1965
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ندرا
!
(0 1030/1703
Réc
X
P.I. 51-3902
2017/01
C.O.R. 30.
+
bjecti
-
Ahok.
TOP SECRET
FILE NUMBER
FED 528 400 10:
PART
FAR
EXIST DEPARTMENT
FILE PERIOD
FILE TITLE
1963-1965
EVACUATION OF BRITISH SUBJECTS
HONG KONG IN THE
FROM
EVENT
OF AN EMERGENCY
When circulated this file must be enclosed in a "Special Care" numbered box and must be kept under lock and key when not in use.
INDEX HEADINGS
PART
FILE NUMBER
FED 528/400/01
|EVACUATION
H-504
¦
HONG KONG
!
1
(0 1030 1703
Ө
REC
19/2/91
куха
х
P.L. 51.3502
C.O.R. 30,
mleden v ang
1960-62-
PRECEDENTS NOTED UNDER:-
RELATED FILES :-
(Previous -Same Title (No.)
CROSS REFERENCED UNDER:-
RESTRICTED
UNITED KINGDOM SECURITY WARNINGS
1. Category AC telegram. Paraphrase NOT required.
GRANJA CIRE
18 JUN 1963 correspondence
A telegram which contains a reference to any classified telegram of correspondence must itself be classified.
3. The Ministry of Defence Cypher Office must be consulted if it is desired to distribute or release this telegram, or any part of it, to a person or nation who would not normally be authorised to receive it,
FAR EASTERN
FRO
: MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, LONDON
2 4 JUN 1963
1
ΤΟ
: CINC FAR EAST
DEU KRED
MAGUNTA 28
33/60-64 Reference
02
7033 TOO 171620Z
17th June, 1963
Reference: JP(61)51(A) (Draft) → FED 5-28/400/0
Regret no progress to report. Subject at
present under consideration in the Colonial Öffice.
CIRCULATION
Director of Plans, C.D.S.
TOO 171620Z
Director of Plans, Admiralty
Director of Plans, er Office
Director of Joint Plans, Air Ministry Secretary, Joint Planning Staff
0.0.S.
RESTRICTED
|
Our reference: Your reference:
From:
TOP -OBORET - QUARD))|
Captain I.G. Mason, R.N.
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Storey's Gate, LONDON S.W.1 Telephone: WHitehall 7000
7th November 1963
૫
り
Dear Alee,
I have been taking a look at the state of various studies undertaken by the Defence Planning Staff over the past two years and which have not yet been completed.
(33 Pree) As
(35
As you know the study on Hong Kong (JP(61)51) came to a halt in November last year at the draft stage. The last paper on our file is a letter from you to Wernon Erskine Crum (FED 528/400/01 (TS) of 13th November 1962) forwarding a copy of a minute you had put up on the subject.
I wonder if you could let me know how this matter now stands. In June this year we told the Far East
Planners that the subject was under consideration in the Colonial Office. Perhaps we ought to consider sending them a further situation report unless you feel they are already aware of the position. If there is no intention or progressing this study at the moment we ought, perhaps to consider letting the Chiefs of Staff know. Could we discuss this next time you are over here?
The Hon. A.P. Cumming-Bruce, 0.B.E.,
Colonial Office,
Church House,
London, S.W.1.
Jours sicurly
Ian Maan
Warnin 8/11
TOP-JEGRET---GUARD
1504
FEAR
L
Feel
75/51/02
in
3
TOP SECRET
BIGOT
loopy for FED 52.8/400/01)
30th December, 1963
I really must apologise for the delay in replying to your manuscript letter of the 25th October in which you asked whether there were replies to several outstanding questions, 1.8. the role of the garrison, denial policy, dormant Commission and evacuation policy. Even now I cannot do more than indicate the present state of the play at this end and give you an ides of the line we have taken in a preliminary talk we have had with Tright, the Unie -- Secretary who is accompanying the Minister of Defence on his visit to you next month. Clearly, there is little more we can do at this end until after the Minister's return, and I am sure that it will help matters along a great deal for you to have been able to discuss all these questions with him, particularly as the new CBF will be a member of his party.
In your Top Secret savingram No. 1805 of the 9th August, you said that you have accepted the revised directive to the CRP subject to the proviso that it would be liable to amendment in the light of any decision on the ultimate purpose of the garrison. You asked however that the role of the garrison should be further clarified and that "our policy and purpose" should be re- examined. Our feeling is that while there is not likely to be any diaposition to insist on resistance for its own sake it is not possible to define in advance when resistance would become useless. We doubt therefore whether we shall get
We think that our very far with any attempt to secure such a definition. tactics should be primarily directed towards securing satisfactory answɑr's on the related questions of denial policy, the dormant Commission and evacuation. If you have these, then perhaps the lack of definition of the role of the garrison will not be so important.
Taking denial first, we gather from your letter of the 14th June that it is the interpretation to be placed on the general phrase that appears in the prosent directive, i.e. "to deny an aggressor the use of installations of shart term military value" with which you are concerned rather than with the phrase itself. It is of course just possible to conceive of circumstances where even a limited denial of this kind might be inappropriate and where, as between helping to cover the sscape of persons who would be in special danger if the Chinese occupied the Calory and such denial, the former justified a higher priority in the use of scarce troops. With the directive as it stands at present the CBF of the tins would obviously have to give priority to the latter. This is a point you my wish to raise with the Minister,
In your letter you draw attention to the BDCC(FE)'s views of 1960 and to the difficulties that these would raise. We think the most promising line of approach here would be to try and secure a closer definition of what is involved. in "installations of short term military value," and in particular of items such as fuel stocks, docking and repair facilities: for example, we should expect
SIR ROBERT BLACK, GCMG, OFE,
GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
VICTORIA
5913 593
TOP SEC E
BIGG
/the
TOP SECRET
The
the military authorities to be very resistant to the idea of leaving any aviation fuel intact, but to be less vorried about ordinary diesel fuel. planning work on this will, we think have to be carried out locally, but we shall seok to secure a directive to the lossl military authorities that will exolude installations or resourose the destruction of which would impose hardship on the local population disproportiomte to the military advantages of denial,
In any onse, thereafter the proposals of the local, military authorities (which they would of course be instructed to discuss with you) would have to be referred back to London for approval.
On the dormant Commission, we have already indicated to you, with the agrement of the Chiefs of Staff (our Top Secret savingram No. 1122 of the 3rd July) that in principle we (at least at the official level) are in sympathy with your point of view. Even though we should probably be unable to secure any closer definition of the role of the garrison we are rolsonably confident that in the light of the further comments in your savingram No. 1805 and of the preliminary discussion we have had with Bright, there should not be undue difficulty in securing acceptance of your recommendation, particularly now that the garrison has been so drastically reduced since the original decision.
I shall be sending you a seperate talegren to arrive in tine for you to consider it before Mr Thorneycraft's arrival, on the most difficult question that of evacuation policy, This of course is a question that will have to be submitted to our Secretary of State and probably to Ministers collectively. Before doing so we shall seek the views of the Chiefs of Staff and it is on some points on which we require further clarification that I shall be telegraphing you very shortly.
Once more may I apologise for the delay in dealing with these complex and important questions ?
(V. I. J. Wallsos)
TOP SECRET
BIGO.
PRIORITY MARKINGS
Emergency Immediate
equired
File No. FED 528/400/01
DRAFT
*TELEGRAM
SECURITY, ETC., MARKINGS Top Secret Secret
*SAVINGRAM Confidential
* Delete whichever is inapplicable. If necessary. "Priority" may be inserted before "Savingram."
Restricted Unclassified Personal Guard
Addressed
Mr. Higham
ali
Mr..
Wallace lot
(Insert appropriate priority marking)
Mr........
چاہتا
GOVERNOR, HONG KONG
Mr......
Sir......
Permt. U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Secretary of State
ENCLOSURES
(Savingrams only!
MEDIUM
En clair
Code
Cypher
¡Delete whichever
is inapplicable)
SAVINGRAMS ONLY
Your Reference
File References
TOP SECRET
Insect appropriate security, etc., marking)
No.
Repeated
(Insert appropriate priority marking)
такл
Corouter
unto la then
ملنا
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13/1
FOR USE IN TELEGRAPH BRANCH
Despatched.
Oa.......
At.
No
Code
.19
Cypher OTP Simplex En clair
..Hrs.
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
182 DEF 75/51/2
Come &
No copying
DISTRIBUTION AND
FURTHER ACTION
the file
+
32:
62 vol
29A: 62 vol.
Following from Wallace.
My letter of 30 Je promised telegram
about evacuation
onpolicy.
2. Before we finally put this to Chiefs of
Staff preparatory to submission to Ministers we
must establish whether there are still any
differences between you and the military
authorities (1.e. C-in-C Far East, now that BDCC
dissolved) on extent to which outline/planning in advance
is necessary. ん
3. Para. 11 of your despatch of 13 October 1962
shows there may still be some misunderstanding.
We think it is clear that, despite some verbal
ambiguity in their paper, BDCC accepted foo
TOP SECRET
Delete whichever.
PRINT NO PRINTING in inapplicable)
TOP SECRET
-2-
o, for different
and that therfore there "plamming Thanks! be mo
this.
for the
and (b) against the ponovility I military situation often outbreak y
Thostilitus parving
ma
lou un formmable than expireted the preparation of outline plans (presumably modest banke) on the evenation, I wider catagoring them are him ted kuum brey
colored by (a)
(28) '62 vol
Townage for comunation.
AL.P.
#ill Planner here) that there could be no
t during a period o planning for large-scale evacuation either tention before hostel has food after hostilities have beskerm and before or during hostilities (DCC paper referred to in para. 10 of your despatch still
however seems to envisage preparation of - outline plans (presumably on a modest scale)
against the possibility of military situation proving less unfavourable uger
(a) _expected-as-
/outline planning for
transpurt for evacuation of particularly vulnerable
valuable categories after start of hostilities
on lines of para. 9(c) of your despatch) Whatove.
5. Presumably objection in para, 35 of paper
enclosed in your letter of 18 June 1962 to
Martin that evacuation of a small proportion of
European women and children would increase
dangers of those left behind would still apply
even if arrangements could be made in more
favourable ciruumstances referred to above,
It would, however, be difficult to deny any
who were willing to risk the hazards the
opportunity of accepting passages if there
Ships and
were spare capacity. In these circumstances
would it not be advisable to have some kind of
priorities or additional categories worked
out and some plans
(a) oborei
L
in the stocks for wing available
I take it that you would have no
objection to planning on lines of para, 9(c) of
your despatch (which on your side may amount to
little more than preparing lists of names).
6. If that to so, then sole divergence between you
and BDCC relates to "less unfavourable situation"
referred to in para, 4 above,
TOP SECRET
SECER
Ev.
Pps.
:
!
Original
on FED 382/400/01 T.S.
Extract from Record of Mtg between V.C.D.S. / Governor Hong Kong-
Tom 15
(b) The suggestion that an evacuation policy was feasible was very
dangerous and unrealistic due to the insuperable difficulties of discrimination. This was also being considered by the Colonial
Office.
5
64
TOP SECRET BIGOT
Avs
by
Hr & Record loopy
FED 528/400/01 TS
TOP SECTET BIGOT
(6)
13th Jamary, 1964
82 on DEF 75/ (3) In the penultimate paragraph of my letter of the 30th December I promised
51/02 - copy
a telegram, to arrive in time for you to consider it before Mr Thorneycroft's marked to come arrival, seeking further clarification on the question of evacuation policy. to this file, but not/yet
here.
This telegram was in draft when we heard that Mr Thornycraft would not after, all be visiting Hong Kong. This removed the immediate urgency, which would have necessitateda telegram, and, in view of the desirability of doing all we can to keep consideration of this question to as small, a number of people (particularly at the Hong Kong end) as possible, it semed to me that it would be better to send the enquiries in today's diplomatic bag.
What follows therefore is the text of the telegram which would have been sent. John Higham saw it as a telegram on Friday and this letter should arrive in good time for you to discuss the matter with him while he is in Hong Kong. Perhaps you would kindly show him this letter.
The draft text of the telegram was as follows 1-
Before we finally put this to Chiefs of Staff preparatory to submission to Ministers we must establish whether there are still any differences between you and the military authorities (i.e. C-in-C Far Bast, now that BDCC dissolved) on extent to which outline planning in advance is necessary,
(32 pew)
Paragraph 11 of your despatch of 13th October, 1962, shows there may still be some misundara tanding. We think it is clear that, despite some verbal ambiguity in their paper, BDCC accepted that there could be no large-scale evacuation either during a period of tension before hostilities or, for different reasons, after hostilities have broken out and that therefore there should be no planning for this.
BDCC paper referred to in paragraph 10 of your despatch still however seems to envisage (a) outline planning for transport for evacuation of particularly vulnerable categorias after start of hostilities (on lines of paragraph 9(c) of your despatch, and (b) against the possibility of military situation after outbreak of hostilities proving less unfavourable than expected, the preparation of outline plans (presumably on a modest scale) for the evacuation of wider catagories than the very limited mmbers covered by (a).
(a) above.
I take it that you would have no objection to plaming on lines of paragraph 9(a) of your despatch (which on your side may amount to little more than preparing lists of names,
SIR ROBERT BLACK, GONG, OBE,
GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
VICTORIA,
FONE KH
TOP SECRET BIGOT
/(b) above.
!
ply
TOP SECRINT BIGOT
(28 Pru) (b) above.
Presumably objection in paragraph 35 of paper enclosed in your letter of 18th June, 1962, to Martin that evacuation of a small proportion of Ewropean women and children would increase dangers of those left behind would still apply even if arrangements could be made in more favourable circumstances referred to above. It would, however, be difficult to dery any who were willing to risk the hazards the opportunity of accepting passages if there were ships and spare capecity. In these circumstances would it not be advisable to have some kind of priorities or additional ostegories worked out and some plans on the stocks for using available tonnage for evacuation?"
(3ga)
(W. I. J. Wallace)
TOP SECRET
ETCOT
TOP SECRET
Hary Ra R
BIGOT
6:
(4)
Exacvation p
Love
7/2
GOVERNMENT HOUSE
Dear Jan.
HONG KONG.
بنا
6
30th January, 1964.
Thank you for your letter FED 528/400/01 TS of 13th January, 1964. I showed it to John Higham and later discussed it with him at a meeting attended by my senior advisers, We considered specifically the points you raise in your letter, and then went over again our own views on evacuation policy.
2.
On "outline planning for transport for evacuation of particularly vulnerable categories after the start of hostilities", so long as this amounts to no more than making lists of names of specialists in Intelligence and of especially vulnerable civilians, in the hope that transport by the Navy may in the event be available, I would agree. No other planning for such categories seems feasible. When the time came to get them away, and if a naval vessel were there, they could be given their instructions verbally by whatever means seemed best at the time.
3.
-
As to further planning, I still hold the view that there can be no other plans - outline or detailed for the evacuation of any larger part of the population, either before or after the start of hostilities. already know my reasons. They are briefly :
You
(a) There would be no means of transporting
all who wished to go. Selective evacuation on grounds of race is, politically, most undesirable and morally indefensible. It could invite the collapse of civil defence services, including the Police, and of law and order generally.
W.I.J.Wallace, Esq., C.M.G., 0.B.E., Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office,
LONDON.
TOP SECRET
/ (b) Any
BIGOTI
I
4.
TOP SECK!
CV
BIGOT
(b) Any evacuation before hostilities
(c)
(a)
started would be interpreted as an admission of defeat, would destroy morale in Hong Kong and damage our reputation throughout the Far East.
Selective evacuation after hostilities started would require employment of British troops or the predominantly Chinese Police Force to protect and assist the evacuation, deflecting them from their proper tasks of fighting the enemy and maintaining law and order.
Europeans would not necessarily be in greater danger from hostile attack than others. On the contrary, the main danger to them would arise from the breakdown of law and order and the development of mob violence and looting.
(e) In any case, people on unprotected
evacuation ships would probably be in greater danger at sea than in Hong Kong.
This assessment stands even if, after the start of hostilities, the military situation developed more favourably than we expected. Preparation of outline plans for the evacuation of wider categories than the very limited numbers agreed in paragraph 2 above brings us face to face with all the objections which constrain us to oppose a wholesale evacuation plan. We cannot determine priorities without discrimination, and the more you try to prune the list the more pronounced becomes the discrimination. I therefore hold to my view that we should not plan for an evacuation of women and children, even in a more favourable military situation than the worst. The furthest I believe we can go in such circumstances, assuming shipping space were available at the time and the risks at sea deemed acceptable, would be to organise ad hoc the evacuation of service families on the grounds that they could be got together quickly
TOP SECRE
and virtually
BIGOT
TOP SECRET BIGOT
- 3-
For the
and virtually without planning or warning. rest, if the shipping companies had space available I consider the most we should do is to encourage them to make the best use of it, women and children first, on a first-come, first-served basis without discrimina- tion.
Yours Care
(R.B.BLACK)
Romi Maca
TOP SECRET
BIGOT
TOP SECRET
D/CBF
Dear You
GOVERNMENT HOUSE
HONG THÀN
Th. Higham
یا
PERSONAL
24 July, 1964.
6/8
7
وهرة
Ано
(32) Pre
FED 520/1488/09
I wonder if you have yet any news for us on the subjects covered in your letter (DEF 75/51/02) of 30 December 1963 to Robin Black,
Purpose of the Garrison,
We have dropped this one, I think we are in fact sufficiently agreed and that the C. B. F. '9 Directive is satisfactory.
Denial. In his letter D/AP II of 16 March Black asked whether you agreed with the list of denial 'targets' agreed between him and the C. B. F. and forwarded to CINCFE.
Dormant Commission. This was discussed with the present C. B. F. when he visited Hong Kong as V. C. D. S. and with Higham when he was here. In his letter of 30 January 1964 Black said that there seemed to be "general agreement that action now lies with the Colonial Office to put a formal end to the dormant Commission, "
-
-
Evacuation. This subject also was discussed with Higham in the light of your letter (FED 528/400/01) of 13 January 1964. In his reply dated 30 January Black reiterated his objections (with which I agree) to any plans outline or detailed for the evacuation of anybody beyond the 'particularly vulnerable categories'. You will recall that in his despatch 2133 of 13 October 1962, Black also sought a decision on his earlier recommendation (savingram 2164 of 27 October 1961) with regard to evacuation from Macau.
Что
Yours ever
David.
C. TRENCH)
W. I. J. Wallace, Esq., C. M. G., O. B. E. Colonial Office, London.
TOP SECRET
i
£
TOP SECRET : PERSONAL
Copy on DEF 75/51/02
вору
FED 528/400/01 TS
8
8th September, 1964
TOP SECRET
PERSONAL
sent 9/9.14
Į
(7)
기
(121)
You wrote to me on the 29th July about denial, the dormant commission and evacuation. I fear that once again we must don sack-cloth and ashes and admit that we have not yet been able to put the papers to Ministers on the two main outstanding
points, 1.e. the dormant commission and evacuation. These two are of course closely interconnected and they must go forward
together. We are now ready to make a submission to Ministers, but we feel that it would be better to wait until a new
Government is in office before doing so. We do promise to seek a decision as soon as possible after the election.
-
I am glad to say that I can be more positive about the third subject Denial, about which Robin Black wrote to me on
the 16th March. The list of installations to be destroyed
enclosed with that letter has now been approved as it stands
by the Chiefs of Staff. You can take it therefore that that
DEF 75/5102 is the list on which action should be based, though we shall
probably seek endorsement from Ministers of the general policy (not of the specific targets) when we put to them the papers on evacuation, etc.
Signed
SIR DAVID TRENCH, KCMG, MC,
GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
VICTORIA,
HONG KONG.
(W. I. J. Wallace)
TOP SECRET: PERSONAL
I
Mr. Higham Y
File No. FED 528/400/01 TS
Mr.
Wallace
staffe
Mr.
Permt. U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
TOP SECRET PERSONAL
Mr.
Minister of State
Sir
Secretary of State
Your Reference.
DRAFT 8.0. LETTER FOR MR WALLACE'S SIGNATURE.
SIR DAVID TRENCH, KCMG, MC, Government House, Hong Kong.
Date
8. 9- 1967
List of The dellations
121: DEF 75/51/02
c.c.
FURTHER ACTION
DEF 75/51/02
KIV
(A
Re-cine this to
M. Carten
(A)
the it
You wrote to me on 29-July about Denise Evacuation. the Dormant Commission and Estion Denial, I fear that once again we must don
sack-cloth and ashes and admit that we have
not yet been able to put the papers to Ministers on the two main outstanding points,
and wonation i.e.Evacuation and the Dormant Commission. These two are of course closely interconnected
and they must go forward together. We are
now ready to make a submission to Ministers,
but we feel that it would be better to wait
until a new Government is in office before
doing so. We do promise to seek a decision as soon as possible after the election.
I am glad to say that I can be more positive about the third subject Denial, about which Robin Black wrote to me on the 16-March, The list (enclosed with the letter of installations to be destroyed/has now been approved as it stands by the Chiefs of
Staff. You can take it therefore that the is the list on which action should be based,
we hall polotting neck what form Thuistin tithe qend policy (not pothe spect) when we tws the the topoma concerto de
Enclome we have
Pc. for fre
du
سيكس
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Signed
་་
[E4098) Wi 42332-0537 50m 1/64 V.B. Gp 791
TOP SECRET : PERSONAL
4. S. Carte 216
Mr..
Mr.
Higham
Mr.
File No.
TOP SECRET
We Autoblert
FED
525/456/07
Permt. U.S. of S.
Wallace Letter being th
Mr.
Sir
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Secretary of State
Your Reference
Date
DRAFT iter
Su Dand Trench, K.E.N.G., M.C.
Garl. Howe
Hong Kong
(121)
Su (128)
Blach
wrote
to
me
The 16"
March
し
under reference
>/API) about dinial policy,
know
with
You
Will
be glad to
that the list (enclosed
his letter) of installations
to be destroyed has
Approved
now been
as it stands
by
the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
FURTHER ACTION
(E6058) WI 42332-8537 50m 1/64 V.B. Gp 791
1
28
1. Magenta 25-10 (133/00-627/7.6.63
Put by. 6.9. Carter
2576
atamen
2 M.of D. (Mason) ref (33) (35) Prev-7-11-63
Ли Смит виль
Re (2) - ? you wit wish and speck
& Cafb, mason about this, which reats with (36) on (60-62) faben
17/12
co
that file.
Thr Higham
& mine up at hun Contin
Warmil
u/u.
en previous file.
Asee (2) & minute
Can we have a word about this at yr cawenisauce.
I
ARme Bence.
12.11
Mr. Higham
ร
sugget
that
(a,
we reply to (2)
Submmion
Demosters have
is being made to
that an early
th
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Submission
bases of the draft apporte
(discusion world of
wondo the the
Jualming at?)
on the
(c)
We accept респита оні наша а hawa 5 of Annex II
The reference to outline
of
Annex I
and
4
Annex II to (33) without
!
further ado.
A
Show
see it
it,
acceptance of the recommendation's
оті реа
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of
the draft submmunion
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same preparations
in ontline of the arrangements
to be branquet into force whe
5
124 occasion
Think the
mwit Adrui
the
sims. Gecordingly. Sam
emmute of 13/12/62
and paras 9-11
Subinusion.
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13/11/63
on fires. fife.
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As inte beseen, I have trchus on
the print in my
atter 7 30th Dec
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from DEF 24/57/02
copy I which in
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Mr Higham
This was touched on when we had our discussion on 20.xii. with Mr Wright of the Ministry of Defence, who is accompanying Mr Thorneycroft on his forthcoming visit to, among other places, Hong Kong.
2. We agreed with Mr Wright that the proper course was to get 003 views on the recommendations of the Governor and the BDCC, making it clear that the matter had not yet been put to Ministers and that the views of the Chiefs were wanted so that the matter might be put to Kinisters, We further agreed that submission to the Chiefs should wait until after Mr Thorneycroft's visit to Hong Kong since this subject will no doubt be discussed by him with the Governor in connection with other matters such as the CBF's Directive, the Dormant Commission and the question whether in the event of a Chinese attack there should be a fight to the finish or not.
3. Meanwhile, as you and I agreed yesterday, we should consider an urgent letter (or telegram) to the Governor to clarify his views about the real differences, if any, remaining between him and the BDCC e.g. in paragraph 9 of Mr Carter's useful draft paper there is the phrase: "the Governor appears to maintain the view that there should be no evacuation plans"; we must know if he does or not. communication ought to get to him before Mr Thorneycroft arrives.
-
Our
On a secondary point, I note that in paragraph 10(b), read with paragraph 6, of the Annex to COS (62)379 - at 294 on the 1960-62 file the BDCC recommend that the Directive to CBF Hong Kong should, as agreed by the CBF himself, be revised to contain a continued reference to evacuation, provided it is varied to cover only the proposals now made. JP(61)51(A)(Draft) at 33 and the Ministry of Defence comment on this at 35 accept this. (Paragraph 11 of 33 and the new paragraph 12 suggested in 35.) Yet I remember that in the revised Directive, as agreed by the Governor and issued some months ago, there is no reference at all to "covering evacuation." Though one can understand why the Governor accepts this omission, I still think it is a pity.
یا
This file (but which is it yet here) by.
10/1
We all
/recognise
1
recognise that after hostilities have begun the chance of evacuating anyone would be rather slim and the possibility that the CBF would have forces to spare to cover this still slimmer.
There is however some advantage from the civilian point of view having at least the desirability of doing this, if possible, written into his Directive. this is water under the bridge now, but the point should not be lost sight of in case the Directive is looked at again in the light of any discussion Mr Thorneycroft may have with the Governor.
ん
I think
24th December, 1963
P.S. In paragraph 15 of his despatch at 32 on the 1960-62 papers the Governor refers to communications from
him about HG's policy on evacuation from Macau to which he has not had a reply.
ん
24.xii.63
3 Hong Kong (Sir R. Black)
Kr. Wallace: Origind
on DEF 75/51102
30-12-63
I think the only point on which we need further clarification from the Governor is that referred to in para. 3 of your minute above, to which Mr. Cumming-Bruce draws attention in para. 3 of his minute of 13 November 1962. I attach a draft telegram.
2. On the general question I do not find myself in entire agreement with the view taken by the Governor on the moral and political aspects of his proposal to abandon general evacuation plans, Provided we made every effort to include in any such plans those local persons who would be particularly liable to Chinese retaliation I do not think that we need have any conscience in endeavouring to bring out as many European women and children as possible. I doubt very much whether such action on our part would have all the consequences suggested by the Governor in paras. 2 12 of 5/11.
3. It seems to me that a decision on this issue must rest on
(a)
our assessment of the fate of European dependents if the CPG take over Hong Kong after a battle;
(b) the practicability of the operation.
If there are any likelihood that European dependents would be subjected by a victorious CPG to torture and degradation, and if there were a good chance of safely evacuating large numbers. then in my view we should not hesitate to insist that plans for evacuation should stand. I think, however, that the Governor's assessment of the situation in E/11 is correct: that European dependents would not be in any greater danger than locals, and that an attempt at evacuation might lead to a breakdown of law and order and endanger the very
/lives
¡
&ww Converted int lettin
131,
very lives we were trying to save. Even the powerful argument that evacuation before hostilities would encourage the Chinese to launch an attack that they might not have initiated would not. I think, be conclusive if there were any serious doubt about the safety of dependents after Chinese occupation. I do not think that we can say that douuts on this score are sufficiently serious to warrant our rejecting the Governor's recommendation in respect of a post or pre hostilities evacuation policy.
Тя
gon
8 January 1964
The amended in consultation
with th. Hihnan.
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See marginal note b
1960-6Rpps. 13.1.64
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Mr. Garten & sen
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Lu.5. Carter
14/1
14-1-64
11-1-64
Extract from record of retry between
V.C.D.S. | Governor Hongkong
-
FEO 382 1400/01
Original
Put by as
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30-1-64
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have
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the
and
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+
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176
posible conres.
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28464
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Hong Kong (Sir 1). Trench) ref (6) -29-7.64
8 To Hong Kong (Sir 1) Trench) ref (~)-8.4.64
Mr. Wallace The Garter)
=(through
You will remember that last year we discussed a draft on this vexed question with Mr Carter. I am sorry it has taken me so long to revise it and, as you will see, I decided that the best course was to completely re-write the draft.
As you know my own view is that. reluctant though I should be to see the abandonment of British Chinese, I do not entirely share the Governor's view that it would be morally wrong to do so. If it is accepted that no evacuation plan can be implemented because of the practical difficulties then this decision about whether or not to discriminate in favour of European women and children does not arise. But if the conclusion is that we must continue to have plans in readiness for dealing with the possibility of evacuation should, for example Americans come to the rescue in good time view is that the present plan should stand, i.e., priority goes to Europeans but we do try and get off as many Chinese loyalists as possible.
the then my
I do not think the Governor's submissions on this question have taken sufficiently into account the possibility of American intervention. Although, as you know, we have felt latterly that it would be unwise to embark on discussions with the Americans about the defence of Hong Kong. the fact remains that the Americans are very much concerned with Hong Kong evacuation plans and, in the early 1950s, were kept in touch with our thinking. As far as I have been able to trace, the Americans intended to send in their own ship to Hong Kong. Unfortunately both plans INCUBATE AND DIGIT (which replaces INCUBATE) cannot be found in the office so we do not know precisely how it was intended to deal with American and Commonwealth nationals. I suspect that, if the Americans scented an emergency in the offing, they would try and get as many of their people off before hostilities; but of course there might be very little time to do this (at the end of 1964 there were nearly 3,500 Americans in Hong Kong).
I hope that the draft note is self-explanatory and covers most of the main points. H. 504 are continuing the search for the evacuation plan and will let Mr. Carter know how they fare.
on
(J. D. HIGHAM) 20 April, 1965.
(Mr Wallace) Mr Highe
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Mr. Lu.5. Carl
Mr.
Mr.
TOP SECRET
File No. FE) $2.5/4.00/pi
Permt. U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Secretary of State
Mr.
Sir
Your Reference.
DRAFT
L
t
Date
!
Iefence Issues:
Three
Heng Keng
defence senes
сепсанита
Hong Kong
have been
et officit level for a conus'dratlan
In der
FURTHER ACTION
(E6098) WI 42332-8537 50m 1/64 V.L. Op 791
1.
(a)
consideration) by officials:..
The evacuation of culiaris
(b) The Governor's Dormant
Om
Commission.
(4) Denial pokeys.
(૯)
The fent l'ivo
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musicsterial
are required.
matter of which
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17we
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Secretary of
State
3.
Au Three
Dure
regarded by the
as extremely
Honą Kaną Government
sensitive subjects
true won the cause
+
of
publé reference to it
This is
particularly
evacuation; any
wered be
Comstoned in the Colony as indicating
an intention to abandon
chy position
there and would be Chely to have
NOTE
TOP SECRET
HONG KONG
(a)
Evacuation of Civilians in Wartime
(b)
Assumption of Government by Commander British
Forces in Grave Emergency
(12) on 14521/15 of
1950
(a)
Evacuation Introduction
At the time of the Korean war the Governor of Hong Kong was instructed to prepare plans for the evacuation of civilians,
He was told by the then Secretary of State, Mr. Griffiths, that while every effort must be made to avoid racial discrimination. in the last resort, public opinion here would expect H.M.G. to ensure that no British women and children were unavoidably left behind. It was eventually agreed that plans should be on the basis that preferential treatment should be given to those who, if left behind, would be in danger of special discrimination or mistreatment and were least able to bear such treatment. By this yardstick top priority would be given to the dependents of service personnel, European women and children and the dependents of Hong Kong Chinese who had actively assisted Government. e.g. in the Volunteer Forces. Numbers involved were expected to be some 10,000, with a further 10 - 20,000 in lower priority categories, such as men and women of friendly
neutral countries and wives and families of British Chinese on
a "first come first served' basis. The current version of the plan is now some 8 years old (plan DIGIT). Subsequently a plan was drawn up for the evacuation, at a later stage, of non- essential civilians and of the garrison; but this plan was abandoned some years ago (plan BITING).
-
•
2. These plans were drawn up when there was a large garrison in Hong Kong (20 major units in 1951), when a prolonged and even a successful resistance was contemplated, when Singapore was available as a staging post for evacuees and when there was some possibility of finding permanent homes for Asian evacuees in territories under British control. Even then 4 days' notice would have been required to provide shipping for 10,000 and 10 days' notice for 16,000 refugees.
The Military Situation
3. By 1960 circumstances had changed so radically since 1951 that existing plans for evacuation were reviewed. With the 8 major units then at his disposal (the garrison has since
/been
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
been reduced to 63 major units) the Commander British Forces advised that he might be able to hold the rim of the harbour area for up to 3 days and to contain internal disorder, but he could not at the same time deploy the substantial forces that would be necessary to cover an evacuation. As the Airport would have been made unusable at an early stage evacuation by air would be impossible. Organised movement in the harbour would not be possible and, with the Chinese controlling by artillery, air and naval units all the approaches to Hong Kong, any major movement in or out of the Colony could not be contemplated. For any shipping that got away there would still be the hazards of a 640
mile journey to Manilla, the nearest reception port.
4.
Given this new military appreciation it is obvious that shipping for evacuation could not be brought in from outside.
Reliance would have to be placed on shipping already available, and this could take only a very small proportion of those eligible for evacuation,
5.
The Governor held that indications that the evacuation of a
favoured group was being organised, consisting largely of European women and children, and "white" British manpower military and civil - was being diverted to do it would tend to accelerate the breakdown of law and order, seriously affecting in particular the morale of the Chinese public rank and file, and thus increasing the risk of attack on "foreigners". Any
evacuation could include only small numbers of the European women and children. Those remaining and Chinese loyalists who
had to be left behind would be at greater risk because of the
evacuation attempt.
6.
The Governor's conclusion, backed by the military authorities in the Far East, was that any planned evacuation after hostilities had started was quite impracticable, and he recommended in 1962 that existing plans for evacuation should be abandoned, He rejected the idea of any attempt to organise an evacuation before the start of hostilities. This would be interpreted both in Hong Kong and in China not as clearing the decks for action but as an admission of defeat and an open invitation to a Chinese attack, As an attack could be mounted at very short notice and at least 6 days would be required to assemble additional shipping from Singapore and elsewhere, there would be no certainty of being able to complete an evacuation in time.
17.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
(30) on 14521/15 1950
Discrimination in favour of Europeans
7.
In 1949
From the very outset of evacuation planning successive Governors of Hong Kong have expressed the strongest objection to any evacuation plan based on racial discrimination. Sir Alexander Grantham said that he was certain that his Executive Council, if they were consulted, would insist that equal opportunities to leave must be available to all, irrespective of race. It was thought that the numbers of non-Europeans wishing to avail themselves of evacuation opportunities would be limited, though it was recognised that any estimate of numbers must be highly conjectural time it was thought that a total of some 30,000 including Europeans) might wish to leave.
8.
At that
Subsequently, when it became clear that shipping could not possibly be made available for numbers of this order, the Governor agreed to the scheme described in paragraph 1 above and felt that this, while being "beyond justifiable criticism" would in fact enable the highest priority to be granted to European women and children since it could scarcely be denied that they were the most vulnerable group of all. At a later stage still however the view has been taken in Hong Kong that even this echeme is politically most objectionable in that it would be obvious that its practical effect would be to give preference to
Europeans.
The more categories have to be pared down because of the very small totals that can be catered for compared with those envisaged in 1950, the more racially discriminatory the
scheme becomes.
9. When Sir Robert Black put forward his recommendation that the present evacuation scheme should be scrapped (in 1962) he expressed the very strong opinion that, even were evacuation feasible, it would be morally and politically wrong that any scheme should favour, or appear to favour, Europeans as against those Chinese, Indians, etc. which might wish to leave. He
considered that an evacuation scheme of this kind would deal a
severe blow to our international prestige particularly in Asia and Africa and in the new Commonwealth;
and that it would, for example, cause doubts to arise in Malaysia about whether, under direct attack. British troops might not be employed for the evacuation of British subjects rather than for the defence of Malaysia. Sir Robert expressed the view that European women and children would not be in greater peril than non-Europeans in the event of a Chinese attack, that the Chinese might be expected to deal far more harshly with those of their own race
/whom
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
whom they held to be "collaborators" with the British, or to be committed anti-communists; that the large number of European internees would be an embarrassment to the Chinese Peoples' Government who would wish to get rid of them eventually; and that the greatest danger to the European community would
arise not from Chinese Government troops but from mob violence
before the Communist authorities had established themselves and
which would be certain to occur if a breakdown of law and order were
precipitated by the diversion of British troops to cover an
evacuation.
10.
Speculation on the likely behaviour of the Chinese Government towards its troops must necessarily be of an uncertain
nature. To some extent this attitude would be conditioned by the
circumstances under which Hong Kong were taken over, If our Forces had done little more than "identify aggression" and had
thereafter been content to fight a delaying action without exposing the Colony to all the horrors of a resistance à outrance it is to be expected that the Chinese Government's desire to avoid unnecessary adverse publicity by illtreating the local inhabitants - Asian or European would prevail. On the other hand, in the unlikely event of nuclear weapons being used against the Chinese mainland as part of the defence of Hong Kong, it could well be that the Chinese Government Forces would do little to protect their enemies from the wrath of the mob. It is not to be denied however that in either eventuality a comparatively small number of Chinese loyalists and their dependents would be at greater risk than even Europeans and their families.
-
11.
Had it been possible to implement an evacuation scheme under which a considerable proportion of those categories included in the original plan (see para, 1 above) would have had a reasonable prospect of safe removal, it is not thought that the Governor's objections to an arrangement which in effect would have led to a preference for Europeans need have been regarded as overriding. If, however, the military argument is accepted that any large-scale evacuation is impossible, then a decision of this question of principle raised by the Governor is not required. A decision would however be required if there was any question of: (a) an organised evacuation before the outbreak of hostilities, (b) if it were decided that plans should be held in readiness in case American military support and shipping were
/available
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
available to an extent which greatly improved the prospects of a successful evacuation, and (c) if it were decided that outline plans should be in readiness in case the military situation were not as desperate as assumed in this paper.
The Governor's Proposals
12. On (a) above the Governor's views are clear and are stated in paragraph 6 above. He does however agree that, before the outbreak of hostilities, the Hong Kong Government should ensure that, in the use of available sea and air transport, such arrangements as are possible in the situation at the time should be made to facilitate the departure of those who wish to leave, with priority for women, children and invalids and for people particularly liable to retaliation by the Chinese. possible these arrangements should be left in the hands of the shipping and air companies and the Government itself should take only the minimum action necessary to ensure that orderly arrangements are made.
As far as
On (b), the Governor thinks that the prospects of American intervention are insufficiently firm for evacuation plans to be based on this
possibility.
On (c), the Governor's view is that shipping is not likely to be available for anything approaching large-scale evacuation. The furthest the Governor believes we should go is to accept, assuming shipping space
were available and the risks at sea deemed acceptable, the ad hoc organisation of the evacuation of Service families, on the grounds that they could be got together quickly and virtually without planning or warning. For the rest, if the shipping companies had space, the most that should be done is to encourage them to make the best use of it, women and children first, on a first come first served basis, without racial discrimination.
A short list of particularly vulnerable persons should however be drawn up and advantage should be taken of any evacuation opportunities either by
commercial or naval transport.
Recommendations
-
13. Further discussions will be necessary with other Departments notably the Kinistry of Defence, Foreign Office and Commonwealth Relations
Office before final recommendations can be made to Ministers. It would
however be helpful to have guidance from Colonial Office Ministers before
we embark on these. It is suggested that our preliminary views should be on the following lines:
(a) on the assumption that resistance to a Chinese attack would be limited to what could be achieved by the present garrison, it should be accepted that any large-scale evacuation would be impracticable and that the present plan should be abandoned;
(b) it should be accepted that there could be no question of a planned evacuation before the outbreak of hostilities;
TOP SECRET
/(c)
1
Mr.
Mr.
File No..........
Permt. U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Sir
Secretary of State
Your Reference.
Date
DRAFT
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While the bliss gleff bet
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FURTHER ACTION
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To deny any aggressor
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pohen is
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the light of the limited Junction of
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and so
the least hardship to the
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to cause
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Mr.
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Mr.
File No...
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Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Secretary of State
Sir
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DRAFT
Recommendation.
Date
18. Sz
is therefore
recemmented
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For the large-scale
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17
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12
abere for
making use
9
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FURTHER ACTION
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our recommendation
he may
(16098) W) 42132-8537 50m 1/64 V.B. Gp 791
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Mr.
Highan
Mr...
Mr.
Mr.
Sir
TOP SECRET
File No. FED. 528/400/01
Permt. U.S. of S.
Blue
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Secretary of State
Your Reference.....
Date
DRAFT SUBMISSION TO MINISTERS
Note
HONG KONG
(a)
Evacuation of Civilians in Wartime
by the then feasting offate & hiffet,
(12) on
14521/15 of 1950
FURTHER ACTION
eg. in the Volunteer Fa
The courant resin the tham some 8 years)
old (then DIGIT)
(b) Assumption of Government by Commander
British Forces in Grave Emergency
(a)
给
At the time of the Korean War/Governor of Hong Kong was instructed to prepare plans for the
evacuation of civilians. He was told/that
while every effort must be made to avoid racial
discrimination, in the last resort, public opinion here would expect H.M.G. to ensure that no British women and children were unavoidably
left behind. It was eventually agreed that
plans should be on the basis that preferential treatment should be given to those who, if left behind, would be in danger of special
discrimination or mistreatment and were least
able to bear such treatment.
By this yardstick
top priority would be given to the dependents of service personnel, European women and children and the dependents of Hong Kong Chinese who had actively assisted Government/ Numbers involved were expected to be some 10,000, with a further 10 20,000 in lower priority categories, such as neutral men and women of friendlynthies
and wives and families of British Chinese on a
"first come first served" basis,
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TOP SECRET
2. These plans were drawn up when there was a large garrison in Hong Kong (20 major units in 1951), when a prolonged and even a successful resistance was contemplated,/when Singapore was available as a staging post for evacuees. Even then 4 days' notice
would have been required to provide shipping for
10,000, and 10 days' notice for 16,000 refugees.
100
J. by 1960 the Garernor and the military authorities
in the Far Bast recommended that circumstances had
changed so radically şince 1951 that existing plans
were revitund
for evacuation shoull be abandoned,
With the 8 major
units then at his disposal (the garrison has since
been reduced to 6
Forces expressed the view that he could not cover
evacuation after the outbreak of hostilities.
major units) the Commander British
falt adored
With the Porces available/he might be able to hold
the rim of the harbour area for up to 3 days and to
contain internal disorder, but he could not at the
same time deploy the substantial forces that would
Gva, au Concurs til
be necessary to protect evacuees,
As the Airport would have been made unusable
and when Love was move possibility of firsborg Hemnet Lowe for Mills
in tuitre when Britt
at an early stage or an
attack
evacuation by air would be impossible. Organise
and movement in the harbour would not be possible and,
Sibollurg
with the Chinese patrolling by artillery, air and
naval units all the approaches to Hong Kong, any
major movement in or out of the Colony could not be
contemplated. For any shipping that got away there
would still be the hazards of a 640 mile journey to
Manilla, the nearest reception port.
4.Given this new military appreciation it is
obvious that shipping for evacuation could not be
brought in from outside. Reliance would have to be
placed on shipping already available, and this could
very
take only a small proportion of those eligible for
evacuation
the
J
bekist
remany
and be recommended in 1962 At Existing Hans for wowration should be awarded.
and at lead to days would be required t asseuble additand siffing for Singappe and chehere,
TOP SECRET
Labt #
S The Governor considers that indications
that we were organising the evacuation of a wasthing Aganger.
favoured group, consisting largely of
European women and children, and the diversion
"white" British manpower
was being divorted
-
military and
civil /to do it would tend to accelerate the
breakdown of law and order, seriously
affecting in particular the morale of the Chinese Jobic rank and file, and thus increase
the risk of attack on "foreigners". Any
evacuation could include only small numbers
of the European women and children, and sett
Chinese loyalists who had to be left behind
ine
would be at greater risk because of the
evacuation attempt.
backed by the
6. The Governor's conclusions that any planned evacuation after hostilities have
de
started quite impracticable, He rejecte
the idea of any attempt to organise an
evacuation before the start of hostilities.
This would be interpreted both in Hong Kong
and in China not as clearing the decks for
action but as an admission of defeat and an
open invitation to a Chinese attack. As an
attack could be mounted at very short notice) we the wall be
should have no certainty of being able to
the additional tommage required by for a
successful evacuationútu Hong Kong ang out befrie
in the time at our disposal.
Ccomplete
an evacuation in time.
/From
TOP SECRET
(30) on 14521
/15 1950.'
TOP SECRET
Discriminatam in favor of European
From the very outset of evacuation planning successive Governors of Hong Kong have expressed the strongest objection to any evacuation plan
In 1949 based on racial discrimination.
Sir Alexander Grantham said that he was certain
that his Execuative Council. if they were consulted, would insist that equal opportunities to leave must
be available to all, irrespective of race.
It
was thought that the numbers of non-Europeans
wishing to avail themselves of evacuation
+
opportunities would be limited thought it was recognised that any estimate of numbers must be
highly conjectural, At that time it was thought that àtotal of some 30,000 (including Europeans)
might wish to leave.
4. Subsequently, when it became clear that
shipping could not possibly be made available for numbers of
this order, and on the basis of the rulingquoted in paragraph/above, the Governor agreed to
the scheme described in paragraph
above
and felt that this," while being "beyond justifiable
criticism" would in fact enable the highest
priority to be granted to European women and
children since it could scarcely be denied that
they are the most vulnerable group of all.
At a later stage still however the view has been
taken in Hong Kong that even this scheme is
politically most objectionable in that it would be
obvious that its practical effect would be to
give preference to Europeans. The more categories
have to be pared down because of the very small
totals that can be catered for compared with those
envisaged in 1950, the more racially discriminatory
the scheme becomes.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
q
When Sir Robert Black put forward his recommendation
that the present evacuation scheme should be
scrapped (in 1962) he expressed the very strong
opinion that, even were evacuation feasible,
it would be morally and politically wrong that any
scheme should favour, or appear to favour,
Europeans as against those Chinese, Indians, etc.
which might wish to leave. He considered that an
evacuation scheme of this kind might would deal a
severe blow to our international prestige,
particularly in Asia and Africa and in the new
Commonwealth; and that it would, for example.
cause doubts to arise in Malaysia about whether,
under direct attack, British troops might not be
employed for the evacuation of British subjects
rather than for the defence of Malaysia.
Sir Robert expressed the view that European women
and children would not be in greater peril then
non-Europeans in the event of a Chinese attack,
that the Chinese might be expected to deal far
more harshly with those of their own racewhom they
held to be "collaborators" with the British, or to
be committed anti-communists; that the large
number of European internees yould be an embarrassment to the Chinese/Government who would
wish to get rid of them eventually; and that the
greatest danger to the European community would
arise not from Chinese Government troops but from
mob violence before the Communist authorities had established themselves/which would be certain to
occur if the breakdown of law and order were
Berkes
precipitated by the diversion of British troops to
cover an evacuation, under the worst possible
circumstances,
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
lo Speculation on the likely behaviour of the
Chinese Government towards its troops must
necessarily be of an uncertain nature. To some
extent this attitude would be conditioned by the
circumstances under which Hong Kong were taken
over.
If our Forces had done little more than
"identify aggression" and had thereafter been
content to fight a delaying action without
exposing the Colony to all the horrors of a
resistance a outrance it is to be expected that
the Chinese Government's desire to avoid
unnecessary adverse publicity by illtreating
-
the local inhabitants Asian or European
would prevail. On the other hand, in the
unlikely event of nuclear weapons being used
against the Chinese mainland as part of the
defence of Hong Kong, it could well be that the
Chinese Government Forces would do little to
protect their enemies from the wrath of the mob.
It is not to be denied however that in either
eventuality a comparatively small number of
Chinese loyalists and their dependents would be
at greater risk than even Europeans and their
families.
//. Had it been possible to implement an
evacuation scheme under which a considerable
proportion of those categories included in the original plan (see para. 1 above) would have
had a reasonable prospect of safe removal, it is
not thought that the Governor's objections to
an arrangement which in effect would have led to
a preference for Europeans need to have been
regarded as overriding. If, however, the military
argument is accepted that any large-scale
evacuation is impossible, then a decision of this
/question
1
TOP SECRET
question of principle raised by the Governor
A decision would however be
is not required.
required if there was any question of;(a) an
organised evacuation before the outbreak of hostilities, (b) if it were decided that plans
should be held in readiness in case American
military support and shipping were available to
an extent which greatly improved the prospects of
wratin
a successful operation, and (c) if it were decided
that outline plans shoud be in readiness in case
the military situation were not as desperate as
assumed in this paper.
The Lovemon's Past
7Z on (a) above the Governor's views are clear and are stated in paragraph 6 above. He does
however agree that, before the outbreak of
hostilities, the Hong Kong Government should
ensure that, in the use of available sea and air
transport, such arrangements as are possible in the
situation at the time should be made to facilitate
the departure of those who wish to leave, with
priority for women, children and invalids and for
people particularly liable to retaliation by the Chinese. As far as possible these arrangements
should be left in the hands of the shipping and
air companies and the Government itself should
take only the minimum action necessary to ensure
that orderly arrangements were made.
on (b) the Grand Riche but this witely tit to Arawing would inthara the prospect of American interaction are inofficials fünf wanation Have she loved
to pribitit.
de
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
L
On (c) the Governor's view is that shipping is
not likely to be available for anything approaching
large-scale evacuation. The furthest the Governor
believe we should go is that, assuming shipping
space were available and the risks at sea deemed acceptable, the ad hoc organisation of the evacuation of Service families, on the grounds that they could
be got together quickly and virtually without
planning or warning. For the rest, if the shipping
companies had space, the most that should be done
is to encourage them to make the best use of it,
women and children first, on a first come first served
basis. without racial discrimination.
A short list
of particularly vulnerable persons should however be
drawn up and advantage should be taken of any
evacuation opportunities either by commercialor
military transport.
Recommendations
I Further discussions will be necessary with
other Departments
-
notably the Ministry of Defence,
Foreign Office and Commonwealth Relations Office -
before final recommendations can be made to Ministers.
It would however be helpful to have guidance f
Colonial Office Ministers before we embark on these.
It is suggested that our preliminary views should be
on the following lines:
(a) on the assumption that resistance to a Chinese
attack would be limited to what could be achieved
by the present garrison, it should be accepted that
any large-scale evacuation would be impracticable
and that the present plan should be abandoned;
(b) it should be accepted that there could be no
question of a planned evacuation before the outbreak
of hostilities;
TOP SECRET
(c)
i
TOP SECRET
Well we have Lotterys been rehstart to (despite the pahimming tables with to Avevious some you ago) &initrite totho with the American aat thing Kong it way
Mutishising Chicol
mcg. aufible and the
Than
eplacement
in the thinge hall islands sta sat of tag Kang
(c) the Governor's proposals for securing that
in a period of tension preceding the possible
werpective of roce. outbreak of hostilities priority/should be
1
given to women, children invalids, and people
particularly liable to retalliation by the
Chinese should be accepted;
/should
(d) that, after the start of hostilities, ad hoc
arrangements only should be made on the lines of
para. 12)above.
(e) that we should consider with the Foreign
Office and the Ministry of Defence whether it
would be opportune to seek discussions with the
Americans about the defence of Hong Kong.
including evacuation plans.
Ministerial
instructions would be sought before there was
any question of initiating such discussions.
in any case be necessary to inform the
terms Americans, who are aware in gheral plans of the
original evacuation plan, that we do not now
consider it to be feasible. so that they can if
Ensula te pritom of
necessery-make separate provision for evacuating
their own nationals. (The Australians and
Canadians who have also been given assurances
about evacuation may also have to be informed).
While it is thought unlikely that the Americans
would wish to intervene if the Chinese attack was
directed against Hong Kong in isolation,
intervention is much more likely if Hong Kong
was attacked as part of a general conflict.
If there seemed to be a likelihood of the Americans
being able to intervene in a manner which would
make an orderly evacuation scheme feasible then
the whole picture would change and it would then
be necessary to decide whether a scheme on the
lines of the present one (1.e. with a certain
:
/element
TOP SECRET
element of racial discrimination) should be
adopted despite the political and moral
objections, or whether a scheme should be based
on a "first come first served" basis,
14 Finally it should be stressed that this whole question is one which is regarded by the
Hong Kong Government as an extremely sensitive hart
subject, because any leak that this subject was even being discussed could be construed as
indicating an intention to abandon our position
which would be likely to have a serious effect
on public confidence. For this reason, knowledge
of the evacuation schemes has been kept to a
very limited circle in Hong Kong, and it has not
form
been possible to draw-up any completely
satisfactory estimates of numbers who might
wish to avail themselves of evacuation
opportunities.
15
A
B attested
TOP SECRET
тор
SECRET
Mr. N.S.
4.5. Carter 45 Mr. Higham
Mr..
Mr.
File No. FED 518/noc/or
Permt, U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Sir
Secretary of State
Your Reference.
DRAFT
Capt. 1.G. Mason, R.N.
Mui. or Defence
(2)
ร
жарат
to
your
latter
of the 7" November, 1963,
addremed
to
Alec Cumming - Bruce
about
The
Planning, Staff
exercise
on evacuation
from Hong Kong
which rest's
6-12
the
(33) Lver. Wht.
Curculation of your paper
J.P. (61) S7 (A) (Draft) of 2nd November,
1962.
S
Q
Sorry
That
Le
have
fo
Greally delayed consideration
FURTHER ACTION
of this matter.
2.
As
how
understand the position
after further discussion
and
correspondence with the Governor,
remains
1Zume
but-
one
paint
at issue
and
The
(66096) WI 42332-8517 50m 1/64 V.B. Gp 791
between BD CC (F.E.)
The Governor considers
Garemor.
1201
3.
practical
-
political grounds,
lange
scale
evacuation of non- Chmere
elements
of the population cannara
Take place
under
chat- 6012 before and after
any circumstances
the
;
~ both Chimere
-
Chinese
(29A)
Live Mps.
(3)
cm freu fyft.
dike
·25A).
hostilities only verwy
стови
will be ala
outbreak
д
humber
izsin
and
one
category
to Chiese retaliation)
to leave
;
and
Imiled
}
to leave anot
12ome vulnern
should be assisted
that, for there purposes,
any jorm of outline evacuation plan a Superfluous and would in
is
Jack be
A
misnomer. BDCC (F.E.)
Ow
other hand appear to mamtain
that
The view
some outline planning for the evacuation of much wider categories (particularly of
non-Chiere elements)
in
سلام به
Stination
to be
Cen
to take advantage of
which
the retamed
should
a
military
in the event,
maight hoo
12am envisaged
unfavourable
(Annex to C.0.5. (62) 379).
not entirely clear to
to wo
exactly
draft J.P.S. report (annexed to
SI-
4.
Where
12
J.P. (61) 5+ (A) (Draft)) stands
in this verject-
When it concludes
that BDCC (F.E.)
should
a se
Their report" as
G
basci for future
J
planminą
-1.e. Whethe
such pulanning
towards
to be directed
Myectwas recommended by the
(and accepted by BD CC (FE))
preparation of a much more ambition's scheme.
The very
limited
Governor
To live
But we have assumere that it bears
The latter The recommendation in 3DCC(FB)'s
Deir origmal report
any
since f
Con làm clien (C.0.5. (61) 130 (Renned)), which they did not find boo
need to modify
remation in their final report to be unconcatent mix the Govenor enuraged
outline plan which would
Jaranable circumstances
Brink women
The retention of
at least ensure in
all
The evacuation
and children.
Mr.
File No.........
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Sir
Permt. U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Secretary of State
Date
Your Reference
DRAFT
5.
think
That
from
the
purely
pragmatic angle
Governor is right in rejectingh
rejecting a large-
the
any
scale
evacuation
and
any planning
The
Case,
See lit,
set out-
That-end.
for accepting his views in
The attached
decision
forumarily
considerations.
memoran olun in,
turns
(however
on poblical
H.M. G.
en
What to dress up plans
The
Firstly
Pahe a
assemmend
will
need
に
Governor's
poblical
view
on the
(in Hong Kong and elsewhere)
window of any
off the
Lazopa
Scalef
dvicromaristory
to
weigh
12 in
balance
attempt at large scale
and secondly,
/ evacuation;
FURTHER ACTION
in
the
(E6098) WI 42332-8537 50m 1/64 V., Gp 791
assenment of
against their own
(a) the libaly judą ment
public opinion
if it was
seen
엉
This comm
comntay
that ho
effent-
was made (more especially,
That no plans existed) to
evacuate
British
and children, and
(b) the probability that public criticisin
could be reasonably met by expected statement that, as anticopr
The actual circumstances
made evacuation imposible.
Political comiderations such an there
the ministerial instruction
A
in Hong Kong
led to
mi 1950
12at plans
children
for the evacuation of Bookish women
should be prepared,
に
after strong advice
had been tendered by
the contrary
then
the / Governor.
6.
his feel that there
are
two possible
Contes
(i)
reconside
12
J.P.S. draft-
(i)
report in the light of the arguments
inn the enclosed
Comed
Serve
memorandum (which
A
Colonial office paper)
To let the report go forward to the
Amanter of Defence (subject to
confirmation of amendments
discussed)
exchanged
mention
17
Ceveren
50
Jar
but to
minute
( Annex I to I,?? (61) 50 (A) (Draft)) the
difference of guinion with
17
need for
the Governor
an outline, plan
ん
(particularly
197
a much wider and aware of
Hendral evacuation
Covering the
"than he recommends
hon - Chiese elements)
that
G
and
doasion here turns
than inchtary comderations
Wineh
The fact
on other
about
The Colonial Secretary will be
は
The Nemnly of Defences will then draft-
Consulting, taxi
a minute for
Minister to send
to the Prime Minister and
/ or Munter
of Defence
and
to any other of his
Mr.
File No.........
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Sir
Permt. U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Secretary of State
Your Reference.............
Date
------------------------ ANNA.....................i
DRAFT
colleagues
he
Consult
may wash This matter.
7. We are
melined
Conce
Sunce
to favour the second whatever agreed conclusion
may
h
at offecil level,
it
on the point at-issue
be reached
further consultation's
will be furt
and foremost far
Minister to decide
12ad the Governor showed be crevaruled
alternatively,
That the
necessary
action should
the
Fahen
to initiate
consultation
his colleag
za with a
View
to
reversal
the
bohay laid down in
of British women
1950
on evacuation
An of
children.
-
9. We
should
be
FURTHER ACTION
grateful for your
Views
how
we might proceed
(E6096) WI 42332-8537 50m 1/64 V.B. Gp 791
Whichever course is pursued,
Care home of
propone at the same
time to take
the
question of verokamą the
1951 Dormant
Commmion seseof the mention) ing providing for the appointment- of the Commander, British Forces
ar
Guvernar 22-26 of the memorandum).
in certain crcumstances (paras
TOP SECRET
File No. FED 528/400/01
Mr. T.S. Carter 5.
Mr...
Mr.
Mr......
Permt, U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Sir
Secretary of State
Your Reference.....
Date...
+
DRAFT
? Eurfeom
? Eufem
Biting has been cancelled -see (28) ~ 1960/62 file
(28)~
>
FH.
FURTHER ACTION
While I sms and children were the first finity.
Evacuation of Civilians
from Hong Kong
This is regarded by the Hong Kong Government as an
because any leak that his extremely sensitive subject; any-public_reference-to-it Suluk Lim even buing durcumvent confil. would be construed as indicating an intention to abandon
our position there and would be likely to have a serious
effect on public confidence 7.
Since 1951 there have been in existence plans for the
evacuation of women, children and elderly men from Hong Kong
(code-names "Incubate" and, subsequently, "Digit"), in the
event of an actual or imminent emergency i.e. an attack by
the Chinese on the Colony. And from 1953 there has been in
existence a plan ("Biting") for the evacuation of civilian
men if a general evacuation became necessary.
2.
These plans had their roots in circumstances that were
very different from today's (particularly in regard to China's
military strength). They were based on the S, of S's instruction
in 1950 that ".......public opinion here would expect H.M.G.
to ensure that no British women and children were avoidably
left behind". Their existence was justified on the grounds
that white women and children "would be considered to be in
greater potential danger than local people". The plans a
répared provided, as a second priority, for the evacuation
of other persons (including Asians or Eurasians) who would be
(Q2431) 57024/8314 2MP 1/62 ATBS. 763
/in
TOP SECRET
in special danger. The evacuation of some 20-30,000 persons
was envisaged; the number today would be of much the same
order.
3.
The preparation of evacuation plans on a basis of racial
discrimination was (and continues to be) repugnant to the Hong
Kong Government. From time to time doubts have been expressed
as to their practicability in view of (a) the availability of
transport and (b) reductions in the size of the garrison
affecting its ability to maintain resistance for the necessary
length of time (14 days) without strong and timely reinforcement
(which would only come from the Americans). The garrison
has since been progressively reduced in size.
Le In 1960 the Commander British Forces in Hong Kong expressed
the view that, in the face of air attack and under conditions of
serious internal disorder (which it must be assumed would
accompany a Chinese attack), he could not with the forces
available carry out the task (then included in his directive)
of covering an evacuation after the outbreak of hostilities. A
review of evacuation policy was accordingly undertaken by
BDCC (F.E.) in consultation with the C.B.F. and Governor,
Hong Kong.
Evacuation after the Outbreak of Hostilities
!
5. The resultant military assessment (with which the Governor
agrees) confirmed the C.B.F's view that any large-scale evacuation
after the outbreak of hostilities would be impracticable,
except conceivably in the event of immediate American assistance.
On this latter point the Governor considers that a decision must
be taken on the basis that there is (and will be) no firm American
commitment,
6. In covering an evacuation, British troops and the Police
Force would be deflected from their primary tasks of meeting
!
aggression and of maintaining law and order. People on
/unprotected
}
Mr..
Mr.
Mr.
Sir
File No......
Your Reference
DRAFT
FURTHER ACTION
Permt. U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Secretary of State
Date.
Concederations.
14
ی
The crux of the malter in whether a plan for the general evacuation
of Eusebeam non-Chiene element's of
the population
(5-
fo.
for use in a
situation.
showed be retained
favourable militains
In Jaronn of velaming
Whole
A
plan
id=_com_be_predthat failure to
arrange for the evacuation of all
European bes
Chiere
elements before the outbreak of
bostilities
caned be
a
schoone of
political embarrasment for
in this ceranting
H.M.G. of and when the Chimene
move againit Hong Kong:
it would
be
of
Напа капа
was
Bout
little arand after
to the existence of
evacuation plans if
they were
well
-
to point
(and
in the event;
shown to be patently
unrealistic and incapable of
execution. This would indeed be
(86098) W: 42332-8537 50m 1[64 V.L. Gp 791
the case if events
were to show that;
TOP
SECRET
on a
progur rappreciation
to be faced in Hong Kong,
12
selination
no effect
plans could
be
made
to divert the
besen any shipping
and arcraft
12a1
an erRenation
comed not the covered
With the
forces
available.
16.
Even if it
Was
militarily
and other winne
practicable
to consider putting suech a plan
into operation, itf
is the
Goreman's view
that the internal pohtical consequences
Smeto
fotopascent its
Completion by adding greatly to the
problems facing
The defence and
secuiirting
forces
world
frevent its
Successful
of it's
completion.
At the same time,
Selective application to non-Chiese
be conse
elements of the
poprelation
The plan
+
side-effects
might have embarraning
The Commonwealth
17. Our
conclusion is that, for a
combination of military
political
on H.M.G'S
relation with
and mohlical
reasons
ainer
Large-scale
evacuation of
hona Chinese elements
ရ
the population
either before
Oy
would be unifiracticable
after the outbreak of hostilities
1201-
the altempt to organise
An of
such an
evacuation, learing Cheniere Barkinh subjects
to their fate,
defend
world
be difficult to
With mi (or withant) the Commonwealth.
in-special-danger, The evacuation of same 20-30,000 persons
was envisaged; the number today would be of much the same
order.
with a large olemat 5. The preparation of evacuation plans on-s-basis-of racial
ai
discrimination was (and contimes to be) repugnant to the Hong
A
Kong Government. From time to time doubts have been expressed
as to their practicability in view of (a) the availability of
transport and (b) reductions in the size of the garrison
Min 1951
for affecting its ability to maintain resistance for the necessary
length of time (14 days) without strong and timely reinforcement Tester mothe
dirin (which would only come from the Americans). The garrison
has since been progressively reduced in size;
151
A magasunite.
6 the
L
(0.3.K.).
20 majer
In 1960 the Commander British Forees in Hong Kong expressed
the view that, in the face of air attack and under conditions office.
serious internal disorder (which it must be assumed would
accompany a Chinese attack), he could not with the forces
available carry out the task (then included in his directive)
of covering an evacuation after the outbreak of hostilities, A
review of evacuation policy was accordingly undertaken by
BDCC (F.E.) in consultation with the C.B.F. and Governor,
Hong Kong.
Ivacuation after the Outbreak of Kostilities
e...
the
7 5. The remiltant nižštery assesment (with which the Governor
agrees) confirmed the ¤‚B;P's-view-that any large-scale evacuation
after the outbreak of hostilities would be impracticable,
except conceivably in the event of imediate American assistance,
On this latter point the Governor considers that a decision mast
be taken on the basis that there is (and will be) no firm American
ommitment.
86. In covering an evacuation, British troops and the Pelios
Ferce would be deflected from their primary tasks of meeting
aggression and of maintaining law and order. People on
/unprotected
W.5. Carter
12 528/400/01
a
serious effect on public confidence.
(monly but by is wean. escheme Forsplan)
I Evacuation of Civilians
from Hong Kong
[This is regarded by the Hong Kong Government as
extremely sensitive subject; any public reference to it
would be construed as indicating an intention to abandon
our position there and would be likely to have a stricis
effect on public cọnfidence 7.
lux..
Since 1951 there have been in existence plans/for the
evacuation of/women, children and elderly non from Hong Kong
men I
{sodo-names-"-Incubate" and, subsequently, ""Digit"), in the
at twarzenby kse. an attack-by
Chinese on the Colony? And from 1953 there has been in
existence a plan ("Beting2) for the evacuation of civilian
men if a general evacuation became necessary.
These plans had their roots in ciremstances that were
very different from today's (particularly in regard to China's
military strength). They were based on the S. of 8's instruction
in 1950 that ".......public opinion here would expect H.M.G.
to ensure that no British women and children were avoidably
left behind". Their existence was justified on the grounds
that white women and children "would be considered to be in
greater potential danger than local people", The pl
he-plane-de
sht
_of_other
as a second priority.
TOP SEORIT
unprotected avacuation ships would probably be in greater
danger at sea than in Hong Kong.
Evacuation before the Outbreak of Hostilities
97.
The Governor has argued that any attempt at large-scale
svacuation before the outbreak of hostilities would be incapable
of execution and politically inacceptable.
|
o 8.
There would be no means of transporting all who wished
to go. Organised evacuation would be interpreted as an
admission of defeat and would lead to a rapid deterioration in
the morale of the Chinese population and to a serious internal
security situation greatly impeding (and perhaps preventing)
efforts to arrange the departure of any section of the civilian
population.
19. Limited selective evacuation on the basis of race would be
morally indefensible and, in these days, might have grave
political repercussions for H.M.G. (o.g. in terms of relations
within the Commonwealth), Moreover, Europeans would not
necessarily be in greater danger of ill-treatment from the
aggressors than others. On the contrary, the main danger to
them would arise from the breakdown of law and order and the
development of mob violence and looting.
inding striking a
- Govenor and [T3DCC (FE).
Govornegie Roscmandations
Rescomendations Govend
2 10.
The Governor has accordingly recomended that
(a) Before the outbreak of hostilities: the
Hong Kong Government should ensure that, in the use
of available sea and air transport, such arrangements
as are possible in the situation at the time should
be made to facilitate the departure of those who
wish to leave, with priority for women, children
and invalids and for people particularly liable to
/retaliation
F
!
!
(b)
TOP
1
SECRET
retaliation by the Chinese; the Government should take
only the minimum action necessary to achieve this
aim.
After the outbreak of hostilities: plans should be made
for the Navy to evacuate as many as possible of the
on pret cont qrammals) particularly vulnerable who still remain when hostilities
start.
In both cases, no element of compulsion or of racial discrimination
would be involved.
3 11.
While EDCC (F.E.) accepted these recommendations, they
in for general
apa Fune considered it necessary to retain some outline evacuation plan in
A
order to take advantage of a military situation which, in the event,
Eight prove to be less unfavourable than envisaged. The Governor,
Let The W
suduration
on the other hand, takes the view that "there should be no 'evacuation
+
plans' - outline or detailed - for the general evacuation of any large
part of the population either before or after the outbreak of
hostilities".
12.
The Governor's view is based on the argments set out in para".
5-9 above that any large-scale evacuation is impracticable and
politically unacceptable, whatever the military situation. In
particular, he argues that shipping is not likely to be available
"in those last few days" and the numbers who will be able to take
advantage of the opportunities offering will be so small that it
would be a misuse of words to call the necessary preparations an "ovacuation plant, se onvisages that planning should amount to
no more than preparing lists of those who fall into the vulnerable
categories. The evacuation of women, children and invalids prior
to hostilities should be left to the shipping companies to arrange
on a first-come-first-served basis, in the light of shipping space
available and of the current assesment of the risks at sea;
Minit.
L
I
TOP SEORIT
a possible exception might be made in the case of service families
whose organised evacuation might be feasible because they could be
got together quickly and with the minimam of planning and warning.
Considerations
13.
Failure to arrange for the compulsory evacuation of all
European women and children before the outbreak of hostilities
could be a source of political embarrasment for H.M.G.
14. On the other hand it would be of little avail after Hong
Kong was overrun to point to the existence of well-laid evacuation
plans if, in the event, they were shown to be patently unrealistic
and incapable of execution. This would indeed be the case if
events were to show that, on a proper appreciation of the situation
to be faced in Hong Kong, no effective plans could be made to
divert the necessary shipping and aircraft or that an evacuation
could not be coväred with the forces available.
15.
It has been recognised (0,D.C. (62)1) that, in the event
of an apprehended or actual outbreak of global war:-
(1)
with the dispersal of shipping to safe havens, there is
likely to be little or no transport either during a
precautionary period or after the outbreak of
global war;
(11)
apart from some possible opportunities for local
evacuation from likely target areas plans for the
movement of large numbers by sea or air would be unwise
and unrealistic.
There is no scope in Hong Kong for purely "local" evacuation.
16. In the event of a limited Chinese attack on Hong Kong, all
available information points to a deliberately mounted and rapid
assault in overwhelming force which will give little time for
precautionary preparations. It will be preceded and/or accompanied
by serious internal disorder fomented from outside the Colony (and
aggravated by any sign that the Colony was being abandoned), which
Avill
TOF
SECRET
ל
1
will fully occupy the garrison and police force to the exclusion of covering an
evacuation.
17. There are no plans to reinforce Hong Kong in the event of external
aggression. There is no American commitment to come to the Colony's aid,
The end is likely to come very quickly before transport for evacuation could
be mobilised.
Conclusions
18. Any large-scale evacuation of non-Chinese elements of the population
from Hong Kong, whether compulsory or voluntary, is seen to be impracticable
on the following grounds:-
19.
(1)
(11)
(121)
Serious internal disorder would precede and/or accompany a
Chinese attack, with the result that military and security
forces would be unable to cover evacuation.
A Chinese attack would be sudden and in overwhelming force; no
external assistance can be expected and the end in Hong Kong
would come very quickly.
Transport would not be available in the event of a global
war and could not be mobilised in time in the case of a Huited
attack on the Colony.
Such large-scale evacuation would have serious looal political consequencer
aggravating the anticipated internal disturbances and night, because of its
selective application to non-Chinese elements of the population, have embarrass-
ing political side-effects on H.M.G's relations with the Commonwealth,
20. Any outline planning to this end would be more window-dressing which,
in the event, would deceive no one,
21. It is therefore recommended that there should be no planning for the
large-scale evacuation of non-Chinese elements of the population, either before
or after the outbreak of hostilities, and that the Governor's proposals
in para 10 above for making use of such limited opportunities as my arise on abain free from raund discomm walioù
Ashould be accepted,
TOP
SECRET
unprotected evacuation ships would probably be in greater
danger at sea than in Hong Kong.
Evacuation before the Outbreak of Hostilities
7.
The Governor has argued that any attempt at large-scale
evacuation before the outbreak of hostilities would be incapable
of execution and politically inacceptable.
8.
There would be no means of transporting all who wished
to go. Organised evacuation would be interpreted as an
admission of defeat and would lead to a rapid deterioration in
the morale of the Chinese population and to a serious internal
security situation greatly impeding (and perhaps preventing)
efforts to arrange the departure of any section of the civilian
population.
9.
Limited selective evacuation on the basis of race would be
morally indefensible and, in these days, might have grave
political repercussions for H.M.G. (e.g. in terms of relations
within the Commonwealth). Moreover, Europeans would not
necessarily be in greater danger of ill-treatment from the
aggressors than others. On the contrary, the main danger to
them would arise from the breakdown of law and order and the
development of mob violence and looting.
Governor's Recommendations
10.
The Governor has accordingly recommended that:-
Before the outbreak of hostilities:
(a)
the
Hong Kong Government should ensure that, in the use of available sea and air transport, such arrangements
as are possible in the situation at the time should be made to facilitate the departure of those who
wish to leave, with priority for women, children and invalids and for people particularly liable to
/retaliation
TOP SECRET
itsiy
(b)
retaliation by the Chinese; the Government/should take
only the minimum action necessary to achieve this
aim.
After the outbreak of hostilities: plans should be made
for the Navy to evacuate as many as possible of the
particularly vulnerable who still remain when hostilities
start.
In both cases, no element of compulsion or of racial discrimination
would be involved.
11.
While BDCC (F.E.) accepted these recommendations, they
considered it necessary to retain some outline evacuation plan in
order to take advantage of a military situation which, in the event,
might prove to be less unfavourable than envisaged, The Governor,
on the other hand, takes the view that "there should be no 'evacuation
plans* - outline or detailed for the general evacuation of any large
-
part of the population either before or after the outbreak of
hostilities".
12. The Governor's view is based on the arguments set out in paras
5-9 above that any large-scale evacuation is impracticable and
politically unacceptable, whatever the military situation.
particular, he argues that shipping is not likely to be available
"in those last few days" and the numbers who will be able to take
advantage of the opportunities offering will be so small that it
would be a misuse of words to call the necessary preparations an
"evacuation plan". He envisages that planning should amount to
no more than preparing lists of those who fall into the vulnerable
categories. The evacuation of women, children and invalids prior
to hostilities should be left to the shipping companies to arrange on a first-come-first-served basis, in the light of shipping space
available and of the current assessment of the risks at sea;
/a
TOP SECRET
a possible exception might be made in the case of service families whose organised evacuation might be feasible because they could be got together quickly and with the minimum of planning and warning.
Considerations
13.
Failure to arrange for the compulsory evacuation of European women and children before the outbreak of hostilities
could be a source of political embarrassment for H.M.G.
14.
On the other hand it would be of little avail after Hong
Kong was overrun to point to the existence of well-laid evacuation
plans if, in the event, they were shown to be patently unrealistic
and incapable of execution. This would indeed be the case if
events were to show that, on a proper appreciation of the situation
to be faced in Hong Kong, no effective plans could be made to
divert the necessary shipping and aircraft or that an evacuation
could not be covered with the forces available.
15. It has been recognised (0.D.C. (62)1) that, in the event
of an apprehended or actual outbreak of global war:-
with the dispersal of shipping to safe havens, there is
likely to be little or no transport either during a
precautionary period or after the outbreak of
(i)
to least
Alsbad wan
fitely
event
Jou
global war;
(ii)
apart from some possible opportunities for local
evacuation from likely target areas plans for the
movement of large numbers by sea or air would be unwise
and unrealistic,
There is no scope in Hong Kong for purely "local" evacuation,
16.
In the event of a limited Chinese attack on Hong Kong, all
available information points to a deliberately mounted and rapid
assault in overwhelming force which will give little time for precautionary preparations. It will be preceded and/or accompanied by serious internal disorder fomented from outside the Colony (and aggravated by any sign that the Colony was being abandoned), which
/will
TOP SECRET
will fully occupy the garrison and police force to the exclusion of covering an
evacuation.
17. There are no plans to reinforce Hong Kong in the event of external
aggression. There is no American commitment to come to the Colony's aid.
The end is likely to come very quickly before transport for evacuation could
be mobilised.
Conclusions
18.
Any large-scale evacuation of non-Chinese elements of the population
from Hong Kong, whether compulsory or voluntary, is seen to be impracticable
on the following grounds:-
(1)
(ii)
Serious internal disorder would precede and/or accompany a
Chinese attack, with the result that military and security
forces would be unable to cover evacuation,
A Chinese attack would be sudden and in overwhelming force; no
external assistance can be expected and the end in Hong Kong
would come very quickly.
(iii)
Transport would not be available in the event of a global
!
war and could not be mobilised in time in the case of a limited
attack on the Colony.
19. Such large-scale evacuation would have serious local political consequences
aggravating the anticipated internal disturbances and might, because of its
selective application to non-Chinese elements of the population, have embarrass-
ing political side-effects on H.M. G's relations with the Commonwealth.
20. Any outline planning to this end would be mere window-dressing which,
in the event, would deceive no one.
21. It is therefore recommended that there should be no planning for the
large-scale evacuation of non-Chinese elements of the population, either before or after the outbreak of hostilities, and that the Governor's proposals
in para 10 above for making use of such limited opportunities as may arise
should be accepted.
Pör Pic.
Mr.
Mr..
File No.
------F-----------
Permt. U.S. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Secretary of State
Mr.
Mr.
Sir
Your Reference.
DRAFT
FURTHER ACTION
[E609) W) 42332-0537 50m 1/64 V.B. Gp 791
خیر
Date
Dormant Commission.
Theme
in existence a
22.
Dormant
Commmion
providing for the
appointment of the Commander, British
Forcen
in Hong Kong
and Commander.
в кой
the event of an emergency and at
The Governer
-
Chief of the Colony
when
both the
The Governor
anne
Should
assume
both arie and
the C.B.E. and
agreed that the former
over-all
ilitary.
command,
This Commission wan
made in
23.
1951
when Chmore
multiany strength
was not so
Ная кая
than it is
today.
formidable
And the gamin
a great deal larger The role
of
the
garviion
hon
12en
to
рил про
the
strongest possible coordmated resistance until eventually driven back to the sea". With this concept of defence to the better.
was camppland evacuation of all
end
not-essential
gor
the
a plan non-Chmore wichane
to the military effort. St-
was envriaged that at a stage when
enclitary Considerations became paramount the Governor world also leave the Colony,
24.
POLLA
4
In it's inclitary role today
at it's present streng 17
to identify aggremien "
ر
12
Garnom,
merely
Serve
Chria has the
capabubuting of manuting an attack against the
in overwhelming force,
Colony
that agamit smely an attack
inderfenible. There
and it in accepted
The Colony in
no fvarnion for enteral cened probably
remifercement and resistance
25
not be maintained for
That resistance
more than 48 hers. cannot (and showed not the
unnecessary) Grolonged
Ov
as reflectical in
denial policy which restrict
destruction to installations of short term inclitamy
Valme
Whatever
may be deaded with regard to
evacuation ( Part A whore), it
1201-
ag amer
this background
is considered
(Zare
longer
The
any justification for the exntence Dermant Communion
remani at his host
of
The Gevarner should
and, in the event of the
Colcuy's
Surrender
to Chinia,
should do
What he can to maintain continuity and
10
Sele
Terms
during the hand-over, reasonable
and conditions for the people of
Hong Kong (particularly of the British
sulyends
+
26.
51- -
выть поте 60th non-Chien
therefore recommended
Dormant Communion
and Chinese).
that the
should be veroked.
L.s. Carter.
17.
Mr...
Mr... R
Mr..
Mr.......
Sir
DRAFT Sudan
to Iamastur
To? SECRET
File No. F 578/406701
FIED
Permt. U.S. of S.
Parly, U.S. of S.
Minister of State
142
There shed tear open s
рате
extione consitivity It mayet h
Secretary of State
Your Reference.....
Date.....
Evacuation of
Archan's
from
Hong Kong conditerem.
[This to regarded by the Hong Kong Govt. are
extremaly
sensitive subject; any buthi reference to it would be
construed
Mitas Mas as inchcorting an
intention to abandon cue parution there
ainst wonder the
thely to have a serious effect on public conglalence.]
Sma
1951
in existence plans for
there have been
plans for the evacuation
FURTHER ACTION
of
women
Children
and elderly
(
Code -hamne ś
from Hong Kong
Inabale
The event
emergency
on the Colony.
has been
and Subsequently, "Digit"),
an
actual
imminent
attack by the Chiene
155-3 12ame
An
Amar from
uni exetence
for the evacuation
어
General evacuation
2.
These plans
Cwaumstancaro
a plan ("Beling")
cvilian and i
became necessary.
had themi roots in
very
That
werve
today's (particularly
China's
вана
(Q1544) 49179/8178 2MP 2/61 AT85. 763
1201-
"....
different from
in regard to
muhtary streng 12). They
12m 5.5's
sary instruation in 1950
humble opinion have would public
!
کرے
expect H.M. G.
women
behind".
to ensure
That no Bartuch
and children
Their existence
12 Gronnals
were avoidably left-
That white
was justified
amat
F
children
would be considered to be in
greater potential danger
12am
local
people".
The plans
krepared
provided
A
Secon of
brity,
J
4.
have a
For the evacuation of other person's
(melnding Asians
te
Eurasians)
who
in speciaal danger.
The
evacuation
q
Some
envmaged
persons
Gumber
Pla, 20-30, 000
was contemplated;
Foday
высота
of much the same be very much greatics
the
Orday
3.
The preparation
8
evacuation plans on
a basus
ฯ
racial discrummotion
was
to be) repugnam(-
Cand
Continines
to the Hong Kong Government. Her
pracdient compteritious
F
The sepeng om plane in from time to time
danbuls
mi
view
161
Cure Can whane expressed
Be to
ન
their practicability
of the availability of
• Franc; wi Availability of shopping
and the effect of reductions
The Gameson
12
The size of
Cabany's abubuting
to
the
without streng
mantam resistance Jar sty
length of time (14 days)
and timely
не сатану
fremforcement (which could only comme
The Americans).
Ailitary Reassessment-
British Forces in
from
The Garrnin has sina been progrenwely
rechuced in
fije.
the Commander
In 1960
Home Kong expressed
The view
Mt.......
Mr.......
Mr....
Mr.
Str.
DRAFT
File No.
Permt. US. of S.
Parly. U.S. of S.
Minister of State
Secretary of State
Date..
Your Reference.
that,
wi
the face of a
aw attack
after the outbreak of
hostilt an
FURTHER ACTION
---
and under
conditions of serious
internal disorder (which it must-
be assumed
attack), he
wild accompany
come o
forms available
then
task Gemcluded
of covering
hot-
Carry
a Chinen
cucit the
and the
in his directive)
an execuationa
accordingly
A verwer
of excauation pokey was undertaken
by
W112
BDCC (F.E.) in commitation
Ithe C.B.F.
Hong Kong
an of
Geremer,
Evacuation sturing Onther 2 Hotubation (w112 which the Governor agrees)
The military asserment of conformed
5
The C.B.F's view
1201-
any large a
evacuation after the outbreake
women
be impracticable,
scale
of horlichties wild
exceput conceivably
in the event of
immediatio
The Pr.
So if
p-southery
Fingremionof and
e
له
::
!
(Q1544) 19179/8175 2MP 2/61 AT&S, 768
American assistance. On
This latter point the Governor considers
A
That planning must facet on
basis mat
the
te
be)
there is (and will be
no form American commitment.
6. 5 Governor's Reassment.
The Goranay
har-arqued Camo BD) CC (FE) have
диа
Coutine fol
에
ད་
on Grenadi
beat before ha
(0) Enquan
of chefs and
acuplied)
any attempt at that large-scale compulsor
bestickties
evacuation before the outbreak of
is
[politically unacceptable
Grounds that:
(the
Ha
(a)) racial discrimmation inverted y would
be morallen indefenceble
days
ๆ
might have
Anot
mi there
¿
grove political
repercussions for H.M.G. Gus term
relations within
(b) it would lead to
7
morale
The Commonwealth)
among the
a rapid datammation
The masses of the accordingly
Chinese population
to se
from ot
a ex internal security salvation
world greatly impede
whin
pashape
arance
Irevent all efforts to
12
departure of any section
7
tha
→ samanly be
Gutades d'ange of ill-trend entud" fa 120mm on Laws
arban population.
B
7.
He / Therefore
me commands
that :.
he has dripped 19
use of this phrase
las Before the outbreak of hostilities: there
a
should be in voluntary assiste of
scheme with
dezantime
praruling for women.
children,
mrahos
nt
people particularly
liable to veľabation by the Chinese,
inthaut
Bby After Hall his Ihe outhreat of
F.
In both cases
The C.3. F.
hostilities:
evacuation
final
(unted
very
showed the attempted
of personnel of special value
(e.g. intelligence and communications
st-ath)
capture
Mis.
and of archan's whore
would be compromisiną
would involve them in
extreme danger.
no racial discrummation would be involed.
and BDCC (FE) have endorsed
Mr....
Mr.....
Mr..
Mr.......
Sir
DRAFT
File No.
Permt. U.S. of S.
Parly, US. of S.
Minister of State
Secretary of State
Your Reference.
Date......
Mere
9.
military authorities
?
recommendations.
Area of disagreement.
The
l'omicole
that
to quie effect to the proposals
para 7
Somme
form of
and line planning
necessary.
planning is necess
The Governor appears to maintain
The view
that
There
shamed the
4
ho
evacuation plans"
outline
detailed
argumg
1201-
shopping in
not wheln to be
available
in those
last days
and
Bai
The numbers hirolved will
L
be so small
That it wramed
the a
bon 15
of words
to call tod
FURTHER ACTION
an "aramal.on
to.
necessary preparations an
Filan"
Failure to arrange for the
compulsory evacuation of European
1
children before the outbreake
women
97
hostilities could be
Service of
(Q1544) 19179/8175 2MP 2/61 AT&S. 768
political embarrassment for H.M.G.
It would be an essential part of
HM.G's case
+
defending
their
paration
to point to the exutence
Où in the hand st
Ele vaike.
+
-
ut of dim thi
in ostos?
well-laid plans
departure of
chose
Women
to leave.
therefore that
for the voluntary
children who
St
cow, deve of
bance plans for
implementing the voluntary assisted departure scheme (covering admmmstrative
procedures, assembling of the shops and
aircraft, ecc.)
must exist
OK
paper.
Conclusions.
12at the aqued
proposals in para 7
be accepted,
subject to thre
Above
Hong Kong Government-
requirement that the Hong Kong
with departiment's
Shameel
mi comiultation
of H.M.G.
make
such and time
plans
Cur
are necessary for the implementation
of a voluntary assisted departure scheme
in the period prior
hostibles.
to the outbreaks of
Colomore office,
Nocember, 1963.
SAVE
DEF
SECRET
119/380/01
Ө
THIL ACUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT,
U.D.C.(62) 1
CUPY NO. 81
13th July, 1962
EVACUATION OF BRITIS SUBJECTS OVERSEAS
IN THE VENT OF GLOBAL WAR
Memorandum by the Uversea Defence Committee
Attached at Annex A is the relevant part of a Report prepared by a Working Party set up by the Evacuation from Abroad Sub-Committee of the Oversea Defence Committee, to consider the policy to be adopted for evacuation of British subjects who are overseas in a Precautionary Stage.
2. In the light of the considerations set out in the Annex and the conclusions reached in paragraphs 5 and 6, the Oversea Defence Committee consider that United Kingdom overseas posts should be guided by the following recommendations in the preparation of evacuation plans (vide Chapter VII, Section H of the U.D.C. memorandum 0.0.0.(58) 16 - Preperation of Defence Schemes).
(a) It is the policy of Her Majesty's Government that it is neither practicable nor desirable to make plans for evacuation of British nationals to the United Kingdom which is likely to
major target area for nuclear attack. Plans for evacuation during a precautionary period, should therefore be for local evacuation only from likely target areas and should be based on the local availability of transport and possible reception areas. It would be unreal to attempt to co-ordinate such plans in the United kingdom; they should be laid in advance as far as possible by posts abroad.
(b) In the case of NATO countries and those countries whicn are assessed as "safe" in Annex B, the policy should be to "stay-put" (which does not exclude all local moves to nearby areas of greater relative safety).
•
(c) It would be unwise to count on assistance from the Services because they will be preoccupied with other tasks having higher priority. But for the reasons given in paragraph 4(b) of Annex A, and in the unlikely event that the Services may find themselves able to assist, it would be important to keep local Service Commanders informed of the evacuation plans in their areas.
a) Plans for evacution after the outbreak of war should be prepared for countries, other than NATO countries, which are shown as likely to be subjected to attack by the enemy or where a breakdown of law and order is expected.
A very limited amount of sea or air transport may become available at this stage.
(a) cre co-ordination of local evacuation plans is possible or desirable this should be undertaken in accordance with the groupings shown in the Overseas Defence Committee memorandum Regional Co-ordination of United Kingdom Overseas Authorities in Global War (U.D.C.(59) 13 (Final)).
-
SECRET
-1-
SECRET
(f) The Services should be responsible for purely local evacuation of their dependants from likely target areas, their dependants should be included in any more ambitious civilian plans.
3. It is essential to guard against the aggravation of the international political situation by the premature imple- mentation of evacuation plans and it must therefore be emphasised that no plans should be put into execution without first obtaining authority from London or until it is known for certain that nuclear attack has been made on the United Kingdom. Authority to implement evacuation plans in overseas territories will be given by means of the evacuation of British Subjects telegram (telegram no. 28 in the memorandum on Notification of Precautionary and War Measures - 0.D.C.(60) 3 (Final)). The responsibility for keeping under review the plans for evacuating British subjects overseas belongs to the Oversea Defence Committee.
4. With the exception of paragraph 3 above, this memorandum is intended to be for guidance only.
(Signed) A.H. FOYNTON
Chairman,
Overson Defence Committee
London,
13th July, 1962
-2-
SECRET
SECRET
AN EX A
Intelligence Assessment (July 1961)
1 •
The most likely risk of war is judged to come not from a calculated Soviet nuclear attack, but from a miscalculation which will probably be preceded by a period of political tension of indeterminate length during which Her Majesty's Government
However, would be able to take certain precautionary measures. warning of the moment of attack derived solely from intelligence of a technical nature might in most favourable circumstances be as little as forty-eight hours; in the worst case the warning might be less than fifteen minutes. The implementation of evacuation schemes during a period of tension is inhibited because such overt actions would be likely to aggravate the situation.
2.
The NATO countries (except, perhaps Norway, Denmark, Greece, Portugal and Iceland) and peripheral strategic bases wherever situated, are likely to be involved in the initial nuclear exchange. The Near and Middle East and North Africa, except where there are strategic bases, are unlikely to receive nuclear attack in the first stages of global war, but certain strategic areas may be the targets for conventional attack; and in many of the Middle East countries there may be a breakdown of law and order. In the Far East, China might or might not immediately enter the war on the side of the Soviet Union, but is likely to take advantage of the situation to pursue her own interests. Any movencnt in the Far East by sea may be hazardous, from the moment global war has broken out. South America and Africa south of the Sahara are unlikely to be attacked, but there may be a breakdown of law and order in many African countries. A list of countries assessed as being unlikely to be subjected to attack is given in Annex B.
Regional Co-ordination
3. One result of a nuclear attack on the United Kingdom may be the complete severance of communications between Her Majesty's Government and posts abroad. In these circumstances action should be taken in accordance with Oversea Defence Committee memorandum 0.D.C.(59) 13 (Final) -Regional Co-ordination of United Kingdom Overseas authorities in global war. Evacuation plans, where they exist, should be co-ordinated between posts in similar lines.
Availability of Transport
La (a) Civilian Transport
The policy is to disperse shipping to safe havens during a precautionary period, and subsequently tho shipping in overseas areas would as a first priority be directed by Ministry of Transport Shipping Representatives to assist with the rehabilitation of devnsted arcas. Similarly civil aircraft during the precautionary period would either be directed to military reinforcement task or evacuated from the danger zones. Subsequently, such aircraft, together with military transport aircraft would come under the control of a joint (R..F./Civil) headquarters to be known as the Joint Air Transport Headquarters and would also be directed to help with the rehabilitation as a first priority. It is therefore difficult to forecast what sea or air transport would be available for evacuation, but there is li.ely to be little or none in most places either during a precautionary period or after the outbreak of global war and it is considered that it would be unwise to prepare schemes envisaging evacuation of large numbers by sea or air.
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(b) Service Transport
It would be equally unrealistic to rely on Service transport, as the Services are likely to be fully occupied with preparations for war or in the prosecution of the war itself. They could be responsible for the purely local evacuation of their dependants from likely target. areas, using Service transport, but would wish their families to be included in any more ambitious civil schemes. The Services would co-operate to the maximum extent possible in any evacuation scheme and should be consulted in all planning.
Conclusion
5.
In the precautionary period, the dispersal of shipping and aircraft to safe havens makes it impossible to make an assessment of transport available for evacuation purposes. It would therefore be unwise to rely on evacuation plans involving the movement of British subjects by sea or air. Furthermore, it seems questionable whether the putting into effect of any large-scale evacuation plans would be politically acceptable in a period of tension, as it could be interpreted as an overt act likely to aggravate the situation.
6. After the outbreak of war, civil and Services shipping and aircraft would as a first priority be directed to assist in the rehabilitation of devasted areas and would not be available for the evacuation of refugees from areas which had not been affected by the nuclear exchange.
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ANNEX B
COUNTRIES UNLIKELY TO BE SUBJECTED TO ATTACK
(See Paragraph 2(b) of covering note)
Afghanistan
Algeria
Ascension
Ceylon
Cyrenaica
Egypt (not Suez Canal)
Falkland Islands
Fiji
Finland
India
Indonesia
Israel
Japan
Jordan
Lebanon
Morocco
Muscat and Oman
Nepal
Pacific Islands
Qatar
St. Helena
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Tonga
Tripolitania
Trucial States
Tunisia
The West Indies
Central America
South America
East Africa/South Arabia
South and Centrul africa West Africa
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