FCO 40/106 Disturbances in Hong Kong propaganda

PART

File No.

B13/22

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SECRET 265

COMMONWEALTH

OFFICE

DEP

1926

AN O

ITLE: HONG KONG : INFORMATION AND!

PROPAGANDA ASPECTS:

DISTURBANCE 1967

REFER TO

DEPT.

DATE DEPT.

NAME

DATE

DEPT.

NAME

918

Me Sammara Fr 1/2

1918 28

My Raminan 20/12

Mr Carter.

......

In Eflguiran 15/08

叭

Nr Laminara 22/1

a Zaman In laminaa Fis

20/

ILLIN

REFER TO

NAME

OPENED

1467

SECURITY N.B.

REGISTRY ADDRESS

Room No.

378

Curtis Green Bulldung.............

Victoria Embankment,

DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. OR P.A.

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FOLIO NUMBERS OF TOP SECRET AND SECRET DOCUMENTS IN THIS JACKET

FORMER FILES PART A.

RELATED FILES

HWA 1/17 - Nong Kong Wistic lance. 1467

HWA 5/16 Economic & Financial Consequences of

Wisturbances

ances 1967)

ས་

No. Gaghinare

I suggest we

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Dear Cafter,

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ARMY INFORMATION

TEAM

Colonial Secretariat,

Lower Albert Road,

Hong Kong.

23rd November, 1967

28/11

live $139

Tony Shephard, who is one of our more senior administrative officers and who, up till recently, has been Commissioner for Transport here, is about to take home leave in England. We wish him to give a series of talks in Britain as part of our Overseas Publicity Effort.

A programme is being drawn up for him.

I should be very grateful if Hr. Shephard could call upon you sometime in January to discuss these proposed talks, and also if he could have access to up-to-date reports on happenings in the Colony so that he might be kept abreast of events.

LAET

KEE

REF.

I Mocking

(J.R. Locking)

for Colonial Secretary

4.3. Carter, Esq., C.V.o.,

Commonwealth Office, LONDON, .#.1.

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVI No. 63

28 NOV 1967

HWA 13/22

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new vohund.

R. 318

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24.

1467

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ARG

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ON HER MAJESTY'S SERVICE

| BY AIR-MAIL

PAR AVION

AIR LETTER

AEROGRAMME

3. Carter, "sq.,

Commonwealth Office,

LONDON, 3.4.1.

Sander's name and addensET.

Second fold bare

Colonial Secretariat,

Lover Albert Road, Hong fong.

AN AIR LETTER SHOULD NOT CONTAIN ANY ENCLOSURE; IF IS DOES IT WILL BE SURCHARGED OR SENT BY ORDINARY MAIL

Hong Kong Government

HIIL 196

G.F. 106 (0001060)

Baby inɔ wɔdo of

Commonwealth Office

S.5.1.

Our rof: KB 13/22

December 1967

Carter has asked me to reply to your letter to him of 23 ilovember.

　　　We shall be glad to see Shephard here in January and to give him any assistance that he may need. Perhaps you would ask him to get in touch with me on his arrival here. (Telephone

Trafalgar 7010, ixt. 127).

J.K. Locking Laq., Colonial Secretariat,

Hong Kong,

(A.M. GAMINARA)

Ed. (3746)

Registry HWB 13/11

No.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret Secret.

Confidential,

Restricted,

Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

DRAFT S/o keltes.

To:-

J.R. Locking FZSER,

Colonial Secretarist,

Hang nóng.

Carter has asked me

Type 1 + $5

From

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

101 December 196

to reply

ما

letter to him of 23th Novetes.

протир

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

127

We shall be

glad to see

Shephard here in

January

to give

him and

assistance that he many

need.

Perhaps you

him

would att

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get

in touch wit

Cong to

　17° Sedgwich with copy (56

Кору сосік сору

anival here. (Telephone - Trafalgar 7010, Ext

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　　to :- (1) M°C. Wilson (IRD (2) this Stowy-JIPGD (3) IT Sedgwich,

thing Mong Crow. Difce, 54 Pall Mall.

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fair μl. Ano

11.47.

GAMINARA

ANGARINARA.

に

R.318.

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4/12

2/58

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference....

All 4/12/64 Batu

p. Lewis

Mr. Gaminara, (Hong Kong Dept.)

Overseas Confidences in Hong Kong

I have discussed this paper with Colin Wilson of I.R.D. and we have agreed to submit our comments separately as they touch on different aspects.

2. My main comment is that in theory this paper is fine and I agree whole-heartedly with the need to identify themes and targets and treat them individually, but what it does not say is how this is to be done. For instance, the paper indentifies the main features of activity and the agents for channelling material but nowhere is there any indication as to who is to produce it. It is also all very well to provide a list of literature distributed but there is no indication where it has gone or whether the outlets available through the U.K. network of Information Officers are being fully exploited. I would suggest therefore that we need to go back to GIS Hong Kong (from whom I have also received copies of this document) and ask them just how it is intended to work out all these theories in practice and what role, if any, they expect us to play in future since the co-ordination and cooperation of the U.K. information effort is not touched upon at all.

Iftimes

(J. Stowe/Miss) 1 December 1967

I think it would be a mistake to under-estimate the efforts that have been made and are being intensified by the Hong Kong Government Services to ensure that overseas confidence in Hong Kong is maintained. However, I agree with the point made by Miss Stowe in regard to co-operation with the U.K. Organisation: we have the machinery at this end (and the outlets abroad) to give any support that the Hong Kong Government might require and the only problem is co-ordinating our programmes. No doubt when Nr. Rivett-Carnąc comes back to London sometime this month many of these details can be settled by discussion on the spot.

10.3 Pemes

(E. G. L-WIS

4 Dece ber, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL.

HWB 13/22

Hr. C. Wilson (Information Resoarch Dopertaent)

Hiss J.A. Stovo

(J.I.P.G.D.)

I enclose a copy of a confidential paper which has been sont to us by the Hong Kong Govornmont Office in London. Tho

out

paper sots the views of the Ovorso: Public Relations

Co-Ordination Committee in Hong Kong on stops to neintain

overseas confidence in long: Kong.

is not intended for publication:

It in a working paror and it is for the use of members

of the Committos in Hong Kong and their counterparts oversors.

I should be grateful if you would let no know by tolophono or otherwise whether you have any comments on anything in the

paper.

ARE.

(A. H. Gaminara)

22 November, 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

HONG KONG GOVERNMENT

INFORMATION SERVICES

6/38

4 PALL MALL

ONDON S.W. 1

Phone: 01-930-7951

OVERSEAS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG

This p per sets out the views of the Overseas Public Relations Co-ordination Committco on how the 1967 Disturbances have affected over-sons confidence in Hong Kong and how efforts can be made to retain and foster overseas confidence. There is also an account of the steps taken so far to achieve this objective.

New Factors Influencing Overseas Confidence in Hong Kong

(a)

(b)

Up to 1966 Hong Kong was able to conduct its economic and social life relatively detached from the political consider tions of China; China had a strong but passive influence over the colony's affairs. The start of the Cultural Revolution attracted even greater overseas attention towards China, It was when the revolutionary fervour caused disturbances in Macau that Hong Kong begun to be associated with events occurring in China. There was apprehension that Hong Kong might be similarly affected.

When street disturbances started in Hong Kong in May, 1967, many people, both in Hong Kong and overseas, were shocked into thinking that China might soon take over Hong Kong. People assumed that this was likely either because of a policy decision in Foking or by an invasion from Kvantung Frovince without the blessing of Poking, or by subversion from within the colony which would be effective enough to destroy the British control of Hong Kong. Even if people did not assume that China would take over Hong Kong, they were at loast reminded that China could take Hong Kong, and prompted to think that it was likely sooner or later because of the anti- imperialist posture taken by China.

CONFIDENTIAL

/(A11).....

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

(b)

(c)

(a)

(e)

(f)

All publicity which drew attention to Hong Kong's close proximity to China in convulsion, especially nows bout the disturbances along the border, cro: ted doubts where before people had tended to ignore such dangers.

Unbalanced and sensational reports, as well as even re son bly ccur. tu reports of violunt incidents during the disturbances, reinforced Assumptions which people had already made about a gonor a lack of safety; ul.ck of anfety both for individual persons within the Colony, and a lck of safety guinst subversion,

There w's some evidence of a lack of confidence locally which, when observed, reported upon, or merely allogod, gave depth to convictions bout the insecurity of ilong Kong, 0.g. the number of people who made arrangements for themselves or especially their children to le vo the colony increased, representing a drin of butter educ ted persons, withdrawl of funds from banks, enquiries about factory sites in Tiwm or Singapore, nd the postponement of business ventures and expansion plans.

The disturbances not only focussed world-wide attention on Hong Kong, but also in many instancou dr. ttention to the soci 1 conditions of the Colony which, to the more advanced outside world, apnuured to them to be conducive to discontent and thus by iplication to revolt, c.g. labour conditions, a shortage of opportunities for youth and crowded and squalid housing conditions. Less sympathetic commert tors highlighted these con- ditions by contrast with the signs of great wealth in the colony; other comment.tors were not slow to advance allegations of the constitutional anachronism of Hong Kong as a Colony.

Competitor countries in the 3.. Asia arca, such as Japan, Taiven, Thail nd and the Philippines, though bically concerned th t ong Kong should not disappear as a buffer between tium and China were not slow to take any advant e they could from the withdrawl of buyers, investors or tourists from Hong Kong. hoy later realised that, as far as tourists pro concerned, their prospects vor、 inter- linked with those of Hong Kong.

/ (2).....

CONFIDA!TIAL

CONFIORITI AL

(3)

Evidence of Decline of (v.rseas confidence in Hong Kong

Buyero

(a)

(b)

(c)

(a)

Some

As an initi.1 assessment the buyers for whom d. livery periods are short, and those who would nood time to look elsewhere and are therefore committed, he not pl:cod fower orders: buyers whose orders require longer to deliver and are able to look: clsewhere are known to bu hesitant, and in some inct nces not placing orders. Some buy.rs for mail order companius or chain stores are t king stups to reduce dɩ- pendence on Hong Kong products. In the long term there is a threat to the hitherto sustin_d growth of exports.

Investors

Although inv. stment which has already been committed has continued, these investments have been predominantly in service industrics, rather than in m nufacturing. There has been very little new investment by local or overseas capital. Re-investment also appe rs to have slowed down.

Tourists

There has been a slow-down in the growth of the tourist industry, both in the number of arrivals, inv.strert in ne facilitis and the actual business transacted. Group tour operators re

lrc.dy Apprehensive about cust.ining or increas- ing their operations. Some tourist carriers are cutting doim on their visits to Hong Kong, either in duration or number of visits.

General public opinion overseas has been more critical of social conditions in Hong Kong by making corparisons with those in more adv.nccd countries, Fart of this critical comment his been nelicious or part of ill-d、duced assessments of the causes of the Cisturb nous, some has been an inability to appreciate why British rule in Hong Kong is not able to advance more quickly to the standards by which people in Brit in live.

/(3).....

COLFIDENTIAL

CC.FIL / NIAL

(4)

The conti ucû ct rate of x colony's imporů

nos which h v been used to rutin confidence

(a)

(b)

(c)

(a)

(c)

(1)

(c)

(h)

(i)

n loster (vorsenNS

nsion of the

Jourist f. cilities uniap ired 20 incr...buď numbers of tom isto blu to njoy their st y in 3 luty.

large pr. cts continu i to progress c.fi. cpansion of the Hor: Kong -1.ctricity Comp ny's Generation c acity, the rucl vation off enchi, the Peninsul.lectric Power Company dev lognent, and vt now 1w-cost housing ttes.

Che continuir nor lit, of life in schools, chops ad f.clries; industri 1 production con- tinued to ine ne so fund the port work fluentiy

nd officiuntly.

cool-ho. dedness of the dr ristrution on the offici mey

restr int of th. Holic. Forc.

I very mus r.ssions of support for the Gov. micnt by representative organic tions and quiet rejection of the communists by the popul tion

whole.

China e rus large proportion of her foreign chuge cmnings in and through Hong Kong.

Foking did not initi.t. the disturbances in long Kong, in fact the 1.L.A. often restrains demonstrators

t the bordor.

The xtremely all number of local conanista

nd their dividedness.

Guidc-linus for Tutur. Action

די

(a) The use of a contr 1 co-ordinating committee to

dvise on the ublic relations fforts in the

n rts of the world most important for Hong Kong And to net as forum for new ideas.

བ་ས་

COTIDIATAL

/(b).....

(b)

(0)

(a)

CONFIDLITIAL

(5)

The m in the tros of one: tion to be the U.3.A.

Cn.l. U.K., Surope, Japan, B.1. Acia, Australiá and parts of Africa. Bach theatre presents different problews; though the targāts may be broadly sinilor in each the try the t ctics to be used and th. crh cis on v rious thenes will be qiff、runt.

The 2 ran to for the cnfidence-building offerts

re buyers, investors, tourists, sellers, foreign governments, overes Chinese in S.J. "sin and, indirectly, oversens public opinion.

Phones,

Different targets require different enphases. The three main trg ts at which speci.l efforts nocd to be made are buyers, investors and tourists. It in lso thought that sont effort should bo m do towards those who sell goods to Hong Kong.

In the blue-print which fellows, under unch tar et is given (4) the composition of the image and (3) the in factual detail which lies behind the in, mə It is anticipated that any public relations offerts directed try rds ..ch target group will deronstr. to the facts Liven in (3) in order to create the i pression given under (A).

Target : BUY AS

(A)

Inagu

1. Good profits.

2. Goods ansy to sell.

3. Value for money. 4. quick delivery.

5. English widely used.

(B)

Themes underlying In PL

(:) People work, h rd,

quickly, and offici.ntly

(b) Lively, intelligent, enterprising nd dynamic n nagenents.

vory high degree of nnual skills, dexterity

also ingenious.

(a) Production highly

flexible in volum und product design.

() Sophisticated d

perienced corcinl infra-structure.

/(f).....

CONFIDENTIAL

COLFIÐLITIAL

(6)

(B)

(f) Sound b.nking facilities

(g) Minimum and cusy

docwa ntation procedures,

(h) ficient c rgo-handling

both sea anì air.

(i) Frequent air and sva

: rvices in and out of Hong Kong, which is

contrally located for 2 st asian routes.

Targets : INVIDICAS

(A) Image

1. Rapid returns 2. High growth ratu

from high base.

3. 36. bl. government.

4. 3t ble economy

5. Dedicat.d to frue

enterprice

6. Low tax tion.

7. Loading world

tr ding unit.

8. English widely used.

(B) Themes underlying Image

(1) Free port status, (b) sophisticated and ox-

perinced commerci l infr-structure.

cations.

(d) Convenient and efficient

cargo handling godown facilities.

import、d goods.

(1) Leu 1 accuss for 11

suppliers.

(g) Vell orcablished tr do

links throughout S.L.Asia

(0) The treatment of such thone will be to present in a

manner most likely to appeal forcefully to the target

group t which it is being aimed.

COMNI DIITIAL

/(1).......

CONFIDENTIAL

(f)

(7)

Tactics. It will b. necessary to decide which medi./ nudium is best suited for particular targets, in

particular regions at certain times. The media possible

aro:-

(1) DIRECT

neusp.pers, newsletters, panphlets. Personal and individual contacts. Trade Delegations.

(ii)INDIRECT-advertising, influencing newspapers

correspondents, agency representatives rdio commentators. Use of radio or T.V. progr mnus, Us of films. 'Aside' tele- grans. Influencing a third party who in turn will influence the target.

(B) Tools. The org nisations through which the effort

will b、 de ar listed in para.4. The employment of Public Rolations consultants will be made on carefully selected and defined projects,

(h)

(i)

Timing can be as important as the message itself and vill se kupt in mind.

Translation. It is important that targets be approached in their om 1、nguage whenever possible.

(j) It is recognised that the overall Public Relations

effort must be sustained.

Principal Agencies ung ged in retzining, repairing_and fostering oversuis confidence.

In Hong Kong :

Government Jnformation Services.

Department of Commerce and Industry.

Tr.de Development Council.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(a)

Federation of Ilon, Kong Industries.

(0)

Tourist Association.

(f)

Hong Kong Gener 1 Chamber of Commerce.

(In)......

CONFIDENTIAL

In the U.3.A.: -

CONFIDENTIAL

(8)

(a) Washington D.C.

(b) New York

British Embassy.

Counsellor for Hong Kong Commercial Affairs at the

British Embassy.

Tourist Association's

representative.

I.D.C.'s representative. Tourist Association's

representative.

(c)

In major cities

British Consulates-General

(a)

(e)

Tourist Association's representative in San Francisco uid consultants in

Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston and Dallas.

Chabors of Commerce

In Canada:-

(a) British High Commission, Ottawa and Trade

Commissioners in provincial capitals.

(b) Tourist Associatio Consultants in Toronto,

Kontreal and Vancouver.

In Britain:-

(a) Hong Kong Government's London Office

incorporating the Department of Commerce

nd Industry and the Government Information Services.

(b) Trade Development Council's representative

and F..

consultants.

(d)

(e)

@ @ @

Hong Kong Association

A Ship Owners sub-committee dealing especially with seamen.

(f) Chambers of Commerce.

CONFIDENTIAL

/In Europe

CONFIDENTIAL

(9)

In Europe:-

(a)

(b)

(c)

British Missions in all e pit ls and consular postз in many cities.

Counsellors for Hong Kong Commercial Affairs, British Embassy, Brussels, and British Mission, Geneva.

f.D.C. representatives in Europe (operating from Brussels) with the services of Public Relations consultants in Paris, Bonn, Genova, Milan, Hamburg, Stockholm and Barcelona.

(d) Chamber's of Commerce.

In Japan:

(a)

British Embassy in Tokyo and consular posts in c.rtain major cities.

(b)

Tourist Association's representative.

In Australia:-

(a)

British Hi h Ca missioner's Office and Deputy High Commissioner's Office in state capitals.

@ @

(b) Sydney

1.D.C.'s representative.

Tourist Association's

representative.

(a) Chambers of Commerce .

CONFIDENTIAL

/Other countries

Other countries:-

CONFIDENTIAL

(10)

(a) British Missions in all capitals, and consulates in many major cities.

(b) Chambers of Commerce

(c)

(a)

Trade Development Council's

representative in Nairobi,

Tourist Association's representative in Beirut.

Steps taken to retain, repair and foster overseas confidence

(i) In Hong Kong

(a) The Government Information Services have

been ensuring that overseas correspondents resident in Hong Kong are regularly briefed and at briefing sessions have influenced the correspondents to file balanced copy with a sympathy for, and confidence in, Hong Kong, This work is a continuing process, the objective being to build up trust in as many correspondents 5 possible. Some correspondents remain to be convinced. In addition, G.1.3. has maintained casy and accurate facilities for obtaining information, ither by calls on the newsroom or by arranged visits to the border or to actious during curfews or cordons; these steps were and are necessary if correspondents are to convince their editors that they are

obtaining accurate, first-hand news

material. Because it is known that some

overseas correspondents might draw their material from local newspapers, some attempts have been made to influence local papers to produce a confident tenor in their stories,

CONFIDENTIAL

/(b).....

CONFIDENTIAL

(b)

(11)

The Government Information Services has encouraged overseas radio and T.V.

producers to give coverage to the

norality and progress to be found in the Colony.

agencies in Hong Kong to overseas representatives so that they might be well briefed when making contacts with persons abroad. G.I.. in particular has been sending such bulletins twice daily to their overseas representatives and T.D.C. representatives. Also increasing use has been made of guidance telegrans to British Missions overseas.

(d) Literature designed to promote confidence

was sent out by the various agencies either by direct nail or via overseas

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

reprisent .tives to the wide variety of persons who have an interest in Hong Kong. (See Annexure A).

Some overseas representatives have been recalled to Hong Kong for up-to-date verbal briefings. (See Annexure B).

Businessmen in Hong Kong have been briefed by Governant and their Associations on current trends so that they may themselves retain confidence and in turn emanate confidence whenever de ling with overseas associatus.

Various trade and business leaders from Hong Kong, witon travelling abroad, have used every possible opportunity to give radio or f.V. interviews, lectures or personal talks to engender a feeling of confidence in Hong Kong. (See Annexure C).

Hong Kong rather than a European city was used us à venue for talks with a trade delegation from the Benelux countries during the disturbances as a gesture to show that the Colony was quite safe for such purpose at that time.

CONFIDENTIAL

/(ii)...

CONFIDENTIAL

(12)

(ii) In overseas countries (in addition to the action

by representatives mentioned above)

(a) In the U.S.A.

A T.D.C. Mission visited many citics displaying products and giving publicity to Hong Kong. Plans have been made for the promotion of a Hong Kong Association. Publicity has been arranged for Hong Kong's Festival of Fashion. Tourist Association ran a promotion operation in 26 cities in conjunction with Cathay Pacific Airways.

(b) In Canada

A T.D.C./General Chamber of Commerce mission toured Canadian cities promoting sales for specific products and goodwill.

Speciil newsletters were ide up and miled by G.I.S./r.V.C. to approximately 400 businessmen and politicians with a special interest in Hong Kong. H.E. the Governor gave a press conference in the Commonwealth Office and also addressed the London Chamber of Commerce. A committee to discuss influencing attitudes of people in Britain towards Hong Kong was formed.

(a) In Europe

T.D.C. representatives embarked on lecture tours throughout Scandinavia, West Germany, France, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland and Spain. Also monthly

newsletters were distributed to businessmen.

CONFIDENTIAL

/(e)......

CONFIDENTIAL

(13)

Infora 1 cont .cts were ude by the British Embassy with nwspaper correspondents and a Japanese-sp. king staff member was sent to Hong Kong to build better contacts with locally-based correspondents from Japan. Tourist Association arranged special displays in Osuka and Kyoto.

(f) In Australia

A lecture tour was planned by the T.D.C. representative. A supplement on Hong Kong

was prepared for the Australian Financial Review. Tourist Association representative gave television and press interviews.

(g) In East Africa

A T.D.C. Trade Mission embarked upon a trado promotion tour.

CONFIDENTIAL

(14)

Overseas Public Relations Co-Ordination Committee

J. Cater, Deputy Colonial Secretary (Special Duties)

(Chairman)

Mrs. S. Yuen, Ex.cutive Director, Federation of

Hong Kong Industries

Mr. R.G.L. Oliphant, Executive Director, Trade

Development Council

Major H.F. Stanley, Executive Director, Tourist

Association

Mr. G. Archer, Executive Director, Hong Kong General

Ch uber of Commerce

N.J.V. Watt, Director of Government Information

Services

D.C. Rivett-Carnac, of Government Information Services

C.P. Haddon-Cave, Deputy Economic Secretary

7. Dorward, Assistant Director, Commerce and Industry

Department

J.R. Locking, scistant Secretary (Special Duties)

(Secretary)

October, 1967

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT

CONFIDENTIAL

erature Distributed Overseas (hain items only)

ANNEXURE 'A'

From G.1.3.

lo. of Copies

(a) "To Seamon and Their Furilies" Leaflet

5,000

(b)

"To Seamen and Their Failies" Leaflet (Revised)

5,000

20,000

(d) Reprint of "Made in Hong Kong" (E)

"High Fashion" (E)

5,000

"Hong Kong Cones to East Africa"

10,000

(e)

Letters to Oversea Friends

40,000

(f)

The World of Hong Kong No. 1

8,000

(g) The World of Hong Kong No. 2

20,000

(h) "Radio Broadcast - Jobs available at the Seamen's Recruiting Office" Poster

1,500

(i) Reprint of "High Fashion" (E)

10,000

"Made in Hong Kong (3)

10,000

"Facts of Hong Kong'

7,500

Australia

(j) Seamen's Recruiting Office Bulletin No. 2 (E) 2,000

(k) Hong Kong Jones to Austr dia

2,500

7,500

(1) The World of Hong Kong ilo. 3

35,000

(m)

News Letter to liong Kong Seamen lio. 1

10,000

(n)

"Parliamentary Salutation" Leaflet

2,000

(0) "Hong kong Government's Message to Seamen (E)

1,000

(0) 25,000

ઉધર

(t)

(p) "Message to Semen" by liong Kong Government

(q) "Against Intimidation" Poster

"Economic Progress" Le flet

Dear Friend No. 2 (E

"Seamen's" Foster

(u) "Return of H.. the Governor" Leaflet

3,000

10,000

100,000

7,000

60,000

2,000

150,000

2,000

(v) Poster for Restorants

(Note:

(0)

English Chinese)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENT I AL

ANNEXURE 'B'

Overseas Representatives who were recalled to Hong Kong for Briefing

From U.S.A:

Mr. K.T. Woo, T.D.C. Representative in New York.

From Britain:

Mr. Lorenzo Lo, T... Representative in San Francisco.

Mr. Ronald Boxall, of Hong Kong Government's London Office.

Mr. H.T. Woo, Liaison Officer of Hong Kong Government's London Office.

Mr. II. Curtis, H.K.T.A.'s Representative.

From Australia:

Mrs. W. Munson, H.K.T.A.'s Representative.

From Japan:

Mr. J. Revoir, H.K.T.A's Representative.

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEXURE 'C'

Leading Hong Kong Personalities who made visits overseas

The following persons visited the countries as listed in giving personal talks, press, radio or T.V. interviews:-

(a) U.K.

Mrs. 3. Yuen

Mr. G. Archer

(b) U.3.A.

Mrs. 3. Yuen

Fir. R.G.L. Oliphant Hajor H.F. Stanley

Mrs. J. Yuen

Mr. G. Archer (with Trade Minion) Major H.F. Stanley

(a)

Eurore

tir. R.G.L. Oliphant

Mr. N.J.V. tt

ikajor H.F. Stanley (athens)

(e) Jupin

Major H.F. St.ley

(f) Philippines

Mr. J. Carlos-Clarke

CONFIDENT I À L

SECRET

Reference........

----

Mr. Gaminara

You will be interested to see the enclosed extract from a Hong Kong report on the interro- gation of two European business men recently returned from China who trade in Chinese objets d'art and antiques. The report describes the source

as:

"Two Europeans, one of whom had visited China on several previous occasions on business. For the other, the journey which resulted in this report was his first visit to China or to the Far East. Both Sources were well educated, intelli- gent and widely travelled, and both were very cooperative."

Their nationality is not clear except that they are not British subjects. Their views on publicity in their own country about the situation in Hong Kong are a little disquieting although they may be based on the alarmist reports which most newspapers carried at the early stage of the crisis in Hong Kong. They also claim that they are unaware of the existence of the Hong Kong govern- ment's Information Offices. I presume

G.IS in

Hangling wit

Love

Lec

& refor.

faso

(C. Wilson)

6 December, 1967

Copied to Miss Stowe (JIPGD)

Spoke Mr Wilson: this information will be

availabe to the Hong Kong Gart.

ра

怕

läne

no action.

9.11.47

AME 7.12,$7.

다 a cor mus

теб

CODE 18-75

SECRET

Effect of news originating on Hong Kong in Europe

News items from the Hong Kong press relating to events in Hong Kong and the mainland which had either originated in Hong Kong or had originated in China and had been reproduced in the Hon: Kong press, fre- quently appeared in all news media, especially the press, in Sources' native country. The news thus conveyed was almost always alarming and sensational. Both Sources were unanimous in emphatically asserting that if the reproduction of this sort of news in European countries continued uncontrolled, very many European businessmen would discontinue, or not con ider beginning, to do trade with both mainland China and Hony Kong and few tourists would entertain the notion of coming to Hong Kong for pleasure. They suggested that the Hong Kong government establish a press and public relations office in all European countries. They were not aware of the present existence of any such organisation.

HONG

KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICE

PALL

MALL LONDON s. w. t

Our Ref: 42/220SD.

6th December, 1967.

Dear Bill,

　　We spoke about the paper which I enclosed on Hong Kong Overseas Public Relations which I sent to Bunny Carter under cover of my letter of 16th November, 1967. I now enclose three copies of an addendum.

　　What Hong Kong asked me for were my reactions to the paper and any suggestions I might have for its improvement. The idea is that the paper should be subject to modification in the light of the experience available so that it can be maintained as an up to date guide for those making use of it.

The paper was discussed at the last meeting of the Publicity Liaison Committee under my Chairmanship and we propose to produce comments in draft based on points made in the Committee for consideration at the next meeting of the Committee on 18th December. Unfortunately Carrocher could not come to the last meeting, so that we did not have his reactions but it would be useful to know how the direct Hong Kong effort is to be tied in with indirect efforts on Hong Kong's behalf undertaken by departments of H.M.G.

LAZT

ASF.

50)

NEX

REF.

A.W.Gaminara, Esq., Commonwealth Office, Curtis Green Building, Victoria Embankment, LONDON, S.W.1.

(3)

Encl: FCMS/VMH.

Yours sincerely,

bat berperan

(P.C.M.Sedgwick).

Record:

Spoke Mise Stown & M° C. Wilson.

Ameeting of

the Working Group will

probably be conored for next wack. The leper at E/58 waill be on the the point at 1x abor will

agenda

be taken.

,67,

12,

TELEPHONE WHITEHALL 01-930-7951

CABLES HONGAID LONDON S.W.1

CONFIDENTIAL

Fart

OVERSEAS CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG ADDENDUM

Please insert the following immediately before

ph 4 (e) of the paper on Overseas Confidence in Hong Kong:

Targets: TOURISTS

(A) Image

(B) Themes underlying Image

Good shopping

(a)

Hotels among the best

in the world.

2+ Western comforts Eastern mystery.

(b)

Bright Lights.

Luxurious yet

(c)

inexpensive.

Exceptional or Oriental sights.

斗

Visitors well

cared for.

(d) Charming Oriental customs

and manners.

English widely used. (e) Friendly people give

gracious service.

(f) Villages and temples

reminiscent of old China.

(8) Frequent services by

air and sea.

(h) Hong Kong in centre

of E. Asia.

Targets SELLERS

(A) Image

(B)

Themes underlying Image

Large and rapidly

(a)

Free port status.

expanding import

market.

(b)

Sophisticated commercial infra-structure.

Strategically placed

and well equipped

(c)

distribution centre

Good air and sea commun- ications.

for S.E. Asia.

(d)

Convenient and efficient

Resourceless economy

in terms of materials.

cargo handling and godown facilities.

(e)

Consumer preference for imported goods.

(f) Business conducted in

English.

(g) No discrimination between domestic or overseas suppliers.

(h) Well-established trade

links throughout S.E. Asia.

(i) English widely used.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

Polisen HWA 1/13

Curtis Green,

December, 1967.

We had a long talk about Hong Kong with the Secretary of State on Monday (27 November) and, among other things, we discussed the paper on my visit together with

George Foggon's report.

The Secretary of State said that he found my report very helpful, and endorsed the conclusions in paragraph 24 of the paper. We therefore now have the green light to take the necessary follow-up action, Accordingly would you, during your visit, discuss with David Trench:-

(a) what can be done to reorganise the Secretariat

to bring it into line with current needs without loss of efficiency and how unofficial members of the Legislative and Executive Councils might be more closely associated with specific subjects of government (paragraphs 13 and 14 of my report). As agreed with you Henry all is sending David Trench a note giving some tentative views on these subjects, and will send you a copy of his letter which will include some thoughts on the establishment of a proper Private Office which I discussed during my visit;

(b) what action is being taken by the Government

Information Services to tackle the "hearts-and- minds" problem (paragraph 23 of my report) and to counter the inflammatory propaganda of the communist press, A general discussion with the Governor about public relations matters would also, I think, be helpful;

and

/(c) v

SIR ARTHUR GALSWORTHY, KCMG,

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

་

PRIVATE AND CUNET

appoint District Officers in the urban areas to explain Government policies to the people at the grass roots and to look into complaints.

The Secretary of State thought that George Foggǝn a paper on labour matters was first-class and has asked me to authorise you to talk it over with David Trench with particular reference to taking speedy action on steffing problems, the

Our proposed Labour Policy Committee and social security. views as crystallized at Monday's meeting are as follows:-

Staffing of the Department of Labour

We all agree that the status of the Department of Labour should be lifted and that a more dynamic Commissioner is needed to breathe new life into the Department. Although George Foggon hns argued a case for a professional officer as head of the Department, he would be content and I go along with him on this - to see the appointment of a thrustful administrative ́officer such as Jack Cater, if he can be persuaded to remain

in the Service and if he would be attracted to the post for a stint of, say, 18/24 months. If Goodwin does well, perhaps he could take over at that time.

We must assume from what we have heard that the two expatriate senior Labour Officers, Messrs. Bennett and Price, are not likely to return to Hong Kong after their present contracts expire next April. If this assumption is correct it is important to know, at this stage, what the Hong Kong Government proposes to do to find successors. Unless action is taken urgently there is danger that the Department could collapse. I think you might also usefully ask what the Department of Labour proposes to do in order to attract and retain the more able of local entrants to the public service. A career which at present stops dead at Senior Labour Officer is simply not good enough.

Labour Policy Committee

David Trench is, I know, keen to see early action on improved labour legislation, but under the present arrangements

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.

/all

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

all we are likely to get in the next six months is a modest improvement in workers' compensation, This is, I think you will agree, entirely inadequate to the scale of the problem which is to bring about, with something approaching the speed and determination which Hong Kong has shown in so many other directions, improvements both in labour standards and industrial relations. The existing process for dealing with these matters operates with painful slowness and we all attach great importance, therefore, to the establishment of a Labour Policy Committee whose object would be specding up decisions on labour policy and maintaining a close oversight of the progress of projected labour legislation at all stages. I appreciate that the senior members of the Secretariat who will form the nucleus of the Committee are already heavily burdened but it is precisely the need to lift these labour matters out of the mainstream of day to day work that the proposed Labour Policy Committee is intended to deal with.

Social Security

The Governor has expressed publicly in Hong Kong his interest in some advance being made on the social security front; but apart from the pending publication of the Working Party's report nothing is likely to happen for some months at least, Would it not be helpful, as Foggon proposes, to have the report of what, with all due respect was a working party of non-specialists, examined quietly on the spot by someone with specialised experience? We have in mind someone from our Ministry of Social Security who has had experience of social security problems in less developed countries. The Secretary of State has rightly pointed out that the person appointed must have his feet firmly on the ground and not his head in the clouds.

One final point on labour. My concern about labour conditions and reform is tempered by the realisation of the

/economic

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

PRIVATE AND CONFIDDNTIAL

economic consequences that might arise affecting both the Colony generally and the workers in particular. However, while I appreciate that it may be necessary to phase in reform I firmly believe that a start should be made and a clear policy programme be announced, An announcement of this sort would enable industry to adjust so as to reduce the impact of change,

These are, of course, just some of the specific points arising from my visit which both the Secretary of State and I would like you to follow up. We also assume you will discuss more general matters with David Trench and I hope you will get around and see as many people as possible. I would particularly like you to see Jack Cater.

If you can persuade him to remain in the Service it would, I think, be in the best interests of Hong Kong.

I hope your journey so far has been interesting and worth- while and that you were not too distracted by the fair maidens of Tonga! I look forward to comparing notes with you on Hong Kong when you return.

(SHEPHERD)

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

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17. 341

CONFIDENTIAL

/ From: Director of Information Services

Ref. ISD 21/69(CR)

Tel. No.

H-233191

Date 17th October, 1967

EH 0

To: D.C.S.(Special Duties)

Future of Special Publicity Unit

The following comments relate to the three draft papers on the future of the Special Publicity Unit which were prepared by my Deputy while I was on leave and which have been submitted to your Publicity

Committee for further consideration.

2. I recognise the urgent need for a fresh appraisal of Government's approach to its problems of information and public image and I welcome the fact that the disturbances have produced the necessary impetus to initiate this preliminary appraisal through such a broadly representative group as your Committee a Committee (and its associated working sub-unit) which I have recognised as essential from the outset and have encouraged by instructing that the best of my staff should be utilised irrespective of the loss of efficiency to less essential services of my department..

3. Having said that, I must however record my concern for the procedure which has been followed in the preparation and preliminary consideration of the draft Report. I do not believe that the special problems of community information, which are being handled so effectively by your Committee and particularly by my Deputy, can be dealt with satisfactorily in isolation from other of my departmental problems. But even if this were possible, I do not think that the Committee should have sought a policy report of this nature from one of my senior officers without seeking my approval in writing to such a procedure. Nevertheless the objectives we are trying to attain are to my mind so vital to the future of Hong Kong that I am the first to recognise that delays caused by procedural niceties are not to be tolerated and personal irritation is a very secondary consideration,

4. I have deliberately restrained myself from commenting on the Report long enough to ensure that the recommendations which follow reflect my carefully considered views in the best interests of an overall government information policy.

5. The type of work now being undertaken by the Special Publicity Unit is a vital facet of Government's information effort, the importance of

CONFIDENTIAL

0003110

G.F. 321

CONFIDENTIAL

of which has been appreciated by me and my senior staff for some considorable timo but, prior to the disturbancos, my departmental efforts in this direction have been sporadic and only partially effective mainly due to lack o central government and inter-departmental co- orlination and stimulus. Tho listurbances have provi`ed this essential unifying factor, but it would be foolhardy to suggest that because of this, the work of the Unit is only rolated to an umoroney situation. Tho Unit is providing an expanded community information service which has long boen needed, and will bo nooded increasingly on a long-term,

continuing basis. I therefore recommend that the Special Publicity Unit be established as a permanent division of my department and I believe the proposed title "Community Affairs Information Section"

adequately reflects the type of work it is undertaking and will be

undertaking in the changing pattern of events which must lie ahead.

6. If physical violence declinos, and the battle for hearts and minds

moves loss obviously but with increasing dangers into the shadows,

the broader spectrum of work to be undertaken by the Special Unit must

inevitably become more closely associated with the more routine services

of the central information machine and with the developing information

activities of departments. The effective co-ordinating organisation

which has been applied to Government energency information requirements

will need to be developed to embrace the overall information policy

and services of Government. I do not believe that this can best be

done by breaking up an existing organisation, but rather by modifying

and expanding it.

I accept as urgent the need to make available to selected departments

information staff and facilities to enable those departments to operate

their own information units es pert of their departmental policy-making

structures and I agree broadly with the departmental staffing recon-

mendations contained in the Report. Preliminary attempts have been

made by me during the past few years to develop specialised information

services with the ultimate objective of departmental units, but only

limited progress has been made because of lack of senior staff.

8. I have also on a number of occasions in the past attempted to

persunde Government to second senior executive and administrative personnel to my dopartment to assist in the improvement and expansion of information

services, but due to staff shortages in the Colonial Secretariat my requests have hed to be rejected. I support the Report's recommendation

that renowod effort must be made to bring administrative personnel into

the information field, working side by side with trained information staff.

CONFIDENTIAL

/I accom

0003230

G.F. 323

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

I accept also that we must look more to the universities as a source of future recruitment, and indeed this policy in respect of local recruitment is already in force in my department and a number of university graduates without specialised, professional working experience have already been recruited. But if oxpanding information services are to take greater account of the value of administrative o.ficors and univer- sity graduates as a means of developing effective information teams, carc must be exercised not to build up too largo a group of policy makers to the exclusion of the craftsmen and professionals who must be available to carry out the policy. It should be remembered that all the officers I have seconded to Special Unit duties are the product of my professional recruitment programme and this must continue in step with the recruitment of officers with other backgrounds.

9. I cannot accept the contention that "there is not much sign that any of them (cxisting Information Services Department staff) have the potential to act as responsible advisors on public information capable

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　I believe we have of exercising any degree of judgement and initiative".

given the encouragement and training

now amongst our local officers at least five, who are capable of filling the departmental S.I.0. appointments, with a very real chance that they

night

be suitable P,T.0. material

in the future. I also believe that the emotional demand for localisation of the Civil Service is a political factor which cannot lightly be dis- regarded, and the programme of localisation which has taken place under my direction during the past four years has contributed greatly to staff morale and efficiency and has done much to make the departrent more acceptable to the local press. Continuing effort must be made to exploit and encourage local talents to come forward and fill the front ranks of our information services.

10. Departmental information units should be headed by a P.I.0. who, In initially, ill, in most cases, have to be an expatriate officer. these circumstances the S.I.0. must be a local officer capable of deputising for the P.I.0. in direct relations with the public and the

local press.

This may mean that the 5.1.0, will have very little time to ork as a publicity officer and in addition to the full or part time services of departmental administrative officers. Some strengthening of the unit staffs above the basic recommendations in the Report may be necessary. Also some of the central technical services in the department may have to be strengthened to meet the demands of the departmental units as the scheme gets under way e.p、 film, photographic, design and teleprinter services.

CONFIDENTIAL

/11. T

0003230

G.F. 3:3

CONFIDENTIAL

11. I support the need for a senior administrative officer, of the calibre of Er. Jordan, to be seconded to I.S.D. to provide effective departmental stimulus and liaisen, but his interests should extend to my whole department and to the entire arena of government information and broadcasting initiative.

12. I see considerable disadvantage in breaking up the existing Information Services departmental structure into a number of sub-units under the administrative control of the Secretariat. The principal staff of an Information Department is of necessity a highly-specialised, professional team and the ability to utilise these staff talents to the best advantago of Government's image could be seriously hampered by an administrative machine which is not attuned to their special needs. Those needs can better be met by an independent administration rather than one which is a rigid section of a Colonial Secretariat administration.

13. If it were practical to decentralise information services without a large supporting production and distribution machine then it might be possible to run an Information Service as a segment of the Colonial Secretariat on the lines of the General Clerical Service, thereby officers

are sent to departments and absorbed into various departmental adminis-

trations without the need for a central, professional control.

14- In the case of an Information Service not only are central services essential at the outset, but they must inevitably extend to keep pace with the groth of departmental information activity. I believe that professional departmental information officers and their staffs should

become part of the departments to which they are attached and they

should be responsible to the Head of that department. Professional

staff should be recruited initially to the Information Services Department

who would second them to the departments concerned where they would join

the administrative staff of that department to make up the information

team. This would provide promotion opportunities for the specialist

staff involved in the information programme and would enable outstanding

officers to be moved to more deserving departments. It would also

enable departments, who find they have an officer who fits uncomfortably into their particular establishment, to seck a suitable replacement. Such a system would also provide for flexibility in times of intense

departmental activity whereby a mobile unit could be sent from the eentral unit to support the departmental team.

15. It is true that General Orders are, under present conditions, restrictive although at one time they were appropriate - but they have been administered in recent years with common senso and, on my

too

CONFIDENTIAL

IAL / Cult - Aa

0001230

G.F. 3:3

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5-

instructions, have been observed more in the breach than in the observance. They should be re-drafted, but to suggest that the solution is to break down existing machinery which has been assembled patiently and intelligently

over the years is ludicrous.

16. The Director of Information Services is at prosent responsible for

advising the Governor and Government on information policy, and I do not see that changing him into an Information Scoretary as a Secretariat official will alter this aspect of his duties. lor do I consider that it will be a better stimulus to improvod departmental information offort than we are achieving with the present Publicity Committee - provided that this Committeo, or another like it, has its scope enlarged to consider all aspects of information work and is empowered, on behalf

of the Colonial Secretary, to issue information policy guidance to departments. I suggest that a Committee, under the chairmanship of the D.C.S.(S.D.), or someone of equal seniority and ability, should be retained on a permanent basis and the Committee should include on

its membership all those concerned with information policy.

17. The Director of Information Services rould be able to give moro

time to matters of central government information policy if the directorate staff of his department was strengthened in order to relieve him of some of the detail of departrental administration. If the Special

Unit is to be established on a permanent basis, as I think it must,

thon D.I.S. should be given two substantive deputics one administrative to run the departmental administration, and one professional to direct personally the Community Affairs Information Section and to co-ordinate

the other professional activities of the Department.

18. Otherwise, I agree with the proposed staffing of the S.P.U. but I suggest the proposed grading of P.1.0. should be changed to C.1.0. with an equivalent grading to the C.P.0. and C.Pub.0. thus allowing the unit

to compete effectively for the best talents of the other divisions of

my department.

19. Lastly, may I request the Report you are considering in conjunction with this paper be graded "Confidential".

NJW!/stm

(N.J.V. Vatt)

Director of Information Services

CONFIDENTIAL

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5.F. 323

CONFIDENTIAL

DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR AN INCREASED LOCAL PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORT BY

GOVERNMENT

This paper attempts to put in perspective with other considerations, the need for an increased, organised and well-directed public relations effort.

The Introduction sets out to justify why such effort is necessary :

the second part is a framework for the actions proposed; the final section selects one particular field of the public relations effort which is considered to be of primary importance and gives recommendations as to how it might be implemented.

1. INTRODICTION

(a)

The 1967 Disturbances have demonstrated that, for the

time being at least and presumably thereafter, Hong Kong

can no longer promote its own prosperity with a passive,

unoffensive China in the background. All people in the

Colony, those who do business with it and all those who know

it, are now conscious that China "holds an ace over Hong

Kong" by virtue of China's strength and close proximity.

Nearly all assume that China can and may destroy, gradually or

suddenly, the British administration of Hong Kong.

(b) This phonomenon of what people now think is the cardinal

fundamental element in Hong Kong's prospects, since it

determines confidence in so many ways to so many people.

The ordinary resident, if not able to emigrate himself, will

certainly aspire to having his children go abroad; usually

this means the loss of educated young people the Colony needs

The buyers think twice about ordering goods.

(c)

here.

investor looks elsewhere.

The

These few examples serve to

illustrate how the earning power of the Government and the

people is critically jeopardised by the threat, real or

assumed, from China.

It is appreciated that nothing can be done immediately

by Hong Kong to remove or diminish this external threat.

It may be kept alive indefinitely by reminders from China from

time to time. It may die quietly to the pre-1967 level

CONFIDENTIAL and....

0043230

ALF. 329

CONFIDENTIAL

(a)

(e)

and thus permit all apprehensions about it to die. It

may be that it will be possible for Hong Kong to achieve

a working relationship with China whereby it is understood

that Hong Kong can exist as a Chinese/British anomaly

under conditions acceptable to both sides.

These

possibilities are in order of preference as far as Hong Kong

is concerned.

The very

It is appreciated also that, within Hong Kong itself, consent

and support for the Government does exist, and was slowly

being increased up to 1967. It is strongly believed that

the disturbances of this year have augmented and made more

urgent the need to retain and fortify the consent and

support of the local population as a political insurance

against attempts at subversion from within.

nature of communish, the strong appeal of "tung bao" and

the existence of many areas of social activity which lend

themselves as targets for formenting discontent, all these

things importantly supplement the normal objectives of a

government which wishes to serve its population well.

It is a case of adding internal security to altruism as a

reason for affecting improved government.

hile it is a considered view that eliminating the external

threat is the primary need and that this cannot be eliminated

in current circumstances, it is held that within this

limitation (Let's hope temporary limitation) efforts need

to be made to increase and fortify the support of the

population for the Government.

This can be done in two

groups. Firstly by fresh improvements which are

perceptibly beneficial to people without being

transparently cheap political gestures for supports' sake.

Secondly by making sure that past, current and imminent

improvements wrought by Government are part of people's

/consciousness.

CONFIDENTIAL

0001130

G.F. 323

(f)

CONFIDENTIAL

consciousness, understood and appreciated.

The first way requires manpower and money in extra

quantities which the Government cannot afford without

savings elsewhere.

Revenue can

Short of borrowing money, which is

not feasible because of the external threat, it may be

possible to reshuffle effort and money to bring about some

of the changes, but certainly not all the changes which

are considered necessary. It is unfortunately a raw

fact that all desired, perhaps essential, changes cannot

be paid for until revenue is increased.

increase only as Hong Kong comes to sound terms with threat

from China. We should therefore swallow hard and accept

this fact, wreak the less costly improvements until the

"threat" is eliminated and make the most of the second way

of increasing the support of the population, which overall

costs less. The second way can be briefly defined as :

PUBLIC RELATIONS

(a)

(b)

Retaining and fostering the allegiance and goodwill of the

population of Hong Kong to the Administration is achieved

by evoking a reciprocal response to the allegiance and

goodwill of the government to the population. The acid

test used by the population for this government's role in this

relationship is "Does the Government make my life and other

people's lives here safer and better?" The acid test used

by the Government for the population's role is "Will people

resist persuasion that an alternative administration is more

advantageous to them?"

It is necessary for Government to take the initiative in

creating positive answers to both questions in the order given.

CONFIDENTIAL

0003230

G.F. 121

CONFIDENTIAL

(c)

(a)

(e)

Public relations is an essential integral part of Government

action and not 'a sauce for the less palatable'. It is the

creation of a posture or image while governing which eteures

that the maximum goodwill is derived from a course of action

or policy. A Public Relations effort can also make

initially less acceptable actions more acceptable.

There

are many diverse facets of a public relations effort and the

paragraphs below set out those which are considered necessary

for the Hong Kong Government.

Objective:

To retain and foster the support of the population for and

allegiance to the policies and actions of the Government.

Theatres:

(3)

The Urban areas.

(ii)

The rural areas.

These two theatres require different emphasis.

(f)

Targets:

Efforts at influencing people will vary with different

groupings and at the outset it is necessary to be conscious

how different groups respond so that different treatment can be given when appropriate. Different groups are:

(1) Europeans and foreigners.

Those can be sub-divided into businessmen, missionaries,

and teachers, journalists, consulates, government servants.

Also there are the Indians, Portuguese and Eurasians.

(ii) Chinese residents.

These can be sub-divided into income groups, language groups,

age groups, sexes, and by political affiliation.

CONFIDENTIAL

/(g).....

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G.F. 321

(g)

Themes:

CONFIDENTIAL

(1)

(1) Good security of the Colony.

(ii) Progressive nature of government in economic promotion,

social leadership, and provision of services.

(iii) Impartiality and fairness of government.

Tactics:

Where and when Government actions affect or are about to affect

people's lives, it is necessary to promote not merely a

knowledge of these actions but an understanding of and

'sympathy for them. A Public Relations effort can be also

used to good effect before a course of action to soften-up

anticipated opposition (e.g. Resettlement Department's

efforts before the clearance of Staunton Creek).

Taction which can be used are

DIRECT: (a) Press releases.

(b) Radio interviews.

(d) Leaflets, circular letters.

(e) Loudspeakers from vehicles.

(f) Verbal conversations with persons involved.

Such diret£ tactics are usually employed when government action

is imminent.

INDIRECT : (a) Release of background information through the press.

(b) Radio discussions.

(d) Briefing and influencing press correspondents

and radio interviewers.

(e) Talking to persons uninvolved in a particular

course of Government action, persuading them of

the merits of the course of action and

encouraging them to talk to those directly

involved in the Government action.

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6.F. 121

CONFIDENTIAL

(i)

(f)

Tools.

This tactic can be used to overcome resistance to

persuasion or anticipated hostility_7.

Frank explanation of the reasonableness, progressiveness

and thoughtfulness of Government policies on every

conceivable occasion e.g. when senior officers leave

or arrive in the Colony, informally at clubs, in

speeches at clubs, in conversation at parties.

Agencies which can operate or be used for the public relations

effort :

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Senior Government officers, and from them

Junior Government officers.

Government Information Services.

Radio Hong Kong, Commercial Radio and Rediffusion.

Both T.V. stations.

Leading and respected local leaders in the constitutional,

business, educational, social fields.

3. PUBLIC RELATIONS ROLE OF SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICERS.

If Government has to take the initiative as stated in para 2(b), then

it is most important that senior officers are briefed and at ease in performing

these public relations functions and therefore able to give a lead to others.

The summary in para. 2 itself gives senior officers a consolidated account of what is involved over the whole range of the effort, which is a start. This section sets out in more detail guiding principles for senior officers when building up and integrating a public relations effort with their other

administrative tasks.

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0403236

G.F. 323

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decentralised

Argument (by DDIS) for a

information system in Hong Kong

INTRODUCTION

　　The following paper was produced originally as a background to certain detailed proposals concerning the organisation of information services. It attempts to put the need for a continuing and increased public information effort in the context of the present phase of confrontation. As such, the paper may be of interest to Heads of Departments and other senior Government officers who may not be directly involved at present in information work but who, as the last three paragraphs suggest, may now be called upon to take a much greater part in these affairs.

0 0 0 0 0 0 0

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　　　　To those engaged in public information work it might well seem incredible at this late stage of events to have to justify a greater effort in this field. Since the Communists began in May their determined attempt to shake the basis of the Hong Kong Administration public information work of many kinds has been one of our main weapons. The very fact that today it is necessary once more to build up an enthusiasm for public information work is to some extent a reflection of our success in that we have, as we moant to dɔ, given people confidence that the Hong Kong Government and its security forces were capable of containing and limiting if not climinating the Communist threat and that behind that protection life could return to normal.

　　　　Throughout this poriod we have had occasion to recognize this fact and to recognize also that it can be at tine dangerous. Other administrations in similar circumstances have met the same problem of maintaining public confidence simultaneously with public readiness to take firm and effective measures. This really involves two quite contradictory operations at the same time: one to mininse the threat and maximize confidence in the Government ability to deal with it and the second to prevent the public from becoming complacent, to persuade them to accept and support strong measures which they may even find inconvonicnt and distasteful by reminding them that the threat still exists.

The dilemma is even more evident within the Government. As far as the public is concerned it is possible to risk quite a largo degree of complacency if confidence is the more important objective. But all those branches of Government directly involved in moeting the Communist threat require the active appreciation and support of the rest of the Government which will not be available if they have any false or complacent feeling about the situation. This applies to the security forces who must continue to take measures which are inconvenient and perhaps also costly as well as to the information organization. There is good authority, on the basis of adequate experience in other similar situations, for recognizing that at this time an accelerated and expanded programmo of public information is more rather than less neccssary. It is also a time when the objectives of our programme will not be so obvious as when the public can see clearly the confrontation between the forces of law and order and the mobs in the streets or the bomb throwers. If we are committed to anything we are now committed to a fierce battle for the hearts and minds of the population. We have to make as many people as possible conscious of, grateful for and loyal to this administration for the benefits it brings to thom and which they are not willing to let go. We must make them appreciative of what the Government has done for them already, we must exploit to the full the things we are doing now and which we plan to do in the future and if for any reason we are unable to meet their expectations in any field we have to be convincing in our explanations

or cxcuses.

　　　　　　Our confrontation with the Communists has shaken the assumption that Hong Kong can simply continue to promote its own prospority with an indifferent China in the background. All of us who live here as well as those who do business with Hong Kong, are

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- 2.

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now conscious of the threat which China's strength and aggressive demeanour pose to the Colony. In view of the statements made by the Communists locally and in official Peking organs it is not surprising that many people assume that China can and may destroy, suddenly or gradually, the British administration in Hong Kong. Unfortunately the simplest method of allaying that anxiety, by referring to the large rolitical and economic issues involved, are not ojen to us because Jublic com.ents on such matters (as well as diplomatic action) are the prerogative of the British Government and not of the Hong Kong Government, and certainly not of its spokesman.

　　　　　　　Confidence both within Hong Kong and abroad must therefore be promoted to a large extent indirectly. If the confidence does not exist then several consequences would eventually follow. If the Communists resume violent assaults upon law and order we shall not be sure how far we can rely upon the public to support the Government. the Communists change their tactics, avoid violence, and hogin a scientific attack upon the various institutions of Government and our society generally, exploiting grievances and relating them to a general dissatisfaction (as they have orenly promised to do) then we shall be faced with a steady of erosion of ṛublic support. In such an atmosphere of uncertainty those who could leave Hong kong would do so or send their children abroad and, because their children would be the better educated part of the younger generation and Hong Kong, would thereby be weakencd/ Externally there will be some direct and immediate results of such a situation. For example tourism can and will suffer if there is doubt about the ability of the Hong Kong Government to maintain reace and stability. It is less certain to what extent our overall trade is affected by these factors but it is generally agreed that in the long: term there would be a considerable effect if buyers, who have to think ahead for several years are not sufficiently confident about Hong Kong to put all their ergs in our basket.

That there has been and still is at the time of writing a lull in the confrontation is evident to everyone. It can be related to the Communists' decision as how they wish to celebrate the National Day, in an atmosphere of self congratulation rather than of conflict. It can be related to possiblc directives from China showing that economics, and a realization of the extent to which earnings through Hong Kong have been lost since May, are once more taken precedence over politics. Internally it can be related quite simply to a realization of the failure of the previous violent line. Quite openly the local Communists admit that the Hong Kong Police Force had proved too hard a nut for them to crack and they are advocating a change to a more subtle form of subversion, including of course subversion of the Folice Force.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　It may well prove advisable to encourage a degree of satisfaction about this lull. It will not be advisable oven so for as the general public is concerned to engender complacency. To some extent by talking about the return of peace and normality we may in fact persuade some of the enemy to want such a return. On the other hand even when the public is con- cerned we may hove to keep them alive to the danger of the new Communist line. Certainly as far as the Government is concerned overy- one should be aware of these dangers and there should be no complacency.

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At the same

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LCON

　　　　　　　　　　　　time as they are made to realize the exact nature of the threat as it is now morging Government officers should realize our own objective which takes into account the reality of the Chinese Communists' presence.

This is a subtle and difficult situation and the exploitation of public information for maintenance of public confidence and public support in this situation calls for a greater effort and greater understanding than ever bofore.

In the first piras: of violent confrontation our propaganda has been largely a rasponse to Communist actions and these actions them- selves have been so unpopular that the public could casily be persuaded to reject them. The other factor in the first stage was the simple but, in Hong Kong, the over-riding question are the authorities physically strong enough to deal with the Communists? Fortunately the Police laft no doubt this as the Communists have openly recognised.

　　　　　　In the second phrase of 'underground' confrontation thoro will be no such simple issues, no such easy appeal and no such asy demonstration of Government's ability to win. We shall have to prove everything as we go along. We are not in the habit of doing this. far as public information is concerned we are rather in the habit of assuming that reasonable people would appreciate what we have done and if people do not appreciate the Government for its undoubted achievements on their behalf it is because they are either stupid or malicious. Therefore we have to spend a lot of effort showing how progressive our policies ars and making people appreciative of them.

50.

To some

10.

　　　　　　There are high expectations about further progross. extent this is a very fortunate situation (as the Communist would say) for the Hong Kong Government. lthough they could have done it the Communists have not yet campaigned in the fields where there is an obvious need for further progress although they may do so at any minute. In other words they have not taken up our options before us are ready to do

　　We are still therefore in a position to claim all the credit although we may not be in tha fortunate position much longer.

fortunate position much longer. To quite a large extent this is not a matter of making vast and hasty changes in policy but of exploiting our present intentions or changing them slightly so that they can seem to fit in with popular expectation to a greater extent, Presentation is the key to the whole thing. Confidence and loyalty are Lnotemotional and logical things and can be encouraged emotionally but not

logically. The excessive application of logic is more likely to dismay.

11.

　　　　　　The basis for this paper is the assumption that the various facilities and methods hitherto employed in public information work are not sufficient in themselves for a positive and effective programme of 'winning hearts and minds'. A public information programme with that broad objective will embrace very much more than the conventional methods currently available. It will employ, in addition, to the access to the pross and the various other publicity techniques which the Information Services has developed, every other passible muans of communication with the public whether in small groups sharing particular and special interests or as a whole.

ONFIDENTIAL

　　　　　In secking procice t'rgets (which is what the Communists promise to do) the Government's public information programme will have to exploit every means of identifying and reaching sectional interests. Those depa tments which have contact with or knowledge of such groups will have to design material calculated to appeal to them and even to act as the means of communication, In other words there is a new + positive and active role for all the departments of Government.

13.

love

　　　　　But these departments will not only have to represent themselves to their own specialised targets, they will have to represent Government as a whole to the whole public. so s.nior officer will have to learn not only to do a good job, but to be seen doing it and to relate the good job they are seen doing convincingly to the overall purpose of the Government. While this is in no sense sclf-glorification for senior civil servents it does call for a personal effort and a personal exposure which is not natural to civil servants and which in other places is the proper field of clected ministers. Since there are none such here we cannot let the case go by default. Senior officers must take upon then- selves personally much of the responsibility for projceting the desired image of Government in human teras as an organization which has taken the trouble to understand what the people need and expect and is taking wisc stops to meet those needs and expectations,

14.

In this task senior civil servants will expect to receive sound technical advice and be assisted by the various technical serviccs of professional publicity, but the Lanctus will come from them. They, and the Government as a whole must be convinced with the urgent neccssity to win active and conscious support for the Government, to assist by whatever meons in their power the development of the necessary machinery and techniques and to play their part in their use.

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004.1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Notes on the Structure and Organisation

of Information Services

Part I

This consideration of the future structure of information services in the Hong Kong Government arises immediately from the need to determine the future of the Special Publicity Unit.

　　　　The S.P.U. was set up in June to meet the obvious need for counter-propaganda and to develop positive propaganda on a "hearts and minds" basis. The S.P.U. was set up for an initial period of six months as an off-shoot of the Information Services Department on to which in turn, were grafted personnel from the Secretariat for Chinese affairs, Radio Hong Kong and the Police Force. From the beginning the Unit's operations have been guided by a committec under the chairmanship of the Deputy Colonial Secretary and latterly the Deputy Colonial Secretary (Special Duties).

　　　　　Soon after the formation of the Unit the Committee accepted the view that there would be a need for an organisation similar to the Unit continuing far beyond the original, and purely notional, six months which expire in December 1967, and that a decision on this must be taken soon if only to ensure proper recruitment or the replacement in their parent departments of seconded staff.

The Deputy Director of Information Services was asked to suggest the future role and organisation of the S.P.U. but his report was delayed until now as a result of his commitments as Acting Director during August and September.

　　　　The very fact that a special unit had to be set up demonstrates one shortcoming of the original Information Services Department which was of course symptomatic of a generally passive attitude to information work throughout the Government. This fact alone suggests that it is not worth examining the role of the S.P.U. without examining the total pattern of information work as it is now seen to be required.

　　　　During these four months, quite apart from the specialised and novel functions of the S.P.U., the pressure put upon the con- ventional services of the I.S.D. have high-lighted many of its inadequacies.

　　　　Without further apology, then, the opportunity has been taken to ezanine the whole pattern of information work and to make suggestions for a radical change.

On the one hand the Hong Kong Government Information

/Services

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Services Department is a highly professional and efficient machine for the dissemination of official information and the preparation of publicity material. The expenditure of money and talent on this service should indicate the extent of the Government's concern to keep the public and particularly the communications media informed,

On the other hand the Information Services Department is poorly thought of by the public, distrusted or resented by many other Government departments and certainly by many individual civil servants and openly and frequently attacked by the press.

10.

It may be said on the latter point that no official information | service can hope to endear itself to the press who must on principle regard it as a hindrance to their free access to original sources of information. But this cannot explain the regular condemnation of the department. In the past month two British national newspapers, the Daily Express and Daily Telegraph, have gone out of their way to print reports by their staff correspondents criticising the service of the department. One cannot find parallels for this in other situations where correspondents might be thought to have met similar frustrations at the hands of official information departments.

11.

It is possible, though probably not profitable, to suggest historical reasons for various resentments which exist among foreign correspondents, local journalists and among other departments. But some of the friction can only be traced to the structure of the department and its relation to other departments and can only be cured by literally breaking the present structure of information services and reforming it so as to meet new conditions and requirements.

12.

　　　　　　　This is an urgent requirement because the relative popularity of the Information Services Department is something more than a matter of personal concern to the officers concerned. The test of the department's value is the acceptability of the information it distributes and if, as scems only too clear, that acceptability is reduced a drastic remedy is urgently required.

13.

In fact acceptability of material from the department has reached on occasions such a low level that it can really be said to amount to the famous "credibility gap" and that is a situation which cannot be tolerated for a moment.

14.

In the international sphere Hong Kong depends more than anywhere else in the world on a correct, firm and appreciative understanding. Locally, the Government in the absence of other channels of communication relies heavily upon the medium of the department to create appreciative understanding of its actions and policies.

15.

A starting point for the examination of the performance of the present information services is their place in the Government organisation with its advantages and draw-backs.

16.

The department grow rapidly from a simple PRO function to a fully-fledged department largely through the drive and energy of its first director. It is certainly to the Government's advantages that he was able to establish the importance of information work, and

/particularly

Levine Defto

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particularly its employment as a tool of policy which is recognised, for example, by the attendance of the D.I.S. at Executive Council and other policy making meetings. The purpose is more than to give him an early sight of matters which it may later fall to him to deal with. The important point is the recognition that the way in which a intter say or can be handled publicly is a prime factor in reaching a decision.

17.

　　　　It may well be, however, that the very drive and energy exhibited by the first director in establishing his department and extracting recognition for its role created resistances of their

However unfortunate and improper this reaction may have been it is a factor which cannot be ignored in assessing present attitudes, within the Government, to the department and more importantly to

own.

information work.

18.

It is not only that personal resentments linger but there has never been a willing acceptance of the centralised information system among other departments any more than among the press,

19.

　　　　Until recently all dealings with the press had to be conducted through the department and the concept is unrealistically enshrined in General Orders. The inevitable result has been to diminish the interest of departments in information work and of course to make some civil servants look rather stupid when instead of answering a simple question they had to refer the caller to the I.S.D. (The poor impression was usually compounded when the enquirer found that the I.S.D. did not know the answer either and had to refer to the department, and probably to the man, who received and declined to answer the original enquiry.)

20.

In so far as this rigid rule was relaxed it was often only to the extent of a department answering easy questions, or whose answers reflected well upon the department themselves, but referring the sticky ones to I.S.D. with the excuse that this was the rule which they were not allowed to break.

21.

From the point of view of the press these antics were unjustifiable and they cumulatively diminished respect for I.S.D.

22.

　　　　The only radical departure from this pattern has been the posting of one officer (of too low a grade) to Police Headquarters and the current proposals for a properly constituted Public Relations Unit for the Police Force. With that cxception the I.S.D. retains its central control over not just the policy of information and publicity on behalf of Government and its component departments, which is wise, but over the machinery of communication which is unwise and wasteful.

23.

　　　　　The fact that information services arc conducted by e department constructed like other Government departments inevitably affects the readiness of other departments to accept direction from the I.S.D. on matters which, not surprisingly, they believe themselves

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competent to deal with. It also militates against the effective performance of information functions.

24.

Close observation suggests in fact that for effective operation a departmental organisation with its notions, or obligations of pyramidal seniority structure are antagonistic if not fatal to useful and productive information work.

25.

"Parkinson's Law" operates with relentless power in such place as the 1.S.D..press room where titles of seniority proliferate and promotion dependent on the efficient performance of information tasks Icads inevitably to administrative posts where those talents are unused. The most glaringly obvious feature of the press relations work of the department at the present time is that the critical part of the work is being done by those least fitted for it. Those bost able to do it are engaged on tasks which make no demands on the skills they have laboriously and, for the Government, expensively acquired and on the basis of which they earned their promotion.

26.

All newspapermen and many Government officers who have dealings with the department's press room on a day-to-day basis, and on the level at which normal routine enquiries are handled, have the same impression of the low-calibre of the officers they deal with. There is bound to be a general feeling that the man docs not grasp the subject he is dealing with. Senior Government officers expecting to receive careful professional advice on scrious matters speak of having little confidence in these officers. Yet it is the handling of those day-to-day routine enquiries which form the backbone of the Government's information work.

27.

In a situation where an enquiring newspaperman, or a senior Goverment officer only feels he will get satisfaction if he approaches a senior officer of I.S.D. one is bound to ask why there is so much reliance on so many ill-equipped juniors.

28.

　　　　　There are many reasons. They include the fact that I.S.D. has given a lead to other departments in this policy of local recruitment, often in the face of good sense from all other points of view. (Local journalists who would press as a matter of public policy for local recruitment would put the efficient handling of press enquiries far higher in the list of priorities.)

29.

Another factor is certainly the policy of recruiting journalists wherever possible. This again dates back to the original director who had some journalistic experience himself and subscribed to the belief that only journalists could speak to journalists. This is an easy axion to accept but will not stand examination. Perhaps in the first place it applies more readily in countries where journalists are of a higher standard than in Hong Kong. But it is not likely to be true that a bad or mediocre journalist is the best person to speak to a journalist. For many years I.S.D. has been recruiting steadily

/from

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- 5

from the ranks of a press whose poor standards the many people deplore and we can only console ourselves with the thought that I.S.D. has been getting the best (which may not have been a good thing for local journalism, or Hong Kong).

30.

　　　　　Experience actually shows that journalists do not want to talk to other journalists now cmployed in information services and in fact tend to distrust them. The only argument in favour of the employment of journalists is that by their knowledge of technique they are able to avoid pitfalls which gape before the layman dealing with a reporter. This however is an advantage which can be secured by the employment in key positions of some journalists and does not necessarily justify nothing but journalists.

31.

It is worth trying to create a system which uses professional officers as such to a greater degree than is possible at present. To some extent it happens in any organisation, and particularly in Government departments with a professional function, that the necessary administrative duties absorb the best professional talents. But the situation in information work is not quite the same as in other Government services. In other departments it is likely to be the senior officers of the department who bear the burden of contact with the public if any while their juniors feed them with material. Thus the public impression of the department is formed by contact with the abler and more experienced of the staff. In I.S.D. where impression counts even more than usual cxactly the opposite happens and the impression which our highly critical customers have of us is formed from their contact with relatively inexperienced and less capable staff.

32.

The result is too often a poor impression which cannot be crased by more occasional contact with the higher grades.

33.

　　　　　This problem cannot be solved so long as the present departmental structure remains. Promotion, which inevitably removes 'the best officers from the work they do best, is the only avenue to

the proper rewards for their ability. To keep them at their pro- fessional tasks and to hand over administration to a different class of officers will not solve the problem if they are consequently denied advancement. However, a solution would be possible if the departmental structure were entirely broken and the professionals were in long-scale grades comparable to the administrative service. This radical re- organization would also solve other problems which now limit the efficiency of information services.

34.

　　　　　The departmental structure wastes the abilities of its best officers and puts the weakest officers in the most vulnerable position. It also sets up certain resistances in other departments which directly reduce the efficiency of information work and, more significantly, reduce interest in what should be a vital spect of all departmental operations.

35.

　　　　　There is another unfortunate effect of the departmental structure in that it leads to a routine attitude to information work.

/Finding

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Finding themselves in a machine with rigid seniority levels and rigidly delineated responsibilities information officers begin to see their work in terms of their output rather than the effect of it. Over the years the department has settled down to a routine in which success is measured by the comprehensiveness and regularity of the material issued and not by its effect on the public mind.

36.

　　　　This explains the apparent paradox of an information department which is much admired for its organisation and the methods it employs but as much reviled for failing to do its real job. The press room of the Hong Kong 1.S.D. is much better equipped than any comparable organisation, on a superficial assessment better staffed, and is in a better position in the Government organisation to make information policy work effectively. But its shortcomings are constantly brought to notice where less well organised services are treated with respect and affection.

37.

　　　　To some extent the very efficiency and comprehensiveness of the I.S.D. is its own worst enery. It is too obtrusive. The journalist enmeshed in the system feels inevitably that he is getting a "snow-job", a machine made substitute for real live information, and however unjustified this suspicion may be it is a factor in the acceptability of the output of I.S.D. which we must deal with.

38.

It is

The mere size of the establishment is suspicious. a "machine". Its establishment is 140! By the time you have mentioned that figure it is too late to point out that this includes 14 messengers, 17 clerks etc. not to mention that many of these officers are engaged on specialist duties like poster production or film-making. There is an irremovable suspicion that this great organisation, which promises so much with its big staff, spacious offices, teleprinter networks, somehow doesn't live up to the promise.

39.

　　　　Most people are incurably sceptical of professional public relations organisations. While they will accept architecture, medicine or accountancy as fields for specialisation they sub- consciously resent the idea that the communication of ideas, especially the communication of ideas about their own work is something they cannot handlc for themselves. It is possible by example to demonstrate to such people that a professional organisation can help them to "put themselves over" but the establishment of I.S.D. as a separate, and in a sense "rival" department, makes other departments less likely to seek such help than if they had the assistance of their own public relations expert.

40.

The chief argument against the haphazard proliferation of departmental public or press-relations functions has been and still is that in a small territory where all operations arc subject to the same political considerations there must be a recognised and uniformly applied public information policy.

41.

The solution seems to lic therefore in two directions

/at

تھا

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at once ami they need not conflict. must be exercised in a way which does not arouse resentment or stifle

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　On the one hand policy control departmental initiative. On the other hand the major departments should as far as possible speak, and be seen to be speaking for themselves. Undoubtedly this will release a tremendous amount of public relations good-vill which will vitally affect relations between the Government and the people.

42.

The way to meet the first requirement is to disband the I.S.D. as a department and to establish information policy control as an arm of the central secretariat organisation on the lines of the Finance or Establishment branches while executing much of the policy at departmental level. It would only be necessary to retain a small professional organisation to deal with those aspects of Government action which were not the fields of identifiable departments or to handle the public and press relations of those departments which are not large enough or suitable for the establishment of their olm information units. Additionally there would be certain centralised services such as are presently provided by the various specialised sections of the I.S.D. - Film Unit, Photographic Section and Library, Distribution Section, Design and Display Section, Publishing Section, Overseas Features Editing Section, all of which are at present under the control of the department's Chief Publicity Officer.

43.

The catablishment of the Director of I.S.D. and his deputy es members of the Secretariat responsible for policy advice and control in information matters would be a stop really no more novel than having a political advisor, a financial secretary or an establishment officer and might in fact be a much more logical recognition of the relationship of the head of information servicca to the central Government. Outwardly it would demonstrate in most welcome fashion the recognition by the central Government that public opinion is a factor to be calculated at every step in our future progress.

44.

　　　　　Functionally these changes would not prevent the head of the information services, who might be known as Information Secretary, from exercising direct control over his central servicing sections and over a small but high calibre section dealing with central Government matters. His control over information work in independently staffed departments would be necessarily indirect but the new relationship might make it more cffective and would certainly make it more productive.

45.

　　　　　The breaking-up of the I.S.D. would provide an opportunity to reward intelligent informulion staff for being good at their jobs instead of offering as the sole reward removal from those jobs.

46.

It would be necessary to fill a larger number of posts at a higher level but it would be possible to dispense with much of the infra-structure of junior grades who have proved in practice to be incapable of development to really useful status.

47.

It would also be possible to associate with this new concept the introduction of non-journalist Government officers, apart

/from

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iron mu recruits, and so develop the potential for better public relations which has undoubtedly been stifled by the over-centralised

role of 1.S.D.

48.

The practice of the Foreign Office is a good example of the advantage of making information work one of the postings for every officer in his tinc.

49.

Such a development would parallel the posting within departments of departmental officers to work for a time side by side with "professional" information officers.

50.

　　　　　Such a concept for the administration of information policy and the execution of information services would, to get back. to the origimml intention of this report, allow for the logical inclusion of the function now performed by the Special Publicity Unit.

31.

　　　　　The detailed proposals for the overall disposition of information personnel are made in Part II, and the proposels for the S.P.U. in Part III,

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Fart II

The staff of the Information Services department is presently disposed as follows.

1 Director

Ilotes

Deputy Director (supernumerary) to replace the sub-

Chief Press Officer

Press Officer

4 Senior Information Officer;

10 Information Officers

14 Assistant Information Officers

Class I

4 Assistant Information Officers

Class II

stantive deputy now with the S.P.U.

the substantive post

of the present

supernumerary deputy is unfilled.

Subordinates not yet fit to act.

graded P. I 0.

including one super- numerary post for the Hong Kong office in London, and one for the Folice Information office (presently with- drawn to make up staff deficiencies). One of these S.I.O. posts is associated with the radio news operation.

3 are supernumerary, and held against the supernumerary S.1.0. posts mentioned above. 4 of these work on radio news.

4 of these work on radio news.

Chief Publicity Officer

4 Principal Information Officers.

each controlling a sec- tion providing a specialised service: Films, Fublicity, Editorial, and Display and Design.

/Senior

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4 Senior Information Officers

5 Information Officers

Assistant Information Officers Class I

5 Assistant Information Officers mostly photographers

Class II

or techncians in the Film Unit.

That makes a total of fifty-eight professional officers of various grades spread around the various publicity and information function of the department.

The balance is made up of the kind of support to

organization one would expect:

1 Frincipal Information Officer who is general

advise on matters of Chinese language and style

2 Executive Officers

4 Iersonal Secretaries

1 Confidential Assistant

1 Shorthand Audio-typist

4 typists

2 telephone operators

1 stores supervisor

7 clerks

1 chauffeur

3 drivers

office attendants

14 messengers

Some of these, such as the typists in the press room are actually part of the production unit; one messenger works in the photographic dark rooms and another and a clerk are really part of the distribution office.

There are some other posts which are not properly speaking professional but are nevertheless an integral part of the professional function such as:

/calligraphists

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-3-

present.

7 calligraphists or assistants

3 library clerks

This roughly covers the establishment of the department at

　　　　　　　It shows that out of 58 professional officers 27 are engaged on specialized publicity services which would have to be offered to any information machine however constituted. They have at present the support of a very small group of supporting staff: an executive officer, 1 personal secretary, 1 Shorthand Audio-typist, a library clerk, an office attendant and several messengers,

　　　　　　　The rest of the professional staff, and the bulk of the support staff are devoted to information work and most of them to press work, preparing and translating press releases and answering press questions.

　　　　　　　In the press division, and leaving aside the radio news operation, the single S.1.0. posted to London and the S.I.O. normally posted to Police Headquarters there are under the chief press officers:

10.

1 Senior Information Officers

6 Information Officers

Assistant Information Officers Class I

4 Assistant Information Officers Class II

The senior information officer acts as editor of the daily bul- letin and executive supervisor of the work of the press room.

11.

　　　　　　　　The information officers compile the releases in consultation with departmental sources and are concerned with translation.

12.

　　　　　　　　The enquiry desk is manned from the ranks of the Assistant Information Officers Class I (and even more regularly by the lower grade of all, Assistant Information Officers Class II, since recently most of their work has been done by 2 officers Mr. KC Hau-leung and Mr. K.A, Azan who are substantively Assistant Information Officers Class II.) They refer different questions to the Senior Information Officer.

13.

　　　　　　　　The question is how much of this organization ought to be contrally retained and how much could usefully be distributed among important departments.

14.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

　　　　　There are about thirty government departments whose acti- vities are from time to time the subject of public information or publicity. Some of them are of such infrequent interest to the public that it is possible to write off altogether the need for them to handle their own public information and publicity which may continue to be handled centrally.

15.

16.

Roughly these are (subject no doubt to argument):

Audit, Inland Revenue, Kowloon-Canton Railway, Post Office, Printing, Rating and Valuation, Registrar General's, Registration of Fersons and Stores.

Some other departments whose activities are of regular public interestcan nevertheless best be handled centrally, such as, the Royal Observatory.

17.

　　　　　　Some departments, are by their nature in the public informa- tion business and should be handling their information affairs themselves already. They include, the Fublic Enquiry Service, Secretariat for Chinese Affairs and Radio Hong Kong.

18.

Certain central government operations demand the services of a public information and publicity service but it ought to be centrally controlled. These are the Secretariat generally Legal Department and Treasury.

19.

That leaves a number of departments which qualify for greater attention in the shape of their own public information and publicity units.

20.

There are already proposals for the establishment of a full unit in the Police Force. Good cases can be made for similar units in the following departments:

Agriculture and Fisheries

Commerce and Industry

Education

Fire Services

Immigration

Labour

Marine

Now Territories Administration

Public Works

Registry of Trade Unions

Resettlement

CONFIDENTIAL

21.

Rosettlement (and Housing)

Social Welfare

Urban Council and Urban Services.

　　　　liot all of these thirteen have the same priority or the same requirements. In several the direction of information work is less to the general public than to the people for whom the department works. For example the Registry of Trade Unions is mainly concerned with Trade Unions as such but may need professional help in producing suitable informational material.

22.

The came may be said of some of the function of the Agricultural and Labour Departments who, however, also have general public information problems.

23.

　　　　At the other end of the, scale are departments dealing with the issues which represent, in the eyes of the public, the progress of the community and the Government's care for the people. They are notably:

24.

Fublic Works

Education

Medical and Health

Social welfare

Labour

Resettlement

Urban Council and Urban Services

　　　　These seven departments ought to be provided with their own public information and publicity units, who would receive general policy guidance from the Information Secretary, and share the common services of the specialist publicity services but who would work on a day-to-day bacis as departmental spokesman and initiators of publicity projects.

25.

The size and scale of these units will depend on the nature of the task and also on the number of staff already partly engaged on publicity work. For example there are already several people engaged in the U.S.D. on the preparation of publicity material and similar activi- ties are also undertaken within several other departments.

26.

However each of these units ought to be handled by a man equivalent in grade to the I.S.D.'s present Irincipal Information officer. Below their grade one cannot expect the standard of policy advice which the head of a large and important department is entitled to expect.

/The

CONFIDENTIAL

27.

- 6

　　　　　　The department would contribute those staff already engaged on what amounts to publicity work and also onc of their administrators who would take at least part-time responsibility for public information and publicity work. Depending on the size of the task it might be necessary to hold a sccord information officer, equivalent to the present S.I.0., to undertake publicity side of the work.

28.

This would mcpn, for these seven departments two information officers (1 P.1.0., 1 S.1.0.) one of the department's own senior staff and whatever of its staff were already engaged in such dutics leaving aside the Police Force for which an establishment has already been proposed and which involves the return to his dutics there if one of the S.1.0.'s presently in the press room)

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　so the proposal calls for 7 P.1.0.'s and 7 S.1.0.'s against the present Press room staff of one P.1.0. and one S.I.0.

29.

Not only docs this combat more P.1.0.'s and S.1.0.'s than are presently available but it does not provide for the staffing of the central press room which will still be required for handling public information for the central government and for those departments which do not have their own public information and publicity units. Now does it account for the 6 Information Officers, 10 Assistant Information Officers Class I and 4 Information Officers Class II presently engaged on press dutics. However many of these will in fact be required for the translation and other preparation processes in the release of information coming in from both the central and the departmental units. Some of them, but only a very few might merit consideration and posting es departmental information officers but it is more likely that they will have to be recognised as only suitable for mechanical duties. There is not much sign that any of them have the potential to act as responsiblc advisors on public information, capable of exercising any degree of judgment and initiative.

30.

Posts calling for men of that calibre will almost certainly have to be filled largely from abroad. Although the department has filled one Principal Information Officer post in the press room by pro- motion the prospects for repeating the process are poor and all other appointments to their class, although admittedly in specialist fields, have been made from overseas.

31.

　　　　　　　In the S.1.0. class repeated recruitment exercises have been disappointing. In view of the fact that a very long experience in newspaper journalism has been the basic required qualification, and that candidates have been sought locally among the ranks of a very poorly staffed profession this is not surprising.

▸

It would seem sensible to recognise this state of affairs by, on the one hand widening the qualifications so as to attract graduates with commercial or other administrative experience and on the other hand to be prepared to face reality by seeking half the necessary personnel abroad.

/On

33.

CONFIDENTIAL

　　　　　　　On the face of it this plan calls for the immediate recruitment of cight Principal Information Officers and eleven Senior Information Officers who, together with the one of cach already cstablished would be disposed of as follows: one of each to the seven departmental units and two Principals and five seniors to staff the central press office.

34.

　　　　　　　　This number could be reduced if a number of executive and administrative officers were introduced into the system. Initially the number would have to be small because such officers without professional training could not work alone without supervision or a professional colleague.

35.

　　　　　　　There would be a further possible reduction if some of the present press room Information Officers were fit to take up higher grade posts in either the central or departmental units.

36,

　　　　　　　It is clearly not possible on such a sketchy basis to anti- cipate the total cost of such an establishment and offer a comparison with the present establishment. Of course it is bigger because it is intended to produce a large expansion of public information and publicity work. At the same time it is economical in that properly qualified people will certainly produce more results per dollar of their salary. One properly qualified Senior Information Officer poid $3510 3870 a month can turn out more productive information material than tuo Assistant Information Officers Class I paid £1160 2135 a month cach. This is not just because the more highly paid and qualified men write faster and more effectively, which they do, but because the jounior пen experience mor、 difficulty obtaining the material from senior officers in other departments.

37.

On the basis of this plan the pattern of information services and its staff would be something like this:

Information Secretary

Deputy Information Secretary

Notca formerly D.I.S.

formerly D.D.I.S.

(These two officers would be responsible for advising the Governor and Government on public information and publicity policy and for overall administration and guidance of the work of departmental public information and publicity policy)

CENTRAL PRESS UNIT

2 P.1.0.'s

S.1.0.'s

6 1.0.'s

10 A.1.0.'s I

4 A.1.0.'s II

May be reduced by posting

a promotion as suggested

in para, 29.

/CENTRAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL PUBLICITY SERVICES UNIT

1 Chicf Publicity Officer.

P.1.0.'s

A S.1.0.'s

1.0.'s

No change from present catablishment

5 A.I.0.'s I

5 A.1.0.'s II

DUPARMENTAL PUBLIC INFORMATION AND PUBLICITY UNITS

7 P.1.0.'s

7 S.I.0.'s

RADIO NEWS UNIT

1 S.1.0.'s

38.

4 1.0.'s

6 A.1.0.'s I

　　　　　　　　Rough as this calculation is it does provide a basis for comparison between the present cstablishment and what is now proposed.

P.I.C.

S.I.O.

Existing

Frodosed

1.0.

A.1.0. I

No change execpt as possibly suggested in para. 29.

39.

A.1.0 II

　　　　　　　　In other words the cost of the proposed expansion of public information and publicity work is 3 more P.I.0.'s and 8 more S.1.0.'s, and this could be reduce by as meny executive and administrative officers as could be introduced into the information system.

CONFIDENTIAL

PART III

The Special Publicity Unit was very hastily thrown together to meet an urgent requirement for counter-propaganda and a positive propaganda effort directed to winning hearts and minds for the government.

　　　Its components were roughly selected to make use of the written word, by incorporating ISD staff, the spoken word by in- corporating PHK staff and personal contact by borrowing staff from SCA.

When making these selections on a functional basis it was also possible to borrow people who were expected to show some political sense and a readiness to operate outside the usual field of government information work, both as to the methods of communi- cation and the matter to be communicated.

　　　　In the event all of the key personnel who were borrowed to form the Unit have met these requirements to a large degree. This consideration of the future of the Unit will be valueless if it is not based on clearly stated arguments so it will be as well to get right down to individual cases.

　　　　The four men seconded from the ISD were a Principal Infor- mation Officer, Peter Moss, an Information Officer, Gerald Xavier, and two Assistant Information Officers, Class One, Tse Ming and Leung Tung-pui, the establishment for the initial six months period being two Senior Information Officers and two Assistant Information Officers Class One.

　　　　Moss immediately revealed a flair for counter-propaganda writing which could be effectively reproduced in Chinese. There is every indication that he could be even more useful in the production of longer-term, positive material for the 'hearts and minds' phase which we now embark upon. Unfortunately he had to be diverted to equally urgent work in the border area where he has combined press liaison duties with useful propaganda press work in that part of the New Territories.

Xavier is more simply a press man and demonstrated great enthusiasm and ability in the preparation of the factual material on which much successful counter-propaganda work has been based. He too had to be diverted to the border and is now on a long-planned three-month information course in England. Both Moss and Xavier are popular with pressmen, particularly foreign correspondents.

17.

CONFIDENTIAL

·2·

Tse and Leung are both good Chinese reporters able to produce fast useful material, suited to the requirements of the Chinese press and are both able to suit their style to the particular medium and the occasion. Both have a well developed political sense, Tse perhaps more so. Leung is technically a more highly qualified officer with a better standard of Chinese. Both are lively-minded and capable of unsupervised, original and productive work,

　　　　In the first three months of the operation, when the Deputy Director, Moss and Xavier were all turning out material in English for re-writing and reproduction in Chinese, a disproportionate burden fell upon Leung and Tse and it was decided to recruit two more AIO's Class One to assist them. Two candidates were selected but have since turned down the offer.

　　　　Until now the proposal was to retain Leung and Tse in the Unit. The intention was also to retain Xavier and let Moss who is a grade higher than the actual post return to where he is badly needed in the Publicity Division of the ISD, seek a replacement for him at SIO level and to continue to seek two other AIO's Class One.

10.

　　　　The disadvantages of this proposal are that there is no certainty of our obtaining a satisfactory replacement for Moss who has demonstrated his ability, versatility, local knowledge and enthusiasm; that Leung would now merit promotion to 10 if he had remained in the ISD press room; and there is a receding hope of acquiring worthwhile recruits at AIO level,

11.

　　　　It is therefore suggested that instead of an establishment of 2 SIO's and 4 AIO's Class One the ISD component should consist of one PIO, 1 S10, 1 10 and 2 AI0's. The ancillary staff (calligraphists etc.) are correctly consituted and need not be changed.

12.

The Radio Hong Kong staff who joined the Unit were a Programme Supervisor Cheng Keng-piu, a Programme Officer Michael Kaye and an Assistant Programme Officer Wong Wah-kay. Cheng, as a senior, well-experienced and able broadcaster has proved also to be wide- awake politically and able to exploit the opportunities which have been offered. The idea of the Unit is that having been seconded officers they will naturally be employed as fully as possible in the skills they have but are expected to turn their hands to associated or even quite different tasks.

/13.

CONFIDENTIAL

13.

　　　Chong has shown himself able to do this and the Unit simply must have a radio man of his calibre. Although considerably junior Michael Kaye has demonstrated that he has exactly the kind of brain and the creative talents to turn loose on the problems which now confront us in the propaganda field, together with the technique to produce from his ideas useful broadcasting material. He, like Cheng must be retained,

14.

Wong, is as far as I am able to judge, a competent radio man but I doubt whether it makes much difference that he is seconded to the Unit rather than retained at Radio Hong Kong. The idea of the broadcasting component must be to get things done which could not be done merely by liaising with and stimulating the production facilities of Radio Hong Kong. This could probably be done by retaining Cheng and Kaye (at a more suitable grade, say Programme Officer) and by returning Wong to RHK.

15.

It is essential to retain the small and useful team built up to produce fast transcriptions of radio material for press issue.

16.

Undoubtedly the most imaginative part of the construction of the SPU was the addition of the SCA Unit. It made available for propaganda work both new channels for communication and now sources of information on public attitudes. The most fortunate move of all was the posting of David Lai Kar-wah. It would have been difficult to find an officer more suited for this work and he has displayed tremendous energy, enthusiasm and ability. These qualities would not, however, be notable in this context if they were not at the service of a highly-developed political sensc. Lai brought with him from SCA a Liaison Officer Class One, Chan Hon-kwong and a liaison Officer Class Two, Cheng Pak-nin.

17.

It is difficult to disassociate the value of the SCA component of SPU from the personal energy and initiative of David Lai, Provided that the essential link with SCA and his machinery can be maintained the Unit could probably drop both Liaison Officers but this would in fact sever the link. It is suggested therefore that the L.0. I, Chan be retained, and of course David Lai who will henceforth be a key figure in the SPU.

18.

The attachment of a police officer, Inspector Chau Kyun-to was originally little more than a convenience so that the police members of the Publicity Committee could retain daily liaison with the Unit. In fact Inspector Chau has proved to be an active member of the Unit. It is not only convenient to have a police officer attached to the Unit to facilitate press and similar arrangements. There is the much greater advantage, as in the case of Mr. Lai, of having a man whose wide contacts open up possibilities for the effcctive expansion of propaganda work and it would certainly be desirable to retain Inspector Chau's services on a permanent basis.

/19.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4

19.

Work

　　　Considering its output and the long hours willingly worked the Unit is modestly supported by secretarial and other staff. does tend to come in fits and starts but at present all but the secretary in the Radio Hong Kong section are fully employed, as their over-time sheets testify. The slackness in the radio transcription operation can be taken up whenever we develop the use of this valuable medium.

20.

Since the actual personnel involved in these secretarial and office grades have fitted so well into the organisation it is proposed that they should now be transferred to the Unit.

21.

The only existing member of the staff not so far considered is Miss Celine Poon Kah-ling, an Executive Officer loaned to the Unit from the Establishment Branch as researcher. Mr. Downes who selected her very accurately judged the Unit's requirement for a well-educated, well-organised and lively-minded officer and Miss Poon has played an essential part in the Unit's operations to date. Her job has been to read as many original sources as are available to us, (the Chinese press as a whole, Communist papers in particular as well as leaflets, posters etc.) and to report on their political significance as a guide to the Unit's work. Miss Poon has done this work excellently but makes no secret of the fact that she looks forward to returning soon to what she sces as a more normal career. The Unit needs such a researcher. On the other hand it is not likely that anyone with exactly the right talents will easily be found by recruitment, certainly not by recruitment in an information officer grade, considering the existing qualifications.

22.

It is therefore suggested that Miss Poon should be retained for the rest of the first six months of the Unit's existence and that thereafter an attempt should be made to find from the ranks of Hong Kong University graduate Executive Officers, a similarly qualified officer for a similar attachment. This would initiate the pattern of attachment in the SPU at least, which, it is suggested, will be of value to the officers attached by broadening their horizons and giving them a feel for the political situation, to the organisations they belong to because of the experience they will take back to them and to the Unit by establishing its links with other parts of the Government organisation.

/23.

CONFIDENTIAL

23.

The same purposes would be additionally and more importantly served by attaching in the same way a senior Administrative Officer. The next phase facing the Unit will call for a great deal of effort from departments. If the proposals in Part II are accepted it will be some time before they can be implemented and departmental links set up. Although departments, in their present attitude to those matters, tend to argue that they cannot contribute more to the propaganda effort until they have the staff it is nevertheless true that, at least for the specialised requirements of the SPU, all that is needed is the will to contribute, and if this is displayed by the head of the department the exploita- tion can be done by staff of the Unit or the ISD. This kind of liaison and persuasion is exactly the task for a senior Administrative Officer who would also, of course, strengthen the general policy direction of the Unit. The task is worth the talents of an officer of the calibre of Mr. David Jordan if he were available.

24.

　　As far as staff are concerned then the proposal for the SPU is as follows:-

1 Deputy Director of Information Services

1 Senior Administrative Officer (seconded)

1 Executive Officer (seconded)

ISD Component

1 Principal Information Officer

1 Senior Information Officer

1 Information Officer

1 Assistant Information Officer Class One

Radio Hong Kong Component

1 Programme Supervisor

1 Programme Organiser

/SCA

CONFIDENTIAL

SCA Component

1 Administrative Officer

1 Liaison Officer Class One

25.

Police Component

1 Inspector

Ancillary Staff

No change.

　　　　This plan involves an increase of one Senior Administrative Officer, one Principal Information Officer offset by the loss of one Senior Information Officer, one Assistant Information Officer Class One, ono Assistant Programme Organiser and one Liaison Officer Class Two.

26.

As set out the plan reflects the original structure, showing which department supplied the various people in the first place. But if it is accopted that for as far ahead as one can see there will be a requirement for an information unit working on the lines developed by the SPU then its staff should belong to it and not be left hanging somewhere in between, which is bad for them and bad for their work. Even the most dedicated officers, who see the value of the work they are doing, must be slightly concerned about the effect on their carcers of posting to an indeterminate organisation with no recognised establishment and no future. Moreover these officers find it difficult to establish their position with, for example, other Government officers in the course of their work when they are unable to explain precisely who or what they represent.

27.

　　　　The reorganisation and redeployment of information services proposed in Part II will make it much easier to fit the Special Publicity Unit into the pattern and in turn to fit the staff into the Unit. For Administrative Officers their posting would be just the same as going to another branch of the Secretariat (and in the case of the Administrative Officers they should be appointed to designated posts). The Information Officers would of course be working as such in the central information apparatus.

This leaves only the two Radio Hong Kong officers and the SCA liaison officer. In the latter case there seems to be no harm in making his a

/straight

CONFIDENTIAL

- 7 -

straight attachment.

His value is the fact that he is an SCA man

and known as such. An additional L.0. I post should be created permanently in SCA to allow for this posting. The RHK officers present a less-easily soluble problem. If Mr. Cheng's career is in radio, then on the face of it the SPU however it will in future be constituted, cannot offer him the same prospects. Mr. Kaye on the other hand, with less service at RHK might convert more profitably. On the other hand the two RHK men might be treated on the same basis as is proposed for the SCA Liaison Officer. It is for the Director of Broadcasting to say how suitable it would be for him to have additional permanent posts of one Programme Supervisor and one Programme Officer on the understanding that one of each would be permanently attached to SPU. The problem would seem to be an internal one for Director of Broadcasting as to how well such people could be re-integrated in RHK, which secondment or attachment implies. If Director of Broadcasting feels this is impractical then the two officers at present in SPU will have to transfer, if they are willing, to the information grade, and if the other proposals, sketched in Part II for a long time scale information grade, are accepted, will have to get their career prospects within that grado. Although it has been suggested above that Cheng might have diminished prospects outside RHK this does not mean he will have no prospects at all. If we develop a comprehensive policy of using all media for positive programmes of public information and publicity, if we produce a sensible information officer structure based upon performance and not on an inappropriate departmental pyramid, and assuming, as there is no reason not to assume, a sensible working relationship with RHK, then people like Cheng should have reasonable careers if they transfer.

28.

　　　　　It is proposed that all other staff not mentioned above should be transferred permanently to the SPU or its successor organisation.

29.

These proposals for the continuation and the staffing of the SPU are related to the proposals for information services generally. If certain parts of the information service are decentralised as suggested, and other parts drawn into the central secretariat organisation it will be logical and natural to have there, in addition to the central press service described in paragraphs 18 29 of Part II, a unit carrying out the work of the present SPU.

/SPU........

CONFIDENTIAL

- 8 -

30.

Even if those proposals for information services generally are not accepted, or are accepted but not immediately implemented, it is suggested that the SPU should be a unit under the direction of the DCS(SD) rather than a part of the present Information Services Department. It does not seem possible to incorporate the various members properly while the Unit is itself an appendage of the ISD. The present supernumerary post of Deputy Director of Information Services should be made permanent (or a grade of Assistant Director created) and the present substantive Deputy should continue to head the SPU. He would therefore be seconded to the Unit in the same way as is suggested for Administrative Officers. The administrative separation from ISD need not involve physical separation. ISD will still have to provide the outlets for most of the Units material and the Unit will be calling on the specialised services of the publicity division as at present.

31.

Apart from the establishment changes involved there will be necessary adjustments to the financial arrangements necessi- tating the creation of a vote on a permanent basis to meet personal emoluments as well as the running expenses of the Unit.

32.

Finally but not unimportantly there is the question of a name for the Unit. "Special Publicity Unit" as a title was as hastily conceived as the thing itself. It is unsuitable in that it is a) misleading since publicity is only an aspect of its purpose and b) because the word "special" is quite unsuitable for public consumption. In the initial and mainly counter-propaganda phase it was not intended to make public the existence or work of the Unit. It is still undesirable that it should in any way attract public attention, On the other hand, and especially as we enter a new, positive and consequently more open phase of propaganda the necessary contacts with departmental and other government organisa- tions, and quite frequently with non-government institutions and private firms, call for some acceptable and reasonably accurate identification. Not only is "publicity" inaccurate but "special" is too suggestive of cloak-and-dagger and propaganda.

33.

　　　It is probably impossible to approach the selection of a name scientifically. It is easier to say why words like "special" and "publicity" are unsuitable than to say which words are suitable. On the one hand, for example, the name might cught to convey something about information. On the other hand the use of the actual word "information" may lead to confusion about the Unit's relation to ISD. "Public Affairs" is an American term commonly accepted in this field. It has curtain attractions and Public Affairs Section is one possible title. "Public Opinion" which, after all indicates the true purpose of the operation is another possibility Public Opinion Section sounds odd but perhaps Public Opinion Liaison has a useful sound, The word 'community' has even better overtones

/.......

CONFIDENTIAL

-9-

and it would be useful to associate the purpose of the Unit by the use of the phrase 'Community affairs'. However, it would then be necessary to introduce the word 'information' otherwise the title certainly would be misleading. 'Community Affairs Information' would appear to fit the bill nicely, combining both the actual function with a pointer towards the overall intention of the organisation. The only further requirement may be the addition of an 'organisation' word such as 'section', 'branch', 'Office' etc. If this were thought necessary than COMMUNITY AFFAIRS INFORMATION SECTION is suggested.

Reference

M* Carter

Please

su your

note on

To on persions

Volume.

IRB

I sunt comes of 5/50 to

JIPGD

who have commuted at

(3)

18. 12.67

(sphohn Stone)

11/12

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x183.

5. See also the thimister's brews at (5).

Ed (4206)

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7.12.67

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(S+LE) "Pa

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.

DRAFT s/o Letter

Type 1 +

From

To:-

P. C. M. Sedgwick, Esq., CMG, Hong Kong Government Office, 54, Pall Mall, S.W.1.

Telephone No. & Ext.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top decreta

X Confidential.

Restricted. Unclassifed.

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

Нал был

Department

I am replying to your letter of 16 November with

which you enclosed a copy of the paper produced by the

Overseas Public Relations Coordination Committee in

Hong Kong on steps to maintain overseas confidence in the

Colony.

From our study of the paper it seems to us that it is

intended to set out Hong Kong's own domestic arrangements

to project the Colony's image overseas. We have reached

this conclusion because nowhere does the paper mention what

part the United Kingdom information effort is to be asked

to play. It does, however, refer in paragraph 5 to the

use of various British Missions overseas as "agencies

engaged in retaining, repairing and fostering overseas

confidence" in Hong Kong. But this appears to be a

reference to an already existing situation.

Rivett-Carnac is to return here from Hong Kong

later this month and he will doubtless be able to clarify

the above points.

I understand that the reason why China is not

mentioned in paragraphs 5 or 6 of the paper is because

that country is regarded as requiring separate and special

treatment.

On a matter of minor detail, should not the

reference in paragraph 4(g) be to paragraph 57

SECRET

HONG KONG WORKING GROUP

　　The third meeting of the Hong Kong "orking Group was held in Room 226, the Foreign Office at 11.15 a.D. on Wednesday, 13 December, 1967. Present were:

Mr. Peck (Chairman)

IRD

Mr. Gaminara

Hong Kong and West India Dept.

Mr. Littlejohn Cook

JIPGD

Mr. Lewis

JIPGD

Mr. Rivett-Carnac

Miss Stowe

Colonel Wild

Mr Wilson

JIPGD

Ministry of Defence.

IRD

　　　The Chairman said that the meeting had been called in order to take advantage of Mr. Rivett-Carnac's presence in London to discuss the situation in Hong Kong and problens of staffing and organisation of the information effort there.

3. Reporting on his tour of duty, Mr. Rivett-Carnac said that his first two months had been fully occupied in organising information activities of the various committees established to deal with the Hong Kong emergency. He reported that they were well able to deal with information designed for the population of the Colony. The main requirement had been to improve con- tacts with the foreign press corps and for better external communications. He had initiated twice-weekly press conferences. These had been open to all foreign correspondents but, as many were in Hong Kong primarily as China ratchers, attendance had in practice consisted mainly of representatives of the larger news agencies. Briefings by the Governor and by Heads of various government departments had been valuable, while the introduction of group units to closed areas along the Chinese border, which frequently figured in rews reports, had been much appreciated.

4. On communications with the rest of the world, Mr. Rivett- Camac reported that the declassification of the Sitrep tele- grams to the CRO enabled information to be used quickly for briefing the press. He felt, however, that there was considerable scope for improving the content of the daily telegban from the GIS Hong Kong to the Hong Kong office in London. This should include points for use in positive propaganda as well as factual reportage. The main problen was the lack of writers who had not previously been needed for the internal information effort.

5. Elr. Rivett-Carnac added that, as an outsider, he had been able to do much to improve relations between the various govern- ment departments. The release of material previously classi- fied quite unnecessarily had also improved nows coverage. He emphasised, however, that lack of physical security ande the GIS an unsuitable vehicle for unattributable propagandā.

THIS IS A COPY

THE ORIGINAL HAS DEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 344) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

SECRET

/6.

631

SECRET

-2-

Mr. Puck reverted to the rustion of atrial for the Hong Kong government office in Lenton.

Its reported that as the day telegram was prepared by a local employ in Hong Kon, edsures to improve it would have to be taken in Hon Kong.

7. Mr. Rivett-Camac expressed the view that there was no nued for anyone to be appointed to replace him. It was, however, essential for someone to be found by April 1968 to act for the Deputy Head of the Inferntion Svices, who was responsible for running the special committees in Hong Kong and he would be on loave from lay to Ducembur, 1968. This was a Hong Kong government appointent and a candidate was available.

8. In reply to Hr. Littlejohn Cook Mr. Rivett-Camic stated that ideally three writers were needed to reparo tori-1 i. Dalish, Since a three year tour of duty s envised, this ruled out the possibility of the Foreign Office supplying an officer on temporary secondment. Although to responsibility for the recruitment of two furt or writers rested with the Hong Kong government working through the Hong Kon, office in London, it was agreed that JIFGD and IRD should keep their eyes open for suitable candidates. It was claphasised that the successful candidates would have to be fully briefed on Foreign Office news outlets.

9. Chinese-sporking audiences were largely kept informed by the circulation of Hong Kong news10.crs. This had proved an impractical nodium for reaching Hong Kong seamen who were catered for by leaflets and other material produced by the Marine Departent and given world wide distribution by Hong Kong shipping companies. Hong Kong citizens abroad wore in general not yet well informed.

10. In reply to further questions, Mr. Rivett-Carnac said that coverage of events in Hong Kon in the Japanese recs had improved considerably, following the two-week visit of a Japanese speaker from t. British bassy in Tokyo who had done auch to establish better relations with Japenese correspondents.

11. Asked by Colonel id about te strength or weakness of Hong Kong radio, Kr. Rivett-Crnac said that it operated on medium wave for internal audiences only and was largely a vehicle for Government views. A short wave norse link enabled ships to be reached. A satisfactory volume of materi l as received from the COI. He adued that television had no great influence as it did not reach the majority of the population. The existing station as government-run and a second commercial station as just starting. ir. Listlejohn Cook said that he hoped to meet the head of Hung Kong radio, currently in London,

12. Colonel 714 reported that the psychological warfare team had been in Hong Kong, for a week, It had obtained financial

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　i.asures support for a six month tour of duty.

to establish it on a per..anent oasis would depend on whether the Hong Kong government wished it to remain or started up a similar unit of its own.

13.

It was agreed that:

written comments on the paper "Overseas Confidence in Hong Kong" produced by the Hong Kong government's Overseas Public Relations Coordination Committee should be sent to Mr. Gazinare and copies to other members of t'e Working Group.

b) JIPGD would write to Kr. att, Director of the Hong Kong Government's Information Services, offering further assistance in the recruitment of writers.

There's the

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION

P.O. Box 1812, Custom House Quay WELLINGTON, New Zealand

Telegraphic address: Ukrep Telephone: 46-060

Telex: NZ 3325

2-WEL. 280/35/1

Ar. Capfovince A. Brown

Mr. Hewit wa

H.K. tu No 135′′5′′

Dear Carter,

14 December, 1967

handling Wr28/12

We ought to send

suitable reply.

ADI VICE PUBLICITY ON HONG KONG

We were interested to see Hong Kong telegram No. 1355 which expressed concern at the attitude of a number of the major airlines and shipping companies to the promotion of travel to Hong Kong and we had thought of commenting on it at the time insofar as it referred to Air New Zealand and press reporting in New Zealand of Hong Kong affairs. It seemed however that your telegram No. 1954 was probably no more than an interim reply and that you might be considering bringing us more directly into the exchanges at a later date. As it has turned out, our guess was wrong, and we have seen no more correspondence on this subject. The general situation in Hong Kong has now improved, but it may still be useful if, even at this late date, I set out briefly some

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　I set out briefly some comments on the points raised in Hong Kong's telegram.

2. It is difficult to see on what grounds Hong Kong based their asse. tion that there had been a "good deal of inaccurate reporting of Hong Kong affairs

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　in New Sealand". Most of the reports which have appeared in the New Zealand press have reflected pretty faithfully the line taken by newspapers in Britain -as they often do on other topics. In this instance, since the New Zealand Press Association have no representative in Hong Kong the local press has leaned heavily on Reuters representative for its stories. The local papers have also published many of the articles and background notes which we have distributed on receipt from London. In addition, the N.Z.B.C. broadcast (live or recorded) the B.B.C. Overseas News four times each morning and twice in the evenings. The press and radio coverage here has therefore been factually correct, and it would be difficult to lay our hands on any item which was given a more sensational slant than the original story.

Carter Esq. C.V.O.,

Hong Kong and West Indien

Church House,

Great Smith Street

LONDON, SV.1.

LAST

REF.

Rif.

tment

(65)

CONFIDENTIAL

13. ...

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 63

1 JAN 1968

HWA 13/22

Ans t

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2

Žinou

　　　Le cannot commen on the attitude of the shipping lines, though as your own telegram suggested, their actions may have been dictated by purely commercial considerations). 3t we do know that, in September for example, bookings to Hong Kong through the local BOAC office were showing an upward trend and that there had been no sign of a fall in business even during the height of the trouble.

　　　By and large most New Zealanders travellin abroad will, if the oportunity arises or can be contrived, stop-over in Hong Kong. The prospects of good duty-free shopping tend to over-ride many other considerations; and there is no reason to suppose that this attitude would change unless the situation in Hong Kong deteriorated quite severely and there were authenticated stories of visitors being molested and getting involved in the shooting. (I might add, for good reacure, that one Wellington paper published a story about a Few ealand woman who had lived in Hong Kong for some months includin the worst of the trouble; she said that life had one on much as before and that she had had no difficulty over shopping etc. and that she had not had any fears even when her husband was travelling outside Hong Kong

5. This is all rather negative, but I think it indicates clearly enough that Hong Kong has not had a bad press in New Zealand. Koreover, there is no reason to suppose that if there were to be another outburst, reporting here would be other than factual. Of course, the right type of ́ammunition" would always be useful, and it might well be worth considering whe ther now or some time in the future the Hong Kong Tourist Office in Sydney could or should take a more positive line in "selling" Hong Kong The Tourist Office sends out regular

information and rews letters to airline offices and travel agents, and this sort of information from some one on the spot (or almost on the spot) is likely to be more convincing than any ress reports.

5. Finally, I think you will be interested to see the enclosed cories of some correspondende which an importer in Auckland exchanged with a firm in Shanghai It would not be unfair to say that Mr Jackson (the importer) is an average New Zealander"; but you will see that he holds very robust views which illustrate in another way that Hong Kong's telegram contained more than one assumption which turned out to be inaccurate.

Joma sincerely. John hilles

(J.2.A. Miles)

CONFIDENTIAL

0:-

CODES USED "BENTLEY'S"

"'SCHOFIELD'S SAFE.CHECK

3 LETTER

CABLES AND TELEGRAMS "'JAXONIA"

PHONE 48-863

ALL DEPARTMENTS

ESTABLISHED 100

P.O. BOX 2199

F. E. JACKSON & CO. LTD. 64//vi

MERCHANTS IMPORTERS & EXPORTERS

HF en sectin

32-36 ANZAC AVENUE,

AUCKLAND, C.1, N.Z.

7th Cetober, 1987.

ju vid,

gou for your "elter of Ten Ond then

ng the correspondence ont épies of letters receiv the Chids mati vel fight Industrial Prodants of mini chei.

Lought the

the Tall

4. "ong

Lose of these pliers

Commission an affecting

Aucided not to mandy 15 tiz

f n now wil ond engla da considerable

The will be

xitein'g interests ia "

Tong 6.

　　　　　Fear the Chios Pati na tight Industria" act will bo 1· L lying the Lordde vædered,

י.

for your nokks uzledgment 14,

Sinop 320

中國輕工業品進出口公司上海市分公司

HINA NATIONAL LIGHT INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS IMPORT & EXPORT CORPORATION

87-655

SHANGHAI BRANCH

128 HUCHIU ROAD

SHANGHAI, CHINA

CABLE ADDRESS) INDUSTRY SHANGHAI CODES USED

ACME

BENTLEY'S COMPLETE

BENTLET'U 2ND ANC ETH

Jept. 19, 1967.

1.,/9, 7.5, Jackson & Co.Ltd,

2238 MMAD Avenue,

muckland, 0.1, New Zealand,

Dear Sir a,

ماشا

cutéli

Attention: kr. Gainor Jackson

Jou nave use the rest malicious words in your letter of 15 August to abuse our world thunder ei revolutionary young fighters - the med Guards, to slander the just struggle of our valiant longong patriotic compa trict against the iritish violence and to attackour great Chinese Courunist rty as well as our goat socialist system. zainst it, we lodge our strongest protest with you,

from our pint of view, we consistently hold that trude and commerce sunnot be divorced from politice. but you have played the hypocrite by saving "we are surprised at your allowing a political situation to daler tats irade and Commerce", "Trade and Commerce are amove politicaì

bez ormai derations" and "Trade transcends the jour a c? overment to ona trǝl It't, etc., which are aberlutely preposterous ideas. in the words and Lines of your letter, there are full of ressurs, enders and defamation. what on it Le if it is not of politicɛi

Tu vite a slander against our country that there is no "fretion of the ¡uge 16 Gifne. This is impas mengers: isa.ed by a manier with nis vyss dopea. bne legaer chip of our groet lander Cherman Mao the radiest, rediost red sun in the nines of the people in China and the word inver and the great Chinese Communist carty, the Chinese worker 9, the poor and her midale peasants ant read masses of waking;eople Tecome the mastery of the country and unfol! the three great revolutionary movesonte of elass strungie, the struggle. Arroiction and welentific

experiments. The proletarian cultural rewlution folusi et present de unir gelented in nistry. lo-ary, can you Sh. any capitalist country or ravisionist country we may allow its broad masses of people to 190 big-cuerecter posters, the great contention, the extensive 8rs of våvel mid the grout agbutes as four great woujons for infeliẳng groet critisit llo, statiuvaly impossilo! May are scored to Jeath! Sonda they un x, would not they meet an gnominious and ut so-calleJ "amor boy" and "Tom" advertised by all the capitalist countries in

cant'd...

Coder Uscɔ "dentlEY'S"

"SCHOFIELD'S SAFE.CHECK"

3 LETTER

GABLES AND TELEGRAMS "JAXONIA"

PHONE 40.003

ALL DEPARTMENTS

F. E. JACKSON & CO. LTD.

MERCHANTS IMPORTERS & EXPORTERS

1 Copy to wo Dymond

ESTADLIGHED 1000

P.O. BOX 2199

32-38 ANZAC AVENUE,

AUCKLAND, C.I, N.Z.

Cut September, 1967.

Who Wilen to see

The High Cen lesión, y for

P.C. Max 1310,

the United Kingdom,

29/9.

مما

Dear Sir,

64/2/ii

played in "We Dymond

Chien/llong Tong Border

On the futh bigust last I wrote to you and enclosed a photoster copy of a letter received from the China National

- dustrial Products, Import & Export Corporation, nghed, wherein they stated that because of the Aisturbances Tong long, caused by the Pritish Fascists, they were not, mder my circumstances, prepared to trans-ship some goods ordered by ne vie Tong (948. akira weled a copy of our letler la reply.

basis of

The goofe that we

.. New Zenien

that we had established was

　　i Stest resetion was i dilessing with ..

ל.

trans-shlpent at

tri I have

ster of

fully informe

we ve the

tu as on a

"le"s

uct

Letter fro: the

Lich we et close

•1low

shot t

Ten. Dhe Pr¢

britlen sho114

hese town?

is latest

etler

sible for writing

Chloe was vivasly completely

has rell;

　in rotrinated with the Sowmist ideology. jivo.. ne a thorough. 4 last 25" with. en anti-missile stile.

would see, that the rive

a misologist.

In any ense, their action in now refusing to supply the goods resolves the tee to our complete satisfaction and Instead the orders will be red with Fritish firms, despite

.2/

The Nich Co infoner for

S6th Sentember, 1067.

the higher cost. So it is an ill wing that blows nobody some good.

　　　　　　Apart from sending a copy of this letter from the China Watimal Light Industrial Products to yourself and the Price Minister, we have decided to give it no further publicity as it may injure diplomatic relations between Britain and China, but it is as well that you should be informed.

GJ: EB 2.

Yours faithfully,

Sannfachen

Gai Jackson.

Sis the 22 agjent Grilled on an Exclay's send dispell the leller

Lagers com from the Ponty ins/presentive worth this organsation that they will the stiffing our orders sinch preffort the writer stedenent "What. Hasle Hanseerd, the powvius qförvi innestok confit of rik " Trade & bigger thin printes

CH...A NA!

中國輕工業品進出口公司上海市分公司

L LIGHT INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS IMPORT & EXPORT CORPORATION

40-658

SHANGHAI BRANCH

128 HUCHIU ROAD

SHANGHAI, CHINA

CABLE ADDRESS.

INDUSTRY SHANGHAI

ACME

CODES USED

BENTLEY'S COMPLETE

BENTLET'S 2ND ABC ETH

Sept. 19, 1967,

the sprli sme merely two masks for hiing shane, in these places, the bresc resses of working people have only the freedom to be enclaved, the fezlom be ex; lcited, and the freedom to be hunger ud,

Do you feel s mu of your selves that you should reverse right and wrong and cone the bias with white?

what went cusa in your letter that he have every faith that any action Taken My Me Sitish authorities in mengkong will have been to put dosa violence under mua disturbing, K. o peace and goo, order of that community" 1s just the one tanu of the Iritish Imperialists playing a trick of thief crying "stop thief".

de mult a^lepaly point out that Hongkong is the territory of China. for some than a century, the witish imperialists occupyin, Hongkong

པ གས have done ze much evil, and incurred so many tlood jolts; particularly during the recent sonths, everywhere in long ong it is founi sist our hongrong org,trioto have been beaten up, kidnapped, per segitea and

It is the ritis imperialists ho nave perpetrate the Macist strocitius und disturbed the normal or uur of the command ty. These are tie iron facte which are undeniable.

kus valiant strugie of our fongkong corputriots ogsinat the towering faciat crimes of die British Amperialia: is stirul, sega). TH+ there is oppressir, there is registence. in the present srn, it is not the size ac in the aptch of 19th-century. Having & powerful socialist notherlund es their book for ce, how can Hongkong's patriotic compatriots stmed with the invincible thought of hao Tse-tung tolerate the fascist aterities : the British authorities in dongkong! No, thou aanú "po". Ten thousan) me." To-day, the fate of Hongkong is held in the hands of Cainese people as well as of our Hongkong compatriots. It is abolutely incssille to tolerate the Indian 15perialists' em tinued misdeeds in

　　　　The Chinese people and the Vengkong patriotic conju tricts van grond.

ora me to triumph, an, the british imperjelists are gure to be defeated. Pioan wie ste in chorus with iritish. inper fuldsts will als er no account no to a god end.

Just as our great isade CHLIKMAN MAD SAYS:

鳞 A BOCA CHLY KO TRG. OB CAL'S OWN FB:' IS A O UNASU POL: JAYING

I USUGRIEN THE DE AVIOR OF CERTAIN POOLS. TIL REACTIONALIES IN ALL COUM KIES AKVE POOLS OF MIS KIND",

cort1d...

中國輕工業品進出口公司上海市分公司

"SINA NATIONAL LIGHT INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS IMPORT & EXPORT CORPORATION

49-658

SHANGHAI BRANCH

128 HUCHIU ROAD

SHANGHAI, CHINA

CABLE ADOR EST

INDUSTRY SHANGHAI

ACHI

CODES USED

DENTLETTO COMPLETE BENTLEY'D AND ABC ETH

Sopt. 19, 1967.

The valiant young revolutionary fighter - Red Quards have ackieved immortal neits in the proletarian cultural revolution, winning resound famo over the world. The revolutionary people of all countries are without exception elated and inspired and unanimously expressing their high approbation to the Red Quards' achievements. But contrary to this, the imperialists, the revisionists, all reactionaries, ghosts and monsters Mg or sull, facing such a situation are completely losing their heads. They sweet, dance with rage and roar! What's the use of it? China gives privilege to those secson who have friendly attitude or no bad intentiona to visit our parts, but can never allow a handful of reactionaries on individual stecher wantonly attack the proletarian cultural revolution in our land, arouse serious anti-China pro vocation, and more than that go further to insult our goat leader Chairman Mao openly, which is absolutely intolerable to the 700 million Chinese people. Their azo actiona have done least harm to the glory of the eat thought of Meo Tre tung.

On the contrary, it further evidences the correctness and eatness of hao Tse-tung the Marxist-Leninist of our

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　or a. Tuo necec8ery treatment given to such a handful of persons by our department concerned and revolutioary young fighter axed Guards in accordance with the Chinese law is not debatable. Are these actions of ours are of "foolish antice"? You, "kind-hearted" getlen, are just proving that you are the biggest foola.

You have now participated into the rank of anti-China clowns and make a fuss about the matter to slander the young revolutionary fighters- the fed Guards, This action of yours is utterly intolerable!

It is also mentioned in your letter that there are workers in China opposed to the Red Quards, which is a rumour and alander out and out Our worker a and the Rad Guards follow most closely the teachings of our great leader Chairman Mao and constantly unite together in carrying the proletarim quìtural revolution thru to the and with resolution.

In view of your abusing our revolutionary young fighters, slander ing the just struggle of our Hongkong patriotic compatriots, and attacking our great Chinese Communist rarty as voll as socialist system, it resulta in impossibility of business low. Therefore, we have taken the necessary measure in refuting such an avil attitude of yours and inform Muana, Aichard J. Kelly of it to that effect.

　　　　"CODES USED "BENTLEY'S" "SCHOFIELD'S SAFE.CHECK"

3 LETTER

CABLES AND TELEGRAMS "JAXONIA"

PHONE 401-883

ALL DEPARTMENTS

F. E. JACKSON & CO. LTD.

MERCHANTS IMPORTERS & EXPORTERS

The High Commissioner for

P.O. Box 1812, WELLINGTON.

Dear Sir,

the United Kingdom,

ESTABLISHED 1800 P.O. BOX 2199

32-38 ANZAC AVENUE,

AUCKLAND, C.1, N.Z.

16th August, 1967.

pps

With this letter I enclose a photostat copy of a letter received from the China National Light Industrial Products Import & Export Corporation, Shanghai, China in which you will note that they refuse to trans-ship goods at Hong Kong because of the fascist violence of British Authorities in that port. 1 enclose a copy of my Company's letter in reply.

After discussion with their New Zealand Agent,

18/

Hr. R.J. Kelly, we decided to allow them to trans-ship at any port as they had quoted on a C.I.F. basis and freight was there- fore a matter for their concern.

I trust that my letter in reply and the cuttings

enclosed enlightened them.

I am,

Yours sincerely

For and on Behalf of: F.E. JAC, SO' & CO. LTD

GJ: DB Encs.

Gainor Jackson, MANAGING DIRECTOR

•

ANTICH TRADE CO. MISSION

1 8.00 1967

ELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND

copes Used: "BENTLEY'6"

"SCHOFIELD'S SAFE-CHECK"

3 LETTER

GABLES AND TELEGRAMSI "JAXONIA"

PHONES: 48.803 (3 LINES) ALL DEPARTMENTS

ESTABLISHED 1870

F. E. JACKSON & CO. LTD.

MERCHANTS IMPORTERS & EXPORTERS

28-38 ANZAC AVENUE,

The Manager,

China ational Light Industrial

Products,

Import & Export Corporation,

Shanghai Branch,

128 Huchiu Road,

Shanghai,

CHINA

AUCKLAND, C.1, N.Z.

15th August, 1967.

Dear Sir,

ccyléli

　　　　　　　Wo are in receint of your lebter of 5th August in which you acknowledged receipt of our letter of 17th July covering our Order No. 11, Item No. 721 for various itens of tools.

　　　　　　　In reply to our letter of 17th July we note you have also receive? our Letter of Credit, No. 94/2571/2, established through the National Bank of New Zealand Ltd.

　　　　　　　As indicated in our letter, we provided in this Credit for trans-shipment to Hong Kong for the reason that regular, direct sailing to Auckland are available from that Port. We have now received your letter in which you say that in no circumstances will you allow trans-shipment to be made at Hong Kong, and the reason you give is to protect the fascist violence of British Authorities in liong Kong and to give fire support to the political struggle of our Hong Kong compatriots in their grand strike against this violence, we shall, in no circumstances, allow trans-shipment to be made at Hong Kong".

Frankly, as a Commercial House, we are surorised at you allowing a political situation to enter into Trade and Commerce.

　　　　　　　　　We have always held the view that Trade and Commerce are above political considerations and that Trade transcends the powers of Governments to control it. It is bigger than politics.

Our Company is constantly representing this point of view to our own Government, who, for many years past, has re- stricted Imports by a system of Import Licensing.

We, as

....2/

　Importers, have suffered much in our freedom through the Trade Restrictions of successful Governments. Practically all the goods we handle are subjected to Import Licences and these are extremely difficult to obtain. Our greatest difficulty is to give orders to all the suppliers from whom we require goods.

　　　　　　We are very friendly disposed to your New Zealand Agent Mr. Kelly and for that reason we are taking a lenient view of your attitude in this matter. We would respectfully suggest that unter the Communist Regime in China you are shown only one side of the picturc. The fact is that in China you have not got freedom of the Precu. You have detained British shios, italian ships and Russian shins. Your Red Guards have painted Mao slogens all over the top sides of the ships, you have arrested the Captains and crews of those vessels and detained the vessels. We respectfully suggest that this is no way to win friends and influence people throughout the world.

Trade and Commerce are the means whereby we live and whereby you live, and without which no llation can survive.

　　　　　　The latest incident is reported in our newspaper this morning and we enclose a cutting, showing that China had detained a Russian ship and arrested the Captain and some members of the crew because of their anti-Mao attitude.

　　　　　　If Communist China wants Trade, we would suggest that she will have to drop these foolish antics of detaining vessels that call on her Ports and arresting Officers and Crews who may or may not agree with the political idiology at present dominant in China. But we would suggest that many of your own people are in revolt against the existing Regine, as indicated by the recent riots in Shanghai, Canton, Peking and other parts of China where the workers have been opposed to the Red Guards.

However, enough of Politics. We are business people and are concerned only with Trade and Commerce and we are not one scrap interested in the internal Politics of China, which please note.

After discussion with your Agent, Mr. Kelly, in which we took strong exception to your comments, we have appreciated the fact that your goods have been quoted to us on a C.1.F. basis, which means that you are responsible for Freight and Insurance. In these circumstances, it is only reasonable that we should leave to you the question of what route or vessels by which the goods are shipped.

We have therefore instructed our Bank to allow trans- shipment at any Port, but we would suggest that by eliminating

....3/

Hong Kong, through freights with trans-shipment at other ports may cause you considerably more than trans-shipment via Hong Kong, from which Port there are regular soiling to New Zealand.

　　　　　　Finally, we woul draw your attention to the fact that New Zealand is a British Dominion and we have every faith that any action taken by the British Authorities in Hong Kong will have been to put down violence which was disturbing the péace and good order of that community.

Will you please see that, otherwise, the terms of our Letter of Credit are strictly adhered to.

We are,

Yours faithfully,

For and on Behalf of: F.E. JACKSON È CO. LTD.

GJ: ES

Enca

Gainor Jackson, MANACING DIRECTOR.

44407

中國輕工裳品進出口公司上海市分公司

CHINA NATIONAL LIGHT INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS IMPORT & EXPORT CORPORATION

A8-161

SHANGHAI BRANCH

128 HUCHIU ROAD SHANGHAI, CHINA

CABLE ADDIERE

INDUSTRY SHANGHAI

ACHE

CODES USED

BENTLEY'S COMPLETE BENTLEY'S 2ND ADC

W/4. P.E. Jackson & Co.Ltd., 28-38 Ansac Avenue,

Auckland, C.1, New Zealand,

Dear Sire,

5th Aug., 1967.

We have to hand your letter of 17 July as well as L/C 04/2571/2 which has arrived recently.

To protest the fascist vielence of British Authorities in Hongkong and to give firm suppert to the political struggle of our Nongkong compatriots in their grand strike against this violence, we shall en'no circumstances allow transhipment to be made at Hongkong.

If you are interested in any other Glassware than these offered, we shall be pleased to make a good recommenda- tion of them en request.

We are looking forward to hearing good news from you.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No. H. 13/22

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

"Top Secret.

Secret.

Confidential.

Restricted: Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

(64

24A Jon

Vel A.

(Ho

DRAFT Letter

To:-

J.E.A. Miles, Esq.,

British High Commission, P.C. Box 1812,

Custom House quay, Wellington,

New Dealand.

Type 1 +

Nr. -2

From

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

& Jeweling 1911

I am replying to your lotter lio. 2-1-280/35/1 of 14 December about adverse publicity on Hong Kong.

I am sorry if you have been awaiting a follow-up to our telegram No. 1954 of 7 September to liong Kong. In fact, our subsequent exchanges with them on this subject have been confined to one Saving despatch which we sent them on 18 October, and a copy of which

I now enclose. You will note from it that any changes

in the schedule of P. & 0. visits to liong Kong appear

to have been due to events in the Middle East rather

than to the situation in the Colony.

We similarl"

got little change out of our enquiries about B.C.A.C.'s

attitude, apart from the act that this too was

apparently due to technical considerations rather than

to the disturbances in Hong Kong.

As regards your second paragraph, in the light of You

what to say, I suspect that the reasons for the

statement made in the last sentence of Hong Kong

telegram No. 1355 can be traced back (at any rate sO

far as the position in w Zealand is concerned) to the

somewhat inaccurate picture of the situation in Hong

or which was conveyed by press reporting in this

country at the time.

since taken steps to c

The Hong Kong, Government has

So far as possible

that

hat an accurate account of

the situation in the Colony is rade known overạng

particularly where their own trade connexions are

concerned. We are, however, passing on to Hong Kong

the suggestion in para/raph 5 of your letter.

14.

We were interested to read the correspondence

nclored with your letter: the robustness displayed

by F.E. Jackson and Company Limited is ost encouraging.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

HWB 13/22

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,

Curtis Green Building,

London. S.W. 1.

8 January, 1968

　　　　I am replying to your letter No. 2-WEL-280/35/1 of 14 December about adverse publicity on Hong Kong.

　　　　　　　　　　I am sorry if you have been awaiting a follow-up to our 24A) telegram No. 1954 of 7 September to Hong Kong. In fact, our

　subsequent exchanges with them on this subject have been confined to one Saving Despatch which we sent them on 18 October, and a copy of which I now enclose. You will note from it that any changes in the schedule of P. & 0. visits to Hong Kong appear to have been due to events in the Middle East rather than to the situation in the Colony. We similarly got little change out of our enquiries about B.0.A.C's attitude, apart from the fact that this too was apparently due to technical considerations rather than to the disturbances in Hong Kong.

　　　　As regards your second paragraph, in the light of what you say, I suspect that the reasons for the statement made in the last sentence of Hong Kong telegram No.1355 can be traced back (at any rate so far as the position in New Zealand is concerned) to the somewhat inaccurate picture of the situation in Hong Kong, which was conveyed by press reporting in this country at the time. The Hong Kong Government has since taken steps to ensure so far as possible that an accurate account of the situation in the Colony is made known overseas, particularly where their own trade connections are concerned. We are, however, passing on to Hong Kong the suggestion in paragraph 5 of your letter.

We were interested to read the correspondence enclosed with your letter: the robustness displayed by F.E, Jackson and Company Limited is most encouraging.

LAI

RLE.

J.E.A. Miles, Esq., British High Commission, VELLINGTON.

(W.s. Carter) R. sys. no hat was the

CONFIDENTIAL

alch

Land contoday 11/

I presume that a copy

(38 was

with as

indoved

Leer?

the...

Hr. Carter

HWB 13/22

Reference

دعا

I attach a raft reply to or consideration.

10) (243

The relevant correspondence We repoated t'e telegram at a)to Tellington bur send them copies of any that we send them a copy of(3o

(39) and

lid

ti Porrespondence. I suggest under cover of this letter.

3. These vents are all cow water un'er the bridge and since they occurred liong Kon,, ve 'aken ter to accurate micture of events ir te Colony is

e t'at an le availa1 le

oversens, i had thot of velosing a copy of t ́e corespond

ence forway led with (4)with

raft

etter now

on balance I do not think it it vonla

worth!

not sure wh them in vnre. Jacl son preciate it.

Commony would

Aisa best

MR.

(^.

icainor)

5 Januy, 16,

Plue fans craft for my signature

تدرس

Registry No.

HWB 13/22

DRAFT Letter

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

To:-

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

W(B)L 51-7433

*Top Secret

Secret

Confidential,

Restricted: Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

24A

Vol A.

(64

J.E.A. Miles, Esq.,

British High Commission, P.O. Box 1812,

Custom House quay, Wellington,

New Zealand.

Type 1 +

Mr.

From

Telephone No. & Ext

Department

8 January 1916)

I am replying to your letter o. 2-EL-280/35/1

of 14 December about verse publicity on Hong Kong.

I am sorry if you have been awaiting a follow.up

to our telegram No. 1954 of 7 September to Hong Kong.

In fact, our subsequent exchange- with them on this

subject have been confined to on Caving despatch

which we sent them on 18 October,

copy of which

I now enclose. You will note from it that any changes

in the schedule of P. & 0. visits to Hong Kong appear

to have been due to events in the kiddle Eart rather

than to the situation in the Colony. We similarl"

cot little change out of our enquiries about .C.A.C.'s

attitude, apart from the act that this too was

rently due to technical considerations rather than

to the disturbances in Hong Kong.

As regards your second paragraph, in the light of You

what say, I suspect that the reasons for the

statement made in the last sentence of Hong Kong

telegram No. 1355 can be traced back (at any rate so

far as t'e position in Sw Zealand is concerned) to the

somewhat inaccurate picture of the situation in Hong

which was conveyed by press reporting in this

country at the time.

The Hong Kong Government has

So far since taken teps to ensure

an forsible

at an accurate account of

the situation in the Colony is rade known oversens,

particularly where their own trade connexions are

concerned. We are, however, passin" on to Hong Kong

the suggestion in paragraph 5 of your letter.

14.

HWB 13/22

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,

Curtis Green Building,

London, S.W.1.

January, 1968.

　　　　Would you please refer to Hong Kong telegram No. 1355 of the 7th September on the subject of adverse publicity for Hong Kong.

　　　　The telegram in question was repeated to Wellington and we have recently had a letter from our Mission there. The letter explains that since the New Zealand Press Association have no representative in Hong Kong the local press have leaned heavily on Reuter's representatives for its stories: however, thatswater under the bridge. My reason for writing to you now is to pass on a suggestion, contained in the same letter that the Hong Kong Tourist Office in Sydney might be in a position to ensure that more accurate reports on events in Hong Kong are available in that part of the world. The idea is that this might be done as part of the service that the Tourist Office provides in sending out information and news letters to airline offices and travel agents.

However,

　　　　No doubt this sort of exercise is already being taken care of by the Hong Kong Overseas Public Relations Co-ordination Committee. we have told wellington that we would pass the suggestion on to you and this I am now doing. Perhaps you would be good enough to see that it reaches the proper quarter.

E.T. Davies Esq.,

Assistant Political Advisor,

Colonial Secretariat,

Hong Kong.

A.W. Gazinara.

With the Compliments of the

Political Adviser Hông Kông

January 13th, 1968.

As I think you know, we set up a special publicity unit here fairly early on in the disturbances. It is still in existence. You may be interested by the enclosed copy of a report on its activities.

　　　　　　　　I am sending a copy of this letter, with enclosure, to Gaminara in the Commonwealth Office.

(T.A.K. lliott)

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES Ma. 63

22 JAN258

HWA 13/22 ншарыг

Information Research Dept.,

C. Wilson, Esq.,

Foreign Office,

London, S.W.1.

तेह

ሉ

R.318

Rak.

WATS

23.

IT'

Introduction:

CONFIDENTIAL

►

%7 67

Report on the operation of the overal

publicity unit

unit

　　　　Funds and staff for a upucial, ublicity whit which i.. th subject of this report were approved by the Finance Committee on Jur.. However, it would be difficult to disentan,lc thetion of the u. from the work of the publicity committee with which is no buen clos. linked from the beginning.

The publicity committee

The publicity committee was formed on my 16 under the c ship of the Deputy Colonial Secretary. The committee'a fundamental were stated as follows:

(a)

to strengthen the population's resolve;

(b)

to deflate opposition and show up their weak points;

(c)

to strengthen/restore the confidence in Hong Kong and its future of people in Hong Kong and oversund.

From these fundamental aims were derived the lines for p information work which have since guided the work of thu consil special publicity unit. The only change since made in that ori, inal ́: ment of aims has been to leave concern for overseas publicity to s committee.

2 the charmen.. Duty Diroc.

The original committee W^%, ecop card, ta the Deputy Colonial Secretary Nr. G.C.milton, of Information Services; r. ...J. Tuple, then secretary of the Univer. Grants Committee; hr. J.". Inyes, Chisi istant la crurg for Chân.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ntative cath Affairs; Chief Superintendent Russ 11 bruke na mga Commissioner of Folicu; kr. N.k. Hy h innt Dir ciuz cf Buc Mr. J. McGregor, Assistant Director of Gamerce and Indu...try; ar. Brocks, Director of Broadcasting. Mr. ... Locking wm, ouerolizy ti

committee from the outsut.

יי

s may be deduced this companulien involved mumber: cholen.. represent d.partments with an obvious interest in information she cost. cation in the widest sense as well as those chosen for the individual contribution they re able to make to the unusual tasks before them.

　　　　Later, Mr. J. Cater as Deputy Colonial Secretary (Stucini Duties) replaced Mr. Hamilton as Chairman and the Committee was enla by the addition of Mr. D. Ford from the Special Duties Suction of th.. Colonial Secretariat, who then became the committue's secretary. Lai who is also a member of the special publicity unit became a mumb r the committee and r. K.Y. Young now represents the District Commis. i, .. New Territorios.

Mr.

16.

C.P. 323

CONFIDENT

- 2

The composition of the special publicity wit

The approval of the Finance Comitice wit given for the creation of a unit to carry out intcmified infiemtien truku, in the conturu of the confrontation with local c. mum. 1.1.

by secondment from other sections of the information Services Departache. Secretariat for Chinese "ffeiro, Radio flong; hon; and supernumerary job. wore crunted in those departments to regine, necu dud staff. Curtnin other secretarial and support staff were provided from the Colond: 1 Secretariat.

　　　　　This composition reflects generally reflects the intenti.f unit to exploit, in addition to the normal ciranelu cpen to the Informs a Services Department, all others which would surve the now mad urgent purpose.

　　　　　　In fact the wit never realised the full entrblindment sål... for. The Finance Committee paper is unintentially misleading, in atributing 6 Assistant Information Officers to the unit. In het A 1927 of these posts had been proposed errlier : tat the I... mesti. could develop a propranme of hourly news bulletins and it wa ke. implement thuse "roposals along with these for the publicity unit. when approval was given for two more Assistent Information Officer. For the unit it was founded impossible to recruit suitable candidatur posto have never been filled.

י! -

Thy olaff was further reduced by the diversion in July of the two senior 1.S.D. cfficers to permanent duty to handle inftrustion on th- border, and neither has yet returned to his original duty with the unit, One has been temporarily recalled by the Director of Information &rvic. for urgent administrative duties, the other went on a courue to Pritik in September and has been retained there for a further month to c. lat the unit's pro ramme with Hong Kong Chinese residents in V.R.

General pattern c1 Work

10.

nd ma 2.0

Lin.

　　　　　　With the staff at ito diey...ar), accompanying diegram, the unit has enkeny, ured ti challenges of confrontation by the consundention of inn nntion tarquen press, radio and T.V., by the publication and distribution of gendering newspapers, leaflets, and booklets, as well . by direct communicati through its S.C... liaison staff and its other contact with Government departments, civil servants Jenerally, the plico Force, public bodie schools and societies and clubs of every kimi.

14.

The key to effective information work in the context of the confrentation has, however, been the ability to follow the changes in the polovical situ vion and produce the appropriate responsus, or better .ti. ansleipate the challenges and forectall opposition prop..."nda. Miza chi. in view omphasis has always been placed up, the assessment of proj a nú objectivos:

　　　　　　　　project has been ur dertaken, however small and apparently cbvisus, without a firm appraisal of its purse and likely effects and whether these e peributed to the general current ains.

/12.

12.

It do in this respect thee the clube dr und the publicity committee ku been crucii. WILD

the

the unit ing received

　　　　　　been owan I the best noo.esgunt. of the QURTUAL D--wition m. likely trends. Fren the committe now only guidance but impetus and direction.

The wait the born when the in

r cut fr ZA

י,

י.

sa Law and order. The relatively stred her award banka, for the m

J to expose the disrupive and violent offer or the Top 1 Celtelike to, Support the police and to ally public

a behind the gover mint the local communists.

14.

1 D.

As events progressed the dinghi e como P-, ropte take changed to meet different challenges.

■

15.

　　　　　　　　In the wrir of strikes then s 120 1 1. ľ countr communics ap usls to workure, exposing this tntiem, and restriz, the public. Che navel of bombings called APCfferent robjChoo m procens phase of attack upon confidoneu, Popresented by the exploduntiva of prie tonovo, sving, counter-propagalbo work vine utily many from the style and purpose of the early months. Bayhaqda must now be on thi improvement of the joy...mment image and the outrblishment of public onfi- duncu ac as to minimise communist ability to exploit these grievance.

15.

In facing such a programme the unit illa double role, inwords as well as outwards. The channels of communication developed for the issue of information are a sucful chai isc for the study of bile reaction. The unit end the publicity coumicuou have been able to comment. realistically on problems whion crnnot always be overcome by presentation. alinu. But they have also been able to snow that in the major by cr situppiens greater attention to presentation will corunikly len to rui.

2000 Panoe and an improvement in public confidence.

2 record of work

17.

The special publicity unit w

nover I ublicly announce u never acted, as far as the public are concerned, run, unte entity.

　　　　setéd, staff have retained their departmental identition, and fe rudensen, 15.. publications have berne no imprint to indicate their origin, be shirt there is no reason for anyone to knew of its existence unless they i lunrved nd queried the much greater recent cutput of inferuntion mo rinl, capoci 11y in Chinese.

18.

In a rough way the work of the uail can be busted neethin to the production of information material in various med

/19.

News-sheets

19.

　　　　　　In the period of ricting and viclent strest famouslauta n communists used single-shoot "Extra", pesants. of the Ta. Kun i and hen rei Ino to NARRA

[

i jin

r. Jucci Ll. in .. but 1

PL'V Li

To counter theme, which muze himfed out in the unit "extras"", Their ori ̧lund style who directly o ulos 2−j? aditions were tudi to e^rry positin Ja-BW PIG, IL D who made of cortoune md local nuwgapur erlochenta more cum in 1 my A

his work. The Sheets were deciṛned to be mad hoc te probeči,

́autre address broadensto

20.

In the period of street viclesa, the communiste med egna. iv use of public addrenu systems to unco arevo government and police. The unit purchpad va these broadensts. Mhic equiyment was inter

similar use there.

El b

21.

c. maj bank..

úhort films in Chinese were ba for a win courage partici ̧ zich in demonstrativno ne aims. Choou were loo shown on the Chinese mation Burvicus Deportment's Film Unit h ́.... wide range of publicity, including overato tra and connet Always anomer the publicity unit, e 11. material for loonl propaganda purposOD. Wh 16 min. chmura i experience shows that Infintion Offieurs given bak. instructions by experts con reduce simple bu usul short subjects which ere taken by the ulovision companies and serve our publicity needs.

Radio brender ts

22.

[

Ar quick now. il

The unit was provided with a andie Hong Kong" Supement be thrt broadcaste to meet urgent propagande purposen could be mak ithin the unit or initissed there ad produced with the P cllities of the brand- casting stations. In the concext of violence thede rogrammus were very much a hoc affairs dueling with immedinte onuiti no cccunts of such.loy monsurco, ukhervations to avoid fhylication in demontresina, interviews to build up government support. In the bug why the unit originated or stimulated programmes to meet the chilumpen of the food on transport strikes, in the former ence producing twice-dily foud: tock- ond-price bullevins which undoubtedly dit much to runucure the public und avoid ponic.

23.

　　　　　　　An important aspect of the work in radi, ha beun the tr.... oniyuden ccrvice, A competently conducted alle dito,vi、w is a simpl. end (fective way of putting over a story in " convincing" manner. gevezzment officials will submit to this wit.

to se on interesting account of their work for public Miu în num.

special section of the unit has been voted 1. produeia.

of these interviews, mainly in Chinese and th... have been most acceptable to newspayers who preciste their spontaneity and authencity.

/24.

24.

　　　　　Simultaneously the unit up untuvused to blush the frequency with which Government officers capit in die ir mork on rodis. By no mesto all the moving in this Fila can be chained by the mit. To a large extent the rodio stations tu ...iv. age more actively Ek those interviews and on their own initivt.ve some government oli le 23 becoming more routy to help. But th.. pallicity ce malice and th together can claim much of the crudit for a very substantial 1.wowindow Cho Chinese services of both Rodlu Hong Kong and Commercial PANA. (ch corried interviews with about 140-150 governannå officers during da. Haun of October alone, almost every one of these was of course a C... Cr Chinese-speaking officer and in only 2 or 3 cosce did the stations 12V, use the technique of over-laying the official's voice with a arundhati..

(manquer advertising

25.

The first of a series of apsive advertising compaign. In Ulu Cillmond press run by the unit was to publicise the public 1. 1 plays organisations pledging their support for the maintenance of law G13 Or. Several departm..., including notably 2. 3.0.4, 822 5.0, & I. werG responsible for puimulating their response but menntun was largely maintuined and effect achieved by the series of full-age advertis.....ent appearing day ofter day in every Chines、 lovepiper. ..peconiery adv.m of this co-lyn was that to accisted the non-commist ross at '. TA time and helped to secure their fullest opozt. Guler davereisi.; an An vle Chinesu prosa kove included the display (dvertisemate to a wiây vocnnoics in Government schools for pupils A communist cel.Juls. 11 Mijes were taken in Chinese newspapers or si dy cf in. funerals of sl. policemen to carry obituaries, photograph.. and tributes.

Fosters

26.

　　　　　　Although the communisto mác Lumive 150 di pandurog lade, used as post-rs and slogans painted on walls tin anllarili, discoung reteliction by the special publicity unit was th prowała which it might Lo an escalation". However, the komplecie no formed to above ucru uusi for dual use as posters and were so used by th

A poster we

↓

produced with a general theme of denunciation of tembli ziko ra f designed so that specific messages could be maded to tab partienda? situations. These have since been used La bomba and to carry the lion, Colonial Ser and information. Cunor posters were procj sitions. For example, ponte n wich ehergency lows on Labinet.

The penalties imposed. A colourta

Chinese restaurants in Britain defining than ... logai mag ang Cambli

27.

klete

MAG : 10 MC

One of the major efforts of production on a large coul. of clay sl.

in the pont.m and purpose reflect t them were cicher ody in Ohlar or, i.. Chance and Engish Ln one version. The way doyaien, für vitious Suupons, your houflet reproducing, Autographiendly, duhanit Don Britik 1.2. p. The most claborito proletion was the bot of the People" which inituted a commatet bok onlled "LE LO QUAL thegu utrocinic.?" #GLASALVAS ..." followed the game shumeo, dumi sq but suaccotully showed how the communists had distorted tun

reduced two "Dear Frienâ" letture which were reproductions vritten accounts in letter style of cycoon ân Hồng Hong in 5 dias designed to be put overpose by Hong Kon, a lenti, icly New Territories, to their relatives and dricked by old make Gunman a proj. vndo versions of the come events. ... Lwilt on th. if...

Kong to preduced ani issued la dojjuction wid, a wing campaign wille.. the unit run on the t...

unde

outlining Alpay the progress of Hong Kong M

་

with a note per campaign. Other leflets, are in dhon, d. 15 resisting price opscule, water poolricti an, miten und deter-imation to preist violence und stbyciela,

of "Struggle Committecs" in the New Territori.

23.

The general purpose has been t

general policy, arc conceived enl writ.d.. illustrated where appropriate and above al

.... ply but on longe qnuitics.

M.......... in

Typic. LA

od used miskin a few days of 11.B.'s tarn Ir

Lfter Lord Mhepherd's visit.

CLASS Newspaper for H.K. Workeru L. :

20.

This is the unit's only

to concern about the concentra

panebo mal qquickly

De Tel

mi indi

ホン

1..

نا

י,

Britain. Their portman 1.

H.I. people but that, in Uk dipe

students particularly, they regresul " H.K. sitution, if coloured by co...A, NATIO to their families, undermine local confic in significat BLOG AB,

い

The unit began sunding counter-props, put acring 1, Almeribbon te them in the puller, at the some vin :

The Hali

communist H.K. Chinese newspapers in Bratan teta become obvious that there was a guy Vitiel has been done by producing a 4-p, Chlo ve kabloid tamnagar in a i' of a "Digest" of material from the H.K. press. It in chunky 120kmu,

infreighted free to Britain by an airline and the jer cost As Al

/distribution

10tribution by mail. The mailing li

www.

the wait .rom lign.tion Duyartı:...A MA do Mund proving place to rastet local. Chinchuppen to build up cur. câretimüion, on a court commercial Male 1 m a moving on tinig'la for favourosžu, air-freight ruteu ont advising on Lituative ulvelutbl 20

Press Relea

50,

This is nach & stu..lupd operation for Me for smart mondt *.... covers such a wide range of uttujceun bant Sher. In Liukko na mah Set of in akout short the tako ku profund preso Inkbola sa chay t m.ich seemed to fix in with the aimb of the day. These trovo trangea Î Site Improvement of departmental press roletnes no no to bring data. positive prap penis me junge, the cover by reporters of th. thi such as polivu mela, ond searches or indid nta on old beara suúton of Chinese furture articles (auch np. tione ex ln EN MA system of justice generally to upcolal Mrks on mos la ako the 21% Orden Ordine and the Criminal Prosedur. Ordimas.. 1 CL-M 2ulcapes were issued in Chineas and moul sa them having been Copen, V written in Chinese were not issued in English.

　　　　The majority of these promp relansen won parely foNONĀ Wong intended as propaganda, they dza nut health b. pals cut savi conclusions from the facts they prepentea, During Stunt, July major Ingust, however, the series of ily Chim articles was inste si

na title "Indisputable Pacte which word orthrightly by informula. designed to ridicule, cxposc, unl counter gemist Manica, hai.. prope sonde. This serica was widely wc tự tin. 10-20lik

broadcast twice daily by Radle long nonga Chinese ...rvice.

irect, person-to-berson SPRE.CL

32.

special publicity wait were to måned

!!!

11. E

CLI

of Government's "communication" departamenty kant van al experience and machinery for tappist for dis machinery ca a further means for air.....i. Bolsodes Like the food code provides Hd inplea of the m c. be made of these muthais. S.C.... metal, die shed by the 1.0...

L, component of the publicity whit jot Jup trap mukkerp and 16ed in Aler organised resistance to colanape strike typenis, provided down-bu-2. Lucts, based on personal observation, on feed prices in the streets : carried government's message when other means of comunicu tion her did not reach or had no impact. This technique has since been repeti, in other situations and could be exploited much more in future to one the best weapons in the Government propigendu zrusury il mor、 HUN JI the right type could be found.

/35.

- ૐ

33.

chment of 11 of different med in

To ricors the work of the mit big the oh that may be misleading for several rucnons, moi kamu semua is nigb that the median deoldep tan mesenge nai n by up 15 shemale be, way round. Has the unit ins do with no success in to plot. chisting and son, hitherto unused tɩcaniques for patin, Dar t Peripe tax Lust ensily illustrated cape was the hamton nd in t. Dikelor of Buucntion of woposals for clamp in the Sagol derec Paumiticn. This probably gut..ero promo tri pidiɔ coverups tiny Comilor amoureument by a head of a dopirulent bonus, the unit : special entreist out of it. in itself Lin mursunseent wis likely popular but equally likely to be misam ra

MM. M. Willin

pagad as two newspaper ammourschaabi, 1 English and Chinese, produced as a odio-op 2 both languages, transcrisa at art Pally printed a few days later a bi-lin. she tolks, the contents in radio discus. recorded in the press. Da unit epih programmes had been available the eivab the absolute maximum of publicity in ull. intended as a acllenevation of the Dawet, he realised when the publicity for Governdal was. Cais e an cotton which could be va of this technique de vital in cruce who in C be unpopular, probably isunderstood and purposes by the communists,

31.

יני.

ᏞᎥ .

pics of ecti, da:

....!

її

}

Iri.

to be popular bi

LIK

Mhoiled for prese

　　　　　Listins by the use of various midis is also icleouing best it minimisco se muid function of the unit which is to make informida for Governmens by ensuring that it is closely meshed with the sper'i. the Govermen mache me a wholc. Such a list cannot convey the hori

of the infor.....sion and guidance which the unit receiver 200n the paddie.... commiable nor the importance of research before action (vichout this wi.. an excuse for delay, let it be gsid). selection of tosks and the 24 AU in conjunction with the fortgoing list, illustrate the methods of the ...

The Border

35.

A very great deal of the unit's wilention In bou... air. the bardor even to the extent of posting the the nest dealer for Services Department staff to a spacial offic in 46 Vrig

Kong to handle intor, tion on the border, Dan Muki; blind wide ww that, following the Sha Tau Kok incidents particularly, the confidenes the general urban population was affected by the in hortage on 2, ON GI of the behaviour of the Chinese Commaist wy on the border to bla security and stability of the border gentrilly. M.L. MOB a wire to thic

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　¦ .....1 local communist propagando wurized anorg biely by anuale anticly a In town the ability of the authorities to contain local comming vi

/and.....

　　　　　　　　　And order was visible and cr. Nibic. In the close. border area, unser the threst raised by pro, pain, it vo.. not so make our control equally credible. Thin

!1¢!!,43£st**

ment of permenext staff to handle boruur Sulon: bien in clone with the ray.

　　　　　　　　It Me A.Volved not only day-to-my information in the sipuation bup thu handling of information on may incidente which were very difficult from the propaganda point of view, including s verad abducti, no and the return of ubducted people, oceanians on which Government cliciale, police or soldier, have been held prictar of lost wusgons, and the incidents crected ut hen Hom No by Chinese Tervit, former, or workers which have twice led to the closing of the brid,

26.

　　　　　　　　Until the Director of Information Borleen found it necessary to withdraw the remaining officer from that rout (pan. ) the comparative relaxation on the Lorder hud rude it possibly to rive grustur en habis to more general H.T. projtjında in a more com.ructive vein. 11 this respect the unit is now working closely with the newly

blished my Information Toom.

37.

　　　　　　To maintain contact at the policy level the officur in charge of the special publicity unit hus regularly attended auctims of FAGENT, the Police, Army and Government Committee.

Folico

36.

the..

From the start the unit has regarded the police forca prime concern. The presence of a senior policy officur on the publicžųj stee and the resting of a very able experienced Clin. lolle.

Chinese pector to the unit he made it pond le to support the police

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ha ollectively with information mterial. The mit's own rebunren in the extent to which the locul communistu recognize the police fere, bú have been the main factor in the failure of their ori, incl tactic. unit has given priority to propaganun about the police force una a Chin the police force. This has included not only like nowal vype of information material but the arrangements of visits by legislativ. councillors, senior govemment official and others to jolic, foru:tion and the widest publicity to these visits.

Strikes

30.

[

ith

　　　　　In producing propganda concern, tempted, mị 2.mytea, the unit had the advantage of - ... publicity committee. The unit albo ih vide material on communist controlled unions, their Inti-Strike propa, and included the ra projected bite strike which con..is tast casting in Chinese at the time of a ri to counter communist grunt. upon the inability of ul.

pay and the exploitucion or ta

trikt, nettl nd

intellinne iron,

יי.

al ili: own in betrek.

Aructure and PetourGOL

inf

/ 40...

40.

　　　　　By close co-operation with 4e herine by ruent the unit ana able to play a useful role in limiting un syrung of the scomunte atrik und continues to support the harine Department's effort: nyingt sube version of this vulnerable group.

Political confrontation

41.

　　　　　Even de establishment of a special publicity univ do..... not providu govun...ent with, the full armoury necem ary to confront · 11-out commundes propaganda kuzing use of live as freely a truth to dicen dit Se governmudu.

It is probably co that truth will vân cut over lies - il on Laâs "in the long run". In propagands it may often be difficult to enter up with a goon lie before nearly irreparable lounge in wohu. the witn never been tempted to trade lies with the comunists and how with only -- Dow exceptions issued material which was ojully attributable to government Lourous. Nevertheless there are bound to ...o inhibitiong about the SobuL by Government of even some kinds of factul information, particularig where thy alscredit people or organisations. To some extent therefore Govern- munt has been fighting its propaganda battle with one hand tiu? behind 24

Cnly on a few occacions has the publicity unit been free to exploit directly and to the full telling information about prom...ent local communists as in the case of Dr. Tad Vi-ham and the Country Club.

42.

　　　　　　　The obverse of this political situation is the need to incrud e public respect for end confidence in Government's chief supporters and senior clicials. The und, has been very motive in this fiel..., endurvou to increase the modinees of senior officile to match at least some of expectations of the pullic when they ok. In the presunt place t will certainly be 1. hih priority for the unit, since it is their r conviction that the confidence of the public in the men who make decisic: all by the most important factor in public acceptance of the decision more important than the und standing of the public un a whole of the 60: complicated argumon 11VOLVU

43.

The curli.r

The latter part of this paper ima been an attempt to illur tril. by a very few examples from many themes the approach which the 'speci publicity unas has taken to various propaganus: Lusticno. part illustrasus, again only by example, the 4 employed. Any recipient of his paper who in mter, de of the work of the unit or, better still, who t... : thenue or methods should contact Ar. Stevenen al

•

in learning? LOTN

tions for HOW

Jch January, 1966.

•

S.F 438.

Dear Caster,

Canterbury House 68

Stoke berry

King's Lynn. Norfatt

I shall be in London on

the 14

and will call to see

about 11 am

R. 312

you

if that is convenient.

yours sincerely

忻

Anthony Shephard,

file

الحد

(Hoy Kong)

2238

HWB13/02

AND ADDRESS OF SENDER

March 3 OLYMPIALC top

SLAYER

1263

LETTER

DON

GARD

IF YOU SEND THIS LETTER CARD TO A PLACE

ABROAD, YOU SHOULD STICK ON POSTAGE STAMPS TO COVER ANY ADDITIONAL POSTAGE WHICH MAY BE PAYABLE.

ужит

Car

J9988

Esa

POSTAG

55 Weech Bak

wealth office (Far Eastern Div =) New Scotland Yand

London Sw..

TO OPEN THE LETTER CARD, TEAR OFF THE TDGE AT THE PERFORATION

and on fil

SECRET

Category AC: no unclassified reply or reference

From: CINC FE

Mr. Ganishnana 69

2607352 January

Date: 26.1.68

Recd: 16102

To:

MOD UK

Info: Farelf

CBF Hong Kong

WARNING

RECIRCULATION AUTH:

BY DOC/COSSEC 2917252

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED

NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR REFERENCE

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES M 63

31 JAIE

KBC/SEASEC 02

Ref:

SECSEA 51 DTG 191226Z Oot, 67.

HUA BIN

Following text contains CBF Hong Kong report on progress of AID and a request, which is strongly endorsed, for the retention of the team after their six months emergency tour is scheduled to end.

2. Begins Although the AIT has been operating in the Colony for barely two months the District Commissioner New Territories has already reported to the Governor that District Officers are finding that the team are doing invaluable work, We were asked in reference that should there be a case for a long term requirement, we should put this forward not later than February 1968. The Governor has now asked that KGIS team should be deployed in the Colony until 31 Mar. 69 by which time it is hoped that the Government will have set up their own organisation and have it sufficiently well trained

to ensure that there is no Hiatus when the AIT goes. You will appreciate the great need and scope here for all types of hearts and minds operations, also that much of the teams efforts will have been wasted if their work comes to an end in may without replacement. There are many problems to be overcome in providing Government replacements, not the least of these will be finding suitable rank and file. I appreciate that for various reasons the retention of all the personnel of the present team is likely to be impracticable. However, clearly the more members of the team who can be kept, the more continuity there will be. Bnds.

3. The Governor and CBF are both convinced of the value to the Colony of this effort and have CINCFE full support in making this request for their retention.

2607352.

TLM..

D of F.P. Action (2)

D MO/AD.

JAP/128/88

R. and set

R. 328

LAST

ACF

ARM (23

Ans

Copus to MVC Wisa -I.R.D.

Miss

Stove

Then bu 5.2.68

UAE 31.12

JIPED

SECRET

31. 1.68.

CONFIDENTIAL

JUP COPY

Cypher/Cat. A

IMMEDIATE

HONG KONG TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

*Pelno 138

2 February, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

го

My telno 1608: Army Information Team.

　　　Although the A.1.T. has only been operating for two months it has already made a considerable impact on the local population and is making a valuable contribution to our 'hearts and minds' programme.

2. I am anxious that the type of work being done by A.I.T. should continue and in due course intend to replace it with a similar government unit. It will not of course be possible to do this before the A.IT. is scheduled to leave at the end of May.

3. May I therefore request that the A.I.T. tour be extended until 31 May 1969 by which time the government unit should be ready to take over.

Sir D. Trench

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PR. Copy 17 Henne Major White

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{M.O.D.

J.. J. P.G, D.

IRD.

Miss Slowe

• M°C, Wilson

Arckly has gone.

Ano 28.

Sone. Aws люб

F.O.

C.R.C

25.

P.S.

biFIED. Hel D.D.RUS!)

LA Gabroncs wil klali

...land. Referre Dut

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.

DEPARTMENT

HWB. 13/22

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Geeree -Geeres-

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Flash Immediate

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In Confidence

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Draft Telegram to:- Gusedwall, Harry Wink

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-6FEB 18

ار

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should

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Saving to

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Your telegram No. 138

-Pr BILJ

Army Information Teams.

DT. W

PJILI

IPPIPIN

Minating of Defence have informed

tour in Hong Kongwaan of

nóng,

Saving to:-

team's tour in

Distribution:-

As for tresgram

No. 2270

LE Hàng nông,

basis

requested, on fexisting

extended as

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financial. Gratiful for confirmation of

date mentioned in

11 rr..

that

your havegraph 3 since corresponding

Copies to:- 14.0.5-14 Hemd

-Major White

CINCFE signal

J.L.PED- Miss Stave

to Ministry

mentions

31 March repeat

March.

IR.D-

Issue Ano 2/2168.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT.A,

IMMEDIATE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO HONG KONG

T TO. 204

2 FEBRUARY, 1968

(HWB 13/22)

CONFIDENTIAL.

(10

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 138.

ARMY INFORMATION TEAM.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE HAVE INFORMED US THAT TEAM'S TOUR IN HONG KONG CAN BE EXTENDED AS REQUESTED, ON BASIS OF EXISTING FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS. GRATEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION OF DATE MENTIONED YOUR PARAGRAPH 3 SINCE CORRESPONDING CINCFE SIGNAL TO MINISTRY MENTIONS 31 MARCH REPEAT MARCH.

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Bric's

At replay

comed

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to this has come in a should be lekove

DAGE

Gd.

Jud

HWY

TOP COPY. 03.38

094 FRAM

RECEIVED IN F.O. BY

TELEPRINTER AT.

PRODROME LONDON

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1//0305462

del no 145 of 3/2

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YOUR TELEGRAM 204.

DATE SHOULD BE 31ST MARCH, REPEAT MARCH.

ERROR REGRETTED.

GOVERNOR Sid D. TRENCH

Files Toft

.GMT

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ذة

n. Denn & M.OD.

whil

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5/2

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sile

ind

6.2,68.

Chier to n

Maji

In ag here.

CONFIDENTIAL may line office (3).

Total 9 Cyphe...

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9. Foreign

(6)

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Category AC: no unclassified reply or reference MOD SIGNAL M

C'mweales

Instructions on completing this form are In Office Instructions-MOD Manual 2

PRECEDENCE-ACTION

ROUTINE

PRIMARY

ROUTING

TIME

FOR COMMCEN USE

OPERATOR

COPIES

DESPATCH

TIME

OPERATOR

184605

125 99

PRECEDENCE INFO DATE TIME GROUP

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0518452 feb

TO (One addressee to a line)

CINOFE

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RUCTIO

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AS INFO

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|AR'

DIG

SERIAL No.

(Inserted by COMMCEŃ)

RTT

CHECK

SEOBEA 03

169

References: A.

170

HWA13/22

KBC/2607352 Jan/SEASEC 02.

Governor, Hong Kong/Commonwealth Office

Tel No 138 dated 2nd February 1968.

DFP 2/1 dated 30th January 1968.

　　　　The retention of the Army Information Team in Hong Kong until 31st March 1969 is approved subject to agreement by the Hong Kong

Government to their continued acceptance of the additional costs involved.

However at Reference B it is noted that the Governor of Hong Kong,

in putting forward a similar request to the Commonwealth Office, has

asked for retention of the team until 31at Nay 1969. You are requested

to clarify this discrepancy in dates.

3. You will have seen at Reference C that one Psychological Operations

Unit has now been included in the Army Order of Battle.

The Army

Department has noted your wish to retain the maximum number of the

present personnel in the team and will be dealing direct with HO FARELER

on details.

DISTRIBUTION (To include originator)

FILE NUMBER

TIM

D of FP (2)

R.818 R. 318.

RA PA on

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DRAFTER'S NAME IN BLOCK

LETTERS

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LACT

REF.

.Pages

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NUMBER

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OFFICER'S SIGNATURE

NAME IN

J.D. SHALLOW

COSSEC

BUILDING: MAIN EXTENSION?

6804

Wandushom

BLOCK LETTERS J.H. GIBBON

5.2.68.

RANK

Major-General

K&S Ltd 31-4553

fers to a classified message

This message (Tick appropriate box)

does not refer to a classified message

Note: Messa

6.2.63.

DATE

"CONFIDENTIAL*ted

R 08090OZ FEB

FM CINCFE

DIRECTORATE OK FORWARD PLANS

DATE

SEEN BY

IN1L6

KACTION BY MISSAGE CONTE

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VECTION

CLERK

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INFO RBMAA/FARELF

CONFIDENT I A L KBC SEASEC 03 REFERENCE SECSEA 03.73)

1. CBF WILL PROVIDE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT WITH ESTIMATE

OF ADDITIONAL COSTS AND ARE CONFIDENT OF THEIR ACCEPTANCE.

2. CONFIRM DATE FOR AIT IN YOUR PARA 2 IS 31 MAR (R) MAR 69.

GOVERNORS TEL NO 138 CORRUPTED IN TRANSIT

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NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR REFERENCE

(ADL ACTION STEADY-

Özilian

Dof FF (2) activ Diro (MD) Рос

LAST

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วา

R. 378

Cofy to

P.A. on propaganda file

ARO

Gd.

to COSSEC.

15.11

C.O. How Kong Defle!

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES M., 53

HWA 10/20

With the Compliments of

D. F. Plans

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE Main Building, Whitehall

London, S.W.1.

WHItehall 7022

DS. Form 4

Ed (4206)

Reference

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