FCO 40/46 Kowloon disturbances

FCO 40/46

40/46

1926

"PART

GM!

INDIAN "C"

File No

ONV

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed when ever necessary.)

SECRET

COMMONWEALTH

OFFICE

DEPT.

HONG KONG AND

WEST INDIAN "C"

TITLE:

"HONG KONG: POLITICAL AFFAIRS - INTERNAL:

KOWLOON DisturbancES :

MAY 1967.

REFER TO

DEPT.

DATE DEPT.

NAME

REFER TO

NAME

REFER TO

DATE DEPT.

DATE

NAME

1926

Delgadoras bato pom

のカ

Fox 40/4

----------+---------

------

REGISTRY-ADDRESS

Room No. 318

Curtis Green Building,

Victoria Embankment

DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY RETURN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. OR P.A.

FILE

CLOSED

1967

1.6.67.

FILE No.

انے

B. 1/17

(N.B. The grading of this jacket must be the same as that of the highest graded document contained in it. The appropriate upgrading slip must be affixed when ever necessary.)

SECRET

Gp.410

PART

FOLIO NUMBERS OF TOP SECRET AND SECRET DOCUMENTS IN THIS JACKET

FORMER FILES

PART A.

RELATED FILES

HWB 5.12 HONG KONG : ECONOMIC AFFAIRS-INTERNAL:

LABOUR FORCE : Disputes.

111

En clair

PRESS

COM

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

25 MARCH

FROM HONG KONG (British Information Services)

D. 22 May, 1967.

22 11

03552

1967

　　Hong Kong Standard on its front page this morning covers yesterday's events in central district with a story headlined; "Little Force, from action wine day for peace and order".

Standard.

It was the battle of downtown, central, said

The police won.

The paper added: "their superably co-ordinated action nipped in the bud every effort by the mob to break loose from their box after police had manoeuvred them into it.

They sealed off three major accesses.

To the east at

Arsenal Street. To the west at Jubilee Street near the vehicular ferry pier. And the roads to the Albert Road levels.

　　In the limited perimeter enclosed, police kept the twisting turning writhing tired frustrated mobs in check. And there, platoon after platoon of supremely disciplined men in khaki, dealt with each emergency in text book fashion".

　　In addition the papers editorial said: "Not only is there an ever present danger of eruption into lethal violence, but also it is evident that a failure to take effective counter-measures is likely to encourage wilder

and more lawless activities".

　　The official announcement that further disorderly gatherings will not be permitted is, therefore, to be fully supported by the public.

Distribution - H.K. W.I.D. 'C'

- I.G.D.

J.I.G. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:-

IMA

P.S. to Prime Minister Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

- D.I.O., J.I.R. Mr. de la Mare - Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson Mr. Denson Mr. Foggon

Hong Kong Government

Treasury

Office

Export Credits

Mr. Boxall

Mr. D. Hawkins!

Guarantee Department

LPST

MS.

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No. 63

{F 23ACK 170/

Mr. C.P. Rawlings

00 HUPDL

HUNSF

221040Z

ASOL.M

NO. 461

TO OO ASOLHY

AVCLLU

280

54522

Peking.

545

22/5

54522

37522

xx.

sent

the

P.S.

(12)

An Rodgen P/us/s. La Salle

Mu de la Rish

Tä Hel FED.

ADDSD TO FO TELNO 545 OF 22/5 RF1 GOVERNOR HONGKONG.

M.I.F.T. VICE MINISTER LO KUEI-PO IN AN ORAL STATEMENT SAID

a SEAD

4 New All.

(TD (2)

UKWID (ST)).

THAT EVER SINCE THE CHINESE GOVT STATEMENT OF 15 MAY THE BRITISH

AUTHORITIES IN HONGKONG HAD CONTINUED TO DEPLOY LARGE NUNDERS OF

POLICE TO SUPPRESS THE RESIDENTS OF HONGKONG AND COMMIT FASCIST

ATROCITIES. 600 TO 700 ARRESTS HAD TAKEN PLACE INCLUDING OLD MEN

AND CHILDREN. THIS SUPPRESSION WAS STILL SPREADING

. IT MUST CEASE IMMEDIATELY AND THE BRITISH GOVT KUST MAKE A

SPEEDY REPLY TO THE FIVE POINTS OF THE CHINESE GOVT.

2..WHEN YOU SUMMONED SHEN PING THE CHINESE CHARGE ON 19

MAY YOU ADOPTED AN ARROGANT IMPERIALIST ATTITUDE AND SLANDERED

THE CHINESE MASSES. HE PROTESTED AT THIS,

3.. LO FINALLY SAID THAT IN VIEW OF THESE ACTIONS THE 1954 AGREEMENT

WHEREBY WE MAINTAINED AN OFFICER IN SHANGHAI HAD LOST ITS ORIGINAL

MEANING, THE CHINESE GOVT THEREFORE ANNULLED IT AND DEILANDED THAT

MR HEWITT SHOULD LEAVE SHANGHAI WITHIN 48 HOURS

4.. I REPLIED THAT I TOOK NOTE OF HIS STATEMENT, I ONCE AGAIN

STRENUOUSLY DENIED THAT THE HONGKONG GOVT WAS OPPRESSING THE PEOPLE

OF HONGKONG. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF FASCIST ATROCITIES,

THE GOVERNMENT WAS MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER IN THE FACE OF ILLEGAL

DEMONSTRATIONS, THE POLICE HAD ACTED WITH GREAT RESTRAINT.

5.. LO KUEI PO INTERJECTED THAT MY QUOTE QUIBBLING UNQUOTE WAS

NOT WORTHY OF REFUTATION. HE HAD SUMMONED ME TO TRANSMIT A PROTEST

AND INFORM MẸ OF A DECISION, HE THEN STARTED TO WALK OUT

AS HE LEFT I EXPRESSED THE STRONGEST PROTEST AT THE UNILATERAL

A BROGATION OF THE 1954 AGRECHENT AND ASKED WHETHER HEWITT NIGHT

DE WITHDRAWN TO PEKING.

SECRET

113.

Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

. Telno. 539 22 May 1967

SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 539 of 22 May Repeated for information to Hong Kong Washington and PULAD Singapore.

1106

Washington telegram No. 1698, paragraph 2.

There has been I think there may be something in this. another puzzling event or rather non-event over the weekend. Our Soviet colleagues report that obvious preparations for demonstrations against the Soviet Embassy were being made on 19/20 lay. Loudspeaker systems were installed in neighbouring streets, slogans painted, etc. But nothing really happened and the loudspeakers were later taken away.

2. There was also the forcible occupation of the Foreign Ministry by rebels from the Foreign Languages Institute on 13 May. Ch'en Yi is still under attack and some of my colleagues believe he is no longer directing foreign affairs except in a purely formal capacity, though we have no real evidence of this.

In a speech at the end of April (being reported by Bag) Chou En-lai is reported to have said that he supported the Foreign Ministry Revolutionary Liaison Station which repre- sented 60 per cent of the staff. He also stated that he was "in charge" of the Foreign Affairs Department as well as those of Finance and Agriculture.

4. It is not therefore surprising if the Foreign Ministry seems at sixes and sevens. The fact that their statement on Hong Kong of 15 May was not in the form of a Note, and the "demands" were open-ended may imply a compromise between hotheads who insisted in full support for the Hong Kong Left-Wing and the cooler heads who were reluctant to commit the Chinese Govern- ment too far. Hsieh Fu-chih's relatively cautious speech of 18 May would also be consistent with this.

Foreign Office pass Priority Washington 227 and Hong Kong 371

Mr. Hopson

Sent 0700Z/22 May Received 09352/22 May [Repeated as requested]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.O. F.E.D.

PPPPP

S.E.A.D.

C.O. F.E. & P.D.

D.D. & P.U.S.D. J.I.R.D. News Dept.

SENT TO HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO. 99).

D.T.D.

D.I.S. M.O.D.

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 63|

23APK 1701

HUA'/17

AS COMMONWEALTH_OFFICE (D.T.D.)

"SECRET

то

107

CC.

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

Cypher D. 22 May, 1967.

FLASH SECRET

No. 662.

1100Z

MAY

(114)

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No. 63

2 3 Ark 196/

HWAY/17

Addressed to Commonwealth office. Repeated " POLAD Singapore No. 115.

"Peking No. 248. "Washington No. 129.

My telegram No. 641.

(s. of S. please pass FLASH to Singapore and Peking and PRIORITY to Washington).

Hong Kong Disturbances.

77B

　Over the past two days the situation has deteriorated. There has been an increase in the number of violent incidents, particularly in the central area of Hong Kong; and known pro-communist elements have been involved in many of these. An important feature has been the continuous broadcasting from the Bank of China (which has not opened for business today) of incitements to violence against Government and Europeans generally, including such slogans as "kill Trench", "police turn your weapons (i.e. against your officers)" The pro-Communist press is giving full and approving accounts of violent action by demonstrators and calling for their extension. There have been token strikes today by the bus companies and taxis.

•

2. The key to the situation here is the maintenance of public confidence and especially police morale. The police have stood up very well to the harassments of the last few days, but there are two adverse factors in the situation: (a)

　　(a) fatigue which is now beginning to tell on them; and (b) the constant barrage of Communist propaganda directed specifically to the subversion and intimidation of the rank and file. We believe that Communist tactics over the next few days will be to create incidents in several places at once, so as to extend the police while maintaining the propaganda barrage. Public morale is still holding surprising well, but there is increasing interference with daily life; and there are signs that unless we are seen to take effective action to control the situation, instead of simply acting to block individual communist initiatives, public confidence will slip. A landslide could quickly follow.

274

SECRET

116 118

SECRET

3. We have considered various new measures to deal with the situation. These include:-

(1) picking up and if possible deporting, and

failing that detaining, a selection (e.g. up to 24) of the known leaders of the present campaign;

(11)

(111)

action to neutralize several of the buildings from which the campaign is being directed, notably (1) the Bank of China and (11) the communist-controlled Federation of Trade Union Head Quarters and the Workers' Club. This might be achieved by declaring 24 hour curfewn in areas around the buildings, or possibly declaring them closed areas under the Public order Ordinance (Cap. 245);

action against the principal communist nowspaper "Wen Wei Po" the official C.P.G. organ in Hong Kong, for either sedition or inciting police to disaffection;

(iv) bring commando ship BULWARK on a visit to

Hong Kong

4. Each of foregoing actions would entail certain amount of risk of escalation, and possible complications with Peking. We face a dilemma, in that:-

(a) we obviously wish so far as possible to avoid

(b)

action which could lead to more C.P.G. involvement (and there is some evidence C.P.G. themselves wish to

avoid this); but

holding the situation here requires that Government should retain the initiative.

Since (b) is imperative, we must be prepared to face some risk under (a). On this basis pros and cons of various courses in paragraph 3 above, as we see them are as follows:

Course (1)

5. The disruption of leadership would be a distinct and positive gain, at least in the short term. It would be seen by our friends here as firm action. But since it is unlikely that China would accept persons concerned as deportees, the probability is that they would have to be detained indefinitely in Hong Kong. This would provide local communists and Peking with a standing grievance, and would inevitably lead to creation of a further "demand".

Course (11)

6. This would seriously hamper the communist leadership in their control and development of anti-Government operations. For a while they would be bottled up in their existing Headquarters, cut off from outside contacts. At very least

/it

SECRET

But this is inflammatory broadcasts coming from the Bank. not sufficient in itself, since the Bank building remains one of the principal rallying points for demonstrations; and anyhow we know it is one of the main communist control points.

Course (iii)

7. The worrying thing about not taking action against the worst offender among the communist press is that it is daily in flagrant breach of the law, and if we continue to ignore

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　But it would this it may well be taken as sign of weakness. obviously be regarded by Peking as a provocation (see Peking telegram No. 483 of 15 May). Furthermore there are 9 other communist newspapers here which could all continue the campaign unless similar action were taken against them.

Course (iv)

It would take three and a half days for BULWARK to reach Hong Kong. Her presence here, with a commando aboard, would undoubtedly strengthen public and police morale, and both Commissioner of Police and CBF are strongly in favour. Her arrival here might be represented by Peking as sabre- rattling, although they could have no legitimate grounds for doing 80. It would not of course be publicised here as a reinforcement, but simply as a routine visit. Practice here

is not to publicise visits of H.M. ships in advance.

9. Recommendations.

　　　My advisers and I have discussed these courses with CBF, Galsworthy and Bolland, and we all agree in recommending course (ii) and course (iv) at this stage.

10. I am holding a meeting of my Executive Council tomorrow (Tuesday) morning, and I intend to seek their views on courses (1), (ii) and (iii), but on a contingency planning basis only. However, I would hope that I may have urgently your approval for courses (ii) and (iv) and would welcome your early comments on the other two courses.

　　　Galsworthy will be telegraphing separately about useful discussions held this morning on labour matters,

11.

(Passed as requested with advance copies to

Foreign office F.E. Dept.)

SECRET

/Distribution

SECRET

Distribution

H.K. WID 'C' I.G.D.

J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:-

P.s. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

Treasury

體

Export Credits Guarantee

Department

D.I.O., J.I.R. Mr. de la Mare

Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson

Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawking

Mr. C.P. Rawlings.

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

(115)

Cypher

22 May, 1967.

R. 22

1400Z

MAY

1567

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

No. 663.

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES 2.63

23AM...

Addressed to Commonwealth office.

"Peking No. 249.

Repeated

鸭

"P.A. Singapore No. 116.

"Washington No. 130. (Please pass PRIORITY

to all).

HWA'li

My telegram No. 656.

108

　　　Statue Square was again the main centre for disorder, but there were also disturbances in Kowloon and farther east on Hong Kong Island. The first main incident was at 1100 hours when a crowd tried to force its way up to Government House. Over 100 people were arrested. At about the same time a crowd of 600-700 outside the South Kowloon Magistracy, consisting mainly of school children became unruly and had to be dispersed with tear gas. Demonstrators on the Hong Kong side reformed in Statue Square and at the foot of Garden Road, then moved in procession around the central area of the city singing and shouting. Their main aim was to provoke the police. they were encouraged and directed by the loud speaker in the Bank of China.

In this

　　　At 12.30 as the lunch time traffic was building to its peak, bus drivers in the area of the Star Ferry and its approach roads on the Hong Kong side abandoned their vehicles completely blocking the roads. Shortly after on the Kowloon side a group of bus company employees attacked the police at the bus/ferry terminus. At the same time, a crowd in the Causeway Bay area on the island speedily grew to over 1,000 when reinforced by school children and had to be dispersed with tear gas.

3. The situation was obviously deteriorating and the Commissioner of Police asked for a curfew in Hong Kong. At 15.15 hours I declared a curfew to cover the urban areas on the north of Hong Kong Island from 18.30 to 05.00 hours.

4. During the afternoon, demonstrators remained in the Statue Square but made no major offensive moves. The drowning of the Bank of China's loudspeaker by an even louder machine playing music from the roof of a nearby Government building possibly helped. By 16.30 hours the situation was quiet and crowds, mainly from offices in the central district, were dispersing towards their homes as best they could, conscious of the impending curfew and hampered by the dearth of public transport. It is hoped that the curfew will enable the police to rest some of its men. At the same time it may discourage

the onlookers who throughout the day complicated the problem of

/crowd

108

SECRET

120 124

пара

SECRET

crowd control.

Up to time of despatch although some minor incidents have taken place, the curfew is effective.

5. At 1700 hours today 148 persons had been arrested, four policemen and a number, not yet known, of rioters injured. This includes one man who was shot after assisting in throwing petrol over the members of a small police patrol.

condition is described as fair.

H18

Details of arrests and sentences to date are:-

Arrested

727,

convicted

403,

remanded

90,

awaiting trial

193,

acquitted

24,

released without

charge

17.

6. Unions are obviously taking a more direct part in support of demonstrators. The action of the bus drivers in blocking the main roads at a peak period is one example. There have been reports of go-slow tactics and disruption of work at a major Government workshop. The use of children to swell crowds on a large scale is a new tactic and one which it is difficult to counter. It would appear that the local communist leadership has appreciated that a comparatively small number of demonstrators can, with the unwitting aid of onlookers, tie up large numbers of police and cause a dis-proportionate disruption of the city's life. There is no sign of activities of this sort abating.

(Passed as requested)

(Also passed to D.S.A.0. for Messrs. de la Mare,

Wilson and Bolland)

Distribution

H.K. WID 'C' I.G.D.

J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:-

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office

Foreign office

伸

Treasury

Export Credits Guarantee

D.I.O., J.I.R.

Mr.

de la Mare

kr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson

Mr. Foggon

- Mr. Rodgers

Mr. D. Hawkins

Department SECRET

- Mr. C.P. Rawlings

10 (2429)

Reference......

THO

M. Hall

Minister of State

Please sce Hong Kong telegram 642.

The Governor would like urgent approval of

two courses of action.

II Action to neutralise several of the

buildings from which the campaign is being directed, i.e. notably the Bank of

China and the Communist-controlled

Federation of Trade Union Headquarters,

and

that H.M.S. Bulwark, a Commando-carrier, equipped with helicopters, should visit Hong Kong on a "routine visit".

When the telegram came in this morning I was

able to have a brief word with Sir Saville Garner

and his initial reation was that these two

courses should be approved. You will see from

paragraph 9 of the telegram that

Sir Arthur Galsworthy and Mr. Bolland agree with

these reactions and so does the Commander of the

British Forces in Hong Kong.

I have had a brief word with the Ministry of

Defence, who are urgently considering the question of

the availability of H.M.S. Bulwark. I shall also

consult the Foreign Office.

I submit the draft of a short telegram which

I hope we will be able to clear with the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office this afternoon.

MPH.

(H.P. Hall) 22 May 1967

Agreed.

Jx 2715

Oma

XXXXX

XXXX

SECRET

HONG KONG

GOVERNOR HONG KONG

POLAD, SINGAPORE PEKING WASHINGTON

Your telegram No. 662.

Disturbances.

Ministers approve courses II and IV.

2. On course II imposition of curfew might be

preferable to declaration of closed areas but

Ministers leave decision on actual method to you.

to command

says

3. On course Vinistry & Defence re

wall uniti cive to take excutin actin

issuing nodess.py instructions forthwith.

later.

Comments on other two courses will follow

Telipped Brand,

Wittige 117

The Commonwealth Secretary & the Sef for Defence have

both apprised the telegram to Hong Kong below.

The Freage Seentory has still to appor it. He has her acked to inform the Resident Clerk/ahr will them in for you.

tuken

You

Riar froth Bridect Clark will you please

despatil the bilgen Flack to H King & Polid Singapore & Rating

↑ Prunty & Washington.

Hilfall

22/5.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

Cypher

TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

Sent 22 May, 1967. 21252

(!!

IMMEDIATE SECRET No. 1000.

For Galsworthy from Garner.

Meeting of Defence and Oversea Policy

Committee has been arranged for 9.45 on Thursday,

25 May before the holiday weekend. Secretary of State will report on Hong Kong and it will be very helpful if you could send by Wednesday evening summary of any recommendations you may have.

Distribution

SECRET

132

FILES GYBAND. HK.W.ID.C

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No. 63

2 3 Ark 170/

HWAY/17

れ

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.

DEPARTMENT

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION PRIORITY MARKINGS

(Date)

Top Secret

Secret

Emergency]*

Confidential

Immediate

Despatched..

IMMEDIATE

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should

reach addressee(s)

22.5.67

2125Za

Restricted Unclassified

Priority Routine

нка

380

Security classification

SECRET

En Clair. Code Cypher

[Codeword-if any]

HONG KONG

Addressed to

Draft Telegram to:-

HONG KONG

telegram No.

1,000.

(rp)

25 MAY 1967

1000

No..

And to...

Tol. C. D.

(Dale)

And to:-

repeated for information to

---

ייז י

Repeat to:

Saving to:-

Saving to

For

Galsworthy from Garner,

Meeting of Defence and Oversea Policy

Committee has been arranged for 9.45 on Thursday,

25 May before the holiday weekend. Secretary of

State will report on Hong Kong and it will be

very helpful if you could send by Wednesday

evening summary of any recommendations you may

have.

Send

Distribution:-

Gits tapt

FILES G.S.A.D.

Coples to:-

Sir S. Games

All

M. furites 3

shan's

No.

Registry No.

DEPARTMENT

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

(Date)...

Secret

Top Secret

Confidential

Restricted Unclassified

Flash

Immediate

Priority Routine

}

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should

Despatched D5A0

reach addressee(s).

222249 W

118

MANHATTA

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

Bu Clair x Rotte

Cypher

Draft Telegram to:-

HONG KONG

No. 100%

[Secur

"Security classification -if any

[ Privacy marking ]

---

PLAN p

222245

SECRET

ECEIVED 23 MAY 1967

[Codeword-if any]

Addressed to

GOVERNOR HONG KONG

telegram No..

1001

7/1

(date)

92 May 1967

And to

(Date) 22 Hay...

repeated for information to

MATTINTINOMATOPOLVERINESTONE PALATESTA LEHE VIDEO||

And to:-

Saving to.....

Repeat to:-

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Flask

Prority

POLAD, SINGAPORE

WASHINGTON

Saving to:-

Distribution:-

tat 662

As fur H Kay til

plus Mr N Forward

H of Defence.

Copies to:-

Your telegram No. 662.

Disturbances.

Ministers approve courses II and IV.

On course II imposition of curfew might be preferable to declaration of closed areas but Ministers leave decision on actual method to you. Secretary of State for

hes concussed. Defence are with uninte CINC FE to take exccutive action. issuing necesšury instructions forthwith.

On course IV Ministry We assume Mat

later.

you

Comments on other two courses will follow

(Passed to DSAO for repetition to Pozo Sing cupore, Peking &

Рогов

Washington)

Cypher

SECRET

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

FROM THE CommonwealTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

Sent 22 May, 1967. 22402

118

FLASH SECRET No.1001

Addressed to Governor Hong Kong Repeated FLASH to POLAD Singapore

" FLASH to Peking

PRIORITY to Washington

Your telegram No. 662.

Disturbances.

Ministers approve courses II and IV.

　On course II imposition of curfew might be preferable to declaration of closed areas but Ministers leave decision on actual method to you.

　On course IV Secretary of State for Defence has concurred. We assume that you will invite C.in G. F.E. to take executive action.

Comments on other two courses will follow later.

Distribution

(Passed to D.S.A.0. for repetition

to POLAD Singapore, Peking and Washington)

H.K. WID 'G'

- I.G.D.

J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:-

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

D.I.O., J.I.R.

Mr. de la Mare

Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson

她

Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawkins

Treasury

Exports Credits

Guarantee Department

Mr. C.P. Rawlings

Ministry of Defence

Mr. N. Forward

SECRET

114

121

SECRET

it would disrupt their communications (e.g. Government could pick up all their couriers). And they might well eventually have to move to other premises where it would be easier for Government to keep them under closer surveillance. Further advantage is that it would enable us to isolate Bank of China without taking direct action against the building which could involve us with the C.P.G.. As an immediate measure I have deployed loudspeakers blaring forth cheerful Chinese tunes to drown the inflammatory broadcasts coming from the Bank. But this is not sufficient in itself, since the Bank building remains one of the principal rallying points for demonstrations; and anyhow we know it is one of the main communist control points.

Course (iii)

7. The worrying thing about not taking action against the worst offender among the communist press is that it is daily in flagrant breach of the law, and if we continue to ignore this it may well be taken as sign of weakness. But it would obviously be regarded by Peking as a provocation (see Peking telegram No. 483 of 15 May). Furthermore there are 9 other communist newspapers here which could all continue the campaign unless similar action were taken against them.

HWB.1/17.

CONFIDENTIAL

Kraft

Record Ches

~ HUA 21/5

22nd May, 1967.

119

You wrote to Carter on the 19th May asking if you could bo

sent copies of current material on the situation in Hong Kong, and

if we could let you have an urgent assessment of developments in that

territory. Carter is away from the Office at present and since I

have seen that you would like an early reply to your letter, I am

answering in his absence.

I enclose a copy of a Confidential paper which was prepared

lest week and which contains what assessment we are in a position to offer,

at the present time. I have also arranged for your name to be put on

the distribution list for Hong Kong telegrams dealing with those

aspects of the situation with which you are concerned.

I am copying this letter and its enclosure to S.H. Wright and

Luçaă (Treasury), Spiers (Bank of England), R.L. Davies (Board of Trade)

and Cotterill, I en also copying letter enclosure to the Foreign

without

Office.

C.P. Rawlings Esq.,

Export Credits Guarantee Department,

P.0. Box 272,

Barrington House,

59-67 Gresham Street, E.C.2.

CONFIDENTIAL

(A.W.Gaminara)

да

пр

En Clair

INWARD TELEGRAM CC.

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 23 May 1967 R. 23

01 352

120

IMMEDIATE No.665

Addressed to Commonwealth office (D.T.D.) Repeated

"Peking No.251

"POLAD Singapore No.118

Washington No.132

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES M. 63

70/

(S. of S. please pass to Washington),

My telegram No.663. -(119

FILJA 1/17

Uneventful night in both Kowloon and Hong Kong.

The curfew in Hong Kong was well observed other than for a short period in one district where 13 persons were arrested for breach of curfew. No incidents were reported after 21.00.

2. I have decided that no further public processions or public meetings will be permitted without the prior authority of the Commissioner of Police. I have done this to prevent further disorders arising from the small groups of demonstrators who have been allowed to proceed to Government House to petition.

3. China Motor Bus Co. employees are refusing to operate vehicles today and no buses plying at present. Trams on island operating normally and public transport in Kowloon. No formal strike has been declared and position somewhat confused. Apparently they demand the release of several C.M.B. employees arrested earlier before returning to work.

the The total arrested in the 24 hours ended 08.00 on 23. 5. 67 was 203 out of whom 110 have been charged. Toral of arrests since beginning of disturbances is 781 of whom 671 have been charged.

(Passed as requested)

Distribution H.K. W.I.D. 'C'

- I.G.D.

J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

D.1.0. J.I.R.

- Mr. de la Mare

Treasury

Export Credits Guarantee

Department

Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Dens on

Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawkins

Mr. C.P. Rawlings

PARA

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

121

Cypher

Do 23 May, 1967. R. 23

1005Z

IMMEDIATE SECRET

No. 677.

ΑΠ

153

HWA

بر دار کرد

LIWA 1/1

Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.).

"Peking No. 254.

Repeated

"P.A. Singapore No. 122.

"Washington No. 133. (Commonwealth Office please pass to all).

Your telegram No. 1001.

Disturbances.

118

　　I am most grateful for your very speedy approval of courses il and iv in my telegram No. 662- At this morning's meeting of Executive Council there was full endorsement of both these measures. We hope to be in a position to implement course ii tomorrow (Wednesday).

Public

Meanwhile the situation is evolving here. opinion is flowing strongly in our favour, is advocating firm measures on our part, and we believe that extent of this support has perplexed the other side. So far today has been quiet. The Committee of 17 have been in session most of the day. They may of course be hatching up something fresh to launch on us tomorrow, and this may well be simply the lull before the next storm.

3. Executive Council this morning were unanimously of the opinion that deportation would be the most damaging and effective action we could take against the Communist leadership. They have authorised me to deport all or any of a list of 24 persons at my discretion. It is unlikely, however, that I would wish to deport so many at once and would prefer to use this weapon more selectively. It is of course a weapon which I would not propose to use lightly or necessarily very soon: but the need to do so may arise very quickly. If the Opposition begin tomorrow to act in a more methodical and co-ordinated manner it may be necessary to act promptly to disrupt their leadership. I very much hope therefore that you will be able to agree to my proceeding on this basis.

40 On Executive Council's advice, I am submitting fairly comprehensive emergency regulations to Council tomorrow, primarily to assist me to combat subversive publications such as posters, public address systems and so on.

These regulations

will I hope give me better powers to act against the Communist press than those I have mentioned to you so far (my present thought is to act against printing works rather than the newspapers themselves. I am however still reluctant to act against the press and would not do so without consulting you.

SECRET

REF.

.15.

118

150

SECRET

You will be glad to learn that management of San Po Kong artificial flower factory has reached agreement, with Labour Department help, with some 240 of his employees and hopes to reopen factory towards the end of this week.

　6. Above has been discussed with CBF, Galsworthy and Bolland who agree.

Passed as requested)

(Also passed to Messrs. de la Mare

and Wilson)

Distribution

H.K. WID 'C' I.G.D.

J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:-

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet office

Foreign Office

炸

Treasury

Export Credits Guarantee

Department

Ministry of Defence

け

帅

לון

DS11)

DS6)

D.I.O., J.I.R.

P.S. to Mr. Rodgers

Mr. de la Mare

Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson

- Mr. Foggon

- Mr. D. Hawkins

- Mr. C.P. Rawlings

Mr. C.H. Henn

Major Koe

- M.0.2.

Room 5131

SECRET

En Clair

(

PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 555 23 May, 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

23 May

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 555 of

Repeated for information to:- Washington, Moscow, Hong Kong and POLAD Singapore.

People's Daily of 23 May carries three items on Hong Kong.

122,

(1)

(2)

(3)

Reporting my session at Foreign Ministry yesterday, during which Chinese announced their decision to annul 1954 Agreement on Shanghai

reporting meeting on 21 May in Hong Kong of Struggle Committee to oppose British persecution (as in NCNA of 22 May); and

reporting clashes between rioters and Hong Kong authorities on 21 May. This item contains the sentence, the situation shows that the British Government and British authorities in liong Kong are brazenly disregarding our Foreign Ministry's statement and the strong protest of our compatriots from all walks of life in Hong Kong and Kowloon, and are determined to treat as enemies 700 million Chinese people and nearly 4 million compatriots in Hong Kong and Kowloon.

Mr. Hopson

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION F.E.D.

23 May,

Sent 0802Z

1967 Recd 1404Z 23 May, 1967

bbbbb

LAST RIF.

лава

EXT

REF.

Cypher/Cat. A

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY TAMSUI CO FOREIGN OFFICE

10. 21

23 May 1967

123

CONFIDENTIAL

　　Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 21 of 23 May Repeated for information to Political Adviser Hong Kong and Peking, Washington.

　　General themes of local Press comment on recent events in Hong Kong have been.

(i)

(ii)

Britain is paying the penalty for having perpetually bowed and scraped to Peking since 1950.

The authorities in Hong Kong are standing firm and will not cower before pressure from Peking as did Fortuguese in Macao. Nevertheless they have been too lenient and should get tougher with rioters,

(iii) Pro Nationalists in Hong Kong should offer large

scale resistance to rioters.

　There has been much speculation here that disturbances will result in flight of capital and trained workers to Formosa but although Nationalists would no doubt welcome this "Government" sources have denied they will entice them away.

3. Sub-paragraph one (iii) is unlikely to represent views of Nationalist leaders here. Ky information from (grp undec] sources is that leaders advocate restraint and non-involvement by their supporters in Hong Kong and are encouraging them to cooperate with the authorities. This attitude would almost certainly change if it were thought that Her Majesty's Government were likely to reach some form of settlement resulting in suppression of Nationalist Organisations in the Colony.

H.K. Consul-General

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.0.

F.E.D. S.3.A.D.

Sent 1016Z/23 Kay 1967 Rocd 11132/23 May 1967

J.I.R.D.

D.D. & P.U.S.D.

LIST

J.I.P.G.D.

REF.

News Dept.

ALF.

140

PAD

C.0.

F. E. & P.D. D.T. D.

SSSSS

DIS KOD

CONFIDENTIAL

124

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

COPY

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

Cypher

D. 23 May, 1967.

13152

1007

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 63

24/40 17/

IMMEDIATE SECRET

No. 678.

HWAY/17

Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.). Repeated

"Peking No. 255.

"P.A. Singapore No. 123.

"Washington No. 134 (S. of S. please pass PRIORITY to all).

My telegram No. 663.

115

SITREP as at 232000 hours.

It has been a quiet day on both Hong Kong and Kowloon sides. The effective measures taken by the Police yesterday and the new restrictions on processions seem to have robbed the Communist leadership of the initiative.

2. There has been a proliferation of loudspeakers broadcasting from Communist offices and stores. Though they have limitea themselves to tape recordings of extracts from newspapers and of music, they are a potential danger and steps are being taken to prevent their use. The main loudspeaker system in the Bank of China has been successfully jammed all day.

3. There has been increased industrial activity. The China Motor Bus Company remained on strike on the Hong Kong side and the Communist trade union in the Tran Company staged a walk-out in sympathy this eveni

in bringing the tram workers out: union members continued to work. brief protest strike in shipyard.

Intimidation played a part but most of the right wing There has also been one

4. There have again been numerous rumours of a water shortage and of the P.L.A. massing on the border. The management of right wing and neutral factories were rung up

during the morning and told that since the C.P.G. was definitely going to take over here and the British were preparing to evacuate, they had better change their policies. An official and categorical denial of this was made over the radio.

5. Right-Wing posters have appeared in a number of places in Kowloon and in two towns in the New Territories. There is, however, no sign at present of strife building up on a large scale between these two factions.

6. A crowd, 2,000 strong and including 300 soldiers and

The some militia was seen on 22 May in China near the border military element fixed bayonets and paraded up and n near the border. The numbers involved are not unusual though the

SECRET

PARA

/presence

775

138

SECRET

presence of armed soldiers is, This demonstration was clearly designed for Hong Kong consumption.

7. A major conference has been taking place all day long between representatives of all pro-Communist and sympathetic unions and circles. Their prolonged deliberations may indicate that they are somewhat unsure of what to do next. The Communist leadership is thought to be opposed to strikes which will inconvenience the population as a whole since they see their major task is winning more public support. Nonetheless the most likely development is more industrial action, backed up with intimidation of both workers and management.

(Passed as requested)

Distribution

H.K. WID 'C' I.G.D.

J.I.G. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:-

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

D.I.O., J.I.R.

Mr. de la Mare Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson

Treasury

Exports Credits Guarantee

Department

Ministry of Defence (D.S.11)

DS.6)

Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawkins

Mr. C.F. Rawlings

Mr. Henn Major Koe M.0.2.

SECRET

(125)

NOTATION

En Clair

PRESS

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

MAY

FROM HONG KONG (Information Services)

D. 23 May 1967 R. 23

16432

1967

シス

Corsa HWAY/12

　Hong Kong enjoyed a day free from serious incidents today. There were no demonstrations and the main focal point of the "propaganda" war, was the battle of loudspeakers in Central district where Government equipment drowned public address broadcasts from the Bank of China. It is estimated that Communist broadcasts are being made from seventeen or more places in the Colony.

It was announced, towards the end of the day, that people who allowed their property to be used by broadcasts by public address systems for incitement to violence may (repeat may) be prosecuted.

Public transport has operated normally in Kowloon, but oa Hong Kong Island vehicles of the China Motor Bus Company did not (repeat not) appear on the streets. Taxis and trams are running normally.

Rumours about a water cut-off have been circulating, but there is no (repeat no) basis for them. And Government have warned people against paying heed to malicious rumours.

Government has also acted against those who are trying to persuade young workers to join demonstrations by intimidation. Details will soon be announced of how threatened workers can register for new jobs.

This morning Government House announced that the British Government stood four square behind the authorities in its determination to preserve peace in Hong Kong. The statement said Sir Arthur Galsworthy brought with him fullest confirmation of Britain's support.

　On the labour front, a management and workers of the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works met this morning at the Labour Department and agreed in principle to reopen the injection moulding department of the factory as soon as possible. It was also agreed that re-employed workers would receive compensation and terms and conditions in force at the time of the close down would stay the same.

　Of the two hundre and three people arrested yesterday on Hong Kong Island one hundred and ten have so far been charged. Total arrests since disturbances began until eight o'clock this morning stood at seven hundred and eighty one and six hundrel and seventy one have been charged.

For Boxall above cable sent.

(Passed to Resident Clerk)

вово

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No. 63

2 4mok 1967 CHEBUTT

/Distribution

ANZ

Distribution

H.K. W.I.D. 'C' I.G.D.

J.I.C EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

D.I.O., J.I.R.

Mr. de la Mare

Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson

Treasury

Hong Kong Government Office Exports Credits Guarantee

Department

Ministry of Defence (D.S.11)-

(D.Š.6)

Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawkins Mr. Boxall

Mr. C.P. Rawlings Mr. C.H. Henn Major Koe

- M.0.2

Siß. Registry

Registry No. The IS

DEPARTMENT

1/17

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret

Secret

Comicential

Restricted

Unclassified

• Date and time (G.M.T.) telegrain should

reach addressee(s)

23/5 167

los

NIPS.

126

Despatched 20.202 box Jo Jably

PRIORITY MARKINGS

(Date)

Phot Immediate Priority=

}

PRIVACY MARKING

[Sec

Security classification -if any

ation]

SECRET

[

Privacy marking -if any

]

Cypher

Draft Telegram to:-

EONG KONG

No.

(Date)

And to:-

Repeat to:-

[Codeword-if any]

Addressed to.

telegram No. 101/

10/1

And to

repeated for information to

Saving to..

24 MAY 1967

HONG KONG, AK:38

(date).

า

lisa +---

CARTHUR pampublik

Your telegram 669: U.S. Facilities.

Following for Bolland from de la Mare.

Saving to: --

940

Distribution:- JI.C. Internal

H.IT. W...D IGO

Depil. Copies to:-

As for thong ting

tel 669.

What The

e take it that the Governor still proposes

set out in paragraphs 2 and 4

to follow the course

of his telegram 639,

Bainbridge is due to

provocation potential.

we agree.

Ar dacc ANG

23.6.07.

and that his objection to the

nature

its size and consequent

On this understanding

Cypher

SECRET

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

HWB 1/17

Sent 23 May, 1967. 2020Z

126

неагрорага

No. 1011

Your telegram 669.

U.S. Facilities.

HWA 2/1/100

Following for Bolland from de la Mare.

We take it that the Governor still proposes

to follow the course set out in paragraphs 2 and 4 of his telegram 639, and that his objection to the BAINBRIDGE 18 due to its nature and consequent provocation potential. On this understanding we agree.

Distribution - H.K. WID 'C'

I.G.D.

J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:-

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

D.1.0., J.I.R.

Mr. de la Mare

Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson

ป

Treasury

Exports Credits Guarantee

Department

Mininetry of Defence (D.S.11)-

(D.S.6)

Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawkins

Mr. C.P. Rawlings

Mr. C.H. Henn

Major Koe

M.0.2.

DAD

SECRET

surveillance.

　　　　　　　　　　Further advantage is that it would enable us to isolate Bank of China without taking direct action against the building which could involve us with the C.P.G.. As an immediate measure I have deployed loudspeakers blaring forth cheerful Chinese tunes to drown the inflammatory broadcasts coming from the Bank. But this is not sufficient in itself, since the Bank building remains one of the principal rallying points for demonstrations; and anyhow we know it is one of the main communist control pointa.

Course (iii)

Connoa (14)

INWARD TELEGRAM ČL

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Information Office).

RECEIVED IN

En Clair

D. 23 May 1967

ARCH!

R. 23

21 092

23.1.

PRESS

HWA 1/1) Hit

127

Hong Kong Government has decided with immediate effect, no (repeat no) further public processions or public meetings will be permitted without prior authority of Commissioner of Police. In a statement last night, Government spokesman said although for the past few days small groups of petitioners have been permitted to move in procession to Government House provided they did so in an orderly manner. disorders have subsequently broken out on each day.

He said any person who in future participates in a

- procession or meeting in a public place without prior

permission in writing from the Commissioner of Police will be liable to arrest and prosecution. He pointed out

that individuals who wish to petition the Governor may continue to do so by post.

　　　Latest police report states the curfew which was imposed on Hong Kong Island at 6.30 last night is being observed.

Earlier today, police units on riot duty were issued with special cameras that had been specially fitted with telephoto lens to photograph people taking part in the illegal gatherings. Government loudspeakers broadcasting Cantonese music also drowned out message inciting the crowd which were broadcast from loudspeakers installed in the Bank of China building.

　　　So far police have arrested 167 people most of them on Hong Kong Island. Fifteen people have been taken to Queen Mary Hospital where seven, including one police constable, have been detained for treatment.

All day crowds of "demonstrators" frequently swelled by young hooligans gathered in various parts of central Hong Kong, blocking traffic and singing and chanting outside banks and public buildings. Traffic in central district was also disrupted.

In Kowloon there were a few incidents.

Another 19 representative organisations have pledged support for Government's firm determination to maintain peace in Hong Kong. This brings to 270 the total number of organisations which have so far publicly stated their support for the authorities.

　　　　　The education fund for children of junior police officers has now reached almost 400,000 dollars (repeat dls.400,000) and contributions from ordinary citizens continue to pour into the collection office at the Department of Commerce and Industry.

(D.T.D.)

For Boxall, above cable sent Commonwealth Office

раф

/Distribution

Distribution

H.K. W.I.D. 'C' I.G.D.

J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

介

TT -

Treasury

D.I.O., J.I.R. Mr. de la Mare Mr. Bolland Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson

Mr. Foggon

- Mr. D. Hawkins

Exports Credits Guarantee

Department Mr. C.P. Rawlings

Hong Kong Government Office

Mr. Boxall

Ministry of Defence (DS 11)

Mr. C.H. Henn

Major Koe

(Room 51 31)- M.0.2

CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN OFFICE TO PEKING

IMMEDIATE

ELNO 385

23 MAY 1967 (F)

FOR REGISTRA

1128

RECEMODDIN

ARCIM) VES 'Nɔ. 63 25.170/

HIWA '//

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO PEKING TELEGRAM NO 385 OF 23 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO HONG KONG WASHINGTON AND POLAD SINGAPORE.

HONG KONG,

THE CHINESE ACTING CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CALLED AT HIS OWN REQUEST AT 11 AM. ON 23 MAY TO MAKE AN ORAL DEMARCHE ABOUT HONG KONG.

HE WAS SEEN BY MR RODGERS.

　　　THE CHARGE REFERRED TO HIS MEETING ON 19 MAY WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND SAID THAT HE HAD NOT ON THAT OCCASION HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO REFUTE MR BROWN'S QUOTE SHAMEFUL IMPERIALIST LANGUAGE UNQUOTE. IN ADDITION MR BROWN HAD ON 22 MAY (PRESUMABLY ON BBC PANORAMA) QUOTE VICIOUSLY ATTACKED THE CHINESE PEOPLE UNQUOTE. HE SAID THAT LARGE SCALE QUOTE FASCIST ATROCITIES UNQUOTE

IN HONG KONG WERE THE DIRECT RESULT OF COLLUSION WITH U.S.

AND CHIANG CLIQUE AND REFERRED TO THE QUOTE BEATING UP AND

ARRESTING OF CHINESE COMPATRIOTS UNQUOTE AND QUOTE SANGUINARY

SUPPRESSION UNQUOTE. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT RESOLUTELY BACKED THE

JUST ACTION OF THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG AND STOOD BEHIND THEM.

3. THE CHARGE THEN SAID THAT H.M.G. HAD NOT ONLY FAILED TO REPLY TO THE FIVE CHINESE DEMANDS BUT HAD ALLOWED THE SITUATION TO GO FROM BAD TO WORSE. HE DEMANDED THAT:

(A) PERSECUTION IN HONG KONG SHOULD CEASE:

(B) H.M.G. SHOULD IMMEDIATELY ACCEPT THE FIVE QUOTE SOLEMN AND JUST UNQUOTE CHINESE DEMANDS.

　　　　HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT CHINA WAS DETERMINED TO CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE. H.M.G. WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL THE SERIOUS

/ CONSEQUENCES

CONFIDENTIAL

рабо

CONFIDENTIAL

FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 385 TO PEKING

CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ACTIONS.

-2-

5. MR RODGERS SAID THAT HE WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT THE CHARGE SHOULD TALK SUCH ARROGANT NONSENSE. HE CATEGORICALLY REJECTED THE CHINESE ALLEGATIONS ABOUT HONG KONG AND SAID THE LANGUAGE IN WHICH THEY WERE COUCHED AND THE REMARKS ABOUT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WERE COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE. IF THE CHINESE HAD A NOTE TO LEAVE IN THESE TERMS IT WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED. WE WERE ALWAYS READY TO DISCUSS WITH THE CHINESE MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN BUT NO DISCUSSIONS WERE POSSIBLE IF THE CHINESE USED THE LANGUAGE NOT OF DIPLOMACY BUT OF PROPAGANDA.

SOSFA SENT 16542 23 MAY 1967

FO/CO/WH.DISTRIBUTION

F.E.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

SENT TO HONG KONG AS COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (D.T.D.) TELEGBAN

NO.

•1015

129

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

FLASH PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 560 24 May, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.560 of 24 May, Repeated for information to Hong Kong, Singapore and Washington.

Your telegram No.386:

Following for de la Mare.

I am strongly in favour of taking some retaliatory action. The problem is to find some thing which will not lead to escalation in diplomatic warfare and increase our difficulties here. Visas are a case in point. We have just applied for visas for two extra wireless operators from Singapore so that we can keep twenty four hour watch here. Our own operators are under great pressure and it is important that we get the extra hands, though the Chinese may refuse or delay in any case.

I agree that N.C.N.A. is the best target. Perhaps we should take a leaf out of the Chinese book. They recently expelled three Soviet correspondents, allowing three others to remain, because they have only three N.C.N.A. men in Moscow. We could therefore as a gesture reduce the London N.C.N.A. staff from eight to say four. This should leave the one Reuters staff man undisturbed here on a basis of reciprocity.

If this were agreed I hope it would be possible to

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　A method allow the deporting men reasonable time to leave. the Chinese have also used here is to refuse to renew residence permits when these expire. I do not know the position in London, i.e., how often permits have to be renewed, but if some of the N.C.N.A. permits are due to come up for renewal soon, it might be possible to deal with them on that basis. On the other hand you may feel that this is not drastic enough, though we could issue a strong statement immediately announcing our decision to reduce the N.C.N.A. staff for all the relevant reasons, specifying four individuals whose residence permits will not be renewed on expiry and for whom we will not repeat not admit replacements. The Chinese Charge would presumably be informed of this decision before publication of statement.

Alternatively we could do something to N.C.N.A. in

Hong Kong, subject to the views of the Governor.

　I realise that this would not amount to a very grand gesture of retaliation, but it could be dressed up in the statement to appear more than it really is. I fear the closing of the N.C.N.A. office and expulsion of all its staff would in present circumstances not only lead to expulsion of Reuters

CONFIDENTIAL

/but risk

PARO

CONFIDENTIAL

Peking telegram No.560 to Foreign Office.

-2-

but risk action against my staff too. Peters, for example, after his incident at Canton would be vulnerable.

Grateful for warning if action is going to be taken.

Foreign Office please pass Washington routine 286.

Mr. Hopson

Sent 02552/24 May Recd 0537Z/24 Nay

[Repeated as requested]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.0.

88888

F.E.D.

P.C.D.

P.U.S.D.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

CONFIDENTIAL

STRIELYGAT A

FROD KAEDAH PEKING

TELNO $62

SECRET.

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

24 WY 1907

(2)

Ale Birchajimes

لام

... HEFE P.)

Amer

SD cilen 小

M. Jebe Mlmen..

Love FED

DVD Almo itali

Ad Lib D

(B)

ADDRESSED TO FO TEL NO 502 of 24 HAY DEPTD FOR IP TO HONG KONG.

MY TELEGRAM NO 499.

K'AO HSIAO HS1 OF 20 MAY CAR

RIES A F P REPORT OF 17/MAY OF

GUILALTH OFFICE STATEMENT ON HON.

VG KONG AS II, :

ELL US NEV

-TERS

REALIG REPORT OF 18 HAY CN CH'EN YI'S AVOIDANCE OF ME AT THE

RWEGIAN NATION

AL DAY AND HY ORAL PROTEST TO LO XUDI PO. ISSUE

C2 27 MAY CZARIES NO HONG KONG NEWS.

Rack no kurala RRRT OF

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　GRAT 2. ILOVE OF 23 PAY GIVES FRONT PAGE COVE4-05-20-407991-NDUS49"DIS

NO WAY OF YOUR PROTEST TO SIEN FING. IT ALSO REPORTO GALSUCKTHY'S

BOL IN HONG K

·ONG FOR QUOTE SECRET TALKS INQUOTE WITH GOVERNOR

AND GIVES EXCERPTS FROM HIS STATEMENT ON ARRIVAL. THE RISING PRICE

SELDİ İN

CELDȚIN HONG KOja IS ALSO MENTIONED.

HOPSON SENT AT O7307/24 Y

RECEIVED IN F.O. BY

TELEPRINTER AT............................

A02/24

FUS 018/24

ZZ/PP HUPDL

HUPLE

HCPCW

HUMSF

...FM

ASOLIM NO. 483

TO ZZ ASOLHY

56124

ZZ AVCLLU

38424.

PP ASOLKN

PEKING

.GMT

FLASH

PP ASOLYZ

30324.

17 20724 (WIN) Szikl

1728729

82/2

131

ADDSD TO FO TEL NO 561 OF 24 MAY RFI TO HONGKING (FLASH)

POLAD SPORE AND WTON

REPEAL

NCNA REPORT DATOLINED HONGKONG 23 HAY PUBLISHED IN TODAYS.

PEOPLES DAILY STATES. THAT ON 22 MAY QUOTE AT LEAST TWO

ייך

HUNDRED COMPATRIOTS WERE KILLED, OR: SEVERELY, INJURED UNQUOTE

IN HONGKONG AND KOWLOON.

2. THIS BLATANTLY INFLAMMATORY DISTORTION, OF. THE FACTS

WILL CERTAINLY LEAD TO RENEWED DEMONSTRATIONS. HERE.. IN

· FACT AS. I WRITE ONE HAS JUST BEGUN,

USTAB

Mh Hopson.

Fo/co/wh.D

NNNN

FED.

REF.

LIET

RIF.

c.k.

152

·PA

P.S. P.U.S.

3.S.

Шальнов

ས་ས་་་་་

Cypher

(132

12 1

1967

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

24 MAI

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 24 May 1967

R. 24

04352

PRIORITY SECRET No.680

For Garner from Galsworthy.

Your telegram No.1000.

せ

(117

I am sending later today three telegrams

containing

(a)

(b)

(c)

our analysis and appreciation of situation;

summary of measures already adopted by Hong Kong Government to deal with situation;

recommendations concerning further measures which may have to be taken.

2. These telegrams are being prepared in close consultation with Governor and C.B.F. and are endorsed by Bolland.

Distribution

FILES

117

1357136

H.K.W.I.D.'C'

SECRET

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES - $3

2 4MAL1907

HWN1/1

CONFIDENTIAL

133

CORY FOR REGISTRATION

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

MAY

12 1

1967

RECEIVED IN

Cypher

D. 24 May 1967

1+ R. 24

ARCHIVES No. 63

04402.

4MẨY 1967

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

No.682

HOD 1/17

Addressed to Commonwealth Office

זו

Repeated Peking No.256

** POLAD Singapore No.1 24 "Washington No.135

(S. of S. please pass IMMEDIATE to all)

Foreign Office telegram to Peking No.386.

As seen from here, closure of N.C.N.A. in London

is likely to have following repercussions on Hong Kong situation.

2. One of our main purposes here is to keep down tension and, unless we are forced to take a specific step to meet the internal security situation in Hong Kong, to avoid anything which might lead to greater involvement by Peking. While we see the value of closing the N.C.N.A. in London as a retaliation against Shanghai, our fear is that Chinese will regard it also in Hong Kong context and increase their pressures here

30 Further, if we were to close N.C.N.A. in London but not to close them in Hong Kong, not only Peking but also opinion here (both Communist and non-Communist) might well regard it as an admission on our part that we did not dare to take this action here. Fact that N.C.N.A. is engaging in even more poisonous propaganda and activities here than in Britain would emphasise the point even more. But we would regard closing of N.C.N.A. in Hong Kong as a major escalation which we think would inevitably provoke a strong response from Peking affecting the Colony.

4. In the interests of Hong Kong therefore I would feel much happier if you could avoid taking such a step.

(Passed as requested with advance copies.

for Foreign Office F.E. Dept.)

Distribution

H.K. W.I.D.

- I.G.D.

J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office D.I.O. J.I.R.

Foreign Office P.S. to Mr.Rodgers

- Mr. de la Mare

Mr. Bolland

CONFIDENTIAL

197

раво

/Mr.Wilson

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign Office

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson

Treasury

Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawkins

Export Credits Guarantee Department Ministry of Defence (Room 7365)

(Room 7163)

(Room 51 31)

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr.C.P. Rawlings

Mr. Henn

Major Koe

En Clair

Mr. Cameras

PRIORITY RAWALPINDI TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

COMMON

Mr. Har 134

Hall

Эт) дост

Telno 516

UNCLASSIFIED

24 May 1967

нени

to have

fot this

24/5

Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No. 516 of 24 May. Repeated for information to Delhi and Washington.

Defence Minister.

It was announced on 21 May that Vice--Admiral A.R. Khan, Pakistan Defence Minister, will visit China at the invitation of the Chinese Government, for a week from 25 May. He will be accompanied by S. M. Yusuf, Foreign Secretary.

Sir C. Pickard

Sent 0740Z 24 May

Recd 09182 24 May

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

0.0.

3.A.D.

F.E. & P.D. Defence Dept.

J.R.D.

J.1.R.D.

J.J.P.G.D. News Dept.

F.O. F.E.D.

22233

LAST

REF.

вата

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

Cypher

24 May, 1967. R. 24 "

13002.

FLASH

SECRET

No. 688.

135

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 63

25 MA

MAY

Addressed to Commonwealth office. Repeated

"Peking No. 261.

" POLAD Singapore No. 126. "Washington No. 137. (Please repeat

PRIORITY to all).

132

.967

My telegram No. 680 (not repeated).

Following from Galsworthy.

Following is our analysis and appreciation.

In the present state of overspill from the Cultural Revolution and given the Chinese propensity at this time for irrationality, we cannot be sure what are China's intentionE towards Hong Kong or how they will react to any given situation. With this reservation, as seen from here it does not look as though Peking intends at present to force us out of Hong Kong. Our assessment is rather that the local Communiste felt that they must act here increasingly in accordance with the principles of the Cultural Revolution (one of the "sins" of the Hong Kong Government is that it had "limited" the effects of the Cultural Revolution in Hong Kong), and accordingly seized the incident at, inter alia, the artificial flower factory as a suitable opportunity for doing so. This seems to have been a mistaken initiative by the local Communists, representing their response to their understanding of current trends of thought in China, rather than a policy deliberately directed from authoritative mainland sources. But once the local communists had committed themselves, Peking, on the basis of misleading reports of the local situation, felt not only that tho.. must react in support, but also that they could exploit the situation in order at least to humiliate us to such an extent as to ensure that in future we would be much more quickly sensitive to Peking pressure (e.g. over U.S. warships), and if possible to force us to accept a Macao-type situation.

2. This situation is therefore essentially political. Although it arose from a genuine labour dispute, it could as easily have arisen from any other incident involving the Authorities here. From the c. teet the original labour dispute was taken over and exploited by the Communist press and organisations, Although the management, belatedly, sought the assistance of the Commissioner of Labour in settling the dispute, the Communists rejected his efforts, maintaining as a matter of principle that the Government has no status or role to play in labour matters.

SECRET

132

757

SECRET

　3. The local Communists seem to have misjudged the temper of the general public in Hong Kong, which has shown itself strongly opposed to the imposition of a Macao-type situation on Hong Kong, and, with Government encouragement, has been surprisingly out-spoken in its support for Goverment's measures to frustrate Communist pressures and maintain law and order, There is evidence that the Communists (both local and mainland) have been taken aback by the strngth of public opposition. After their earlier demonstrations in Kowloon had incurred much public odium because hoolganism was encouraged and took over, they switched to the Macao pattern of endeavouring to humiliate the Governor within Government House. When this failed, they resorted to fomenting disorders in the central district of Victoria, encouraged by venomous inflammatory loudspeakers, principally from the Peking-owned Bank of China. In the face of firm police action and public disapprobation, these tactics ceased on Tuesday 23 May, which appears to have been a day of reappraisal by the Communists. Today 24 May the emphasis is on a number of stoppages (unrelated to any industrial dispute) in the bus and tram services. So far this action has been reasonably orderly; but there is evidence of strong feeling amongst several Communist unions that more violent

methods should be used in order to create incidents which can be exploited.

　40 On the other hand there are indications of some disillusionment and disagreement in the local Communist leadership; some are reported to be feeling that they have to some extent blundered by exposing themselves too early, by misjudging public reaction, and by underestimating the efficacy of Government's response.

　5. If however Communists decide to press their campaign vigorously, their most likely tactics seem to be:-

(a) Engineering stoppages in public utilities, Government

Departments, etc., accompanied by intimidation on a considerable scale.

(b) Provoking the police by fresh and more violent

riotous demonstrations using women and children as a screen (as in Macao).

(c) Maintaining a general atmosphere of tension, e.g. by use of loudspeakers, poster and press campaigns, intimidation by telephone and letter, spreading

rumours, and propagandist Red Guard style demonstrations on the frontier. (d) Attempting by all available means to subvert and intimi-

date the police, and over-stretch their resources.

(e) Assaulting exposed Europeans and well-disposed Chinese.

فرة

The kind of situation envisaged in paragraph 5 above, if it were vigorously sustained over a period of, say, two to four weeks could lead to the exhaustion of the police and of the troops, who in these circumstances would of necessity have been called in (they have not been yet). Before this point was reached, over-extension of the security forces would require them to be used in smaller numbers at each incident; they would then have to use greater force to restore the situation; this would cause mounting casualties and loss of life, and hence a vicious spiral of exacerbation.

SECRET

The

　7. This raises the question whether the local Communists are capable of sustained and vigorous enough action to over- extend and exhaust the security forces.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　By themselves they probably are not. But the perennial danger especially in Kowloon and parts of Hong Kong Ialand, is that any rumpus draws a crowd, and any crowd can quickly become a mob. Communists have in fact used this technique already (paragraph 3) and could revert to it again. If they did so systematically and on a wide scale, we would need to take very tough measures to avoid being swamped.

до

　　　　To deal successfully with all this, it will be crucial to maintain general public confidence (which task will get more difficult the longer the crisis lasts), and particularly the confidence and morale of the police. We must continue to show firmness and steadiness here, backed by reaffirmations of H.M.G.'s support for the Hong Kong Government's measures (this latter is vital). We must strive to retain the initiative in Hong Kong, which we have now secured, to help to show that public confidence in us is not misplaced. We must be prepared to counter-attack selectively, taking care to avoid so far as possible direct challenges to the Peking Government of a sort that would oblige them to intervene more actively.

(Passed as requested with advance copy.

for Sir Saville Garner and to F.E.D.)

Distribution H.K. WID CL

- I.G.D.

J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:-

P.S. to Prime Minister Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

D.I.O., J.I.R.

- P.S. to Mr. Rodgers

Mr. de la Mare

Mr. Bolland

忖

野

帏

Treasury

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson

Mr. Foggon

D. Hawkins

Commonwealth office (News

Dept.)-Mr. Carrocher

Export Credits Guarantee Dept.- Mr. C.P. Rawlings

F.0./0.0.

Board of Trade

Ministry of Defence( Room 7365)-Mr. Henn

Consular Sept.

Mr. J.A.B. Darlington

7163)-Major Koe 5131) M.0.2.

SECRET

Cypher

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 24 May 1967

R. 24

12302

COON SE

אבלנןגבס וא

136)

1967

MAY

7 1

PAR

FLASH SECRET No.690

192

adopted.

Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.)

Repeated

"Peking No.262

"POLAD Singapore No.127 "Washington No.1 38

(S. of S. please pass PRIORITY to all)

132

My telegram No.680 (not repeated).

Following (?for Garner) from Galsworthy.

Following is a summary of the measures already

Maintenance of Public Confidence

2. Support of the Government's actions has been remarkably strong and widespread. Its open expression has been officially encouraged by all possible means and has been widely

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　H.M.G.'s publicised through the press, radio and television.

clear support has been of very great assistance in maintaining the momentum of this confidence. As this has been reiterated and as each new step taken here to maintain order is announced there has been a further surge in confidence.

This has proved

a disconcerting weapon for the Communists and we cannot afford to let it be blunted.

3. The Information Services Department has issued large quantities of useful counter-propaganda material against the excesses in the Communist press and this has been made full use of by the radio and the friendly press. This is biving on the Communist press which is devoting increasing space in attempts to defeat it.

4. The Department has also had marked success in promptly countering all malicious rumours (e.g. of rice or water shortages, or bank runs) put about by the Communists.

5. The Labour Department's achievement in obtaining a settlement of the dispute in the two artificial flower factories (one of which has already reopened) has had a good effect on confidence. It will continue to conciliate wherever possible but stoppages of work in present circumstances tend to be political not industrial and in at least one case a conciliation officer was driven out by threats of physical violence.

6. The arrival shortly of H.M.S. BULWARK is likely to have a very good effect on confidence generally. Primarily, however, confidence depends on the ability of the police to maintain order.

/Maintenance

SECRET

Maintenance of Public Order

The

　70 The Police Force went over to its emergency organisation after the second violent incident at the artificial flower factory at San Po Kong on 11 May. auxiliary police (some 2,400 volunteers) were called out on the same day. The turnout was 99.5%. The Government Emergency

Control Centre also opened on 11 May.

　8. Very great restraint has been exercised throughout. Processions, assemblies in public places and the sticking of posters on public buildings, although unauthorised and therefore unlawful, were tolerated so long as demonstrators remained reasonable despite extreme provocation of the Police by way of shouted abuse, assault and incitement to disaffection. It has, however, been necessary because of increasing rowdiness to prohibit and disperse further unlawful assemblies and processions since 20 May, although until 22 May parties of 20 were still permitted to present petitions personally at Government House.

9. Where violence (stone throwing at the Police, hooliganism, and damage to property etc.) has occurred minimum force (626 rounds of tear gas, batons and 329 baton shells) has been successfully used to stop it. No firearms have been used (except 3 revolver shots wounding one man by a constable over whom petrol was thrown). It has not been necessary to call upon any military forces to help maintain order.

10. Generally speaking, disturbances have occurred principally in North-east and West Kowloon, in the areas of Government House, the Central District of Victoria, and the Magistrate's Courts. The Emergency Court's Regulations made on 23 May empower Courts to exclude the public other than bona fide press representatives. This has been necessary because chanting and screaming mobs within and around Courts had made hearings impossible.

11. The Emergency (Prevention of Inflammatory Speeches) Regulations have been made today to enable the Police to deal quickly and effectively with the public address systems which have for some time been operating from private buildings and blaring forth inflammatory and provocative Communist propaganda and incitement to violence and disaffection. Inability to take effective action under the existing law has had a bad effect on public morale.

12. Disruption of public life by official action has been restricted to curfews, the temporary diversion of traffic in areas of disturbances and the temporary closure of some schools. A night curfew was imposed in parts of Kowloon on the nights of 11, 12, 13, and 18 May and in the Northern part of Hong Kong Island on 22 May.

13. Total arrests to date have been 788, of whom 42 were released or acquitted. Of the remainder 439 have been

convicted and 307 cases are pending or unconcluded. Known casualties have been: Police 36, demonstrators 70. Of these two Police and 14 others were admitted to hospital. Only death has been the bystander killed by a stone.

SECRET

/Other Measures

SECRET

Other Measures

14.

　It has not been necessary to call out any units of the (Volunteer) Essential Services Corps to maintain essential services. Apart from some stoppages and reduction in land transport services, all public utilities have continued to function normally.

　　　　　　　There has been no interruption in food or water supplies from China; rice stocks are at present good. Food prices have remained generally steady.

15. The Auxiliary Air Force has been called out since 11 May so as to provide "spotter" assistance for the police with its helicopters.

16. Every effort has been made to maintain contact through intermediaries with individual Communists of influence. While at present little can be achieved through these channels it is clearly important to keep them open.

(Passed as requested and advance copy

for Sir Saville Garner)

Distribution

H.K. W.I.D. 'C'

I.G.D.

J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:

P.S. to Prime Minister Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

D.I.O., J.I.R.

- P.S. to Mr. Rodgers

Mr. de la Mare

Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Treasury

Mr. Dens on

- Mr. Foggon

Jad

Export Credits Guarantee

Department

Ministry of Defence

Board of Trade

Mr. D. Hawkins

Mr. C.P. Rawlings (Room 7365) - Mr. Henn

(Room 7163)- Major Koe (Room 5131)

M.0.2

- Mr. J.A.B. Darlington

SECRET

Cypher

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

CC:

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 24 May 1967 R. 24

1 31 02

137)

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 62 25:

HWAY/N

751

MAY

# 12

1907

2:10

FLASH SECRET No.691

130

155

action.

Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D. Repeated PRIORITY to: Peking No.263

POLAD Singapore No.128 Washington No.1 39

(S. of S. please pass to all)

My telegram No.680 (not repeated). (133

Following from Galsworthy.

६.

Following is summary of our views on possible future

International Aspects

1. Any deterioration in our relations with Peking runs the risk of adversely affecting the situation over Hong Kong. We therefore again strongly advise no action be taken against N.C.N.A. in London (Hong Kong telegram No.682).

2. Providing we hold on successfully in Hong Kong and the Communist campaign slackens, it may well eventually become necessary to offer Peking some way out which they at least can claim saves their face as a means of terminating the whole incident. This, however, we should only do from a position of strength. The enormous difficulty is to find anything suitable to offer as a face-saving gesture and then to find a means of "offering" it, without giving Peking the idea that we are weakening. This would lead to further demands, which we would find it increasingly difficult to resist as did the Portuguese in Macao.

3. The Governor is considering whether there is anything local which could be used in this way. Another possible course is as follows. It would in any case be helpful if we could work out with the Americans a reduction of their use of Hong Kong for the rest and recreation of their armed forces. As regards naval visits, could these for example be restricted as a general rule to small units, with only occasional and well-spaced visits by major units? If we could establish such a position, while there could clearly be no question whatsoever of our "negotiating" over this with Peking, it might nonetheless be possible for them to claim it as a success. We would not of course admit this. We ro.ise the difficulties, but feel it is worth considering.

II.

Internal Aspects

4. The maintenance of law and order here, which is obviously the first essential, seems to us to require that the Governor should be authorised to deport (and failing that detain) selected Communist leaders, if the situation deteriorates to the point of demanding it (see his telegram No.677).

SECRET

121

15.

114

SECRET

5. Although the Governor is reluctant to take measures against the Press (see paragraph 4 of his telegram No.677),(2) Emergency Regulations have been approved by Executive Council but not yet made, providing powers for dealing with inflammatory posters in public places and for the temporary closing down if necessary of printing presses. We agree tha if a stage is reached at which action against the Communist press has to be considered, this would be a much swifter and more effective method of action than prosecuting them through the Courts. If there were a substantial deterioration in the present situation, we might well have to contemplate action on these lines.

　　The Governor has already been authorised to close selected places if necessary, by means of closed area orders as proposed in his telegram No.662 paragraph 3.

This power has not yet been used in view of the present lull.

7. The presence of U.K. military forces in Hong Kong is one of the basic factors in maintaining public morale, and very directly also the morale of the Police. It would have a most adverse effect here if it became known that we intended to withdraw a major unit. We feel therefore that this decision should be shelved for the time being.

8. Apart from the suggestion in paragraph 7, probably the most helpful contribution we can make from London at the present moment is to repeat H.M.G.'s support for the Hong Kong Government in their measures to maintain law and order; and to do this in a way which will convince people here that we intend to stay in Hong Kong.

(Passed as requested and advance copies to

Sir Saville Garner, Mr. Wilson and

Distribution

Mr. de la Mare).

H.K. W.I.D. 'C' I.G.D.

J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:

P.S. to Prime Minister

'Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

帏

字

Treasury

D.I.O., J.I.R. P.S. to Mr. Rodgers Mr. de la Mare

Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wils on

Mr. Denson

Mr. Foggon

Export Credits Guarantee

Department

Board of Trade Ministry of Defence

Mr. D. Hawkins

- Mr. C.P. Rawlings

Mr. J.A.B. Darlington (Room 7365) Mr. Henn

Room 7463) Major Koe (Roon 51 31) - M.0.2

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE CO) KONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

138,

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.63

25twat vol

なんとり

Cypher

D. 24 May 1967

R. 24

13352

IMMEDIATE SECRET No.693

COPY FOR RESISTRATION

Addressed to Commonwealth Office

"Peking No.264

"POLAD Singapore No.129 "Washington No.140

(S. of S. please pass PRIORITY to all)

Repeated

EXOT

124

157

DADO

My telegram No.678.124,

Sitrep as at 24 2000 hours.

The day has again been one of uneasy calm. The

emphasis has been on industrial action, mainly in the transport services, with intimidation playing a substantial part. The threat of effective counter measures has quietened all pro- Communist broadcasting over loud-speakers except from the Bunk of China which was again effectively jammed.

　　　There has been a mainly effective attempt to paralyse public transport on Hong Kong Island. The Tramway Company has continued to operate at 50% efficiency. Only a very few buses of the Dhina Kotor Bus Company were in operation. In both cases there were reports of successful intimidation. The pro-Communist faction in the Kowloon Motor Bus Company succeeded in keeping all buses off the road until 0900; thereafter services were normal. We do not know what the situation will be tomorrow.

Other developments on the labour front have been a two-hour token strike by workers in the Hong Kong and Whampao Dock Co. Ltd. and continued Communist intransigence in the Government workshops where repairs on Police vehicles have virtually ceased. Right-wing and neutral workers have taken leave. Action to deal with this is under consideration.

4. There are rumours that the Communists are putting pressure on their supporters, sympathisers and those over whom they have some form of economic control such as small shopkeepers selling mainland goods, to raise money and support for a major effort in the near future. We can foresee continued harassment through industrial action such as we have encountered this week, always with the possibility of a larger scale series of strikes. Nevertheless we still do nut believe that the Communists will risk alienating the whole population by a general strike or one in any of the major services such as electricity, telephones of water.

(Passed as requested with advance copies for

Foreign Office F.E. Dept.)

SECRET

Distribution

SECRET

Distribution

H.K. W.I.D. 'C' I.G.D.

J.1.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:

P.S. to Prime Minister Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

- D.I.O., J.I.R.

- P.S. to Mr. Rodgers - Mr. de la Mare

Treasury

Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson - Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawkins

Export Credits Guarantee Department Ministry of Defence (Room 7365)

(Room 7163) Room 5131)

Foreign Office /Commonwealth Office

Board of Trade

Mr. C.P. Rawlings Mr. Henn

Major Koe

M.0.2

Consular Dept.

- Mr. J.A.B. Darlington

SECRET

PHER/CAT A

FLASH

PEKING

TELECRAM NO. 570

はxerox

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

24 MAY 1967

FOARIX

139

"""Pus⋅ Roa

Mr homers Sir D Willen

Mr.delo slave..... Hal. F.E. Snor (

Ha. S.E.AD

Co.

P.S. Pus⋅

LAST

RIF

CONFIDENTIAL

FLASH.

DID

Depot·L

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 398 : MEASURES AGAINST CHINESE,

Restlyth

Dopic

(bults

IF YOU EXPEL ACTING CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AND OTHER MEMBERS OF CHINESE

CAFF THE CHINESE WILD OF COURSE DE BOUND TO RETALIATE. APART FROH

NSELF THEY ARE LIKELY TO CONCENTRATE ON CHINESE SPEAKERS. THE

RESULT WOULD OF COURSE DI TO REDUCE DRASTICALLY THE EFFECTIVENESS

CF THIS MISSION AT A PARTICULARLY VITAL POINT IN CHINESE HISTORY AND

ASO WITH REGARD TO HONG KONG IN ANGLO-CHINESE RELATIONS. IS THIS

KHAT WE WANT?

NEED

2, I REALISE THE NEED TO MAKE SO..E RETALIATORY GESTURE, DUT I MUST WTH RESPECT POINT OUT THAT IN THE GAME OF DIPLOMATIC WARFARE THE CILLESE CAN TRUMP OUR EVERY CARD. THEY CONTROL EVERYTHING HERE, AND

THEY PROBABLY DO HOT BUCH CARE O RESTRICTED THEIR STAFF ARE ABROAD. I THEREFORE FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO THICK OF ANY EFFECTIVE ETALIATORY MEASURE WHICH WOULD NOT REBOUND MORE HARDLY ON CURSELVES AND REDUCE THE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF THIS MISSION.

3. AS SEEN FROM HERE THE MOST EFFECTIVE STEP AND THE LEAST DAYAG- ING TO OUR INTERESTS WOULD BE ACTION AGAINST NCNA, I WOULD

PREFER GRADUATED ACTION AS PROPOSED IN MY TELCORAM NO 560 BUT IF YOU FEEL IT IS ESSENTIAL TO DO SOMETHING MORE DRASTIC I WOULD DE

1.ED TO RICK THE CONQUENCES OF COMPLETE CLOSURE, THE DIS-

TARNICE OF REUTERS HERE WOULD DE HO GREAT LOSS TO US (:0

•

STION ON T.

BRESPONDENT IS

RED). IT IS POSSIBLE

¡PPEARANCE OF REUTERS HERE WOULD BE NO GREAT LOSS TO Us (1:0

FLECTION OF THEIR CORRESPONDENT IS INTENDED), IT IS POSSIBLE MOUGH NOT I THINK CERTAIN THAT THEY WOULD RETALIATE AGAINST THIS

OFICE. IN ANY CASE YOU HAVE A FINE QUOTE CASUS BELLI UNQUOTE WITH THIS MORNING'S NCN A REPORT ON HONG KONG (Y TELEGRAM NO 563).

4. NEVERTHELESS I THINK WẸ RUST TRY TO CEE THIS PROBLEM IN PER- SPECTIVE. THE AFFRONT TO THE DIGNITY OF MEMBERS OF MY STAFF HAS DEEN GRAVE, AS IS THE UNILATERAL BREAK OF AN AGREEMENT, BUT THE ACTUAL LOSS OF SHANGHAI IS IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES OF LITTLE KIPORTANCE TO US. THE MAIN INTEREST OF H M G IN THIS QUESTION AS CIEN FROM HERE IS TO MAINTAIN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ITS MISSION IN CHINA. TO JEOPARDISE THIS IN ORDER TO MAKE A DEMONSTRATIVE GESTURE CF RETALIATION WOULD I AM SURE BE WRONG. I REALISE SOME RESPONSE

G NECESSARY. BUT I HOPE THIS MAY BE LIMITED IN THE LONG TERM INTER- CTS OF HG TO SOMETHING (E G, ACTION AGAINST # C# A) WHICH

SHOULD NOT SERIOUSLY AFFECT OUR EFFICIENCY.

HOPSON

SENT AT 17122/24 HAY

RCCD AT 18072/24 MAY

Cypher

CONFIDENT IAL

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

140

Sent 24 May, 1967. 1950Z

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1029.

123

Following telegram of 23 May from Tamsui addressed

to Foreign Office No. 21 repeated for information to Political Adviser Hong Kong No. 7, Peking and Washington.

Begina.

General themes of local press comment on recent events in Hong Kong have been:-

(1)

(11)

Britain is paying the penalty for having perpetually bowed and scraped to Peking since 1950;

the authorities in Hong Kong are standing firm and will not cower before pressure from Peking as did Portuguese in Macao. Nevertheless they have been too lenient and should get tougher with rioters;

(iii) pro-Nationalist in Hong Kong should offer large scale

resistance to rioters.

　2. There has been much speculation here that disturbances will result in flight of capital and trained workers to Formosa but although Nationalists would no doubt welcome this, "Government" sources have denied they will entice them away.

　3. Sub-paragraph ↑(111) is unlikely to represent views of Nationalist leaders here. My information from (group undecypherable) sources is that leaders advocate restraint and non-involvement by their supporters in Hong Kong and are encouraging them to co-operate with the authorities. This attitude would almost certainly change if it were thought that Her Majesty's Government were likely to reach some form of settlement resulting in suppression of nationalist organisations in the Colony.

UST

Distribution H.K.W.I.D. 'C'

123

CONFIDENTIAL

pp.

Ends.

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.63

リ

HWA 1/17

KOWLOON DISTURBANCES

APRIL/HAY, 1967.

141

The origin of the disturbances was astrictly industrial in charactor and datos back to a 1bour disputo,which arose during the wook ending 6th ny, in two factories (ono, in long kong and ono in Kowloon) belonging to an artificial flower factory. The dispute arose as the result of the introcastion by the managanent, during April, of revised shift arrangements and new method of calculating wagon in the injection moulding dopartnonta of the two factorios in question. The total number of workers affected was 264 in the Hong Kong factory and 394

in the Kowloon factory. Discussions are understoo: to have taken place between the management and the workers' reprecant tives but no agreement was reached. The procize issues discussed are not known. The following ia a diary of events.

29th April

The oxistence of the disputo was first notified to the Labour

Department by the managemont. The manager then reported that owing to

the obstructive attitude of the workers ho had closed the moulding

departzent of the Kowloon factory and had dismissed all the workors on

the 28th April. The closure of the moulding departant in the Hong

Kong factory appeared imminent to the management who also reported that

workers' reprosentativos had failed to attend a meeting arranged for

a discussion of the issuos in dispute.

lat May

مملم

The management reported to the labour repartɔent that all moulding workora hail beeli urskilyrðd in the 29th April 2nd indicated that they were opposed to any intervention by the Labour Department to arrango joint discussions.

3rd May

The Labour Departsont made daily attempts to make contact with the llong Kong and Kowloon Labour and Plastic Workers' Union (Loft-wing) but these approaches were avoided by the Union until the 6th lay when the Chairman doclined Labour Department assistanco and indicated that direct talks at the factory were all that was required. Concurrent approaches to the menagoment net with a similar response. The managemont made arrangements to pay off all the dismissed workers: about 20 1:ong Kong workers and 170 Kowloon workers, believed to bo left-wing or sympathetio did not accept payment.

→

/6th May

6th May

The dismissed workers who had assembled outside the Kowloon

factory for some days attempted to interfere with the movement of produce from the factory. Police intervention resulted in 21 arrests including that of the Union's Chairman.

7th May

The Rubber and Plastic Workers' Union pot in the evening

and attempted to put forwararku following demands:.

The immediate release of the arrested workers.

Punishment of the evil-doors and compensation.

Guarantee of the workers' personal safety.

No interference henceforth by the police in labour disputes.

8th Kav

The arrested workers appeared in Court. One had pleaded

guilty to a charge of unlawful assembly and was fined 100 H.K.dollars; the others pleaded not guilty and were remanded on bail until the 16th

Mey. Six workers who claimed to represent about 200 workers in the Hong Kong factory (mainly right-wing) asked the Labour Department to

inform the management of their desire to return to work. The line taken

in the loft-ing pross was that the British authorities in a planned and promeditatod way have organised a series of bloody repressions of

workers and patriots in the Kowloon area amounting to fascist violence.

Prose The serbere also referred to the increased use of Hong kong by "U.S. imperialism as an aggressive baso". It added that, ator the Xaçao affair many U.S./Ching elements concentrated in Hong Konɛ-

The pross st-903-that-they-would carry out their activities. British authorities in Hong Kong ought to recognise, the error that they committed on the 6th

acce Kay and angede the workers' nem ismodiato donanda.

9th May

Press

The left-wing membans reported that the Executive Committee of the Foderation of Trade Unions had issued a stateront condemning what it described as polico interference in labour disputes and the "unprecedented serious bloodshed and repressive violence". It alleged that sono 100 "patriotic workers" who had been bystanders had been boaton up. It accused the British authorities of attempting to treat the workers as criminals.

which

11th May

Press

The left -ing/contained allegations of police brutality

towards those arrested and of the lack of nodical attention for them. It also warned "those for Hong Kong British Special Agonta anil prison underlings who have beaten up the Chinese compatriots" that if they rozedn

obdurate national discipline will not tolor to them". The blood døbt they oma to compatriots will one day have to be paid.

Through the

aft noon workɑra demonstratod outside the Kowloon artificial flower

works and hold an illegal mooting which grow to sono 1.500 pers: ns. The

demonstrators pushed against the factory gates and the management onllød

on the police for protection. The police tried to ronson with tho

demonstrators but they persisted and bottles and rofuse were throw at the polioc. Scuffles developed and about 60 parsons more arrested. The police used batons and baton shells only. In the evening the situation deteriorated; the auxiliary polico more called out a e curfew covering

the disturbed area of N.E. Kowloon was dangzod fron 21.30 hours to 05.30

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Mople hours (12th llay). By £1.00 hours 90 had been arrested and 11 injured (ora seriously). At 21.45 hours four C.S.Gas shells wore fired in ono

instance, otherwise only batons and baton shells were used. In order

to provide personnel from the cuxiliary air force for helicopter observation duties the Governor authorised a limited call-out by the Commandor, Hong Kong Dofence Force. By midnight the affected area hed returned to nor al, cost police units wore withdrawn but mobile patrols contined to operate. 127 persons were arrested and 15 persons wore injured. A total of 53 can-shella had been fired during the morning and afternoon. Discussions wore known to be taking place between the Lofting Federation of Trade Unions and the nein left-wing unions. The Kowloon Motor Bus Co. opployees considered taking tokon strike action. Left-ing member continued their allegations against the British authorities, accusing them, inter alia, of "brazen anti-Chinese activity" and "taking "U.S. Imperialism chestnuts out of the firo". It also described the Governor as the "principal trouble-nakor" and alloged that "all the criminal responsibility for the series of bloody suppression ecainos must be laid at his door. It warned the Governor that the

Tho

It Booms

Chinese people-who have armed themselves with the over-victorious thoughts of Heu- are not to be trifled with". The Governor reported that all available information suggested that the disturbances on the 6th Kay had not boon planned in advance either by by the rubber and plastic workers' union or by any other organisation. The rank ani file had boon encouraged to develop a "stragglo" arcinst the nanngament and what started off as peaceful pickoting dogonorato into violenco. unlikely that the Hong Kong loft-ming leadership rore at this stage looking for a confrontation with Government but that the arrosts of the workers dispute became a political struggle with the result that the leadership now had little alternative but to exert all out pressure on the llong Kong Government to accept the demands (soe paragraph above) who had been made in the style of laceo. The loft-wing pross published

/thoir

otkey

their further demand that the Government should apologise to the arrested workers. Up to this tine there had been some indications that the left- wing had been trying to restrict the struggle to places where disputes vero actually taking place. However, it had become clear that they Creery having diffic.lty in now keeping the rank and filo under control. The disturbances recomenced by about mid-lny and the Governor imposol a curfox covering the same area as before, from 18.00 hours to 04.30 hours (13th May). The police intermittently had to deal with two

THE or three incidents involving groups of 200 - 300 persons. no police companies were then engaged. One police inspector, ono sorgeant and 15 police constables had been injured and 2 police constables detained The curfow was in hospital. Soveral cividians had also been injured. effective and the areas concerned were generally quiet apart from the odd incident. 3 police companies remained on patrol. One person was found on the 15th floor balcony of a re-settlement block on long Tai Sin with a fractured skull and subsequently died in hospital.

13th May

For the period 08.00 hours on 12th May to 06.00 hours on 13th lay, arrests totalled 106. 17 police on were injured (nono seriously) and there were no civilian casualties. The tone of the loft-wing members steadily deteriorated to such a degree that the possibility of prosecution eithor for seditious publications or other attempts to cause disaffection in the police forco presonted itself. A crend of 1000 2000 persons gathered at the plastic flower factory in Kowloon. Tho p lice moved

Subsequently

in to disperse it and made a call nurber of arrests. crowds gathered in four nearby re-settlement estatos. The police more attacked, cars set on fire and a block of staff quarters was also set on

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Sutreequentry firo. The situation became tanso,when it(becano Imów that the Federation of Trade Unions had established a "llong Kong and Kowloon all-industries Workers anti-persecution Committee" and had called for the establishment of an "all circles" Committee on Haono linos. Up to this point left-wing action outside the industries immediately concerned in the disputes had cen confined to mistering moral and financial support for the arrested workers and for the four demands referred to in above paragraph

A chango in this attitude now becaso apparent and there were indications that in many left-wing circles the line was being taken that the dispute hnd oscalated as a result of doliberate Govern ent aation and that the Left must therefore prepare for a further escalation.

the It became known that plans were, being made to organise A physical defence of left-wing pieritics and alco demonstrations in which children

(as in Kacao) would play a prominent part A stage of paychological

warfare had been reached in which the main weapons of the Left had been

Properties

/the

(So fosse quite unsuccesfoly

the sustained press campaign nimed at undermining the police

as well as discrediting the Government and i

destroyin

in its will and

public Confidence in it

to resist. Capacity to

*th Hay

15th Hay

A curfon was imposed from 19.00 hours, 13th lay to 04.00 hours

on the 14th May. During the period from 08.00 hours 13th Hay to

06.03 hours 14th May 110 arrests were unde bringing tho tot since the

disturbances started to 391. The Governor asked the U.. Consulate-

Genoral to arrange with the U.S. Raval cuthorities for the postpone-

nucloar

ment of tho visit to Hong Kong of the U.S.Warchip "MIHBRIDEE" which

had been scheduled for 19th May. The line taken by the loft-wing pebera

was that "the violence of the Hong Kong British continues to escalate.

The aroa, steeped in blood, continues to spread". A great deal of space

was devoted by the embors to calls for the formation of anti-

persecution struggle committees on the lines of that organised by the F.2.U. One left-wing newspaper (^~en Wei Pao")editorial alleged that

the Hong Kong British authorities were carrying out "mad racialist

suppression", that is to say, "wo are now freel with not only a class

struggle but also a racial struggle". Up to 6 p.n, thorɑ had been

only one minor incident during the day: one arrest had boon made

bringing to 392 the total number of arrests nale since the disturbances

started.

A left-wing member Pross editorial contained a reference to the

"impermissibility" of prosocuting the 21 workers arrested in the

incident of 6th May and due to appear for trial on the 16th May.

Infomation was received from Peking that the British Chargo d'Affairos

there had been summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that

norning and handed a copy of a statement by the Chinese Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, which is being published. The statement in offect

declared the solid support of the Chinese Government and people

for "their compatriota in Hong Kong"; domandad that the British

Government should instruct the British authorities in liong Kong to

accept the demanda put forward by the workers (seo paragraph

abovo; offer apologies" to the victims and compensato them for all

their losses"; adding that the Chinese Government and people were

determined to carry the struggle through to the end and thit should

the British Government and the British authorities in Hong Kong cling to their "averso course" they must be held roep nsible for all the

15th May

16th May

grave consequences arising therofrom.

Lator in the day the Governor issued a statement in Hong Kong

in the course of which he recalled assurances already given to the

public about the maintenance of lm and order. Ho alded that"tho

polico do not and will not involve themselves in labour disputes but

will only enforce the law when it is brokon."

The position remained quiot on the ground on thoro woro no

indications of umisial occurroncos in the frontier area, The courts

moro however familier with the situation in Macao in relation to

the Consular Forait Office and Consul'a roop nse was highly unsatisfactory.

Unruly groups had plastered the three buildings with posters and

alogans. The car of the Consul and Vice-Consul had boon similarly

иджей treated and rondered useless. The Fort üthorities had aade no effort

to intervene making it clear that they regarded the trouble as a quarrel

between the British and the Chinoso and that they did not propose to

become invlved. The Consul was forced to close the Consulate and he

ond the Vice-Consul vacated their rosidoneos and novod to an hotel.

The Governor reported that the reaction of the ordinary citizens

of Hong Kong left-wing mould depend on their judgment of how H.H.G.

would react and whether H.H.G. man fully determined that law and order

should be maintained. lio further reported that there was good evidence

that the statement that he had made (800 paragraph

above) had a

beneficial effect and had been widely volcomed. The Hong Kong Govern-

ment had boom trying for the past for days to stimulate local neutral

and non-left wing organisations and personalitius into coming out with

public expressions of a desire for ponce and at bility in Hong Kong

and with similar indications of lack of support for pro-ont left-wing

agitation. He suggested that any Hong Kong Cinoso groups in England

who could be stimulated into taking similar netion would possibly be

helpful.

/Tho

The loft-ring members took the line that the expression of

support by the Chinese Government should reinforce the confidence

of local patriots.

Poking reported that the Chinose Goverment would naturally

rogard any notion against their mouth-piocas in Hong Kong as a further

provacation not; and recommended that if possible no doɑision on

this (see paragraph

above) should be takon until it was seon how

the Chinese intended to proveed in Hong Kong and co long as thoro was

any hope of a compromiso.

16th May

Teking reported that demonstrations against the British Mission

had begun on the night of 15th Hoy, when the walls of Chancery, his

House, staff quariërs and many other parts of Feking were liberally

plastered with posters applauding the Chinero Ambassador's statement

end con.leaning the activities of the British and Hong Kong Governments.

The 20 persons arrested on 6th Hay (coo paragraph nbove)

appeared at the South Kowloon lagistrates' Court. A crowd of about

150 spectators had assemblad in Court and started chanting, a further

crowd of roughly the same number also joined in. The Court was

adjourned twice when the Director for Public Prosecutions applied for

a hearing in the absence of the general public (the members excepted).

This was agreed and the Court resumed and adjournod at 17.40 hours

until 17th May after only 2 prosecution witnesses had been heard. The

crowd dispersed peacefully.

PRIORITY MARKINGS

Emergency Immediate Priority

Reply urgently required

H.6.31

Tile No... HW11/12. DRAFT

*TELEGRAM

"SAVINGRAM

* Delete whichever is inapplicable. If necessary, "Priority" may be inserted before "Savingram."

Mr........Hall

Mr....

Mr.

phoned

Mr........

Sir......

745

Permt. U.S. of S.

Parly. US. of S.

Minister of State

Secretary of State

ENCLOSURES

(Savingrams only)

Addressed

IMMEDIATE

(Insert appropriate priority marking)

Governor Hong Kong

HK 380

#631

No.

10381.

MEDIUM

SAVINGRAMS ONLY

Your reference

€.

Cypher

(Delete whichever

is inapplicable)

Seoret

{Insert appropriate security, etc., marking}

File References

SECURITY, ETC., MARKINGS

Top Secret Secret Confidential Restricted Linclassified Personal Guard

Repeated

142

12)

No.

(Insect appropriate priority marking)

Tapes // 5

FOR USE IN TELEGRAPH BRANCH of m

Despatched..

Code

On...........

재요..

.19

At.....

2241-2

Cypher OTT Simplex Eu clair

.Hrs.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

DISTRIBUTION AND

FURTHER ACTION

For Galsworthy from Hall.

Ministers will be discussing Hong Kong situation

on Thursday morning. I hope telegram approving Governor's

proposals will issue immediately thereafter but because of time faoter it will not reach Hong Kong until Thursday

night. I thought you would wish to know position before

your own departure.

N/e

PAD

NO PRINTING

Delete whichever

inapplicable)

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

(143)

Cypher

D. 22 May, 1967. R. 22

1100Z

こ

FLASH SECRET

No. 662.

Addressed to Commonwealth Office.

Repeated

"POLAD Singapore No. 115. "Peking No. 248. "Washington No. 129.

(s. of S. please pass FLASH to Singapore and Peking and PRIORITY to Washington).

My telegram No. 641.

Hong Kong Disturbances.

　　Over the past two days the situation has deteriorated. There has been an increase in the number of violent incidents, particularly in the central area of Hong Kong; and known pro-communist elements have been involved in many of these. An important feature has been the continuous broadcasting from the Bank of China (which has not opened for business today) of incitements to violence against Government and Europeans generally, including such slogans as "kill Trench", "police turn your weapons (i.e. against your Officers)". The pro-Communist press is giving full and approving accounts of violent action by demonstrators and calling for their extension. There have been token strikes today by the bus companies and taxis.

2. The key to the situation here is the maintenance of public confidence and especially police morale.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　The police have stood up very well to the harassments of the last few days, but there are two adverse factors in the situation: (a) fatigue which is now beginning to tell on them; and (b) the constant barrage of Communist propaganda directed specifically to the subversion and intimidation of the rank and file. We believe that Communist tactics over the next few days will be to create incidents in several places at once, so as to extend the police while maintaining the propaganda barrage. Public morale is still holding surprising well, but there is increasing interference with daily life; and there are signs that unless we are Been to take effective action to control the situation, instead of simply acting to block individual communist initiatives, public confidence will slip. A landslide could quickly follow.

ра

77A

MALT municheveri

SECRET

3. We have considered various new measures to deal with the situation. These include:-

(i) picking up and if possible deporting, and

failing that detaining, a selection (e.g. up to 24) of the known leaders of the present campaign;

(11)

(111)

action to neutralize several of the buildings from which the campaign is being directed, notably (i) the Bank of China and (ii) the communist-controlled Federation of Trade Union Head Quarters and the Workers' Club. This might be achieved by declaring 24 hour curfews in areas around the buildings, or possibly declaring them closed areas under the Public Order Ordinance (Cap. 245);

action against the principal communist newspaper "Wen Wei Po" the official C.P.G. organ in Hong Kong, for either sedition or inciting police to disaffection;

(iv) bring commando ship BULWARK on a visit to

Hong Kong,

4. Each of foregoing actions would entail certain amount of risk of escalation, and possible complications with Peking. We face a dilemma, in that:-

(2) we obviously wish so far as possible to avoid

action which could lead to more C.P.G. involvement (and there is some evidence C.P.G. themselves wish to

avoid this); but

(b) holding the situation here requires that Government

should retain the initiative.

Since (b) is imperative, we must be prepared to face some risk under (a). On this basis pros and cons of various courses in paragraph 3 above, as we see them are as follows:-

Course (i)

The disruption of leadership would be a distinct and positive gain, at least in the short term. It would be seen by our friends here as firm action. But since it is unlikely that China would accept persons concerned as deportees, the probability is that they would have to be detained indefinitely in Hong Kong. This would provide local communists and Peking with a standing grievance, and would inevitably lead to creation of a further "demand".

Course (ii)

　　　　This would seriously hamper the communist leadership in their control and development of anti-Government operations. For a while they would be bottled up in their existing Headquarters, cut off from outside contacts. At very least

/it

{

SECRET

(

SECRET

it would disrupt their communications (e.g. Government could pick up all their couriers) And they might well eventually have to move to other premises where it would be easier for Government to keep them under closer

surveillance.

But this is not sufficient in itself, since the Bank building remains one of the principal rallying points for demonstrations; and anyhow we know it is one of the main communist control points.

Course (iii)

Course (iv)

8. It would take three and a half days for BULWARK to reach Hong Kong. Her presence here, with a commando aboard, would undoubtedly strengthen public and police morale, and both Commissioner of Police and CBF are strongly in favour. Her arrival here might be represented by Peking as sabre- rattling, although they could have no legitimate grounds for doing so. It would not of course be publicised here as a reinforcement, but simply as a routine visit. Practice here

- is not to publicise visits of H.M. ships in advance.

Recommendations.

　　　My advisers and I have discussed these courses with CBF, Galsworthy and Bolland, and we all agree in recommending course (ii) and course (iv) at this stage.

10. I am holding a meeting of my Executive Council tomorrow (Tuesday) morning, and I intend to seek their views on courses (i), (ii) and (iii), but on a contingency planning basis only. However, I would hope that I may have urgently your approval for courses (11) and (iv) and would welcome your early comments on the other two courses.

11.

Galsworthy will be telegraphing separately about useful discussions held this morning on labour matters.

Passed as requested with advance copies to

Foreign Office F.E. Dept.).

SECRET

/Distribution

SECRET

Distribution

H.K. WID 'C' I.G.D.

J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:-

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

Treasury

Export Credits Guarantee

Department

D.I.O., J.I.R. Mr. de la Mare

Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denвon

Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawkins

Mr. C.P. Rawlings.

SECRET

Miglin

(144)

Minister of State

163

Please sce Hong Kong telegram 662.

The Governor would like urgent approval of two courses of action. -

II Action to neutralise several of the

buildings from which the campaign is

being directed, i.c. notably the Bank of

China and the Communist-controlled Federation of Trade Union Headquarters,

and

that H.M.S. Bulwark, a Commando-carrier,

equipped with helicopters, should visit Hong Kong on a "routine visit".

When the telegram came in this morning I was

able to have a brief word with Sir Saville Garner

and his initial reation was that these two

courses should be approved. You will see from

paragraph 9 of the telegram thut

Sir Arthur Galsworthy and Mr. Bolland agree with these reactions and so does the Commander of the

British Forces in Hong Kong.

I have had a brief word with the Ministry of Defonce, who are urgently considering the question of the availability of H‚μ‚S. Bulwark, I shall also consult the Foreign Office.

I submit the draft of a short telegram which

I hope we will be able to clear with the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office this afternoon.

HOH.

(H.P. Hall) 22 May 1967

XXXX

SECRET

GOVERNER ZONG KENG

Í OLAD, SINGAPORE PEKING

CHHINGTON

Your telegrum No. 662.

Disturbances.

Ministero approve courses II and IV.

2. (A course 11 imposition of curier might be

preferable to declaration of closed areas but

Ministers leave decision on actual method to you.

3. On course IV Ministry of telence ore

issuing necessary instructions forthwith.

24. Comments on other to ecurses will follow:

luter.

145

The Acpula Under-fecretary in change of The Dependent Tentoni

　Dursion of Commonweddin office is at present in Hong Kong, wieră other officials,

ма

As my colleagues will be aware, the present

troubles in Hong Kong had their origin in a labour

dispute, which was not handled wisely by

management in its early stages somewhat provocatively7. It was after a lockout and wholesale dismissals that the

Concernel.

1250

first scuffles occurred, outside the factory We have

now heard that the dispute is over, and that there has

been a resumption of work.

A full account of the history of the disturbance is quien at Annex A.

However, the origin seems now to be probably almost

irrelevant in the light of the pattern of demonstrations

and violence of the last ten days. It may help my

colleagues to know that on the whole the assessments and

analyses of television and responsible press reports

in the last few days accord with my own interpretation,

based on the most reliable sources available to us. Briefly

this is as follows.

(a) A loosening of control by mainland China of the

C.P.G. in Hong Kong has resulted from recent developments

in the Cultural Revolution, The first mass demonstrations

in Hong Kong were probably promoted independently by the

C.P.G. there, in an opportunist desire to make the most

of genuine labour unrest

(b) Mainland China had to react to the situation, and

chose to give support to the C.P.G. in Hong Kong.

3. The unknown factor in the present crisis is how

far mainland China has now decided to go in bringing

pressure on IMG, and how far there are different views

there on future policy.

4. The possible interpretations of the Chinese course

on the assumption

of action, that she is now controlling events, appear

to be these:-

(i) China has decided to try to force us to

accept a Macao position in Hong Kong,

this is so, she will continue to escalate

Hong Kong disturbances to the point when,

in order to remain in Hong Kong, we must

capitulate to whatever demands are made, and,

in effect, accept Chinese domination of Hong Kong.

(11) China has decided to sacrifice the economic

benefits she derives from Hong Kong to Cultural

Revolution "purity" of doctrine, and to drive us out

qf Hong Kong completely,

(iii)

China has made no basic policy decision, but is

trying to achieve some propaganda victory as the

price for calling-off the disturbances. Such

a propaganda gain could relate to the presence

of American ships and troops from Vietnam on

leave in Hong Kong; or to labour reforms;

to the release from prosecution or

of the

imprisonment

charged with or sentenced

for their role in the riots,

Our aim must continue to be that of restoring order

and peace in Hong Kong. We have so far acted with both firmness and restraint. But the police are now tired, and

it is clear that if disturbances continue we shall have to use troops. This in itself may provoke Chinese escalation, both both in Hong Kong itself and in mainland China.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　We must therefore consider HMG's interests very carefully indeed.

I convinced that a Macao solution would be unacceptable. It would be damaging to our international prestige (at a

we face a hamber of problems).

Crucis

very

time when Gibraltar and Adep are presenting-several problems) It would be intolerable for, the Governor, and impossible in

/terms

ידיד rחt-

terms

affan's of my responsibility for Hong Kong in Parliament, This being so, it follows that if China is embarking upon course (i), our resistance to it will

compel her to resort to (ii) or (iii). If she has decided, or later decides upon (ii), an alternatives

would be to resist which could would mean war

to withdraw.

Withdrawal would represent an unpleasant recognition

of the realities of the situation. I am very much

concerned that if this proves inevitable, our decision to withdraw should be so made and so implemented as to

preserve as much of our dignity as is possible. To

scuttle out hastily under intensive Chinese pressure

would be intolerable.

I therefore propose to inform.

my colleagues if my information should lead me to the belief that withdrawal is likely to be inevitable, and I am in the meantime preparing contingency plans

for withdrawal, in consultation with the Secretary of

State for Defence.

9. If, however, we are facer win

Course (li), I must ask my

to consider one o

Colleague to

more the following possibilities Open to us.

(a) We could proceed vicposonsty

and effectively to carry one lasoin reformis.. I have been engaged in dócussion with the Hong Kong Government Krough The Goreiner, aboni. Theme

in any

But there

case;

has been á considerable Amount of resistance pour The "employers represent alwes on the Executive Counci

In early Mary (?) I insisted.

on land

аска

eary achai particular aspect. The

one

employers are at present very anxious asamitié qemeral Situation

commimediarely

and we

Comedy Cams Inrough extensive.

Cany And long-overdue labomi reforms (outlined in Annex B), I woved like to do this; But the taboon reform

is labour

Aptar, earth It woner be welcome! by the average Worker in Hong Kong and woned give us

à bener

moral position but it woner be unlikely to satisty, China:

·Nevertheless of the Chinese decision were to Mayap. Mas seek a lowering of the temperature, she might.

well clami a

4 we do

viday. In shove

what is certainty

right we may gave que China a face-Saving Pormnia at the cost of her claim to a propaganda gain

(by we comes withdraw

Consent

to American leave

visits to HK in the

Knowledge that her troops.

Corned wake

стече

use kai

they do ar present of Bangkok. And Manila. As The effect of this would be gradual. as it became realised thei no further visits were taking place. (At the moment, we

have cancelled Thure (?) inipending nails) which wit abonent take place) Qui in die

the Chinese toned.

Com se

слалий

a significans

propaganda gani

ANRA because of thei Concern with Russian attitudes, the's woned

winous donor be meaningful to them manner.

We comer make concessions in relation to changes, and sentences already passes upon those who participared in the nits. The Chinese.

прог

that we

pumili

conneme

Annart

shoven

are the

them

aporigin

to the "vistime

は

Chemi

сотр

110.

"demands" included Thi's wome's now bein

accord win the legal and Come procedures in HK

and I

it.

مه

не

not recommend

I therefore ask my colleagues to endorse the general. Conclusions reached in

6,7 and

sara!! 8 and to decide:

Whelner

showed to

Mamão pursue either (a) or (b) above

а вый

ין

146

SECRET

HONG KONG

Outline of Paper for OPD

We have always known that Hong Kong was vulnerable.

But it is valuable to China and we had assumed that it was

Indeed there

in her interests to maintain the status quo. has been evidence in the past that the Central Government

have controlled and restrained the Communists in the territory.

The scene has now changed. Arising out of labour troubles

a major campaign has been amounted in Hong Kong itself linked with hostile demonstrations in Shanghai and Peking and with

the expulsion of our representative in Shanghai. A loosening of

control by mainland China of the Communists in Hong Kong has

resulted from recent developments in the Cultural Revolution. The first mass demonstrations in Hong Kong were probably promoted

independently by the Communists there, in an opportunist desire

to make the most of genuine labour unrest. Mainland China had

to react to the situation, and chose to give support to the C.P.G.j

in Hong Kong.

3. The unknown factor in the present crisis is how far mainland

China has now decided to go in bringing pressure on HMG, and

how far there are different views there on future policy.

4. The possible interpretations of the Chinese course of action, assuming

that she is now controlling events, appear to be these:

change

(i) China has made no basic policy decision, but is trying

to achieve some propaganda victory as the price for

calling-off the disturbances. Such a propaganda gain could relate to the presence of American ships and troops from

Vietnam on leave in Hong Kong; or to labour reforms;

to the release from prosecution or imprisonment of the

persons charged with or sentenced for their role in the

riots.

PAGO

SECRET

/ (ii)

よ

SECRET

(ii)

China has decided to try to force us to accept

a Macao position in Hong Kong. If this is so, she will continue to escalate Hong Kong disturbances to the point when, in order to remain in Hong Kong, we must capitulate to whatever demands are made, and, in effect,

accept Chinese domination of Hong Kong.

(iii) China has decided to sacrifice the economic

benefits she derives from Hong Kong to Cultural

Revolution "purity" of doctrine, and to drive us out

of Hong Kong completely.

We cannot resist a determined attempt to force us out

altogether and we could not tolerate the humiliation of

remaining in Hong Kong without effective control. But there

is no need to assume the worst and our immediate responsibility

is to maintain law and order, retain morale and confidence so

that the economy can continue to flourish. Firm action is

required to do this but, at the same time we should avoid,

as far as possible, action which could be regarded by the

C.P.G. as provocative. We should avoid doing anything to

"escalate the confrontation" to the extent that we get

involved in a situation from which there is no escape except by abject surrender or a futile attempt to fight it out,

leading to the same result, Our steps, therefore, must be

directed to the needs of the local security situation while

taking the wider implications into account, and they need

to be carefully measured and timed.

SECRET

16.

SECRET

6. Recommendations

(i) Local Security

(a) We are already sending the Commando Carrier

BULWARK to Hong Kong where she should arrive by

the end of this week.

(b) The governor has already been authorised to

neutralise several of the buildings from which

the campaign is being directed,

up and, if possible, deport (or failing that,

detain) a selection of up to 24 known leaders of

the present campaign. The disruption of the

leadership would be a distinct and positive gain

and would be seen by the majority of the population

as firm action. On the other hand it is unlikely that

the Chinese Government would accept these leaders as

deportees and, if they were detained in Hong Kong,

this would provide Peking and the local Communists

with a grievance. The Governor has undertaken not

to use this weapon lightly or unnecessarily and, on

balance, I recommend that he should be given the

authority to go ahead if the situation requires it.

(d) Action against the principal Communist newspaper

which is the official C.P.G. organ in Hong Kong.

The Governor accepts that prosecutions for sedition

or inciting the police to disaffection might have

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　duotina dangerous repercussions, and is proposing to seek

emergency powers to close down the printing press,

h but/would only take action after consulting me on

each individual case. I would propose to give him

a general authority on this understanding.

/(ii)

SECRET

(ii) Labour

Relations between employees and employers in Hong Kong have not been good and we should do our

best to improve matters.

　　　　Less than 12% of the total working force are declared members of trade unions

and there are 100,000 members of the Communist

Unions as opposed to 70,000 others.

The Communist

Unions are basically disinterested in genuine industrial issues. I recommend that we should press the Governor to go ahead vigorously with improvements

in the labour legislation including early steps to

shorten the hours of work of women and young persons.

(iii) Other Matters

(a) Facilities to the U.S.

In the background of our difficulties with

the C.P.G. lies their irritation at the

facilities which the U.S. forces in Vietnam

enjoy in Hong Kong. We have latterly restricted

number visits of warships to the same as last year and

more recently have suggested that larger ships

should not come. I do not recommend any further !

immediate action since any significant

diminution would be claimed by the Chinese as

a propaganda victory. But I am sure that this

is something that we should keep under review

in the longer term.

(b) Military Planning

I suggest that contingency planning should

be set in hand with regard to the implications

of:-

(i) a prolonged confrontation with Communist

China;

ii) withdrawal7.

SECRET

St.S.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

97499

Registry No.

Top Secret. Secret. Confidential. Restricted. Unclassified.

DRAFT

O.P.D. PAPER

Type 1 +

To:-

From

Telephone No. & EIL

Department

Memorandum by the Commonwealth Secretary

Situation in Hong Kong

A background note on the recent

disturbances ie at annex.

The policy of the Hong Kong Government

has been to deal firmly with any disorders

which the Communists may try to instigate

but at the same time to avoid so. far as

possible action which could be regarded by

the Chinese Peoples Government as

unnecessarily provocative.

3. One encouraging feature is that many

public organisations have rallied behind

the Government's attempts to maintain peace. in

Hong Kong. But there are already signe

that unless the Hong Kong Government are seen

to take effective action to. control the

situation, instead of simply acting to block

individual Communist initiatives, public

confidence will slip. Once this occurs a

landslide could quickly follow.

4. The key to the situation is the

maintenance of public confidence and especiall

police morale, The police have stood up to

the situation very well but:-

(a) fatigue is now beginning to tell on

them; and

(b) the constant barrage of Communist

propaganda

gand

propaganda, directed specifically to

the submission and intimidation of the

rank and file, could begin to take

effect if allowed to continue unchecked.

The Governor has been given authority

to neutralize several of the buildings from

which the campaign is being directed by

declaring 24 hour curfews in the areas round

the building, or by declaring closed areas

around them. This will, initially, disrupt their

communications and seriously hamper their

control of operations. If they move to other

premises it would be easier for the Hong

Kong Government to keep them under closer

surveillance,

The Commando Carrier "Bulwark" has been

ordered to Hong Kong and should arrive on the

May. Her presence will strengthen public

and police morale.

The Governor has also recommended

(1) picking up and if possible deporting

(and failing that detaining) a

selection (e.g. up to 24) of the known

leaders of the present campaign;

and

(ii) action against the principal Communist

newspaper "Wen Wel Po", the official

C.P.G. organ in Hong Kong, for either sedition or inciting the police to

disaffection.

The disruption of the leadership would

be a distinct and positive gain, at least in

the

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

SECRET

the short term. It would be seen by the majority of

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　On the other hand the population as firm action.

it is unlikely that the Chinese Government would accept

these leaders as deportees and they would have to be

detained in Hong Kong. This would provide Peking

and the local Communists with a standing grievance and

a further "demand".

The newspaper "Wen Kei Po" is in flagrant breach

of the law and if its activities continue to be

ignored it may well be taken as a sign of weakness.

There are nine other Communist newspapers in Hong

Kong which could continue the campaign unless

similar action were taken against them. Action

against these newspapers would certainly be regarded

by Peking as provocation.

10. Labour Relati ons. The Communist dominated

trade unions are basically disinterested in genuine

industrial issues, except in so far as they can

exploit them for political ends.

Indeed, their

demand is not for more Government involvment in

labour relations but precisely the contrary the

Government should stay out of labour disputes and

leave them to be settled by direct "struggle"

between management and labour on cultural revolutionary

lines. Less than 12% of the total working force

of about 1.5m. are declared members of trade unions

(100,000 favouring the Communist F.T.U., 40,000 the

right-wing T.U.C. and 30,000 neutrals) and paid-up

membership are smaller (9% of the labour force).

11.

SECRET

11.

Hours of work for women and young children.

There is a split between the employers and workers'

representatives on this issue, but the recent events

are likely to have put the employers in a more

receptive frame £ of mind. The Governor has

suggested that a possible method of reducing the hours

of work would be by legislation to empoĝer the

Commissioner of Labour (by regulation):-

(i) to introduce at once a 48 hour week for

individual industries where this is not

already the universal practice;

(ii) to introduce at once in industries where the

48 hour week is the common but not the

universal practice, a 48 hour week with

permissive overtime, about 12 hours per week

for individual factories;

(iii) to work out a phased programme for the

12.

reduction of the standard working week for all

other industries, with the object of bringing

them all ultimately to 48 hours.

The Governor also considers that now is the

moment to announce that the Hong Kong Government, with

the advice and assistance of H.M.G., intends to proceed

with a review and Expanнtix expansion of its labour

legislation, on which considerable preliminary work has already been done (there are about 30 pieces of legislation at various xxx stages of preparation).

He would welcome expert assistance from H.M.G. in

carrying out this review and considers that an expert

SECRET

would

SECRET

would need to be lent to the Hong Kong Government

for a period of between 6-12 months. He has asked

for the services of Miss S.A. Ogilvie (Assistant

Labour Adviser, Ministry of Overseas Development)

for this purpose.

13.

Available information suggests that the

disturbances of 6 May and later were not instigated

from China but occurred partly because control over

pro-Communist organisations in Hong Kong fron

The

China had slackened and local leaders had taken the

initiative in acting in a militant fashion which

they believed to be in keeping with the present

atmosphere within China. Since the tk 15 May, however,

Peking has supported the Hong Kong pro-Communist Chinese "demands" and after large scale demonstrations

in Peking and the xak sacking of the office in

Shanghai have closed down the Shanghai Office.

Russians (Moscow telegram 848 of 20 May) have also

begun to taunt Peking about the Chinese lack of

interest in undermining the colonial regime in Hong

Kong, trade with which yielded more than half China's

foreign currency earnings. The Chinese may

themselves also hope that by putting pressure on Hong

Kong they can prevent it being used by American

warships and leave personnel.

14. The dilemma we face is that determined and firm

action against the pro-Communist leaders and newspapers

in Hong Kong is essential if we are to retain control

over

SECRET

over the situation in Hong Kong. But such action

is likely to provoke retzkittxury retaliatory

action by the Chinese Government. The Chinese could

cut off water and food supplies but the major effect

of doing so would be to injure the interests of the Hong Kong Chinese population generally, including their pro-Communist supporters. Even if these

supplies were cut off, Hong Kong could manage by

strict rationing and alternative supplies of food from

Japan at extra cost.

15. A long drawn out confrontation could sap the

morale of the Chinese and continuous widespread

disturbances could lead to fatigue on the part of the

police. But it would also affect the pro-Communists

unless they were able at an early stage to secure some

resounding success.

16. The alternative to firm action is likely to be

further humiliation and a gradual loss of control

over the situation in Hong Kong. We would only be

able to remain there on sufferance and we would have

to carry out the instructions of Peking and remove from

Hong Kong any organisations or interests which the

Chinese Government considered hostile or unfriendly.

Many Chinese and others who had thrown in their lot

with us, especially those in the public services and

the police, would be at risk.

17.

Conclusion.

a) The risk of an all-out confrontation with

China should be accepted.

(b) The known pro-Communist leaders of the

SECRET

present

SECRET

present campaign should be picked up and

deported if possible, or detained.

newspaper "Wen Wei Po" and against other

Communist newspapers if they continue the

campaign of sedition and intimidation.

(a) The Governor should announce the review and

AXE¤nsatin expansion of Hong Kong's labour

legislation including steps being taken to

improve conditions of service.

We should

assist by providing expert assistance for this

purpose.

SECRET

ANNEX

Hong Kong Disturbances

Events in Kowloon

The recent disturbances in Kowloon arise from an industrial

dispute in April between workers and their employers about wages

and conditions of employment involving 650 workers in two factories

producing artificial flowers. The injection moulding sections of

both factories were closed and the workers were dismissed. The

Labour Department of the Hong Kong Government offered to help the

parties to reach agreement but this was refused by both prties.

2. Disturbances broke out on the 6th May outside one of the

factories situated in Kowloon and as a result 21 persons were

arrested.

3. On the 8th May the Rubber and Plastic Workers Union put

formard four demands:-

(8) immediate release of the workers arrested;

(b) punishment of the evil doers and compensation;

(a) no interference henceforth by the police in

labour disputes.

The pro-communist press endorsed these demands and deliberately

slanted its reporting to create the impression of unnecessary

brutality by the police who had in fact behaved with exemplary

moderation,

The pro-communist press also demanded apologies by

the Government.

Further disorders broke out in Kowloon on the 11th May and

continued for several days. The police were attacked, cars were

Bet on fire and some property was damaged.

Curfews had to be

/declared

SECRET

declared in certain areas to help control the situation.

Chinese Government's Statement

6. On 15th May the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued

a statement castigating the Hong Kong authorities for "Fascist

atrocities", hostility to the Chinese people and "collusion with

the United States Imperialists". The statemont included a demand

that Her Majesty's Government should instruct the Hong Kong

Government to accept all the local pro-communist demands which the

Chinese must have known to be unacceptable to the Hong Kong

Government.

The statement was the strongest and most abusive about

Hong Kong for some years.

7. No direct reply was given to the Chinese Government statement

but on the 17th May a statement was released in London referring

to the industrial origin of the disturbances and stating that "H.M.G.

fully support the Hong Kong Government in fulfilling its duty both

in maintaining law and order and in the efforts it is making to

bring about a settlement of the industrial dispute".

8. From the 18th May the campaign switched from Kowloon to

Government House on Hong Kong island. At first the demonstrators

were noisy and abusive. Petitions were presented and Government

House was plastered with posters.

On the 20th May the demonstrations began to lose their orderly

and disciplined nature and the demonstrators started to resort to

rowdiness and violence by molesting spectators and blocking roads,

particularly in the area of Statue Square and the Law Courts.

Loudspeakers on the Bank of China buildings adopted an anti-British

tone and included such slogans as "Kill Trench" "British murderers",

etc.

10.

The Hong Kong Government issued notices stating that dis-

orderly processions or unlawful gatherings would not be allowed but

SECRET.

/the

SECRET.

the people would still be allowed to continue to exercise their

right to petition the Governor in small, orderly groups or by post.

11. The situation deterriorated further and on the 22nd May the

Governor asked for permission:-

(a)

to neutralize the buildings from which the campaign

is being directed the Bank of China and the communist-

controlled Federation of Trade Union H.Q. and the Workers

Club; and

(b) to bring the Commando Carrier "Bulwark" to Hong Kong.

Both these requests were approved.

Attacks on our posts in Macau, Peking and Shanghai.

12. Soon after the disturbances began in Hong Kong, the British

Consulate in Macau wes the target of repeated demonstrations and the

staff have been compelled to vacate their quarters for a hotel.

13. After the Peking statement of 15th May similar denonstrations

were mounted against our offices in Peking and on the 16th May the

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　On the 22nd office in Shanghai was invaded by a mob and sacked.

May the Charge d'Affaires in Peking was informed that the Chinese

Government considered that the 1954 Agreement was annulled and

demanded that the Shanghai office should be dosed within 24 hours.

The apparent parallel with Macao

14. There is an apparent parallel with events in Macao which

have been widely studied in pro-communist circles in Hong Kong.

There too the crisis began with a local dispute (in that case,

however, badly handled by the police) which led to "demands" by

local pro-communists which were endorsed later by the Chinese

authorities. The Portuguese reacted by trying to appease the local

pro-communists who only stepped up their demands. Internal and

external pressure was applied, including the implied threat of

/Chinese

SECRET

Chinese military action, until the Portuguese backed down and

accepted the Chinese demands in full. The Chinese were entirely

intransigent and seemed determined to enforce their will and to

demonstrate that the Portuguese were remaining in Maoao only on

sufferance and subject to them falling in with Chinese wishes on

all points.

I d 12829)

SECRET

Reference..

Mr. Forster

ties

147

Hong Kong

We spoke and I enclose copies of a draft D.O.P. paper and background note which I prepared last night. I have not yet had an opportunity of discussing these with Ers. Hart, who is at present holding a meeting with the Banabans. I hope to do so at about 12.30. I also enclose a copy of three recent telegrams from Hong Kong, and you will see from telegram No. 677 that the Governor now asks for urgent authority to pick up and deport the ringleaders.

SECRET

APK.

(H.P. Hall) 23 May 1967

MEMORANDUM

From PRIVATE SECRETARY

To The Ganimats

To....

N429) 155249 50 7-65 ATGS 656.

mala...

SECRETARY OF STATE

With 147

145,146,

144

　　　You will wish to have the attached papers of Ivertaken

have

They

see

39 (62) لحم

HWB 1/17.

f. M. To way.

3715

헤

file.

Juf- hedder

SECRET

दि

The Hall.

148

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROFERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

OFD(67)39

24th May, 1967

CABINET

COTY NO.

14.

DEFENCE AND OVERSE.. POLICY COMMITTEE

HONG KONG

Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs

We have always known that Hong Kong was vulnerable.

But

it is valuable to Ching end we had assumed that it was in her interests to maintain the status quo. Indeed there has been evidence in the post that the Central Government have controlled and restrained the Communists in the territory.

2. The scene has now changed. arising out of labour troubles a major campaign has been mounted in Hong Kong itself linked with hostile demonstrations in Shanghai and Teking and with the expulsion of our representative in Shanghai. (summery of recent developments is t innex). locsening of control by mainland

China of the Communists in Hong Kong has resulted from recent developments in the Cultural Revolution. The first mass demonstrations in Hong Kong were probably promoted independently by the Communists there, in an opportunist desire to make the most of genuine labour unrest. Mainland China had to reset to the situation, and chose to give support to the communists in Hong Kong.

3. The unknown factor in the present crisis is how far mainland China has now decided to go in bringing pressure on H.M.G., and how for there are different views there on future policy.

11. The possible interpretations of the Chinese course of action, assuming that she is now controlling events, appear to be these:-

(1) China has made no basic policy change, but is trying to

achieve some rropaganda victory as the price for calling- off the disturbances. Such a propaganda gain could relate to the presence of American ships and troops from Vietnam on leave in Hong Kong; or to labour reforms; or to the release from prosecution or imprisonment of the persons charged with or sentenced for their role in the ricts.

(ii) China has decided to try to force us to accept a Macao

position in Hong Kong. If this is so, she will continue to escalate liong Kong disturbances to the point when, in order to remain in Hong Kong, we must capitulate to whrte ver demands are made, and, in effect, accept Chinese domination of Hong Kong.

(iii) China has decided to sacrifice the economic benefits

she derives from Hong Kong to Cultural Revolution "purity" of doctrine, and to drive us cut of Hong Kong completely.

　We cannot resist a determined attempt to force us out altogether and we could not tolerate the humiliation of remaining in Hong Kong without effective control. I um convinced that a Macao solution would be unacceptable.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　It would be damaging to our international prestige (at a time when Gibraltar and den are

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　It would be intolerable for the presenting several problems).

Governor, and impossible in terms of my responsibility for Hong Kong in hurliament. This being so, it follows that if China

SECRET

/is

SECRET

is embarking upon course (ii), our resistance to it might compel

her to resort to course (iii)

Firm

　But there is no need to assume the worst and our immediate responsibility is to maintain law and order, retain morale and confidence so that te economy can continue to flourish. action is required to do this but, at the same time we should avoid, as far as possible, action which could be regarded by the C.1.G. as provocative. We should avoid doing anything to "escalate the confrontation" to the extent that we get involved in a situation from which there is no escape except by abject surrender or a futile attempt to fight it out, leading to the same result, Our steps, therefore, must we directed to the needs of the local security situation, while taking the wider implications into account, and they need to be carefully measured and timed.

Recommendations

I accordingly ask my colleagues to endorse the views in paragraphs 5 and 6, and to agree to the following action:-

(i) Local Security

(11)

(a) We are already sending the Commando Carrier

BULWARK to Hong Kong where she should arrive by the end of this week.

(b) The Governor has already been authorised to

neutralise several of the buildings from which the campaign is being directed.

up and, if possible, deport (or failing that, detain) some of the known leaders of the present campaign limited to 2 or 3 in the first instance. The disruption of the leadership would be a distinct and positive gain and would be seen by the majority of the population as firm action. On the other hand it is unlikely that the Chinese Government would accept these leaders as deportees and, if they were detained in Hong Kong, this would provide Peking and the local Communists with a grievance. The Governor has undertaken not to use this weapon lightly or unnecessarily and, on balunce, I recommend that he should be given authority to go ahead if the situation requires it.

(a)

Action against the principal Communist newspaper which is the official C.F.G. orgon in Hong Kong.

The Governor accepts that prosecutions for sedition or inciting the police to disaffection might have dangerous repercussions, and is proposing instead to seek emergency powers to close down the printing press. But he would only take action after consulting me on cach individual case. I would propose to give him a general authority on this understanding.

Labour

Relations between employees and employers in Hong Kong have not been good and we should do our best to improve matters. Less than 12% of the total working force are declared members of trade unions and there are 100,000

SECRET

/members

SECRET

members of the Communist Unions as opposed to 70,000 others.

There is a complete split between Communist and K.H.T. unions.

The Communist Unions are basically disinterested in genuine industrial issues.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　I have been engaged in discussion with the Hong Kong Government, through the Governor, about labour reforms. The employers, who have in the past shown a considerable amount of resistance to reforms are at presunt very anxious about the general situation and we could immediately carry through extensive and long-overdue

labour reforms

I would like to

do this. It would be welcomed by the average worker in Hong Kong and would give us a better moral position, but it would be unlikely to satisfy China. Nevertheless if the Chinese were to seek a lowering of the temperature, this would give the C...G. a face-saving

I recommend that we should press the

Governor to go ahend vigorously with improvements in the labour legislation including early stops to shorten the hours of work of women and young persons.

(iii) Other Matters

Facilities to the U.8.

In the background of our difficulties with the C.I.G. lies their irritation at the facilities which the U.S. forces in Vietnam enjoy in Hong Kong. we have latterly restricted visits of worships to the same number as last year and more recently have suggested that larger ships should not come. I do not recommend any further inmediate retien since any significent diminution would be claimed by the Chinese as a propaganda victory. But I am sure that this is something that we should keep under review in the longer term.

H. B.

Commonwealth Office, 5 ..1. 24th May, 1967

SECRET

ANNEX A

Events in Korleon

HONG KONG DISTURBANCES

The recent disturbances in Kowloon arise from an industrial dispute in April between vorkers and their employers about wagos and conditions of employment involving 650 workers in two factories producing artificial flowers. The injection moulding

sections of both factories were closed and the workers were dismissed. The Labour Department of the Hong Kong Government offered to help the partics to reach agreement but this was

rofused by 1oth parties.

Disturbances broke out on the 6th May outside one of the

factories situated in Kowloon and as a result 21 persons were

arrested.

3. On the 8th May the Rubber and Plastic Workers Union put

forward four demands:-

LL.

(a) immediate release of the workers arrested; (b) punishment of the cvil doors and compensation; (e) guarantee of the workers and personal safety;

(a) no interference henceforth by the police in

labour disputes.

The pro-communist press endorsed these demands and

deliberately slanted its reporting to create the impression

of unnecessary brutality by the police who had in fact behaved

with exemplary moderation. The pro-communist press also demanded

apologies by the Government.

5. Further disorders broke out in Kowloon on the 11th May and

continued for several days. The police were attacked, cars were

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Curfews had to be set on fire and some property was damaged.

declared in certain areas to help control the situation.

Chinese Government's Statement

On 15th May the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued

/a statement

SECRET

a statement castigating the Hong Kong authorities for "Facist atrocities", hostility to the Chinese people and "collusion with

the United States Imperialists".

The statement included a demand

that Her Majesty's Government should instruct the Hong Kong Government to accept all the local pro-communist (lemands which the Chinese must have known to be unacceptable to the Hong Kong Government. The statement was the strongest and most abusive

about Hong Kong for some years.

7. No direct reply was given to the Chinese Government statement but on the 17th May a statement was released in London referring to the industrial origin of the disturbances and stating that "H.M.G. fully support the Hong Kong Government in fulfilling its

duty both in maintaining law and order and in the offorts it is

making to bring about a settlement of the industrial dispute".

8. From the 13th May the campaign switched from Kowloon to

Government House en Hong Kong island. At first the demonstrators

word noisy and abusive. Petitions were presented and Government

House was plastured with posters.

9. On the 20th May the demonstrations began to lose their

orderly and disciplined nature and the lemonstrators started to

resort to rowdiness and violence by molesting spectators and

blocking ronds, particularly in the area of Statue Square and the

Law Courts. Loudspeakers on the Bank of China buildings adopted

an anti-British tone and included such slogans as "Kill Trench"

"British murderers", ctc.

10.

The Hong Kong Government issued notices stating that

disorderly processions or unlawful gatherings would not be allowed

but the people would still be allowed to continue to exercise

their right to petition the Governor in small, orderly groups

or by post.

11. The situation deteriorated further and on the 22nd May the

Governor asked for permission:-

(a) to neutralize the buildings from which the campaign

/is being

SECRET

را

is being directed

SECRET

the Bank of China and the

communist-controlled Federation of Trade Union H.Q.

and the Workers Club;

and

(b) to bring the Commando Carrier "Bulwark" to

Hong Kong.

Both these requests were approved.

Attacks on our posts in lineno, Poking and Shanghai.

12. Soon after the disturbances began in Hong Kong, the British Consulate in Macao was the target of repented demonstrations and

the staff have been compelled to vacnto their quarters for a

hotel.

13. After the Peking statement of 15th May similar demonstrations were mounted against our offices in Foking and on the 16th May

On the the office in Shanghai was invaded by a mob and sacked.

22nd May the Charge d'Affaires in Poking was informed that the

Chinese Government considered that the 1954 Agreement was annulled

and demanded that the Shanghai office should be closed within

24 hours.

The apparent parallel with Macao

14. There is an apparent parallel with events in Macao which

have been widely studied in pro-communist circles in Hong Kong.

There too the crisis began with a local dispute (in the case,

however, badly handled by the police) which led to "demands"

by local pro-communists which were endorsed later by the

Chinese authorities. The Portuguese reacted by trying to

appease the local pro-cummunists who only stopped up their

demands. Internal and external pressure was applied, including

the implied threat of Chinese military action, until the

Portuguese backed down and accepted the Chinose demands in

full. The Chinese were entirely intransigent and seemed

determined to enforce their will and to demonstrate that the

Portuguese were remaining in Macao only on sufferance and

subject to them falling in with Chinese wishes on all points.

SECRET

COM FOR REGISTRATIO

149

-NER/CAT A

PRIORITY WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NO.1751

SECRET

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

24 MAY 1967

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO.1751 OF 24 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION (PRIORITY) TO HONG KONG AND ROUTINE TO PEKING

AND POLAD SINGAPORE.

10MY TELEGRAM NO.1697: DISTURBANCES IN HONG KONG.

IN FURTHER GENERAL DISCUSSION TODAY THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR CONCERNED (DONALD) SAID THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD MORE OR LESS REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE NO (NO) SIGNS OF ANY DECISION TO DAMP DOWN THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER IN HONG KONG ITSELF, PERHAPS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FEATURE OF RECENT DAYS, AND A HOPEFUL ONE, HAD BEEN THE REMARKABLE ABSENCE OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FROM PEKING. THE AMERICANS HAD NOT (NOT) AT THAT STAGE HEARD OF THE NCNA ARTICLES REPORTED IN PEKING TELEGRAM NO.563, AND DONALD AGREED THAT THE DECISION TO PUBLISH SUCH INFLAMMATORY FALSEHOODS WAS DISTINCTLY OMINOUS. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT HE WOULD NOT (NOT) ATTACH TOO MUCH SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ARTICLES IN ISOLATION: THEY DID NOT INCLUDE ANY PUBLIC REITERATION OF THE DEMANDS: AND THE IMPORTANT QUESTION WOULD BE WHETHER THE CHINESE NOW SUSTAINED SUCH A TONE.

2. OTHER STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS HAVE SINCE TENDED TO WRITE DOWN RATHER FURTHER THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE PARTICULAR REPORTS, POINTING OUT THAT THEY ECHO SCURRILITY IN SOME PROVINCIAL PAPERS ALSO, BUT NEED NOT (NOT) NECESSARILY IN THEMSELVES LEAD TO ANY PARTICULAR ACTION BY THE CHINESE.

3. DONALD, LIKE THE GOVERNOR, EXPECTED LEFT WING EXPREMISTS IN HONG KONG TO PURSUE FURTHER EFFORTS AT DISRUPTION THROUGH UNIONS AND INDUSTRY: HE FEARED THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT INDEED FOR THEM TO ACCEPT THE BAN ON MEETINGS.

4. DONALD AGREED WITH A SUGGESTION THAT THE EXTREME CHINESE MEASURES IN SHANGHAI MIGHT TIE IN WITH ACCUMULATING INDICATIONS

OF GREAT DIFFICULTIES FOR THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION IN THE PROVINCES,

RECEIVED IN

/AND

SECRET

104

PARO

ARCHIVES No.63

2 5Mini 170/

HWB1/12

SECRET

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO. 1751 TO FOREIGN OFFICE

-2-

AND CORRESPONDING SENSITIVITY AT THE ONLY OFFICIAL FOREIGN REPRESENTATION OUTSIDE PEKING. HE COMMENTED THAT THE REGIME NOW SEEMED TO BE RUNNING INTO SERIOUS PROBLEMS EVEN IN SHANTUNG AND HEILUNGI ANG, TWO OF THE VERY MEAGRE NUMBER OF PROVICES IN WHICH THE REVOLUTION HAD REACHED AN APPROVED STAGE. THE EXCUSE TO ENGINEER THE DE FACTO CLOSURE OF OUR POST IN SHANGHAI MIGHT HAVE BEEN ONE ELEMENT IN THE CHINESE DECISION TO BACK THE EXREMISTS IN HONG KONG, THOUGH HE DOUBTED IF IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A MAJOR ELEMENT SINCE THEY WERE NOT (NOT) PEOPLE WHO NEEDED EXCUSES. FO PASS PRIORITY HONG KONG 73 AND ROUTINE PEKING 22 AND POLAD SINGAPORE 25.

SIR P. DEAN

SENT AT 25/0403Z

RECD AT 25/0403Z

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.0. F.E.D.

S.E.A.D.

C.O. F.E. & P.D.

D.T.D.

SECRET

SENT TO HONG KONG AS COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (D.T.D.) TELEGRAM

NO.

1033

BBM

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Hason

Mr Gaminam

سام

145/15 (150)

c.c. Mr. Hall

Mr. Moreton Mr. Diggines

Mr. Holt's Visit : 12 to 18 June

Since the original briefing programme was drawn up we have had the troubles in Hong Kong and the Middle East. I think Mr. Holt will wish to discuss both these matters with the Prime Minister, and separate briefs will be needed.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　Could you please consult whoever is responsible either Mr. MacInnes or the Cabinet Office and arrange for the necessary requests to issue. I imagine the Foreign Office will not wisk to prepare their brief until the last moment, while the Hong Kong brief could probably be started now in terms of general policy and long-term assessment, but will clearly need final revision nearer the day. Mr. Holt's first talk with the Prime Minister is on Tuesday,

13 June.

(A.H. Reed)

24 May, 1967.

M Macinner tells me

will provide the necesscen

thakat

the TO.

насерс

Groups.If that

wr mal

가

ток робник

produce one.

CONFIDENTIAL

ARE, 67.

अ.

пова

SECRET

INVARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

(15)

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No. 63

25 MAY 19/

HWJA 1/17

Cypher

D. 25 May 1967 R. 25

0550Z

FLASH SECRET No.69%

Addressed to Commonwealth Office,

Repeated

"Peking No.267

(C.O. please pass)

KOMOTRATION

Following from Galsworthy for Forster.

　　Please ensure S. of S. has following information before Thursday D.O.P.C. meeting. Reference paragraph 4 of appreciation in our telegram from Hong Kong No.688.. 135

S. of S. will wish to know that evidence is

accumulating from several sources in touch with pro-Communists that high level Communist official from Canton has arrived in Colony to investigate situation. The reports indicate that Peking are gravely dissatisfied with local Communist apparatus for their conduct of recent events. Local leadership is reportedly being criticised for misjudging and misreporting the extent of their own support, of public opposition to themselves and determination of the Government. There are less reliable reports that they are also being criticised for inflating and misreporting the nature of the "Fascist atrocities" and generally for the way in which they have misled Peking. It appears likely that this man's mission is to report to Canton and to advise on whether a further, all-out effort should be made against Hong Kong or not. Less reliably, he is reported to have instructed that, pending a decision, some form of pressure should be maintained but that no serious incidents should be fomented.

2. Another (and curious) development is that Ho Yin is now in Hong Kong. It will be recalled that he is a prominent pro- Communist millionaire in Macao who, having played an important part initially in the crisis there, was thought to have been discarded. He has apparently now returned to some degree of favour with Peking. He is said to have been seen by Chou En-Lai in April.

3. It appears that he has come over on the suggestion of R.C. Lee (one of the Governor's intermediaries) and with the approval of Canton where we believe he might have been yesterday. He has been having consultations with the "millionaire wing" of the Communist leadership here (who are known to be disturbed on two counts, first that Peking were not happy about the escalation, second, because the campaign was not going well). indicated a desire to make some direct contact with Cater on the Governor's staff: and we are hoping that a meeting between

He has

/Cater

13)

SECRET

PARA

165

SECRET

Cater and Ho Yin, with R.C. Lee and another Chinese friendly to us, will take place at 4.30 this afternoon at the Hang Seng Bank building. (Ho Yin's brother is connected with this bank.)

The

4. Probably nothing but courtesies will emerge from thi meeting today. But it could be that Ho Yin may be probing (either for his own reasons or on instructions) for some face saving gesture to enable the Communists to disengage. Governor has instructed Cater to go to the meeting primarily to listen. But if this or subsequent meetings go well, Cater has been authorised to make certain points:-

(1)

that the Governor, knowing a need to save face would arise, had already deliberately permitted demonstrations outside the main gate of Government House which were allowed to reach a degree of unruliness before being stopped that would not otherwise have been allowed (this was in fact one of the Governor's reasons for tolerance):

(2) that a positive indication of good faith will

be required of them, such as the physical removal of the loudspeakers from the Bank of China building:

(3) that he felt it probable the Governor would not

wish to take retrospective legal action for offences committed in the last few days provided all Communist action now ceased, although he could not of course intervene where charges had already been laid:

(4)

The

that, before going on leave, the Governor might in a television or radio interview make a generally conciliatory (though not of course apologetic) reference to recent events, including the theme of no victimisation. major part of the subject matter in any such interview would be references to general progress in Hong Kong, including mention of steps to be taken to improve labour relations.

The Governor has some other ideas which could be held in reserve: the above seems enough for a start.

5. Governor, however, has also asked me to emphasise that too much should not be made of these developments and that, although all is quiet today, Hong Kong is by no means out of the wood.

6. All this provides a further strong reason for not taking action against N.C.N.A. in London.

During this lull, though Governor has been preparing for tougher measures he has not had to use any. Since publication yesterday of regulations dealing with inflaminatory loudspeakers, there have been virtually no such broadcasts. Governor had not therefore yet had to declare any buildings closed areas. It is good that he has these measures still up his sleeve. It is important to recognise that, if the Communists decide after this lull to have another go, Governor may have to hit them with all he has got.

8. Bolland would be grateful if copy could be passed at once to Private Office, Foreign Office.

SECRET

/(Passed

•

SECRET

(Passed to Resident Clerk and Private Office, Foreign Office)

(Passed to Peking an advance copies to Messrs. de la Mare

and Wilson)

Distribution H.K. W.I.D. 'C'

I.G.D.

J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:

P.S. to Prime Minister Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

D.I.O., J.I.R. - P.S. to Mr. Rodgers

Mr. de la Mare

- Hr. Bolland

Treasury

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson

Mr. Foggon

- Mr. D. Hawkins

Export Credits Guarantee Department Kinistry of Defence (Room 7365)

Mr. C.P. Rawlings

Room 7163) Room 51 31 )

Foreign Office/Commonwealth Office Board of Trade

Mr. Henn

Major Koe M.0.2

Consular Dept.

Mr. J.A.B. Darlington

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

En clair

25 May, 1967

R. 25

09552

152

MAY

לי

1967

IMMEDIATE

No. 699.

Addressed to Commonwealth office (D.T.D.). Repeated "Peking No. 268.

"P.A. Singapore No. 130.

"Washington No. 141. (Please pass to Washington only).

131

Peking telegram No. 561.

Casualties in Kowloon Disturbances.

Hong Kong Information Services have issued a public challenge to anyone knowing of any deaths in the disturbances (beside the one boy who was killed by a stone on 13 May) to produce the names of those killed and information about where

the bodies or graves are. One man (Fung Yuen-Heng) claimed by the pro-Communist press to have been killed on 22 May appeared perfectly fit in court yesterday.

The pro-Communist press has so far made no response. We (and no doubt they) know perfectly well that one person only

has been killed.

(Passed as requested and advance copies to

Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. de la Mare and Mr. Wilson)

ond

Distribution

H.K. WID 'C' I.G.D.

J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:-

P.S. to Prime Minister

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No.63

252.mi 170/

HLIA 1/1

D.I.O.. J.I.R.

P.S. to Mr.Rodgers Mr. de la Mare

Mr. Bolland

Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

LET

13/

TEXT

REF.

204

Mr. Wilson Mr. Denson

Treasury

Foggon

Mr D. Hawkins

Export Credits Guarantee Department- Mr. C.P. Rawlings Ministry of Defence(Room 7365)

Board of Trade

11 7163) 5131)

Commonwealth Office (News Dept.)

Mr Henn

Major Koe

M.0.2.

- Mr. J.A.B. Darlington

Mr. Carrocher

KREISTRATION

En clair

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 25 May, 1967. R. 25

0958Z

PRIORITY No. 702.

153

Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.)

Repeated

It Peking No.270

Washington No.143

(S. of S. please pass Washington)

Hong Kong Disturbances.

Tone of pro-communist press for 25 May

is rather less militant and more defensive. Much of front page of both main papers is devoted to Peking news not connected with Hong Kong. "Wen Wei Po" editorial attacks Government for using new "fascist" regulations for suppression of struggle and emphasises unity of workers in carrying out struggle to the end. A good deal of space is devoted to debunking news items aimed at showing support of local population for Government.

(Passed as requested and advance copies to

Commonwealth Secretary Messrs. de la Mare

and Wilson)

Distribution

H.K. W.I.D. 'C' I.G.D.

J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:-

P.8. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

LRET

Fir

D.I.O., J.I.R.

- P.S. to Mr. Rodgers

Mr. de la Mare

艹

Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson

Treasury

Export Credits Guarantee

Department Ministry of Defence

RECEIVED IN Board of Trade

ARCHIVES No. 63)

3 0MAY 1907

ний

リ

PAR

Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawkins

- Mr. C.P. Rawlings

(Room 7365)

Mr. Henn

(Room 7163)

(Room 5131)

Major Koe M.0.2

Mr. J.A.B. Darlington

CYPHER/CAT A

154

RESTRICTED

བཅས་"

PRITY BANGKOK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 280

25 May 1967

RESTRICTED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.280 of 25 May. Repeated for information to long Kong and Canberra.

On instructions received from Canberra on 22 May the Australian Commercial Counsellor and Consul here are telling businessmen and tourists who ask that it is unwise to go to Hong Kong.

2.. This is the reverse of what we are telling our people and Such Thais as enquire namely that we see no reason why plans made to visit Hong Kong should be altered. The Canadians, indians and New Zealanders are adopting much the same line as ourselves.

　　　Not only does it look odd in a matter like this to have Commonwealth Missions in the same capital putting out conflicting advice, I should also have thought the Australian attitude wrong in that it encourages those who want to make the situation in

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　On the face of it Hong Kong sound worse than it really is. Canberra's attitude does not square either with the situation in Hong Kong as reported in the London and Bangkok Press and an J.1.0. telegrams from London, or with the forecast in Guidance 106, that the Hong Kong authorities should be able to keep the situation under control.

4. You may care to consider whether anything can or should be said in Canberra or London to produce a more united front. Meanwhile we shall do what we can in conversation with our Australian colleagues to mitigate the effect of their instructions. F.C. pass Hong Kong 51 and Canberra 14.

Sir A. Rumbold

Bent 1000Z 25 May

[Repeated as requested] Recu. 15172 25 May

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.0.

F.3.D.

S.E.h.D.

D.D. & P.U.S.D.

Consular Dept.

News Dept.

C.0.

F.E.P.D.

B.T.D.

RES ARCHE

SOMAL90

168

HWAI/D

t I

　SENT TO HONG KONG AS COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (D.T.D.) TELEGRAM NO. 1058

VVVVV

PAA.

RESTRICTED

SECRET

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

Cypher

TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

Sent 25 May, 1967. 1230Z

155

FLASH SECRET

No. 1038.

Addressed to Governor Hong Kong.

Repeated PRIORITY for information to Peking.

庸

处

"POLAD Singapore. "Washington.

121

131

Your telegrams 677 and 691.

From Commonwealth Secretary.

Disturbances.

I have now consulted my colleagues and we agree with you that the key to the situation is the maintenance of public confidence and police morale. I would like to congratulate you and your staff and particularly the police force on your Buccess in holding and keeping on top of the situation. On this I am sending you a separate message which you can make public.

2. We agree our policy must be to continue to deal firmly and fairly with any disorders which the Communists may try to instigate.

3. We also agree that action should be taken about selected Communist leaders so as to disrupt their campaign but have some doubts about your being able physically to deport them. We are advised that they might well not be accepted at the border, and that therefore we might lose face. But we must rely upon your judgment to weigh up the various factors here.

As you

say this weapon should not be used lightly and I assume that you would begin with only two or three key leaders at a time. You have authority to go ahead if the situation deteriorates but please keep me informed of any action you take.

4. We also agree that if the Communist pres8 continues to carry out or step up the campaign of sedition and intimidation you should use your emergency regulations to close down the printing presses. I would, however, wish to be consulted before any action is actually taken.

5. With reference to paragraph 1 of your telegram 691, it is appreciated that any decisions on action against the N.C.N.A. must fully take into account the position in Hong Kong.

LASY 6.

121 9 137

паро

SECRET

172-179 92428.288

151

SECRET

　6. I agree with views expressed in paragraphs 2 and 3. We had already thought of taking up with the Americans a reduction of their use of Hong Kong on the lines you suggest and this will be pursued.

　7. It was not in any case intended to make any announcement about the decision to withdraw a major unit (your paragraph 7) till later in the year and, prior to your present troubles, the position was to have been reviewed in June in the light of the situation in China.

　8. The return of Parliament next week will give me an opportunity to make a statement on the situation in Hong Kong and to report H.M.G.'s support for the Hong Kong Government's measures to maintain law and order and of our determination to stay in Hong Kong.

　9. We naturally hope that a show of firmness in maintaining law and order will not lead to an all-out confrontation with the C.P.G. We ought, however, to be prepared for this possibility and I am sure that you have already planned how you would meet it. I expect Galsworthy can tell me about your contingency planning on his return.

Please

10. Your telegram No. 698 has just been received. do not at present say anything publicly about your intention to go on leave as this may cause loss of confidence just when the situation seems to be improving, paragraph 4 of your telegram refers.

(Passed to D.S.A.0. for repetition to Peking,

POLAD Singapore and Washington)

Distribution

H.K. WID 'C' I.G.D.

J.I.C. External Distribution

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:-

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

D.I.O., J.I.R.

P.S. to Mr. Rodgers Mr.

de la Mare

Mr. Bolland

Treasury

Export Credits Guarantee Department Ministry of Defence (Room 7365)

7163) 5131)

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson

Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawkins

Mr. C.P. Rawlings

Mr. Henn

Major Koe

M.0.2.

Board of Trade

SECRET

- Mr. J.A.B. Darlington

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should

reach addressee(s)

PRIORITY MARKINGS

(Date) 255-67 124.08.

Registry No.

DEPARTMENT

Frip!/17

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret

Secret

Confidential

Restricted

Unclassified

Flash Immediate

Priority Routine

}

25.5.67.

Despatched Momo Kong / DS4A-

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

Blu

Cypher

Draft Telegram to:-

Hong Kong

No.

(Date)

And to:-

1038.

Repeat to:-

Saving to:-

260

Distribution:-

Copies to:-

Ar Owne

25-6-7.

"Security classification] -if any

[ Privacy marking ]

any

[Codeword-if any].............

25 MAY 1967

SECRET

GOVERNER, HONG KONG.....

Addressed to

telegram No.

1038

And to

Primity repeated for information to

Onyangka |--|-----|-ULILLAHYARH4414141

Saving to...

ZOD

זו - " - " .

(date)

*+*+

HK 380

ILIAR P.

Pekinge PoCAD Singalee Washington

Your telegrams 677 and 691.

From Commonwealth Secretary.

Disturbances.

I have now consulted my colleagues and we

agree with you that the key to the situation is

the maintenance of public confidence and police

morale. I would like to congratulate you and your

staff and particularly the police force on your

success in holding and keeping on top of the

situation. On this I am sending you a separate

message which you can make public.

2. We agree our policy must be to continue to

deal firmly and fairly with any disorders which

the Communists may try to instigate.

We also agree that action should be taken about selected Communist leaders so as to disrupt their campaign but have some doubts about your

being

being able physically to deport them. We are

advised that they might well not be accepted at

the border, and that therefore we might lose face.

But we must rely upon your judgment to weigh up the

various factors here. As you say this weapon

should not be used lightly and I assume that you

would begin with only two or three key leaders at

a time. You have authority to go ahead if the

situation deteriorates but please keep me informed

of any action you take.

4. We also agree that if the Communist press continues to carry out or step up the campaign of

sedition and intimidation you should use your

emergency regulations to close down the printing

presses. I would, however, wish to be consulted

before any action is actually taken.

With reference to paragraph 1 of your

telegram 691, it is appreciated that any decisions

on action against the N.C.N.A. must fully take

into account the position in Hong Kong.

I agree with views expressed in paragraphs 2

and 3. We had already thought of taking up with

the Americans a reduction of their use of Hong

Kong on the lines you suggest and this will be

pursued.

7. It was not in any case intended to make any

announcement about the decision to withdraw a major

unit (your paragraph 7) till later in the year and,

prior to your present troubles, the position was

to have been reviewed in June in the light of the

situation

($430) Dd,033246 600 9/66 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.963

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

situation in China.

8. The return of Parliament next week will

give me an opportunity to make a statement on

the situation in Hong Kong and to report H.H.G's

support for the Hong Kong Government's measures to

maintain law and order and of our determination

to stay in Hong Kong.

9. We naturally hope that a show of firmness in

maintaining law and order will not lead to an

all-out confrontation with the C.P.G. We ought,

however, to be prepared for this possibility and

I am sure that you have already planned how you

would meet it, and I expect Galsworthy can tell me

about your contingency planning on his return.

10. Your telegram No. 698 has just been

received. Please do not at present say anything

publicly about your intention to go on leave as

this may cause loss of confidence just when the situation seems to be improving para 4 of your tilegne

refers.

(Pared to DSDS for repetition ti

Peking, POLAD Singaful is

Washington)

156

RESTRICTED

CYPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

LATE LATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO PEKING

TELNO. 408 25 MAY 1967 (F.)

RESTRICTED

ADDRESSED TO PEKING TELEGRAM NO 438 OF 25 MAY.

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO HONG KONG SAVING TO WASHINGTON YOUR TEL NO 563: N.C.N.A. ARTICLE ON HONG KONG. N.C.N.A. LONDON BULLETIN OMITS EMOTIVE PHRASES IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 5, QUOTE STAINED WITH THE BLOOD OF OUR COMPATRIOTS UNQUOTE AND QUOTE BLOOD FLOWED ON THE TERRITORY OF THE MOTHERLAND UNQUOTE. QUOTE BEAT- EN TO DEATH UNQUOTE( YOUR PARA6 ) APPEARS AS QUOTE REPORTED KILLED UNQUOTE AND QUOTE MORTAL DANGER UNQUOTE IS OMITTED.

2. ARTICLE IS BAD ENOUGH AS IT STOOD, BUT GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHETHER IT WAS SLIGHTLY WATERED DOWN FOR BRITISH MARKET OR WHETHER ENGLISH BULLETIN IN PEKING MADE SIMILAR CHANGES.

SOSFA

SENT 1311/25 MAY

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.0. F.E.D.

NEWS DEPT.

C.O. D.T.D.

RECEIVED IT:

ARCHIVES : .63

301.170l

HWB||17

PPPPP

пар.

RESTRICTED

SENT TO HONG KONG AS COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (D.T.D.) TELEGRAM

NO.

1041

Cypher

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 25 May 1967 R. 25

757

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

No.705

15252

Culi

HI/13

Addressed to Commonwealth Office

Repeated

"Peking No.271

" POLAD Singapore No.1 31 "Washington No.144

(S. of S. please pass to all)

My telegram No.693.

Sitrep as at 25/2000.

138

　　Three token stoppages occurred today none of which inconvenienced the general population. Transport on Hong Kong Island has returned to normal and there are encouraging developments in the resolution of the two labour disputes which sparked off the present disturbances.

　　China Motor Bus Company on Hong Kong Island decided to return to work after a management threat of "no work, no pay". After a slow start, bus and tram services returned to normal.

3. There were token stoppages in the Dairy Farm Organisation, the main supplier of fresh milk, which also runs cafés, restaurants and grocery stores. There was also a token stoppage on the Star Ferry between 1630 and 1730, the time when the majority of people return home. These may well indicate that similar incidents directed against those who are unlikely to support Communist aims may be expected.

There was also a sitdown strike at the Kowloon power station which did not affect supplies. These stoppages were demonstrations against Government only.

4. The injection moulding section of the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Co. at San Po Kong is due to reopen tomorrow morning. At the Green Island Cement Company peaceful picketing continues but over 100 workers have now accepted

severance pay,

(Passed as requested with advance copies to Foreign Office

F.E. Dept. and Commonwealth Secretary's Private Office)

Distribution

―

H.K. W.I.D. 'C'

- I,G,D.

J.1.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

198

166

Copies also sent:

CONFIDENTIAL

вор

TINA 1/17

Copies also sent to:

CONFIDENTIAL

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

Treasury

ון

Board of Trade

D.I.O., J.I.R. P.S. to Mr. Rodgers

Mr. de la Mare

Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson

Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawkins

Mr. J.A.B. Darlington

Export Credits Guarantee Department Mr. C.P. Rawlings

Room 7365)

Ministry of Defence

(Room 7163)

[

(Room 51 31)

Mr. Henn Major Koe M.0.2

Australia House (Senior External Affairs

Representative)

Canada House (Counsellor)

Mr. T.K. Critchley Mr. K.W. Mackellan

CONFIDENTIAL

En Clair

1MEDIATE

FOREIGN OFFICE TO LISBON

Telno. 584 25 May, 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

(F)

　　Addressed to Lisbon telegram No. 584 of 25 May. Repeated for information to: Hong Kong

-HKX9/2/66-

　　Hong Kong telegram No. 696 to Commonwealth Office, paragraph 2.

Please act accordingly.

SOSPA

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.O.

F.E.D.

Central Dept.

D.S.A.0.

Security Dept. Personnel Dept.

น

Sent

1628Z 25 May

RECEIVED IN 1.RCHIVES Nɔ. 63

3 MAY 1967

HUAlli

SENT TO HONG KONG AS COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (D.T.D.) TILEGRAN

NO.

1049

вод

158

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No. DEPARTMENT

HWA'll

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should

reach addressee(s)

25.5.

5.67.

2300 2

NIP.

1547

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

(Date)

Despatched

Emergency Immediate

Confidential

priority.

Routine

Cypher

[Security classification Confidentul.

any

[Codeword-if any)..........

GOVERNOR, HONG KONG

.......date)

Draft Telegram to:-

HAG 380

No.

(Date)

And to:-

Addressed to

telegram No.1043

And to

repeated for information to.

Saving to

Repeat to:-

Saving to:-

Distribution:-

FER

Copies to:-

The Minister of State and I would like

to convey to you personally our admiration,

shared by all our colleagues, of your handling

of the recent disturbances in Hong Kong. As

you know the current situation was discussed

by Ministers this morning. In the course

of this, the Prime Minister particularly

lunch asked that we shout

ould let you know how he homised, together with our tanqua

been personally ke have impressed with your

　　　　　　　　they handling of the situation, and how much he

ha appreciated your judgment and skill in

keeping the situation as cool as possible.

He has been particularly pleased to note

from your telegrams how British common sense,

grace and good humour have been uppermost,

despite the gravity of the situation; for

example

the arrangements made at Government

House for the orderly presentation of petitions

and your decision to deploy loud speakers,

blaring forth "cheerful Chinese tunes" to counter

/the

the broadcasting from the Bank of China, He has suggested

that if any future public counter-propaganda is necessary

Government loud speakers might propagate some selected

thoughts from the Red Book of Mao's Thoughts (e.g. that his

followers should "speak politely, pay for everything you

damage, do not bit or swear at people and do not damage

crops", or, "the only way to settle controversial issues

among the people is by the democratic method, the method

of discussion")!

We very much hope that the worst really will prove

to be over and that you will be able to get away shortly

for the rest you must so badly need.

SECER.

Ah 257

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Cypher

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

159,

Sent 25 May, 1967. 23002

CONFIDENTIAL No. 1043

　　　　　　　　　The Minister of State and I would like to convey to you personally our admiration, shared by all our colleagues, of your handling of the recent disturbances in Hong Kong, As you know the current situation was discussed by Ministers this morning. In the course of this, the Prime Minister particularly asked that we should let you know how much he himself, together with our colleagues, have been impressed with your handling of the situation, and how much they have appreciated your judgment and skill in keeping the situation as cool as possible.

　　　　　　　He has been particularly pleased to note from your telegrams how common sense, grace and good humour have been

for uppermost, despite the gravity of the situation;

example the arrangements made at Government House for the orderly presentation of petitions and your decision to deploy loud speakers, blaring forth "cheerful Chinese tunes" to counter the broadcasting from the Bank of China.

We very much hope that the worst really will prove to be over and that you will be able to get away shortly for the rest you must so badly need.

Distribution

H.K.W.I.D. 'C'

CONFIDENTIAL

169

PARO

Registry No. HWalln

DEPARTMENT

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should

reach addressee(s) ..

NIP

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret Secret

PRIORITY MARKINGS

(Date)

025 5.67

Despatched

22402

(160)

Confluential

Emergenty Immediate J

ٹے

Restricted

Anclassified

Pority Routine

En Clair.

Cyplex

Draft Telegram to:- HKG 380

No.

(Date)

And to:-

Security classification -if any

[Codeword-if any).........................

GOVERNOR, HONG KONG

Addressed to

1044.

telegram No.

(date)

And to

repeated for information to

Saving to

Repeat to:-

Saving to:-

Distribution:-

AkdWide

Copies to:-

Following from Secretary of State

and Minister of State, Mrs. Judith Hart.

Would you please convey to the Commissioner

and all ranks of the Hong Kong Police Force

our warm appreciation of all their untiring

efforts during the recent disturbances. Their

great restraint and devotion to duty under the

most trying circumstances has been exemplary;

and, as they may know, have been fully

appreciated in Britain. Their efforts in the

preservation of law and order must be a great

comfort to the people of Hong Kong. The ir

deservedly high reputation for discipline,

courage and impartiality has been enhanced.

To all those policemen injured, during

the disturbances, we send our hopes for their

speedy recovery.

SELER

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

160)

En clair

Sent 25 May, 1967,

2240Z

No. 1044

Following from Secretary of State and

Minister of State, Mrs. Judith Hart,

Would you please convey to the Commissioner and

all ranks of the Hong Kong Police Force our ward appreciation of all their untiring efforts during the

　recent disturbances, Their great restraint and devotion to duty under the most trying circumstances has been exemplary;

　and, as they may know, have been fully appreciated in Britain. Their efforts in the preservation of law and order must be

　a great comfort to the people of Hong Kong. Their deservedly high reputation for discipline, courage and impartiality has been enhanced.

To all those policemen injured, during the disturbances, we send our hopes for their speedy recovery.

Distribution

H.K.W.I.D. 'C'

EPET

RES

ALI

162

пода

Cypher

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

COP

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 26 May 1967 R. 26 ti

CONFIDENTIAL No.701

03052

MAY

HK1/31/17

ZATION

Addressed to UKMIS Geneva (for Jones) No.M.346

Brussels (for Martin) No.M.347

Repeated

Washington (for Hermann) No.142

HONGAID London (for Sedgwick) No.M. 348 (C.O. please pass to all)

From Sorby.

　　Regret very much not able to keep you fully informed during recent disturbances. Following is general background information on which you may draw in reply to questions.

2. Disturbances in Hong Kong engineered by local initiative of radical elements in Communist organisations as an overspill of cultural revolutionary enthusiasm.

3. Authorities with overwhelming backing of vast majority have succeeded in reasserting law and order and has greatly weakened power of these radical elements. Overt demonstrations have not occurred for two days and chance of recurrence of violence seems small.

40 Everything now back to normal. Banking system steady. Gold price dropped 8 dollars today (before disturbances 282 dollars per tael, yesterday 282 dollars per tael). Tourists continuing to pour in. Confidence is returning to Hong Kong.

5. Long term economic effect of disturbance: too early to judge with precision yet, but during the disturbances no hold ups in Portuguese warehouses, official documentation, manufacture. Exports and imports have continued normally throughout.

Extent of damage very few vehicles burnt, windows of a few branch banks in Kowloon damaged, a few bruises and bloody pates. Only three (repeat three) bullets fired.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　The only death was caused by rioters. Three nights of partial curfew in one manufacturing district of Kowloon, one in the business district of Kowloon, one in the whole waterfront of Hong Kong Island. At the height of demonstrations some two to three thousand well-disciplined marchers carried petitions to Government House until a police ban stopped them. on Hong Kong Island stopped for one and half days only.

Bus services

Seems

very

CONFIDENTIAL

ела

Cypher

CONFIDENTIAL

INTARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMmonikalth OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 26 May, 1967. R. 26

04102

CONFIDENTIAL No. 706

　　Grateful if you would ensure that Sedgwick is kept fully up to date on current events in Hong Kong.

Distribution

H.K. WID 'C'

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 63

3 UNAY 170/

1/1101/11

162

Cypher

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 26 May 1967 R. 26

CONFIDENTIAL

No.708

1 045Z

Your telegram No.1043.

159

PATIO

ATTC (163

Thank you very much for your kind message. Everyone here has of course supported me marvellously and whatever we have been able to do, has been accomp- lished by the whole Public Service team, with the steadfast support of the great majority of the people of Hong Kong.

(Passed to D.S.A.0. for F.E. Department

and Private Office (Commonwealth Secretary))

Distribution

H.K. W.I.D. 'C

CONFIDENTIAL

RECLIVED IN

ARCHIVES No. 63

Jumal dul

HUA.

159.

PAR

CC.

En clair

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 26 May, 1967, R. 26

1005Z

No. 713

164

MAY ISE>

Addressed to Commonwealth office (D.T.D.) Repeated

Peking No.274,

POLAD Singapore No.133 and Washington No.146

(Commonwealth Office please pass Washington)

　　　Wen Wei Pao editorial of 26 May emphasises the #invincible spirit" of the Hong Kong working class.

On 22 May workers of two bus companies "went on mass strike immediately" and "the one-hour strike was victoriously completed". The next day bus workers on Hong Kong Island struck for the whole day and all bus workers in Kowloon stopped work for four hours. This was the victorious achievement of united action. The Star Ferry Company stoppage for one hour shows "that our workers have control over the sea".

All these strikes "serve as a warning to the Hong Kong British Authorities"

"After the big slaughter on 22 May many a traitor and running dog are celebrating. But let them not smile too soon...... our anti-persecution struggle will carry on. Just let them wait and see".

(Passed to D.S.A.0. for Washington and advance

copies to Private Office (for Commonwealth

Secretary) Messrs. de la Mare, Wilson and

Bolland, F.E. Dept.)

Distribution H.K. WID 'C'

I.G.D.

J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:-

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

- D.I.O., J.I.R.

- P.S. to Mr. Rodgers

!!!

Mr. de la Mare

Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson

Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawkins

Guarantee Department

Mr. C.P. Rawlings

Treasury

RECEIVED IN

ARCHAT

Export Credits

nili

11401/17

/Ministry of Defence

Cypher

SECRET

INYARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

R. 26 May, 1967.

1030Z

FLASH

SECRET

No.714

MAY

165,

Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.) Repeated

Peking No.274

(Commonwealth Office please pass IMMEDIATE)

　　　　　　　　　　　Reference paragraph 3 of Galsworthy's telegram from tối) Hong Kong No 698, The meeting between Ho Yin and Cater did

not, (repeat not), take place.

Ho Yin did, however, spend some time with members of local Communist hierarchy discussing the Hong Kong situation.

Later he held joint and separate meetings with R.C. Lee and Q.W. Lee (a senior member of the Hang Seng Bank in whose office these meetings were held, and to whom reference was made as "another Chinese friendly to us" in (5)-telegram No. 698). After these meetings Cater saw the two

Mr. Lee's separately, and the following covers the main points of substance.

　　　　　　　Ho reportedly said that the local Communists were firm that their "four just demands" should be met: that the Communists were aware that "face" had to be given on both sides and accepted that Hong Kong was quite different from Macao and allegedly had no intention of forcing a Macao situation in Hong Kong.

R.C. Lee gained the impression from his discussion with Ho that the local hierarchy "anted first to obtain instructions from Canton: that meanwhile the Communists would not wish to escalate the local situation seriously, but to continue with token strikes.

　　　　　　　　.W. Lee was a little more forthcoming over his discussions with Ho. In addition to the comments at

paragraph 4 above, he reported comments of Ho to the effect that "time is on our (i.e. the Communist) eide" and that Q.W. Lee should contact Ho if it were thought that Ho's presence might be of value and particularly "if the Hong Kong Government wishes to modify the demands". Q.W. Lee's assessment of his discussions with Ho are of some interest:

(1)

On the refusal to let Ho see Cater, he thinks that one, or a combination of the following would fit the case:

LAST

LEA

REF.

151

208214

SECRET

Pipp

RECENT

ARCHIV

-/(a)

H/WA/17

SECRET

(11)

as follows:

(a)

(b)

(c)

(a)

The Communist hierarchy, after the events of the past few days, genuinely do not know what to do:

They have doubts as to the "suitability" of using Ho Yin in the present situation as he is a Macao man and not really well- known in Hong Kong:

They are still awaiting instructions from China and, therefore, do not wish to take precipitate action:

A form of blackmail, in that by keeping us waiting they may force us to flap and offer terms which otherwise in the present conditions we should not be prepared to consider.

On "time is on our side", Mr. Q.W. Lee thought

(a) This could be a straight comment on the fact

that, given more time, the Communists would be able to increase their intimidation of the local population and allow the hierarchy time to reorganise their forces for a more efficient and successful operation or series of operations: but

(b)

Knowing Mr. Ho as a wily, intelligent person who is expert at communist type negotiations, he thought this could well be a "planted" remark for onward transmission mainly to harry us and force us into precipitate action in regard to the four demands etc: that given time with no communist successes locally, the communist forces themselves would be downhearted and the local population increasingly confident provided they were what Q.W. Lee termed "nursed along intelligently".

Our assessment of the above is as follows:

(a)

Re paragraph 4: there is reliable evidence that, in fact, the Communists are seeking to achieve a Macao type settlement:

(b) Re paragraph 5: While local Communists

appear to be awaiting instructions as to next major moves, token strikes apart, there is every possibility of a further confrontation with security forces on the ground:

information has been obtained third hand one can but comment upon Q.W. Lee's impressions on the face of it, they appear to be reasonable appreciation of the present circumstances.

Our own assessment of the present situation is

SECRET

/(a)

(i)

(11)

(iii)

(iv)

SECRET

(a) Intelligence derived from reliable and

delicate sources indicates that certain members of the Communist hierarchy consider that they have met with a set-back in their confrontation with Government, not only in respect of their demonstrations but also in the propaganda field, and, most important of all, in their failure to obtain the public support they seem to have expected (either by wooing or intimidation):

(b)

It is clear that the Communists anticipate and are planning for a "long struggle":

To continue consolidating their position, within their own organisations, in an effort to maintain morale of their supporters:

To demonstrate to the general public their power by organising token stoppages in the public utilities:

To intimidate individuals and organisations that are actively supporting Government:

To press on with their anti-Government propaganda through the media of newspapers, posters and Kwangtung Radio.

(a) At the time of writing there are no firm

indications as to the next positive action planned by the Communists. It does appear that, having met with greater opposition than expected from Government and the public as a whole, they are having a complete re-think. They may well be waiting for further instructions or what they consider to be a major escalation by Government before they take any fresh steps.

(Passed as requested)

(Passed to Foreign Office for Advance copies to F.E. Dept. and Resident Clerk)

(Passed to Cabinet Office for D.I.O., J.I.R.)

Distribution - H.K.WID 'C'

I.G.D.

J.1.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

SECRET

/Copies

Copies also sent to:-

SECRET

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

D.1.0., J.I.R.

P.S. to Mr. Rodgers

Mr. de la Mare

Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Treasury.

Mr. Denson

Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawkins

Export Credite Guarantee Department Ministry of Defence (Room 7365)

Board of Trade

Room 7163)

Room 5131)

Mr. C.P. Rawlings

- Mr. Henn

Major Koe M.0.2

Mr. J.A.B. Darlington

SECRET

Cypher

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 26 May 1967

R. 26

CONFIDENTIAL

No.715

11 13152

•TION

166

1967

Addressed to S. of S. Repeated

Peking No.275

"POLAD Singapore No.134 "Washington No.147

(S. of S. please pass PRIORITY to all)

My telegram No. 705.

157

Sitrep as at 26/1800.

Two Government Departments had limited stoppages. 700 postmen are on strike from 260800 to 270600, thus preventing any

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Counter delivery or collection service except airmail. service remains normal but sorting has been partially affected. Staff of the Marine Department slip-way staged a 3-hour strike from 0800 this morning. This affected some fifty launches and slightly disrupted transport for sanitation and port works. Port services to visiting ships were not affected.

I have had a general warning issued to the public service pointing out that those who participate in stoppages leave themselves open to disciplinary action including dismissal.

The only other strike action was the sit-down of some 3,000 workers of the Taikoo Dockyard and Engineering Co.

This was peaceful and the in Hong Kong from 1300 to 1600. workers are carrying out an equivalent amount of overtime this evening. Private companies are being advised to take a firmer line on strikers.

440

Transport services have been fully normal today.

5. There have been 3 rumours of strike action at the Electric Co. which serves Kowloon, the Telephone Co. and the Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering Co., but there have been no stoppages.

In the early afternoon leaflets were thrown from roof-tops and high windows in several parts of both Hong Kong and Kowloon. These carry invective in Chinese against British

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Police are imperialism and alleged Police brutality. investigating. Two loudspeakers have been intermittently broadcasting but subject matter has not warranted Police action.

7. 18 court cases unlawful assembly were heard today without incident. The casevolving a China motor bus employee who was the pretext for an earlier strike was concluded

but sentence deferred until tomorrow.

(Passed as requested, also to Resident Clerk, D.S.A‚O.

Far East Dept. Foreign Office and Private Orga

Commonwealth Office)

157 170

CONFIDENTIAL

DADO

Distribution

CONFIDENTIAL

Distribution- H.K. W.I.D. 'C'

I.G.D.

J.1.0. External Distribution

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

D.I.O., J.I.R.

- P.S. to Mr. Rodgers

Mr. de la Mare

Mr. Bolland

}

Treasury

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson

Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawking

Mr. C.P. Rawlings

Export Credits Guarantee Department Ministry of Defence (Room 7365) Mr. Henn

Board of Trade

Australia House

Room 7163)

Room 5131)

Major Koe

1.0.2

Mr. J.A.B. Darlington

(Senior External Affairs Representative) Mr. T.K. Critchley Canada House (Counsellor)

Mr. K.W. MacLellan

CONFIDENTIAL

En clair

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 26 May, 1967.

R. 26

1 21 OZ

ATION

167

[

1967

No.716

Your telegram No. 1044.

(160)

The Acting Commissioner has asked me to convey

to the Minister of State Mrs. Judith Hart and yourself the sincere thanks of all ranks of the Hong Kong Police Force, including the Commandant and all ranks of the Auxiliary Police Force, for the kind message of appreciation received today, which he proposes to publish in Headquarters Orders.

All police formations are now rested and Acting Commissioner is confident that they are ready to meet any calls that may be made upon them with resolution and restraint.

　　　　　I am glad to report that only one injured constable is still detained in hospital, and he is progressing favourably.

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES NO. 63

and

(Passed to D.S.A.0. for F.E. Dept.

Private Office (Commonwealth Secretary)

30 Distribution H.K. W.I.D. 'Q'

160

ACAT A

CCTY FOR

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO CANBERRA

TELNO 1158

26 MAY 1967

(FE)

168

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO CANBERRA TELEGRAM NUMBER 1158 OF 26 MAY REPEATED

FOR INFORMATION TO HONG KONG AND BANGKOK.

154 BANGKOK TELEGRAM NUMBER 280 TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

PLEASE TELL THE AUSTRALIANS THAT WE SEE NO REASON IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO ADVISE BUSINESSMEN AND TOURISTS AGAINST VISITING HONG KONG AND SUGGEST THEY MAY WISH TO BRING THEIR ADVICE INTO

LINE WITH OUR OWN, WE HAVE SPOKEN IN THIS SENSE TO AUSTRALIA HOUSE.

CROSEC

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION.

F.O.

F.E.D.

SENT 13292/26 MAY 1967

C.0. F.E. & P.D.

D.T.D.

RECEIVED IN

63)

D.S.A.0.

CONSULAR DEPT.

H401/17

154

176

CONFIDENTIAL

FFFFF

BENT TO HONG KONG AS COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (D.T.D.) TELEGRAM

NO. 1064

PARD

En Clair

PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telma 583

26 May, 1967

168A

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 583 of 26 May. Repeated for information to: Hong Kong

Washington.

POLAD Singapore

　　People's Daily of 26 May reports rally in Peking on day before, attended by ten thousand people to "support the just struggle of the Palestine and Arab peoples against United States imperialism and its tool of aggression, Israel". Chou En-lai, Li Hsien-nien,

Kuo Mo-jo and Liu Ning-i were present. Kuo Mo-jo made main speech. 2. Also present were the representative of the Palestine Liberation Front in Peking, Gerbou, the U.A.R. Ambassador, Imam, Yemen Ambassador, Hameed, the Syrian Chargé, Farah, a First Secretary from the Algerian Embassy and a Third Secretary from the Iraq Embassy.

3. In his speech Kuo Mo-jo accused United States imperialism of instigating Israel to prepare large scale aimed provocation against Syria. The Syrian people and all Arab people had urgently mobilised and are prepared to smash the aggressors. The Chinese people stand firmly on the side of the Syrian, Egyptian and all Arab people. He also attacked the Soviet Revisionists for working on behalf of United States imperialism in Arab countries. The Revisionists were colluding with United States and British imperialism to persuade the Arab people to take a "cautious" and restrained" attitude to United States and Israel aggression.

4. Kuo Mo-jo also condemned United States imperialism for escalation in Viet Nam. He said the Chinese people are paying close attention to the development of the Viet Nam situation. "No matter to what degree United States imperialism escalates the war or expands the war on whatever scale, the Chinese people are determined to support the Viet Nam people to the end".

5. Kuo Mo¬jo also accused the "Hong Kong British authorities" of colluding with United States imperialism and Chiang bandits to carry out Fascist suppression of Hong Kong compatriots. He said, "I once again seriously warn the British Government and the Hong Kong British authorities, you must immediately and unconditionally implement the five just demands of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and immediately stop suppression of Hong Kong compatriots. If you continue to go your own way and are determined to make an enemy of the Chinese people then you will certainly get a bloody head".

Foreign Office please repeat as required.

Mr. Hopson

Sent 0700Z 26 May

Recd 1910Z 26 May

F.0./C.0./H DISTRIBUTION

F.E. Dept.

uuuu

раво

Cypher

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 27 May, 1967. R. 27

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 718

04152

Addressed to Commonwealth Office Repeated

P.A. Singapore No.135

(please pass)

Following from Political Adviser.

Hong Kong Disturbances.

Anything I.R.D. can do to explain the facts

of the situation to overseas Chinese communities in S.E. Asia would of course be most helpful at his stage. If messages or statements of support could be elicited from prominent members of the communities that would be invaluable.

169

(Passed as requested)

(Advance copies passed to Messrs. de la Mare, Wilson and Bolland and Private Office,

Commonwealth Secretary)

(Réfented to Vientiane, Kuala Langheer Djakarta, Bangkok at

Distribution H.K. WID

I.G.D.

réquent of F.0.

J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

FED.

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:-

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

- D.I.O., J.I.R.

- F.S. to Mr. Rodgers

Mr. de la Mare

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVE 1.63

31 MAI (70/

Mr. Bolland

Treasury

Export Credits Guarantee

Department

Mr. Wilson

Hr. Denson

- Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawkins

- Mr. C.P. Rawlings

Ministry of Defence (Room 7365)

Board of Trade

# 7163 5131

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Henn

Major Koe

M.0.2

Mr. J.A.B. Darlington

воро

}

COPY FOR REGISTRATION

170

En Clair

No.721

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 27 May 1967

R. 27

1505Z

Addressed to Commonwealth Office

Repeated to:

Peking

POLAD Singapore

Washington No.148

301

MAY

(1967

}

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 63.

3 0 MAY 1967

HUA 1/17

(S. of S. please pass to Washington)

My telegram No.715.

1666

Sitrep as at 27/1800 hours.

　　It has been a quiet day. Rumours of impending stoppages in the transport and ferry companies and public utilities have continued to circulate but nothing has happened. Unless there are major developments there will be no Sitrep on 28 May.

(Passed to D.S.A.0. for repetition to Washington and for

advance copies Resident Clerk and Foreign Office

F.E. Dept. and Secretary of State for

Distribution

Commonwealth Affairs)

H.K. W.I.D. 'C'

- I.G.D.

J.1.C. External Distribution

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office D.I.O., J.I.R.

Foreign Office P.S. to Mr. Rodgers

Mr. de la Mare

[{

166

1?7

Mr. Wilson

Mr.

Bolland

Treasury

Mr.

Denson

- Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawkins

Export Credits Guarantee Department Ministry of Defence (Room 7365)

帽

Board of Trade

Australia House

Mr. C.P. Rawlings -Mr. Henn Room 7163) - Major Koe

M.0.2 (Room 5131)

- Mr. J.A.B. Darlington

(Senior External Affairs Representative) Canada House (Counsellor)

BAB

Mr.T.K.Critchley

Mr. K.W. MacLellan

COPY FOR RECISTRATION 171

30°

MAY

1967

RESTRICTED

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 28 May 1967

Cypher

R. 28

PRIORITY

RESTRICTED No.722

0335Z

Addressed to Commonwealth Office Repeated

Canberra No.30

(S. of S. please pass)

Your telegram No.1163 to Canberra.

Following for Crowe from Political Adviser.

As long as situation remains relatively quiet here it would be most helpful if Duncan would come as planned.

(Passed to D.S.A.0. for advance copy to

Sir G. Crowe)

Distribution FILES

H.K. W.I.D. 'C'

Copy also sent to:

Diplomatic Service Administration

RICOND IN

**1.63

AUDI/17

Office

Sir Colin Crowe

рава

172

SECRET

FOR LEGISTRATION

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

MAY

1967

REC

FD JN

ARGIN LENG. 63

Cypher

D. 29 May 1967 R. 29

0755Z

SECRET No.726

5 Ummi 190l

HWA 1/17

リク

155

Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.)

Repeated to:

Peking No.281

POLAD Singapore No.1 37 Washington No.149

(S. of S. please pass to all)

Your telegram No.1038.

Disturbances.

I am very grateful for your response to my proposals.

　　　In present lull, extreme measures are not of course immediately necessary; but we must be careful not to be so over-tolerant as to allow a fresh and different assault to be hatched up in total impunity, nor to lose the initiative entirely. Posters, leaflets and the press are still operating flagrantly outside the law, and the continued and unmolested presence here of the worst of the leaders and agitators remains most dangerous. While we certainly must not be unduly provocative at the present time, it would be equally dangerous for several reasons to shew excessive complacency, weakness or apparent vacillation.

3. I am therefore considering what counteraction within the above limits might be taken during this present phase. It could best, I believe, take the general form of a gradual but fairly (?omission) reinsistence on adherence to the law (either by normal police action or through the courts) in carefully selected cases. In this, it would not, of course, be practicable to consult you on every occasion; but I would naturally consult before doing anything particularly likely to stir up trouble.

4. Your paragraph 3. Possibility of deportees being refused entry at the border has of course been very much in my mind throughout. But, if this should occur, detention or police supervision procedures would in suitable cases, if things got that far - be available.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　For militant small fry police supervision orders might be a very useful weapon.

5. Your paragraph 9. It is difficult to make firm plans without knowning what form a new and serious confronta- tion would take. We are, however, actively planning, with the public utility companies where they are concerned, what we would do to counter widespread and prolonged stoppages in the essential services. This seems the most probable risk at present, apart from a plain recurrence of violence.

PARO

SECRET

155

150

18982007228A

SECRET

6. Your paragraph 10. My intention to take leave was, of course, made public several weeks ago, well before the present crisis. At the moment, I am simply taking the line in response to any enquiry that I cannot tell at present whether I shall be able to go after all or not; but I have to make certain public arrangements on the assumption that conditions will permit me to go even if these arrangements have to be cancelled at the last moment.

*(Correction being obtained)

(Passed as requested and to Resident Clerk)

Distribution H.K. W.I.D. 'C'

- I.G.D.

J.I.C. External Distribution

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:

P.S. to Prime Minister Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

Treasury

- D.I.O., J.I,R.

P.S. to Mr. Rodgers

Mr. de la Mare

Mr. Bolland Mr. Wilson Mr. Denson - Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawkins

Export Credits Guarantee Department - Mr. C.P. Rawlings Ministry of Defence

(Room 7365) Mr. Henn

(Room 7163) Major Koe (Room 51 31 ) - M.0.2

Board of Trade

SECRET

Mr. J.A.B. Darlington

En Clair

173

COPY FOR REGISTRATION

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 29 May 1967 R. 29

"MAY " 7967

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 63

10302

3 OMAY 196/

PRIORITY No.728

HWA IN

Addressed to

Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.

Repeated to: POLAD Singapore No.1 39

Peking No.283

The Communist papers this morning (29 May) devoted their front page editorials and other reports to the arrival of the "BULWARK".

2. The Ta Kung Pao editorial entitled "Are the Hong Kong British intending to indulge in gunboat diplomacy?". Times have changed and gunboat diplomacy cannot now work against the New China. "Obviously the British ships have come here to bolster Trench's morale, to intimidate Chinese compatriots in Hong Kong and to provoke the whole of the Chinese people....The Hong Kong British are today trying to increase their suppression by intimidation this plot must be exposed. In this way everybody can raise their vigilance, unite and get organised and struggle with them to the end. With the strong motherland in the rear and the thoughts of Hao Tse-Tung pointing the way the struggle will definitely be victorious".

3. The Wen Wei Pao editorial entitled "People are not frightened even by an aircraft carrier" makes the following specific points. The presence of U.S. ships in Hong Kong at the same time as the "BULWARK" is evidence of Anglo-U.S. collusion. The display on deck of men and equipment as the "BULWARK" arrived was a clear indication of the intention to intimidate. The Chinese people have never been intimidated by gunboat diplomacy, witness the opium war, the Boxers and the "AMETHYST" incident. What use is the "BULWARK" anyway? Can its aircraft bomb Statue Square? of what value are your 2,000 troops even with the support of the so-called "400 and more organisations". The "BULWARK" is a paper tiger with one tooth and half a claw. As Chairman Mao teaches us "In order to struggle against the enemy we have formed the concept over a long period that strategically we should despise all enemies but tactically take them seriously". If you escalate we will also escalate and struggle right through until the Hong Kong British have unconditionally accepted the 5 serious demands of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 4 just demands of the Hong Kong compatriots.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　This conclusion was reached already a long time ago.

4. There are also on the front pages of the N.C.N.A. reports datelined Hong Kong 28 May, which describe the "BULWARK", state that its visit is a plot and that Chinese compatriots in Hong Kong are closely watching this.

5. A number of neutral and right-wing newspapers have published pictures of the ship, usually without comment.

215

/Distribution-

Distribution

H.K. W.I.D. 'C' I.G.D.

J.1.C. External Distribution

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:

P.S. to Prime Minister Cabinet Office Foreign Office

Treasury

D.I.O., J.I.R.

- P.S. to Mr. Rodgers

Mr. de la Mare

Mr. Bolland

- Mr. Wilson

Mr. Dens on

Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawkins

Export Credits Guarantee Department Ministry of Defence (Room 7365)

Board of Trade

Room 7163) Room 51 31)

Hong Kong Government Office

Mr. C.P. Rawlings

Mr. Henn

Major Koe

M.0.2

Mr. J.A.B. Darlington Mr. Boxall

COZY

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

RATION (174

MAY

11 1Z

1967

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench) RECI

Cypher

D. 29 May 1967 R. 29

10352

CONFIDENTIAL No.729

ARCHIVES N¡

30 MAI 190

H4151/1)

Addressed to Washington No.152 Repeated

"Manila No.30

11 Seoul No.11

(Please pass ROUTINE to all)

　　　　We are concerned at official pronouncements from Governments advising their nationals against visiting Hong Kong because of recent disturbances.

2. We did not ourselves attempt to discourage people from coming even when there were riots in Kowloon. There have now been no disturbances here since 22 May and there seems at present no need positively to discourage tourists from coming here.

3. We are not clear what present position of U.S. (or Korean or Philippine) Government is but if they can be persuaded to accept the advice in paragraph 2 so much the better.

(Passed as requested)

Distribution

H.K. and W.I.D. 'C'

CONFIDENTIAL

LIT

การ

CYPHER/CAT, A

175

COPY

copy non pEGISTRATIO...

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON ΤΟ FOREIGN OFFICE

TELNO. 1836

29 MAY 1967

1741

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO HONG KONG TELEGRAM NUMBER 77 OF 29 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO C.O., MANILA AND SEOUL. YOUR TEL. NO. 152.: ADVICE ON VISITING HONG KONG, AN A.P. ITEM OF 23 MAY REPORTED THE STATE DEPT. SPOKESMAN AS SAYING THAT TOURISTS INTENDING TO VISIT THE COLONY HAD BEEN WARNED TO TAKE THE TURMOIL THERE INTO ACCOUNT. HE ALSO SAID THAT THERE WAS NO (NO) BAN ON AMERICANS GOING THERE AND THAT US MILITARY LEAVES FOR REST AND RECREATION WERE CONTINUING. 2. THE DIRECTOR OF ASIAN COMMUNIST AFFAIRS TOLD US THAT BUSINESSMEN WHO ENQUIRED WERE INFORMED THAT THERE WAS NO REASON AT ALL WHY THEY SHOULD NOT GO TO HONG KONG, BUT IT HAD BEEN POINTED OUT TO. THOSE GOING PURELY AS TOURISTS THAT THEY MIGHT FIND IT DIFFICULT TO GET ABOUT. JACOBSON SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO (NO) RECENT ENQUIRIES AND IF THE SITUATION CONTINUED TO BE QUIET THE STATE DEPT. WOULD FAIRLY SOON PUT OUT A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE EARLIER ADVICE WAS NO LONGER PERTINENT. HE WAS SLIGHTLY PREOCCUPIED BY THE FACT THAT THE CHINESE HAD REFERRED AGAIN TO THE NEED FOR A REPLY TO THE FIVE DEMANDS,

FO PASS HONG KONG MANILA 10 AND SEOUL 7.

STR P. DEAN

SENT

01582/30 MAY 1967

RECD. 0158z/30 MAY 1967

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION

F.E.D. D.T.D.

1 14

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.63 31 MAY 1:07

SSSSS

CONFIDENTIAL

SENT TO HONG KONG AS COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (D.T.D.) TELEGRAM

NO.

|:.| 215 |

HWAY/

Clair

PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 601 29 May 1967

UNCLASSIFIED

175-A

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 601 of 29 May Repeated for information to Washington, Singapore and Hong Kong.

　People's Daily of 28 kay reports Hong hong Anti-Persecution Committee's statement on 26 May which concludes that unconditional and speedy acceptance of Chinese Foreign Ministry Five-point demands and Hong Kong compatriots' Four-point demands is only way out for British authorities.

　Second article reports recent strike action taken in Hong Kong by enterprises sharing solidarity with Left Wing.

Mr. Hopson

Sent 0130 /29 May Received 0800/29 May

FO/CO/WH/DISTRIBUTION

F.E.D.

PPPPP

ва

し

En Clair

PRIORITY

PEKING

TO FOREIGN OFFICE

29 May 1967

(175

175-B

D. 605

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 605 of 29 May. Repeated for information to Washington, Hong Kong and POLAD Singapore.

People's Daily of 29 May carries commentator article entitled "Gunboat policy long ago consigned to rubbish dump".

2. Article says sending H.M.S. Bulwark to Hong Kong to intimidate compatriots is vain attempt to repeat 19th century gunboat policy. But Chinese people and Hong Kong compatriots do not give a jot for a few broken down worships.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　British imperialis has learned no lesson from Amethyst incident and Suez affair. Article concludes "We once again warn British imperialism, Hong Kong compatriots directed by Mao's thoughts, will certainly fully settle accounts for your terrible crimes in Hong Kong. Chinese people armed with the thought etc. will certainly give you deserved punishment. Let imperialist gunboat policy go to devil. If British imperialism persists in wilful acts, it must eat the fruits of them".

3. Same paper gives more details of strike action in support of Left Wing in Hong Kong and reports Governor as saying on 26 May that Chinese Foreign Ministry 5 point Jemands and Bong Kong compatriots 4 point demands are not acceptable.

　　　Another article reports statement on 27 May of Anti- Persecution Committee which calls for immediate withdrawal of all plain clothes agents who are keeping under surveillance workers of Yau Ma Ti Ferry Company and other places.

Mr. Hopson

Sent 14302/29 May 1967

Recd. 06352/30 May 1967

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.0.

F.E.D. News Dept.

F. I!.

J. P.G.D.

S.E...D.

0.0.

D.T.D.

F.E.P.D.

SSSSS

LABA

Cypher/Cat A

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY FOR REGISTRATION

IMMEDIATE CANBERRA TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Telno. 862 29 May 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

1.76

168

Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No. 862 of 29 May Repeated for information to Hong Kong and Bangkok.

Your

Hong Kong.

telegram No. 1158. Australian Government and Visits to

I spoke accordingly to-day to Secretary of Department of External Affairs,

Plimsoll admitted that instructions had been sent to Bangkok and some of other Australian posts in the area to answer enquiries from businessmen and tourists by saying that it would be unwise for them to go to Hong Kong. This instruction had been based on the fact that at the time (22 May) it seemed unwise, and undesirable from the point of view of the Hong kong authorities themselves, to encourage Australian visitors to Hong Kong. I suspect that Australian Government also had in mind the responsibility that would attach to Australian Ambassadors if they appear to have been complacent in giving advice to Australian nationals.

3. Plimsoll agreed that in present circumstances there was no reason why Australian posts should continue giving advice in that sense. He said he would look at the question again and I gathered that he would send instructions bringing Australian advice into line with our own.

Commonwealth Office pass Priority Hong Kong 50 and Bangkok 15.

Sent 08292/29 May Received 08462/29 May

Sir C. Johnston

[Repeated as requested]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

C.O. F.E. & P.D.

D.T.D.

F.O. F.E.D.

S.E.A.D.

D.S.A.0. Consular Dept.

вар

R'I

168

182

REP

PEEKP TO HONG KONG AS COMMÔRMALARDALICE (D.T.D.)

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 62 31 MAY 1967

Hwil

TELEGRAM NO, 1074

CONFIDENTIAL

Carter

Kim's 176A

Note for Commonwealth Secretary (for Cabinet 30 May)

Situation in Hong Kong (as at 29 Kay)

Since the situation in Hong Kong was discussed in DOPC on 25 May, the local communist leadership has continued to avoid violent or riotous action. The police are rested and the Governor hopes to be able shortly to stand down the Auxiliary Police.

Communist tactics have been to organise short lightning stoppages in public utilities (i.e. in bus tram and ferry services) and in Government Departments (postmen and some Marine staff). While their use of loud speakers to broadcast inflammatory exhortations has greatly diminished, propaganda in press and posts continues to inveigh against British imperialism, alleged police brutality etc., and to press for

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　The arrival of the acceptance of the "five demands"

"Bulwark" in Hong Kong has been described as "intimidation by gunboat diplomacy".

The Governor has not been able to establish direct informal contact with the communist leadership (the possibility of his doing so was reported on 25 May). Kis assessment of the present situation is that this is

a time of reappraisal of tactics by the leadership and that they anticipate and are planning for a "long struggle".

Hong Kong Department Commonwealth Office.

29 May 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

177)

MAY

COPY FOR RESISTRATION" 12

1967

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

Cypher

D. 30 May 1967 R. 30 I

0320Z

RECEIVED IN

ARCHING 10.63

IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL

No. 731

Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.) Repeated PRIORITY to: Peking No.284

POLAD Singapore No.141 Washington No.153

(Commonwealth Office please pass to all)

Sitrep as at 29 2000 local time.

My telegram No.721.

170

After a quiet and uneventful weekend there were stoppages in one public transport and three industrial concerns today. The Hong Kong Yaumati Ferry Company's operations were mainly brought to a halt from 0600 to 0900. In Tsuen Wan, three textile factories had token stoppages, in one case repeated in each succeeding shift. There is a strong right wing element in Tsuen Wan and representations were made to the police about intimidation. Tomorrow we expect a limited stoppage on two bus routes in Kowloon. We are considering the taking of a stronger line over the pay of a Government employee who joins in stoppages to stiffen the resistance to intimidation of right wing and neutral workers.

The pro-Communist press has today attacked gunboat diplomacy as exemplified by the arrival of H.M.S. "BULWARK". A campaign is also in progress against the police for alleged brutal treatment after the arrest of those in custody as a result of riots etc. This is gaining some ground amongst the local population, and we are considering ways of refutation, The police reverted to a lower state of readiness - force stand by at 1200 hours on 29 May.

Stop press (30 May). A token strike from 0800 - 1000 at the waterworks is in progress. Supplies are not affected.

(Passed as requested)

(Passed to D.S.A.0. for Hessrs. Bolland, Wilson

and de la Mare and Private Office (Commonwealth

Secretary))

1770

CONFIDENTIAL

177

PARO

/Distribution

CONFIDENTIAL

Distribution

H.K. WID 'C' - I.G.D.

J.I.C. External Distribution

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:-

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

刺

Treasury

帏

===

Export Credits Guarantee

Department

Ministry of Defence(Rm.7365)

Rm. 7163

- D.I.O., J.I.R,

- P.S. to Mr. Rodgers - Mr. de la Mare

Mr. Bolland Mr. Wilson Mr.

Denson

Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawkins

Mr. C.P. Rawlings

Mr. Henn

Major Koe

[11] Rm.5131) - M.0.2.

- Mr. J.A.B. Darlington

Board of Trade Australia House (Senior External

Affairs Representative) Canada House (Counsellor)

Mr. T. Critchley Mr. K.W. MacLellan

CONFIDENTIAL

En Clair

No.733

COPY FOR RECISTRATION

(178

HAY

1967

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 30 May 1967 R. 30 11

0920Z

Addressed to Commonwealth Office Repeated

POLAD Singapore No.143 19 Peking No.286

The Communist papers this morning (30 May) give

front page spread to the 'People's Daily' commentator article about the "BULWARK" and our alleged gunboat diplomacy. A good deal of front page space is also devoted to reports of token strikes conducted "victoriously" on some of the ferry services and in a number of textile mills. The editorials in both the "Wen Wei Pao" ("illegal trials must be stopped") and the "Ta Kung Pao" ("you must immediately release people") both take the line that the trials now going on are illegal, that those accused had committed no crimes and that any crimes committed were committed by the police in beating up and arresting "patriotic compatriots".

　Elsewhere in these newspapers a good deal of space is devoted to reports of alleged torture and beating up by police of prisoners.

Distribution H.K. W.I.D. 'C'

I.G.D.

J.1.0. External Distribution

ION

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

DISTRIB BUTI

Copies also sent to:

P.S. to Prime Minister Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

- D.I.O., J.I.R.

- P.S. to Mr. Rodgers

Mr. de la Mare

Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson

Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawkins

HLUBI|17

в 20

Treasury

Export Credits Guarantee Department Ministry of Defence (Room 7365)

(Room 7163)

(Room 51 31)

Board of Trade

Commonwealth Office (News Dept.) Hong Kong Government Office

Mr. C.P. Rawlings

Mr. Henn

Major Koe

M.0.2

Mr. J.A.B. Darlington

Mr. Carrocher

Mr. Boxall

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

179

MAY

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIV. 53

Cypher

D. 30 May, 1967.

ITH

09222.

30.

PRIORITY SECRET

No. 734.

HUB 1/1

Addressed Repeated

to Commonwealth office.

"Peking No. 287.

"P.A. Singapore No. 14440

"Washington No. 154. (Please pass

PRIORITY to Washington only).

Your telegram No. 1038.

155

Disturbances.

Paragraph 8. A statement of this kind would be

most helpful here at this time, since some public apprehension still exists as to the real extent of H.M.G.'s support for Hong Kong. To assist with publicity for the statement locally, it would also be most helpful to know when it is likely to be made and its content.

(Passed as requested)

(Advance copies to Messrs. de la Mare, Bolland

and Wilson and Private Office (Commonwealth Secretary)).

Distribution - H.K. WID 'C'

I.G.D.

J.I.C. External Distribution

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

ME.

ILI

155 186

Copies also sent to:-

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office

Foreign office

- D.I.O., J.I.R.

- P.S. to Mr. Rodgers

Mr. de la Mare

- Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Treasury

Export Credits Guarantee

Department

Ministry of Defence (Rm. 7365)

Board of Trade

Rm. 7163 Rm. 5131)

SECRET

Mr. Denson

Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawkins

- Mr. C.P. Rawlings

Mr. Henn

Major Koe

M.0.2.

- Mr. J.A.B. Darlington

PAD

•

Cypher

MAY

!! 2

1967

✪ CONFIDENTIAL

CUSTRATION

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 30 May 1967 R. 30

0925Z

IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL No.735

180

Addressed to High Commissioner Kuala Lumpur

No.20

(Commonwealth Office please pass IMMEDIATE)

We have received a manuscript letter of support for the Government action during the recent disturbances from a Richard Chow, who claims to write as Chairman of the Hong Kong Citizens Union in Malaysia and Singapore. Grateful for any information about Chow and the Organisation. We would like if possible to give publicity to this support.

(Passed as requested)

Distribution

H.K. W.I.D. 'C' I.G.D.

HUA1/17

Copies also sent to:

Foreign Office (F.E.Dept.)

Mr de la Mare

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson

Cops sent flor for Blen

пор

ес

LESEN.CO.

ک/3

Jocument is the P...

FMV(W)(67)16.

30 May. 1967

SECRET

Mr. Carter, DTD, Church House

(to keep)

(181

at's Ger..!.!.

Copy No. 20

VISIT OF THE PRIME MINISTER TO

CANADA AND WASHINGTON 1967

CHINA AND HONG KONG

Supplementary Bricftby the Foreign Office

Talking Points

B - D D A NA M

The Chinese continue to insist on Britain's acceptance

of their "demands" on Hong Kong. There have, however, been

no important developments in our relations with Peking

since last Wednesday, 24 May, when, following the unilateral

annulment by the Chinese Government of the arrangement by

which we kept an officer in Shanghai, we withdrew Mr. Hewitt

and his family to Peking. The sharp message of protest

Hr. Brown sent to the Chinese Foreign Minister was not

accepted. There have been rune.red demonstrations outside

our Office in Peking but these have not resulted in violence.

2. We considered the possibility of retaliating against the Chinese for closing our Shanghai Office and for maltreat- ing our officials. There were three main steps we could

take:

(a) to break diplomatic relations;

(b) to declare personac non gratae members

of their diplomatic mission here; or

China News Agency.

We decided against (a) because we believe that the present political situation in China will almost certainly change. *and we want to maintain our presence there. Against (b)

was the certainty that the Chinese would retaliate, leading

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No. 63

- 1 JO1967

LIWA '/17

PAGO

SECRET

/to

KG Machines

131/5

SECRET

to a round of reprisals culminating in (a). The best

step seemed therefore to be (c). However we decided

not to do this at the moment, having in mind the overrid-

ing need to keep down tension with Poking as much as

possible because of its possible repercussions on China's

attitude towards Hong Kong. If Peking should take further

hostile action against our Mission or its officials we

would then consider, in the light or the circumstances,

what action to take, including measures against the N.C.N.A.

3. After the intolerable harassment of the Consul and

his staff in Macao they were withdrawn to Hong Kong on

Thursday, 2; May. The Consulate has been temporarily

closed. Its future will be decided when we see how the

situation develops.

4. Latest reports from Hong Kong indicate that the Governor

remains firmly in control. The only developments over the

weekend have been the continued brief stoppages in public

utilities. Present indications are that these will continue

for some time. The local Communist leadership seems to be

engaged in rethinking its tactics. But we do not think

that at present Peking wishes to force us out of Hong Kong.

FAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT

30 May, 1967.

SECRET

En Clair

PERING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 610

30 May 1967

181!!!

من

UNCLASSIFIED

　Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 610 of 30 May Repeated for information to:

Washington, Hong Kong, POLAD Singapore.

People's Daily of 30 May has only one item on Hong Kong, which reports statement of Afro-Asian writers Permanent Bureau on 29 May condemning British Government's actions in Hong Kong along stock lines.

77777

Mr. Hopson

Sent Q500Z 30 May Read 0817Z 30 May

F.O./C.O./WH DISTRIBUTION

Eastern Dept.

ki.

Ringa

CONFILES

Cypher/Cat A

CANBERRA TO

Telno-873

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

31 May 1967

་ ་

Addresscd to Commonwealth Office telegram No.873 of 31 May, Repeated for information to Hong Kong and Bangkok.

;

...

Australian Government and Visits to Hong Kong.

862.

176 My tele, ram No. 862.

k+6:223/12

Booker (External Affairs) today informed D.H.C. that he had sent a message to Australian Ambassadors concerned cancelling previous instructions.

2. He also mentioned that Dorman on his return to Canberra saíd that he had not only spoken to Chinese as in my telegram No. 827 but also gave them message in writing. It may be of some signifi- cance that Chinese accepted this piece of paper and took it away.

.3. In return D.H.C. said to Booker that we hoped soon, to be in

　　　　　　a position to tell Australians a little more about our forward HWR3), 2 thinking (your telegram No. 1147)

4. My paragraph 1 above. We have been given broad hint by Prime Minister' Department officials that Qantas authorities in Hong long have been spreading alarm and despondency here and that this in part accounts for previous instructions to Australian Ambassadors, It might be helpful if Hong Kong atithorities were to brief Qantas (without of course revealing that we have been given this dip).

·Commonwealth Office pass long kong 51 and Bangkok 16.

Sir G. Johnston

Sent

06527 31 May

Recd 06572 31 May

¡Repeated, as requested]

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

0.0.

F.E. & P.D.

D.T.D.

F.0.

F.E.D.

S.E.A.D.

DSAO

Consular Dept.

NNNNN

196

PLE

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES :s.

- 1 JUN 1967

HWA TE

229

nts.

PAD

Cites

HWA S.

CONFIDENTIAL

SENT TO HONG KONG AS COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (D.T.D.) TELEGRAV

NO.

1086

CONFIDENTIAL

182.

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY POREIGN OFFICE TO FEKING

TELNO 429 31 MAY, 1967 (F)

.CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED PEKING TELNO 429 OF 31. MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION HONG KONG.

YOUR TELNO 586: HONG KONG AND SHANGHAI BANK; SHANGHAI.

...

HONG KONG AND SHANGHAI BANK LONDON TOLD DE LA MARE TODAY THAT WHEN SELF APPLIED FOR AN EXIT PERMIT HE WAS TOLD THAT HE MUST APOLOGISE FOR THE CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE BANK SINCE 1949''. HE HAD NOT SO FAR DONE THIS AND THE BANK'S HEAD QUARTERS IN HONG KONG WERE SEEKING THE VIEWS OF THE POLITICAL ADVISER TO THE GOVERNOR.

2. DE LA MARE SAID THAT HIS FIRST REACTION WAS THAT IF SELF SO APOLOGISED, PARTICULARLY IF IN WRITING, HE AND THE BANK MIGHT, GET THEMSELVES INTO EVEN. MORE TROUBLE, EVEN THOUGH IT WOULD BE CLEAR THAT HIS''APOLOGY' WAS MADE UNDER DURESS. HE HIMSELF MIGHT BE HELD IN SHANGHAI FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION AND HIS EXIT PERMIT MIGHT IN ANY CASE BE REFUSED. ALTERNATIVELY THE CHINESE MIGHT SEEK · TO... 'EXAMINE?? HIS SUCCESSOR, LACHIAN, WHO I UNDERSTAND IS ALREADY IN SHANGHAI,

3. GRATEFUL IF YOU AND POLITICAL ADVISER HONG KONG WOULD TELEGRAPH ANY DEVELOPMENTS, AND YOUR COMMENTS.

SCE PA SENT 12522./31 MAY

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

F.0. F.E.D.

CONSULAR DEPT.

C.0.

F.E. & P.D.

вод

CONFIDENTIAL

SENT TO HONG KONG AS COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (D.T.D.) TELEGRAM

NO. 1093

ATOR

Cypher

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

D. 31 May 1967 R. 31

0800Z

CONFIDENTIAL

No.738

"33"

183

MAY

15907

Addressed to Commonwealth Office

Repeated IMMEDIATE to POLAD Singapore No.145

ROUTINE

Peking No.289 "Washington No.155

(Commonwealth Office please pass to all)

My telegram No.731.177

Sitrep as at 31/0900.

On 30 May a two-hour token stoppage by non-essential workers in two waterworks depots passed without incident

or interruption of supplies. There were further stoppages in two textile factories in Tsuen Wan, both of which had stoppages on 29 May. In one case R.W. workers were responsible. There was an unsuccessful attempt to delay early morning tram services.

2. There are many rumours that Communist sympathisers are being advised to stock up with two months supplies of food. Communist concerns particularly the Bank of China are known to be building up considerable reserves of rice.

3. Efforts to spread the policy of stoppages to all major public concerns including armed forces depots and hospitals are reported.

4. Action is now being taken to prevent the display of posters on Government buildings and vehicles etc.

(Passed as requested)

(Passed to D.S.A.0. for Messrs. de la Mare, Bolland

and Wilson and Private Office (Commonwealth Secretary) Distribution H.K. W.I.D. 'C'

- I.G.D.

J.I.C. External Distribution DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

Treasury

D.1.0., J.I.R.

- P.S. tó Mr. Rodger)

Mr. de la Mare

- Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson

Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawkins

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 63

31 MAY 196/

1-WA1/17

177 1897190

/Export

CONFIDENTIAL

Export Credits Guarantee Department

Ministry of Defence

Board of Trade

Rm.7365 (Rm.7163)

Rm.51 31

Mr. C.P. Rawlings

Mr. Henn

Major Koe

M.0.2

Mr. J.A.B. Darlington

Australia House (Senior External Affairs

Representative)

Canada House (Counsellor)

Mr. T. Critchley - Mr. K. MacLellan

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Carter

Av Gammara is

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS

COMPLIMENTS

183

Mr. A.J. de la MARE

Foreign Office, S.W.1.

Kr. Bolland

CONFIDENTIAL

1837

Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation

Shenghei Branch

Mr. Stewart of the longkong and Shanghai Bank in London telephoned me this morning to eay that lir. Solf, the Bank's Manager in Shanghai, has applied for an Exit Forait to leave the country. ile was due to leave anyway and his successor, Kr. D.G. Lauchlen, is alrowly in Shanghai.

2. then Mr. Self applied for the Exit Permit he was told that he must apologine "for the crimes committed by the Bank since 1949". He has so far not done this. The Bank's headquarters in Hong Kong are seeking the advice of the Political Adviser to the Governor (Mr. Elliott) but Er. Stewart wanted us also to know of this development.

3. I told him that my off-the-cuff view was that if Mr. Self signed such a document, even under duress, he and the Bank might get themselves into even more trouble. The Chinese might then say that since Solf hal acknowledged the fact of these alloged crimes he himself might be held in Shanghai for further investigation and his Exit Permit might in any case be refused. Alternatively, if he were allowed to leave, the Chinese might take it out on his successor, lir. Lauchlan.

4. I said that I would get in touch with Peking and with Kr. Elliott in Hong Kong and would keep in close touch with Hr. Stewart, but I strongly advised him to get the most careful legal advice possible from the Bank's own legal advisers as to the possible implications.

I have sent a telegram to Peking repeated to Hong Kong.

Copies to: Mr. Rodgers

Hra. Denga

(A.J. de la Mare)

31 May, 1967

Mr. Hall (Commonwealth Office) -

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

Sent 31 May, 1967. 2200Z

　　PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1090

(184)

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 63

- 5 JUN1967

HUB

Following telegram of 30 May from Seoul to Foreign Office

No. 82 addressed to Hong Kong No. 26.

Begins.

　　　　　　　　On 26 May the Korean Government placed an official ben on direct travel to Hong Kong by Korean nationals. have now received a request from the chairman of Hong Kong Tourist Association to try to persuade Koreans to rescind this I would be grateful for your confirmation that visitors (non-military) are welcome.

ban.

Distribution H.K.W.I.D. 'C**

A..

CONFIDENTIAL

воро

Ends.

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

Cypher

D. 31 May 1967 R. 31

0900Z

184

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

No.743

Addressed to Peking No.290 Repeated

Commonwealth Office

(C.O. please pass IMMEDIATE)

Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank here heard from Self, their manager in Shanghai, who is now due to leave, that he was told this morning (31 May) that before his exit visa is granted he must "apologise for all the crimes" committed by the Hong Kong Bank since 1949. He was due to have another meeting this afternoon to discuss the matter.

2. The bank have told him to ask for full details of the alleged "crimes" before saying anything.

3. They speculate that the intentions of the Shanghai authorities may be either:

(a) to try to force the Chairman of the bank

here to make some sort of "confession"; or

(b)

The bank would do not wish to Chinese.

to close the bank's Shanghai Branch down if no admission of guilt is made by the local

manager.

of course be delighted to agree to (b), but give the remotest indication of this to the

4. Bank would not wish any action to be taken on Self's behalf until they have further information and are able to assess the situation further. But they (and we) would be most grateful for your views on the points in paragraph 3

above.

Distribution

(Passed as requested)

H.K. W.I.D. 'C'

- I.G.D.

Aid Dept.

J.1.C. External Distribution

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:

вар

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office

D.I.O., J.I.R.

/Foreig1 Office

CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign Office

Treasury

•

P.S. to Mr. Rodgers

Mr. de la Mare

Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Dens on

Mr. Foggon

- Mr. D. Hawkins

Export Credits Guarantee Department Ministry of Defence (Rm.7365)

Rm.7163) (Rin.51 31)

Board of Trade

Mr. C.P. Rawlings

Mr. Henn Major Koe M.0.2

Mr. J.A.B. Darlington

CONFIDENTIAL

185

Background Note

There is still no evidence

Chinese are planning to take over Hong Kong.

that the

It is equally unclear

The Hong Kong police

how far they intend to push their demands. and garrison (which consists of 63 major units including more than 7,000 fighting soldiers) could probably contain all but

very widespread disturbances.

China.

2. All the available information suggests that the incidents in Hong Kong on 6 May and later were not instigated from mainland

They may have occurred, however, partly because control

over pro-Communist organisations in Hong Kong from the mainland has

recently slackened and local leaders and the rank and file have taker

the initiative in acting in a militant fashion to keep up with

the present extreme atmosphere of the cultural revolution in

China.

3. During the past few days the disturbances have ceased and

the activities of troublemakers are at the moment confined to

instigating temporary stoppages and token strikes in industry

and in certain public services.

4. The Governor's assessment is that the local pro-Communist leadership are now reappraising the situation with a view to deciding upon their future tactics and that they anticipate and are planning for "a long struggle".

THIS IS A COPY

THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION SM OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

CONFIDENTIAL

YYD

PRIME

MINISTER

1 Dear Dand,

/185t

10 Downing Street Whitehall

May 31, 1967

cupres to

PS Mistert

риб Sin Abadsworthy Mr Hall McCarter wit. Mr Gaminam

The Prime Minister has seen inward telegram News eft. No. 699 from Hong Kong. He has commented:-

"Should not this be published at home?"

　　I should be grateful if you would arrange for this point to be considered.

Yous

kurs so

swever

Wench Andress

1.P.R. Mackilligin, Esq., Commonwealth Office.

2296.

рава

PRIORITY MARKINGS

Emergency

Immedige Priority

Reply urgently required

NIL

Mr..

Dale

Mr.......

Mr......

Sir....

File No...H

HW DRAFT

*TELEGRAM

*SAVINGRAM

* Delete whichever is inapplicable. If necessary. "Priority" may be inserted before "Savingram.

Addressed

FLASH

!Insert appropriate priority macking)

No.

SECURITY, ETC. MARKINGS

Top Secret

Confidential Restriated Unclassified Personal Guard

186

Repeated

(Insert appropriate priority marking)

No.

Permt. U.S. of S.

Parly. U.S. of S.

Minister of State

Secretary of State

ENCLOSURES

(Savingrams only)

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Governor

Hàng nóng

нка 380.

MEDIUM

Eo clair Code

~Cypher ---

(Delete whichever

is inapplicable)

File

References

1 JUN 1967

1095

SAVINGRAMS ONLY

Your reference

Confidential

insert appropriate security, etc., marking)

FOR USE IN TELEGRAPH BRANCH

TELEGRAPH

Olde Sypher DTP

1947 Splex

Despatched.... O............

2200

At..

.Hra

Your telegram No. 734.

Disturbances

EntHair

DISTRIBUTION AND FURTHER ACTION

Mr. de la Mare

of :-

Mr Berland (3

1. Denson

Mr Wilson

Lord Beswick: C.O.

(Downing $17)

OSE

later than

H.Khe. Tuden 'Ci,

1.G.D

(Delete whichever

NO PRINTING In Inappilcable)

Thursday und for up-to-date figures for inclusion in paras 5 and 7 of

Jollowing telegrams contain testa

(a) statement to be made

in 2012 Hansen

(Thursday) tomorrows & afternoon

Parlament

(b) notes for supplementaries.

Grateful for your

hott

Ove

two mimediately

draft's

comments

10.00 hours B.S.T.

от

File References

statement.

You will appreciate that

Amendment's

may

the made

here un

The course of Thursday. We will

the telegraphy l'ext of actual statement and supplementa

BBB Busin

Soon

Gus

(Q1543) 19176/8177 2MP 2/61 AT85. 768

proof is available.

Hamrard

6554

31/5/67

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

(186)

Cypher

Sent 31 May, 1967.

2200Z

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 63)

FLASH

CONFIDENTIAL

- 11407

No. 1095

179

Your telegram No. 734.

Disturbances.

Our two immediately following telegrams

contain drafts of:-

(a)

(b)

statement to be made in both Houses of Parliament tomorrow (Thursday) afternoon

notes for supplementaries.

　Grateful for your comments not later than 10.00 hours B.5.T. on Thursday and for up-to-date figures for inclusion in paragraphs 5 and 7 of statement.

　You will appreciate that amendments may be made here in the course of Thursday. We will telegraph text of actual statement and supplementaries as soon as Hansard proof is available.

Distribution

H. K. & W.I.D. 'C' I.G.D.

Copies also sent to:-

Foreign Office

[F]

Kr. de la Mare

Mr. Bolland

Mr. Denson

Mr. Wilson

Lord Beswick

Commonwealth Office,

Downing Street.

CONFIDENTIAL

E+

вада

179 187.9191

Cypher

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

Sent 31 May, 1967. 2200Z

(187)

1४

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No. 63.

1 JUN 967

FLASH

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 1096

1186

My immediately preceding telegram.

Text of Statement.

Begins.

I wish to make a statement about Hong Kong.

1011

In the period between the 6 and 22 May there was a series of disturbances. These arose originally from a labour dispute in two factories. But what began as a genuine labour dispute was then taken up and exploited by local communists for quite different ends. Organised demonstrations were mounted as a direct and deliberate challenge to the authority of the Hong Kong Government. In some cases these were orderly but in others they led to disturbances involving police action. There has been open incitement to violence and to disaffection.

3. Up to the 17 May the demonstrations were confined to parts of Kowloon: thereafter they spread to Victoria on Hong Kong Island. Processions, assemblies in public places and the sticking of posters on public buildings and on Government House itself, although unlawful, were tolerated so long as demonstrators remained orderly.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　It became necessary, however, on the 20 May, because of increasing rowdiness, to disperse further unlawful assemblies and processions,

although up to the 22 May orderly groups of 20 persons were still permitted to present petitions at Government House.

　　Throughout the disturbances the Hong Kong police have succeeded in controlling the situation with the minimum amount of force. Apart from the firing of three revolver shots, wounding one man, by a constable over whom petrol had been thrown no firearms have been used. The greatest restraint has been exercised throughout by the police, despite extreme provocation.

The Secretary of State and I have already paid public tribute to them in Hong Kong, and I will do so again

now.

5. The casualties comprise 36 police and 70 demonstrators. Of these, two police and 14 other casualties were admitted to hospital.

There has been only one death, that of a bystander who was killed by a stone, 788 persons were arrested, of whom 42 have been released or acquitted.

of the remainder

439 have been convicted of riot, unlawful assembly, assault, breaking curfew and other offences, and 307 cases are pending.

CONFIDENTIAL

All persons arrested are being treated in the normal way in accordance with the due process of the law. The Mouse may feel that these facts contrast somewhat with other reports alleging, for example, that on 22 May "at least two hundred compatriots were killed or severely injured" in Hong Kong and Kowloon,

There have been no demonstrations since the 22 May. But there have been a series of token stoppages in certain transport and supply services.

　7. In Hong Kong itself there has been widespread and forthright public support for the Government's measures to deal with violence, intimidation and hooliganiam by a small minority, including messages of support to the Governor from nearly 300 representative organisations.

　　　　As regards the original labour dispute, my latest information is that work at both the factories has now been resumed. I am in consultation with the Governor about changes in the field of labour relations which I think we would all feel would be timely. I have in mind such matters as hours of work for women and young persons, conciliation machinery and factory legislation.

　9. For the future, we must hope that good sense will prevail. I am, of course, in close and constant touch with the Governor. There have been statements by the authorities in China alleging that the Hong Kong Government have been acting out of motives of enmity towards China. I do not need to say in this House that we, like all sections of opinion in Hong Kong, desire friendly and good-neighbourly relations with China. But the Government of Hong Kong has the duty to maintain peace, order and good government in there for the benefit of all sections of the community; and this task they must fulfil, and in it we shall give them our complete support.

10. Finally, I wish to pay tribute to the calm and courageous leadership during these difficult times of the Governor, Sir David Trench; to the ability and the determination shown by the whole Hong Kong Administration; and to the splendid and exemplary manner in which the police hace acquitted themselves.

Distribution

H.K. W.I.D. 'C'

- I.G.D.

Copies also sent to:

Foreign Office

Mr. de la Mare Mr. Bolland

Mr. Bolland Mr. Wilson Mr. Denson

Commonwealth Office

CONFIDENTIAL

Lord Beswick

Ende.

PRIORITY MARKINGS

Emergency Immediate, Priority

Reply urgently required

Mr..du.

Mr.......

Mr..

Sir..

Cart

Pile No....HW

DRAFT

*TELEGRAM

*SAVINGRAM

* Delete whichever is inapplicable. If necessary, "Priority" may be inserted before "Savingram."

Addressed

FLASH

(Insert appropriate priority marking)

No.

NA!!

SECURITY, ETC., MARKINGS

Top Secret Searst Confidential Restricted Unclassified Personal Guard-

87.

Repeated

(Insert appropriate priority marking!

• 1'' : . ·

No.

Permt. U.S. of S.

Parly. U.S. of S.

Minister of State

Secretary of State

ENCLOSURES

(Savingrams only)

Governor,

Hong Minh

1096

(68

HKLG 380

MEDIUM

En clair Code

Sypher

[Delete whichever

is inapplicable)

File

SAVINGRAMS ONLY

Your reference

FOR USE IN TELEGRAPH BRANCH

Despatched... O.............

At..........

د. ال

.19%) Simplex

22002 Hra.

Code Cypher

Confidential

(Insert appropriate security, etc., marking)

References

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS,

Dujt HK, W.ise

Les

۳۰۵۰

Mi de la Make my Bollard Me Wilson B

29.46.

Cu. Magy

DISTRIBUTION AND

FURTHER ACTION

As for

M...R.T

PRINT NO PRINTING

(Delete whichever:

inapplicable)

My unimediately preceding telegram.

Text-

Statement. REGINS.

[

Take in x-x altached

ENDS.

31/5/67

Mr. Carter.

Mr.

File No........

Mr.

Sir

Permt. U.S. of S.

Parly. U.S. of S.

Minister of State

Secretary of State

Your Reference...

Date

DISTURBANCES IN HONG KONG

wish to make

DRAFT PARLIAMENTARY STATEMENT

leading

of disturbancesto

crismally

There arose

! from a labour

　dispute in two factories 0

I am taking this early opportunity-of-making a statement to-the- abol

House-on-the disturbances in Hong Kong.

Servien

In the period between 1206 and 22nd May there was a 2. There was an industrial dispute in April in two-factories-

-producing artificial flowers But what began as a genuine labour

by local Communuts

thew

dispute was/taken up and exploited for quite different ends.

Organised demonstrations were mounted as direct and deliberate

challenge to the authority of the Hong Kong Government. In some cases

these were orderly but in others they have led to disturbances

involving police action. There has been open incitement to violence

and to disaffection through certain-newspapers-and-through-public_

address-systems-mounted in private buildings.

Up to the 17th May the demonstrations were confined to parts of

Kowloon: thereafter they spread to Victoria on Hong Kong Island.

Processions, assemblies in public places and the sticking of posters

on public buildings and on Government House itself, although unlawful,

were tolerated so long as demonstrators remained orderly. It became

FURTHER ACTIONcessary, however, on the 20th May, because of increasing rowdiness, to disperse further unlawful assemblies and processions, although up

to the 22nd May orderly groups of 20 persons were still permitted to

present petitions at Government House.

4. Throughout the disturbances the Hong Kong police have succeeded in controlling the situation with the minimum amount of force. Apart from the firing of three revolver shots, wounding one man, by a

constaple over whom petrol had been thrown no firearms have been used. The greatest Vary-greet/restraint has been exercised throughout by the police,

(E6098) WI 42332-8537 50m 1/64 V.B. Gp 791

/despite

despite extreme provocation by way of shouted abuse, assault, incitement

to disaffection and attempts at intimidation. It has not been necessary

to call upon any military forces to help maintain order.

5. A feature throughout these disturbances has been the witały wildly

extravagant and misleading reports emanating from Communist sources

and unfortunately given credence and wide circulation by the authorities iv Chuia as to the extent of the disturbances, the alleged "fascist atrocities" of the Hong Kong.

that of course, very diffrau.

and the number and nature of the casualties involved. The facts are, that

The casualties, comprise 36 police and 70 demonstrators. Of these, two

police and 14 other casualties were admitted to hospital. There has

been only one death, that of bystander who was killed by a stone.

788 persons were arrested, of whom 42 have been released or aquitted.

of the remainder 439 have been convicted of riot, unlawful assembly, assault, breakding curfew and other offences, and 307 cases are pending. All persons

arrested are being treated in the normal way in accordance with the due

process of the law.

6. There have been no demonstrations since the 22nd May. But the

troublemakers have been seeking to put pressure on the Hong Kong

authorities, and to disrupt the life of the community by instigating a

Leben

series of shert stoppages in certain transport and supply services. This

pattern has been evident over the last few days and may very well continue.

7. One of the most striking and encouraging factors throughout these

difficult days in Hong Kong has been the widespread and forthright

public

support for the Government's measures to deal with violence,

intimidation and hooliganism by a small minority. The cheerfulness and

steadfastness with which the vast majority of the people of Hong Kong have

gone about their daily business despite delays and many other forms of

inconvenience have been most heartening. The people of Hong Kong have

shown very clearly the value they attach to an orderly and peaceful

existence. Their support for the measures taken to restore law and order

has been voiced by a remarkably broad cross-section of public opinion

including nearly 300 representative organisations. The public has shown

its admiration for the bearing and conduct of the police by the generous

response made by organisations and individuals from all walks of live

to a fund for the higher education of children of the police which was

se up by public initiative.

18-

22nd May

despite extreme provocation.

The Secretary of State and I have already paid public tribute to them in Hong Kong, and I will do so again now.

hospital.

The casualties comprise 36 police and 70 demonstrators. Of these, two police and 14 other casualties were admitted to There has been only one death, that of a bystander who was killed by a stone.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　788 persons were arrested, of whom 42 have been released or aquitted. Of the remainder 439 have been convicted of riot, unlawful assembly, assault, breaking curfew and other offences, and 307 cases are pending All persons arrested are being treated in the normal way in accordance with the due process of the Jaw. The House may feel that these facts contrast somewhat with other reports alleging, for example, that" at least two hundrest compatrid's were killed or Severely injured" in Hong Kong and Kowloon.

6. There have been no demonstrations since the 22nd May, But, there have been a series of token stoppages in certain transport and supply services.

7. In Hong Kong itself there has been widespread and forthright public support for the Government's measures to deal with violence, intimidation and hooliganism by a small minority, including messages of support to the Governor from nearly 300 representative organisa-

tions.

ன்

As regards the original labour dispute,-I-an-happy to be able-

to tell the House that the sustained efforty of the Hong-Kong

Government's-Labour Department to bring the parties to the dispute

together-have been successful-and my latest information is that work

at both the factories of the Hong Kong Artificial Flower-Company-

has now been resumed. I am in consultation with the Governor about

Woned

would be timely.

changes in the field of labour relations which I think we all feel 5 have in mind such matters as house of work for women & Young persons, Conciliation machinery and factory Lequlalini,

9. For the future, we must hope that good sense will prevail. I

am, of course, in close and constant touch with the Governor over- measures that may need to be taken-to-deal-with-whatever-we-may-yet-i

There have been statements by the authorities in China

-have-to-face,

alleging that the Hong Kong Government have been acting out of motives

China

of enmity towards the Chinese-people. I do not need to say in this

House that we, xxh like all sections of opinion in Hong Kong,

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　0112 Barnestly desire friendly and good-neighbourly relations between--

Hong Kong and China. But the Government of Hong Kong has the duty

Mere to maintain peace, order and good government in Hong-Kong for the

benefit of all sections of the community; and this task they must

and in it ive shall que them our complete Support. fulfil, /We have already made it clear that HAG stand four-square-

withthe-Hong Kong Government in discharging it. We have no intention

of abdicating this duty, and-the-Government-of-Hong Kong will.....

continue to have the full backing and assistance of Her Majesty's

Government in taking whatever measures may-be-necessary.

wuh to

10. Finally, I know that the whole House will wish to join-me-in-

paying tribute to the calm and courageous leadership during the se

difficult times the Governor, Sir David Trench; to the ability

the

and the determination shown by the whole Hong Kong Administration;

splendid &

and to the exemplary, indeed splendid, manner in which the police

have aquitted themselves. Be then, and indeed to all the ordinary

people-in-Hong Kong who are determined to stand fast to their

peaceful-way-of-life, the House will wish to send its message of-

admuation

understanding jand-support; and support.

PRIORITY MARKINGS

　Emergency Immediate Priority

Reply urgently required

File Notti

*TELEGRAM

· DRAFT

SECURITY, ETC. MARI

*SAVINGRAM

Confidential Restricted Unclasatile Personal

188,

No.

Repeated

No.

* Delete whichever is inapplicable. If necessary. "Priority" may be inserted before "Savingram."

Mo... Carl

Mr....

Mr......

Addressed

FLASH

(Insert appropriate priority macking)

{Insert appropriate priority marking)

Mr......

Sir......

Permt. U.S. of S.

Parly. U.S. of S.

Minister of State

Secretary of State

ENCLOSURES

(Savingrams only)

Governor

- 1 200 Toř

Hàng nông logic

нка 38с.

MEDILIM

En clair

Code

Cypher

Delete whichever

is inapplicable)

SAVINGRAMS ONLY

FOR USE IN TELEGRAPH BRANCH

Your reference

Despatched....

O..............

At........

31.67.

Gode. Cypher OPP

19 plex

Z 2002

En clair

File References

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

Dust H.K.Wilde

FO-made fa Mark

Mr Bollard (5)

M No Wilson

C.O-Rond Bellyju

DISTRIBUTION ANDY

FURTHER ACTION

0245

As for

M.PT.

(Delete whichever

NO PRINTING is Inapplicable)

Confidential

[Insert appropriate sécurity, etc., marking)

My immediately preceding telegram.

Text of notes for supplementaries.

BEGINS.

[

Take in x-x

attached

ned]

END S-

31/5767

1 I can hardly be expected to respond

to demands" such

that we should

Notes 1 of Supplementaries

Is it not the case that labour conditions in the Colony are the underlying cause of the disturbances?

This is a mistaken view.

There is much in labour

relations in the Colony which we wish to alter, and, I have said, we are in consultation with the Governor about this.

But the cause of these disturbances was clearly political; aim-on-the part of the local Communists in Hong Kongman Andered it wor

attempt by the local communints to exert premure Hong Kong authorities.

wa am

Hak

What are we going to do about the "Four Demands (or "Five Demands")?

"As-I trave said, work has been resumed at the Artificial Flower Factory, and we have various measures to improve labour-relations in mind. And the processes

of the law-must clearly take their course. I think this must be our response.

(unmediately stop all facist measmes in

　　　　　　　　　　　At the Hàng nông Some time, an I have already sand, without prompting from anyone,

We shall continue to do

What is wiensany

Have we plans to reinforce Hong Kong in case of need?

We do have such plans, as we have for all our territories.

　　Improve labour relations And in the meantime

we are determined

But, as my Rt. Hon. Friend said yesterday:",

[

Has the Governor got all the powers he needs2

Yes. We have had the fullest consultations with him,

to continue to uphold and there is complete agreement as to how the situation The rule of law.

can best be handled.

To what extent has the life of the community been disrupted?

During the actual disturbances there was inevitable disruption, through the closing of roads, the imposition of curfews, and the temporary closure of some schools. The measures adopted by the authorities were designed to cause as little disruption as possible to the life of the Colony. The present series of token stoppages in public utilities and supply services are also inevitably causing some disruption and inconvenience.

Are the Hong Kong Government prepared to deal with more prolonged stoppages in the public utilities?

The Hong Kong Government have made plans for this contingency.

The

This is not clear. But

What i

abundantly mun-tunately enly Foodint in that the Chinese

wit

their

authorities, The full force of propaganda media,

hare supported the local Framble-makers and Grossly

　　　　distorted Thme memuren taken

by The Hong Kong

Gent, to maintain fumble order.

Were the disturbances instigated by Peking?

The extent of Communist China's involvement

It is unfortunately the case that the official Chinese Communist news agency has disseminated most inaccurate reports of events in Hong Kong;

and the Bank

of China in Hong Kong has operated a loudspeaker from its premises broadcasting most inflammatory incitements to the local population, including attempts to suborn or intimidate the police. These broadcasts were effectively drowned. Generaly, the Communists in Hong Kong have been

encouraged by the authorities on the mainland in their efforts to disrupt the life of the-Colony,

What effects have the disturbances had on the economy

of Hong Kong?

Events of this kind are bound to have some effect, but so far Hong Kong, with its splendid resilience, seems to be bearing up very well. But we are watching the

situation very closely.

COPY FOR RECISTRATION

SECRET

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

RECES 5.217

ARCHIVI: No 173

Cypher

D. 1 June, 1967.

R. 1

02452

-1 July

PRIORITY SECRET

HWA 417.

NO. 744.

189

JUir

Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.) Repeated Routine to Peking No.291

to P.A. Singapore No. 148

Washington No.156

(S. of S. please pass all)

1172

My telegrams No.726 paragraph 2 and No.738 183)

paragraph 4.

Disturbances.

　　　After consulting Executive Council, I intend to start taking action within the next few days against the many inflammatory posters which are still appearing on buildings, vehicles and harbour vessels and are causing public concern. Emergency Regulations to enable this to be done effectively are being published very shortly. I hope

later today, A warning in general terms was issued last night.

No action against the press is yet contemplated, except in so far as individual copies of newspapers are stuck up and used as posters.

There is some danger that pro-Communist bus and ferry workers in particular may attempt to counter by fomenting further stoppages but I am sure we must take this risk. We shall of course proceed with caution.

(Passed as requested)

(Advance copy for Messrs. Wilson, Bolland, De la Mare

Far Eastern Dept., and for Private Office Secretary

of State and Resident Clerk)

Distribution - H.K. W.I.D. 'C'

- I.G.D.

J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

SECRET

1729 183

207

/Copies also sent to:

SECRET

Copies also sent to:-

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

帽

Treasury

= =

- D.I.O., J.I.R.

- P.S. to Mr. Rodgers

Mr. de la Mare Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

- Mr. Denson - Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawkins

Export Credits Guarantee Department Ministry of Defence (Room 7365)

Mr. C.P. Rawlings

Mr. Henn

Board of Trade

(Room 7163 Room 5131

SECRET

Major Koe

· M.0.2

- Mr. J.A.B. Darlington

SECRET J. 1.C. Draft. for

meeting

4/6/67.

normal

188

Situation in Hong Kong

HONG KONG

Since the Hong Kong Government took firm action

against demonstrations and public meetings the situation

there has been much quieter. For the last few days there have only been sporadic strikes usually of short duration.

2. There have been indications that the pro-communist

Itupormity

leadership has beer/disconcerted and disrupted by the fail- ure of their confrontation with the Government, and in

particular by their inability to win public support for

their objectives. It is not yet possible to say what

action they intend to take in the future. It appears that they are conducting a meme re-examination of their policy and are possibly waiting for instructions from Peking.

the meantime, there are signs that they intend to carry

out a 'long term struggle" against the Hong Kong authorities

and are developing this by organising token stoppages in

including public tramprit,

the public utilities to

ilities/to demonstrate their power and in an attempt to maintain the morale of their own supporters. They may also be planning to spread stoppage of work to civilians Amployed by armed may and to

the hospitals.

Attituac of the Chiness Government

3. The official Chinese line on Hong Kong remains uncon-

promising and tough, The press and goverment leaders have continued to demand immediate acceptance of their "five

demands" At the same time demonstrations outside the

British Office in Peking have continued but on a smaller

scale than two weeks ago. Despite this, news about Hong Kong in the Chinese press has been overshadowed by internal

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　It is possible that events of the Cultural Revolution.

the harsh line on Hong Kong is intended mainly for internal

　　　　　We cannot yet say how far it will be reflected consumption.

immediato

in their programme for action in Hong Kong.

SECRET

/Conclusion

Conclusion

4. We consider that the situation in Hong Kong romains

potentially dangerous The Chinese Government are still

strongly committed to forcing the Eritish to accept their

"demanda". By firm unprovocative handling of the

sitution the Hong Kong Government has managed to win

the first round and the degree of public support for the

firm action by the Hong Kong authorities has probably

surprised and dismayed the pro-communist leaderlip. It

now appears that the pro-communists are reviewing their

strategy. It sooms likely that they intend to embark on

a long term confrontation, with the authoritics usin

industrial setion as their stief zo19onst

SECRET

190

TRZY FOR REGISTRATIONJUN

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

(The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

100

RECEIVED IN

1967

Cypher

D. 1st June 1967 R. 1st 11

ARCHIVES No. 63

0245Z

1 JUN1967

IMMEDIATE

HLIA 1/17

SECRET No.745

Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.)

Repeated

"Peking No.292

"POLAD Singapore No.149 "Washington No.157

(S. of S. please pass PRIORITY to all)

Sitrep as at 01/0900 hours.

My telegram No.738.

183

　There is evidence that a major confrontation on the industrial side is being prepared. 1st June was the original target date but this may now have been postponed until 3 or 4 June. It is, however, by no means certain that the pro- Communist faction have sufficient support for such action. Planning may be designed to maintain morale rather than an expression of firm intent. Small scale stoppages are expected to continue. Textile factories and the telephone company may be affected today. The latter has only a very small pro-Communist element.

2. Employees of the Marine Department are refusing to work until the Communist posters which were removed on the night 30/31 May and replaced by Government posters are put

Since we are today taking action to declare inflammatory posters illegal, this could be the beginning of a trial of strength.

back.

(Passed to D.S.A.0. for repetition as requested)

(Advance copy for Messrs. Wilson, Bolland, de la Mare

Far Eastern Dept. and for Private Office, Secretary of State and for Resident Clerk)

Distribution H.K. W.I.D. 'C'

I.G.D.

J.I.C. External Distribution

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office - D.1.0., J.I.R.

1.:

183

1987206

/Foreign

SECRET

рабо

SECRET

Foreign Office

Treasury

P.S. to Mr. Rodgers

Mr. de la Mare

- Mr. Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson

Mr. Foggon

Mr. D. Hawkins

Export Credits Guarantee Department Ministry of Defence (Rm.7365

[1]

Board of Trade

(Rm. 7163) (Rm. 51 31)

Mr. C.P. Rawlings

Mr. Henn

Major Koe

M.0.2

Mr. J.A.B. Darlington

Australia House (Senior External Affairs

Representative)

Canada House (Counsellor)

Mr. T. Critchley

Mr. K. MacLellan

SECRET

COPY POR REOTB

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

Cypher D. 1 June, 1967.

FLASH

1 性

** 07352

191

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 63)

- 1 JUN 1967

CONFIDENTIAL No. 750.

186

Your telegrams 1095 and 1096.

187

Disturbances: Statement in Parliament.

1-1401/17

　　　　I think the draft statement generally puts the matter well, but I have the following suggestions and comments.

Your paragraph 2.

After "local Communists" insert, "with stimulated intervention by hooligan elements, some of whom were paid".

3. Your paragraph 3. For "on Government House" substitute "at the entrance gates to the grounds of Government House". No posters were stuck on Government House itself. For "remained orderly" substitute "remained fairly orderly, apart from chanting and shouting venomous abuse".

All have

4. Your paragraph 5. Insert"known" before "casualties". Admissions to hospital were 3 police and 14 others. since been discharged. Total arrests were 815; not proceeded against or acquitted 65; convictions 565; cases still pending 185. Figures are as at 0800 hours 1st June.

5. Your paragraph 6. Stoppages have also occurred in two shipyards and three textile mills. In no case were stoppages other than politically motivated,

　6. Your paragraph 7. Over 500 representative organisations have openly declared their support. The police children's education fund now stands at over $3 million.

Your paragraph 8. 7.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　For "would be timely" substitute "might be timely, although the possible economic repercussions will have to be carefully watched". I would prefer to see the

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　There is already considerable apprehension last sentence omitted. here amongst industrialists and businessmen generally at the long term effects on the economy of Hong Kong of recent events; and it could be unwise to aggravate this loss of economic confidence both here and abroad by over-insistence at this time

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　even though there is on changing our labour legislation; undeniably room for reform in some areas.

　　　Your paragraph 9. I recommend omission of the words "by the authorities in China" in the third sentence (to avoid a

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　This is the paragraph in the direct attack on Peking). statement which will get the greatest publicity here and the terms in which H.M.G.'s determination to support Hong Kong is

/stated

ሀ.

1869 187

CONFIDENTIAL

рабо

CONFIDENTIAL

stated will have a major impact on local confidence. I therefore recommend strengthening the phrase on the lines "This task they must fulfil; and we have given them clear assurances of our complete support and determination to maintain our position there".

9. Your paragraph 10. It would be very desirable also to include a tribute to Hong Kong people generally, perhaps to "... the indomitable spirit and unity of the people of Hong Kong in facing their present difficulties".

10. Finally I would ask whether anything can be done to correct the impression being given by constant references the withdrawal of British Forces from the Far East, particularly in press reports. It is very possible that many of the doubts regarding the U.K.'s intentions here spring from a misinter- pretation of these statement as applying to Hong Kong.

Distribution

H.K. WID 'C' I.G.D..

Copies also sent to:-

Foreign Office

Mr. de la Mare Mr. Bolland

Mr. Denson

Mr. Wilson

Commonwealth Office

P.S. to

CONFIDENTIAL

Lord Beswick

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

192

SIRATION

Cypher

D 1 June, 1967.

R. 1 T

0750Z

FLASH

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 751

188

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 63

་་

~ I JUN1967

HUA 1/17

Your telegram No. 1097.

Disturbances:

Notes for Supplementaries.

I have the following comments on proposed answers.

　Question 1. A most material point about the labour relations position here is that much of what is wrong in labour relations is and will always remain beyond the power of Government to correct by legislation. The difficulties derive from the unsatisfactory nature of industrial unionism in Hong Kong, and its exclusively political nature.

Question 4.

(a) The closure of roads, imposition of curfews and closure of schools were confined to comparatively small areas of the colony and the disruption caused, though severe, was not widespread.

(b) There have been no stoppages in public transport services this week and last sentence might read "token stoppages in some Government Departments, public utilities and supply services have also inevitably caused some disruption and inconvenience".

　Question 6. There is no evidence of C.P.G. instigation. I recommend substitution of the following for the words after "evident" and before "grossly" "is that official Chinese Communist organisations in Hong Kong have given the trouble-makers propaganda and other support and have".

Distribution

H.K.WID I.G.D.

ст

Copies also sent to:-

Foreign Office

Mr. de la Mare'

忖

Commonwealth Office

Mr. Bolland

Mr. Denson

Mr. Wilson

P.S. to Lord Báswick

CONFIDENTIAL

188

пл

CONFIDENTIAL

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)

FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)

Cypher

D. 1 June, 1967. R. 1

11352.

IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 755.

Addressed to Commonwealth Office.

Repeated

"Peking No. 294.

"P.A. Singapore No. 150. "Washington No. 158. (S. of S.

please pass all).

* interdicted

1G0 190.

SITREP as at 01/1800 June,

My telegram No. 745.

190

The stoppage over the removal of Communist posters at the Government dockyard continued until 1700. 90% of the Marine Department's launches were tied up as a result. The strikers, who included most of the crews and key maintenance workers, barricaded themselves into the dockyard and prevented four Europeans as well as loyal staff members from leaving. They refused to accept anything less than the replacement of their posters. (The Government posters which has been put up instead drew attention to the disciplinary penalties applicable in cases of absence without leave). Despite occasional chanting and attempts to foment violence by a small number, they all dispersed at 1700 on receiving a guarantee that they would not be arrested when leaving. They promised a repetition tomorrow if their posters were not put back.

An announcement is to be made tonight over radio and television and tomorrow in the press that the participants have been indicted (1.e. suspended) and disciplinary action will be taken against them. This may possibly provide the pretext for a major confrontation with the Communists.

There were no other incidents or stoppages today. There are indications that one of the ferry companies may stop work tomorrow.

RECEIVED IN

ARCHIVES No. 63

- 6 JUN 170I

HIVA In

(Passed as requested)

(Advance copies also sent to D.S.A.0. for Messrs. de la Mare, Bolland, and Wilson Far East Dept. and for P.S. to Commonwealth Secretary)

CONFIDENTIAL

/Distribution

193

CONFIDENTIAL

Distribution H.K. WID 'C'

- I.G.D.

J.I.C. External Distribution

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

Copies also sent to:-

P.S. to Prime Minister

Cabinet Office

Foreign Office

Treasury

Export Credits Guarantee

Department

Ministry of Defence

帏

Rm. 7365)

Rm. 7163

D.I.O., J.I.R.

- P.S. to Mr. Rodgers

Mr. de la Mare Mr Bolland

Mr. Wilson

Mr. Denson

- Mr. Foggon

- Mr. D. Hawkins

- Mr. C.P. Rawlings

Mr. Henn Major Koe

(Rm. 5131) M.0.2.

- Mr. J.A.B. Darlington

Board of Trade Australia House (Senior External

Affairs Rep.)- Mr. T. Critchley

Canada House (Counsellor)

CONFIDENTIAL

- Mr. K. MacLellan

Prepared

in the Tresemming

194

POSSIBLE CONOMIC BPECT ON U.K. OF DISTUMANGS IN HONG KONG

リ

All fi uro in Smillion

Political background

This note is written against the conclusion in the Spocial

Aapesonen! in JIC(67)(SA)39 dntel 18th May 1967, which concludoo

that there is a potentially dangerous situation in which we my no

longer be able to rely on the Chineze continuing to accept the

status quo for economic reasons, but that it is still possible that

the Hong Kong Govarnmont will be able to vilo out the crisis withoul

ay major change in the status quo. Political "lonais" nro boing

Lade and there is a grave risk that the Chinone Government and the

local pro-communisto will sock to force the long long Covernment to

capitulate to thene "domundo",

U.K. trie

U,K, exporta wore 65 in 1967.

Prospects have been gool,

an in ect the level has risen from 41 in 1960. Exports cover o

wide range, including a good deal of nachinery and transport equip-

mont and other metal gools. To think that come proportion goes on

to other markets through Hong Kong, but that not much now 7000 on

to China.

U.K. imports in 1966 were 61 c.i.f.. Thi include 30 ·

clothing and 18 textiles. The texților come un er the special

arrangenmts liniting imports from in1iviul reuzeos.

The worst situation for th: U.X. balance of pa ments would

be if the Chinese were able to prohibit all U.. o o

but the ecolonic life of the colony continued unit, they sere able to coll

their 00.5 world wile an at recent.

To shoul: lere 65 oporte

log two amounts what we could sell

rect in the

sell

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　keto hitherto mupplicl. through Hon; Kon, in what we coull moll in olieer worl!

Clearly a lot of the exports woul! be

Hide marketa.

ifficult to

DADO

bc mo

1201 102 1 fay ng of

1, and tallin c to a fairly

ien, hon2.

e unranli-ic;

1 in

1* only for 'ition rentras, com o o

or to our injorta Cron Hon -

- "on;

on; roul

Is there are tonly stopal, Sura to 12:

---titulo, rusticul r? from other Bechem ou ̧liom,

In one tontiles.

1 1 an

- સ

3 1ht cardly wa a

on irpost ccount, at the anyone of forgein

toring ions of or in cols to go

'hot of concnie iloction it be call,

For, corte mi ht riz 811 Y91 at a ti3

'dically in selling our exports.

Chin

en in ith the bilateral rac1' of

v det ir daentioanl Tron our point c^ vier.

adt voet Wlo metr out in round Alqurts Want 'mo of lion; Kong-

Ah.ro aro V

ozzars an

0.0

00.

eti hec osition as a Sini 1

possibly

-17 ba

of he currency in various crunlzije

2.1.

5.1

. color wer to To, at one to Chonch my 1- enorma

די

ericit : Chin

le':, taken with

LAYNEY und math and other payment", norno

Mou

evar from on

can, co..t . 21 cv:

"on position

Mipt of

1 va bien roin

20 42

g in sny coed not be close

A Corsi salına

Tionc "o:

toll of

anchi 1

"1-0 noto n`n ontre for rollin, ('7it' in a

faero Jon's which to to world

Chilas often natin through on; on morchatu

rblesura Bi in ro c'offective than trying to

cal to oic worl: Circot.

out

1 full not: on the sermonie value of long "ong to Chine

by the ́infutay of Defence un' io attach.d.

lydende a ima otment

DIGHE

Jp .r

one in a of elite end Jivilen'o are ecsparatively

20 10. We pay out more in interest en sterling

The dunes on fact in this area are cubjcot to

U.. direct invostrant my be

ving coast.ele leubb; V.

2 20 in 40 an

ortfolio inactment about the one fi un,

oil total of CO. A joot doal of the local

Alo1 ome, log of the financial ad

losely

conomi1 iustity'ions thm might be ex actel in in the hands

plante. Some of the bl; fime are nov rojistero i

in Hon on, the Lenon oficia bain: formally of subordinata

in lova b-11eva""

Who of rs of thong enterprizes ar

to li 1. Hon 'oa or awh the in the .K., in ma

Ar 2 14' Chimn

i- led bly sova poliție~l by othonia i adopta

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Dan c: orb to China · 1:ht alro ba n'eete".

Thero

1 maint o* £ccet) ·nɔen- raw mat

4 19

I. o, o

34. s might well lon

ro 32

TO%

if exporta were cut off since the capital

i må hit by id ̃^imilt to roll olnaziora

Clic

peper oung man

1: ort.

not b

-1th ≈ be bou

1101p dila'l

. Lau...

hit in other countries or possibly

earning; como nonra or licloention

The not effect on the bal mee of

1975 10/20) in valtion te

sigawan (pt

~b on our by

with Hong Kon".

/Distribution

vubion:

MA. Maar:

e. Connolly

Fin Alec Chimero's

Nires

Hah ck

Raphael

2:calཀ

foffason

VV:10

Jan.

Spon ler Morton

Te, Thillips

teen

Hawkins

r. Darin ton

COM

Han, Howbuzy

Hr. Herr

Hr.

haloy

AF: Caninara

D0.1603 Hr. Hillyani

}

Therouxy

3.5.0.

Dan': q 'n Land

Goal of Tr le

Ministry of teahou

So onworth 022110

Torcim offic.

Noll. Ahonrary

..1

1084 104, 1067

ICNG KONG TRADE AND PATIEMS

£ million (approximato)

1966

From: U.ke

C. Soho Chifpa

SALA

Other

Total

Importa

160

300

580

irports and re-exports

ncgl.

320

470

The balance

+10

+ 20

−167

+ 20

110

Invisibles:

Tounicm

T.K. forces

+10

Domain 10 on Shalances

+25

Other I.P...

-10

Other (incomplete)

- 5

+10

Long-term capital

fotel neumonia deficit

Eurons and onierions

+ 110

១០

Incmonne (+) in reuetamp

holding, of idehi:

sterling

other chamoneles

Total sterling holdingğ: end-1966, £372 million not,(end-ifɩrch 1967

dollar holdings ond-1966 £51 million

C336 million)

19/9/67

SECRET

A Note on the Economic Valve of Hong Kong to China

heavily against Chinese interference in Hong Kong's present status

Under normal circumstances economic considerations would weigh From the Colony China obtains a large annual trade surplus, most of he remittances contributed by Overcas Chinese, and the important enefits from Hong Kong's entrepot role. The following paragraphs set out the chief facts about China's economic relations with Hong

Kong.

Trade with and through Hong Kong

Chinese exports to the Colony in recent years have accounted for over nine-tenths of the annual two-way trade, giving Peking a large surplus (in Hong Kong dollars) ranging from the equivalent of £58 million in 1961 to £168.7 million in 1966:-

Chinese exports to Hong Kong* Hong Kong exports to China Hong Kong re-exports to China China's trade surplus

1961

1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 (£ million)

64.5 76.2 92.5 123.1 145.0 173.1

0.5 0.5 0.5 0.8 1.1 0.96 5.7 4.8 3.9 2.9 3.4 3.4 58.3 70.9 88.1 119.4 140.5 168.7

(a more detailed table showing the composition of trade is given at

Annex).

This surplus, which is regularly converted into sterling, has played a major role in financing Chinese trade deficits with other areas of the Free World with the industrial countries of Western Europe in 1959-60 and again in 1965-66 and with Canada, Australia and other major grain exporters to China,

3. The Colony depends largely on China for supplies of fresh fruit and vegetables, meat, dairy products and oilseeds, and to a lesser extent, for the main staple foodstuffs such as rice, wheat and sugar. Although large amounts of rice are imported from China the principal sources of supply are the South East Asian countries. There is also a considerable market for Chinese textiles, simple machinery and other manufactured goods.

4. From 1962 to 1965 Chinese exports to Hong Kong increased at an average annual rate of 24%. This may be regarded as a period of exceptional growth, during which China was not only benefiting from the long-term expansion of the Hong Kong economy and population, but regaining a market largely lost in the difficult years of 1960-62. Signs of a levelling off appeared in 1965-66, and in the 12 month period July 1965. to June 1966, Chinese exports showed an increase of only 4.2% over the previous 12 month period. This may

/have

(1) Total Chinese receipts from exports to Hong Kong are probably

somewhat higher than shown in the HK Government statistics, since valuation takes place when the goods first enter the Colony, and therefore excludes the profit margins of Chinese trading corporations operating in Hong Kong.

(2) Re-exports of goods obtained from China (see para. 5) are

recorded as imports from China both by HK and by the country .eventually receiving them.

SECRET

have been due largely to the levelling off of the economic boom in the Colony and the consequent lower increase in demand. Shortages of supply (reportedly in evidence at the Canton Fair in April 1966) may also have played a part. The third and fourth quartero showed a ufficiently large recovery to lift the total figure of Chinese exports to £173.1 million, an increase of 19% over 1965.

A part of this increase must be attributed to a change in Hong Kong regulations which have increased the coverage of trade statistics. Compared with 1965 recorded figures for 1966 may over state the growth by about 5%.7

Under normal circumstances Hong Kong's consumption requirements could be expected to continue to grow, but further Chinese successes would probably turn increasingly on the quality and diversity of their

exports.

5. Entrepot trade. The figures show that Hong Kong's domestic exports to China are negligible, and that most of the items sold originate elsewhere. Such re-exports include chemicals, base metals, textile fibres, and animal and vegetable materials. Their value, however, is steadily decreasing, as China ships more and more goods from the original supplying countries. The value of Hong Kong's re-exports of goods obtained from China is not published, but from information supplied by the political advisor's office is believed to have been about £34 million (about 20%) last year (1966). Goods thus re-exported include Chinese food specialities, textiles, animal by-products and medicines; and are sent mostly to South East Asia, Japan and Europe. It is evident that the Chinese still find it convenient to use Hong Kong and its variety of services for shipping many of their exports. Their own trading organisations, moreover, are not nearly so well equipped as Hong Kong merchants to handle a variety of small orders from overseas markets. Never- theless, as time goes on, the Chinese may be expected to improve their own facilities, and rely correspondingly less on those of Hong Kong.

6. Commercial liaison.

Hong Kong is in addition a useful trading outpost for China, especially as regards commercial dealings with countries with whom Peking does not have diplomatic relations. Preliminary negotiations for grain deals with Australia and Canada have often taken place in Hong Kong. Western firms, too, can readily make contact with Chinese commercial organisations in the Colony.

Overseas remittances

7. Most of the remittances from Overseas Chinese to the mainland are channelled through communist-controlled banks in Hong Kong. Up to 1958 they averaged about £25 million yearly, but subsequently there was a prolonged decline, largely because of unfavourable reaction among Overseas Chinese to the introduction of communes. This was accentuated by the tendency of people abroad to send food parcels instead of cash at the time when the Chinese food situation was at its worst - although it temporarily increased foreign exchange receipts from parcel duties and other charges. Cash remittances in 1961 and 1962 were probably down to £15 million, but have subsequently recovered, reaching an estimated £30-35 million last

This range is perhaps unlikely to be significantly exceeded; Indeed as a result of the cultural revolution and events in China, Femittances declined in 1966 totalling an estimated £23-28 million for the year. Investments by Hong Kong Chinese in the Overseas Chinese Investment Companies in China probably amount to £1-2 million a year.

year.

Other Invisible Earnings, Expenditures and Economic Advantages 8. The main Chinese invisible expenditures in Hong Kong are for services rendered by the latter in the fields of shipping, ship

/repairs,

SECRET

repairs, insurance and marketing.

These are gradually falling

as China improves her own port facilities, and extends her direct

trading links with other countries.

Such

inly from the operations of Chinese financial and commercial

Invisible earnings are derived enterprises in Hong Kong; from the annual sale of £1-14 million worth of water to the Colony; and from a growing tourist trade. receipts are not, however, large compared with those from trade and remittances. Deposits received by the 11 communist controlled banks in Hong Kong are lent to their head offices in China, but the sums involved are subject to recall at very short notice In June 1966 the figure involved was about £3 million/.

Conclusion

It is estimated that China's net annual foreign exchange receipts from the above sources averaged some £80 million in the years 1960-62, £120-130 million in 1963-64, £170-180 million in 1965, and £200-210 million in 1966 (over a third of China's total earnings of foreign exchange). Such a rapid rate of increase is in any case unlikely to be maintained, and from now on Hong Kong's relative importance as a source of foreign exchange may even gradually decline. However, it could remain the largest single source of earnings for some years to come, and continue to perform a valuable role in developing China's commercial relations with the Free World.

D.E.I.(DIS)

LEVEL AND COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF CHINA'S TRADE WITH HONG KONG

(£ millions)

ANNEX

Commodity group

Chinese exports to H.K. 1961 1962 1962 1963 1964 1965 1965

H.K. exports to China

1961 1962

1963

1964 1965

H.K. re-exports to China 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965

Foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco

Crude materials

Chemicals

27.3 37.2 45.4 63.9 7.5 6.8 6.9 6.0 8.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 2.1 2.6

72.5

0.6

0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1

0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

1.0

1.4

0.8

1.2

0.9

0.1

2.4

1.6

2.0

0.2

0.3

Textiles, machinery and other manufactured

goods

Other

Total

28.2 30.6 38.4 50.8

61.4

0.3 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.9

1.7

1.3

1.0 1.4

2.1

0.2 0.2 0.2

0.3

64.5.76.2 92.5 123.1 145.0

0.5 0.5 0.5

0.8

1.1

5.7

4.8

3.9

2.9

3.4

EN CLAIR

PERING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno 620

1 June 1967

(194!!

UNCLASSIFIED

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.620 of 1 June. Repeated for information to Washington, Hong Kong and POLAD Singapore.

Peoples Daily of 1 June, carries two articles on Hong Kong. The first reports strike action by employees of the Water Board, Shanghai Garments Co. and Wham Poa Dock, and claims that peasants in the new territories are also active in expressing their anti British anger.

Second article reports military exercise on Lantao Island

on 31 May in which Hong Kong Garrison and Marines from H.M.S. Bulwark took part. Article also reports arrival on 30 May of Royal Welch Regiments C.0., Bullock allegedly to conduct plotting activities. Article concludes all these military activities are ridiculous, like "ants trying to shake large tree". Same paper also prints photograph showing Hong Kong police confronting demonstrators outside Hilton Hotel.

Mr. Hopson

FO/CO/WH DISTRIBUTION F.E.D.

Sent 0430Z 1 June Recd.0755Z 1 June

VVVVV

вор

CLOSED

NO FURTHER

ין

•

10 6:

N YN MILL CONTINUED ON-

HWB 1/17 Part C (195)

Folio

TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

Cabinet Documents

No.

Reference

180A ce (67) 3310 Thocking

Date

30.5.67

The above-listed Cabinet document (s), which was/were enclosed on this file, has/have been removed and destroyed.

For complete series of Cabinet documents see CAB (CABINET OFFICE

CLASSES

Signed

Landny

Date

3/7/98