY No. 30 21 SEP 1971

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT

LOWER ALBERT ROAD

HONG KONG

3 September, 1971

L V Appleyard Esq

FED

F CO

FEH 2/2

༡༥

Door Len

PAPER BY PROFESSOR HARRIS

Chris Hovells wrote to you on 14 July enclosing a copy of a paper by Professor Harris. The Professor has now sent us a copy of his paper without any security classification.

You may therefore regard the enclosure to Chris Howells's letter of 14 July as unclassified. The version we have now received contains the note that the article is "an earlier uncorrected draft of an article published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London)".

الله

Yoin

Ather

(A F Maddocks)

cc.

RC Samuel Esq (Peking) J D I Royd Esq (Washington)

41A

15,000-4/71-1

REF.

SCR 4/3571/62 Pt. V

CONFIDENTIAL

Enfis

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT

LOWER ALBERT ROAD

HONG KONG

L V APPLEYARD ESQ

FED

F CO

14 July 1971

Deem Len

PAPER BY PROFESSOR HARRIS

A copy is enclosed of the paper by Professor Harris that you asked for in your letter of 17 June. We came by it circuitously. He did not want to part with a copy yet having sent it in, he says, to the editor of "a journal of high international repute". It is not an impressive paper; perhaps what we have got is an early draft.

Of course ve don't like speculations about the future of Hong Kong to be aired in public, and in this paper we disagree with or dislike :

(a) the introduction of Hong Kong into the curious

equation on Sino-Soviet relations at the head of page 6;

(b) the reference to declining commercial confidence

at the foot of page 6;

Kong with 'economism' on page 8;

(d) the reference to US warships and servicemen on

pages 13 and 14:

CONFIDENTIAL

-/2

رجم

CONFIDENTIAL

2 -

(contd)

(e) the absurd mention of an 'independent Cantonese

republic' on page 20; and

(f) the suggestions of sudden change in the post-Mao

period at the end of the paper.

But think ve must accept that speculation of this kind is likely to increase. As a good deal will be generated abroad we cannot hope to check it and, for the moment at least, our best course seems to remain detached in order to be able to disclaim it all and, if necessary,

to dismiss it as unfounded,

Vocans

Chais

(C.J. Hovells)

Assistant Political Adviser

c.c.

Encl:

R C Samuel Esq Peking

JDI Boyd Esq Washington

w/o encl:

CONFIDENTIAL

Herodontiste conta

The International Futura of Hong Konr

Hong Kong's legal position is regulated by three treaties reflecting the

tripartite division between the island itself and the two extensions of the

hinterland, Kowloon and the so-called Now Territories. The actual details

contained in the treaties are very infrequently quoted, but it may be valuable

to examine the provisions of the treaties with a view to establishing tho

position of Hong Kong in law.

In the case of Hong Kong island itself, Article III of the Treaty of Nanking (1842) contains the following:

Treaty of lianking Art III

"It being obviously necessary and desirable that British subjects

should have some Port whereat they may careen and refit their Ships, when required, and keep Stores for that purpose, His Majesty the Emperor of China cedes to Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, etc., the Island of Hongkong, to be possessed in perpetuity by Her Britannic Kajesty, lier Heirs and Successore, and to be governed by such Laws and Regulations as Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain etc., shall see fit to direct.nl

The island of Hong Kong clearly devolves in perpetuity to the British Crown, though it may be remarked that what was envisaged in 1842 was a puroly

maritime exercise. In the liong Kong of the succeeding contury, of course llong

Kong commercial, industrial, financial and banking role for surpassed her

significance as a port whoreat only "British subjects", "may careen and rofit

their Ships, when required, and keep Stores for that purpose,............." Tho

second aide in the Hong Kong colonial triangle refers to the peninsula of

Kowloon which is of course actually a part of the Chinese mainland. The island

was itself increasingly dependent upon Kowloon for supplies and for access to

1 Treaties, Conventions, etc. between China and Foreign States

Vol. I, Socond Mition 1917. (China. The Karitime Custom III Mico. seriest No. 30. Published by Order of the Inspector General of Customs, Shanghai.) p. 352

the mainland, as well as recognising the need to control piracy in and around

Hong Kong itself.

The actual tores of the Convention of Peking, 1860, are as follows:

Convention of Peking (1860) Art VI

"kith a view to the maintenance of law and order in and about the

harbour of Hongkong, His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China agrees to code to Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, and to Her Eeiro and Successors, to have and to hold as a dependency of Her Britannic lajesty's Colony of Hongkong, that portion of the township of Cowloon, in the province of Kwantung................."2

It is to be noted that the tera in perpetuity' does not appear in this article but it is no doubt a reasonable assumption that if Kowloon devolved to the United Kingdom "to have and to hold as a dependency of Her Britannic Majesty's Colony of Hongkong", then Kowloon's future would be Hong Kong's future. In short Kowloon too may be regarded as a colony in the legal sense.

With the case of the so-called New Territories, or 'ooded territories', the situation is quite different and, hence gives rise to the whole discussion regarding the future of the entire colony on the legal (though not the political)

level.

A document signed at Peking on June 9, 1898 which came into force on

July 1, 1898 read as follows:

".... the limits of British territory shall be enlarged under lease

to the extent indicated generally on the annexed map........................" "the term of this lease shall be ninety-nine years,"3

The justification for the extension, according to the document, lay in the bald statement that, "an extension of Hong Kong territory is necessary for

2 op.cit. p. 433

3 Convention for the Extension of HongKong 1898 (Peking, June 9, 1898)

nocdo

the proper defence and protection of tho Colony", The needs of the military olearly czerzod as the over-riding factor in the rationale behind the annoxation,

To imagino what the situation might be a century hence is an extremoly difficult. For those who negotiated a lezoo in 1898 whoco terminal date vas 1997, future calculations and prospects were sufficiently far away to be of

rolatively 1itle concern. For the army and navy officera who beliovod that

they could defend and protect Hong Kong only if they cocured

squaro miloo

of Chinese mainland territory, a ninety-nine year lease must have appearod necure enough, Indood, in 1893, China itcolf appoared unable to withstand the onslaught of western imperialics, let alone · Cope

with logal nicotion

such as the length of a leaso and a disguised annexation. In 1898, Hao Tco-tung

wan five years old.

Etrictly speaking thereforo, the legal position is that the New Territoriog

will revort to the owners of the lease, the Chinose government, whatever and

whoever that might be, on June 30, 1997. In a sonso, we are not so very for

removed in teran of uncertainty of the futuro situation than the signatórios of the Peking Convention of 1893. For one thing while the legal situation

rosadno unchanged, the political situation is always flexible and no one can

foresee either the likely attitude of the Chinese government in 1997 or who may be in pover at that tice. The crucial question asks who will succoed to the mantle of Hao, and to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The Hoover Institution has estimated the possible death of Hao Tse-tung as 1974, but evon this guons, whether correct or not, is of little value in knowing that China'a "political formula" is likely to be two decades after the death of Hao. It is hardly possible that Kao can survivo to ago 104 and oven if he could, he

is not necessarily likely to be capable of directing policy.

Fon grasp at certainty wherever they can. Bolingbroke's Reflections uron Edilo put the point regarding cortainty in politics with succinct accuracy:

de "Truth lies within a little and cartala compass, but error is immenco." AG for an Hong Kong in concorned the margin for error is immenso and the margin

time absolutely programmed (in strictly legal terms) but, at the same time

absolutely unknown. That the British authorities in Hong Kong have in fact

done is to behave as if the legal situation woro the absolute cortainty, and

this has also appeared to be the appraisal of the Chinese Communists.

We may perhaps call a reliance upon the strictly legal view, and the

implication that the New Territories will (in the absence of a new but

unexpected negotiated extension), revert back to China, a 'poker-faced

theory', The 'poker-faced theory' of Hong Kong's future operatos in such a

way that all parties play the game of international politics as if the legal

programe were literally true. It suits the llong Kong government to act in

absolute conformity with the poker-faced syndrome, to maintain a perfect

poker-face as it were. The Chinese government, it could be argued, has

consistently played poker-face diplomacy over Hong Kong.

The point was made quite explicitly by a former governor of liong Kong,

4 Sir Robert Black in a newspaper interview on April 14, 1971. On the particular

} question of the future of the New Territories, Sir Robert declared that it was

quite conceivable that China would agree to a renewal of the lease in 1997.

Sir Robert was perhaps taking the poker-faced syndrome to its reductio ad

absurdum. Few persons would be so bold as to speculate what choicos the

Chinese government would cake in 1997, for all the political choices romain

with the Chinoso. In contrast, the British must stake everything upon a legal

interpretation of the three treeties signed in the last century which we have

already quoted in the relevant extracts. Some persons have argued that Hong

Kong can continuo to survive even if it does lose the New Territories.

sense such a view is a refinement of the legalistic argumont, for it argues

that, even if the official Chinese authorities were to clain the New Territories

in accordance with the Convention of 1898, they would still be bound by the

earlier treaties of 1842 and 1350. Hong Kong's four millions would be forced

to live, if they still chose to live within the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong

government, in an impossibly confined area. For the colony to survive without

In a

the low Territories would bo, tantamount to saying, in the words of one

journalist, that it is possible for somebody to leave his house and live in

the toolshed'.

Before we leave the territorial question however, it might be worth remarking that the legalistic poker-faced argument containe two sorts of advantages. In the first place, quote obviously, it suggests a polite fiction all round that Hong Kong's security is assured in an uncertain world. Idoology becones 'neutralised', as it were, for the time being, in that it is not permitted to generate action. The second advantage which attaches to the legalistic approach is related to cortain attitudes. In paychological terms, it may be true that when nobody knows where they are going it is better to bo guided by a lowest common denominator, in this case the law, in particular, sono antiquo treaties signed on behalf of two long-dead monarchs. In short the greatest advantage to be derived from an uncertain situation is a neutral fora of certainty. In the extraordinary conditions of Hong Kong, "where 200 per cont capitalia faces 200 per cent communism", the future is best shelved in the

contemplation of the miracle of the present.

In international terms, however, such a situation has not been lost upon China's rivals, friends and enemies. The Russians in particular have mado sarcastic references to the anomalous situation in which a communist country accepted the existence of colonies on its very doorstep. In a speech made to the Supreme Soviet in December 1962, Khruschov made several particularly cutting references to China's toleration both of Macao and of Hong Kong. While Khruschev's denunciation was doubtless mado as part of the Sino-Soviot var of nerves, it certainly did not suit the Chinose People's Republic to have raiced the sensitive issue of colonialism. The legalistic argument might not necessarily survive if confronted by the stark facts of communist ideology and

'orthodoxy.

5 Boe C.A. Linden, Khruscher and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-64 (1966)

John Hopkins Preco, p. 175

However, for particular but unstated reasons, the Chinese politbureau clearly believed that, Hong Kong was more important than Khruschov's friendship, (though rhother, in the long run, it is more important than Soviet friendship is perhaps another matter). Whatever the calculations made by Peking in tho goneral evaluation of options, stences and positiona, Hong Kong did not appoar to be reclaiming either before or for some time aftor Khruschov's renoval in

October 1954.

Apart from the legalistic arguments which operate at the official level, there are a number of other assessments of the future of Hong Kong. The assumption underlying of most of them is that the New Territories problem doos not constitute a separate issue, but in part of a package deal. The fact that Kowloon and the island are logally different from the New Territorios has not provented one recent riter from saying, "It is highly unlikely that this loase will be renewed, and the Colony cannot exist without the Now Territories. Another estimate made at the end of an account of the 1967 disturbances in Hong Kong argued that, without the New Territories, Hong Kong "may not be able

Some support was to survive as a separate functional and economic unit".7

given to this view in the Annual Departmental Report of the Commissioner of Labour in 1970. The Commissioner stated that "the New Territories is an integral part of Hong Kong and must provide most of the industrial sites

Thus any prosent and future development required by industry in the future". of the entire colony as an industrial power can be seen only if the Now

Such a situation night categorically Territories are included in Hong Kong. rule out any suggestion of a continuation of Hong Kong's present status after 1997. Moreover, Hong Kong's banking and financial importance is likely to become less important, because the uncertainties of the final decade of the lease are bound to reduce confidence in the sensitive areas of business and

financial activity.

6 D.J. Haller, The Government and Politics of Communist China (Hutchinson)

1970 p. 169.

7 J. Cooper, Colony in Conflict (Swindon Prosa) 1970 Introduction.

8 Commissionor of Labour, Annual Departmental Report 1969-70.

1969-70. Section 190, p. 5)

The question which most observers in and of Hong Kong constantly ask is

why does China permit Hong Kong to exist. The answer normally given is economic,

that Cuina permits Hong Kong to exist because China gains quite considerablo

economic advantages fron permitting the British Crown Colony on her doorstep.

The entire rationale for China's toleration of Hong Kong is most commonly

stated in economic teras. We may consider a number of those assertions.

Karold Hinton has stated that Hong Kong ig tolerated because "it is the largest

single carner of non-Communist foreign exchange"." Pator Calvocorossi believed

that China's tolerance developed after the Communist take-over in 1949 because "it (China) took a pragmatic and not a doctrinaire view of its own interests.10

Another writer argued that "China has allowed it to remain British because of the convenience it affords her to trade with the non-communist world.

1.1.1

Alcost to a man, journaliste explain China's toleration of Hong Kong in

purely economic teras, The Sunday Telegraph of November 9, 1969 can fit to

place its discussion of Hong Kong in the Business Section. 12 The Times of London

produced two special reports on Hong Kong in quick succession, dated October 30, 1969 and October 15, 1970. In the former report it was stated that, "Hong Kong

is, in fact, China's only roxarding financial and banking bridgehead with the

rest of the world and her most convenient springboard for export dumping forays

into South East Asia

13 That. Hong Kong lives on "borrowed time" is seen as

a tribute to the appeal of the "good clean smell of money", assessed variously

as between £250 million and £300 million in terms of Peking's earnings of foreign

exchange.

Host arguments whether from acadzzies or journalists which attempt to appraise

China's acceptance of Hong Kong's situation in purely economic terms are not

convincing, Hong Kong is of course intolerable to the Chinese Communists as a

9 R. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics (Houghton Mifflin) 1966 p. 24.

10 P. Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1945 (Longmans) 1968 p. 74.

11 D. Crosley, The Eackground to Current Affairs (5th edition) 1970 Papermac,

(Hacmillan), p. 226.

symbol of capitalion, but to argue that because it is accepted by the Chinese

on account of its profitability needs closer examination. In short the

argument boils down to the simple belief that China is prepared to swallow

her ideology for money, even during a period of ferocious ideological upsurge

like the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1957. It must not be

forgotten that economien', the search for wealth before ideological truth,

was one of the cardinal cins of the heretics' of 1967. It was better to be

'red' than 'expert', bettor to be full of rovolutionary zeal and, if necessary,

14 empty in the stomach. Yot Eong Kong survived, pace the 1967 riots.

What the 'economic argumont effectively suggests is the heresy, Poking

itsolf practisad (and still practisos) the revisionist sin of economiam -

placing material well-being prior to revolutionary ideclogy. If one accepts

the ideology of the Cultural Revolution even at a highly devalued level, it is

still difficult to understand how unbridled capitalisa continues unchecked.

Ideology and myth are of course the abstractions produced by the political

culture, which can be crudely defined as the mass perception of the political

'rules of the gane' in all its aspects. Can it be argued that such a funda-

mental and all-pervading phenomenon as the Chinese political culture suddenly

stops short at the Shun Chun river border between Hong Kong and New Territorios

and the mainland of China? Can China's communists believe in an inspirational

ideology except for Hong Kong, where the highest value is the stock exchange

and the bank? One explanation for the puradox is that so does not take his

own ideology seriously. Indeed he told the French writer Andre Kalraux that

"husan nature left to itself does not necessarily reintroduce capitalism, but

it does reintroduce inequality. It is moreover true that the political and

rhetorical value of ideology is there to be capitalised on particularly amongst a people so attracted by ideology as are the Chinese.15

14 Ping-tillo and Tang Taou, China in Cricis (Chicago) 1968 vol. I, Book II,

p. 519.

15 Lucian Pyo, The Spirit of Chinese Politics (M.I.T.) 1968 pp. 12-16.

particular, Chapter Two, The Comforts of Hierarchy and Ideology "The Chineco haya olmayn falt profoundly uncomfortable. disentințând, and throstened

Yot, for a life-long communist, such as Mao, it is inconceivable that he should be cynical enough to tolerate the casa Nao cult nythology, yet behaving hicself as a complete cynic in private. so has not swallowed his ideology for economics, neither has he assumed a now devioumess, the answer therefore must

be sought elsewhere,

Indeed if Hong Kong were to be condemned as an ideological outrago, it would have been re-absorbed into China at any time after 1949, if not long before. It is sometimes forgotten that Hong Kong has beon in the British Empire (to use that term in the strict historical sense) for a century and a third of

a century sixty years before Nigeria for example, Hong Kong has, it could

be argued, been an affront to Chinese pride long before it became the important

Of course the Hanchus did inlet of foreign exchange which it has now become, not then have the power to resist foreign devils, but on the contrary, the Chinese communista do possess this power. Thy do they not use it?

If.

The answer can only be a guess because there is unlikely to be a single anover which would satisfy the political scientist in the way that it would possibly satisfy the economist. It may perhaps be nearer the park to auggest that Hong Kong is essentially a political pawn in the game of Chinese pover politics. Hong Kong may perhaps be regarded as a Trojan Horse in reverse. as is sometimes said, Britain is a Trojan Horce for the U.S.A, in Europe, it may be that by a process of oriental logic, Hong Kong can be used as China's Trojan Horse in the U.S. sphere of interest in Asia. Through Hong Kong, China has been able to penetrate the consciousness of the West, particularly in the two decades after assuming control in China.

While a colonial government remained in power in Hong Kong firmly wedded to the legalistic poker-faced syndrome, the Chinese authorities have of courca asserted their "rights" through the large numbers of communists in the colony. To create a disturbance in Hong Kong may be the communist's method of warning Britain that China was annoyed not with the colonial government but with tho

Hong Kong United States. Riots in 1952 and 196 fall into this category. could also be used as a sounding-board for Poking's exasporation with Taiwan.

↓

In October 1956, there were Rationalist riots in Kowloon, severe enough to

cause Chow on-lad to state that China "could not permit such disordere on

the doorstep of China". The policy of confronting China through Hong Kong

General had already been developed by the United States during the Korean war,

McArthur hud stated that, in spite of the embargo of the U.S.A. on trade with

Communist China, Hong Kong's authorities had peraitted "substantial quantitios"

of patrol to find it way to the mainland. No support was given to the general's

assertions either by the U.S. Consulate-General or by the Hong Kong government.

but Hong Kong's role in Asian power politics was spelt out clearly. The advico

given by the U.S. Consulate-General, in Hong Kong in January 1951 for all American

citizens to evacuate the colony spelt out the fears, and indeed the appraisal,

17 of China's intentions as they were perceived by the U.S.A.

British policy to stand by the legalistic implications of the three treatios

vas spelt out immediately after the victory of Mao's forces in 1949. As early

as 1951, the British government, through the somewhat improbable person of the

Chief Justice, Rome, stated that mainland China had been lost to the Nationalists,

no longer in effective control, and that H.1.G. was "fully alive to the probability

18 of the withdrawl of recognition by the British government in the near future".

Mr. Harold Macmillan from the Conservative back benchos asserted, during the

debate on the Amothvat incident that the Conservatives supported Britain's

decision to remain in Hong Kong and he described the colony us "the Gibraltar

19 of the East" At sono stage the authorities in Peking must have calculated to

them the value of a military operation to absorb the colony in propaganda terns,

in ideological termo, in financial terms, and this calculation must have been

made early on.

No doubt the calculation has been made many times since, most

recently during the Cultural Revolution in 1967. These calculations have not

resulted in an invasion. There have been puzzling moments such as occurred

during 1962, when border guards on the Chinese sido permitted 70,000 people to

leave in a Great Produs, Most of those were in fact returned, and the colony

continued as before. The triumph of legaliom behind the facade of lagalicm continuod.

16 Times, October 13, 1956.

Some writers have seen, somewhat crudely that Hong Kong 10, in internationel

Where thera has torno, "a means of exerting pressure on the United States" been, somewhere in the Far East came particular problem, the Chinese authorities hava decided to make internal discard in Hong Kong. There is a grain of truth in the idea for while the British cufforad severe disconforture in Hong Kong they would react by impressing on their American friends a policy of greater caution. However, China's calculations in terms of her international politics were probably far broader than this, but the very fact that Hong Kong was left untouched ray in sone vay explain that while Britain was prepared to recognisa the Chinese Commmists, and keep all its dealings 'correct', the colonial government could retain its (albeit loose) role over the "capitalist city". In Peking's terms, given the full growth of the Mao-cult, this was a conciderable price to pay. This was at a time when, during the 1950's, "Republican leaders paid regular dues to the "China Lobby" and talked about "unleaching Chiang Kai-shek. It is only 10 years since the House of Representatives voted by 395-0 against the admission of China to the U.N.21 In contrast with the U.S. attitude, the correct legalism of the British government was calculated to be accoptable.

However, it would not do to accept the situation without demur, Chinese attacks upon continued British occupation nevor ceased to be made and may be considered from two angles. In the first place, British occupancy of Hong Kong was not unexpectedly subjected to much rhetorical and ritualistic language, so characteristic of revolutionary systems or political systems in revolutionary turmoil. Such language has two functions. In the first place, it serves to stool the nerves of those who, for reasons of internal policy, require either to steel or be steeled against all dangers and enemies both internal and external. Outsiders are depicted as 'paper tigers', monsters or villains, and particular worda come to have particular connotations, such as 'imperialist' or 'reactionary'.

21 Far Eastern Economic Review, May 1, 1971 p. 11

22 S.R. Schram, The Party in Chinens Communist Ideology in J.W. Lewis (ed.),

Party leadership and Revolutionary Pover in China, (Cambridge University Press), 1970, p. 195.

***** 12/-

ihatover

A second element in the Chinese Communist position relates to the need to

give aid and comfort to Communist party monbers in Hong Kong itself.

posture, negative or positive, which Peking adopts over Hong Kong, the bizarro

situation continues whereby devoted revolutionary communists exist in, and draw

sustenance from a Crown Colony. If imperialien in a paper tiger, what is the

good communist to do when he is a cubject in a colony those existence is tolerated

by his superiors? The bizarre nature of the situation is increased and enhanced

by the active involvement of Hong Kong'o communists in the commercial life of

Hong Kong, including ownership of ships, banks, department stores, ovon Suzie Wong establishments scattered throughout the city.23

Hong Kong's communiots

become just one other (albeit more highly politicised) interest group within the

vast interest group spectrum which makes up the colony's political sub-structuro.

The high-point in the aid-and-confort syndrome lay in the riots of 1967 when

the party apartchiki in Hong Kong or Canton took to the streets to demonstrate

solidarity with the Cultural Revolution. Yet, paradoxically, the aid-and-comfort

was rather more a product of the Hong Kong communiste vis-a-vis the mainland

rather than vice versa. It has been suggested that Hong Kong communists were

not, in provoking the riots, acting in strict accordance with the wishes of

party headquarters in Peking. During the 1967 riots, Hong Kong's communists

may have acted with an excess of zeal in their determination "to prosent Hong

Kong as a humble gift to Chairman Kao", The course of the evouts of 1967 has

25 been minutely described, both from an official, as well as an unofficial,

The problem of ascertaining Chinese thinking on the matter of Hong Kong's

future is complex, so much so that we require to grapple with unlikely with

clues provided from many diverse sources. Such an examination may not necessarily

bo reduced to mero Pekinology but may take the observer on occasion to written

Communi

evidenco as to what Communist China conceives to be hor national interest in

23 The Tires.

October 30, 1969. Article by Richard Hughes.

24 H.K. Government Annual Report, 1968.

25 J. Cooper, Colony in Conflict (Swindon Press, Hong Kong) 1970.

Asia. According to Foking orthodoxy on the subject, the areas which about

China itself nay bo` divided into three parts.

1) "Lout territories, like Taiwan, the Ryukus, Blutan, Sikkin, which are

subject to recovory at come time.

2) Areas which voro forcorly states in tribute to China, such as Burk,

Thailand, Korea, Vietnam, Loos and Cambodia, described comovhat rhetorically

by Poking on arons where Foking "refuces to sit idly by while helpless stated

aro ravaged by foreign powers,

3) Areas of "just ambition", which have historical or race tien with China.

26 Thoso include Russien, Turkiston and the Maritimo Provinces,

This is indeed a comprehensive analytical list, but it studiously omits

both Hong Kong and Hacao, which one might have considered to have been included

in the first or third categories listad. However, both Hong Kong and lacto ero

conspicuous by their abronce. It may be, as the Hoover Institution suggests,

that this omission indicates a "degree of progmatic flexibility'on the question

of the future of Hong Kong. On the other hand, the Peking authorities may not

wish to categorise either Hong Kong or Macao because the international futuro of

these territories is as much a puzzle to Ching as to everybody also.

Some indication of the dilemma which prevails may be illustrated by the

atlitude of the Chinese authorities to the visit of U.5. warchips to Hong Kong.

Peking clearly disapproves for all possible reasons, military and ideological.

28 Nevertheless V.S. varchips continue to call. Of course, the cynię might argue

that a prosperous Hong Kong must directly or indirectly assist Communist China,

from wherever the income lo dozived and U.S. serviceson alone opont ¡3430 million

in Hong Kong. Indeed, during the palny days before 1971, (whon the inflow of V.5.

serviconon diminished), it was ostimated that overy day about 5000 0.1.0 visit

26 D.J. Doolin, Territorial Clninc in the Sino-Soviet Conflict (Stanford, loovor)

1955, pp. 16-17.

27 Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Arms Control Arrangements

for the Far East, Yuan-li wu (ed.) (Stanford, Hoover) 1957.

the British colony.

It may well be that such expendituro does benefit China, but it would be cynicias indeed to argue that these are the cole and sufficient reason why China permits her North-Vietnamose ally to suffer for China to gain some share of Hong Kong's var profiteering. It may well be that there are come things best left unsaid. To borro

To borrow Hermon Kahn's paraso on nuclear warfare, the detailed discussion of Hong Kong's future may be tantamount to "thinking the unthinkable". Hence Peking says nothing about Hong Kong and Macao.

There is however an interesting attempt to assess the probable worst eventuality which may befall Hong Kong, given a 'high-tension' scenario. This gloony prediction foresees a falling off in tourist trado, in the amount of foreign capital passing to China through Hong Kong and a resulting decisive military action taken against the British colony. The Hoover Institution's prognosis is worth quoting in full:

"As of 1973, China's foreign exchange receipts from the Hong Kong trade have fallen to one-third those of 1966. China decides that the time has come when she no longer wishes to pay the humiliating price of continued colonialism on Chinese soil for Hong Kong profit, and in a bold military action, beginning on June 23, 1974 and ending less than forty-eight hours later, both colonies (Hong Kong and Macao) aro seized by the P.L.A. The action is so swift that only a few thousand escape to Taiwan and elsewhere. British protests to the United Nations Security Council are unavailing. The United States and Britain, in consultation, agree that there is little that can be done, although the United States Seventh Flect stands close to Hong Kong for some weeks to aid in picking up small vessels with refugees abroad.

1,30

Clearly such a forecast is extremely bold. As from the date of this article, the future of Hong Kong is restricted to a mere three years. It is admitted that such an assesment forms part of a "high-tension scenario", and that the date of June 23, 1974 is clearly a hazardous guess at an exercise in pinpoint

29 The Timon, October 30, 1969. Article by Margaret Allen.

stay was five days, it was revealed, and their average expenditure vas

Their averago the substantial figure of HK$5,780.

30 Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Poace (Stanford University)

Commund at China and Arms Control (1968) 'p. 144

accuracy often associated with astrologers rather than with cober political noientista. The parallel "lon-tension-scenario", hoxover, does not include a dicevasion of the future of liong Kong, though it does envisage the death of Kao in spring 1972.31

Thore is howevor, an important non-participant in the dialogue over long

Tho

Kong

the United States. The United States has had double thoughts regarding

In the Hong Kong. At one end of the ambivalence is the question of China. early days, Britain was rogarded as perfido Albion in the Orient (just na the French have seen the United Kingdon in thic light in the European context). In coze respecto this thinking has been related to an ideological commitment. U.S.A. had a cause to pursue, the global containment and defeat of Communism whose worldwide oncroachments constituted a major threat to the peace and

The British were often neon by soourity of what was called the "Free World". the Americans as either "poft" on Communism (a "fact" somehow strangely linked up with the occasional existence of Labour governments in Britain), or es more concerned with trade than justice. Seen at its lowest estimate, Britain'o recognition of the Chinese People's Ropublio, was just one other means of currying favour with Orientals in order to cling on to the 'rags and tattors' of the British Empire. The point was made by Mlinton in which he linked up a number of widely dispersed variables including thinking on Hong Kong.

"The U.K. recognised the Chinese People's Republic not only because it was

the de facto governmiont of the mainland of China, but in order to protoot Hong Kong, and as much as possible of British trade with and investmonts in China, to avoid if possiblu dáving the C.P.R. further into the arua of the Soviet Union, and, perhaps cost important of all to pleasa Nehru (who was vory insistont on recognition of the C.P.R.) and keep India in the Commonwealth."32

It is the vory opitono of perfido Albion.

31 on.cit. p. 130. Thio feconario' alco enviragos the democratication of

Taiwan at the lower level, and a defeat for the (rain) Congreso Party in India, while Pakistan, "boset by economic and political problems of hor own, roadily taken the opportunity to nako come retronchmont in her own uilitary expenditures". ep.cit. p. 134. tione of thece territories acted in the ways onvisaged.

Hence until 1969, trade man utterly prohibited as betwson the U.S.A, and

China, and American visitors vero permitted to savour the delights of Hong Kong,

but had to ensure that they bought no goods whose origin was on the mainland.

Even after the wild thaw of 1971, following on the new ora of ping-pong democracy..

it could be stated authoritatively by the U.S. Defence Secretary that trade

should be avoided where this would "help the Chinese raise their relatively lou level of technology 33 However on the day on which the Defence Secretary spoko,

the U.S. Consulate-General in Hong Kong announced a proposed increase of sales

of its fara goods into Hong Kong of twenty-five per cent and entered into direct

competition with China as a supplier of food into Hong Kong. In short whatover

might be the course of Sino-America relations, Hong Kong would naturally and

necescary be the stamping ground for their rejected ideas and surplus goods. For

the situation could so easily become that as depicted by Byron in his versas on

Tear Alexander I.

"Now half dissolving to a liberal thaw

But hardened back whene1er the morning's raw.

The other 'face' shown by the U.S.A. to Hong Kong is admittedly the 'public

smiling face' of visiting politician. Perhaps the most bizarre judgment was

made in Hay 1961 by Lyndon Johnson (then Vice-President of the U.S.A.) when he

34 described Hong Kong as the "show window of the free way of life in Asia" Yot

while such hyperbole would not be given much credence (oven coming from the

travelling politician), the trend of American foreign policy has always containod

a heavily moralistic element which must be taken seriously but not exclusively when China is involved. 35 To adapt a modified form of the thinking well-known

from the writings of Hans Korgenthau, the U.S. attitude to China has been 'moralistic'

while the U.S. attitude to Hong Kong (apart from the immediate period after Korcan

War), has been Tealistic,36 Such an appraisal may well continue to be characteristic

33 Report in liong Kong Standard, Kay 11, 1971

34 New York Times, 16 Hay 1961. Johnson also said of Chiang Kai-shek "not only in the history of his own nation but also in the wider history of free mon's couraço against tyranny everywhere, President Chiang's name will never be forgotten". Seo D.C. Watt, Survey of International Affairs (Oxford University Pross) 1961 p. 355.

35 M. A. Guhin, The United Stoles and the Chinese People's Republic International

of the future. In the past, the U.S.A. has hoped that the Chinese Communiat

authorities would "encounter incurmountable obstacles in their attempt to gain.

control"

Communies would thereforo prove to be unworkablo as well as

undesirable. Hong Kong was useful because, as Lyndon Johnson, perhaps over- stated the position, it appeared to be at least workable (no a "show window") if not quite roopectable in that it wag under the supervision of a colonial

power.

Britain of course, fully accepted the de facto situation in China and on many occasions brought pressure to bear upon the United States to do the case. Even in Barch 1951, during the negotiations over the Japanese Peace Treaty, the British Foreign Office puggested that Communist China should be made a party to

30 the negotiations and that Formosa chould be restored to China.

Tho United

States did not comply then or later fer reasons which "lio deep in both the national interoat sa percaivad by American leadership, and in the relationship

postures",39 between dozeotic political situations and infernational postures".

ween

Clearly the Horgenthau "solution" would have been the whole of China in the Bare light - us Hong Kong - as a vast trading area, in which national interesto could compete and profit and prosper without too much attention paid to other people's ideological convictions. Korgenthau believed that the effect of V.S. policy towards China vas to produce "one of the most resounding defeats our 4:5

foreign policy" had "even sustained". In 1951, the People's Republic of China was declared "an aggresnor in respect of assistance to North Korea in the Korean

Affair". By 1971, an izsense change had come over the thinking processes of

the diplomatic world.

Where did Hong Xong stand in all these developmento?

37 Guhin, or.cit. p. 54.

38 Guhin, er.cit. pp. 56-57. He argues that the urge to give Hong Kong cocurity

of trada lay at the root of these canoeuvres.

39 Culia, on.cit. p. 63.

40 11. Forgontbau, American Foreign Policy: A Critical îxamination (London: Kethuon)

The internal situation in Hong Kong is not the concern of this essay.

However it may be of some considerable use to ask como questions upon which the

discussion of the future of Hong Kong is based. It is commonly belioved that

Hong Kong is a dynamic laforsk-fnira rocioty in which capitalics flouriches in

a ruthless and unbridled fashion. It is believod that any investor must secure

a roturn on his investments within five years, liong Kong to presumed to vorchip

ono god

Goney and to naimowledge but one ethic that of mammo11.

This is true only in the crudost conco. To a western political theorist

the post characteristic featured of capitalics are coon as part or whole of a

package deal. Theco have been recently conveniently listed as: "the absoluto rule of private property, the subjection of the whole of economic life to

market influences, the domination of the profit motivo, the noutrality of

government, the typical laissez-faire division of incomo, and the ideology of

individual rights".

1464

What Hong Kong'a version of "capitalism" is a particularly truncated form

of this credo. Private property exists only in the narrow conce of bank ascoto, stocks and sharos (on one of the three stock exchanges), and mutual funds or

unit trusts of doubtful merit. Land values are calculated puroly as cach assets,

realizoable in the very short run and a subject for overall government. Moreover,

while it is true that nocial oorvices are only on the verge of existence, the

operation of market influencos is not absolutely without rostriction. Govornsent

pays particularly close attention to price levels in the sphore of transport. It was, after all the proposed increase in ferry fares which was the occasion for the rioto in 1967. By its use and manipulation of transport franchises, such

as roducing the amounts payable by the various bus companion, the government

Indirectly suboidicos auch public transport. In the sphore of public transport

the authorities require constantly to 'hold the balance', to ensure that, within

the colony's restricted road space, a Hobbesian state of nature does not suddenly

42 Her Fabian Ezcaya, K.N.S. Crocaman (ed.) (Third Impression) 1970, J.K, Dont,

The Prunition Iron Canitalim by G.A.R. Crossland, p. 46

19/-

develop. The market economy does not work in the area of housing either for alsest one-half of Hong Kong's population will be in receipt of public housing. The Hong Kong govorament has been forced to bacomo a public landlord becauso the prospects of an immigrant population housed in squattor make-chift 'homoo' could not be tolerated even under the cost doctrinaire espousal of laicsox-fairo philosophy. Free elementary education was introduced, though not on a compulsory

basis in 1971.

The profit rotivo moreover and its consequences are clearly covereign in Hong Kong, but it does not enjoy untrammelled authority and sovereignty. In a Chinese society, position, hierarchy and stability count for much, and in a senco, corves as the social coment for every society in which the Chinose dominato. The pervacion of a capitalist society with "faco", attitudos to authority, posture and colidarity are crucially important. Sono Chinese think only in terms of profit and loca; they are often very woalthy. It is porhang more characteristic of the behaviour wasterners who come to find their fortunes in Hong Kong that among them the profit motive can be said to operate, Honco thoco frequently describe Hong Kong as a materialistic society. Yet government spends about $1,000 million on social corvices.

The profit motivo la 'rootless' and; in the dosper sence, meaningless as a cotivo. While it may even be fully acceptable as an 'ethio' for some, it does not accord woll with the Chinese socialization process, whose effect hao boen "to produce individuals with a strong sense of the advantage of order,

43 disciplino, propriety and competence".

The final three items in Crossland's Hist refer to "the neutrality of govornzent, the typical laiccos-faire division of income (which presumably means income inequality)" and the ideology of individual rights. Without doubt the Hong Kong government is a 'noutral' in the conce that it is the recipient of pressures and not their instigator, and without doubt thoro is little or nothing of the classical liberal ideology of individual rights to be found in

Hong Kong. Howover the various incozo differentials do not necessary revent the typical laitsex-fairo division of income. Far from exporiancing a Harxist depreciation of the proletariat, the employeo's vago position improved betvees 1964-1973, so much that, during this period average wages rosa 634 in each terms

The Employment Amendment Ordinanco was passed, "making and 32 in real terms. it an offence for employers to hire labour which they knew they would bo unable

to pay".

It was ootimated that Hong Kong's averago ducono per hand was no high na V.5. 3600 per annum, thich in terms of comparable Asian countriod was

remarkably high.

Hong Kong then, if a capitalist's paradice (for capitalists), was not a

In 1970, for example, Hong Kong placed severe restrictions capitalist culture. upon any civil corvants seen to be living beyond their means (the French rolatod concept of 'evidencos extoriauren do la richesse') to prove that thoy had

If this was a obtained their income in an unimpeachable and correct mannor. restriction upon civil servants, it was in a sense also a restriction upon the tampters. While there may very well be a Chinese political culture and even a Hong Kong political culture, it does not always pay to believe that men will always act altruistically. Hong Kong is not, as we have suggested, to be classified or labelled in any particular way. Moreover, its future is clouded by uncertainty. However, the enquiror should not hold back from analysing the situation in an attempt to discover the options opon in the Hong Kong puzzlo, on which banis wo now proceed. There would appear to be four particular elements in the situation on which the future of Hong Kong as an independent city state appear to defend. Firstly is its relationship with its giant parent. The question which has to

small-country pattern

be answered in this connection is whether the big-country can poraict without Hong Kong simply bocoming a 'donino' (a rich and ripe domino) either after or sozoțime before 1997.. What is really at issue is whether Kong Kong can become an independent Cantonese republic; for after all the logic of the campaign to make Cantonese an official language is the logic of Cantonese nationalium. One vondora whether Poking would tolerate a city of banko and 'exporta', but the doos co now.

44-1971 Yonrbank, Far Eastern Fannomic Review, p. 151.

In the second place, much will depend upon the various positions taken

as between Chira and the Soviet Union. If the Sino-Soviet confrontation intoncifios

and worsens, then the repercussions are likely to be felt upon Hong Kong. Tho Soviet Government is likely to bocoma interoated in Hong Kong, particularly if

the city reverts to the mainland. In short, como "bucklash' is inovitable upon

Hong Kong given a chango in the relationship between the two great super-povore.

The details of the 'backlash' are unknown to us. The paradox of the situation

is that Soviet interest in Hong Kong is likely to be less well-developed provided

the British maintain their colonial too-hold, but the removal of this is likoly

to bring long Kong into the cotaphorical firing-line.

In the third place, many Chinese in Hong Kong will have to make careful

calculations regarding their future and the bonefits to be gained from continuing

to stay in Hong Kong as 1997 approachoo. Hany Hong Kong Chinoso votod with thoir

folt' to leave China either in 1949 or later and at least 10,000 still escape

from the mainland every year. If they have to think the unthinkable' again and

nako an organising choico, would a new exodus take place, and if so to where? Even the communists in Hong Kong must be uncertain of their future given a consunist

occasion to power.

It is a classic complaint that cone poople (such as liu) ofton "wave the rod flag to oppose the red flag" or that they are "left in form but richt in essenco". The borderline between 'true' and 'false' policies can be drawn only with the utmost difficulty. One calculation which can be made with some cortainty in that Hong Kong's banking and financial buoyancy must subside aftor the first suggestiona that the mainland is prepared to abcorb the city. This point has been put with simple clarity by a recent historian. "... Tho political (Eritish) empire still exists in Hong Kong, but it can hardly survivo

beyond 1998, then the leam of the low Territorica comos to an ond and Hong Kong,

"45 acrosa a narrow strait from a hostile China, will become virtually untenable."

Of cource not all analysts agros with this view,

China may adopt a course of cweet reasonableness.

"Arthur Huck ougcosta that

45 G. Woodcock, The British in the Far Eant (Woidenfold and Nicolson) 1969, p. 245.

absorption will probably bo dofurred until the Chinese economy is a great deal stronger. For the immediate future the econonte advantages of leaving them intact are considerablo. When the louco of the Rou Territories which forms the greater part of the Crown Colony of Hong Kong runs out in 1999 (sic), China may use the occasion to negotiato the absorption of the colony; but it is by no means certain cho will

46 want to do so even then."

It is unlikely that many people make this serene assessment. Post are inclined

to calculate on a less optimistic basis. Those who are able and willing to

retreat socothero in the West will clearly do so. Those who must rosain, the

vast majority, will leave their children to survey the options two decados hence.

The fourth element in the discussion concerns the role yet to be played in

Eastern Asia by the United States. It has been suggested above that Hong Kong's

position vis-a-vis the United States has been uncertain but given a general

relaxation of hostility between China and America, Hong Kong should be acourod of

a greater measure of respect from the U.S.A. It may be of some interest to note

that the U.S. ban withdraw from the U.ll. Committee of Twenty-four (the special

committee on colonialism). What is likely to omorge is a new debato on the place

of the so-called Third China. If Feking (the first China) finda itself implacably

opposed to Taiwan (the second China), what would be ito attitude towards a third

China (Hong Kong as an independent off-share Cantonose republic)? Put in theas

terms the answer can be only on resounding vote of confidence in the status quo.

Indeed some people regard the 'fear of a third China' argument as a conservative

bogoy equivalent to an appeal not to rock the colonial boat.

However, this argument may be obsolescent. Given a seating of Peking in

the United Nations in the foreseeable future, the place of the Second China may

be nearer solution in the sense that Taiwan's position can become only weaker and

nover stronger.

46 A. Hluck, The Security of China (Columbia University Proso, N.Y.) (for

Institute of Strategic Studies, London) 1973, p. 90.

23/-

The Feople's Phily has solemnly stated: "Hong Kong has been Chinoce

territory since ancient tizco. This is a fact know to all, old and young in

the world. More than a century ago British Imperialism camo to China by pirate

ships provided the criminal "opium war", massacred nunorous Chinese people and

occupied the Chinese territory of Hong Kong. Later it snapped the Chinose

territory of Kowloon and the Chinese territory of the "Now Forritories",

This

is an enormous blooddebt British Imperialian owes to the Chinoce people. Sooner

or later the Chinese people will make a thoroughgoing liquidation of this debt,"

147

What is wrong with this statement is concerned in the term Chinese people.

Of course the 'Chinese people' are represented as a unity, and indeed the great Han

people represent a passive testament to ethnic homogeneity. However, Hong Kong

Chinese are constantly subjccted to relentless woaternisation in often the crudost

and most rapacious forms, through the press, television, cinema and radio. No

longer do most Hong Kong Chinese wear traditional dress or hair-styles or necessarily

behave the same as their mainland compatriota. The English language has a high

prestige anongst young Hong Kong Chinese in spite of their enthusiasm for Chinese

as an official language. They are interested in the so-called 'modernisation

process' and Apter's well-known book The Politics of Moderniņation has an especial

appeal for many Hong Kong University students precisely because it appears to be

concerned with their predicament.

Hence it is not clear that the Chiness people aro consciously collectively

and permanently infuriated at the thought of Imperialism on the doorstep. That

Hong Kong is a valuable asset is plain to noe but it is not economics plone which

has permitted Britain to retain its control, as no have already suggested. The

clus to this is to be sought in the laws of power politics and to some extent, in

the simple fact of personality. Mao Tse-tung has ruled China for 21 years and

Hong Kong has been socure during this period. It may very well be then, that. aftor

his departure, and even before 1997, the situation may change. The French speak

of l'apres-gaullisino; might thore not be such a thing as l'apres-maoicmo?

47 People's Daily, August 20, 1967.

ד דו-י -- ה -

**-

Whatover are the reasons which impol Poking to permit Hong Kong to curvive may

very well disappear cîter Hao'o coath. His demise and removal may give way to

a succession disputo in which each sido tries to demonstrate that it is hollor-

than-thou in obedience to his memory (plus maoistoque Mao). The cubjuration of

the Imperialist vorm on the doorstep may be a small and simple way of establishing

oneself in the corridors of pozor in Poking.

Churchill once described Russia as a riddle wrapped in un enigna inside a

mystery. It is tempting to reapply this cliche to China and particularly to

China's thinking on liong Kong. Yet the simple fact which is constantly forgotten

is that China consists of about one-quarter of the world's population. To expoct

consistency, clarity and continuity more than actually is the case (and whích ic

to a degree romarkable) may be to expect too much. It was after all, Nao himself

who wrote a famous essay in 1957, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Anong

The People. That sone contradictions remain, including the situation of Hong

Kong itself ought porhaps to surprise nobody.

CJ Kovella Baq FOG LO

17 June 1971

d/d...17/6

PAPER BY PROFESSOR HARRIS

News Agut

1. Hong Kong telegram No 408 referred to a paper prepared by Professor Harris for the Hoover Institute about the 'International Puture of Hang Long'. Could we see a copy?

Copy tor

1 0 Bazuel Isq

Peking

J DI Boyd Beq Washington

L V Appleyard

Far Eastern Department

(16181) D4.727490 750M 171 Hw.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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Secret.

Confidential,

Restricted. Unclassified

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

DRAFT

To:-

CJ Howells

Type 1 +

From

спа

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

Paper by Professor Harris

Hong Kong telegram No. 408 referred to a paper for the Hrores Institute

prepared by Professor Hanis about the

Fiature of Hong Kong! Could we see a

кад

"Intematinal

copy?

a. R(Jamal

все

Renning

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