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(Part A.)
18
TITLE: REPRESENTATION OF CHINA IN HONG KONG
REFER TO
REFER TO
NAME
TO
DATE
(and dept when necessary)
SEE:
NAME (and dapt, when necessary)
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DATE
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SECRET
CLOSED UNTIL
2004
Registry Address
Room No. ...271..
King Charles Street.
K.
YEAR STAMP
1973
REFER TO
PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL
TOP CL.
Jue
CYPHER/CAT A
GPS 80
FM HONG KONG 1609252
CONFIDENTIAL
1973
TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 539 OF 16 MAY/INFO PEKING.
YOUR TELEGRAM 478: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
I SUGGEST THAT THE TELEGRAM TO SINCLAIR BE AMENDED BY THE DELETION
OF THE PHRASE QUOTE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT NOT ONLY FACTORS OF PARTICU-
LAR RELEVANCE TO HONG KONG, BUT ALSO THOSE OF MORE GENERAL IMPORTANCE AFFECTING SINO/BRITISH RELATIONS IN THEIR FULLEST SENSE UNQUOTE.
2. THE INCLUSION OF THE ABOVE PHRASE COULD ENCOURAGE FEARS ABOUT
THE ASPECT THAT MOST ALARMS PEOPLE HERE. THIS IS THAT THE FUTURE OF
HONG KONG MIGHT BE SACRIFICED TO SERVE U.K. IMMEDIATE COMMERCIAL
INTERESTS. IF YOU AGREE WITH ITS DELETION, WE WILL PASS AMENDED TELEGRAM TO SINCLAIR.
MACLEHOSE
FILES
FED
HKIOD
NEWS D
P/S MR ROYLE MR WILFORD SIR E NORRIS SIR D WATSON
1
CONFIDENTIAL
Reply sent
Gå 1815
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PRIORITY CYPHER/CAT A
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TU PRIORITY GOVERLOR HONG KONG TELEGRAM NUMBER 478 OF 15 MAY 1973
INFO PEKING.
P
MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 417: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1.
KEVIN SINCLAIR HAS SENT ANOTHER TELEGRAM TO MR. ROYLE, AS
FOLLOWS:-
''MANY THANKS YOUR REPLY ON CHINESE LIAISON OFFICE. WOULD GREATLY
APPRECIATE FULL STATEMENT FROM YOU AFTER REPEAT AFTER THE REPLY
TO BE GIVEN IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON MAY 9. PLEASE CABLE
STATEMENT AFTER GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN REPLIES TO LORD BROCKWAY'S
QUESTION OF MAY 9.
REGARDS SINCLAIR".
2.
IF YOU AGREE WITH THE WORDING, PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING REPLY
TO SINCLAIR FROM MR. ROYLE:~
ÁS LADY TWEEDSMUIR TOLD THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON 9 MAY THE CHINESE
GOVERNMENT HAS PROPOSED THAT A REPRESENTATIVE OF THEIR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN HONG KONG. THIS IS
A PROPOSITION WHICH WAS FIRST RAISED IN 1956, REJECTED BY H.M.G. IN 1958 AND WAS RAISED AGAIN BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS AT THE LEVEL OF AMBASSADOR LAST YEAR. AS A RESIDENT OF HONG KONG YOU WILL KNOW YOURSELF THAT THE PROPOSAL WOULD GIVE RISE TO CERTAIN PROBLEMS AND FOR THIS REASON IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT IT SHOULD BE CAREFULLY AND COMPREHENSIVELY STUDIED, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT NOT ONLY FACTORS OF PARTICULAR RELEVANCE TO HONG KONG, BUT ALSO THOSE OF MORE GENERAL IMPORTANCE
AFFECTING SINO/BRITISH RELATIONS IN THEIR FULLEST SENSE.('OUR STUDY IS NOT YET COMPLETED, AND IT WOULD BE WRONG FOR ME TO FORECAST ITS LIKELY OUTCOME, I AM SURE YOU WILL UNDERSTAND,
KINDEST REGARDS,
ANTHONY ROYLE'.
DOUGLAS-HOME
FILES
FED
HKIOD
NEWS D
FS/MR ROYLE
MR VILFORD SIR E NORRIS SIR D WATSON
RESTRICTED
·
CONFIDENTIAL
Mingyenes
Mr Evans
ni Wilford
Enter
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1.
B
Lu
"ADA
5.
Mr Kevin Sinclair, the Daily Express correspondent in Hong Kong, has sent a further telegram to Mr Royle, to follow up his earlier exchange. Mr Sinclair was the author of the front page article in the South China Morning Post of 26 April reported in Hong Kong telegram no. 445.
2. Mr Guest has minuted that in replying to Mr Sinclair's request, Mr Royle naturally feels he cannot go any further than Lady Tweedsmuir in her reply to Lord Brockway's Parliamentary Question on 9 May.
3. I submit a self-explanatory draft telegram. HKIOD and News Department concur.
10 May 1973
M. Wilford M. Evans.
Since
so little
The exchanges
Thank
H L1 Davies
Far Eastern Department
Rm. Evans
you.
10 may, 1973.
Imombant a revised vertr
agreed with M: Evans. It doesn't
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Hi Royle
but it is longer
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14
CONFIDENTIAL
sec 13
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POST
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INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAPH SERVICES
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To send Telegrams
CONSULT TELEPHONE
DIRECTORY OR TELEX
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HONGKONG 57 3 1155
(9 May)
13 951
415.
ANTHONY ROYLE HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON
MANY THANKS YOUR REPLY ON CHINESE LIASON OFFICE STOP WOULD
GREATLY APPRECIATE FULL STATEMENT FROM YOU AFTER REPEAT
AFTER THE REPLY
TO BE GIVEN IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON MAY 9 STOP PLEASE CABLE
STATEMENT AFTER GOVERNMENT SPOKEMEN REPLIES TO LORD
BROCKWAY ON MAY 9 STOP REGARDS
SINCLAIR PORTSCRIPT HONGKONG
COL
११
POST
OFFICE
IONAL TELEGRAPH SERVICES
To send Telegrams DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALLING
CONSULT TELEPHONE
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POST
INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAPH SERVICE OFFICE
150A
PRIORITY
CYPILER/CAT A
F F C 0 3010307
CONFIDENTIAL
AHFIDENTIAL
FEH1 3/9/1
1973
TO PRIORITY GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELHO 417 OF 30 APRIL INFO PRIORITY PEKING
نظام اينكم
YOUR TELEGRAM NOS 444 AND 445: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HO:IG
KONG.
(FE)
1. MR ROYLE HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM DATED 21 APRIL FROM MR KEVIN SINCLAIR, DAILY EXPRESS CORRESPONDENT IN HỌNG KONG: QUOTE WOULD APPRECIATE FULL STATEMENT ON PRESENT STATE OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN UNITED KINGDON AND CHINA RECARDING ESTABLISHMENT
OF CHINESE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. UNDERSTAND THIS DISCUSSED BY YOU ON LAST VISIT PEKING AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL FULLEST DETAILS. REGARDS KEVIN SINCLAIR POSTSCRIPT HONG KONG
UNQUOTE.
2. PROVIDED YOU SEE NO OBJECTION, I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD PASS THE FOLLOWINC REPLY TO MR SINCLAIR FROM MR ROYLE: QUOTE THANK YOU FOR YOUR TELEGRAM OF 21 APRIL, MY COLLEAGUE LADY TWEEDSMUIR WILL BE ANSWERING A PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON THIS SUBJECT ON 9 MAY. I DO NOT THINK IT WOULD BE RIGHT FOR ME TO ANTICIPATE WHAT SHE WILL SAY.
I MI SORRY THAT I CANNOT BE MORE HELPFUL. KIND REGARDS, ANTHONY ROYLE UNQUOTE,
DOUGLAS-HOME
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PS/MR ROYLE MR WILFORD SIR E NORRIS
CONFIDENTIAL
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M HONG KONG 260846Z
NCLASSIFIED
TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 445 OF 26 APRIL INFO PEKING.
THE FOLLOWING IS THE FULL TEXT OF A FRONT PAGE ARTICLE WHICH APPEARED IN THE SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST TODAY (THURSDAY) UNDER THE HEADING QUOTE A CHINA OFFICE IN HONG KONG A CERTAINTY UNQUOTE:-
CHINA IS VIRTUALLY CERTAIN TO HAVE A QUOTE REPRESENTATIVE
UNQUOTE OFFICE IN HONG KONG WITH THE NEXT FEW YEARS.
BUT JUST WHEN IT WILL BE SET UP IS THE BIG QUESTION.
TALKS AT A QUOTE SENIOR UNQUOTE LEVEL ARE BEING HELD IN WHITEHALL AND IN PEKING ABOUT THE FORMATION, THE STATUS AND THE LIKELY STAFFING OF THE CHINESE OFFICE IN HONG KONG.
BUT ALTHOUGH CHINA HAS RAISED THE QUESTION OF REPRESENTATION TWICE WITH BRITISH MINISTERS IN THE PAST YEAR IT HAS NOT BEEN PRESSED RECENTLY AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL.
IT SEEMS LIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT A GO AHEAD WILL EVENTUALLY BE GIVEN BY LONDON DESPITE SOME RESERVATIONS BY OFFICIALS.
ONE OF THE FORMOST ADVOCATES OF AN OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENT- ATION IN HONG KONG WITHIN THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT IS THE UNDER- SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, MR ANTHONY
ROYLE.
IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT SINCE MR ROYLE'S LAST TRIP TO CHINA LAST YEAR, WHEN HE WAS QUOTE OVERWHELMED UNQUOTED BY AN ENTHUSIASTIC CHINESE WELCOME AND FLEW IN A BRITISH JET AIRCRAFT WITH AN ALL-BRITIB CREW BACK TO HONG KONG FROM SHANGHAI, HE HAS BEEN PRAISING THE QUOTE NEW CHINA UNQUOTE IN LONDON.
IT IS KNOWN THAT HONG KONG GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES HAVE SENT A FULL AND DETAILED REPORT TO LONDON ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES OF ESTABLISHMENT HERE OF A CHINESE OFFICE.
THESE ARGUMENTS ARE, ON THE GOOD SIDE;
IT WILL MEAN GREATER CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG IF AN OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE IN THE COLONY INDICATES TO LOCAL PEOPLE
PUNERE ADE OUATE AUULTE MŁODY
1
1
1
F
H
TI WILL HEAN GAIRIET VOR DE NON IN HONG RUNG IF AN OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE IN THE COLONY INDICATES TO LOCAL PEOPLE
THE OUTSIDE WORLD THAT THE CHINESE ARE QUOTE QUITE HAPPY H THE WAY THINGS ARE GOING UNQUOTE.
IT WILL MEAN AN EASING OF VISA AND TRADE RESTRICTIONS.
A
BUT ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN, IT IS BELIEVED THE FOLLOWING POINTS HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION:
:
IN TIMES OF PEACE THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEMS, BUT IN TIMES OF STRIFE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OFFICIAL CHINESE OFFICE IN THE COLONY WOULD BE A FOCAL POINT FOR TROUBLE.
THIS COULD HAVE A CRUCIAL BEARING ON CONFIDENCE IN THE COLONY.
ANOTHER DANGER IS THAT, ALTHOUGH CHINESE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS KOULD NOT SEEK, NECESSARILY, TO PROPEL THEMSELVES INTO THE PUBLIC EYE, PRESENT MINOR TROUBLES SUCH AS TEACHERS' DISPUTES COULD MEAN A LARGE PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION WOULD REGARD THE MAINLAND REPRESENTATIVE AS A QUOTE CHINESE GOVERNOR OF HONG KONG UNQUOTE.
THE QUESTION OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION WILL BE RAISED IN THE BRITISH HOUSE OF LAORDS NEXT WEEK BY A LABOUR PEER, LORD BROCKWAY,
LORD BROCKWAY ASKED IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON APRIL 16 ABOUT PROPOSALS THAT CHINA SHOULD HAVE OFFICIAL STATUS IN HONG KONG,
HE WILL BE ANSWERED IN AN OFFICAL STATEMENT BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO THE LORDS ON 9 MAY.
SPEAKING TO THE S.C.M. POST IN A RADIO TELEPHONE INTERVIEW LAST NIGHT HE SAID HE WOULD BE QUOTE DELIGHTED UNQUOTE IF THE CHINESE REQUEST FOR REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG WAS GRANTED.
QUOTE I THINK IT IS VERY NECESSARY UNQUOTE, LORD BROCKWAY SAID, QUOTE ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE CHINESE POSITION IN REGARD TO HONG KONG UNQUOTE.
HE SAID HE HAD NEVER BEEN TO THE COLONY, BUT REGARDED CHINA AS BEING VERY IMPORTANT TO THE PEACE OF THE WORLD.
QUOTE I AM A TRADE UNIONIST AND SOCIALIST AND I AM CONVINCED THAT THE ATTITUDE TAKEN BY THE WORKERS IN CHINA TO IMPROVE THEIR CONDITIONS AND THE ANSWERS TO THE FAMILY OF NATIONS ARE CORRECT UNQUOTE.
t
P
+
I
!
PORNTIONS ALL THE A
"UNQUOTE.
T
+
VI
ד
FORD BROCKWAY SAID: QUOTE THERE HAVE BEEN SOME INDICATIONS IN LONDON THAT A DECISION IN THE DIRECTION OF WHITEHALL AGREEMENT TO CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG HAVE BEEN REACHED
UNQUOTE.
ASKED IF THIS MEANT A DECISION AT THE LEVEL OF THE PRIME MINISTER, HE SAID HE COULD NOT SAY, BUT ADDED IT HAD QUOTE CERTAINLY BEEN DISCUSSED BY THE FOREIGN AND COM440NWEALTH OFFICE UNQUOTE.
LORD BROCKWAY SAID HE WOULD NOT DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITIES OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG BEING UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT.
THE OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATIVES IN HONG KONG TODAY ARE SPLIT INTO THREE CAREFULLY-SELECTED BRANCHES
HSINHUA, THE NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY STAFF, OF WHICH THE LEADING MEMBER IS MR LIANG WEI-LIN, WHO TRAVELS TO AND FRO ON A DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT WHICH DESCRIBES HIM AS A BONA FIDE MEMBER OF THE PEKING CONSULAR CORPS.
OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PEKING PRESS IN HONG KONG ARE ALSO QUOTE DIPLOMATS UNQUOTE ACCORDING TO THEIR PASSPORTS.
MEMBERS OF THE CHINA RESOURCES STAFF, WHO HEAD MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR NEGOTIATIONS WITH WESTERN ORGANISATIONS. AND
STAFF OF THE BANK OF CHINA, THE MEN WHO HAVE TWO MAJOR ROLES IN THE ECONOMY OF THE COLONY: HANDLING THE VAST IN-FLOW
OF REMITTANCES FROM OVERSEAS CHINESE AND THE TRADE DEALS (MOSTLY INVOLVING HONG KONG FOOD) FROM CHINA.
MACLEHO SE
+
NNNN
SENT AT 26/09272 RD
HONG KONG STANDARD. APRIL 15πt' 73
-
Peking bid for
HK office:
No official
moves yet
―
BRITAIN is not going to allow China to establish an office in Hongkong at the moment. But the Foreign Office has admitted that the politically sensitive question is still being considered.
According to news agency reports from London, a Foreign Office spokesman told a press conference on Friday that Peking's proposal was "under review but not 1. "vely at present".
+
A
spokesma for the Hongkong Government saad in
statement yesterday That the question of a Chinese representabre coming into the Colony "hat not been muted
The Hongkong Government but it has been raised front time to time duping the past few year with the Brush Government
"So far as we know," said the $lalement "no official discussions are taking place at the in".
T
Observer in London clasın The British Government's hexilation over the question it is 15 yeast since Peking fast ninde the request waser from The supposition thai China wishes to establish a senior official liangkong who might interfere with the role of the coloral government here.
Experts
Hongkong
תון
however, disagree with
umpban and can see little hami in such an office being ket up.
Professor P. B. Harris of the Political Science Department of the Hongkong Unirealty told the longkong Standard yesterday that he saw renewed unese request s "extremely interesting" but not ma political manoeuvre.
H
the
Prol Ilarms sard that because Peking had mad request Instead of **demand" to Britam pigosted that Hungkong was being regarded with " Than degree of acceptance" by Chine. He saw the "staggering difference from the CS demands for representation in 1967
1 "Yolc of confidence in Hongkong".
The professor said "that he thought
"perfectly possible" that Britain would agree to the request ultimately. He said, however, that in view
of the legal and procedural complexities connected with Poking making further
recognition of Hongkong's colonul status, the capacchet of a Chinese representative would have to be "very clearly defined".
It was a possibility, "but a very unlikely one" that Peking intended the more political weapon. said Proj Harris.
He pointed out that China ready has a "fully equipped Trade Service in Hongkong al the Bank of China and he supposed that new office would be an "official" one. Prof Harris said that it was also possible that a senior official of The Bank may be appointed to the new post. thus avoiding aggravating Brush fear that à top
from Peking who could be seen at a public al representative would tike The poil.
man
Another China
expert. Professor Dut Shen-yu, political science levarer at the Chinese University also thought i likely
that the office would be sel
1..
"It will be an informal one which can handle not only Irude. bul other
+
including consulur and townsas matka he said. lie added that the office night also serve Lor Clunese exploratory discusIDES with the Tawan Gioremmail.
En
PELLING BEL
Mr Ma Man-fai, Chairman of the United Nations Association in Hongkong, disagreed with the professors. He said that although the Chinese would hol want to interfere in the dumetic affaus of Hongkong. it was inevitable that the offic would become involved because of the wishes of the people of the Colony.
H
" peñonally welcome the move. he said. "and 1 think the majonly of Hongkong People will be delighted". Mi
because the
Ma felt that
longkang Goverturient wer "paymg only tipservice" to Chinese
Focalisation, that
presentative would become " voice that the Govemment can respect".
Diplomati in the Colony KUTS that the proposed office would be polítically involved.
File.
19/5/1973
Reference StRD FED
Hansard Extract
Vol: 342 House of Commans
Co1:403
Lords
written
Oral
7
403
Hong Kong and
【9 MAY 1973]
HOUSE OF LORDS
Wednesday, 9th May, 1975
The House meat half past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers-Read by the Lord Bishop of Portsmouth.
HONG KONG AND CHINESE REPRESENTATION
Chinese Representation
404
the success of the trade mission in China. and in view also of the great hopes that there are of developing trade with China, it would be a pity if this matter could not be dealt with in a manner satisfactory to both sides?
of
BARONESS 'TWEEDSMUIR BELHELVIE: My Lords, we certainly hope that it can be settled to the satis- faction of both sides. But we do not think that it has in fact any link with trade, which, as the noble Lord rightly said, is improving.
LORD BYERS: My Lords, may I ask the noble Baroness whether, parallel with
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords, I beg this, it would not be possible to accelerate
leave to ask the Question which stands
in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether China bas requested the establishment of a diplomatic mission in Hong Kong: and, if so, what decision has been reached.
THE MINISTER OF STATE. FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (BARONESS TWEEDSMDIR OF BELIELVIE): My Lords, the Chinese Government has proposed that a repre sentative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be established in Hong Kong. This proposal is still under consideration.
LORD BROCKWAY: My Lords. I thank the noble Baroness for that Answer. May I ask her whether there is not increasing evidence that Peking recognises the value of Hong Kong separate and distinct from China an à link with the rest of the world, and may it not be that a diplomatic mission would stabilise this position immediately, what- ever the ultimate status of Hong Kong, particularly if democratic self-government is developed within Hong Kong itself?
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE: My Lords, I am not so sure about a diplomatic mission. The Chinese Foreign Minister has accepted my right honourable friend's invitation to visit this country, and although dates remain to he settled I think that perhaps that is the best way to pursue the matter.
LORD BESWICK: My Lords, is the nulle Ikutinieka aware that in view of
H.L. 23 D 2
the provision of a direct air link between Peking and Hong Kong for trade and other purposes? When I was in Peking that was what was required.
OF
BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR BELHELVIE: My Lords, the Chinese have suggested that talks about an air service agreement should take place in Peking at the end of May.
LORD SEGAL: My Lords, is not the present situation in Hong Kong suffi- ciently stable to justify a continuation of the status quot
BARONESS
OF
TWEEDSMUIR BELHELVIE: My Lords, it is perfectly true that there are well-established chan- nels of communication, and that is why my right honourable friend is giving this matter long and careful thought.
SCOTTISH HOUSING AND HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS
2.39 p.m.
The Earl of DUNDEE: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Quartión which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
Tisk Her Majesty's Government What functions they foresce for housing associations and housing socialios-in their proposal for solving the outstand- ing problem of Sportsh housing.
The MINISTER or STATE, SCOT. TISIL OFFICE (LORD POLWARTII): My
leofds, the Government look to the.. Housing Corporation under new Chairman, Lord Goodiem, to help the lic using associatiques and housing societies.
1
WEDNESDAY 9 MAY 1973
fan spanlı
THE LORD BROCKWAY:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether China has requested the establishment of a diplomatic mission in Hong Kong; and, of so, what decision has been reached.
ANSWER
(BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE, MINISTER OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE)
My Lords, The Chinese Government has proposed that a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be established in Hong Kong. This proposal is still under consideration.
み
/ 3
supup.
(17296) DL297473 Im 12/72 0.WB.Led Op.363
House of Lords
PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION
for ORAL answer on.
Wednesday 9 May
Mr. Davies, FED May we have your draft reply by 5 pm on Friday, 4 May please.
Lady Tweedsmuir's Office 17 April
WEDNESL
Td+
C
stablishment
ent at a digi muatic
History of the Request
In February 1956, the Chinese Government
proposed that a representative of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs should be established in Hong
Kong. In February 1958, the then Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs told the Chinese Chargé
d'Affaires that we could not agree to the proposal.
The Chinese Government revived their proposal in
March 1972. My Hon Friend, the Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State (Mr Royle), and My Rt
Hon Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, discussed the subject with
members of the Chinese Government during their
visitSto Peking in 1972. The proposAT is still
under consideration.
Mr Clark
Mr Evans
A
B & C
D
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1=
Mr Kevin Sinclair, the Daily Express correspondent in Hong Kong, has sent a further telegram to Mr Royle, to follow up his earlier exchange. Mr Sinclair was the author of the front page article in the South China Morning Post of 26 April reported in Hong Kong telegram no. 445.
2. Mr Guest has minuted that in replying to Mr Sinclair's request, Mr Royle naturally feels he cannot go any further than Lady Tweedsmuir, who will be answering a Parliamentary Question on this subject today.
3. I think we might ask the Governor to try to persuade Mr Sinclair to avoid this channel of communication in future since he derives no benefit from it (and it involves everybody in a certain amount of unnecessary work).
4.
I submit a draft telegram. HKIOD and News Department
concur.
9 May 1973
H L. Davies
Far Eastern Department
+
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRETS
mi Crowson. M. Clark-
Pe
183
49A
speck; a bow Th and Richard Hughes's
rece
GOVERNMENT HOUSE
HONG KONG
äride in the
Economist.
香港總督府
II
TS 2/1126/50
R.B.
Des Michat.
15/5.
3/3.:!
Enter
4th May 1973 FED comment for.
FED. for
used in briefing. Mu
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG
Thank you for your letter of 17 April.
I agree that CH'IAO Kuan-hua went no further with Charles Smith than he did with Mr. Royle last June. In many ways what he said reflects more closely what CHANG Wen-chin had to say to Denis Greenhill in October.
2.
14/
Naturally Smith's story has been widely taken up in the local press. The piece by Kevin Sinclair in the "South China Morning Post of 26 April (our telegram No. 445) perhaps went into the most detail. There has been a certain amount of editorial comment. Initially some of this was superficially favourable to what was known of the Chinese proposal; this was an entirely predictable piece of re-insurance and should not be taken to reflect the real views of the Chinese community in Hong Kong. You will have seen the piece in last week's Far Eastern Economic Review, which suggested that in return for accepting a representative we should get some promise that the New Territories lease should at least run its course. (Any such promise would of course be quite meaningless, and Derek Davies should know better than to suggest such a deal). Middle-of-the-road comment in the Chinese press has suggested that, although representation was a natural step on the path of the normalisation of relations with China, if the proposal was accepted the terms of reference of the representative should be closely written so that he had no right to concern himself with Hong Kong's internal affairs or with the activities of Chinese people here. The right-wing press has naturally been more openly opposed to the proposal. Although the implication of much of what has been written is that a representative may one day be
K.M. Wilford Esq., CMG
SECRET
SECRET
2.
Thaur
the amph :
allowed, the conditions suggested for his acceptance are such as to negate the generally forthcoming tone of the editorials. Indeed a group of leading Chinese editors explained to Jack Cater that while
of course they were completely opposed to the idea, 1
they felt they had to be careful what they wrote. they wrote too openly against the idea, and then
If
a Representative came, their position would be difficult. The editorial in the South China Morning Post" of 30 April (copy enclosed) reflects a fairly mature
3.
The story was probably as responsible as any other factor for knocking 300 points off the Hang Seng stock exchange index.
4.
Dick
The public airing of the proposal appears to have caught the local communist hierarchy on the hop and unbriefed. Our own sources suggest that there has been no officially-inspired discussion at least in the middle and lower echelons in Hong Kong, and there has been a tendency to discount the reliability of the accounts in the newspapers. Stratton's letter of 25 April to Richard Evans related the very negative attitude to the proposal taken by K.C. Jay. To what extent this means that the local hierarchy are not at one with Peking on this is hard to say, but it is significant that they were not briefed by Peking on the deliberate airing of the issue with the Hong Kong journalists, and so were caught short when the story broke. I listed Chinese motives for pressing for an official Representative in para 13(a) of my despatch of 11 January. I think one can now add to these a desire to oust the old brigade, bring in new blood, and impose direct Peking (MFA) control. They are proceeding with this anyway but it would obviously be timely, from their point of view, to give the reformed mission official status. Of course if I am right, this would account for the surprising absence of briefing of the local hierarchy by Peking.
5.
I fully agree that we need not change our negotiating position for the air services talks. I expect that representation will come up at some point during the discussions, but not necessarily in
SECRET
SECRET
3.
A contingency brust with the mended for
M
the first round or indeed at the negotiating table itself. If it is raised formally we may then have to consider whether the Secretary of State should be advised to get his reply in, if only to clear the air. But this is for the future. We look forward to seeing the British team in Hong Kong at the end of the month. One problem will be to ensure that if the issue does arise the strong BOAC element in the team are aware of the implications (assuming that they will be present at the more general, non-technical discussions).
5.
On your paragraph 4: one would like
His
to see the full text. At first sight in view of what he said afterwards it may be that what CH'IAO meant was that the problem of Hong Kong's future need not come up for some time. I don't think one can read into it any wish for early reversion. claim that there was no time to discuss representation during his visit to London last autumn is presumably Ye quite disingenuous. The same would be true of a
similar claim in respect of subsequent meetings between British and Chinese ministers, when the matter was not mentioned.
6.
I am sending a copy of this to
Morgan in Peking.
Yes, but Ika
Chinese have a
하
strong sense of
propnciy
она
Foreign
off are are only
Mu
Y-.
と
discussed by foreign to incsting Ministes.
R.E. 1575.
SECRET
ና
1
Soul: China Morning Post
MONDAY, APRIL 30, 1973
Confidence must be our first concern
In any consideration of official Chinese representation in Hongkong the dominant issue is not whether the Chinese authorities desire it, but how it can be resolved without disturbing the confidence of the people of Hongkong-
"It wit be generally agreed that in the state of relations between Hongkong and China today any move this community can make to develop closer ties with a country so deeply linked by blood, culture, custom and commerce, is a step in the right direction.
Indeed, this newspaper has suggested a number of ways in which Hongkong and China could become more, closely linked such as container transportation, communications and economic services..
China is now reported to have expressed a desire to be represented by some more official presence. And it is likely that people here will, in time, accept this as being in the best interests of Hongkong and China.
It would be wrong, however, to plunge into this without recognising that there are substantial doubts about the consequences; these stem less from the role which the Chinese Government might expect their representative to play than the way in which his position might be exploited here.
It is admittedly unlikely that the Chinese authorities would appoint a consul-general to a territory which they do not consider to be "foreign."
There are, however, other titles which could be devised to make this distinction, though this is of far less concern to people in Hongkong, who have long accepted Chinese statemeats on the future of the Colony with equanimity, than the duties lie is accorded.
+
The main demand is likely to be that any official representative should deal purely with official business but in no way involve himself with domestic matters which remain the sole concern of the Hongkong Government.
If there were to be any departure from this principle it would very rapidly lead to a damaging loss of confidence with serious repercussions on the social and economic fabric of Hongkong.
Moreover, any breach could lead to a rapid deterioration in relations which would be inimical to Hongkong's interests AS well 85 an embarrassment to China.
These are just some of the reasons why the proposal deserves very careful thought in Peking, London and Hongkong before it is taken any further.
In the meantime, it is difficult to believe that the continued absence of an official representative can pose any greater difficulties or problems to Peking than it has experienced in the past 24 years.
Indeed, during this time we have advanced a long way to setting up good contacts at official levels which have proved hoth practical and workable and have resulted in smooth relations in matters such as communications, rail and sea links, trade, travel, finance and banking, to name the most obvious,
Hongkong welcomes this trend as a tangible expression of ever-improving relations. Our mais desire, however, is to ensure that any further step we take contributes to the
+
+
SECRET & PERSONAL
√49
ва 7/5"
MiCurr Midories /
Dar
H.T.J.O. Dept.
BRITISH EMBASSY
F
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14
to see
to
Pink
1 May 1973
M. and I. Depr.
am wiliord £8q Cra
R.E.
FED
7/5.
MW%.
4
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
PARDON DN1
Dear Michael,
38
@
Yes.
R.E.
7/5.
CLARE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1 Thank you for a copy of your letter of 17 april and of Charles omith's record. it is inter-stin, that Ch'iao Auan-bua should arrogated to himself with what has traditionally been chou n-lai's role in providing leaks to non-officials designed afarently to influence a Government's policy.
2 un the face of it, Un'iao's remarks on the future of mong kong represent a tightening of the time-scale since Chi E'eng fei told the secretary of state on 31 uctober last year that "Hi Government should be clear about China's general policy; that they are not in a hurry to recover uong kong". But uni did not of course say, nor so far as I am aware has vhou ever said, that 1998 is the earliest date that the chinese would expect to rɩcover ang nong. it would not be characteristic of the chinese to close their options in this way. Moreover, the chinese nave clearly uerived encouragement from further developments in the rar Lastern situation during the last six montus and their curious ceremony in the ureat all of the reople on 28 rebruary suggests that they may Low see some real prospect over the I wonder. Dext few years of a Taiwan reunification which would in turn influence the лong nong relationship.
R.E.
7/5.
3
üh'iao's remarks art tous not definite enoughto indicate a change of policy on the long term issue; but I think we snould interpret them (since he would have expected them to get back to us) as an attempt to soften us up and, at the
SECRET & FEROVNAL
2/.....
アー
DEURE) AND PERSONAL
- 2 -
same time, as a ballon d'essai on the question of official representation. what we have seen from here of public reaction in mong song and London may, I think, have con- firmed the chinese in their view that taey can tighten the screws without riskin, too much. However, in the snort term, the Chinese Goverment has as much interest as we have in the maintenance of Jusiness confidence and stacility in nong kong and this in turn will strengthen our hand in dealing with any pressures. I agree, therefore, that
ing
Ch'iao's remarks should not influence our initial, position /negotiat- in the forthcoming talks on an air services agreement. But we must recognise that we may encounter obstacles that have more to do with Chinese tactics for securing their objective on representation than with the merits of the case itself.
I am still sponnistic
That the Chinese will
or link mero issues
during our tovincomming talks with Them.
R.E.
Your Ey
Jhorl.
(Mn Morgan)
7/5.
Copied to: oir hurray maclehose aʊNG MBE
Governor of dong hong
ソ
DELMET AND PERSONAL
Caliberia!
EXTRACT
Extract Trae Eastcend Economic Review
25/25/23
73
补
OUR MAN IN HONGKONG
CHINA is continuing the process of establishing Triendly bilateral relations with the countries on its periphery, with the obvious exception of the Soviet Union. It is hardly conceivable that in 12 months' Lime, China's relations with India and Bangladesh will be as artificially strained as they are today. It is even possible that China will close the circle. Just as Peking's vitriolic attacks on US imperialism rose lo a climax prior to the arrival in China of Henry Kissin- ger, so the level of abuse being directed against Mos- cow today could conceivably presage an attempt to achieve a détente with the "social imperialists.
1
The revival of the suggestion that China should et up a representative government office in Hong- kong must be seen within the context of China's eneral campaign to clear the decks of any obstacles that could impede the smooth operation of its for- ign relations and foreign trade. Peking has given various verbal assurances to British ministers that the question of Hongkong is of no particular mo- inent and can wait until the problem of Taiwan has een settled. China's need to import sophisticated foreign technology makes Hongkong's contribution to its foreign reserves now running at about £500 nillion (US$1,245 million) annually an essential Factor in China's economic equation, for the recent barvest setbacks will ensure that Peking will go on mporting cereals at least for the next few years, vhile its generous foreign aki programme also cats nto the limited supply of hard cash. An official nission could facilitate the flow of trade and could cuarantee that Hongkong would more efficiently ex- and its future role as a "shop window" for foreign technology on China's doorstep, within a commu- nity offering no political challenge to China which obviates the need to have foreign sales representa tives stationed permanently in Peking or Canton.
Counting tomorrows
-
At first glance, it would appear that the advan- ages to Hongkong would be even greater than those iccruing to China. By establishing such a mission, Peking would come close to giving de Jure recogni- on to the "separateness" of the enclave on its oast, thus conferring an even longer term future on community which has until recently been unable To count its tomorrows.
Nevertheless, Hongkong and Britain (which will be the final arbiter of the response to Peking) are de- ermined to look this gift horse very cautiously in he mouth. The colony's past experience of a Chi- ese commissioner who represented the Nationalist Government until 1950 was not a happy one. Less Trusting souls recall the excesses of the 1967 riots
nd ask themselves how much more embarrassed the
P
Hongkong Government would have been had there been a Peking representative in the colony at that time.*
But even if China's foreign policies do not change drainatically yet again, the head of any such mission would be an obvious target for petitions from disgruntled elements in Hongkong's society, from striking schoolteachers and evicled tenants to those resentful of increased Crown tents and the landlords of opium divans and unregistered doctors operating within the "Walled City." Presumably Hongkong will want a fairly watertight guarantee that the mission would not give l'eking's backing to such causes. If not, the Governor could easily find himself in the situation feared by one of his prede- cessors, Sir Alexander Grantham, who was against the proposal (when mooted in 1956) on the ground that it would present him with a "rival" governor.
A question of face
On the other hand, Hongkong's colonial, proto- colaire society does not accord proper prestige to the Government of the People's Republic - diplo matically or socially. It is widely recognised that the heads of the New China News Agency, the Bank of China and of the other branches of China's govern- ment in Hongkong are in every sense official re- presentatives (a fact which in itself disposes of most of Hongkong's worries about how the head of a Pe- king mission would conduct himself). Inadequate steps are taken to ensure that these distinguished men are accorded their proper importance within the life of the colony.
On balance, it would seem that the gains to Hongkong's status and the other marginal advan- tages which would accrue from such a mission out- weigh the possible disadvantages listed by the cau- tious. Another factor which must now enter into the calculations is the loss of goodwill that would result from a refusal by London to respond to Peking's feelers.
There is one way of swinging the scales defini- Lively in Hongkong's favour. London could point out to Peking that Hongkong exists today by virtue of certain 19th-century treaties denounced by China as "unequal" and therefore invalid. If China is to establish an official mission in Hongkong, London coukl justifiably ask China to take advantage of the occasion to state in black and white that it was will. ing, of its own volition and obviously under no duress, at least to let the New Territories lease run its course. It would be a fair request, and there is no reason China should remain enigmatically evasive on the issue. With such a guarantee, Hongkong could welcome with open arms the arrival of Peking's man.
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
APRIL 18H 73
L
Peking office will
'solve snago
Peking. Apr. 17. The Chinese Government favours opening "representative organisation" in Hongkong, an authoritative Chinese source said today.
He was commenting na reports from London concerning the eventual opening of a Chinese mission in the Bitish Colony,
"The Chinese Government has already posed the problem of establishing a representative organisation of the Chinese Government in Hongkong," the source said.
"The Chinese Government considers that establishment of such an organisation would be useful for resaiving many concrele problems between Kwangchow (Canton) and Hongkong.
H
He did not specify the nature of the "representative organisation" that Was envisaged. However, observers here excluded the possibility that it would be a consulate. For Peking, the British Colony 19 an integral part of Chinese
territory.
The comments. of the authoritative Chinese source left the impression in the question of a "representative organisation" in Hongkong had been raised several times.
Reports from Hongkong recently indicated that that was the case.
- AFP.
L
सा
31
td
B
A
Mr Wilford
Wilto:
Mr Goodenough
Parliamentary Unit
CONFIDENTIAL
A.&✓
FER
For off
LORD BROCKWAY: PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION: CHINESE OFFICIAL
REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1.
I submit a draft reply and draft Notes for Supplementaries.
They incorporate suggestions by the Governor of Hong Kong. The
Embassy at Peking concur. I also submit a background note on
the history of the problem and our current attitude towards it.
2. Lord Brockway's interest in the subject will have been
aroused by a number of press articles on the subject, particularly
that in the Financial Times of 13 April.
3.
The Chinese last mentioned their proposal to us officially
on 29 December, when the Chinese Ambassador referred to it during
a call on the Permanent Under-Secretary. The Permanent Under-
Secretary told the Ambassador that the Secretary of State was
giving the matter his personal consideration, but that, because
of the problems this raised for us, this consideration would have
to be long and careful. The Secretary of State intends to give the Chinese Foreign Minister (Chi P'eng-fei) our definitive
answer when the latter visits Britain later this year. The visit
was postponed from February and new dates remain to be settled.
The Secretary of State did not think it appropriate to refer to
the subject when he met the Chinese Foreign Minister during the
Vietnam Peace Conference in Paris in February and the latter did
! not bring it up. When the Secretary of State does speak to Chi P'eng-fei, he will speak from the attached document and give Chi
whe
C
-
CONFIDENTIAL
/P'eng-fei
CONFIDENTIAL
A
E
F
P'eng-fei a copy (this document is very strictly Confidential
until the Secretary of State has given it to the Chinese).
Although the matter was not raised by the Chinese with
Mr Walker or Mr Heseltine during their visit to China in March,
the Chinese took advantage of the presence of British press men
in Peking to leak details of their proposal. The senior Chinese
Minister of Foreign Affairs "(Ch'iao/Kuan-hua) told Mr Alan Hare
and Mr Charles Smith of the Financial Times about it during a
discussion on 31 March (a transcript of the discussion has been
given to us on a confidential basis by the Financial Times).
As a result, the Secretary of State was questioned by the
Financial Times during an unattributable press briefing on
13 April. The Secretary of State said that the question of
official Chinese representation in Hong Kong had been a live one
for some time; it would need careful consideration. He did not
think, however, that the lack of a solution need hold up the
development of commercial relations between Britain and China.
Nor did he think that it would in fact have this effect.
The
Financial Times published an article on the following day.
There has been some subsequent publicity including a front page
article in the South China Morning Post, a leader in the Far
Eastern Economic Review and an article in the Economist,
The article in the South China Morning Post makes it clear that
Lord Brockway favours the Chinese proposal.
5.
хх
The Chinese decision to leak their proposal is part of a
well-established pattern in their negotiating tactics. When the
question of Chinese official representation was a live issue in the
1950s, the Chinese used precisely the same tactics; as a result,
Parliamentary interest was aroused. Mr Selwyn Lloyd replied to
/a Parliamentary
- 2 -
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
a Parliamentary question on the subject on 6 June 1956. During
the negotiations for the exchange of Ambassadors rakakians with
China, Chou En-lai leaked details of the talks to Mr Neville
Maxwell, who subsequently published a detailed article in the
Sunday Times.
16.
The subject is of considerable delicacy. On the one hand,
we do not wish to say anything publicly which could be interpreted
by the Chinese as shutting the door in their face before the
Secretary of State has spoken to the Chinese Foreign Minister.
On the other hand, we do not wish to imply that further study of
the proposal will lead us to accept it. The reply has been
[drafted with these considerations in mind.
7.
Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department concur.
3 May 1973
R.M. Evens
R M Evans
Far Eastern Department
When hady Turademir has rear the pp she
aught
and
like to have
Falk with F.E.D.
Ken Wilfe 40.
- 3-
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG BACKGROUND
1.
There is a long history to this problem. The Nationalist Government had an Official Commissioner in Hong Kong from 1945 to October 1949. He gave the Government of Hong Kong a great deal of trouble by, for example, claiming a status superior to that of the consular representatives of other countries. 2. In February 1956 the present Chinese Government formally proposed to our Chargé d'Affaires in Peking that they should
be allowed to establish in Hong Kong an "Office of a Commissioner of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China". We told the Chinese in February 1958 that we could not agree to this proposal.
3. When agreement was reached on the exchange of Ambassadors in March 1972 the Chinese formally revived their 1956 proposal on Representation. It was discussed at some length during both Mr Royle's visit to Peking in May and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's visit in October. Both Mr Royle and Sir Alec Douglas-Home told the Chinese that we could not accept their proposal. The Chinese asked us to give further consideration to it. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary agreed to do so but he held out no hope that he would change his mind. Не intends to take the matter up with the Chinese Foreign Minister when the latter visits Britain later this year.
i 4+
The main reason for our dislike of the Chinese proposal is that we believe the establishment of a representative of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs would have a strongly adverse effect on confidence in the future of the Colony. We do not believe that sufficient practical benefits would accrue to justify the risk of such an appointment. There are already a large number of Chinese Government officials in Hong Kong (eg in the Bank of China, NCNA and the China Travel Service) who deal very efficiently with all practical questions of commerce, culture, information and transport.
N.C.HR. Cauchina News Dying-
New
CONFIDENTIAL
[
+
+
FINANCIAL TIMES ·
China presses
+
for envoy
in Hong Kong
BY CHARLES SMITH, FAR EAST CORRESPONDENT
+
FS
PBH
• PUSIR Av. Pusos
L
L
1 3 APR 1973
Cha
APR 1973 19
-
+
to F considerable / with the question of representative.
Rejected
| GHINA HAS been exerting pres- vice to China, but the flow is sure on Britain so agree to the taken that this matter is con appoinuneat of A0 offical nected Chinese representative in Hoaz extent Kong. British reluctance 10 agree to this proposal could delay the settlement of other bilateral issues between the two countries, including plans for the opening of a BOAC scheduled
· service to Peking or Shanghai
This has emerged from sources In both London and Peking, altbruch China's sense of
P
Although Chinese officials regard the whole question of
■ representative in Hong Kong as being
I mature for solution the issue is not a new one.
It was Arst raised by the urgency over the matter may Chinese Government la February, not, as gel, be fully shared by 1936, and rejected two years Britain.
later by Britain, China raised the maiter again in the spring of 1971 and it is known to have come up in the jalka held in Peking last year by Sir Alec At the moment the People's Douglas Home. the Foreign Republic is represented in Hong Secretary, and Mr. Antbosy Kong by the director of the Royle, the junior Foreign Offica Hasibua" (New Ghora) News Minster responsible for Far Agency-in frangement which Eastern affairs.
Irony
bus continued since the estab Britain apparently avoided bshment of the Communist giving a direct answer to the régime in 1949, but which the Chinese proposal at both sets Government in Peking clearly of talks and the malter is still regards as anachronistic.
understood to be "under con
+
n
--
Chinese officials have com- sideration by the UK. Govern mented on the irony that ment. However there are obvious China should be about lo estab- Teasons why there should be Wish a liaison office in Washing, besitation about China's request. stop but cifrớt yet have a repre-
sentative on its own doorstep.
But i was assured in Pekine recently that the lack of a repre sentative office in Hong Kong poses + number of practical problems, particularly in the communications deld.
H
One is that an official Chinese representative LET Hong Kong could become a focus for polit cal activity in the Colony whether or not wanted this to happen.
China itself
Another fear is that the open- ing of a Chinese official missing might Imply a change "In the Colony's status which, at the very least, could undermine business confidence.
China claims it is not con- venient for members of lae Chinese Government in travel through Hong Kong while the Britain and China are representat.ve isque remains un- theoretically at nila over the settled (A recent case in point status of Hong Kong since the was the new Chinese ambassador U.K. regards the territory as a to Japan, who travelled by British Calogy while China sees special aircraft to Tokyo ratner, it is a piece of Chinese territory than pass through the British which has passed under foreigh Colony.)
administration as the result of
Officials in Peking have also an "unequal treaty." indiested there will be difficul-
tles about agreeing on the establishment of direct rail
Talks
link between Hong Kong and This disagreement
however,
Canton while what they regard has not prevented a smooth as the principal Isrue lo Hong Kong remains outstanding.
There is less precision in | Peking about the question of an ale services agreement and the start of a BOAC sebeduled ser
working relationship between Chine and Hong Kong and there have been no fears that Chioa
burry lo obtaio the
01
Colony's "reversion."
Whether or not China really means to link the Hong Kong representative (ssue with the proposed ROAC Mights late China, progress on the latter Issue appears to have been slow.
The text of an air services agreement has been presented to China by Britain but there bas still been no detailed Chinese reaction to the draft. It is hoped, however. That talks may get under way in London during the bext few weeks.
:
I
+
CONFIDENTIAL
Not the Used.
FORM OF WORDS TO BE USED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN TALKING TO THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER
"I discussed this subject with you and with the Prime
Minister when I visited China last autumn. I told the Prime
Minister on 1 November that I would like to think about the
matter and I would get in touch with you in due course.
"The positions of our two Governments on the status of
Hong Kong are necessarily different. But, as I see it, we have two important interests in common. These are to preserve the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong and to preserve the relationship which has developed between our two countries. So far as Hong Kong is concerned, stability and prosperity depend on confidence. Confidence is a tender plant: it grows only slowly, but can wilt very quickly. If, as I believe, we share an interest in the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong, it follows that we also share an interest in the preservation
of confidence there.
"As far as the relations between Britain and China are
concerned, there can be no doubt that the situation in Hong Kong is a factor of importance. If, therefore, we share an interest
in preserving good relations between our two countries, we also share an interest in doing nothing in, or over, Hong Kong which could disturb the situation there.
"I have given most careful consideration to your proposal since I spoke to you and the Prime Minister last autum. In the light of this consideration I have come to the conclusion that the time is not ripe for a change in the pattern of your representation in Hong Kong. I would therefore ask you not to press your proposal. It is my judgement that it will be some time before circumstances might change in such a way as to warrant an alteration in the arrangements which now exist."
Approved by the seciciary 87-sicie
CONFIDENTIAL
R.E.
375.
Afidentid.
Transcript of arks about Hong Kong made by China's Vice Foreign Minister, Chiau Kuan-hua during an Interview with Alan Hare,
hanaging Director of the Financial Times and Charles Smith, Far East Correspondent of the Financial Times. The Interview was held in Peking on Friday, 30th March, 1973.
In response to a question (at the opening of the
interview) about the state of Sino-British relations, Chiao said
that, in general, relations were developing very smoothly. However,
there was one question which was "still not solved". This was the
question of the Chinese Government appointing a representative in
Hong Kong. If this matter was not settled, other questions "would
arise". Chiao said that relations between Canton and Hong Kong
were "very close" but many things "could become troublesome" without
a settlement of the representative issue. Hong Kong's relations
with the mainland were the same as they had been "since the Second
World War". At the moment, Chiao said, the Hsinhua director acted
as China's representative in the Colony.
Mr.
Chiao said that Premier Chou had discussed Hong Kong
"very clearly and frankly" with Sir Alec. But the British atill
seemed to feel "some difficulty" over the Chinese proposal.
Royle had said in June that Britain "wanted to keep the balance"
in Hong Kong. The proposal to station a representative in Hong Kong
had been made "a long time ago" but the time for solution of the
question was "now mature". Practical matters whose solution could
be facilitated by an agreement on the representative included the
establishment of air connections and a direct rail link between
Hong Kong and Canton and the issue of visas for China in Hong Korg.
Chiao said it was difficult to issue visas without an official
representative. He pointed out that China was about to open a
liaison office in Washington. It was ironic that it could not have
a representative in Hong Kong.
P
- 2
-
P
ist
At the end of the interview, Chiao reverted to ilong; Kong and the question of BCAC flights arose. Chiao said he "believed it would be much easier for BOAC to fly to Teking" if the represent tive issue were settled. The representative issue and the question o*
airline connections were "connected to a considerable extent".
the moment it was "not impossible, but not convenient for Chinese officials to go to Hong Kong". China's ambassador to Japan went by special aircraft to Tokyo "otherwise he could have taken the Hong Kong route". In answer to questions about 1998, etc. Chiao said "the problem of Hong Kong's future does not lie in the long term".
The British public was "not clear about changes in the
world situation. 1998 is still 25 years away - with 25 years we
can work great changes". Changes in the world situation
"including the realignment of various forces" would continue and
would accelerate.
Chiao said that the representative issue had
not been discussed on his own visit to London because of lack of
time.
I
¿
F
·
J
+
IMMEDIATE CYPHER/CAT A
GIS 200
CONFIDENTIAL
FM FC 0 1217102
(FE)
CONFIDENTIAL.
+
DESKBY 135001Z BOTH,
TO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELEGRAM NUMBER 365 OF 12 APRIL 1975
AID TO PEKING,
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
ON THE STRENGTH OF REMARKS MADE TO CHARLES SMITH OF THE FINANCIAL TIMES BY CH'IAQ XUAN-HUA AT A RECENT INTERVIEW IN PERING, SMITH'S COLLEAGUE ROBERT GRAHAM ASKED ME ABOUT THIS SUBJECT AT AN
UNATTRIBUTABLE BRIEFING WHICH I GAVE TO THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC PRESS TODAY (12 APRIL). Į SAID THAT THE QUESTION OF OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG HAD BEEN A LIVE ONE FOR SOME
TIME: IT WOULD NEED CAREFUL. CONSIDERATION. I DID NOT THINK,
I
H
HOWEVER, THAT THE LACK OF A SOLUTION NEED HOLD UP THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND CHINA. NOR DID I THINK
THAT IT WOULD IN FACT HAVE THIS EFFECT.
2.
SMITH INTENDS TO PUBLISH A PIECE ON THE SUBJECT IN THE FINMICIAL TIMES TOMORROW (13 APRIL). WE HAVE PUT THE CHINESE PROPOSAL IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND HAVE EXPHASIZED TO HIM THAT IT IS STILL UNDER
CONSIDERATION.
3.
CH'IAO KUAI!-HUA APPARENTLY TOLD SMITH THAT ONLY **ONE BIG PROBLEM'' REMAINED IN RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND CHINA: THE
QUESTION OF OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. THE SOLUTION OF OTHER PROBLEMS, SUCH AS THE ISSUE OF VISAS · (WE. SHALL ASK SMITH TO ELUCIDATE THIS) AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AIR AND RAIL LINKS BETWEEN HONG KONG AND CANTON, WAS LINKED WITH ITS SOLUTION. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, CH'IAO SAID THAT THE GRANT TO BOAG OF A SERVICE TO CHINA WAS 'CONNECTED TO A CON31 DERABLE
EXTENT''.
:
+
CONFIDENTIAL
/4. WE
CONFIDENTIAL
+
4. WE SHALL TELEGRAPH FURTHER WHEN VE HAVE SEEN THE PRESS TOMORROW AND HAVE HAD TIME TO DIGEST THE IMPLICATIONS OF WHAT CH'|AO IS ALLEGED TO HAVE SAID.
DOUGLAS-HOME
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
FED
IKIOD
NEWS D
RESEARCH D (F E SECT)
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CONFIDENTIAL
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·
A Cima
office in Hongkong
a certainty
By KI VIN SINGLADE
China is vir
hy certain to have a
"representative" office in alongkong within the next few years.
But just when it will be set up is the big question.
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Talke at a "sunapr" lysed are being held in Wintchall and an Peking about the formalun, los M. tus and the bkdy stalling of the Chinese office in Lion; "DEN
But although China has no id que queridong në representation twice with Brush ministea in the past year it has not been pressed recently at maartenal fercl.
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MORNING POST
APRIL 26TH '73
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Prime Minister. he said he Dr Cinese Government could not say, but added it and sock. "Certainly been discussed by propel the Foreign and Graves me the punge eye. Commonwealth Office."
Lord Brockway said he
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One of the forenave advocacy of an representation in Hong Kong w.chin
within the present Government is the Undo Secretary of State for Foreign auk Commonwealth Affairs, Me Anthony Boyl..
It is understood that songe Mr Righ
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year, when he was "overwhelmed" by an enthusiastic Cluese welcome and flew in a bronhijet murernft with an aid Britisie crew. back to Hongkong from Snanghai, he has been praising the "new China" in London.
It is known that Hongles; Governinent representatives have sent a full and detailed report to Fundon about the possibilities of establishnient here of a Chinese CHKAS
These arguments are, on the good sales
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(c) It will mean greater civiliovence in Hongkong if an offical Chinese representative in the Colony indicates to local people
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But on the other side of the coun, it is beloved the foulement,
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Du tones of powce there will be no problems,but in times wi strife the establishment of an oificial Chinese office in the Colony would be a focal point for trouble.
This could have a crucial bearing on confidence in the Colony,
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The official Chinese representatives in Hongkong today, are split into three carefully selectou brunçõest
Buahua, the New Chian News Agency staff, of which the leading nienaber is Me Lat Weiln, who travels to an TEA
jolitarik passport which devandes son as a bona didel raconoce of the Peking consulart
The Poking guera in Hongkong are also "kliplomats" according to Thier passports.
ARRY
niembers
+
C. Maqbers of the China Resources staff, who head unula milion dollar negotia Tina with Western organisa- Don, and
¤ Staff of the Bank of Chun The unen who have two major roles in die economy as lae Colony: haruling the vast in Chow (nd vennittances Overticus Chinese and the trade denin (mostly involving Tiongkong food) from China.
UNGEN
Mituria!
OUR MAN IN HONGKONG
CHINA is continuing the process of estualishing friendly bilateral relations with the count on its periphery, with the obvious exception of the Soviet Union. It is hardly conceivable that in i 2 months' time, China's relations with India and Bangladesh will be as artificially strained as they are today. It is even possible that China will close the circle. Just as Peking's vitriolic attacks on US imperialism rose to a climax prior to the arrival in China of Henry Kissin- ger, so the level of abuse being directed against Mos- cow today could conceivably presage an attempt to achieve a détente with the "social imperialists."
--
J
The revival of the suggestion that China should up a representative government office in Hong- kong must be seen within the context of China's general campaign to clear the decks of any obstacles that could impede the smooth operation of its for- eign relations and foreign trade. Peking has given various verbal assurances to British ministers that the question of Hongkong is of no particular mo- ment and can wait until the problem of Taiwan has been settled. China's need to import sophisticated foreign technology makes Hongkong's contribution to its foreign reserves now running at about £500 Įmillion (US$1,245 million) annually an essential factor in China's economic equation, for the recent harvest setbacks will ensure that Peking will go on importing cereals at least for the next few years, while its generous foreign aid programme also cats into the limited supply of hard cash. An official ission could facilitate the flow of trade and could barantee that Hongkong would more efficiently ex- pand its future role as a "shop window" for foreign technology on China's doorstep, within a commu- nity offering no political challenge to China which obviates the need to have foreign sales representa tives stationed permanently in Peking or Canton.
Counting tomorrows
At first glance, it would appear that the advan- tages to Hongkong would be even greater than those accruing to China. By establishing such a mission, Peking would come close to giving de jure recogni" tion to the "separateness" of the enclave on ils coast, thus conferring an even longer term future on a community which has until recently been unable to count its tomorrows.
Nevertheless, Hongkong and Britain (which will be the final arbiter of the response to Peking) are de- termined to look this gift horse very cautiously in
e mouth. The colony's past experience of a Chi- hese commissioner who represented the Nationalist Government until 1950 was not a happy one. Less trusting souls recall the excesses of the 1967 riots and ask themselves how much more embarrassed the
Hongkong Goverment would have been had there been a Peking representative in the colony at that time.
4
But even if China's foreign policies do not change dramatically yet again, the head of any such mission would be an obvious target for petitions from disgruntled elements in Hongkong's society, from striking schoolteachers and evicted tenants to those resentful of increased Crown rents and the landlords of opium divans and unregistered doctors operating within the "Walled City," Presumably Hongkong will want a fairly watertight guarantee that the mission woukl not give Peking's backing to such causes. If not, the Governor could easily find himself in the situation feared by one of his prede- cessors, Sir Alexander Grantham, who was against the proposal (when mooted in 1956) on the ground that it would present him with a "rival" governor.
A question of face
On the other hand, Hongkong's colonial, proto colaire society does not accord proper prestige to the Government of the People's Republic - diplo- matically or socially. It is widely recognised that the heads of the New China News Agency, the Bank of China and of the other branches of China's govern- ment in Hongkong are in every sense official re- presentatives (a fact which in itself disposes of most of Hongkong's worries about how the head of a Pe- king mission would conduct himself). Inadequate steps are taken to ensure that these distinguished men are accorded their proper importance within the life of the colony.
On balance, it would seem that the gains to Hongkong's status and the other marginal advan- tages which would accrue from such a mission out- weigh the possible disadvantages listed by the cau- tious. Another factor which must now enter into the calculations is the loss of goodwill that would result from a refusal by London to respond to Peking's feelers.
There is one way of swinging the scales defini- tively in Hongkong's favour, London could point out to Peking that Hongkong exists today by virtue of certain 19th-century treaties denounced by China as "unequal" and therefore invalid. If China is to establish an official mission in Hongkong, London coukl justifiably ask China to take advantage of the occasion to state in black and white that it was will- ing, of its own volition and obvody under no duress, at least to let the New Territories leastrum its course. I would be a fair request, and there is no reason China should remain enignetically owave on the issue. With such a guarantee, Honkong Crukl welcome with open arms the arrival of Peking's man,
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ne building ban by putting up wned houses up to three gh. The order of the day in Bulgaria, though, is quite explicit : clear land and return it to the
storeys
INTERNATIONA REPORT
farmy.
China
No incentives, just due rewards
FILOM A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT
The trains now run faster-as well as on time-in China and the internal Purlines fly at night which they did not do on your correspondent's last visit
6 years ago. Today he purged victims of the cultural revolution are being quietly restored and production is being increased by higher wages and material incentives. There are confident assur- ances that the fatal recklessnesses of the 1958 great
leap-now cheerfully admitted will not be repeated. There wil more discretion, Bexibility and
planning," and "decentralised
adjustments."
COMNIUNG
Conditions vary from 1.5 commune and from Shanghai to Canton, even on the approved tours for "foreign friends" which, quite naturally and understandably, concentrate on model teamis and
brigades. The value of peasany Labour also varies: able-bodied hand working peasants are paid more Kan less productive comrades. "As Igde as production goes up, personal jécomes go up," the leader of the Ho La brigade
20. Operial Hy/1a
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The Economist Intelligence Unit
27 16. Jamar's Pizon, Løftes 5W LA INT
her
She want where they,
near lovely Wydih explained. In this showpiece commune which now deve- lops cultured pearls, though far less effectively man the Japanese do, a five- member family earned not quite £100 for 1,480 working days last year plus allotpients of grain, firewood, oil and vegetables. The family also grows vegetables on a private plot, whigh means one-sixtieth of an acre.
At another thriving brigade outsidej Canton, 547 out of 986 households had savings in the bank, a total of 150 houses had been built in the past two years and gra bicycles and 280 sewing machines had been bought. Briefings by singularly capable revolutionary com- mittee leaders stress "increased produc- tion for the state with wider distri bution for the passes." This principle differs from the sabotage operations carried out by the disgraced Liu Shao- chi in the 60s, it is alleged, because Liu evilly put the individual ahead of the state while the party now, somehow, puts the state ahead of the individual though it relies on the same incentives.
Comrade Lu Wen-tsai, veteran phairman of the Shanghai number one steelworks, argued that Shanghai factories were still untainted by material incentives. However, the fixed wage scales for workers vary from 42.50 yen a month to 126 and Comrade Lu him- self earns 200. This variation in the Shanghai wage levels reflected the degree of the worker's political con- sciousness, production level and years of experience." His own high wages, he explained, were due to his pre-libera- tion activity as a party member and had been fixed for different work in 1954.
**
THE ECONOMIST APRIJA 28, 1973
In Shanghai, Peking Cantors and the provinces, it is still frightening to listen to clear-eyed young students and workers-hand-picked, of course--in- sisting that they want only to continue in their present humble miles, to po only where the party sends them, to develop no personal ambitions or indi- vidual ralents in any foreseeable circuro- stanges. Yet the column of about poo young persons, seen by chance trudging
the station in Shanghai under evic- tion from their homes to some strangg rural setting, looked neither joyful pe expectant. One million have been práns- ferred from Shanghai alone in Me past five years.
Hongkong and China Ever closer
FROM OUR HONGKONG CORRESPONDENT
Peking's revived interest in opening a Chinese mission in Hongkong has caused no surprise here. The Chinese have already renovated an official rel= dence on Barker Road on the peak -which was once barred to all Chiues". Appropriately it is across the road fron the home of the American consul genera), where agents from the Central Intelligence Agency, lying on their stomachs around the pool, could f necessary photograph all visitors.
The last time the proposal for official diplomatic representation was openly made was in 1956, but the governor, Sir Alexander Grantham, objecte-l vigorously to the concept of "twin governors for the colony. Now the mood has changed and although the matter will be officially decided br tween Peking and London, opinion in Hongkong strongly favours the pr
per- posal.
The last mainland representation in Hongkong belonged to the Kuomin- tang, whose chief angrily departed for Brazil in 1950 after Britain recognised. China. Apart from the red guard violence in Hongkong in 1967, which was directed from bellicose Canton and not from Peking, Chiang Kai-shek was always more hostile to the colony than Mao has been, A Peking liaison office in Hongkong is likely to hasten another decision the restoration of direct rail- way passenger traffic between Canton and Hongkong, without the irritating train change at the border. After all,
large Peking mission recently visited Hongkong to discuss with imperialist interests the adaptation of western methods of hotel administration for the "middle kingdom"-or, ratlier, the
middle peopledorn.
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CHINA (RELATIONS WITH
HONG KONG
42. Mr. Younger asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what request he has received from the Government of the People's Republic of China for the establishment of relations with the Gov- ernment of Hong Kong and what answer has been returned,
Mr. Selwyn Lloyd: On 25th February the Chinese Government informed Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Peking that they would like to establish in Hong Kong an office of a Commissioner of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China with diplomatic and other staff. This proposal raises a number of issues which are still under consideration.
Mr. Younger: Is the Foreign Secretary aware that in a recent public statement Mr. Chou En-lai said that this was one of a number of matters which made an improvement in relations between the two countries difficult? Since this request apparently came in February, is it not about time that Her Majesty's Govern- ment made up their minds about what scems to be a quite normal proposal between States which recognise each other diplomatically?
Mr. Lloyd: I think that upon reflection the right hon. Member will realise that this question does raise a number of points. I do not think that real complaint can be taken about the time which wo have so far taken to consider the matter. After all, it was about four years after the Labour Government recognised them that the Chinese Government decided to send a chargé d'affaires to London. These matters want consideration, and we will consider them.
-3 JUN 1950
WEDNESDAY 9 MAY 1973
THE LORD BROCKWAY:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether China has requested the establishment of a diplomatic mission in Hong Kong; and, of so, what decision has been reached.
ANSWER
(BARONESS TWEEDSMUIR OF BELHELVIE, MINISTER OF STATE, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE)
My Lords, The Chinese Government has proposed that a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be established in Hong Kong. This proposal is still under consideration.
REFERENCES
Confidential: The Secretary of State's prepared reply to the Chinese
Flag A
Background Note on the problem
Flag B
Financial Times: 13 April 1973
Flag C
Flag D
Flag F Flag F Flag G
Transcript of Vice-Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua's remarks: 30 March 1973
FCO Telegram No 365 to Hong Kong: 12 April 1973 Recent press reports
Mr Selwyn Lloyd's reply to Mr Younger's PQ: Hansard 6 June 1956
NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES
When did the Chinese last refer to the matter?
1. It was last raised during the visit of My Rt Hon Friend
to Peking in November 1972.
ofs-
Was it mentioned during the visit of the Chinese Vice-Minister
of Foreign Affairs in November / the visit of the Chinese
Minister of Trade in January / the visit to China of the
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in March?
2. No, My Lords.
How was the matter left?
3. My Rt Hon Friend told the Chinese Prime Minister that he
would like to think about the matter. As I have said, the
proposal is still under consideration.
Is it not reasonable that the Chinese Government should have an
official representative in Hong Kong, particularly when many
other countries have Consulates and Commissions there?
particularly when 99% of Hong Kong's population is Chinese? /
particularly since the New Territories lease will expire in 1997?
4. The House will not expect me to debate the merits of the
Chinese proposal.
We are studying it in all its aspects.
1
How are day-to-day relations between Hong Kong and China now
A
conducted? ↑ H. G's Embarry - Peking-
!5.
L
There are well-established channels of communication
Then do HMG intend to reply?
2 Mikiai Paky
"(A)
6. My Rt Hon Friend told the Chinese Prime Minister that he
would like to think about the matter and that he would get in
touch with the Chinese Foreign Minister in due course.
When is the Chinese Foreign Minister due to visit Britain?
7. The Chinese Foreign Minister has accepted My Rt Hon
Friend's invitation to visit this country. Dates remain to be
Bettled.
l this issue affect commercial relations between Britain
and China?
18.
We see no reason why it need hold up the development of
our commercial relations.
Will this 188ue affect the negotiation of an Air Services
Agreement between Britain and China?
9. We see no connection between the two subjecta.
When will negotiations on the Air Services Agreement begin?
10. The Chinese have suggested that talks should take place
in Peking at the end of May.
That about better communications between Hong Kong and China?
11. We are in favour of improved links. Cable and telephone
communications have recently been improved.
What about the future of Hong Kong?
| 12.
We and the Government of Hong Kong have every confidence
in the future of Hong Kong. We do not anticipate any change
in the foreseeable future.
/13. HISTORY OF THE REQUEST
F
2
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HISTORY OF THE REQUEST
13. In February 1956, the Chinese Government proposed that a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should be established in Hong Kong. In February 1958, the then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires that we could not agree to the proposal. The Chinese Government revived their proposal in March 1972. My Hon Friend, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Mr Royle), and My Rt Hon Friend, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, discussed the subject with members of the Chinese
Government during their visits to Peking in 1972. (Noventa..)
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Mr Wilford
Mr Goodenough
Parliamentary Unit
For!
48
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B
LORD BROCKWAY : PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION : CHINESE OFFICIAL
REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1.
I submit a draft reply and draft Notes for Supplementaries.
They incorporate suggestions by the Governor of Hong Kong. The
Embassy at Peking concur. I also submit a background note on
the history of the problem and our current attitude towards it.
2. Lord Brockway's interest in the subject will have been
aroused by a number of press articles on the subject, particularly
that in the Financial Times of 13 April.
3.
The Chinese last mentioned their proposal to us officially
on 29 December, when the Chinese Ambassador referred to it during
a call on the Permanent Under-Secretary. The Permanent Under-
Secretary told the Ambassador that the Secretary of State was
giving the matter his personal consideration, but that, because
of the problems this raised for us, this consideration would have
to be long and careful. The Secretary of State intends to give
the Chinese Foreign Minister (Chi P'eng-fei) our definitive
answer when the latter visits Britain later this year. The visit
was postponed from February and new dates remain to be settled.
The Secretary of State did not think it appropriate to refer to
the subject when he met the Chinese Foreign Minister during the
Vietnam Peace Conference in Paris in February and the latter did
not bring it up. When the Secretary of State does speak to Chi
P'eng-foi, he will speak from the attached document and give Chi
/P'eng-fei
1-
CONFIDENTIAL
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P'eng-fei a copy (this document is very strictly Confidential
until the Secretary of State has given it to the Chinese).
4.
Although the matter was not raised by the Chinese with
Mr Walker or Mr Heseltine during their visit to China in March,
the Chinese took advantage of the presence of British press men
in Peking to leak details of their proposal. The senior Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Ch'iao Kuan-hua) told Mr Alan Hare
and Mr Charles Smith of the Financial Times about it during a
discussion on 31 March (a transcript of the discussion has been
given to us on a confidential basis by the Financial Times).
As a result, the Secretary of State was questioned by the
Financial Times during an unattributable press briefing on
13 April. The Secretary of State said that the question of
official Chinese representation in Hong Kong had been a live one
for some time; it would need careful consideration. He did not
think, however, that the lack of a solution need hold up the
development of commercial relations between Britain and China.
Nor did he think that it would in fact have this effect. The
Financial Times published an article on the following day.
There has been some subsequent publicity including a front page
article in the South China Morning Fost, a leader in the Far
Eastern Economic Review and an article in the Economist.
The article in the South China Morning Post makes it clear that
Lord Brockway favours the Chinese proposal.
5.
The Chinese decision to leak their proposal is part of a
well-established pattern in their negotiating tactics. When the
question of Chinese official representation was a live issue in the
1950s, the Chinese used precisely the same tactics; as a result,
Parliamentary interest was aroused. Mr Selwyn Lloyd replied to
/a Parliamentary
2
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CONFIDENTIAL
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·
a Parliamentary Question on the subject on 6 June 1956. During
the negotiations for the exchange of Ambassadors reikiama with
China, Chou En-lai leaked details of the talks to Mr Neville
Maxwell, who subsequently published a detailed article in the
Sunday Times.
6.
The subject is of considerable delicacy. On the one hand,
we do not wish to say anything publicly which could be interpreted
by the Chinese as shutting the door in their face before the
Secretary of State has spoken to the Chinese Foreign Minister.
On the other hand, we do not wish to imply that further study of
the proposal will lead us to accept it. The reply has been
drafted with these considerations in mind.
7.
Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department concur.
R M Evans
3 May 1973
Far Eastern Department
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CONFIDENTIAL
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T
1.vuse of Lord..
PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION
for ORAL│| answer on.
Wechesday 9 May
Day we love your draft reply by 5 pm on Friday, 4 Ilay please.
Lafly Tweedsmuir's uffice 17 April
WEDNESDAY THE 9TH OF MAY
**The Lord Brockway-To ask Her Majesty's Government whether Chinn hus requested the establishment of a diplomatic mission in Hong Kong; and, if so, what decision has been reached.
In February 1956, the Chinese Government
proposed that a representative of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs should be established in Hong
Kong.
In February 1958, the then Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs told the Chinese Chargé
d'Affaires that we could not agree to the proposal.
The Chinese Government revived their proposal in
March 1972. My Hon Friend, the Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State (Mr Royle), and My Rt
Hon Friend, the Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, discussed the subject with
members of the Chinese Government during their
visit to Peking in 1972. The proposal is still
under consideration.
(1729) DL89747) 1= 12/73 0.1.3.IAL Oμ463
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REFERENCES
Confidential: The Secretary of State's prepared reply to the Chinese
Flag A
Flag B
Background Note on the problem Financial Times: 13 April 1973
Flag C
Flag D
Flag E Flag F Flag G
Transcript of Vice-Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua's remarku: 30 March 1973
FCO Telegram No 365 to Hong Kong: 12 April 1973 Recent press reports
Mr Selwyn Lloyd's reply to Mr Younger's PQ: Hansard 6 June 1956
4
:
NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES
When did the Chinese last refer to the matter?
1. It was last raised during the visit of My Rt Hon Friend
to Peking in November 1972.
Was it mentioned during the visit of the Chinese Vice-l:inister
of Foreign Affairs in November the visit of the Chinese
Minister of Trade in January / the visit to China of the
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in March?
2.
No, My Lorde.
How was the matter left?
3. My Rt Hon Friend told the Chinese Prime Minister that he
would like to think about the matter. As I have said, the
proposal is still under consideration.
Is it not reasonable that the Chinese Goverment should have an
official representative in Hong Kong, particularly when many
other countries have Consulates and Commissions there? /
particularly when 99% of Hong Kong's population is Chinese? /
particularly since the New Territories leage will expire in 1997?
Lin The House will not expect me to debate the merits of the
Chinese proposal. We are studying it in all its aspecta.
1
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I
How are day-to-day relations between Hong Kong and China now
conducted?
5. There are well-established channels of communication.
When do HIG intend to reply?
6. My Rt Hon Friend told the Chinese Prime Minister that he
would like to think about the matter and that he would get in
touch with the Chinese Foreign Minister in due course,
When is the Chinese Foreign Minister due to visit Britain?
7. The Chinese Foreign Minister has accepted My Rt Hon
Friend's invitation to visit this country. Dates remain to be
settled.
Will this issue affect commercial relations between Britain
and China?
8. We see no reason why it need hold up the development of
our commercial relations.
Will this issue affect the negotiation of an Air Serviços
Agreement between ritain and China?
9. We see no connection between the two subjects.
When will negotiations on the Air Services Agreement begin?
10. The Chinese have suggested that talks should take place
in Peking at the end of May.
What about bettor communications between Hong Kong and China?
We are in favour of improved links. Cable and telephone
communications have recently been improved.
11.
What about the future of Hong Kong?
12.
We and the Government of Hong Kong have every confidence
in the future of Hong Kong. We do not anticipate any change
in the foreseeable future.
J
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CONFIDENTIAL
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG BACKGROUND
1.
There is a long history to this problem, The Nationalist Government had an Official Commissioner in Hong Kong from 1945 to October 1949. He gave the Government of Hong Kong a great deal of trouble by, for example, claiming a status superior to that of the consular representatives of other countries. 2. In February 1956 the present Chinese Government formally proposed to our Chargé d'Affaires in Peking that they should
be allowed to establish in Hong Kong an "Office of a Commissioner of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China".
We told
the Chinese in February 1958 that we could not agree to this
proposal.
3. When agreement was reached on the exchange of Ambassadora in March 1972 the Chinese formally revived their 1956 proposal on Representation. It was discussed at some length during both Mr Royle's visit to Peking in May and the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's visit in October. Both Mr Royle and Sir Alec Douglas-Home told the Chinese that we could not accept their proposal. The Chinese asked us to give further consideration to it. The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary agreed to do so but he held out no hope that he would change his mind. He intends to take the matter up with the Chinese Foreign Minister when the latter visits Britain later this year.
4. The main reason for our dislike of the Chinese proposal is that we believe the establishment of a representative of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs would have a strongly adverse effect on confidence in the future of the Colony. We do not believe that sufficient practical benefits would accrue to justify the risk of such an appointment. There are already a large number of Chinese Government officials in Hong Kong (eg in the Bank of China, NCNA and the China Travel Service) who deal very efficiently with all practical questions of commerce, culture, information and transport.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
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Please do so
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Lubiect to the Gower war's views,
Inmont that fack later
witht widicate the situatio Privatly to the Editer whom I have known for me
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Mr yžíford
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CHINESE "REPRESENTATIVE" IN HONG KONG
BR.
1. Mr Royle suggested on Hong Kong telegram No 445 that it
might be indicated privately to the editor of the South China
Morning Fost that the paper has got his views on the question
of a Chinese representative upside down.
2 =
The trouble with telling newspaper men what Ministerial
views are not, is that this can indicate by elimination what
they really are. At this stage when we have not replied to
the Chinese Government, I think it might be unwise to correct
Sommal this report in any formedr way.
3. I therefore recommend that when I am in Hong Kong next
week, I should have a word with the Governor and suggest that,
if a convenient opportunity arises, he might suggest to a
suitable audience that Ministerial views are by no means as
decided as was suggested in the press.
2 May 1973
cc:-
Sir D Watson
Mr Evans (FED)
DCSL-
A C Stuart
Hong Kong & Indian Ocean Dept
I take it would
a
food rom
M. Stuart to disar of tactics with the
fr
gov. for washing this problem. Paradoxically pubdaty
new kecent weeks hoo helped vatter than hindered
my wew
It has been much laro anbarrang
than me might hause Hought
CONFIDENTIAL
Kunhilfer 3% Kumholfow
IMMEDIATE CYPHER CAT A GFS 30
CONFIDENTIAL
For 3/307/1
FM PEKING Ø2542%Z
CONFIDENTIAL
/1973
TOP CORY
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 540 OF 2 MAY INFO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR HONG KONG (PERSONAL),
ALY
YOUR TEWPO 425 TO HONG KONG: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG,
1. I AGREE WITH THE DRAFT ANSWER AND NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES.
MORGAN
FILES
FED
HKIOD
PUSD
SIR E NORRIS
MR WILFORD
CONFIDENTIAL
IMMEDIATE
CYPHER/CAT A
GPS 250
FM HONG KONG #20850Z
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
1973
FEH
3/302/1
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 475 OF 2 MAY/INFO PRIORITY PEKING,
YOUR TELNO 425 AND PEKING TELEGRAM TO YOU NUMBER 546 CHINESE
REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
I AGREE WITH THE GENERAL LINE OF THE PROPOSED ANSWER AND I
CONSIDER THAT THE NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES COVER ALL THE NECESSARY
POINTS. I HAVE A FEW MINOR COMMENTS TO OFFER:
(1) I SUGGEST THAT THE WORDS QUOTE IN THE PRESENT CLIMATE OF
RELATIONS UNQUOTE AT THE END OF THE SECOND SENTENCE OF THE
SUBSTANTIVE ANSWER SHOULD BE OMITTED: ALTHOUGH FACTUALLY CORRECT THEY SEEM TO ME TO INVITE THE ENQUIRY WHY, NOW THAT RELATIONS HAVE EVIDENTLY IMPROVED, WE ARE DELAYING ACCEPTANCE OF THE RENEWED CHINESE REQUEST,
(2) I THINK THE WORD QUOTE RAISED UNQUOTE WOULD BE BETTER THAN
QUOTE DISCUSSED UNQUOTE IN THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE FIRST SUPPLEMENTARY ANSWER.
(3) I SUGGEST THAT THE WORDS QUOTE BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS
UNQUOTE IN THE PROPOSED ANSWER TO THE THIRD SUPPLEMENTARY SHOULD
BE REPLACED BY QUOTE ON SUCH MATTERS UNQUOTE. THE C.P.G. MAINTAINS
THAT WE ARE NOT A GOVERNMENT' BUT AN 'AUTHORITY', I SEE NO NEED TO OFFEND THEM ON THIS SEMANTIC ISSUE ON SUCH A PUBLIC, AND NO DOUBT MUCH-PUBLICISED OCCASION.
(4) THE SIXTH SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTION MIGHT PERHAPS BE EXPANDED TO EMBRACE SINO-BRITISH TRADE AND IF ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY SINO-HONG
KONG RELATIONS, AS WELL AS AN AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT.
MACLEHOSE
FILES
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HKIOD
PUSD
SIR E NORRIS
MR WILFORD
CONFIDENTIAL
کر رہا
520
IMMEDIATE
CYPHER/CAT A
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CONFIDENTIAL
гонорарка
(FE)
FM F C 0 8115J0Z
CONFIDENTIAL.
TO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR HONG KONG (PERSONAL) TELEGRAM NUMBER 425 OF 1 AY1?3 TO PEKING.
34
MY TELEGRAM NO 388 : CILHESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
THE FOLLOWING IS OUR DRAFT ANSWER TO LORD BROCKWAY'S PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION, TOCETHER WITH DRAFT NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES. GRATEFUL FOR YOUR COMMENTS BY 1200Z ON 3 MAY.
ANSWER: **IN FEBRUARY 1956, THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT PROPOSED THAT A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN HONG KONG. IN FEBRUARY 1950, THE THEN SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TOLD THE CHINESE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES THAT
WE COULD NOT AGREE TO THE APPOINTMENT IN THE PRESENT CLIMATE OF
RELATIONS. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT REVIVED THEIR PROPOSAL IN MARCH 1972, MY HON FRIEND, THE PARLIAMENTARY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE (MR ROYLE), AND MY RT HON FRIEND, THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN
AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT WITH MEMBERS OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT DURING THEIR VISITS TO PEKING IN 1972. THE
PROPOSAL IS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION?".
NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES
WHEN DID THE CHINESE LAST REFER TO THE MATTER?
IT WAS LAST DISCUSSED DURING THE VISIT OF MY RT HON FRIEND TO PEKING IN NOVEMBER 1972. WAS IT PENTIONED DURING THE VISIT OF THE CHINESE VICE-M1||STER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN NOVEMBER/ THE VISIT OF THE CHINESE MINISTER OF TRADE IN JANUARY/ THE VISIT TO CHINA OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRADE AND INDUSTRY IN MARCH?
NO.
CONFIDENTI AL
/HOW
HOW WAS THE MATTER LEFT?
CONFIDENTIAL
MY RT HON FRIEND TOLD THE CHINESE PRIME MINISTER THAT HE WOULD
LIKE TO THINK ABOUT THE MATTER. AS I HAVE SAID, THE PROPOSAL 15 STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION.
IS IT NOT REASONABLE THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT SHOULD HAVE AN
OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN HONG KONG, PARTICULARLY WHEN MANY OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE CONSULATES AND COMMISSIONS THERE? / PARTICULARLY WHEN
99 PERCENT OF HONG KONG'S POPULATION IS CHINESE? / PARTICULARLY
SINCE THE NEW TERRITORIES LEASE WILL EXPIRE IN 1997?
THE HOUSE WILL NOT EXPECT ME TO DEBATE THE MERITS OF THE CHINESE
PROPOSAL. WE ARE STUDYING IT IN ALL ITS ASPECTS.
HOW ARE DAY-TO-DAY RELATIONS BETWEEN HONG KONG AND CHINA NOW
CONDUCTED?
THERE ARE WELL-ESTABLISHED CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN
THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.
WHEN DO HMG INTEND TO REPLY?
MY RT KON FRIEND TOLD THE CHINESE PRIME MINISTER THAT HE WOULD
LIKE TO THINK ABOUT THE MATTER AND THAT HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH
THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER IN DUE COURSE.
WIEN IS THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER DUE TO VISIT BRITAIN?
THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS ACCEPTED MY RT HON FRIEND'S
INVITATION TO VISIT THIS COUNTRY, DATES REMAIN TO BE SETTLED.
WILL THIS ISSUE AFFECT THE NEGOTIATION OF AN AIR SERVICES
AGREEMENT BETWEEN BRITAIN AND CHINA?
WE SEE NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TWO SUBJECTS,
WHEN WILL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT BEGIN?
-2-
THE CHINESE
CONFIDENTIAL
·
CONFIDENTIAL
THE CHINESE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT TALKS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN PEKING
AT THE END OF MAY.
WHAT ABOUT BETTER COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN HONG KONG AND CHINA?
WE ARE IN FAVOUR OF IMPROVED LINKS, CABLE AND TELEPHONE
COMMUNICATIONS HAVE RECENTLY BEEN IMPROVED.
WHAT ABOUT THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG?
WE AND THE GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG HAVE EVERY CONFIDENCE IN THE
FUTURE OF HONG KONG, WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE ANY CHANGE IN THE
FORESEEABLE FUTURE.
DOUGLAS HOME
+
FILES
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PUS D
SIR E NORRIS
MR WILFORD
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PRIORITY
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COP COPY
FEH 3/30/1
1973
TO PRIORITY GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELNO 417 OF 38 APRIL INFO
PRIORITY PEKING
YOUR TELEGRAM NOS 444 AND 445: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG
KONG.
(FE)
1. MR ROYLE HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING TELEGRAM DATED 21 APRIL FROM MR KEVIN SINCLAIR, DAILY EXPRESS CORRESPONDENT IN HONG KONG: QUOTE WOULD APPRECIATE FULL STATEMENT ON PRESENT STATE OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN UNITED KINGDOM AND CHINA REGARDING ESTABLISHMENT
OF CHINESE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. UNDERSTAND THIS DISCUSSED BY YOU ON LAST VISIT PEKING AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL FULLEST DETAILS. REGARDS KEVIN SINCLAIR POSTSCRIPT HONG KONG
UN QUOTE.
2. PROVIDED YOU SEE NO OBJECTION, I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD PASS THE FOLLOWING REPLY TO MR SINCLAIR FROM MR ROYLE: QUOTE THANK YOU FOR YOUR! TELEGRAM OF 21 APRIL. MY COLLEAGUE LADY TWEEDUIR WILL BE ANSWERING A PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON THIS SUBJECT ON 9 MAY. I DO NOT THINK IT WOULD BE RIGHT FOR ME TO ANTICIPATE WIAT SHE WILL SAY.
I AM SORRY THAT I CANNOT BE MORE HELPFUL. KIND REGARDS, ANTHONY
ROYLE UNQUOTE.
DOUGLAS-HOME
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FED
HKIOD
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PS/MR ROYLE MR WILFORD SIN E NORRIS
CONFIDENTIAL
나
Cutting dated
ECONOMIST
28 APR 1973
+
19
fürt
33./1
FE
Lety
HE
Hongkong and China
Ever closer
FROM QUA HONGKONG CORRESPONDENT
Peking's revived interest in opening a Chinese mission in Hongkong has caused no surprise here. The Chinese have already renovated an official resi dence on Barker Road on the peak ~~~~which was once barred to all Chinese. Appropriately it is across the road from the home of the American consul general, where agents from the Central Intelligence Agency, lying on their stomachs around the pool, could if necessary photograph all visitors.
two
The last time the proposal for official diplomatic representation was openly made was in 1955, but the governor, Sir Alexander Grantham, objected vigorously to the concept of governors for the colony." Now the mood has changed and although the matter will be officially decided be- tween Peking and London, opinion in Hongkong strongly favours the pro- posal.
The last mainland representation in Hongkong belonged to the Kuomin tang, whose chief angrily departed for Brazil in 1950 after Britain recognised China. Apart from the red guard violence in Hongkong in 1967, which was directed from bellicose Canton and not from Peking, Chiang Kai-shek was always more hostile to the colony than Mao has been. A Peking liaison office in Hongkong is likely to hasten another decision the restoration of direct rail- way passenger traffic between Canton and Hongkong, without the irritating train change at the border. After all, a large Peking mission recently visited Hongkong to discuss with imperialist interests the adaptation of western methods of hotel administration for the "middle kingdom "-or, rather, the middle peopledom.
:
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CONFIDENTIAL
Agreed.
feew & refting alterations. AR.
Minyetora.
บุป
B & C
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Mr Evans
Mihorgan
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
Enter
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1. Kevin Sinclair the Daily Express correspondent in Hong
Kong has sent a telegram (attached) to Mr Royle asking for a
"full statement" on the present state of discussion between
the United Kingdom and China about Chinese official representa-
tion in Hong Kong. Press interest in this subject continues
in Hong Kong, as Hong Kong telegrams No 444 and No 445 make
clear.
2. Lord Brockway has put down a Parliamentary Question for
oral answer on 9 May. We are in the process of preparing a
draft reply. In these circumstances we could avoid the
problem of what to say to Mr Sinclair by referring him to what
Lady Tweedsmuir will say on 9 May. Mr Royle will not wish to
say anything about the content of his talks in Peking last June
which were confidential.
3. I submit a draft telegram to the Governor of Hong Kong,
asking him to pass on Mr Royle's reply to Mr Sinclair.
4.
HKIOD and News Department concur.
HL1 Davies
Far Eastern Department
27 April 1973 I Think Thai This is right.
agree
Kinhulfer A
FIDEN AL
1+
R.n. Evans
27 April, 1973.
I
ICES
CONSULT TELEPHONE
To send Telegrams DIRECTORY OR TELEX
DIALLING
CARD
NNNN
FED
CC JHK 100
ZCZC CLH544 LPG005X GLP695X GHAO50 HFA794 PC8176
BLH COAXAK 050
HONGKONG/ 50 21 1326
ANTHONY ROYLE
HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDONSW 1
Artaten
Forici
Please. R
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cc also Joãos Dent.
21 APR.
ENQUIRIES DIAL
LHS1271
- CONSULT TELEPHONE
ELEX DIALLING
CARD
POST
OFFICE
INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAPH SERVICES
To send Telegrams
CONSU
DIRECTORY OR TELEX DI
N
WOULD APPRECIATE FULL STATEMENT ON PRESENT STATE OF
DISCUSSION BETWEEN UNITED KINGDOM AND CHINA
REGARDING ESTABLISHMENT
OF CHINESE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN
७
X
10
HONGKONG STOP UNDERSTAND THIS DISCUSSED BY YOU ON
LAST VISIT PEKING AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL ·
FULLEST DETAILS STOP REGARDS
KEVIN SINCLAIR POSTSCRIPT HONGKONG
POST
INTERNATIONAL TELEGRAPH SERVICES OFFICE
V
EN CLAIR GPS 900
Mr. Stuart (Hieros) night it not be indicated
FM HONG KONG 260846Z
UNCLASSIFIED
Privality to have got un views precis
I'm editor Itic i the
1973
an
ا
"upside down"!
TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 445 OF 26 APRILɅNFO PEKING.
ના
Spoken to 17o Rayle and to cater in Maytag
P/A
THE FOLLOWING IS THE FULL TEXT OF A FRONT PAGE ARTICLE WHICH APPEARED IN THE SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST TODAY (THURSDAY) UNDER THE HEADING QUOTE A CHINA OFFICE IN HONG KONG A CERTAINTY UNQUOTE:-
CHINA IS VIRTUALLY CERTAIN TO HAVE A QUOTE REPRESENTATIVE
UNQUOTE OFFICE IN HONG KONG WITH THE NEXT FEW YEARS.
BUT JUST WHEN IT WILL BE SET UP IS THE BIG QUESTION.
2/6
TALKS AT A QUOTE SENIOR UNQUOTE LEVEL ARE BEING HELD IN WHITEHALL AND IN PEKING ABOUT THE FORMATION, THE STATUS AND THE LIKELY STAFFING OF THE CHINESE OFFICE IN HONG KONG.
BUT ALTHOUGH CHINA HAS RAISED THE QUESTION OF REPRESENTATION TWICE WITH DRITISH MINISTERS IN THE PAST YEAR IT HAS NOT REFN PRESSED RECENTLY AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL.
IT SEEMS LIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT A GO AHEAD WILL EVENTUALLY BE GIVEN BY LONDON DESPITE SOME RESERVATIONS BY OFFICIALS.
ONE OF THE FOREMOST ADVOCATES OF AN OFFICIAL CHINESE_REPRESENT- ATION IN HONG KONG WITHIN THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT IS THE UNDER- SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, MR ANTHONY
ROYLE.
IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT SINCE MR ROYLE'S LAST TRIP TO CHINA LAST YEAR, WHEN HE WAS QUOTE OVERWHELMED UNQUOTED BY AN ENTHUSIASTIC CHINESE WELCOME AND FLEW IN A BRITISH JET AIRCRAFT WITH AN ALL-BRITIO CREW BACK TO HONG KONG FROM SHANGHAI HE HAS BEEN PRAISING THE QUOTE
NEW CHINA UNQUOTE IN LONDON.
+
IT IS KNOWN THAT HONG KONG GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES HAVE SENT
A FULL AND DETAILED REPORT TUDON ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES OF ESTABLISHMENT HERE OF A CHINESE OFFICE.
/THESE
THESE ARGUMENTS ARE, ON THE GOOD SIDE:
IT WILL MEAN GREATER CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG IF AN OFFICIAL
CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE IN THE COLONY INDICATES TO LOCAL PEOPLE
AND THE OUTSIDE WORLD THAT THE CHINESE ARE QUOTE QUITE HAPPY
WITH THE WAY THINGS ARE GOING UNQUOTE.
IT WILL MEAN AN EASING OF VISA AND TRADE RESTRICTIONS.
BUT ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN, IT IS BELIEVED THE FOLLOWING
POINTS HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION:
IN TIMES OF PEACE THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEMS, BUT IN TIMES OF STRIFE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OFFICIAL CHINESE OFFICE IN THE
COLONY WOULD BE A FOCAL POINT FOR TROUBLE.
THIS COULD HAVE A CRUCIAL BEARING ON CONFIDENCE IN THE COLONY.
ANOTHER DANGER IS THAT, ALTHOUGH CHINESE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WOULD NOT SEEK, NECESSARILY, TO PROPEL THEMSELVES INTO THE PUBLIC EYE, PRESENT MINOR TROUBLES SUCH AS TEACHERS' DISPUTES COULD MEAN A LARGE PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION WOULD REGARD THE MAINLAND
REPRESENTATIVE AS A QUOTE CHINESE GOVERNOR OF HONG KONG UNQUOTE.
THE QUESTION OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION WILL BE RAISED IN THE
BRITISH HOUSE OF LAORDS NEXT WEEK BY A LABOUR PEER, LORD BROCKWAY.
LORD BROCKWAY ASKED IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON APRIL 16 ABOUT
PROPOSALS THAT CHINA SHOULD HAVE OFFICIAL STATUS IN HONG KONG.
HE WILL BE ANSWERED IN AN OFFICAL STATEMENT BY THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT TO THE LORDS ON 9 MAY.
SPEAKING TO THE S.C.M. POST IN A RADIO TELEPHONE INTERVIEW LAST
NIGHT HE SAID HE WOULD BE QUOTE DELIGHTED UNQUOTE IF THE CHINESE
REQUEST FOR REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG WAS GRANTED.
QUOTE I THINK IT IS VERY NECESSARY UNQUOTE, LORD BROCKWAY SAID,
QUOTE ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE CHINESE POSITION IN REGARD TO
HONG KONG UNQUOTE.
/HE SAID
-2-
HE SAID HE HAD NEVER BEEN TO THE COLONY, BUT REGARDED CHINA
AS BEING VERY IMPORTANT TO THE PEACE OF THE WORLD.
QUOTE I AM A TRADE UNIONIST AND SOCIALIST AND I AM CONVINCED THAT THE ATTITUDE TAKEN BY THE WORKERS IN CHINA TO IMPROVE THEIR CONDITIONS AND THE ANSWERS TO THE FAMILY OF NATIONS ARE CORRECT
UNQUOTE.
LORD BROCKWAY SAID: QUOTE THERE HAVE BEEN SOME INDICATIONS IN LONDON THAT A DECISION IN THE DIRECTION OF WHITEHALL AGREEMENT
TO CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG HAVE BEEN REACHED
UNQUOTE,
ASKED IF THIS MEANT A DECISION AT THE LEVEL OF THE PRIME MINISTER, HE SAID HE COULD NOT SAY, BUT ADDED IT HAD QUOTE CERTAINLY BEEN DISCUSSED BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE UNQUOTE.
LORD BROCKWAY SAID HE WOULD NOT DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITIES OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG BEING UNDER CONSIDERATION BY
THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT.
THE OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATIVES IN HONG KONG
TODAY ARE SPLIT INTO THREE CAREFULLY-SELECTED BRANCHES #
HSINHUA, THE NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY STAFF, OF WHICH THE LEADING MEMBER IS MR LIANG WEI-LIN, WHO TRAVELS TO AND FRO ON A DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT WHICH DESCRIBES HIM AS A BONA FIDE MEMBER OF THE PEKING
CONSULAR CORPS.
OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PEKING PRESS IN HONG KONG ARE ALSO QUOTE DIPLOMATS UNQUOTE ACCORDING TO THEIR PASSPORTS.
MEMBERS OF THE CHINA RESOURCES STAFF, WHO HEAD MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR NEGOTIATIONS WITH WESTERN ORGANISATIONS. AND
/STAFF OF
--3-
STAFF OF THE BANK OF CHINA, THE MEN WHO HAVE TWO MAJOR ROLES
IN THE ECONOMY OF THE COLONY: HANDLING THE VAST IN-FLOW
OF REMITTANCES FROM OVERSEAS CHINESE AND THE TRADE DEALS (MOSTLY
INVOLVING HONG KONG FOOD) FROM CHINA,
MACLEHOSE
FILES
FED
HKTOD
NEWS D
PS
SIR E NORRIS
ÞÆR WILFORD PS/MR ROYLE
+
+
EN CLAIR
GPS 900
FM HONG KONG 260846Z
UNCLASSIFIED
1973
41
←
TOP COPY
TEH 3/31/1
TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 445 OF 26 APRIL INFO PEKING.
мен
THE FOLLOWING IS THE FULL TEXT OF A FRONT PAGE ARTICLE WHICH APPEARED IN THE SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST TODAY (THURSDAY) UNDER THE HEADING QUOTE A CHINA OFFICE IN HONG KONG A CERTAINTY UNQUOTE:-
CHINA IS VIRTUALLY CERTAIN TO HAVE A QUOTE REPRESENTATIVE
UNQUOTE OFFICE IN HONG KONG WITH THE NEXT FEW YEARS.
BUT JUST WHEN IT WILL BE SET UP IS THE BIG QUESTION.
TALKS AT A QUOTE SENIOR UNQUOTE LEVEL ARE BEING HELD IN WHITEHALL AND IN PEKING ABOUT THE FORMATION, THE STATUS AND THE LIKELY STAFFING OF THE CHINESE OFFICE IN HONG KONG.
BUT ALTHOUGH CHINA HAS RAISED THE QUESTION OF REPRESENTATION TWICE WITH BRITISH MINISTERS IN THE PAST YEAR IT HAS NOT BEEN PRESSED RECENTLY AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL.
IT SEEMS LIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT A GO AHEAD WILL EVENTUALLY BE GIVEN BY LONDON DESPITE SOME RESERVATIONS BY OFFICIALS.
ONE OF THE FOREMOST ADVOCATES OF AN OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENT- ATION IN HONG KONG WITHIN THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT IS THE UNDER- SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, MR ANTHONY
ROYLE.
IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT SINCE MR ROYLE'S LAST TRIP TO CHINA LAST YEAR, WHEN HE WAS QUOTE OVERWHELMED UNQUOTED BY AN ENTHUSIASTIC CHINESE WELCOME AND FLEW IN A BRITISH JET AIRCRAFT WITH AN ALL-BRITIO CREW BACK TO HONG KONG FROM SHANGHAI, HE HAS BEEN PRAISING THE QUO TE
NEW CHINA UNQUOTE IN LONDON.
IT IS KNOWN THAT HONG KONG GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES HAVE SENT A FULL AND DETAILED REPORT TO LONDON ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES OF ESTABLISHMENT HERE OF A CHINESE OFFICE.
/THESE
1
THESE ARGUMENTS ARE, ON THE GOOD SIDE:
IT WILL MEAN GREATER CONFIDENCE IN HONG KONG IF AN OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE IN THE COLONY INDICATES TO LOCAL PEOPLE AND THE OUTSIDE WORLD THAT THE CHINESE ARE QUOTE QUITE HAPPY WITH THE WAY THINGS ARE GOING UNQUOTE.
IT WILL MEAN AN EASING OF VISA AND TRADE RESTRICTIONS.
BUT ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN, IT IS BELIEVED THE FOLLOWING POINTS HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION:
IN TIMES OF PEACE THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEMS, BUT IN TIMES OF STRIFE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OFFICIAL CHINESE OFFICE IN THE COLONY WOULD BE A FOCAL POINT FOR TROUBLE.
THIS COULD HAVE A CRUCIAL BEARING ON CONFIDENCE IN THE COLONY,
ANOTHER DANGER IS THAT, ALTHOUGH CHINESE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WOULD NOT SEEK, NECESSARILY, TO PROPEL THEMSELVES INTO THE PUBLIC EYE, PRESENT MINOR TROUBLES SUCH AS TEACHERS' DISPUTES COULD MEAN A LARGE PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION WOULD REGARD THE MAINLAND REPRESENTATIVE AS A QUOTE CHINESE GOVERNOR OF HONG KONG UNQUOTE.
THE QUESTION OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION WILL BE RAISED IN THE BRITISH HOUSE OF LAORDS NEXT WEEK BY A LABOUR PEER, LORD BROCKWAY.
LORD BROCKWAY ASKED IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON APRIL 16 ABOUT PROPOSALS THAT CHINA SHOULD HAVE OFFICIAL STATUS IN HONG KONG.
HE WILL BE ANSWERED IN AN OFFICAL STATEMENT BY THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT TO THE LORDS ON 9 MAY,
SPEAKING TO THE S.C.M. POST IN A RADIO TELEPHONE INTERVIEW LAST NIGHT HE SAID HE WOULD BE QUOTE DELIGHTED UNQUOTE IF THE CHINESE REQUEST FOR REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG WAS GRANTED.
QUOTE I THINK IT IS VERY NECESSARY UNQUOTE, LORD BROCKWAY SAID, QUOTE ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE CHINESE POSITION IN REGARD TO
HONG KONG UNQUOTE.
/HE SAID
-2-
1
P
HE SAID HE HAD NEVER BEEN TO THE COLONY, BUT REGARDED CHINA AS BEING VERY IMPORTANT TO THE PEACE OF THE WORLD.
QUOTE I AM A TRADE UNIONIST AND SOCIALIST AND I AM CONVINCED THAT THE ATTITUDE TAKEN BY THE WORKERS IN CHINA TO IMPROVE THEIR CONDITIONS AND THE ANSWERS TO THE FAMILY OF NATIONS ARE CORRECT
UNQUOTE.
LORD BROCKWAY SAID: QUOTE THERE HAVE BEEN SOME INDICATIONS IN LONDON THAT A DECISION IN THE DIRECTION OF WHITEHALL AGREEMENT TO CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG HAVE BEEN REACHED
UNQUOTE.
ASKED IF THIS MEANT A DECISION AT THE LEVEL OF THE PRIME MINISTER, HE SAID HE COULD NOT SAY, BUT ADDED IT HAD QUOTE CERTAINLY BEEN DISCUSSED BY THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE UNQUOTE.
LORD BROCKWAY SAID HE WOULD NOT DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITIES OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG BEING UNDER CONSIDERATION BY
THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT.
THE OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATIVES IN HONG KONG TODAY ARE SPLIT INTO THREE CAREFULLY-SELECTED BRANCHES #
HSINHUA, THE NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY STAFF, OF WHICH THE LEADING MEMBER IS MR LIANG WEI-LIN, WHO TRAVELS TO AND FRO ON A DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT WHICH DESCRIBES HIM AS A BONA FIDE MEMBER OF THE PEKING CONSULAR CORPS.
OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PEKING PRESS IN HONG KONG ARE ALSO QUOTE DIPLOMATS UNQUOTE ACCORDING TO THEIR PASSPORTS.
MEMBERS OF THE CHINA RESOURCES STAFF, WHO HEAD MULTI-MILLION DOLLAR NEGOTIATIONS WITH WESTERN ORGANISATIONS. AND
/STAFF OF
-3-
STAFF OF THE BANK OF CHINA, THE MEN WHO HAVE TWO MAJOR ROLES
IN THE ECONOMY OF THE COLONY: HANDLING THE VAST IN-FLOW
OF REMITTANCES FROM OVERSEAS CHINESE AND THE TRADE DEALS (MOSTLY
INVOLVING HONG KONG FOOD) FROM CHINA.
MACLEHO SE
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SIR E NORRIS FR WILFORD PS/MR ROYLE
I
QPS 120
CIPHER/CAT A
FM HONG KONG 260845Z
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
1973
TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 444 OF 26 APRIL INFO PEKING.
YOUR TELEGRAM 303.
FEM 3/5./1
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
WE DO NOT KNOW THE SOURCE OF TODAY'S SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST ARTICLE (FULL TEXT IN MY IFT) BUT BELIEVE IT TO BE LARGELY SPECULATION FOLLOWING CHARLES SMITH'S STORY IN THE FINANCIAL TIMES.
2. WE HAVE SPOKEN UNATTRIBUTABLY TO THE EDITOR OF THIS AND OTHER LEADING NEWSPAPERS CONCERNING THE PARAGRAPHS WHICH REFER TO MR ROYLE AS QUOTE ONE THE FOREMOST ADVOCATES OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG UNQUOTE. WE HAVE SAID THAT THE MATTER HAS BEEN RAISED
FROM TIME TO TIME DURING RECENT YEARS WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT MR ROYLE HAS MADE NO STATEMENT ON OR OFF THE RECORD WHICH AFFORDS ANY BASIS FOR THE VIEWS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM.
MACLEHOSE
FILES
FED
HKI OD SIR E NORRIS MR WILFORD
CONFIDENTIAL
P
4
THE TIMES
长
ترام
регис
علم
cutting dated
14th April 1973.19
Hongkong doubts over Peking mission offer
From Leo Goodstadt Hongkong, April 13
News agency reports today of China's desire to establish a mission in Hongkong have had a mixed reception in the colony.
The move would be highly welcome diplomatically to almost all shades of opinion be cause it would imply a subtle change in Peking's present atti- tude, which is de facto recogni- tion of a British dependent territory on "sacred Chinese soil". The more formal status of the colony as a British posses sion, which a Chinese mission to Hongkong would imply, would be a further demonstration of Peking's benevolent intentions towards the colony's long-term future.
Politically, however, opinion in Hongkong is divided. In the past the local administration has firmly opposed any such mis sion, fearing repetition of the attempts made before Chairman Mao Tse-tung came to power to use Chinese Government offi- cials in Hongkong as a rival centre of authority and a focal point for those who would like Peking to intervene in the colony's affairs.
These suspicions still prevail in official and private circles, although China now behaves as if Hongkong's Chinese popula tion and its welfare were the sole responsibility of the British authorities.
This relatively new attitude is becoming increasingly obvious, For instance, Peking has increased its export prices to Hongkong to almost world mar- ket lavels and dropped its previ. ous policy of giving Hongkong's
CO
predominantly Chinese munity access to food and con- sumer goods at prices well below those paid elsewhere.
China has also enhanced its reputation with the Hongkong Government through the highly responsible behaviour of the Ministry of Finance officials sent to work in Peking-owned banks in the colony.
The local communist move. ment has also worked hard since 1969 to demonstrate that it re- flects Peking's own desire to see stability and reasonable material progress in Hongkong, and it has stayed out of industrial and other disputes during the past three years as far as possible.
A serious security problem would arise if a Chinese mission were located in the colony, as its staff would almost certainly be come the target for Taiwan agents. They are believed to have fomented acts of violence in the past in order to harm Chinese relations with Hongkong and Britain.
The site of the proposed mis sion is already known. It is mansion with extensive grounds which belonged formerly to the Chinese maritime customs and became Peking's property on the recognition of the People's Re- public by London in 1950. Our Diplomatic Staff writes: Foreign Office sources confirm that China has several times asked for official representa- tion in Hongkong since 1956, and particularly in the last two years. Britain has the request under consideration. It is not thought in Whitehall that the issue should affect Anglo-
relations on Chinese
other matters.
Ких
+
..
39
CONFIDENTIAL
1ORITY
PHER/CAT-A-
TOP CORT
GPS 100
FM FCO 181705Z
CONFIDENTIAL
TO PRIORITY GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELNO 388 OF 18 APRIL/AND TO PEKING.
(FE{{
3
1973
PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR
31
1.
MY TELEGRAM NO 383: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
LORD BROCKWAY HAS PUT DOWN THE FOLLOWING PARLIAMENTARY
QUESTION FOR ORAL ANSWER ON 9 MAY:
QUOTE TO ASK HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT WHETHER CHINA HAS REQUESTED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN HONG KONG: AND, IF SO, WHAT DECISION HAS BEEN REACHED UNQUOTE.
2. WE SHALL SEEK YOUR COMMENTS BY TELEGRAM ON OUR DRAFT ANSWER AND NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES,
DOUGLAS-HOME
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SIR E NORRIS
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET AND PERSCHAL
Sir Hurray MeɑLehose ZOHO MBE HOTA LONG
17 April 1973
38
1
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1.
As promised in our telegram of 17 April, I molose copy of Charles Smith's transcript of the remarka Ch'lao Xuan-huz made to Alan Hare and him on 30 March. Smith says that this is the nearest he can get to a verbatia record. In producing it, he followed his notes faithfully and did not attempt to clarify a number of obseze passages. He has particularly asked that the Chinese should be given no grounds for suspecting that he has passed a transcript to us. have assured him that we shall respect his confidence.
2.
The transeript clarifies the mysterious point about the issue of visas (paragraph 3 of 700 telegram No 365). Ch'iso sessa to have gone në further on this particular subject than ho did when speaking to Er Royle in June last yaar. At the same time, his words scho the recent rather petulant Chinese remark made in the context of the LPO's application for visas - that the China Travel Service in Hong Kong was not a properly ocartitated coamler office (Priny triogram to 26 to Hoà lưu Kong).
3. On the question of air services, our judgement is that our negotiating position need not be changed, Ch'imo did not say that BOAC would be unable to fly to Peking unless we gave the Chinese what they wanted over representation: and on the same day as Ch'ino talked to Hare the Deputy Director General of CAAC told Er Heseltine that "as far as services from Hong Long to Peking were concerned, the Chinese side would give it consideration in view of the friendship between Britain and China".
4. One point in the transcript did strike us as rather sinister. That is the phrase on the second page that "the problem of Hong Kong's future does not lie in the long tera". On the face of it, this suggests that Ch'iso is thinking in terms of reversion before 1997. On the other hand it could mean that what Chiao saw as "the problem", i.e, representation, might be resolved at a fairly early date.
BECRET AD PERSONAL
/ 5.
BEGRET AND PERSONAL
5. We should welcome your comments and those of Michael Morgan on these and any other points which may occur to you.
00
V H Morgan Esq PEKINO
(with enclosure)
K "
Wilfced
2
SECRET AND PERSCHAL
*
14
RESTRICTED
-
CYPHER CAT A
FM PEKING 140420Z
RESTRICTED
TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO 26 OF 14 MARCH, 1973
INFO ROUTINE FCO.
LONDON PHILHARMONIC ORCHESTRA: VISAS.
1. CONSULAR DEPARTMENT, MFA, RAISED LAST MINUTE DIFFICULTIES ABOUT ORCHESTRA'S VISAS WITH US THIS MORNING".
THE PROBLEM SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN A LACK OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THEM AND THE ASSOCIATION FOR FRIENDSHIP WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES, TO WHOM WE HANDED PASSPORT DETAILS ON 8 FEBRUARY. CONSULAR DEPARTMENT EXPLAINED THAT THEY WOULD NORMALLY EXPECT SUCH VISAS TO BE ISSUED IN LONDON AND THAT ISSUE IN HONG KONG RAISED SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR THE CHIMA TRAVEL SERVICE WHICH, AS WE KNEW, WAS
NOT A PROPERLY CONSTITUTED CONSULAR OFFICE.
WHEN WE EXPLAINED THE SITUATION THEY APPEARED MOLLIFIED AND HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO ENSURE THAT VISAS ARE AUTHORISED
FOR ISSUE IN HONG KONG.
2.
HAVE APPLICATIONS ALREADY BEEN MADE? PLEASE LET US KNOW URGENTLY IF ORCHESTRA ARE ENCOUNTERING ANY DIFFICULTIES.
ADDIS
FILES
CRD
FED
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
RESTRICTED
ARIORITY
CYPHER CAT A
GPS 60
CLAFIDENTIAL
វ
FM FCO 171715Z
CONFIDENTIAL
(FED 3
TO PRIORITY GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO 383 OF 17 APRIL 1973
AND TO PEKING.
YOUR TELEGRAM NO 398: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR
1. CHARLES SMITH HAS NOW GIVEN US IN CONFIDENCE A TRANSCRIPT
OF THE INTERVIEW WITH CH'LAO KUAN-HUA, WE ARE SENDING COPIES
TO YOU AND PEKING BY THE BAG CLOSING ON 18 APRIL UNDER A LETTER
OF COMMENT.
DOUGLAS-HGME
PILES
FED
HKIOD
M WILFORD
SIR E NORRIS
CONFIDENTIAL
+
37
COVERING SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
Mr Wilford
RV
→
FEH1 3/3-1/1
Mi Logan
56
Misinant has Mimelson.
не
Con...r.
Mi Heisey fo
Mi Clark 2714 21314 Co.r).
3074
R.E.
17/4.
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1.
I submit the draft of a letter for you to send to
Sir Murray MacLehose by the bag which closes at 10 am
tomorrow. I also submit the draft of a short telegram of
warning (we promised to telegraph again in FCO telegram
No 365 to Hong Kong).
2. Mr Stuart concurs in the two drafts.
17 April 1973
Rim. Eron
CONFIDENTIAL
RM Evans
Far Eastern Department
MW%
14
M. Stadt
-HKIO
81
35
THE FINANCIAL TIMES
THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD BRACKEN HOUSE CANNON STREET LONDON EC4P 4BY TELEGRAMS FINANTIMO LONDON TELEX 888341-2 TEL 01-248 8000
E/CS/RJ.
Enier.
Dfi lene: i5 für Murray
Richard Evans, Esq.,
Far East Department,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,
Whitehall London, S.W.1.
naceehore.
16th April, 1973.
RE.
17/14.
Dear Richard,
Here is the nearest I can get to a transcript of the Chiao interview. I have followed my notes faithfülly and have not attempted to clarify a number of obscure passages. I trust this is what you wanted.
With best wishes,
Yours sincerely,
རི་ད་གྱིས་ཐ་
Charles Smith
Mi Davies
Penose:.
(c) Circuecie copies to all who
will be present où r 心
Q
Drieking meeting on 18 April. Discuss further action wilń
me.
Ack / Submi / seat.
Comments.
R.E.
10/4.
THE FINANCIAL TIMES LIMITED
REGISTERED IN LONDON HUMBER TETESE
Contbutions to The Financial Times Limited may be included in the company's syndication service for a penod of three months.
采
THE GUARDIAN
16 APR 1973
FE
PBO PUSER
Aerial diplomacy
by PATRICK KEATLEY, Diplomatic Correspondent
The British Government is matter that the new Ambas-¡ resisting pressure from Peking sador to Japan refused to for the establishment of a con and few in a special plane change aircraft in Hongkong sulate-general in Hongkong and from Peking to Tokyo by thereby appears to be holding another route. up conclusion of an air service agreement with China which is frustrating for BOAC.
London chooses not to share J'eking's feeling of urgency but the Chinese are irritated by the fact that their only liaison office in Hongkong is the New China News Agency. So incensed are the Chinese about the Brush refusal to settle the
The tit-for-tat technique is now being employed by China to budge the Foreign Office. Peking has been given the text of a draft agreement for setting up air routes by BOAC and the Chinese airline but is refusing to reply until London acts on the Hongkong issue at least to the extent of agreeing to open talks.
surdly i insepresentation
Entert
Cha
Transcript of Remarks about Hong Kong made by China's Vice Foreign Minister, Chiao Kuan-hua during an Interview with Alan Hare,
naging Director of the Financial Times and Charles Smith, Far ast Correspondent of the Financial Times. The Interview was held in Peking on Friday, 30th March, 1973.
In response to a question (at the opening of the
However,
interview) about the state of Sino-British relations, Chiao said
that, in general, relations were developing very smoothly.
there was one question which was "still not solved". This was the
question of the Chinese Government appointing a representative in
Hong Kong. If this matter was not settled, other questions "would
arise". Chiao said that relations between Canton and Hong Kong
were "very close" but many things "could become troublesome" without
a settlement of the representative issue. Hong Kong's relations
with the mainland were the same as they had been "since the Second
World War". At the moment, Chiao said, the Hsinhua director acted
as China's representative in the Colony.
Chiao said that Premier Chou had discussed Hong Kong
"very clearly and frankly" with Sir Alec. But the British still
seemed to feel "some difficulty" over the Chinese proposal. Mr.
Royle had said in June that Britain "wanted to keep the balance"
in Hong Kong. The proposal to station a representative in Hong Kong
had been made "a long time ago" but the time for solution of the
question was "now mature". Practical matters whose solution could
be facilitated by an agreement on the representative included the
establishment of air connections and a direct rail link between
Hong Kong and Canton and the issue of visas for China in Hong Kong.
Chiao said it was difficult to issue visas without an official
representative. He pointed out that China was about to open a
liaison office in Washington. It was ironic that it could not have
a representative in Hong Kong.
- 2 -
At the end of the interview, Chiao reverted to Hong Kong
and the question of BCAC flights arose. Chiao said he "believed it
would be much easier for BOAC to fly to Feking" if the representative
issue were settled. The representative issue and the question of
airline connections were "connected to a considerable extent". At
the moment it was "not impossible, but not convenient for Chinese
officials to go to Hong Kong". China's ambassador to Japan went by
special aircraft to Tokyo "otherwise he could have taken the
Hong Kong route". In answer to questions about 1998, etc. Chiao
said "the problem of Hong Kong's future does not lie in the long
teru".
The British public was "not clear about changes in the
world situation. 1998 is still 25 years away with 25 years we
can work great changes". Changes in the world situation
"including the realignment of various forces" would continue and
would accelerate. Chiao said that the representative issue had
not been discussed on his own visit to London because of lack of
time.
HR FE B24
BOSTR
L
FINANCIAL TIMES
Cutting dated
16 APR 1973 19
**Hong Kong is cautious
·
about Peking advances
BY OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT
HONG KONG, April 15,
HONG KONG Is reacting grow and Hong Kong residents -cautiously to the revival of would find it easier to spend a pressure from Peking to estab- few days relaxing for a week-end lish some form of representation in Kwantung Province. They say of the People's Republic of the train from Canton which at China in the colony. No official present stops short of the Lowu comment could be elicited from bridge at the frontier could carry the usual Government sources. on down to the Kowloon termi- However, it is known that Hong pal. Communications of all typer Kong has grave reservations. The could be improved. Hong Kong presence of a Kuomintang Com- sources point out, however, that missioner representing the then there is no reason at present why Nationalist Government of China Visas for China should not be until his departure on Britain's issued in Hong Kong now, by the recognition of China in 1950 had China Travel Service office here. been a source of embarrassment,. particularly when friction arose between Left and Right wing factions in the colony.
When the question was raised! In the mid-Afties the then *Governor, Sir Alexander
Grantham, commented that he was unwilling to accede to the setting up of a second, rival Government to his own in Hong Kong.
The matter, of course, is ond to be settled between London and Feking but it is unlikely thad Hong Kong's advice will be enthusiastically positive. It is pointed out that while in 1373 there are advantages in an official Peking representation in the colony, had such an office existed during the cultural revolution ⚫rlots of 1987 the Hong Kong author.ties would have been
¦ under much more pressure than
they were.
The Hong Kong Goverar.cut feels also that the proposed advantages are somewhat nebu Jous. Left-wing sources argue that an office could facilitate all types of traffic between China and Hong Kong. Tourism into China from Hong Kong would
Keep
Cha
السلام
¡
$/3...!
1
THE TIMES
|
cutting dated
14 April 1973.19
Hongkong doubts over Peking mission offer!
From Leo Goodstadt Hongkong, April 13
News agency reports today of China's desire to establish a mission in Hongkong have had mixed reception in the colony.
The move would be highly welcome diplomatically to almost all shades of opinion be cause it would imply a subtle change in Peking's present atti- tude, which is de facto recogni- tion of a British dependent territory on "sacred Chinese soil". The more formal status of the colony as a British posses sion, which ■ Chinese mission to Hongkong would imply, would be a further demonstration of Peking's benevolent intentions towards the colony's long-term future.
Politically, however, opinton in Hongkong is divided. In the 1 past the local administration has firmly opposed any such mis- sion, fearing a repetition of the attempts made before Chairman Mao Tse-tung came to power to use Chinese Government offi- 'cials in Hongkong as a rival centre of authority and a focal
predominantly
Chinese com. munity access to food and con- sumer goods at prices well below those paid elsewhere.
China has also enhanced its reputation with the Hongkong Government through the highly responsible behaviour of the Ministry of Finance officials sent to work in Peking-owned banks in the colony.
The local communist move- ment has also worked hard since 1969 to demonstrate that it re flects Peking's own desire to see stability and reasonable material progress in Hongkong, and it has stayed out of industrial and other disputes during the past three years as far as possible.
A serious security problem would arise if a Chinese mission were located in the colony, as its staff would almost certainly be come the target for Taiwan agents. They are believeu to have fomented acts of violence in the past in order to harm Chinese relations with Hongkong and Britain.
The site of the proposed mis- sion is already known. It is a mansion with extensive
Enter
point for those who would like which belonged former grounds (4) top of Megaz z bap
Peking to intervene in the colony's affairs.
These suspicions still prevail In official and private circles, although China now behaves as if Hongkong's Chinese popula tion and its welfare were the sole responsibility of the British authorities.
This relatively new attitude is becoming increasingly obvious. For instance. Peking has increased its export prices to Hongkong to almost world mar ket levels and dropped its preví. ous policy of giving Hongkong's
to the Chinese maritime customs and became Peking's property on the recognition of the People's Re public by London in 1950. Our Diplomatic Staff writes: Foreign Office so irces confirm that China has several cimes asked for official representa- tion in Hongkong since 1956, and particularly in the last two years. Britain has the request under consideration. 1: is not thought in Whitehall that the issue should affect Anglo- Chinese relations op other matters.
FINANCIAL TIMES
Chona presses
for envoy in Hong
Kong
BY CHARLES SMITH, FAR EAST CORRESPONDENT
FE Mi Day
PBHX
PUSIR
Av. / Pusos
a Aree
Mr Evans
You
R.E.
194.
will wish lisu
Lea wo
articular ham in thing article
As
out the loot
Bellark
1314.
AM. Clark prits antagen to wrong.
Ministeri
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Mi Smilk has
10/4
APR 1973
319
1 3 APR 1973
Cha
CHINA HAS been exerting pres- vice to China, but the view is sure on Britain to agree to the taken that this matter is con-
of appointment
* 10 official nected an
a considerable ! Chinese representative in Hong extent " with the question of Kong. British reluctance to a representative.
agree to this proposal could delay the settlement of other bilateral issues between the two countries, including plans for the opening of a BOAC scheduled service to Peking or Shanghai.
sense
Rejected
Although Chinese officials regard the whole question of a representative in Hong Kong This has emerged from sources as being "nature for salulton In both London and Peking, the issue, not a new one. although China's
of It was Brst raised by the urgency over the matter may Chinese Government in February. not, as yet, be fully shared by 1956, and rejected two years Britain.
later by Britain. China raised the matter again in the spring of 1971 and it is known to have come up in the talks held in Peking last year by Sir Alec the Foreign and Mr. Anthony
Irony
At the moment the People's Douglas Home, Republic is represented in Hong Secretary, Kong by the director of the Royle. the junior Foreign Office Hsinhua (New
Far China) News Minister responsible for
Agency-an arrangement which Eastern affairs. has continued since the estab Britain apparently avolded lishment of the Communist giving a direct answer to the régime in 1949, but which the Chinese proposal at both sets Government in Peking cleary of talks and the matter is still regards as anachronistic.
understood to be "under con-
H
Chinese officials have com sideration" by the UK Govern. mented on the "irony' that ment. However there are obvious China should be about to estab- reasons why there should he lish a liaison office in Washing. hesitation about China's request. ton but cannot yet have a repre sentative on its own doorstep.
One is that so official Chinese representative in Hong Kong could become a focus for politi But I was assured in Peking cal activity IA the Colony recently that the lack of a repre- whether or not China itself sentative office in Hong Kong wanted this to happen. poses a number of practical Another fear is that the open- problems, particularly in the ing of a Chinese official mi$$100 communications field.
might imply a change in the China claims it is not con- Colony's status which, at the venient for members of the very least. could undermine Chinese Government to travel business confidence. through Hong Kong while the Britain and China representative issue remains un- theoretically at odds over the settled TA recent case in point status of Hong Kong since the was the new Chinese ambassador U.K regards the territory as a to Japan. who travelled by. British Colony while China sees special aircraft to Tokyo rather it as a plece of Chinese territory than pass through the British which has passed under foreign Colony.)
administration as the result of an "unequal treaty."
the Talks
Officials in Peking have also indicated there will be difficul ties about agreeing on establishment of a direct rail link between Hong Kong and This dicatreement however, Canton while what they reward has not "revented a smooth as the principal issue in Hong working relationship belt.een Kong remains outstandırg. China and Hong Kong and there
++
H
There is less precision in have been no fears that China 19
la *
to hurry
obtain Peking about the question of an
the reversion." air services agreement and the Colony's start of a BOAC scheduled ser-
Whether or not China really means to link the Hong Kong representative issue with the proposed ROAC fights into
• China, progress on the latter Issue appears to have been slow.
speculcied intelligently
on subject over which I told him he must
specesje.
R.M. Eron
13 April, 1978
The text of an air SERVICES agreement has been presented to China by Britain but there has still been no detailed Chinese reaction to the draft. It is boord, bowever, that talks may ret under way in London during the No.
next few weeks.
Peking.
Ritme.
、e.
3+
**MEDIATE
CAPS 330
CYPHER/CAT A
FM HONG KONG 130948Z
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
TOP COPY
Fat
I
TO IMMEDIATE F C O TELNO 398 OF 13TH APRIL, 1973. INFO PRIORITY PEKING.
YOUR TELNO 3651 CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
*
THIS STORY IS THE HEADLINE IN THIS AFTERNOON'S 'CHINA MAIL'' WHICH REFERS TO TWO NEWS AGENCIES (AP AND AFF) AS QUOTING A SENIOR BRITISH SOURCE''. GIS HAVE SO FAR MANAGED TO
HOLD THE POSITION WITH THE FOLLOWING COMMENT,
''THIS MATTER HAS NOT BEEN RAISED WITH THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT, BUT IT HAS BEEN RAISED FROM TIME TO TIME DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS
WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT.''
2. GIS HAVE JUST BEEN ASKED.
(1) WHAT IS THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT'S REACTION TO THIS LEAK''
(FROM LONDON)?
AND
(11) HOW DOES THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT VIEW THE SUGGESTION THAT
PEKING SHOULD SET UP SOME SORT OF SEMI-DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN HONG KONG
THEY PROPOSE TO REPLY AS FOLLOWS:
(1) "OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS THIS MATTER HAS BEEN RAISED FROM
TIME TO TIME IN LONDON AND PEKING,''
(11) ''SO FAR AS WE KNOW NO OFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS ARE TAKING PLACE
AT THE MOMENT. IN ANY CASE THIS IS A MATTER FOR HER MAJESTY'S COVERNMENT AND THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT,''
CONFIDENTIAL
15. in
CONFIDENTIAL
3.
IN ASSESSING THE IMPLICATIONS OF CH'IAO KUAN-HUA'S REMARKS IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO KNOW THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THEY WERE MADE IN PARTICULAR WHETHER THEY WERE VOLUNTEERED OR MADE IN REPLY TO A QUESTION.
MACLEHOSE
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
FED
HKI OD
NEWS DEPT
P & C D
M & T D
RESEARCH DEPT
(F E SECTION)
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IMMEDIATE
V/CAT A
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FC 0 1217102
(FEX
3/12/1
CONFIDENTIAL.
33
DESKEY 133JJAZ BOTII.
TO
SEDIATE GOVERHOR HONG KONG TELEGRAM HUBER 355 OF 12 APRIL 1973
AND TO PEKING.
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
ON THE STRENGTH OF REMARKS MADE TO CHARLES SMITH OF THE FINANCIAL TIMES BY CH' LAO KUAN-HUA AT A RECENT INTERVIEW IN PEKING, SMITH'S COLLEAGUE ROBERT GRAHAM ASKED ME ABOUT THIS SUBJECT AT AN CATTRIBUTABLE BRIEFING WHICH I GAVE TO THE BRITISH DIPLOMATIC PRESS TODAY (12 APRIL). I SAID THAT THE QUESTION OF OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATICH IN HONG KONG HAD BEEN A LIVE ONE FOR SOME TIME: IT WOULD NEED CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. I DID NOT THINK, H HOWEVER, THAT THE LACK OF A SOLUTION NEED HOLD UP THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND CHINA. HOR DID I THINK THAT IT WOULD IN FACT HAVE THIS EFFECT.
2. SMITH INTENDS TO PUBLISH A PIECE ON THE SUBJECT IN THE FINANCIAL TIMES TOMORROW (13 APRIL). WE HAVE PUT THE CHINESE PROPOSAL IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND HAVE EXPHASIZED TO HIM THAT IT IS STILL UNDER
CONSIDERATION.
3. CH'IAO KUAN-HUA APPARENTLY TOLD SMITH THAT ONLY ONE BIG PROBLEM** REMAINED IN RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND CHINA, THE QUESTION OF OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. THE SOLUTION OF OTHER PROBLEMS, SUCH AS THE ISSUE OF VISAS (WE SHALL ASK SMITH TO ELUCIDATE THIS) AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AIR AND RAIL LINKS BETWEEN HONG KONG AND CANTON, WAS LINKED WITH ITS SOLUTION, IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION, CH'IAO SAID THAT THE GRANT TO BOAC OF A SERVICE TO CHINA WAS **CONNECTED TO A CONSIDERABLE
EXTENT''.
CONFIDENTIAL
/4. WE
CONFIDENTIAL,
A,
WE SHALL TELEGRAPH FURTHER WHEN WE HAVE SEEN THE PRESS TOMORROW AND HAVE HAD TIME TO DIGEST THE IMPLICATIONS OF WHAT CH' [AO IS
ALLEGED TO HAVE SAID,
DOVEL AS-HOME
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
FED
HKIOD
NEWS D
RESEARCH D (FE SECT)
+
-2-
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
CYPHER/CAT A
6ps 20
FM HONG KONG 2396570Z
SECRET
TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 321 OF 23 MARCH INFO PEKING. 1973.
FOR WILFORD
YOUR TELEGRAM 289.
INSTRUCTIONS WILL NOW BE SENT VIA THE NORMAL CHANNEL
OF COURSE REMAINS IN IGNORANCE OF THE TO-DO.
WHICH
MACLEHOSE
FILES
HK100
FEC
MR WILFORD
SECRET
Х AP 28/3
32
FRIORITY CYPHER/CAT A GFS 40A
FM FCO 221145Z
SECRET
SECRET
(HK)
1973
3
TO PRIORITY GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELNO. 269 OF 22 MARCH/INFO PRIORITY PEKING.
FOLLOWING FOR GOVERNOR FROM WILFORD
匹
28
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 325 AND PEKING TELEGRAM NO. 367 TO ME.
1. AFTER RECONSIDERING ALL THE OPTIONS I AGREE THAT WE SHOULD ACQUIESCE. PRESURE THAT YOU WILL INSTRUCT PEKING ACCORDINGLY.
DOUGLAS-HOME
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ар
28/3
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60
SECRET
Bir Hurray MacLehose KCNO 128 TONG RONG
21 March 1973
1. Many thanks for your letter of 3 March about the steps which you have taken to establish a working relationship with the head of the ICIA.
2. Xe quite agree that we ought to abstain from saying anything to the Chinese about these steps (at any rate until the process has been taken a good deal further forward) and think that the line you suggest we should take if the Chinese themselves mention the matter is the right one.
Sir John Addis ICHS PKKING
SECRET
K # Wilford
X AP
IMMEDIATE
PHER/CAT A 43 75
FM HONG KONG 198906Z
SECRET
SECRET
73
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 305 OF 19 MARCH/INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING.
FOLLOWING FOR WILFORD FROM GOVERNOR.
PEKING TELEGRAM 3871 LI CHU-SHENG,
I MUST SAY I TOO WAS A LITTLE SURPRISED AT THE SENSE OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS, UNLESS YOU AND HM AMBASSADOR ARE AGREED THAT THERE IS A STRONG PROBABILITY THAT THE CHINESE WOULD WITHDRAW GRACEFULLY AS ORIGNIALLY FORECAST BYPEKING, BUT ON THE BASIS OF A DIFFERENT FORMULA. IF THERE IS NO SUCH PROBABILITY I FAVOUR ACQUIESCENCE.
MACLEHOSE
FILES HKIOD FED
MR WILFORD
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
SECRET
X
AP
28/3
128
IMMEDIATE
GR 40.
J H
SECRET
DESKBY 191000Z
CYPHER CAT A
FM PEKING 197330Z
SECRET
DESKBY 191006Z
1973
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NO 307 OF 19 MARCH/INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG ( PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).
FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR WILFORD FROM AMBASSADOR.
YOUR TELNO 353- LI CHU-SHENG.
YOUR TEL HAS EVIDENTLY CROSSED WITH MY TELNO 360 OF 15 MARCH. DO YOU NEVERTHELESS WISH ME TO GO AHEAD ON THE BASIS OF YOUR TEL UNDER REFERENCE?
ADDIS
A
IL
·
!
FILES
HKI OD
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MR WILFORD
}
Х
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AP
28/3
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Fl
LMEDIATE
YPHER CAT A
FM PEKING 158400Z
SECRET
SECRET
1973
27
ADOO DOL
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NO 360 OF 15 MARCH INFO ROUTINE HONG KONG ( PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).
FOR WILFORD FROM AMBASSADOR.
HONG KONG TELNO 288: VISA APPLICATION BY LI CHU-SHENG.
1. MY EARLIER TELEGRAM WAS CONCERNED WITH THE MODALITIES OF
AN APPROACH TO THE CHINESE IF THE DECISION IS TAKEN NOT TO ACCEPT
THIS APPOINTMENT. I STILL THINK THAT IF ACTION IS TAKEN WITH
THE CHINESE IT IS BETTER THAT IT SHOULD BE TAKEN IN PEKING AND IN
THE FORM OF AN ATTEMPT TO GET THE CHINESE TO WITHDRAW
THE APPLICATION RATHER THAN A BLANK REFUSAL. IF I AM TO TAKE ACTION OF THIS KIND, I SHALL OF COURSE NEED TO BE CAREFULLY BRIEFED
ON THE PRECISE PHRASES AND FORMULAE THAT CAN BE USED.
I SHOULD HAVE TO MAKE THE BEST OF THE KATERIAL WHICH CAN DE
APPROVED IN THIS WAY, HOWEVER RESTRICTED IT HAS TO BE.
2. 1 HAVE HOWEVER BEEN HAVING FURTHER THOUGHTS ON WHETHER
THE WHOLE EXERCISE IS WORTHWHILE AT ALL.
WE KNOW THAT THE CHINESE WILL CARRY CUT UNITED FRONT ACTIVITIES
IN HONG KONG IN ANY EVENT.
M ANY EVENT. IF LI CHU-SHENG DOES NOT GO,
SOMEONE ELSE WILL BE APPOINTED TO CARRY OUT THE WORK HE WAS SUPPOSED TO DO. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THAT WORK WILL DEPEND NOT ON
THE INDIVIDUAL CARRYING IT OUT BUT ON THE POLICIES AND GUIDELINES THAT ARE LAID DOWN IN PEKING.
Х
YAP 2813
SECRET
/3. THE ONLY
+
P
I
-
SECRET
3. THE ONLY VALID REASON THEREFORE THAT I CAN SEE FOR TAKING
THE RISKS INVOLVED IN TRYING TO OBTAIN THE CANCELLATION
OF LI CHU-SHENG'S APPOINTMENT IS THAT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS
INTELLIGENCE AND SUBVERSIVE RECORD IN INDONESIA AND OF HIS REFUSAL
BY THE SWISS IS SO WIDESPREAD
THAT THE APPOINTMENT WOULD HAVE A VERY UNFORTUNATE EFFECT ON
OPINION IN HONG KONG.
4. ON THE POINT OF SUBSTANCE THEREFORE I THINK THAT MY
RECOMMENDATION FROM HERE MUST BE THAT WE SHOULD SIMPLY ACQUIESCE
IN THE APPOINTMENT WITHOUT TRYING TO GET IT WITHDRAWN,
ADDIS
FILES
HKI OD FED
MR WILFORD
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
-2- SECRET
A
Secretary of State.
26
Mr Evans
Mr Wxford
Mr Logan
SECRET
Agreed.
N.R.
The Private Secretary
THE NONA REPRESENTATIVE IN HONG KONG
(24 11.
M' bilfers.
2) M
1
The Governor of Hong Kong has sent us an account of the ways in which he has already improved the treatment which he gives to the head of the NCNA in Hong Kong. The purpose of this improvement is to take some of the heat out of Chinese requests for the appointment of an Official Representative of their Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hong Kong.
美しい
2. The Governor asks that we should make no mention of these very minor moves in any discussions about the Represen- tation issue with the Chinese.
3.
I believe this advice to be right, and recommend we should follow it. Sir Murray Maclehose also suggests a plausible line for us to follow (para 6) should the Chinese themselves refer to the changes which have been made.
Gellark
GB Clark
Far Eastern Department
24/3
15 March 1973
I think in ai we showed fall in with The Governor's request and his
suggestion
Chinese comments. The argument in
abow responding! Paragraphs of his leve are, i om save, rocid. Mi Stuart agrees.
2. I submit a drafi reply.
R.M. Evens
Sagree
RET
15 March, 1973.
I
LAMEDIATE
CYPHER/CAT A
FM HONG KONG 1407102
SECRET
SECRET
TO IMMEDIATE F C O TELNO 288 OF 14TH MARCH, 1973. INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR).
FOR WILFORD FROM GOVERNOR.
VICA APPLICATION BY LI CHU-SHENG.
WITH THE FACTS ESTABLISHED I SUGGEST WE REVERT TO NORMAL CHANNELS,
(
2. I AM AFRAID I WOULD SEE SERIOUS OBJECTION TO THE INCLUSION IN
ANY REPRESENTATIONS, WHEREEVER MADE, OF HM AMBASSADOR'S PROPOSED SECOND SENTENCE. THIS IS BECAUSE IT SO GREATLY OVERSTATES THE PRESENT FOSITION AS TO IMPLY A PROMISE OF A NEW RELATIONSHIP. WHILE I WISH GRADUALLY TO ACHIEVE THIS, I DO NOT WANT THIS TO BE THE SUBJECT OF AN IMPLIED OR DEDUCED PROMISE, NOR DO I WANT THESE MOVES, WHICH I HAVE INITIATED, DISCUSSED OR ACKNOWLDGED ON THE OFFICIAL KET, AT ANY RATE UNTIL THEY HAVE GOT A GOOD DEAL FURTHER (PARA 5 CF MY LETTER TO YOU OF 3 MARCH REFERS)
يمرغ
3. IN CASE YOU MAY AGREE WITH THE FOREGOING, AND BEFORE HIS SOBUST AND HELPFUL PROPOSAL IS CONSIDERED FURTHER, H.M. AMBASSADOR MIGHT LIKE TO SAY WHETHER HE CONSIDERS HIS PROPOSED LINE WORTH FOLLOWING SUPPOSING THIS DELETION WERE MADE.
MACLEHOSE
FILES
HKI OD PED
FORD
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MR WILFORD
ます
18/3
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36
GOVERNMENT HOUSE HONG KONG
香港總督府
Minnie?
3rd March 1973
Des Michel,
R.EX 1573.
FED
PARION ACSIS'S
I agree with x over. I think a
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Mur'
In my despatch of 11th January about representation I reported that I would seek gradually to establish a working, but unofficial and unrecognised, relationship with the head of NCNA here, Liang Wai-lam. I will not report to you blow by blow, because the details of each little incident are so trivial.
2.
However, I should tell you that at the Cuban National Day, i.e. on 29 January, I did say to him that while as he knew I was accessible to everyone, and that many people from all sections of the community came to see me, I noticed that he never did so. I therefore wanted him to know that if he ever did want to have a chat with me my door was open and I would be glad to see him.
3.
He subsequently reported this with every sign of pleasure to Dick Lee (who as you may know is the member of the Lee family who keeps contact with the Left). After explaining what I had said he asked Dick whether he, Dick, ever invited me to dinner. Dick reported all this to me and I told him to reply. if Liang pressed him, that he understood that I dined out very little, but that since I was a notoriously straight-forward person, if I had suggested that he could see me if he wanted to, it might be better if Liang took me at my word instead of trying to fix up a rendezvous through third parties.
4.
We have since heard that Liang has reported my offer to Peking.
5.
I do not know what if anything will result. But I would repeat here what I said in the despatch. This is a delicate business, and the pace cannot be forced. Nor in my opinion, would the MFA ever accept that an unofficial contact, even if well-established
K.M. Wilford Esq., CMG,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office.
SECRET
SECRET
2.
X
and considerably used, was any substitute for the official representation they have demanded. I do therefore ask that these tentative and in themselves insignificant moves should not be referred to in any discussions about the representation issue with the MFA or the Chinese ambassador in London.
6.
If by any chance they themselves make some reference to the departure from tradition, I suggest that you should not enlarge on it or in any way claim credit, but merely say that it would appear to be more consistent with the friendly relations now established between HMG and the CPG.
7.
John Addis.
I am sending a copy of this letter to
You
12--1
SECRET
COVERING SECRET
Mr Wilford
Iki
HONG KONG : AIR SERVICES NEGOTIATIONS AND CHINESE
REPRESENTATION
1. I submit a draft telegram in reply to Hong Kong
telegram No 234. Mr Stuart concurs in its terms.
2.
(a) and (b) in paragraph 3 are based on a
conversation which I had with the Private Secretary
yesterday evening.
R M Evans
1 March 1973
Far Eastern Department
CONFIDAVALAL
列
23
T
+
OUTWARD
FAR EASTERN
stiment
Drafted by
TELEGRAM
RM EVANS
Tel. Extn.
MA 553
DESKBY
FOR
Ì COMMS. DEPT.
(Date)
USE
Despatched
POSTBY
(Time)
Z
PREAMBLE
Security Clasification
SECRET
Precedence PRIORITY
| (Time of Origin)
"Z(G.M.T.)
(Restrictive Prefix}..
Caveat/
CYPHER
(Security Class.)-
Privacy Marking)
(Coderoord)
(Deskby)
FRIORITY
GOVERNOR HONG KONG
TO.
(precedence)
(post) Governor)
(Personal fotel No.
AND TO (precedence/post)
AND SAVING TO
REPEATED TO (for info) PRIVNINY FAKING
Z
Distribution:-
Files
FED
KIMOD
SAVING TO (for info)
Bir Eric Norris
Dir Duncan watson Mr Wilford
Copies to:- Hong Long
Government Office
L
[TEXT]
Following from Wilford.
Your telegram No 234: AIR SERVICES NEGOTIATIONS AND
CHINES. RLFROSENTATION
1.
Thank you for the suggestion that the Secretary
of State might broach the subject of Chinese representation
with Chi P'eng-fei in Paris.
2. Pep much the same possono es pounselé, We are on
balance not inclined to brief the Secretary of State
to bring the subject up. Against the background of all
the Chinese have said to us about the negotiation of an
Air Services Agreement (Peking telegram No 145 and Fai
Hsiang-kuo's remarks to the becretary of State and
Er walker), we do not judge that the Chinese are likely
to make the negotiations of an Agreement conditional on
/a change
#1-
+
je in our position about representation.
We are
more likely to run into trouble over te veferenca: TO
merigration of Hong Kong
Spot in the
schedule annexed to any Agreement and/or over the service
of China Air lings to Hong Kong.
llavee
3. There are other considerations:
(a) Chi P'eng-fei did not mention the subject of
Chinese representation when the Secretary of State
gave him dinner in Paris on 27 February; it would
seem gratuitous for the Secretary of State to
broach the subject now;
(b) It now seems very much on the cards that Chi
P'eng-fei will pay his official visit to this country in May (we shall telegraph separately
about this when the Secretary of State has had the
chance to have another word with Chi P'eng-fei
during his second visit to Faris); and
(c) Even if there is some risk of the Chinese
mentioning representation during the negotiation of an Air Services Agreement, we think that our
primary interest is to get our timing right in
speaking to them about representation.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
1
PRIORITY
SECRET
CYPHER CAT A
L
Copy on
(FE)
FM F C O #11738Z
SECRET
TO PRIORITY GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELNO 217 CF 01 MARCH/INFO PRIORITY PEKING.
FOLLOWING PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR FROM WILFORD.
YOUR TELNO 234: AIR SERVICES NEGOTIATIONS AND CHINESE REPRESENTATION
1. THANK YOU FOR THE SUGGESTION THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE MIGHT
BROACH THE SUBJECT OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION WITH CHI P'ENG-FEI
IN PARIS.
2. WE ARE ON BALANCE NOT INCLINED TO BRIEF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
TO BRING THE SUBJECT UP, AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF ALL THE CHINESE
HAVE SAID TO US ABOUT THE NEGOTIATION OF AN AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT (PEKING TELMO 145 AND PAI PS|ANG-KLO'S REMARKS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND MR WALKER), WE DO NOT JUDGE THAT THE CHINESE ARE LIKELY
TO MAKE THE NEGOTIATIONS OF AN AGREEMENT CONDITIONAL ON A CHANGE
IN CUR POSITION ABOUT REPRESENTATION, WE ARE MUCH MORE LIKELY TO
RUN INTO TROUBLE OVER REFERENCES TO HONG KONG IN THE SCHEDULE
ANNEXED TO ANY ACREEMENT AND/OR OVER THE SERVICE OF CHINA AIRLINES
TO HONG KONG,
7. THERE ARE THREE OTHER CONSIDERATIONS:
(A) CHI P'ENG-FEI DID NOT MENTION THE SUBJECT OF CHINESE REPRESEN-
TATION WHEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE GAVE HIM DINNER IN PARIS ON. 27 FEBRUARY: IT WOULD SEEM GRATUITOUS FOR THE SECRETARY OF
STATE TO BROACH THE SUBJECT NOW:
(B) IT NOW SEEMS VERY MUCH ON THE CARDS THAT CHI P'ENG-FEI WILL PAY
HIS OFFICIAL VISIT TO THIS COUNTRY IN MAY (WE SHALL TELEGRAPH SEPARATELY ABOUT THIS WHEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS HAD THE CHANCE TO HAVE ANOTHER WORD WITH CHI P'ENG-FE1 DURING HIS
SECOND VISIT TO PARIS); AND
(C) EVEN IF THERE IS SOME RISK OF THE CHINESE MENTIONING REPRESEN- TATION DURING THE NECOTIATION OF AN AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT, WE
THINK THAT CUR PRIMARY INTEREST IS TO GET OUR TIMING RIGHT IN
SPEAKING TO THEM ABOUT REPRESENTATION.
DOUGLAS-HOME
FILES
FED
HKIOD
SIR E NORRIS
SIR D WATSON
MR WILFORD
SECRET
COPIES TO:
HK GOVT OFFICE
6 GRAFTON ST LONDON W1.
PRIORITY
CYPHER CAT A
A FCO 1218467
DED IP
SECRET
SECRET
Now Enje.
R.E. 1572.
Mi Heine.da
не чей
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(FE)
The Foams
I have drawn on thi
1312. for the Inn of for pas
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TO PRIORITY GOVERNOR HONG KONG(PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR) TEL NO 157 OF 12 FEBRUARY AND TO PEKING (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR) INFO PRIORITY TOKYO (PERSONAL FOR WILFORD)
R.E.
137:
HONG KONG TELEGRAMS NO 133 AND NO 142 AND PEKING TELEGRAM NO 109
(NONE TO TOKYO): CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
FOLLOWING FROM HORRIS.
Ex 5/6
#
1. WE ARE MOST GRATEFUL TO YOU SCTH FOR YOUR HELPFUL ADVICE ON
THIS DIFFICULT SUBJECT.
2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS DECIDED TO USE THE FOLLOWING FORMS
OF WORDS WHEN CHI P'ENG-FEI VISITS LONDON.
BEGINS:
''I DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT WITH YOU AND WITH THE PRIME MINISTER
MIEN I VISITED CHINA LAST AUTUMN. I TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER ON 1
NOVEMBER THAT I WOULD LIKE TO THINK ABOUT THE MATTER AND I WOULD GET
IN TOUCH WITH YOU IN DUE COURSE.
THE POSITIONS OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THE STATUS OF HONG KONG
ARE NECESSARILY DIFFERENT. BUT, AS I SEE IT, WE HAVE TWG IMPORTANT
INTERESTS IN COMMON, THESE ARE TO PRESERVE THE STABILITY AND
PROSPERITY OF HONG KONG AND TO PRESERVE THE RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAS
DEVELOPED BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. SO FAR AS HONG KONG IS CONCERNED, STABILITY AND PROSPERITY DEPEND ON COSFIDENCE. CONFIDENCE IS A TENDER PLANT: IT GROWS ONLY SLOWLY, BUT CAN WILT VERY QUICKLY. IF, AS I BELIEVE, WE SHARE AN INTEREST IN THE STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF HONG KONG, IT FOLLOWS THAT WE ALSO SHARE AN INTEREST
IN THE PRESERVATION OF CONFIDENCE THERE.
AS FAR AS THE RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND CHINA ARE CONCERNED,
THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT THE SITUATION IN HONG KONG IS A FACTOR OF IMPORTANCE, IF, THEREFORE, WE SHARE AN INTEREST IN PRESERVING COOD RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, WE ALSO SHARE AN INTEREST IN DOING NOTHING IN, OR OVER, HONG KONG WHICH COULD DISTURB THE
SITUATION THERE.
I HAVE
SECRET
SECRET
I HAVE GIVEN MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO YOUR PROPOSAL SINCE I SPOKE TO YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER LAST AUTUMN. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS CONSIDERATION I HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE TIME NOT RIPE FOR A CHANGE IN THE PATTERN OF YOUR REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. I WOULD THEREFORE ASK YOU NOT TO PRESS YOUR PROPOSAL. IT IS MY JUDGEMENT THAT IT WILL BE SOME TIME BEFORE CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT CHANGE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO WARRANT AN ALTERATION IN THE ARRANGEMENTS
WHICH NOW EXIST''.
ENDS.
HE WILL GIVE CHI P'ENG-FEI A COPY OF THIS TEXT.
3. OUR PURPOSE IS TO PERSUADE THE CHINESE TO SHELVE THEIR PROPOSAL FOR A MATTER OF YEARS, WITHOUT DOING ANY SERIOUS DAMAGE TO ARCLO- CHINESE RELATIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE USE OF THIS FORM OF WORDS WILL GIVE US THE BEST HOPE OF ACHIEVING THIS PURPOSE.
4. WE NOW KNOW THAT CHI P'ENG-FEI WILL NOT VISIT LONDON FROM 22 FEBRUARY TO 25 FEBRUARY (PEKING TELEGRAM NO 157 HOT TO TOKYC). BUT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WILL INEVITABLY SEE A GOOD DEAL OF HIM AT THE CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM IN PARIS. WE SHALL RECOMMEND TO HIM THAT HE SHOULD NOT BROACH THE SUBJECT WITH CHI PENG-FEI IN PARIS. WE SHALL ALSO RECOMMEND THAT, IF THE LATTER SHOULD BRING IT UP, HE SHOULD CONFINE HIMSELF TO SAYING THAT HE HAS GIVEN THE CHIMESE PROPOSAL KOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION AND WILL BE READY TO SPEAK ABOUT IT WHEN CHI P'ENG-FEI VISITS LONDON.
DOUGLAS-HOME
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HD FED
HD HKIOD
PS/MR ROYLE PS/PUS
SIR E NORRIS MR WILFORD
2
·
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Sir Eric Nofris
SECRET
X
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
33.7
2
MiHeivel 13/2
Herus
mi Clark 1012 R.E.
Enier.
I submit a draft telegram to Hong Kong and to Peking
(to be repeated to Tokyo for Mr Wilford).
1.
2.
We now know for certain that Chi P'eng-fei will not
リマ
дво
be visiting London at the end of February (Peking telegram
1812.
13/2
A
No 157).
FEE
3.
Mr Stuart concurs.
12 February 1973
CC
R.M. Erans
RM Evans
Far Eastern Department
Mr Stuart (without attachment)
As proporca
14/2
SECRET
SECRET
IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A
FM FCO 091820Z
SECRET
KONG
(FE* 3/30
TO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR HONG KONG TEL NO 154 OF 9 FEBRUARY 1973 INFO PRIORITY PEKING
PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR,
YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS 148 AND 156: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1. IF PRESSURE BUILDS UP ON THIS STORY, IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN THE LINE CONTAINED IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 2. IT HAS THEREFORE BEEN AGREED, SUBJECT TO YOUR VIEWS, THAT IN RESPONSE TO FURTHER QUESTIONING NEWS DEPARTMENT AND GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SERVICES SHOULD TAKE THE FOLLOWING LINE AS APPROPRIATE:
ON THE RECORD: IT IS NO SECRET THAT THE QUESTION OF CHINESE
REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF EXCHANGES
BETWEEN THE CHINESE AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS FROM TIME TO TIME,
THERE MAY VERY WELL BE FURTHER EXCHANGES IN THE FUTURE.
BACKGROUND 1
A) THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT FIRST RAISED THE QUESTION OF OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG IN 1956( AS WAS MENTIONED IN AN ARTICLE IN CHINA QUARTERLY IN SEPTEMBER 1972).
B) SEVERAL OFFICIAL CHINESE AGENCIES HAVE OFFICES IN HONG KONG AND HAVE A WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GOVERNMENT, EG THE NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, THE BANK OF CHINA, THE CHINA INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL SERVICE (WHICH ISSUES VISAS) AND THE CHINESE STATE SHIPPING CORPORATION,
2. WE REALISE THAT THE REFERENCE TO FURTHER EXCHANGES IN THE FUT- URE'' MAY WELL LEAD TO FURTHER QUESTIONING, HOWEVER, WE MUST HAVE A RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION 'WHAT IS YOUR ATTITUDE TO THE CHINESE
PROPOSAL FOR IMPROVED REPRESENTATION?''
3. WE SHALL SHORTLY BE TELEGRAPHING AGAIN ON THE SUBSTANCE.
DOUGLAS-HOME
FILES
FED
HKI OD
NEWS DEPT 'SIR E NORRIS MR WILFORD
SECRET
187
PRIORITY
CYPHER/CAT A
FMM HONG KONG 190428Z
SECRET
SECRET
TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 164 OF 18TH FEBRUARY, 1973. INFO ROUTINE
PEKING.
YOUR TELNO 154: RESIDENCE FOR A CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE IN HONG KONG,
I AGREE, BUT SUGGEST ONLY USE LAST SENTENCE OF SECOND PARA,
IF PRESSED AND IN ANSWER TO QUESTION.
2. BUT THE STORY SEEMS TO BE DEAD. IT RELATED TO THE TWO
FORMER CHINESE MARITIME CUSTOMS HOUSES AT MAGAZINE CAP. SINCE THE
DEPARTURE OF THE LAST COMMISSIONER IN 1950 THEY HAVE OFTEN BEEN
VACANT AND GENERALLY LITTLE USED AND WERE BECOMING DILAPIDATED.
ABOUT 15 MONTHS AGO RENOVATION STARTED AND IS NOW MEARING COMPLETION
WE ARE INCLINED TO CONNECT THIS (A) WITH THE IMPENDING DEMOLITION AND REDEVELOPMENT OF FELIX VILLAS, WHERE SOME OF THE COMMERCIAL HIERARCHY LIVED AND PREVIOUSLY TRANSIENTS WERE HOUSED,
AND WHICH WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR A YEAR OR TWO: (D) WITH THE INCREASING NUMBERAND SENIORITY OF CPGDELEGATIONS WHICH VISIT
HONG KONG: (C) WITH PRUDENT MANAGEMENT OF THESE VERY FIND PROPERTIES.
WHICH ARE STILL UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE COMMERCIAL SECTION OF THELOCAL
HIERARCHY.
3. I THINK THE DECISION TO RENOVATE PROBABLY PREDATED THAT TO PRESS FOR REPRESENTATION AND IS UNCONNECTED WITH IT. ALL THE SAME IF THEY HAD A FORMAL REPRESENTATIVE HERE, I SUPPOSE IT IS POSSIBLE HE MIGHT USE ONE OF THESE HOUSES INSPITE OF THEIR BURGEOIS SURROUNDINGS AND HISTORICAL CONNECTION WITH UNEQUAL TREATIES.
MACLEHOSE
FILES
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NEWS D
SIR E NORRIS
MR WILFORD
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
SECRET
SECRET.
Reference...
FEH
17
sir & liorris
lir vans FED
hr Stuart HK & IOD
Please destroy the earlier version of this minute
which was sent to you yesterday. This revised version
takes into account the views of Hong Kong and Indian
Ocean Department.
8 February 1973
!
The wen't
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JGB Venit
liews Department
M
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6912
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Enter
872
Mr Leahy
Private Secretary
+
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
Hong Kong telegram no 148 reports that two non-communist
newspapers have stated that China intends to station an official
in Hong Kong to deal with foreign affairs affecting Britain, China and
Hong Kong. Because the Hong Kong Government Information Services were
asked whether an approach had been made to the Hong Kong Government,
they have felt able to reply, on the record, "No". This is, however,
a disingenuous line and one which cannot be held for very long; we
must therefore have a form of words ready for use both in Hong Kong
and here should the story develop, as it seems likely to do.
2.
Ministers have yet to decide what the Secretary of State should
say to Chi P'eng-fei about the Chinese proposal for the establishment
of an official representative in Hong Kong. (Far Eastern Department
are submitting separately on this.) It is therefore important
whatever we say to correspondents is neutral. I therefore suggest
that we employ the following line in answer to queations:
On the record:
It is no secret that the question of Chinese
representation in long Kong has been the subject
of exchanges between the Chinese and British
Governments from time to time. There may very well be
further exchanges in the future.
Background:
(a) The Chinese Government first raised the
question of improved representation in Hong Kong in
1956 (as was mentioned in an article in China
Quarterly in September 1972).
3.
(b)
Several official Chinese agencies have offices
in Hong Kong and have a working relationship with the
government, e.g. the Now China News Agency, the Bank of
China, the China International Travel Service (which issues
visas) and the Chinese state shipping corporation.
Far Eastern Department and Hong Kong and Indian Ocean
Department agree.
We shall need to telegraph the agreed line
to liong Kong whether or not they get further enquiries.
7 February 1973
Jole weait
J G B Weait
News Department
CC
Sir E Norris
Mr Evans FED
Mr Stuart UK & IOD
Mr Leahy
Private Secretary
SECRET.
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
15
12/21/1
26
16A
Hong Kong telegram no 148 reports that two non-communist newspapers have stated that China intends to station an official in Hong Kong to deal with foreign affairs affecting Britain, China and Hong Kong. Because the Hong Kong Government Information Services were asked whether an approach had been made to the Hong Kong Government, they have felt able to reply, on the record, "No". This is, however a disingenuous line and one which cannot be held for very long; we must therefore have a form of words ready for use both in Hong Kong and here should the story develop, as it seems likely to do.
2.
Ministers have yet to decide what the Secretary of State should say to Chi P'eng-fei about the Chinese proposal for the establishment of an official representative in Hong Kong. (Far Eastern Department are submitting separately on this.) It is therefore important whatever we say to correspondents is neutral. I therefore suggest that we employ the following line in answer to questions:
Mor Hervey
メ
Yes. A Mvise has circulated
On the record:
It is no secret that the question of Chinese
representation in Hong Kong has been the subject
of exchanges between the Chinese and British
Governments from time to time. These exchanges
are continuing.
Background:
(a) The Chinese Government first raised the question of improved representation in Hong Kong in 1956 (as was mentioned in an article in China
Quarterly in September 1972).
ے افکاری
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Love greed? E Papx collo mramalla).
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(b) Several official Chinese agencies have offices in Hong Kong and have a working relationship with the government, e.g. the New China News Agency, the Bank of China, the China International Travel Service (which
issues visas) and the Chinese state shipping corporation.
Far Eastern Department agree. We shall need to telegraph
the agreed line to Hong Kong whether or not they get further
enquiries.
3.
7 February 1973
co
Sir E Norris
Mr Evans FED Mr Stewart
JGB Weait News Department
IMMEDIATE
CYPHER/CAT A
+
+pa.
CONFIDENTIAL
空
To
FM HONG KONG Ø80858Z
CONFIDENTIAL
TO IMMEDIATE F C O TELNO 156 OF 8TH FEBRUARY, 1973. INFO PRIORITY
PEKING.
一回
MY TELEGRAM NUMBER 148: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
TODAY'S SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST PICKING UP STORY
REPORTED IN MY REFERENCE TELEGRAM, STATES THAT ''LEFT-WING SOURCES''
HAD ''FLATLY DISMISSED AS NONSENSE' SUGGESTIONS THAT THE HOUSE
IN QUESTION MIGHT BE USED AS THE RESIDENCE OF A CHINESE
FOREIGN MINISTRY REPRESENTATIVE.
MACLEHOSE
FILES
'REPEATED AS REQUESTED
FO
HKIOD
MR WILFORD
SIR E. NORRIS
CONFIDENTIAL
+
MADIATE
CYPHER/CAT A
FM HONG KONG 070750Z
SECRET
SECRET
1973
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 148 OF 7 FEBRUARY/INFO PRIORITY PEKING.
MY DESPATCH NUMBER 14 OF 11 JANUARY: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN
HONG KONG.
TWO NON-COMMUNIST LOCAL NEWSPAPERS, SING TAO JIH PAO AND FAI PAO, REPORTED PROMINENTLY YESTERDAY (TUESDAY) THAT CHINA INTENDS
TO STATION AN OFFICIAL IN HONG KONG TO DEAL WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AFFECTING BRITAIN, CHINA AND HONG KONG, BOTH PAPERS CARRIED PHOTOGRAPHS OF A HOUSE IN MAGAZINE GAP WHICH, THEY SAY, WILL BE USED
BY THE NEW REPRESENTATIVE.
+
2. AS A RSULT OF THESE REPORTS THE GOVERNMENT INFORMATION SERVICES HAVE RECEIVED QUESTIONS FROM ONE OTHER NEWSPAPER, ASKING FOR CONFIRMATION. IN REPLY TO THE QUESTION: QUOTE HAS THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT APPLIED TO THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT TO ESTABLISH A
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICE IN HONG KONG? UNQUOTE THE GIS HAVE SAID
QUOTE NO UNQUOTE.
3. IF THERE ARE FURTHER QUESTIONS REFERRING TO DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN
PEKING AND LONDON ON THIS SUBJECT WE WILL CONSULT YOU BEFORE
REPLYING.
MACLEHOSE
FILES
FED HKI OD
MR WILFORD
4
SECRET
(Submission
below)
ThEO
The subkutin
has soo howard
1/
Mr Evans
SECRET
Reference
Fal
Sis Evic Noins!
(14
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG / Enici oda.
1. Sir Murray MacLehose's underlying objection to your original draft was that, by comparing it with what has been said to the Chinese in the past, they might conclude that it was only a wayside station and that next time they pressed we would retreat a little more to the point where we would agree to a repre- sentative within the foreseeable future. He therefore suggested the deletion of the last 3 sentences of your draft. But we agreed that this might have the opposite effect to that intended.
Wha
I
2. de spoke to Sir Eris Norris the other day, wondered whether the Governor's point might be met by leaving your last paragraph more or less as it was but by inserting in the body of the Speaking Note a passage to make it clear that this was a definitive and not a passing judgement. At the same time we could make it plain that our judgement that the appointment of a representative would harm confidence, was not founded on distrust of the Chinese but on the logic of the situation and the probable reaction to such an appointment both inside and outside Hong Kong.
3. You are the expert on the reactions of the Chinese and will know better than I whether it would be helpful to spell this last point out. But if we could insert something on the lines of the attached passage, between the paragraph ending "... disturb the situation there" and the one beginning "I would therefore ask you...
..", this would make the point and meet Sir Murray MacLehose's preoccupation while at the same time making it possible to retain the last paragraph of your original draft in the formal Speaking Note.
mi sinart. Abs /
Ti Heiver for 912
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水
6 February 1973
A C Stuart
Hong Kong & Indian Ocean Department
But,
1. It would certainly be better in logic to add a passage of the kind suggested by Mr Stuart. politically speaking, I just do not think it is possible for the Secretary of State to tell Chi P'eng-fei that the appointment of an official Chinese representative would undermine the confidence on which the stability of Hong Kong depends.
I should therefore prefer this point to be made by implication in whatever the Secretary of State may say on the record.
/2.
DO897261 230443 300M 571 ON 160A
SECRET
4
SECRET
2. As you will see, I have not dealt in my submission with the question of whether the subject should be put to DOP. My own view on this is that it ought to go to DOP if the Secretary of State decides in favour of any course other than courses (a), (b) and (f).
3. I have just seen Hong Kong telegram No 148 (of which Í attach an advance copy). I am consulting News Department urgently about the line which they might take if they receive enquiries. The answer given by the Government Information Services in Hong Kong is strictly speaking true; but it contains an element of suggestio falsi. We shall need to watch the publicity aspect with great care during the period between now and the date of Chi P'eng-fei's arrival in London.
7 February 1973
R.M.Erons
RM Evans
Far Eastern Department
RE.
9/2
SECRET
મ.
00 FCO
PP I NG
GPS 100
CYPHER/CAT A
FM HONG KONG £767532
SECRET
SCOTET
ADVANCE COPY
IMMEDIATE
Mr Wilfred And FED Hal HK & I Y
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 148 OF 7 FEBRUARY INFO PRIORITY PEKING.
MY DESPATCH NUMBER 14 OF 11 JANUARY: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
TWO NON-COMMUNIST LOCAL NEWSPAPERS, SING TAO JIH PAO AND FAI PAO, REPORTED PROMINENTLY YESTERDAY (TUESDAY) THAT CHINA INTENDS TQ STATION AN OFFICIAL IN HONG KONG TO DEAL WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFFECTING BRITAIN, CHINA AND HONG KONG, BOTH PAPERS CARRIED PHOTOGRAPHS OF A HOUSE IN MAGAZINE GAP WHICH, THEY GAY, WILL BE USED
BY THE NEW REPRESENTATIVE.
2. AS 'A RSULT OF THESE REPORTS THE COVERNMENT INFORMATION SERVICES HAVE RECEIVED QUESTIONS FROM ONE OTHER NEWSPAPER, ASKING FOR CONFIRMATION, IN REPLY TO THE QUESTION: QUOTE HAS THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT APPLIED TO THE HONG KONG COVERNMENT TO ESTABLISH A FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICE IN HONG KONG? UNQUOTE THE GIS HAVE SAID QUOTE NO DNQUOTE.
3. IF THERE ARE FURTHER QUESTIONS REFERRING TO DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PEKING AND LONDON ON THIS SUBJECT WE WILL CONSULT YOU BEFORE REPLYING.
MACLEHOSE
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Sir Eric Norris
Mr. Evanz (PED)
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CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
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A. B
1. The Chinese Foreign Minister and the Chinese Prime Minister
both broached this subject with the Secretary of State during
his visit to Peking last autumn. On 1 November, the Secretary
of State told Chou Eh-lai that he would like to think about the
matter and that he would get in touch with Chi P'eng-fei in due
course. Chi Peng-fei is bound to bring the subject up during his visit to this country from 22 February to 25 February. should the Secretary of State respond?
Background
2.
How
The Chinese have proposed that a representative of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking should be established in
Hong Kong. They first made this proposal in 1956.
It was
rejected by Mr Selwyn Lloyd in 1958. Chou En-lai brought it up
again with Mr Denson in February 1971. It has since been
pursued by Chang Wen-chin with Sir John Addis (in March 1972);
by Ch'iao Kuan-hua with Mr Royle (in May 1972); and by Chi
A, B P'eng-fei and Chou in-lai with the Secretary of State (in October
and November 1972). The history of the case is set out in
detail in paragraphs 2 to 6 of Sir John Addis's despatch of
18 December 1972.
Argument
3. In May 1972, Mr koyle told Ch'iao Kuan-hua that we could
not accept the Chinese proposal. The Secretary of State maintained this refusal in the autumn (though he undertook to think the matter over). The course which will be open to the
1
-
Mr Ogres
SECRET
Тор
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San Nicas...
And maker
Rogle li
PUS: M
13
Secretary of State when he meets Chi P'eng-fei at the end of this month are:
(a)
(b)
To maintain our refusal to consider the Chinese proposal;
To say that we have given very careful consideration
to the Chinese proposal, but that we do not think the time is ripe for the Chinese to pursue it;
- ד
(c)
(a)
(e)
(1)
L
To say that we might be prepared to consider the Chinese proposal on condition that the Chinese would be prepared to designate their official representative as a Consul General;
To say that we are prepared to explore the implications of the Chinese proposal in confidential bilateral discussions;
To accept the Chinese proposal in principle as it stands;
and
To say that we need further time to consider the Chinese
proposal.
The course favoured by Sir Murray MacLehose is course
(a). His essential point is that he sees "the seeds of conflict and confrontation" in acceptance of the Chinese proposal (paragraph 13 (c) of his despatch of 11 January 1973). Sir John Addis favours course (d). The nub of his argument is that rejection of the Chinese proposal would entail "a steady deterioration in bilateral relations on all fronts, political as well as commercial" (paragraph 7 of his despatch of
18 December). The principal argument for and against each of the courses are set out in a paper recently prepared by the Department.
A
Z
- 2 -
SECRET
15.
F
G,
, H
H
H
H
5.
In discussion with you, Mr Royle agreed that we should recommend course (b) to the Secretary of State. With this in
mind, we drafted a form of words for the Secretary of State to
use in speaking to Chi P'eng-fei. We put this form of words to Sir Murray MacLehose and Sir John Addis, inviting their comments (FCO telegram No 116 to Hong Kong). It is clear from their replies that Sir Murray MacLehose still favours course (a) (Hong Kong telegrams No 13 and No 142) and Sir John Addis favours course (d), perhaps to some extent modified (Peking
telegram No 109). These attitudes are not reconcilable.
6. I believe that our purpose should be to get the Chinese to desist from pressing their proposal for a period of years in the manner which is least likely to harm Anglo-Chinese relations. I believe that course (b) is the course which gives us the best chance of achieving this purpose. It would be less likely to damage Anglo-Chinese relations than course (a); and I do not believe (pace Sir Murray MacLehose) that it need
entail us in a more or less continuing dialogue with the Chinese (Hong Kong telegram No 142, paragraph 2). In order, however, to reduce the risk of encouraging the Chinese to
return to the charge, I have substituted fresh language for
the four final sentences in the form of words which we
telegraphed to Sir Murray MacLehose and Sir John Addis. As
you will see, I have made the concluding passage shorter; to compensate, however, I have added two sentences for the
Secretary of State to use if pressed. I have also adopted the amendment suggested by Sir John Addis (Peking telegram No 109,
paragraph 3).
-3-
SECRET
17.
+
1
+
+
7.
There are also two tactical problems:
(a)
Ought the Secretary of State to bring up the subject
or to leave the running to Chi Peng-fei;
(b)
Ought the Secretary of State to give Chi P'eng-fei
anything in writing.
So far as (a) is concerned, it might be better for the
Secretary of State to broach the subject himself. He has under-
taken to get in touch with Chi P'eng-fei; and it is certain that
Chi P'eng-fei will bring the subject up if he does not do this
himself. As regards (b), there is a strong case for the Secretary of State to give Chi P'eng-fei something in writing.
The Chinese set great store by exact forms of words; and there
is a danger that the nuances of what the Secretary of State has
to say will be lost during interpretation.
Recommendation
B.
Against this background, my recommendations are that:
(a) The Secretary of State should himself broach the subject
(b)
(a)
with Chi P'eng-fei;
He should speak in the terms of the form of words
attached to this submission; and
He should give Chi P'eng-fei a copy of this form of words.
9. Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department concur.
6 February 1973
CC
Mr Logan✔
Sir Duncan Watson (with attachments)
Mr Stuart Mr Hervey
4
GLORAT
R M Evans
Far Eastern Department
H
·
:
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
"I discussed this subject with you and with the
Prime Minister when I visited China last autumn. I
told the Prime Minister on 1 November that I would
like to think about the matter and I would get in
touch with you in due course.
"The positions of our two Governments on the
status of Hong Kong are necessarily differant.
But,
as I see it, we have two important interests in
common. These are to preserve the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong and to preserve the relation-
ship which has developed between our two countries.
So far as Hong Kong is concerned, stability and
prosperity depend on confidence. Confidence is a
tender plant: it grows only slowly, but can wilt very
quickly. If, as I belive, we share an interest in
the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong, it follows that we also share an interest in the preservation of
confidence there.
"As far as relations between Britain and China
are concerned, there can be no doubt that the situation
in Hong Kong is a factor of importance. If, therefore,
we share an interest in preserving good relations
between our two countries, we also share an interest
in doing nothing in, or over, Hong Kong which could
disturb the situation there.
"I would therefore ask you not to press your
proposal.
We do not think that the time has come for
a change in the pattern of your representation in
Hong Kong.
(If Pressed)
"We shall, of course, give careful consideration
/to your
:
+
to your proposal if you decide at any time to renew
it.
But we do not expect any early change in the
circumstances which now prevail."
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
A, B
A, B
(including
3
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Sir ri
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PUS
SECRET
ссерта
"FED Glinda wody,
Mr Royle Print Screen
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13
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study the back
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CHINESE KOMMENTATION IN HONG KONG
Froblem
to think about it.
есть
1. The Chinese Foreign Minister and the Chinese Prime Minister
both broached this subject with the Secretary of State during
his visit to Feking last autumn. On 1 November, the Secretary
of State told Chou En-lai that he would like to think about the
matter and that he would get in touch with Chi F'eng-fei in due
course. Chi P'eng-fei is bound to bring the subject up during
his visit to this country from 22 February to 25 February. How
should the Secretary of State respond?
Background
2. The Chinese have proposed that a representative of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking should be established in
Hong Kong. They first made this proposal in 1956. It was
rejected by Mr Selwyn Lloyd in 1958.
Chou En-lai brought it up
again with Mr Denson in February 1971. It has since been
pursued by Chang Wen-chin with Sir John Addis (in March 1972);
by Ch'iao Kuan-hua with Mr Royle (in May 1972); and by Chi
P'eng-fei and Chou En-lai with the Secretary of State (in October
and November 1972). The history of the case is set out in
detail in paragraphs 2 to 6 of Sir John Addis's despatch of
18 December 1972.
Argument
L
3. In May 1972, Mr Royle told Ch'iao Kuan-hua that we could
not accept the Chinese proposal. The Secretary of State
maintained this refusal in the autumn (though he undertook to
think the matter over). The course which will be open to the
/Secretary
1
SECRET
SECHET
A
C
赶
Secretary of State when he meets Chi P'eng-fei at the end of
this month are:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
4.
To maintain our refusal to consider the Chinese proposal;
To say that we have given very careful consideration
to the Chinese proposal, but that we do not think the
time is ripe for the Chinese to pursue it;
To say that we might be prepared to consider the Chinese
proposal on condition that the Chinese would be prepared
to designate their official representative as a Consul
General;
To say that we are prepared to explore the implications
of the Chinese proposal in confidential bilateral
discussions;
To accept the Chinese proposal in principle as it stands;
and
To say that we need further time to consider the Chinese
proposal.
The course favoured by Sir Murray MacLehose is course
(a). His essential point is that he sees "the seeds of conflict
and confrontation" in acceptance of the Chinese proposal
(paragraph 13 (c) of his despatch of 11 January 1973). Sir
John Addis favours course (d). The nub of his argument is that
rejection of the Chinese proposal would entail "a steady
deterioration in bilateral relations on all fronts, political
as well as commercial" (paragraph 7 of his despatch of
18 December). The principal argument for and against each of
the courses are set out in a paper recently prepared by the
Department.
- 2 -
SECRET
15.
·
SECRET
G,
F
, H
H
H
см
I
5. In discussion with you, Mr Royle agreed that we should
recommend course (b) to the Secretary of State. With this in
mind, we drafted a form of words for the Secretary of State to
use in speaking to Chi P'eng-fei. We put this form of words to
Sir Murray MacLehose and Sir John Addis, inviting their comments
(FCO telegram No 116 to Hong Kong). It is clear from their
replies that Sir Murray MacLehose still favours course (a)
(Hong Kong telegrams No 133 and No 142) and Sir John Addis
favours course (d), perhaps to some extent modified (Peking
telegram No 109). These attitudes are not reconcilable.
6. I believe that our purpose should be to get the Chinese
to desist from pressing their proposal for a period of years
in the manner which is least likely to harm Anglo-Chinese
relations. I believe that course (b) is the course which gives
us the best chance of achieving this purpose. It would be less
likely to damage Anglo-Chinese relations than course (a); and
I do not believe (pace Sir Murray MacLehose) that it need
entail us in a more or less continuing dialogue with the
Chinese (Hong Kong telegram No 142, paragraph 2). In order,
however, to reduce the risk of encouraging the Chinese to
return to the charge, I have substituted fresh language for
the four final sentences in the form of words which we
telegraphed to Sir Murray MacLehose and Sir John Addis.
you will see, I have made the concluding passage shorter; to
compensate, however, I have added two sentences for the
Secretary of State to use if pressed. I have also adopted the
amendment suggested by Sir John Addis (Peking telegram No 109,
paragraph 3).
As
- 3 -
SECRET
17.
SECRET
7.
There are also two tactical problems:
(a)
Ought the Secretary of State to bring up the subject
or to leave the running to Chi P'eng-fei;
(b)
Ought the Secretary of State to give Chi P'eng-fei
anything in writing.
So far as (a) is concerned, it might be better for the
Secretary of State to broach the subject himself. He has under-
taken to get in touch with Chi P'eng-fei; and it is certain that
Chi Feng-fei will bring the subject up if he does not do this
himself. As regards (b), there is a strong case for the
Secretary of State to give hi P'eng-fei something in writing.
The Chinese set great store by exact forms of words; and there
is a danger that the nuances of what the Secretary of State has
to say will be lost during interpretation.
Recommendation
8.
(a)
(b)
(c)
Against this background, my recommendations are that:
The Secretary of State should himself broach the subject
with Chi P'eng-fei;
He should speak in the terms of the form of words
attached to this submission; and
He should give Chi P'eng-fei a copy of this form of words.
9. Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department concur.
R.M. Erans
R M
Evans
6 February 1973
Co
Mr Logan
Sir Duncan Watson (with attachments)
Mr Stuart
Mr Hervey
Far Eastern Department
4
SECRET
After hulka discussion the final paragraph of the form I word. "has again beer redrafted, and the two sextence for une it presord" referred to in pan 5 of Its submission have been removed.
If the recommended lime is accepted, opcasting notes In subsequent discussia with the Chinese (which wit, I imagine, certainly take plans) will be prodenced.
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dealing
recoquire that we are with a very fragile thing - confidence
in Hong Kong.
tiat
Never Whelan g
I believe
a matter of years' is too harsh
in
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words.
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and consultation with
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A.R/%/10
2
173.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
(3)L 51-2406)
SECRET
"I discussed this subject with you and
with the Prime Minister when I visited
China last autumn. I told the Prime Minister
on 1 November that I would like to think
about the matter and I would get in touch
with you in due course.
"The positions of our two Governments
on the status of Hong Kong are necessarily
different. But, as I see it, we have two
important interests in common. These are
to preserve the stability and prosperity
of Hong Kong and to preserve the relationship
which has developed between our two countries.
So far as Hong Kong is concerned, stability
and prosperity depend on confidence.
Confidence is a tender plant: it grows
only slowly, but can wilt very quickly.
If, as I believe, we share an interest in
the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong,
it follows that we also share an interest
in the preservation of confidence there.
"As far as the relations between
Britain and China are concerned, there can
be no doubt that the situation in Hong Kong
is a factor of importance. If, therefore,
we share an interest in preserving good
relations between our two countries, we
also share an interest in doing nothing in,
SECRET
/or
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
51-7406
SECRET
or over, Hong Kong which could disturb
the situation there,
"I have given most careful consideration
to your proposal since I spoke to you and
the Trime Minister last eutumn, in the
light of this con-ideration I have come
to the conclusion that tio time is not ripe
for a change in the pattern of your
representation in Hong Kong. I would
therefore ask you not to press your
proposal. It is my judgment that it will
be some time a matter of years)- before
ممتع
circumstances might change in such a way as
to warrant an alteration in the arrangements
which now exist."
SECRET
IMMEDIATE
CYPHER/CAT A
(12)
SECRET
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COPY
I
FM HONG KONG #29858Z
SECRET
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 142 OF 2ND FEBRUARY, 1973. INFO IMMEDIATE
PEKING.
PEKING TELNO 109.
FEM 3.
FOLLOWING FOR NORRIS,
PARA, 2, 1ST SENTENCE: QUITE RIGHT; BUT I MUST ADMIT TO HAVING SEEN COURSE (B) AS A PRESENTATIONAL VARIANT OF (A) SO FAR AS THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE IS CONCERNED.
2. THIS ISSUE SEEMS TO TURN ON ONE'S JUDGEMENT OF WHETHER A MORE OR LESS CONTINUING DIALOGUE ON THIS QUESTION WITH THE CHINESE IS THE BEST WAY OF KEEPING THE TEMPERATURE DOWN IF RPT IF WE DO NOT INTEND TO GIVE WAY WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO. HM AMBASSADOR DOES, I DO NOT, EITHER NIGHT BE RIGHT.
3. BUT WHEREAS IF I AM PROVED WRONG WE CAN SHIFT TO HIS LINE, IF HE IS WRONG WE WILL HAVE GIVEN THE GAME AWAY.
MACLEHOSE
FILED HEAD FED
HEAD HKIOD FS/MR ROYLE SIR E NORRIS
SECRET
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CYPHER/CAT A
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Referred to
Sin E. Norris
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 142 OF 2ND FEBRUARY, 1973. INFO IMMEDIATE
PEKING.
PEKING TELNO 189.
FOLLOWING FOR NORRIS.
Not the intention.
R.E. 22.
PARA. 2, 1ST SENTENCE: QUITE RIGHT, BUT I MUST ADMIT TO HAVING SEEN COURSE (3) AS A PRESENTATIONAL VARIANT OF (A) - SO FAR AS THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE 18 CONCERNED.
2. THIS ISSUE SEEMS TO TURK ON ONE'S JUDGEMENT OF WHETHER A MORE OR LESS CONTINUING DIALOGUE ON THIS QUESTION WITH THE CHINESE IS THE BEST WAY OF KEEPING THE TEMPERATURE DOWN IF RÅT IF WE DO NOT INTEND TO GIVE WAY WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO. HM AMBASSADOR DOES, I DO NOT, EITHER MIGHT BE RIGHT.
3. BUT WHEREAS IF I AM PROVED WRONG WE CAN SHIFT TO HIS LINE, IF HE IS WRONG WE WILL HAVE GIVEN THE GAME AWAY.
MACLEHOSE
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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NO 109 OF 1 FEBRUARY/INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG ( PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).
FOLLOWING FOR NORRIS.
• GOVERNOR).
YOUR TELNO 116 TO HONG KONG AND HONG KONG TELNO 133: CHINESE PEPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1. MY OWN RECOMMENDATION HAS TO BE AS YOU KNOW IN FAVOUR OF COURSE D WHICH MIGHT HOWEVER BE COMBINED WITH SOMETHING OF COURSE B. THAT IS TO SAY WHILE INFORMING THE CHINESE THAT THE TIME IS NOT YET RIPE FOR AGREEING TO THEIR REQUEST WE COULD LOOK FORWARD TO CONFIDENTIAL BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS AT A LATER STAGE. SOMETHING OF THIS KIND WOULD I THINK BE THE BEST WAY TO GUARD AGAINST CONTINUING AND INCREASING PRESSURE.
2.
SIR MURRAY MACLEHOSE IN HIS TELEGRAM SEEMS TO ME TO PE REALLY ADVOCATING COURSE A. I THINK THAT THE ARGUMENT IN HIS PARAGRAPH 2 IS WRONG, IF WE NOW GIVE WHAT THE CHINESE INTERPRET AS A FIRM REFUSAL LOOKING FORWARD TO NO RELAXATION IN THE FUTURE THAT 1S IN MY OPINION THE BEST WAY TO ENSURE THAT PRESSURE WILL CONTINUE AND POSSIBLY ALSO THAT A CHANGE OF POLICY MAY BE DECIDED ON IN CHINESE CONDUCT TOWARDS HONG KONG.
3. IF THE RECOMMENDATION TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS TO BE IN FAVOUR OF AN UNMODIFIED COURSE B THE ONLY CHANGE WHICH I WOULD SUGGEST IN THE DRAFT IM YOUR PARAGRAPH 3 IS TO REPLACE THE FIRST TWO SENTENCES BY THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE: ''THE POSITIONS OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THE STATUS OF HONG KONG ARE NECESSARILY DIFFERENT''.
ADDIS
FILES: HEAD FED
HEAD HKIOD
PS/MR. ROYLE SIN E. NONRIS
SECRET
P
+
INMEDIATE
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P
+
HER/CAT A ONO KONG
311032Z
TOP CORY
CORVATE
TO IMMEDIATE F C O TELNO 133 OF 31ST JANUARY, 1973. INFO IM PEKING.
FOLLOWING PERSONAL FROM GOVERNOR FOR NORRIS.
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 116: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1 AM NATURALLY GLAD AND RELIEVED THAT YOU PROPOSE TO RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO RESIST THIS CHINESE PROPOSAL.
2. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING SEEMS TO ME TO BE THAT IN SPEAKING TO CHI P'ENG FEI THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD USE TERMINOLOGY WHICH, IN THE OPINION OF THE DEPARTMENT AND OF HM AMBASSADOR AT PEKING, IS BEST CALCULATED TO ENSURE THAT THE CHINESE DO NOT DEDUCE THAT WE WILL GIVE WAY NEXT YEAR IT NOT THIS, IF THEY KEEP PRESSING. IM AMBASSADOR MIGHT REPLY THAT THEY WILL PRESS ANYWAY, BUT THERE WOULD BE A GOOD DEAL OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEIR HUNTING TO VIEW AND RUNNING A DOUBTFUL LINE.
3. SHOULD HAVE THOUGH THAT THE BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS EFFECT WOULD BE TO STICK AS NEARLY AS POSSIBLE TO WHAT WAS SAID IN PEKING. THIS WOULD INDICATE THAT ON RECONSIDERATION OUR POSITION HAS NOT CHANGED, AND AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDING BASED ON COMPARISON OF WHAT WAS SAID ON THE TWO OCCASIONS.
4. FOR THIS REASON I SUGGEST YOU SHOULD HAVE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE LAST 3 SENTENCES OF THE DRAFT STATEMENT. THIS GOES SIGNIFICANTLY FURTHER THAN WHAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID IN PEKING ('TIME IS A HEALER''), WHICH ITSELF WAS AN ADVANCE ON WHAT WAS SAID BY MR. ROYLE, WHO OFFERED NO HOPE OF ANY EVENTUAL CHANGE OF VIEW.
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/ 5. I THINK
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5. I THINK THAT OUR OBJECT SHOULD BE TO USE WORDS TO WHICH KM AMBASSADOR CAN REFER AS EXCLUDING FURTHER DISCUSSION IF PRESSED BY THE MFA, AND DO NOT EXPOSE HIM OR HIS SUCCESSOR TO RENEWED REPRESENTATIONS, IN THE WAY THE LANGUAGE USED IN 1956 EXPOSED US TO REPRESENTATIONS AS SOON AS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED.
6. HAVING MADE THIS GENERAL POINT, I WOULD PREFER TO LEAVE IT TO YOU AND HM AMBASSADOR TO DECIDE HOW IT CAN BEST BE MET.
7. YOUR PARA. 4. NOTED.
L
·
MACLEHOSE
FILES:
HEAD FED
HEAD AKIOD
P5/MR. ROYLE
EIR E. NORRIS
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+
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I
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I
:
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IMMEDIATE
SECRET
CYPHER CAT A
19
FM FC0 3016202
DEDIP
SECRET
FOR 3/5/1
1973
TO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELNO 116 OF 33 JAN./INFO IMMEDIATE
PEK ING.
61
(PERSO..AL FOR COVERLOR)
FALLOVING FROM KORRIS.
YOUR DESPATCH OF 11 JANUARY AND SIR JOHN ADDIS'S DESPATCH OF 18 DECEMBER: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN KONG KONG
1.. THE COURSES OPEN TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE WHEN HE MEETS CHI
P?ENG FE! ARE:
30
(A) TO MAINTAIN OUR REFUSAL TO CONSIDER THE CHINESE PROPOSAL: (B) TO SAY THAT WE HAVE GIVEN VERY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE CHINESE PROPOSAL, BUT THAT WE DO NOT THINK THE TIE IS RIPE FOR THE CHINESE TO PURSUE IT:
(C)
(D)
TO SAY THAT WE NIGHT BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE CHINESE
PROPOSAL ON CONDITION THAT THE CHINESE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DESIGNATE THEIR OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE AS A CONSUL
GENERAL:
+
TO SAY THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO EXPLORE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHINESE PROPOSAL IN CONFIDENTIAL BILATERAL DISCUSSIONSE (E) TO ACCEPT THE CHINESE PROPOSAL IN PRINCIPLE AS IT STANDS:
AND
(F)
TO SAY THAT WE NEED FURTHER TIME TO CONSIDER THE CHINESE
P.OPOSAL.
2. R ROYLE HAS AGREED THAT HE SHOULD RECOMMEND COURSE (B) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, LE HAS ASKED US TO PREPARE THE DRAFT OF A STATEMENT FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO USE IN SPEAKING TO CHI P'ENO FEI. THIS FOLLOWS IN PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW. I SHOULD SE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD TELEGRAPH YOUR COMENTS BY 1330Z ON 31 JANJARY AND IF SIR JOHN ADDIS WOULD TELEGRAPH HIS COMMENTS TAKING YOURS
INTO ACCOUNT BY THE SAME TIME ON 1 FEBRUARY.
3. FOLLOWING IS DRAFT.
PEGINS:
" I DISCUSSED
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''I DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT WITH YOU AND WITH THE PRIME
MINISTER WHEN I VISITED CHINA LAST AUTUIN. I TOLD THE PRIME MI
ON 1 NOVEMBER THAT I WOULD LIKE TO THINK ABOUT THE HATTER AND THAT I WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH YOU IN DUE COURSE.
"'WE DISAGREE ADOUT THE STATUS OF HONG KONG. THAT IS SOME- THING WHICH IS A FACT ALD WHICH I DO NOT THINK IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO DISCUSS. BUT, AS I SEE IT, WE HAVE 1:0 1-PORTANT INTERESTS IN
COM.ON. THESE ARE TO PRESERVE THE STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF HONG KONG AND TO PRESERVE THE RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, SO FAR AS HONG KONG IS CONCERTED, STABILITY AND POSPERITY DEPEND ON CONFILENCE. CONFIDENCE IS A TENDER PLANT: IT GOV. "PLY SLOWLY, BUT CAN WILT VERY QUICKLY. IF, AS I BELIEVE, KE SHARE AN INTEREST. IN THE STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF HONG KONG, IT POLLO IS THAT E ALSO SHARE AN 1.TEREST IN THE PRESERVATION OF
CONFIDENCE THERE.
AS FAR AS RELATIONS LEWEEN BRITAIN AND CHINA ARE CONCERNED, THERE CAN BE LO DOUBT THAT THE SITUATION IN HONG KONG IS A FACTOR OF IMPORTANCE. IF, THEREFORE, E SHARE AN INTEREST IN PRESERVING GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, WE ALSO SHARE AN INTEREST IN DOING NOTHING IN, OR OVER, HUNG SONG WHICH COULD DISTURB THE SITUATION THERE.
I WOULD THEREFORE ASK YOU NOT TO PRESS YOUR PROPOSAL.
NE DO KOT THINK THAT THE TIME IS RIPE TO CONSIDER IT. I AM NOT A PROPHET. I CANNOT FORETELL THE FUTURE. BUT IT IS MY JUDGEMENT
THAT IT WILL BE SOME TIME A MATTER OF YEARS BEFORE CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT WARRANT A CHANGE IN THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH NOW EXIST FOR YOUR REPRESENTATION IN HONG HONG.'*
4. 1
ENDS.
RECOMMENDING COURSE (B), WE SHALL ALSO RECOMMEND THAT YOU SHOULD BE AUTHORISED TO MAKE THE MOVES IN HONG KONG WHICH ARE OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPHS 20 AND 21 OF YOUR DESPATCH. WE ARE MOST CRATEFUL FOR YOUR OFFER. GIVEN THE A CUNT OF TIME AVAILABLE, WE DOUBT, HOWEVER WHETHER YOU COULD MAKE ANY GESTURE WHICH WOULD REGISTER FIRMLY WITH THE CHINESE IN PEKING BEFORE CHI P'ENG - FEI SETE JUT POR LORDON.
DOUGLAS-HOME
FILE 3:
HEAD FED
HEAD HKIOD
FS/MR. ROYLE
SIR E. NORRIS
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(FED)
लैं
FM FCO 261830Z
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TO PRIORITY GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELNO 105 OF 26 JANUARY. 1973.
FOLLOWING FOR WILFORD FROM NORRIS.
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
1. I HAVE SUBMITTED A PAPER TO MR ROYLE WHICH SETS OUT THE SIX OPTIONS YOU DISCUSSED WITH THE DEPARTMENTS CONCERNED AT YOUR MEETING
ON 19 JANUARY.
2. ON THE SUBSTANCE, I HAVE DEALT CHIEFLY WITH THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE SECRETARY OF STATE GIVING CHI PENG-FEI A TEMPORISING REPLY. ON PROCEDUPE, I HAVE SAID THAT WE AIM TO SUBMIT PAPERS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE BY THE END OF NEXT WEEK. THESE MAY OR MAY NOT
INCLUDE THE DRAFT OF A PAPER FOR HIM TO PUT TO DOP.
3. PLEASE TELL THE GOVERNOR THAT WE SHALL LET HIM SEE THE DRAFT OF
THE BRIEF WE PREPARE FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE.
DOUGLAS-HOME
FILES
FED
HKLOD
SIR E NORRIS
SECRET
·
SECRET
Sir Eric Norris
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
3/21/
the draft of a minute for you to put to Mr Royle; and
1.
I submit:
(z)
(b)
2.
a draft telegram for you to send to Mr Wilford in Hong Kong-
Both, I hope, are self-explanatory.
R M
Divans
26 January 1973
Far Eastern Department
SECRET
SECRET
Sir Eric Norris
Yorris
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1.
Misinart. H Mi Heive.
нето
по себек дей
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Enter.
I submit a draft personal telegram for you to send
to Sir Murray MacLehose. Mr Stuart concurs in its terms.
31/,
Y/2
R.E.
3*/1.
30 January 1973
CC
Mr Stuart
Mr Hervey
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R.M. Evans
RM Evans
Far Eastern Department
form
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CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
Sis E. Ngeris.
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paper which the Department have
1. I attach a copy of a
prepared on this subject. I also attach copies of the despatches
by Sir John Addis and Sir Murray MacLehose to which the paper
refers and of the records of the conversations which the
Secretary of State had on this subject with Chi P'eng-fei and
Chou En-lai during the course of his visit to China.
2.
I have talked to Mr Evans and Mr Stuart about both
substance and procedure.
On the substance, our view is that
course (b) in the paper is the one which has most to commend it.
The actual terms in which the Secretary of State might speak to
Chi P'eng-fei would of course have to be drafted with great
care. But the great merit of this course, as we see it, is
that it does not carry the risks and penalties which would be
entailed either in a fresh rejection of the Chinese proposal
or in a commitment to explore the proposal.
3.
We have serious reservations about course (f). Chou En-lai
told Mr Denson in February 1971 that the Chinese Government would
like to establish an official representative in Hong Kong. The
proposal was put again to Kr Addis by Chang Wen-chin in March
1972; once again to you at the beginning of June 1972; and
yet again to the Secretary of State at the beginning of November
1972. Although only four months will have elapsed between
the Secretary of State's visit to China and the time when he
meeta Chi P'eng-fel in London, we will have had the proposal
under consideration for very nearly two years.
Another
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/consideration
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consideration is that there is little advantage (and perhaps
some disadvantage) in buying time if we intend to maintain
our refusal to accept the Chinese proposal (or to maintain
this refusal in qualified form), The case for procrastination
only becomes stronger if we are seriously thinking about
entering into confidential discussions with the Chinese, which
we are almost certainly not. Thirdly, there is the factor
that it would be better to give the Chinese an answer before
the Prime Minister visits Peking, as he now hopes to do, in
the autumn. We must do our best to spare him an argument on
the subject.
On procedure, our aim is to submit papers to the Secretary
of State by the end of next week. Unless we do this, the
Department will not have enough time to draft any paper which
may need to be put to DOP. In any case, the Department will
need a certain amount of time in which to clear their draft
briefs on the subject for the Secretary of State with Sir
Murray MacLehose and Sir John Addis.
5. I should welcome an opportunity of talking to you about
this early next week, if possible.
26 January 1973
hi. Naw
Eric N rris
O
Now see subsequeni minnies.
Copy to PUS
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R.E.3%.
1
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OFFICIAL CHINESE REFRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
Background
1.
During the Secretary of State's visit to Feking, both
the Chinese Foreign Minister and the Chinese Prime Minister
asked him to reconsider his rejection of the Chinese proposal
to establish an official representative in Hong Kong. The
Secretary of State told Chou En-lai on 1 November that he would
like to think about the matter and would get in touch with
Chi Peng-fei in due course. On 29 December, the Fermanent
Under-Secretary told the Chinese Ambassador that the Secretary
of State was giving the matter his personal consideration but
that, because of the problems which the proposal raised for us,
consideration would have to be long and careful. The Chinese
Foreign Minister is to visit London from 22 February to
25 February. He is certain to bring up the subject.
The views of Sir John Addis and Sir Murray MacLebose
2. The views and recommendations of Sir John Addis are set
out in his despatch of 18 December (copy attached). The views
and recommendations of Sir Hurray MacLehose are set out in
his despatch of 11 January (copy also attached). The case
made by each is cogent. Our problem is to decide how to brief
the Secretary of State before his meetings with Chi P'eng-fei
at the end of February. We could brief him to adopt the
course recommended by Sir John Addis; or the course recommended
by Sir Murray MacLehose; or some other course (they do not
between them cover all the courses available).
1
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13.
F
Х
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Courses Available
3. The courses open to the Secretary of State are:
(a) to maintain our refusal to consider the Chinese proposal;
(b)
to say that we have given very careful consideration
to the Chinese proposal, but that we do not think the
time is ripe for the Chinese to pursue it;
(c) to say that we might be prepared to consider the
Chinese proposal on condition that the Chinese would be prepared to designate their official representative
as a Consul General;
(a) to say that we are prepared to explore the implications
(e)
of the Chinese proposal in confidential bilateral
discussions;
to accept the Chinese proposal in principle as it
stands; and
(f) to say that we need further time to consider the Chinese
4.
proposal.
Course (a) is the course favoured by Sir Murray MacLehose.
Course (b) is a variant. Courses (c) and (d) are distilled
from the course generally favoured by Sir John Addis.
5. The principal advantages and drawbacks of the six courses
are as follows:
(i) Course (a). The great advantage of this course is that
it is the course which would best seem to serve the
interests of Hong Kong. It could also have the advantage
of putting an end to a dialogue which is becoming somewhat embarrassing. The great drawback is that it would
undoubtedly entail some penalty in terms of Anglo-Chinese
/relations.
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relations.
We cannot at the moment estimate the likely
Another disadvantage is
extent of any such penalty.
that it might mean forfeiting a chance to reach an
accommodation with the Chinese at a time when the climate
of Anglo-Chinese relations is good;
(ii) Course (b). This course is a variant of course (a).
Its advantage is that it would be less of a rebuff to the
Its disadvantage is that it would probably
Chinese.
encourage the Chinese to return to the charge within a
matter of a few years (or even less);
(iii)Course (c). The advantage of this course is that it
would entail putting the ball back into the Chinese court.
But this advantage could be very short-lived: Chi P'eng-
fei might well say that there could be no question of
China appointing a Consul General in territory which
she regards as belonging to her. He would almost
certainly go on to renew pressure for consideration of
the Chinese proposal;
(iv) Course (d). The great advantage of this course is that
it is the course which would best serve bilateral Anglo-
Chinese relations. But it has a hidden trap. If our
confidential discussions with the Chinese were to show
that no satisfactory agreement could be reached, we
should face the choice between breaking off the talks
and accepting an agreement which we did not like.
first alternative would be difficult to adopt and could
do more damage to Anglo-Chinese relations than either
course (a) or course (b);
The
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/(v)
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(v) Course (e). There is really no advantage in this
course. Its manifold disadvantages are set out with
great cogency in Sir Murray MacLehose's despatch;
(vi) Course (f). The advantage of this course is that it
would buy time. But the amount of time bought would
not be very great. It would be very difficult for the
Prime Minister to go on playing for time if, as now seems
probable, he were to visit China in the autumn.
6. Sir Murray MacLehose has suggested a number of limited,
but significant, concessions in the attitude of the Hong Kong
Government to the unofficial Chinese Communist establishment
in the Colony. These concessions might be combined with
course (a) or course (b) (and even with course (c) or course
(d), though with much less political advantage). The case
for asking Sir Murray MacLehose to make these concessions to
offset the effects of the adoption of course (a) or course
(b) on Anglo-Chinese relations is a strong one. But he would
need to act quickly if any impact were to be made before
Chi P'eng-fei visits London.
Far Eastern Department
26 January 1973
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4
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Mr Evané
Sir Eric Norris
Copy No
3/31 0
TOK SECRET
Mi Davi Ender and X.
력
OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
1. This issue was discussed at a meeting on 19 January at which
Mr Wilford took the chair and at which FED and HKIOD were
2.
represented.
setting out the options open to us, for eventual discussion at
an office meeting. Such a meeting might be taken by the Secretary
of State. Mr Royle, the Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Eric Norris
and the Heads of FED and HKIOD might also be asked to be present.
In the light of the conclusions reached at any office meeting,
a paper might have to be prepared for consideration by Ministers in DOP. If a paper were to be taken in DOP, this would have to
be in the week beginning 12 February, given Mr Chi's arrival here on 22 February. A paper would have to be ready for circulation
to DOP by 9 February.
Mr Wilford asked the Department to prepare a paper,
3. I attach the first draft of a paper which you may wish to
discuss with Sir Eric Norris before arrangements are made for an
I Office meeting. Mr Stuart has seen the draft and concurs.
should add that Mr Wilford has asked that the paper should not at
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this stage include recommendations but limit itself to setting
out the courses of action open to us. Nevertheless it was
agreed at his meeting that, of the options described in paragraph 5
of the paper, (a) offered the fewest disadvantages and (f) the
most. In other words the options are presented in order of
preference although this is not specifically stated. From our
point of view (and that of HKIOD) option (a), with (b) as a poor
fall-back, seems the only viable choice.
23 January 1973
R BR Harvey
Far Eastern Department
Cc:
Mr Stuart
Mr Clark
or
Mr Wilford or
1.
I have drastically shortened the draft paper and re-
arranged the options.
2. On procedure, I suggest that we should ask the Private
Secretary whether the Secretary of State would be prepared to
take a meeting on Wednesday or Thursday of next week. A
meeting then would allow the Department time to draft a brief
beforehand and (if necessary) a paper for submission to DOP
by 9 February afterwards. You will, I imagine, wish to have
/a meeting
TOEX SECRET
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a meeting with Mr Stuart and myself before any meeting under
the Chairmanship of a Minister is arranged. Tomorrow might
be a convenient day.
3.
There is one further point. I understand from Mr Stuart
that Mr Wilford has asked to get a telegram regarding our
preliminary views, on both substance and procedure, before he
leaves Hong Kong on 27 January. This reinforces the case for
your holding a meeting tomorrow.
25 January 1973
PS
R.M. Evans
R M Evans
Far Eastern Department
I attach copies of the records of the Secretary of State's conversations on this subject with Chi P'eng-fei and Chou En lại.
Sü
W.
Si Levic Nomis swominied the pope. intimal tomis M. Royle (under mincie of his own).
R.EE.
29/1
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3.
Mr Elliott
DAG
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
Kat
十
سلام
3/2/1
The Permanent Under-Secretary will wish to see a copy of
Sir John Addis's despatch of 18 December. We are awaiting
Sir Murray MacLehose's despatch of comment. As soon as
this is received we shall be submitting on the whole subject.
16 January 1973
HL Davies
Far Eastern Department
FEA
SECRET
Copy retained.
M:
IMEDIATE.
CYPHER/CAT A
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FM HONG KONG 121130Z
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1973
FEH
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 58 OF 12 JANUARY INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING.
(104) FEU 3/301/77
MY TELEGRAM 1252 (NOT TO PEKING) CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG
KONG.
FOR WILFORD.
MY CONCLUSIONS WERE SENT BY DESPATCH YESTERDAY, BUT SINCE THIS MISSES YOUR DEADLINE OF 10 JANUARY IT MIGHT BE CONVENIENT FOR YOU TO HAVE AN OUTLINE OF MY VIEWS BY TELEGRAM.
2. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE FRIENDLY AND HELPFUL THINGS SAID IN FEKING, BUT IN SPITE OF THEM I MYSELF, AS WELL AS THE UNOFFICIALS, REMAIN CONVINCED THAT ACCEPTANCE OF AN OFFICIAL CHINESE
REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE BOUND TO GIVE RISE TO GREAT DIFFICULTIES
BECAUSE -
A) HERE IT WOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED AS A ROUTINE, FAR LESS A REASSURING, DIPLOMATIC MOVE, BUT AS THE PENULIMATE ACT IN THE REASSERTION OF CHINESE CONTROL. IT WOULD THUS RELEASE NEW PRESSURES AND UNCERTAINTIES, NOT LEAST AMONG GOVERNMENT SERVANTS, AND PROVIDE NEW AND TEMPTING LEVERAGE FOR LOCAL COMMUNISTS AND FELLOW TRAVELLERS. BECAUSE OF OUR NEED TO RETAIN CONTROL, THIS SITUATION WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO PRODUCE A CONFRONTATION PREMATURELY THAN TO BUY TIME AND GOOD RELATIONS.
L
B) THE PRESTIGE AND DEFERENCE THAT WOULD ATTACH TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF SUCH A POWERFUL NEIGHBOUR AND CLAIMANT TO THE TERRITORY, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH HIS GOOD OFFICES WOULD BE SOLICITED, WOULD THROW OUT THE PRESENT BALANCE OF POWER IN THE COLONY SOONER OR LATER IT WOULD ALSO FORCE HIM INTO EITHER INTERVENING OR DISAPPOINTING HIS SUPPORTERS. IN THE PRESENT MOOD IN PEKING HE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO RISK THE LATTER, BUT NOT IF PERSONALITIES OR POLICIES CHANGED IN PEKING, OR IF IN SOME WAY THE SITUATION GOT OUT OF HAND HERE.
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/C) SUCH
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C) SUCH AN INCREASED ELEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY WOULD CAUSE REVIEW OF ALL CURRENT INVESTMENT, INCIDENTALLY INCLUDING THE MASS TRANSIT RAILWAY.
3. WE WOULD OF COURSE DO OUR UTMOST TO COUNTER ALL THESE REPERCUSSIONS AND WITH LUCK WE MIGHT SUCCEED FOR A BIT, BUT IT WOULD BE AN INTENSELY DIFFICULT SITUATION THAT MIGHT SOONER OR LATER
BECOME UNTENABLE.
4. H.M. AMBASSADOR'S PROPOSAL TO CIRCUMSCRIBE THE ACTIVITIES OF
A REPRESENTATIVE AND DEFINE THEM BY NEGOTIATION SEEMS TO ME A GOOD FALL-BACK POSTION, BUT ONLY AS THAT.
A) SUCH A NEGOTIATION WOULD BE LONG AND DIFFICULT AND WOULD RAISE, IN AN ACUTE FORM, THE QUESTION OF WHAT THE CPG CONSIDERED THEIR STANDING SHOULD BE IN A TERRITORY IN WHICH THEY CLAIM 98 PER CENT OF THE POPULATION AS THEIR COMPATRIOTS, AND OVER WHICH THEY CANNOT RECOGNISE OUR SOVEREIGNTY. I SHOULD BE SURPRISED IF OUR RELATIONS EMERGED FROM SUCH A NEGOTIATION IN ANY WAY IMPROVED.
B) EVEN IF OBTAINED, SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY UNENFORCEABLE, WE COULD DO LITTLE OR NOTHING TO CONTROL A
AT LEAST WITHOUT REPRESENTATIVE ONCE HERE, FAR LESS EXPELL HIM RISKING THE CONFRONTATION WE HAD ACCEPTED HIM TO AVOID.
5. DIFFICULT THOUGH THE SITUATION DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 3 MIGHT BE, WE WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT IT IF FACED WITH
THE ALTERNATIVE OF SOMETHING WORSE, BUT NOTHING OF THE SORT HAS YET OCCURRED. THE CHINESE HAVE MADE SOME THREATS (FOR THEM QUITE MILD), BUT IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER AND TO WHAT EXTENT THEY ARE PREPARED TO CARRY THEM OUT INN RESPECT OF EITHER HONG KONG OR
THE U.K.
6. AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF CHINA'S PRESENT GENERAL EXTERNAL FOLICY AND ALSO THE STEADILY IMPROVING, AND SATISFACTORILY PRACTICAL, RELATIONS WITH CPG OFFICIALS IN HONG KONG, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO PERSUADE THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL THAT GREATER DANGERS THAN THOSE THEY SEE IN ACCEPTANCE WOULD BE IMMINENT IF WE CONTINUED TO REFUSE. THEY WOULD REPLY THAT WE SHOULD WAIT AND SEE.
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AVEN IF THE CHINESE THREATS AND HM AMBASSADOR'S ANALYSIS CAN BE ACCEPTED IN THEIR ENTIRETY, ONE CAN EXPECT THAT IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THE PRESSURE WOULD BE APPLIED SLOWLY AND PROBABLY RELUCTANTLY, AND THAT THERE WOULD BE PLENTY OF TIME FOR US TO RECONSIDER OUR POSITION BEFORE ANYTHING DISASTROUS OCCURRED.
8. WHEREAS TO ACCEPT A REPRESENTATIVE WOULD BE AN IRREVOCABLE ACT, OUR CURRENT REFUSAL COULD BE QUICKLY REVERSEDIF IT WERE PROVED UNTENABLE.
9. I MIGHT SEE THIS PROBLEM DIFFERENTLY IF I COULD BRING MYSELF TO BELIEVE THAT BY THIS CONCESSION WE COULD IN SOME WAY ESCAPE FROM THE LEGACY OF THE PAST AND STEP OUT IN A NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA. BUT THERE IS NO ASSURANCE THAT THIS WOULD BE THE LAST DEMAND, OR THAT THE LEGACY WOULD NOT REMAIN AT LEAST AS LONG AS WE HOLD HONG KONG. MOREOVER, THOUGH TEMPORARILY THIS CONCESSION MIGHT BUY A SHORT HONEYMOON FOR THE UK, FOR THE REASONS IN PARA 1 IT CARRIES WITH IT THE EVENTUAL LIKELIHOOD OF
WORSE AND NOT BETTER RELATIONS.
10. SINCE WE ARE ON SUCH UNCERTAIN GROUND I RECOMMEND THAT WE STAY PUT, AND MAINTAIN OUR COURTEOUS REFUSAL. BUT BECAUSE IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE CHINESE REALLY MEAN WHAT THEY HAVE SAID, AND THAT UNACCEPTABLE REPERCUSSIONS MIGHT EVENTUATE, WE SHOULD KEEP A VERY SHARP LOOK OUT FOR SIGNS OF MOVEMENT OR CHANGE, I THINK WE COULD COUNT ON DOING THIS ON THE HONG KONG INTELLIGENCE NET.
11. IF EVENTS PROVE OUR REFUSAL TO BE UNTENABLE WE SHOULD ADOPT HM AMBASSADOR'S PLAN OF NEGOTIATING THE BEST TERMS WE CAN FOR A
REPRESENTATIVE.
12. HOWEVER, TO KEEP THE TERMPERATURE DOWN AND THUS MAKE REPRISALS LESS LIKELY I WILL IN ANY CASE:
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A) RELEASE THE REMAINING CONFRONTATION PRISONERS BY THE SUMMER (WE HAVE HAD A GOOD REACTION FROM THE BOARD OF REVIEW).
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/B) STEADILY
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B) STEADILY ADVANCE SOCIAL AND SEMI-OFFICIAL CONTACT WITH THE PRESENT REPRESENTATIVE TO A POINT FAIRLY SIMILAR TO THAT REQUESTED BY THE CPG EXCEPT, AND THIS IS A VERY BIG EXCEPTION, THAT HE WOULD REMAIN UNRECOGNISED. NEVERTHELESS HIS STANDING AND PRESTIGE WOULD BE ADVANCED AND PEKING WOULD NOTE THIS MOVEMENT.
13. I HAVE STARTED THE PROCESS OF 12(B) DURING THE LAST 5 MONTHS, AND IN ANY CASE PROPOSE CONTINUING IT AS A SENSIBLE PIECE OF REINSURANCE.
14. WHILE THE FOREGOING IS AN INDICATION OF MY VIEWS IN ADVANCE OF THE DESPATCH I TRUST THAT ACTION WILL BE TAKEN ON THE DESPATCH RATHER THAN THIS TELEGRAM.
MACLEHOSE
FILES
FED
HKI OD
P.S./FUS
SIR E NORNIS
SIR D WATSON
MR WILFORD
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
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CYPHER/CAT A
FM HONG KONG 150280Z
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
13/1
TOP COPY
EH 3301
TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 52 OF 15 JANUARY, 1973.
MY DESPATCH OF 11 JANUARY: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.
PARA 27 PENULTIMATE SENTENCE: FOR 25 PLEASE SUBSTITUTE 26.
MACLEHOSE
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HKIOD
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香港總督府
GOVERNMENT HOUSE
HONG KONG
{
9873/300/1
CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG
Summary
1.
It would be unsafe to assume that the C P G will
make the development of Anglo-Chinese commercial relations dependent on our accession to their request for official representation in Hong Kong: the precedents point the other way (paragraphs 3-5).
2.
The Chinese justification for their proposal contained a number of inaccuracies; their specific threats related to matters of little importance to Hong Kong. There is still no evidence that they are aiming for a break on this issue (paragraphs 6-9).
3.
This is unlikely to be the last Chinese demand upon us (paragraph 10).
4.
The serious psychological and practical (e.g. for the mass transit scheme) implications of acceding to this Chinese request. Refusal would be reversible: acceptance would not (paragraphs 11-15).
5.
We should maintain our refusal until we are convinced
that the disadvantages of doing so would outweigh the advantages. We should then negotiate as suggested by Sir J. Addis, recognising that these negotiations will be long and difficult (paragraphs 16-19).
6.
There are various ways in which the present unofficial CPG Representation can be given more prestige and brought into closer contact with the Hong Kong Government and thus move towards the Chinese position. The Governor has already made
/some..
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2.
some moves in the direction which have been well received (paragraphs 20-22).
7.
We have made, and hope to continue with, steady progress in the release of confrontation prisoners. Peking will notice a steady improvement on this front (paragraph 23).
8.
Our relations with the local C P G hierarchy on
practical matters have never been better: the recent exchange on Kuomintang letter bombs was well received. Chinese delegations have recently visited us on water, building and
telecommunications, and there have been reciprocal visits to Canton (paragraph 24).
9.
The Executive Council are profoundly convinced of
the dangers inherent in the Chinese proposal and will only agree that it is right to accept when it is manifestly true that the dangers of refusal outweigh the dangers of acceptance (paragraph 25).
10.
The best course of action is to maintain the status
quo as long as possible. Changes in the world situation and in China itself might improve the prospects for settlement. The arrival of an official Chinese Representative would be
seen as the penultimate stage before handing over the Colony to China and might precipitate confrontation (paragraphs 26-27).
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香港總督府
HONG KONG DESPATCH 14
Sir,
GOVERNMENT HOUSE
HONG KONG
11th January 1973
I have read H.M. Ambassador's despatch
3/56 of 18th December 1972 about Chinese official representation in Hong Kong in the light of your visit to Peking, and I have discussed further with my advisers and senior Unofficials. My views on this problem were set out in my despatch of 5th May of last year and my telegram No. 31 to Peking of 26th April. The question is to what extent has the plan of action proposed in that despatch and then accepted by the Office been invalidated by what was said to you and Sir Denis Greenhill in Peking.
2.
To make sure that the situation on the ground here is understood, I have annexed a description of the CPG organs in Hong Kong, and of how they are co- ordinated and directed under the leadership of Mr. Leung Wai-lam, and what the present method is of dealing with official business about Hong Kong.
3.
Are Sino/British commercial and political relations at stake?
I do not think we should start from an assumption that the CPG have already decided that their whole political and commercial relationship with Great Britain and, a fortiori Hong Kong, depends upon major political adjustments in Hong Kong being made now, and strictly in accordance with the proposals they have made. The Chinese have proved themselves singularly hard-headed in their dealings with Vestern capitalist States. I think, therefore, that we should be chary of an assumption that if they wish to be in the sort of relationship with HMG that will enable them to assist in maintaining a firm front to the Russians in Europe, or if they want foreign exchange from Hong Kong to buy British Tridents or American Boeings, or to give them leverage in Africa or the Middle East, they are going suddenly to throw all this out of the window for the sake of Mr. Leung Wai-lam being called the Official Representative instead of the head of the N.C.N.A. They might of course do this (I would be the last to deny it), but it seems to me to be still too questionable a hypothesis to be worth accepting serious disadvantages to meet at this stage. At the worst, even if they are going to insist, they are likely to apply the pressure by slow degrees, so as not to interfere with their overall policy.
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
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SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME, KT, MP
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4.
2.
We are naturally very anxious to maximise our exports to China, and anything that is likely to interfere with this should rightly be carefully scrutinised. But although in the past 15 or 20 years there are plenty of instances of the Chinese talking to foreign capitalist exporters as if political considerations (such as our consulate in Taiwan or confrontation prisoners) would affect purchasing policy, I do not believe that there are any significant instances of it actually happening. I recently checked this impression with Sir John Keswick. The classic examples of Chinese capacity for differentiating between economic policy and political relations are Japan and West Germany. more recent example is France which commercially got virtually nothing out of her dramatic switch of recognition. If therefore the Chinese do or do not decide to buy VC 10s, I suggest price, delivery and perhaps non-super-power origin, not our acceptance of a Chinese representative in Hong Kong are likely to be the dominant factors.
The exchanges in Peking
A
5.
We must also face the fact that in putting their case to you in Peking the Chinese leaders were either disingenuous or at least underbriefed. For example, it was untrue to say that CPG had no control over the Leftists who created the troubles of 1967 in Hong Kong, and that the presence of a Chinese official representative would have prevented them. The fact is that in 1967, the Communist Party in China was in turmoil, and without instructions, the local Party cadres headed by Leung Wai-lam, let the disturbances take their course until instructed to stop them, which they were able to do. The absence of an official representative was quite irrelevant to the situation. Mr. Leung has not even been re-called or moved elsewhere: still less beźng disowned or demoted.
6.
It was also untrue to suggest that with such a large co-ordinating organisation already in existence in the Colony (as described in the Annex), there was a practical need for a formal co-ordinator; just as it was to claim that the CPG's objective was merely to facilitate visas and communications and other practical matters: these are being adequately dealt with at present; and, given the will, need no new machinery to deal even with a large increase over the present traffic.
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7.
With this element of evident inaccuracy
in what Chi and Chou said on this subject, I think it would be prudent not to accept too literally the assurances that they gave at the same time.
The Chinese made some threats.
In the
This
8. first place to students of Chinese minatory practice an extensive field of study what was said was exceptionally mild and far removed from what is normally said before action is imminent. Secondly insofar as the threats were against Hong Kong they related to things of little profit to Hong Kong, but of convenience to the Chinese, notably improved air and rail communications. I think H.M. Ambassador is under a misapprehension that Hong Kong has a strong interest in such developments as through trains and direct air links with Canton. is not so. Our interest is only to respond to any proposals for such developments that the CPG make, and to let them know that we stand ready to do so. BOAC may be anxious to secure rights into China via Hong Kong, but these would bring in little immediate profit. And, despite what Chang Wen-chiu said to Sir Denis Greenhill, the talks on air services are as likely to fail for other reasons (e.g. differing views on sovereignty over Hong Kong) as over the narrow issue of official representation.
To sum up what passed in Peking
9.
Before the visit one could plausibly claim that the Chinese demand was being made against any of the following three scenarios: (a) for the record; (b) because they wanted to get it but not at the expense of a break; (c) because they wanted to get it, if necessary at the expense of a break.
As a result of your visit I think we can downgrade the plausibility of scenario (a), but it did not establish the validity of scenario (c) or even that it is more probable than scenario (b). In coming to this view I am strongly influenced firstly by the general considerations in paragraphs 3 and 4 but secondly, and perhaps more, by the apparent absence of any preparation of the local hierarchy for a tougher attitude, and of the absence for some time of any signs even of special interest in the proposal on the latter's part.
We have had intelligence from several sources suggesting that in private Chinese cadres are much less certain of the
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need for or desirability of representation than Chinese Ministers and officials have appeared to be when discussing the matter on the record with British visitors.
Can we escape from the Past?
10.
I have much sympathy with the point of view that we should take any chance that offers of escaping from the legacy of the past and stepping out in a new relationship with China. But unfortunately we cannot escape from that legacy so long as we hold the Colony at all. Moreover, I think we should be wary of assuming that somehow this demand is a last demand that would free us from this legacy. This has an all too familiar ring. The remaining things between us and friendship with China used to be our vote in the U.N. first on substance then on procedure, and our consulate in Taiwan; then at the last minute it was our doctrine on the undetermined status of Taiwan; now it is representative in Hong Kong. I do not think there is any assurance that his precedence, say, or our reaction to any demand he made - such for instance as communist representation in the Legislative and Executive Councils would not equally be presented as the only thing that stood between the U.K. and smiles, confidences and contracts.
The consequences of accepting a Representative
11.
On the other side of the coin it would be equally foolish to assert that catastrophe would follow the arrival of a C.P.G. representative in Hong Kong as the night follows day. Probably for a little - the first months or year if not years all would continue to be sweetness and light. Moreover, though the arrival of the representative would release the new and divisive pressures and uncertainties and intrigues in the population and business world that we foresee, we would also be exerting ourselves to keep things on an even keel. Barring bad luck, or a change in C.P.G. leadership or policy, and I am afraid one or the other is likely enough, we might succeed for a bit. But in bowing to this Chinese demand that we have successfully resisted for so long, it is the overwhelming advice of those here who should know, that we would seriously shake the confidence of the population and business world and
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start ourselves on a very slippery slope. If we then attempted to claw our way back, as we might be forced to do, it would be difficult not to precipitate just that confrontation to avoid which we had accepted a
Representative.
In these circumstances the confrontation would be with the official representative of China, and the standing of the CPG would be much more directly involved than in similar confrontations in the past.
12.
To give an example of a practical implication; with such an additional element of uncertainty the Executive Council would certainly wish to reconsider the proposal for a mass transit system, and foreign financiers would similarly wish to re- examine the terms they were offering. I would of course urge that in such circumstances to hold back would be to court complete loss of confidence, and I think my view would prevail. But the same sort of re-
examination would be precipitated right across the whole field of private investment.
Chinese demands and their implications
13.
Against the background of these rather
negative points, my analysis is:
(a) The CPG would like to have an official
representative in Hong Kong for a variety of reasons. One probability is that they feel the lack of one inconsistent with their new international status. Another one is probably the increased prestige and leverage it would give them in political and cultural work amongst the population of the Colony which they may feel is steadily drifting further from Maoist principles ("....explain the policies of the Chinese Government to the Chinese people in Hong Kong
...). It would also carry with it an option on more direct political intervention with the Hong Kong Government. Their over-all objective probably is to combine the maximum economic advantage from the status quo with the minimum limitation on their political and representational activities in the Colony. No doubt in their present mood they realise that the latter would have to be pursued with
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discretion if they were to enjoy the former. But the role envisaged, while including practical day-to-day affairs, is clearly ly both political and interventionist (".. to help the authorities in Hong Kong to administer Hong Kong well so that there would be no trouble to relations between China and Britain ...."). Such an over- all role and objective are completely understandable. But while Chi and Chou were at pains to assure that the role would not be abused, it is not at all the conventional role of a normal foreign representative, and their assurances should be viewed with circumspection.
(b) The CPG have said they are not in a hurry,
but that there will be trouble though not serious trouble, if we refuse, and that in particular air and rail communications between Hong Kong and China are regarded as related issues. They have said that it is an issue to which they attach importance and that if we do not respond the responsibility for the consequences will be ours. I am nevertheless still doubtful about what they are really prepared to do about it.
The
(c) We see in such an appointment the seeds of
conflict and confrontation. There are three basic problems. The first is the jolt to the public confidence that accession to these Chinese demands would produce and the forces that would thus be set in motion. second is that a public movement could get out of hand and force the representative into a situation contrary to that intended by Peking. The third is that sooner or later the CPG would be likely to take a completely different view to us of what activities were appropriate for their Representative. This difference would stem from the fact that they cannot admit that the territory is not Chinese or that 99% of the population are not Chinese subjects, and that the ir eventual aim is its reincorporation in China.
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These prospects are too alarming to be worth accepting unless we are clearly confronted with something worse.
(d) We have to decide our course against the
political background of wishing to improve relations with the CPG.
14.
It is as bewildering as any other Chinese puzzle. Generally speaking, I think that the trouble that the appointment might be expected to create in Hong Kong sooner or later is more certain at this stage, than the disadvantages of refusal. The latter may be as great as H.M. Ambassador suggests, but at this stage there is wide room for doubt as to whether the advantages of acceptance or the penalties of refusal are as inevitable or as great as stated.
15.
A further and perhaps overriding consideration is that while we could, at any time, and very quickly, reverse our refusal, acceptance would be irrevocable. It would be an illusion to believe that we could expel or significantly restrict a Chinese representative once appointed.
Proposals for response in Peking and London
16.
Since we are on such uncertain ground the balance of advantage seems to me to lie in favour of staying put, and maintaining our present line of courteous refusal without changing our reasons for doing SO. But we should do this warily, and with out ear close to the ground to hear any signs of impending trouble.
17.
If we do this, and do this consistently without giving the Chinese any ground for hope that we are about to reconsider, one of two things will eventually happen; the Chinese will subside into nagging, or they
While I will proceed by slow degrees to retaliation. doubt if what they say to us will be much guide as to whether the light is green, amber or red, I think we can assume both that if they do something it will be done gradually, and that in any case we will have good intelligence of it. If and when we get a red signal, we can decide quickly whether the balance of disadvantage lies in giving in or facing the music. A prerequisite for such a plan of action is of course good nerves and a refusal to be outfaced.
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18.
If at some point we decided that refusal was becoming untenable I think we should then attempt to negotiate along the lines proposed by H.M. Ambassador in paragraphs 11-13 of his despatch. However we should recognise that this would be something of an exercise for the record; that once the negotiations were started it would be very hard to terminate them; that once a representative was sur place there really would be very little we could do to restrict him; and that there would be nothing at all we could do if through a change in leadership or a change in over-all policy the CPG was no longer as well disposed as it is now.
reasons that H.M. Ambassador's proposal does not seem to me to offer sufficient safeguards to be a satisfactory alternative to the more cautious plan of action I have proposed
19.
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Moreover I think that the sort of negotiation he has in mind would raise in many different ways the question of what the Chinese consider the extent of their legitimate interests in Hong Kong to be, and, in particular, would bring into the open the whole issue of sovereignty, on which so far we have agreed politely to differ. In consequence they would be long and difficult and would tend to focus attention on Hong Kong as a key issue in Anglo-Chinese relations, whereas our object should be to throw it into the background.
And at the end of the road we would have an agreement whose value would always be doubtful owing to differences of interpretation, and the difficulty of enforcement if policies or personalities changed.
Proposals for response in Hong Kong
20.
However, I am reluctant to leave things entirely on this negative basis. I think we could do something to show, even if we cannot say, that we accept that some adjustment to the CPG's position in Hong Kong is desirable. We could do this by slowly and unilaterally, but without anything said of the principle involved, advancing the degree of official contact with the present representative. Over the last five months I have myself already taken the first steps in this direction. Hitherto no Governor has personally had any overt or direct contact with the hierarchy of the CPG here. This position seemed to me unhealthily rigid, and I have slowly accepted and made advances up to a point at which I have twice now had short conversations with Leung Wai-lam and photographs have appeared in the press of me talking to and shaking
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hands with him. I have had to move very cautiously in this as the confidence of the population and the establishment in me was very much at stake. However, the heavens have not fallen, while the CPG for their part, have noted these developments with approval.
21
I could continue this process and now tell him that if he would like to talk, my door is always open. If he responds we could move on to exchanging and accepting National Day invitations. At that point we would be very near the position that the CPG has asked for with some important exceptions. The representative's position would be unacknowledged (and thus could be dropped at any time), and because it was unacknowledged it would avoid posing the virtually impossible question to answer of to what extent we accepted the representative's standing vis-a-vis a population that he claims to be 99% Chinese subjects, and a territory over which he does not recognise our sovereignty. It would also avoid the same jolt to confidence that would be caused by official recognition of a representative. Nevertheless it would accord him a greatly increased prestige and influence. I could move to this position in the course of the next year.
22. like as far as the Peking talks have suggested, nor wuld it allow us the positive answer to Chou En-lai's request that I realise H.M. Ambassador would understandably like to give. But the essence of our position would have to be to continue to sign "No" with our diplomatic right hand while gently signalling a qualified "Yes" with our gubernatorial left. But I think it would be a tactic that the Chinese would understand and might even to some extent respect. At the very least it would take some heat out
assuming that there really is much heat in it and thus make reprisals less likely I would of course ensure that this trend, of which the CPG have already taken note, was fully discernible to them before Chi's visit to London, and was well developed before the Prime Minister's visit to Peking next autumn.
I
I realise this would not go anything
of the issue
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hope it will be possible to agree to this cautious plan of action.
23.
I should perhaps add at this point that I am hopeful that it will have been possible to release the remaining 4 confrontation prisoners by this summer. As I indicated to Mr. Wilford we would do, we have taken the
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temperature of the Board of Review, and it is distinctly encouraging. So on this front Peking will also note
a steady improvement and this may help a little over our continuing refusal of an official representative, in that at least it will make them that much more reluctant to resort to reprisals.
Excellence of present relations in Hong Kong
24.
I should also make the point that in our practical contacts with the local hierarchy relations have never been better. We were recently thanked effusively by N.C.N.A. for the co-operation we volunteered over the discovery of Kuomintang letter bombs in Hong Kong intended for China. We have just concluded a new agreement for an expanded supply of water, and this followed a most interesting week's tour by our engineers of the Chinese water supply scheme in order to assess its capability for expansion. The head Chinese engineer concerned has just accepted a reverse invitation to inspect Hong Kong's water system. Problems over an accumulation of Christmas mail for China have been satisfactorily settled. Chinese delegations have visited Hong Kong to examine building methods, and telecommunications and have done so in the most matter of fact and from our point of view satisfactory way. A similar Hong Kong delegation to Canton about telecommunications was equally satisfactory. Special VIP flights between Hong Kong and China are becoming routine. The more important items on this list succeeded the Secretary of State's refusal of the Chinese request for representation in Peking for what that is worth - just as the increased orders for Tridents and Concordes succeeded Mr. Royles.
Attitude of Executive Council
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25.
The above picture is very relevant to the attitude of the Executive Council here. They are profoundly convinced of the dangers and repercussions that would have to be accepted in acceding to the Chinese request for an official representative. They see these dangers so clearly that they would in no circumstances agree that it was right to accept them, unless it was evident to them that a refusal would result in other and even greater dangers. While I could point to them that it was the view of HMG that such dangers would in fact eventually result, they would reply that it would be prudent
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to wait and see if this assessment was correct, and would point meanwhile to the relaxed and friendly atmosphere that is now so evident in Hong Kong and which manifests itself in the sort of practical ways I have described above. These men are realists, and faced with an evident threat or with intelligence which they accepted was sound that it was about to materialise, they would be willing to change their position. But certainly not in the present circumstances on the basis only of what was said in Peking. It is HMG's right to decide a matter of this sort without their agreement, but they would be profoundly shocked and indeed angered by
it. Some of them might wrongly suspect that Hong Kong's interests had been sold out for some British commercial or other interest in China. It would be a most unpleasant situation.
Long term strategy
26.
Finally I do not agree with H.M. Ambassador's thesis that we should aim at a steady evolution of the CPG's position in Hong Kong over the next 25 years up to the expiry of the lease, and that the presence of an official representative would help this process. I suggest that we should rather aim to maintain the status quo for as long as possible and until we can see what post-Mao/Chou China is going to be like. The passage of time could make a lot of difference to the problems of a settlement. There might be a regime prepared to accord Hong Kong some special status that would safeguard some of our interests. Taiwan might have provided a precedent for such an arrangement. Standards of living in China might have risen and the oddities and severities of administration might have softened to a point at which a future for the inhabitants of Hong Kong even under direct Chinese rule might not unduly disturb them or us, and thus cease to carry with it a prospect of hundreds of thousands of more or less British Chinese refugees looking for a home outside China.
27.
Because the population here would be likely to see the arrival of an Official Chinese Representative as the penultimate stage before rendition, and because this presence might precipitate a confrontation from which the CPG could not retreat, I think our object should be to try to postpone his arrival until a time at which we are
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12.
prepared to move rapidly forward to a negotiated
settlement. Of course if he is forced on us within the next few years, our policy should be to try and hold the line until there was time for the sort of things dexcribed in para. 26 to happen. But this would be difficult to do.
28.
I am sending a copy of this despatch
to H.M. Ambassador, Peking.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient, humble servant,
My
GOVERNOR
New Lehen
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ANNEX TO HONG KONG DESPATCH NO. 14
Organs of the Chinese People's
Government in Hong Kong
There is an extremely large network of Communist
interests in Hong Kong, official and commercial, over all of which there exists the usual communist system of dual control, overt and Party.
2.
On the official side, the major units are:
NCNA (i.e. the Hong Kong Branch of the New
China News Agency)
Bank of China
China Resources Ltd
China Travel Service.
These include
To this must be added a variety of minor units, plus a host of commercial and other organisations. newspapers (with a readership of over a ‡ million), cinemas, film companies, shipping companies, sales outlets, both wholesale and retail, banks and import/export agencies. There are also considerable property interests.
3.
With the exception of NCNA the official units largely confine themselves to their overt function of promoting particular aspects of the CP G's Financial or commercial interests in Hong Kong. In carrying out their tasks they may, as is the case with the Bank of China, have an extremely
important role in China's external relations. Their representational function except in relation to their particular job is however minor.
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2.
4.
NCNA acts as the senior organisation, with
its staff playing a co-ordinating role over the activities of others. Its director, Leung Wai-lam, who has never had anything to do with journalism (he was formerly Director of Education of Kwangtung province), is the senior C P G official in Hong Kong and, in a representative role, it is he who for instance hosts the most prestigious National Day reception.
5.
On the Party side, where real control lies, there is a series of functional committees covering banking, trade, shipping, propaganda etc., which report to a senior Party Committee, chaired by Leung Wai-lam, which has overall responsibility for Hong Kong and Macau. Although in recent months there has been a discernible trend towards direct control by Peking, this Committee in turn reports to the Kwangtung Provincial Party Committee and thence to Peking, where Hong Kong affairs are subordinated to the West European department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This structure of party committees is responsible for formulating and relaying policy to the other official bodies in Hong Kong, the more important of which are represented on the main Hong Kong and Macau Committee.
6.
Some idea of the extent of this co-ordinating role exercised by Leung Wai-lam is given by the size of his staff. This alone amounts to about 200, almost all of whom are specially sent from China. He thus has under him an organisation larger than most British Embassies and is in contact with all activities in Hong Kong,
7.
Links with the Hong Kong Government are at two levels. On the political side the normal channel is between the
/Assistant
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3.
Assistant Political Adviser in the Colonial Secretariat and N CNA staff who belong to a Party Committee specifically charged to be in contact with the Hong Kong Government, the Consular Corps and with influential
foreigners.
Along with some other of the NCNA's co-ordinating staff they are housed avay from the functional (i.e. the journalistic) wing of N CNA in the Bank of China Building. Contact is normally confined to practical matters, and business is conducted by telephone. While for most tasks this means of communication has proved sufficiently swift and effective, NCNA staff do on occasion visit the Colonial Secretariat (e.g. recently over the matter of postal bombs).
8.
At another level there are a frequent comprehensive range of contacts by Government and quasi Government personnel on technical matters (post, railways, water, commerce etc.) with their CPG counterparts in Hong Kong and Kwangtung.
9.
Leung Wai-lam and his staff are thus able through the co-ordinating staff of N C N A, and the interlocking committees of the Party, comprehensively to control all activities of C P G units in Hong Kong. The control is tight and pervasive, and is developed sufficiently to allow the CP G to co-ordinate satisfactorily their activities in Hong Kong; to provide an extensive reporting capability; and to make C P G views known locally.
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