FCO 21/1137 Representation of China in Hong Kong

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TITLE: Representation of China + Hong Kong

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1978

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TO PRIORITY F C O TELEGRAM NUMBER 1465 OF 17 DECEMBER INFO PRIORITY PEKING.

PEKING TELEGRAM NO. 1434 CHINESE REPRESENTATION.

THIS REFERS TO A SMALL BUT SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD IN THE POLICY DESCRIBED IN PARAS 20 TO 24 OF MY DESPATCH OF 11 JANUARY, 1973. EARLIER MOVES WERE DESCRIBED IN MY LETTER TO WILFORD OF 3 MARCH.

THEREAFTER PROGRESS WAS BLOCKED BY THE SICKNESS AND ABSENCE OF LEUNG WAI-LAM (HE HAS NOT BEEN HERE SINCE APRIL), AND THE ARRIVAL OF A NUMBER 2 AND POTENTIAL SUCCESSOR LI CHU-SENG, LATELY OF THE OVERSEAS CHINESE AFFAIRS COMMISSION. TO GET THINGS MOVING

I PROMPTED AN INVITATION TO A PING PONG DISPLAY BY A VISITING CHINESE TEAM AT WHICH LEUNG HOSTED ME. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME A GOVERNOR HAS ATTENDED A LEFT WING MANIFESTATION OF THIS SORT, BUT HE DID NOT ACT ON MY REMINDER THAT HE WAS ALWAYS WELCOME TO TALK TO ME OR HONG KONG OFFICIALS: AND AN ATTEMPT TO ARRANGE A DINNER IN THE HOUSE OF A THIRD PARTY FAILED.

3. SINCE OCTOBER THERE HAS BEEN SOME PROGRESS

(A)

WHEREAS PREVIOUSLY IT HAS BEEN WHO HAVE TAKEN THE INITIATIVE IN SPEAKING TO THE HEAD OF NCNA AT PARTIES,

LI CAME UP AND CONGRATULATED ME ON MY LEG.CO. SPEECH AND ITS POLICIES (SURELY A ''FIRST TIME'' (EXCLAMATION)).

(B) SUBSEQUEENTTLY CHINESE RESPONSE TO HONG KONG PROBLEMS OVER

OIL WAS IMMEDIATE AND FRIENDLY (THOUGH OF COURSE THEY SAW A LONG TERM ADVANTAGE).

BY A PERSONAL LETTER TO ME. AFTER THE SHOW I WROTE BACK. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THERE HAS BEEN DIRECT CORRESPONDENCE OF ANY SORT. THE PRESS MADE A GREAT DEAL OF MY WIFE'S AND MY PRESENCE AT THE SHOWDENTIAL

/(D)

CONFIDENTIAL

(D)

AS IF TO SEAL THE STEP FORWARD LI THEN CALLED HIMSELF ON THE POLITICAL ADVISER AND MADE A FRIENDLY DEMATCHE ABOUT LETTER BOMBS (OUR TELMO 196 TO PEKING), THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THE HEAD OF NCNA HAD PERSONALLY AND DIRECTLY TRANSACTED OFFICIAL BUSINESS ON BEHALF OF THE C P G WITH THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT, THOUGH HE HAD NOTHING TO SAY THAT COULD NOT EQUALLY WELL HAVE BEEN DEALT WITH BY A SUBORDINATE

IN THE NORMAL WAY.

THESE PUBLIC CONTACTS ACCORD WITH CURRENT C P G UNITED FRONT TACTICS. NEVERTHELESS I BELIEVE THAT PROVIDED WE DO NOT OVERDO IT WE ARE THE GAINERS FROM OVERTLY EASIER RELATIONS AND THE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE ENGENDERED.

5. HONE OF THE FOREGOING IS OF SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF REPRESENTATION, WHICH NO DOUBT THE C P G WILL PRESS UPON THE PRIME MINISTER. BUT THE PRACTICAL AND FRIENDLY WORKING AND SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP WE ARE TRYING TO ESTABLISH IS RIGHT ON ITS MERITS, AND IT IS ENCOURAGING THAT N CNA ARE GRADUALLY MOVING TO MEET US.

6. NEVERTHELESS TO USE THESE DEVELOPMENTS IN ANY ARGUMENT REPRESENTATION MIGHT ONLY RESULT IN THE REVERSAL OF THESE

LOCAL MOVES.

MACLENCSE

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8 December 1973

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Thank you for your letter of 6 December about Chinese representation in Hong Kong.

I have consulted the Prime Minister, who confirms that he agrees with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on this matter: i.e., the Prime Minister should again reject the Chinese proposal for an official representative in Hong Kong, when that matter is raised with Mr. Heath during his visit to Peking. Consequently there is no need for the Governor of Hong Kong or H.M. Ambassador in Peking to return to London for consultations before Christmas.

I am sending a copy of this letter, together with a copy of your letter of 6 December, to Webster (Cabinet Office).

P.H. Grattan, Esq.,

Your ever

Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Tom Bridges

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TO ROUTINE F C O TELNO 1438 OF 127H DECEMBER, 1973. INFO ROUTINE

PEKING.

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

YOU MIGHT LIKE TO KNOW THAT DALLAS, REUTERS' CHIEF REPRESENTA- TIVE HERE, HAS TOLD THE POLITICAL ADVISER THAT HE HAD IT FROM TWO SOURCES, ONE OF WHOM WAS THE EDITOR OF THE HSING TAO DAILY,

THAT THE CPG HAD DECIDED TO APPOINT CH'IAO KUAN-HUA AS THE OFFICIAL

CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE IN HONG KONG AND THAT A DEAL TO THIS EFFECT

WOULD BE MADE DURING THE PRIME MINISTER'S FORTHCOMING VISIT TO

PEKING.

DALLAS THOUGHT THIS WORTH PASSING ON BECAUSE OF THE REPUTABLE

NATURE OF HIS SOURCES AND THEIR INSISTENCE ON BRINGING THIS STORY

TO HIS ATTENTION.

3. I SHOULD EXPECT THERE WILL BE MORE KITE FLYING AND PRESS PRIMING OF THIS SORT BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT.

MACLEHOSE

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CONFIDENTIAL

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TO IMMEDIATE GOV HONG KONG TELNO 1263 OF 10 DECEMBER^AND TO

IMMEDIATE PEKING.

MY TELNO 1248.

PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR AND AMBASSADOR FROM WILFORD,

FOR 99% READ 100%. SORRY YOU'VE BEEN TROUBLED.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES

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PS/MR ROYLE MR WILFORD MR YOUDE

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王

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

I shall be draining the

brief myself of the beginning of next week.

London S.W.1

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6 December, 1973

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7 December, 1973.

теледит Telegram.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary spoke to the Prime Minister this morning. He mentioned that the recommendation to the Prime Minister was that he should again reject the Chinese proposal for an official representative in Hong Kong. If the Chinese pressed hard he should say that we are still studying the matter and this should hold the position for the L veing. Sir Alec recommended that if the Prime Minister accepted this advice he did not think there was any need for the Governor of Hong Kong and Sir John Addis to return to London for consultations before Christmas.

I understand that the Prime Minister did not indicate any dissent from this recommendation.

In any event the date originally under consideration for the briefing of the Prime Minister is now only a few days away.

Sir Alec asked me to let you have this note in writing to confirm his understanding of the position.

The Lord Bridges,

10, Downing Street,

LONDON, SW1.

CONFIDENTIAL

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TO IMMEDIATE GOV. HONG KONG TELNO 1248 OF 6TH DECEMBER 1973 AND

TO IMMEDIATE PEKING.

MY TEL NO 1242.

PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR AND AMBASSADOR FROM WILFORD.

S OF S SPOKE TO P.. THIS MORNING AND IT IS NOW 99% CERTAIN THAT YOUR PRESENCE HERE WILL NOT REPEAT NOT NOW BE REQUIRED. FINAL CONFIRMATION WILL FOLLOW.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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TO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO 1242 OF 5 DECEMBER 1973

AND TO PEKING.

PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR AND AMBASSADOR FROM WILFORD,

P.M.'S VISIT TO BELGIUM AND S OF S'S TO SOVIET UNION HAVE DELAYED DECISIONS, P.M. HAS SAID THAT HE WISHES TO SPEAK TO SIR ALEC BEFORE DECIDING WHETHER EITHER OR BOTH OF YOU SHOULD BE RECALLED FOR CONSULTATION, THEY CANNOT MEET BEFORE THURSDAY AT THE EARLIEST. I APOLOGISE FOR THIS CONTINUING UNCERTAINTY,

DOUGLAS-HOME

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MR WILFORD MR YOUDE

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CONFIDENTIAL

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Private Secretary (Mr Grattan)

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

As requested in your minute to Mr Wilford of 4 December, I attach a brief for the Secretary of State to use when he discusses this subject with the Prime Minister (perhaps at Sunningdale tomorrow).

2. I have spoken to Mr Wilford and Mr Youde about the line to be taken in the brief. It may be, however, that Mr Youde will have comments to make. I am therefore sending him a copy of the brief (under a copy of this minute).

R.M. Evans,

RM Evans

Far Eastern Department

5 December 1973

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CONFIDENTIAL

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

Strategy

pexuscle

1. Our purpose is to pursue the Chinese to shelve their proposal

for a number of years. We want them to do this because we judge

that the advantages of accepting their proposal would be outweighed

by the disadvantages of doing so. We believe that acceptance of

the Chinese proposal could have seriously adverse effects on the

security, stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. We do not think

that continued rejection of the Chinese proposal would do serious

damage to relations between the United Kingdom and China or put

at risk any of the commercial irons we now have in the fire

(particularly over the sale of Spey engines or other items of

aerospace equipment).

Tactics

2. If we are to achieve this purpose, we think that the best

tactics are to persist in saying no to the Chinese proposal.

To do otherwise at any rate at the outset could lead the

Chinese to suppose that we would yield to the application of

additional pressure; it might even tempt them to link this

issue with others (e.g. the sale of aerospace equipment). If,

the Chinese were to make it clear in response to our

further rejection of their proposal that penalties might follow,

we might then have to fall back on a promise to study the matter

further. But no reports which we have received have suggested

that this is likely to be the case; if anything, rather the

of course,

reverse.

/Line

CONFIDENTIAL

Line to take in public

3. We have no interest in volunteering anything about the

subject in public. But it is virtually certain that the Prime

Minister will be asked by journalists (in Peking or Hong Kong)

whether the subject was brought up. If the Prime Minister had

confined himself to telling the Chinese that we could not accept

their proposal, he could use the line with journalists which the

Secretary of State has already used in Parliament: that we have

given the Chinese no encouragement to pursue their proposal.

If the Prime Minister had promised to study the matter further,

he could say that it would continue to be studied.

Return of Sir Murray Maclehose and Sir John Addis

If the Prime Minister accepts the Secretary of State's advice

about strategy and tactics, there is probably no need for either

of the two to return to this country (though it might be as well

for the Prime Minister to have a word with Sir Murray Maclehose

on his way out to Peking). If, however, the Prime Minister has

doubts about this advice, we believethat both ought to return.

There would, however, be problems; the recall of Sir Murray

Maclehose at the same time as Sir John Addis would be bound to

generate speculation in the press (certainly in Hong Kong and

perhaps in this country too) about the subject in general.

Far Eastern Department

5 December 1973

CONFIDENTIAL - 2

Mr. Wilford

CONFIDENTIAL

FEA

Tot

Chinese Representation in Hong Kong

I am sorry to revert to the question of reporting to No. 10 the Secretary of State's comments on the paper about Chinese representation. I mentioned on the telephone that I saw some difficulty in a rather full elaboration of a minute by the Secretary of State which was already self-contained and clear. I have tried to make some amendments to the draft but do not see how we can send it as it stands. The Secretary of State's minute says that he does not think that the Chinese will press too hard and therefore to say that we will continue to study the matter will be sufficient to hold the line. The commentary on the minute says that the minute suggests that the Prime Minister should in the first instance say no. I am not sure we can put such interpretations on the Secretary of State's minute without further discussion with the Secretary of State. Also the line to be taken in public as given in your paragraph 4 would have to be cleared with him.

It now looks as though the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State will have a word about this, perhaps in the margins of the tripartite conference in Sunningdale on Thursday. It might be best for the Secretary of State to make his comments orally to the Prime Minister. Could FED, to whom a copy of this minute goes, please prepare a brief on the line for the Secretary of State to take about recalling the Governor and Sir John Addis, on the line the Prime Minister should take in Peking and on the press line? Could we have this by Wednesday evening.

Brief subrivied

Copied to:

PS/Mr. Royle

Mr. Evans

MED

Stuart

R.E. 512.

7/12

CONFIDENTIAL

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4 December, 1973

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CONFIDENTIAL

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4 December, 1973.

Dear Patrick the

Thank you for your letter of 30 November enclosing a memorandum about Chinese representation in Hong Kong. The Prime Minister has read the paper, the minute from the Parliamentary Secretary, and the other documents referred to.

The Prime Minister would next like to discuss the situation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, before deciding whether it is necessary to ask the Governor of Hong Kong and H.M. Ambassador in Peking to return to this country for consultations. I should be grateful if you could get in touch with us so as to fix an early date when the Prime Minister and Sir Alec Douglas-Home are both free.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Webster (Cabinet Office).

your ever

Tay Bridger

Mida Mi Darix

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P.H. Grattan, Esq.,

Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONHDENTRE

R.E.

Mr Stuart

CONFIDENTIAL

R:CEIVED IN

REGISTRY No. 52

- 5 DEC 1973

Fist 3/2

p.or. (106

1. I see that the record of Lord Kennet's talk with Mr Royle quotes, on page 3, Mr Royle as saying: "Wewere making provision for the future by amending the Fugitive Offenders Act". I imagine that he was not as specific as that. Does the record need amending?

30 November 1973

Youde

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3/12

CONFIDENTIAL

Prime Minister

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

As I mentioned to you on Tuesday evening when we spoke

about this, we are now providing you with further briefing.

This consists principally of a condensed summary of the

facts and arguments. We have also sent despatches from

Sir John Addis in Peking and the Governor himself arguing

their sides of the case.

105

You may not have time to read the despatches

but I urge you to read the summary

I should be very glad to discuss this further with you,

if you should so wish.

A.R

30 November, 1973

Anthony Royle

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS IS A COPY

THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

CONFIDENTIAL

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When you and Tom Brimelow spoke on 27 November about the issue of Chinese official representation in Hong Kong, he undertook to let you have a more detailed account of the views of the Governor of Hong Kong, and of Sir John Addis.

I attach a paper which sets out at greater length the considerations which MacLehose and Addis think important. These are based in the main on two despatches from Peking and Hong Kong, copies of which are enclosed in case you wish to have them for your own reference. I also attach a minute from Mr. Royle to the Prime Minister.

You will see from paragraph 3 of the enclosed paper that our conclusion is that the arguments put forward by MacLehose for rejecting the Chinese proposal outweigh those put forward by Addis for accepting it.

The Lord Bridges,

10 Downing Street,

London, S.W.1.

CONFIDENTIAL

{Syd) P. H. Graecar.

104

Prime Minister

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

As I mentioned to you on Tuesday evening when we spoke

about this, we are now providing you with further briefing.

This consists principally of a condensed summary of the

facts and arguments.

We have also sent despatches from

Sir John Addis in Peking and the Governor himself arguing

their sides of the case.

You may not have time to read the despatches

but I urge you to read the summary

I should be very glad to discuss this further with you,

if you should so wish.

A.R.

30 November, 1973

Anthony Royle

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS IS A COPY

THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 944) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

CONFIDENTIAL

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

1. The Chinese have proposed that there should be an

official Chinese representative in Hong Kong. They believe

this to be a logical consequence of the exchange of Ambassador:.

An official representative could act as a link between the

Hong Kong Government and the Chinese Government; and improve

relations by explaining Chinese Government policies to local

Chinese. They maintain there would be no intention to set

up a dual régime. They accept that Britain rules Hong Kong,

but maintain that all of it, ceded as well as leased territory,

is part of China.

ARGUMENTS OF THE GOVERNOR

2. The Governor is strongly opposed to the appointment of a

Representative. He believes the Chinese would like an

official representative in Hong Kong, but that they do not

attach overriding importance to it in the context of Sino-

British relations. The grounds for his objections are:

(a) It would not be interpreted as a routine, far less a

reassuring diplomatic move. Accession to the Chinese

demand would give a jolt to public confidence. The

population of Hong Kong would be likely to see the

arrival of an Official Chinese Representative as an

important act in the reassertion of Chinese control

over the Colony. It would set in motion new forces and

create new uncertainties at a critical time.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ (b)

CONFIDENTIAL

(b)

(c)

Acceptance of the appointment would be tantamount to

establishing an alternative focus of loyalty in Hong Kong.

As such it would irrevocably undermine the authority of

Governor and lead towards a Macao type situation in the

Colony. Because of our need to retain control in and

over the Colony such a situation would be more likely to

lead to premature confrontation than to cement good

relations with Peking.

Such an appointment, whatever title its holder were given,

would carry enormous prestige and influence over the Chinese population of the Colony (99). No matter whet

assurances the Chinese Government gave about the scope and nature of the Representative's functions, these

would be open to conflicting interpretations. Moreover

given the Chinese claim to sovereignty over Hong Kong it i very difficult to guess what limits China would accent

on what it saw as its legitimate intereste. Large secti

of the Chinese community would inevitably look to him to intervene on specific issues on their behalf. Although

such occasions might at first bo few, they could incresce

rapidly. This might become critical at times of stress,

e.g. a recurrence of communist-inspired violence in the

Colony. An official Representative (and through him the Chinese Government) would face the choice of satisfyir-

those who sought his support or of losing face by refundne

it. The standing of the Chinese Government in Peking

/ would

CONFIDENTIAL

(a)

(e)

would be directly involved.

While the present Governtent

in Peking might be prepared to risk a loss of face As

long as the situation in Hong Kong did not threaten to

get out of control - we cannot say how a future Chinese

Government would react.

The increased uncertainties rising from the presence of

an official Representative would damage business confidenc›

in Hong Kong. Investment would suffer severely and the

prosperity and the security of the Colony could be gravel:

endangered. The flow of funds from Government and private

sources abroad might dry up.

The decision to accept an official Representative once

taken would be irrevocable; but if we maintain our

refusal, we could quickly reverse our attitude if it

proved untenable.

Once an official Representative was

(1)

established we could do nothing to control his activitien,

far less expel him, without seeking the major con-

frontation with China which we wish to avoid. He would,

moreover, permanently be at risk and a most tempting

target for assassination by a KMT agent provocateur.

It is unlikely that the request for an official Repro-

sentative in Hong Kong would be the last major politiem?

demand the Chinese would make of us. To give my might

merely whet their appetite, and encourage them to main

demands in other fields.

- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL

/ (g)

CONFIDENTIAL

(g) The majority of the non-communist Chinese press already

(h)

support the line on a Chinese representative taken up

till now by HNG. The Governor would find it impossible

in the light of this to persuade public opinion generally

that greater dangers than those already perceived in the

acceptance of an official Representative would be imminent

if our refusal were maintained. It would be argued that

we should wait and see.

There is no practical need for a change in the present

arrangements for Chinese representation in Hong Kong,

which work efficiently. The following organs of the

Chinese Government in Hong Kong are run, and to a large

extent staffed, by Chinese Government officials: the

New China News Agency (NCNA), The Bank of China, The China

Resources Co Ltd and the China Travel Service. Of thean

the NCNA already acts as a co-ordinating body; its

functions are closely akin to those of a Consulate-Gona"".

but it has of course no official cachet. It acts as the

established channel of communication on the political side

between the Hong Kong Government and the authorities in

Peking. Any need for change can be met by discreetly

advancing the degree of contact between the Governor and

the present "unoffical" representative (who is the Frað

of the New China News Agency).

- 4·

CONFIDENTIAL

ARGUMENTS OF HN AMBASSADOR IN PEKING

2. Sir John Addia believes that there is force in the

Chinese argument that the absence of an official Representative

in Hong Kong is an anomaly.

He believes that we should not

Instead we should, in

return a negative reply to the Chinese.

further discussions with the Chinese, seek to define as closely

as possible the functions and status of a Chinese official

Representative in Hong Kong and to dress up the appointment

in such a way that it can be presented to public opinion

without shaking confidence in the Colony. His argument is

based on the following considerations:-

(a) The absence of a Representative was comprehensible while

full diplomatic relations between the Chinese Governingt

and HMG did not exist. But our agreement to exchange Ambassadors and the subsequent improvement in our relation

with Peking has brought about a new situation.

(D)

We need

to make our voice heard in discussions of Asian affairs;

and so long as Chinese ambitions in this regard are not

fulfilled our relationship with the Chinese Government

and its political value will inevitably be somewhat

diminished.

To accept the Chinese proposal would, to some extent,

place a seal on the present status of Hong Kong and riva us some assurance that the evolution of Hong Kong during the years ahead will take place with the concurrence of

the Chinese Government. Our position in Hong Kong

5 -

CONFIDENTIAL

/ itself

CONFIDENTIAL

itself depends on the Chinese Government's goodwill.

Our position cannot be static but must evolve with develop *

circumstances, particularly over the next quarter of a

century leading up to the end of the Lease of the New

Territories in 1997. We shall need the Chinese

Government's co-operation over each stage in this

evolving situation. The appointment of an official

Representative would have the double advantage of

facilitating this co-operation in the future and

formalising Chinese acquiescence in the present position

now.

If 19

continue to return a refusal, we can expect a steady

deterioration of bilateral relations on all fronta,

political as well as commercial. The Chinese might vell

steer important contracts towards our foreign commercial

competitors. They could also refuse to contemplate

progress on such matters as the signature of the Air

Services Agreement.

CONCLUSION

3. Our conclusion is that the arguments put forward by th

Governor of Hong Kong against accepting the Chinese proponial,

Pause they involve a serious risk of loss of confidence in t

Colony and thus severely affect its economic life, outweigh

CONFIDENTIAL

/ those

CONFIDENT FAL

those put forward by H M Ambassador at Peking for accepting 11.

Our prime consideration must remain the security, stability ani

prosperity of Hong Kong. It would therefore be wrong to accept

an irreversible proposal which could put these factors at risk,

4. It should however be stressed that the Governor is well

aware, in the context of relations between HMG and the Chinese

Government in general, of the need to improve working contacts

with Chinese Government officials in Hong Kong. Hitherto no

Governor has had direct contact with employees of the Chinone

Government in the Colony. With our approval Sir Murray

MacLehose has embarked on a policy of encouraging such contacts.

There is evidence that the Chinese Government have noted, and

responded to, this development.

- 7 -

CONFIDENTIAL

3/14

H L1 Davies Esq

FED

FCO

CONFIDENTIAL

BRITISH EMBASSY

PEKING

29 November 1973

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CHINESE REFRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

Enter

David Bonavia told me yesterday that, when discussing the question of immigration into Hong Kong with Chang Tseng-tsu of the Information Department of the MFA (Mr Ma's successor) Chang linked the problem immediately with Chinese Representation in Hong Kong on lines similar to Mr Wang Tung's kite-flying with Armbassad ov

Bonavia also said that a former deputy head of NCNA in Hong Kong whom he had known in Hong Kong had, unprompted, peddled the Chinese position on representation in Hong Kong to him with some force, when they met by chance not long ago.

чери та

Miche

MJ Richardson

Copied to:

T J B George Esq APA

HONG KONG

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14 De

1773

CONFIDENTIAL

•

CONFIDENTIAL

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

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1. The Chinese have proposed that there should be an

official Chinese representative in Hong Kong. They believe

this to be a logical consequence of the exchange of Ambassadors.

An official representative could act as a link between the

Hong Kong Government and the Chinese Government; and improve

relations by explaining Chinese Government policies to local

Chinese. They maintain there would be no intention to set

up a dual régime. They accept that Britain rules Hong Kong,

but maintain that all of it, ceded as well as leased territory,

is part of China.

ARGUMENTS OF THE GOVERNOR

The Governor is strongly opposed to the appointment of a

Representative. He believes the Chinese would like an

official representative in Hong Kong, but that they do not

attach overriding importance to it in the context of Sino-

British relations. The grounds for his objections are:

(a) It would not be interpreted as a routine, far less a

Accession to the Chinese

reassuring diplomatic move.

demand would give a jolt to public confidence. The

population of Hong Kong would be likely to see the

arrival of an Official Chinese Representative as an

important act in the reassertion of Chinese control

over the Colony. It would set in motion new forces and

create new uncertainties at a critical time.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ (b)

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) Acceptance of the appointment would be tantamount to

establishing an alternative focus of loyalty in Hong Kong.

As such it would irrevocably undermine the authority of the

Governor and lead towards a Macao type situation in the

Colony. Because of our need to retain control in and

over the Colony such a situation would be more likely to

lead to premature confrontation than to cement good

relations with Peking.

Large sections

would carry enormous prestige and influence over the

Chinese population of the Colony (99%). No matter what

assurances the Chinese Government gave about the scope

and nature of the Representative's functions, these

would be open to conflicting interpretations, Koreover

given the Chinese claim to sovereignty over Hong Kong it is

very difficult to guess what limits China would accept

on what it saw as its legitimate interests.

of the Chinese community would inevitably look to him to

intervene on specific issues on their behalf. Although

such occasions might at first be few, they could increase

rapidly. This might become critical at times of atress,

e.g. a recurrence of communist-inspired violence in the

Colony. An official Representative (and through him the

Chinese Government) would face the choice of satisfying

those who sought his support or of losing face by refusing

it. The standing of the Chinese Government in Peking

/ would

CONFIDENTIAL

(a)

would be directly involved.

While the present Government

in Peking might be prepared to risk a loss of face

long as the situation in Hong Kong did not threaten to

get out of control

白您

we cannot say how a future Chinese

Government would react.

The increased uncertainties rising from the presence of

an official Representative would damage business confidence

in Hong Kong. Investment would suffer severely and the

prosperity and the security of the Colony could be gravely

endangered. The flow of funds from Government and private

sources abroad might dry up.

(e) The decision to accept an official Representative once

taken would be irrevocable; but if we maintain our

refusal, we could quickly reverse our attitude if it

proved untenable. Once an official Representative was

established we could do nothing to control his activities,

far less expel him, without seeking the major con-

frontation with China which we wish to avoid. He would,

moreover, permanently be at risk and a most tempting

target for assassination by a KMT agent provocateur.

(f)

It is unlikely that the request for an official Repre-

sentative in Hong Kong would be the last major political

demand the Chinese would make of us. To give way might

merely whet their appetite, and encourage them to make

demands in other fields.

-3-

CONFIDENTIAL

/ (8)

CONFIDENTIAL

(g) The majority of the non-communist Chinese press already

support the line on a Chinese representative taken up

till now by HMG.

in the light of this to persuade public opinion generally

that greater dangers than those already perceived in the

acceptance of an official Representative would be imminent

if our refusal were maintained, It would be argued that

The Governor would find it impossible

we should wait and see.

(h) There is no practical need for a change in the present

arrangements for Chinese representation in Hong Kong,

which work efficiently. The following organe of the

Chinese Government in Hong Kong are run, and to a large

extent staffed, by Chinese Government officials: the

New China News Agency (NCNA), The Bank of China, The China

Resources Co Ltd and the China Travel Service. Of these

the NONA already acts as a co-ordinating body; ite

functions are closely akin to those of a Consulate-General,

but it has of course no official cachet. It acts as the

established channel of communication on the political aide

between the Hong Kong Government and the authorities: in

Peking. Any need for change can be met by discreetly

advancing the degree of contact between the Governor and

the present "unoffical" representative (who is the Read

of the New China News Agency).

- 4

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 2.

CONFIDENTIAL

ARGUMENTS OF HM AMBASSADOR IN PEKING

2. Sir John Addis believes that there is force in the

Chinese argument that the absence of an official Representative

in Hong Kong is an anomaly. He believes that we should not

return a negative reply to the Chinese. Instead we should, in

further discussions with the Chinese, seek to define as closely

as possible the functions and status of a Chinese offical

Representative in Hong Kong and to dress up the appointment

in such a way that it can be presented to public opinion

without shaking confidence in the Colony. His argument is

based on the following considerations:-

(a) The absence of a Representative was comprehensible while

full diplomatic relations between the Chinese Government

and HMG did not exist. But our agreement to exchange

Ambassadors and the subsequent improvement in our relations

with Peking has brought about a new situation. We need

to make our voice heard in discussions of Asian affairs;

and so long as Chinese ambitions in this regard are not

fulfilled our relationship with the Chinese Government

and its political value will inevitably be somewhat

diminished.

(b) To accept the Chinese proposal would, to some extent,

place a seal on the present status of Hong Kong and give

us some assurance that the evolution of Hong Kong during

the years ahead will take place with the concurrence of

the Chinese Government.

Our position in Hong Kong

- 5 -

CONFIDENTIAL

/ite f

CONFIDENTIAL

itself depends on the Chinese Government's goodwill.

Our position cannot be static but must evolve with developing

circumstances, particularly over the next quarter of a

century leading up to the end of the Lease of the New

Territories in 1997. We shall need the Chinese

Government's co-operation over each stage in this

evolving situation. The appointment of an official

Representative would have the double advantage of

facilitating this co-operation in the future and

formalising Chinese acquiescence in the present position

now.

If we

continue to return a refusal, we can expect a steady

deterioration of bilateral relations on all fronts,

political as well as commercial. The Chinese might well

steer important contracts towards our foreign commercial

competitors. They could also refuse to contemplate

progress on such matters as the signature of the Air

Services Agreement.

CONCLUSION

3. Our conclusion is that the arguments put forward by the

Governor of Hong Kong against accepting the Chinese proposal,

because they involve a serious risk of loss of confidence in the

Colony and thus severely affect its economic life, outweigh

- 6-

CONFIDENTIAL

/ those

CONFIDENTIAL

those put forward by HM Ambassador at Peking for accepting it.

Our prime consideration must remain the security, stability and

prosperity of Hong Kong. It would therefore be wrong to accept

an irreversible proposal which could put these factors at risk.

4. It should however be stressed that the Governor is well

aware, in the context of relations between HMG and the Chinese

Government in general, of the need to improve working contacts

with Chinese Government officials in Hong Kong. Hitherto no

Governor has had direct contact with employees of the Chinese

Government in the Colony. With our approval Sir Murray

MacLehose has embarked on a policy of encouraging such contacts.

There is evidence that the Chinese Government have noted, and

responded to, this development.

- 7 -

CONFIDENTIAL

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TO IMMEDIATE PEXING TELNO 1219 OF 29 NOVEMBER INFO PERSONAL

OOVERNOR HONG KONG

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 1337 AND HONG KONG TELNO. 1364:

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

1. WE HAVE NOW PREPARED A PAPER FOR THE PRIME MINISTER, CAREFULLY

SUMMARI SING YOUR VIEWS AND THE ARGUMENTS OF THE GOVERNOR HONG KONG

EUT EXPANDING ON MATERIAL WHICH HE HAS PREVIOUSLY SEEN. THIS IS

DRAWN FROM THE TELEGRAMS AND DESPATCHES ON THIS SUBJECT. THE PRIME

MINISTER WILL DE CONSIDERING TH13 PAPER OVER THE WEEKEND.

2. THEREAFTER WE HOPE TO BE ABLE TO LET YOU KNOW WHETHER IT WILL

DE NECESSARY TO ASK YOU TO RETURN FOR CONSULTATIONS.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES

HD HK I OD

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TRIVATE SECRETARY PS/PUS

FS/MR ROYLE

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST]

COPIES TO

SIR J HUNT, CABINET OFFICE

SECRET

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TO IMEDIATE HONG KONG TEL:0 1219 OF 27 NOVEMBER.1473 PERSO!IAL FOR COVERNOR FROM PUS.

YOUR TELEGRAM HO 1364: CHINESE REPRESENTATION.

195

1. WE APPRECIATE YOUR DIFFICULTY AND HAVE DISCUSSED IT WITH MR

ROYLE AID LORD BRIDGES.

(Fe

101

2. WE SHALL NOW PREPARE A FURTHER PAPER CAREFULLY MARSHALL ING THE ARGUMENTS YOU HAVE MADE IN YOUR TELEGRAMS AND DESPATCHES ON THIS SUBJECT, AND DRAWING IN ADDITION ON CERTAIN INDICATIONS WE HAVE RECEIVED OF THE WAY IN WHICH THE CHINESE MAY HANDLE THIS QUESTION DURING THE PRIME ISTE'S VISIT. OUR HOPE 15 THAT THE PRIME FINISTER VILL BE ABLE TO CONSIDER THIS PAPER CAREFULLY OVER THE WECKEND. HE WILL SCARCELY BE ABLE TO GIVE IT ATTENTION BEFORE

THEN.

3. THE PAPER WILL OF COURSE HAVE TO INCLUDE A SHORT PASSAGE

SUMMARISING THE VIEUS WHICH HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED BY SIR JOHN ADDIS

ON THIS SUBJECT.

4. THE ONE DISCUSSION WE HAVE HAD WITH THE PRIME MINISTER WAS OF A PRELIMINARY NATURE, AND WHEN HE HAS GIVEN FURTHER THOUGHT TO THE PAPER WHICH WE ARE LOW PREPARING, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT WE MAY BE ABLE TO DISPENSE WITH VISITS BY SIR JOH: ADDIS AND YOURSELF. OUR CONCERN HAS BEEN THAT OUR POLICY ON CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENT- STION IN HONG KONG SHOULD NOT BE MODIFIED WITHOUT THE FULLEST PERSONAL CONSIDERATION BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF YOUR VIEWS. IF YOU ARE CONTENT TO LET THE CASE REST ON THE ARGUMENTS WHICH YOU HAVE ALREADY EXPRESSED IN CORRESPONDENCE ON THIS SUBJECT, IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO DISPENSE WITH PERSONAL CONSULTATION, AND WE RECOGNISE THE WEIGHT OF THE CONSIDERATIONS PUT FORWARD IN YOUR TELEGRAM

UNDER REFERENCE.

5. DO YOU SEE ANY OBJECTION TO THE REPETITION TO PEKING OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE AND THIS REPLY?

DOUGLAS-HOME

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TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 1369 OF 28 NOVEMBER. 1973

PERSONAL FOR PUS FROM GOVERNOR.

YOUR TELEGRAM 1219. CHINESE REPRESENTATION.

TO AVOID PUBLICITY I AM SURE IT IS BETTER THAT AT THIS STAGE THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S LINE SHOULD BE DEPLOYED BY THE OFFICE.

2. IF A SITUATION WERE SUBSEQUENTLY TO EMERGE IN WHICH YOU EITHER BEGAN TO DOUBT THE VALIDITY OF THE ARGUMENT OR SAW A CHANCE OF BEING OVERBORNE, AND IN WHICH THERE WAS A REAL POSSIBILITY OF

THE PRIME MINISTER IN PEKING INITIATING A NEW COURSE OF ACTION OVER

HONG KONG, I WOULD BE GREATLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE REPERCUSSIONS HERE.

IN THIS CASE IN SPITE OF THE PUBLICITY ! SHOULD LIKE TO RETURN TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DISCUSSION.

3. 1 HOPE SUCH A POINT IS NOT REACHED, BUT IF IT IS PUBLICITY COULD

BE LESSENED IF MY VISIT DID NOT COINCIDE WITH ADDIS AND IF IT

COULD APPEAR AS CONNECTED WITH CHRISTMAS LEAVE, BUT THESE

PRESENTATIONAL ASPECTS WOULD BE SECONDARY TO THE MEED TO SETTLE

THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUE.

NACLEHOSE

FILES

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MR WILFORD

YOUDE SIR D VATSON

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Mr Youde

Mr Wilford

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nurushing).

It seems that we may be nearing an impasse with the Prime

Minister, which he is liable to resolve at a stroke in the wrong

direction.

He clearly wants something other than a straight negative

brief. We believe that even a "maybe" would be dangerous.

We may

need a fall-back. I wonder whether in these circumstances we should

not reconsider the offer of a Consul-General.

We would have to make it plain to the Prime Minister that

the Chinese had already turned this down in answer to Mr Royle's

feelers. But in fact the proposal could be presented to the Chinese

in quite a positive way.

He could say in effect: "I accept that it is anomalous, in

the current good state of our relations, that your country should be

formally unrepresented in Hong Kong. I agree that the presence of a

Representative would help in many practical ways to keep things on

an even keel. I believe your assurance that a Representative would

not meddle in Hong Kong's internal affairs.

But there is a substantial problem, which affects you as

well as us. The interest of both of us is the stability of Hong

Kong. This depends on confidence. The people of Hong Kong would be

bound to interpret the appointment of a Representative as a sign of

/imminent

SECRET

imminent political change. This would itself promote instability.

In times of stress, whether created by the appointment of a

Representative or otherwise, they would be bound to begin to treat

him as an alternative Governor, even against his will. We would

thus end up with a situation that neither of us want.

The need is to find a solution which leaves no-one in any

doubt that the Governor remains in sole control. We take different

views of the constitutional position of Hong Kong. This is

inescapable, but does not affect our relations.

But on one thing

we are both agreed, that Britain is in de facto control.

We are

both strong supporters of the law. It is perfectly possible in

International Law to have formal diplomatic and consular relations

with a de facto régime, while continuing to withhold de jure

recognition. Thus it would be possible in law for China to send

a Consul-General to Hong Kong while abating nothing of their formal

claim that Hong Kong is part of China. A Consul-General would

therefore involve no more than the acceptance that Britain is in

de facto control and that any change would be by agreement.

we understand it, this is precisely the position of the Chinese

Government.

I appreciate that you have already given this preliminary

thought and have turned it down. But it is a proposal which meets

both the legal and the practical realities. I make it as a genuine

attempt to meet our shared needs without creating unacceptable

difficulties for either. I hope you can accept it."

SECRET

/8....

SECRET

I offer this à toutes fins utiles, in the attempt to find

something that could satisfy the Prime Minister; that would give

us the initiative and put the ball firmly back in the Chinese

court; and that could, if perchance it was accepted, in fact

stabilise the situation in Hong Kong.

Mr Hervey, FED

ACSO

AC Stuart

Hong Kong & Indian Ocean Dept.

I do not think that it is a foregone

conclusion that the A.M. will roll against

present position. To offer

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CONFIDENTIAL

наход

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

R.E.

4/12

The Prime Minister's worries are fourfold:

Pla

(a) his objective is to maintain confidence in Hong Kong

and he says to achieve this the people of Hong Kong

want to have good relations with the Government of

China. The way to achieve this is to satisfy Paking's

demand to have a permanent representative in Hong Kong. He does not believe unofficial opinion to be repre-

sentative of public opinion in Hong Kong.

(b) the right time to achieve a settlement of this question

with Peking is when relations are good

(0)

not when they

are bad; therefore the time to act is now.

if the matter is negotiated now the functions of the

Chinese representative can be closely determined and

set out in an agreement: if he transgresses then we

have legitimate grievance to address to the Chinese

Government.

(d) what is he to do if Chou En-lai ties the appointment of

a Chinese representative to conclusion of a multi-

million pound agreement on the sale of British aerospace equipment to China (or some other major trade deal)?

The answers to the Prime Minister's points in my view are: (a) While the people of Hong Kong are of course glad to see the

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improved relations between Britain and China they would draw

the line at any step which had the effect of damaging

/confidence

CONFIDENTIAL

confidence in Britain's continued ability to administer the

Colony. In the view of the Governor and opinion in Hong

Kong as expressed in the non-Communist Chinese press, to

permit the appointment of a Chinese representative would

be just such a step.

(b) If it is inevitable that a Chinese representative will have

to be conceded one day there is much force in the argument

that it is better to consider it at a time of good relations

than when relations are bad. But the argument at (a)

above still applies. Moreover the Chinese community could

be expected to argue that Britain was taking a step in her

own, or in what she conceived (wrongly) to be Hong Kong's,

interest which was in reality against the interest of Hong

Kong.

representative's functions could probably be negotiated

and it might hold up for a while. But Communist

Governments are not famous for confining their staffa to

legitimate functions, and conditions could change in China

with the consequence of revised instructions to the Chinese

representative from Peking. But a much greater hazard

would be the unwillingness of the Chinese people of Hong:

Kong to be circumscribed by whatever rules might have been

/ drawn

- 2

CONFIDENTIAL

drawn up.

If they had grievances against the Government

they would press them on the Chinese representative who

would be in a less strong position to tell them that

it was no business of his than would an unofficial repre-

sentative such as exists today. The fact that in the

view of the Chinese Government all but a tiny fraction of

the population of Hong Kong are Chinese citizens highlights

the danger. Gradually the risk is that a Macao type situatio

Moreover to expel a Chinese representative

would arise.

who misbehaved would simply not be possible.

(a) The likelihood of the Chinese so acting is not great. They want our aerospace equipment and they want peace

in Hong Kong. They have never in the past made propaganda

publicity on the Chinese representation issue. They are

likely to play the hand carefully. Moreover there is no

guarantee at all that the Spey deal will have reached final

stages of negotiation by the time the Prime Minister roes

to China. If, however, the Chinese should try blackmail

by threatening either disorders in Hong Kong or a flood

of immigrants the Prime Minister could answer that the

resulting lack of confidence within Hong Kong will be neither to the interest of China or Britain (or Hong Kong). If he were to be threatened with a refusal to consumate

a Rolls Royce agreement because of our refusal to agree

-3-

CONFIDENTIAL

/ to

CONFIDENTIAL

to Chinese representation he could surely say that this

was a new situation which he would wish to discuss with

his colleagues.

K M Wilford

28 November 1973

- 4-

CONFIDENTIAL

{

Mr Youde

CONFIDENTIAL

COVERING SECRET

CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

1. As requested by Mr Wilford on 27 November I submit a draft letter to Lord Bridges at No 10 Downing Street. It covers a revised paper setting out in greater detail the views of Sir Murray MacLehose. It also gives an account of Sir John Addis's views.

HK & IOD concur.

Mr Stuart HK & IOD

28 November 1973

R Hervey

Far Eastern Dept

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1. I think that there would be advantage also in sendin

sending? Lord Bridges copies of the two main papers - the desperade mal

from Peking dated 18 December 1972 and Hong Kong's reply of 11 January 1973. I have amended the draft letter to Lord Bridges accordingly.

2. Mr Royle may also wish to see the paper which is now being sent to No. 10.

30/

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CONFIDENTIAL

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Kim Willow 25/1

28 November 1973 Revited i

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124

FED

TO IMMEDIATE PEKING TELNO 191 OF 28TH NOVEMBER, 1973. INFO IMMEDIATE F C 0.

(95

THROUGH A CLERICAL ERROR MY TELEGRAM NO. 1364 TO F.C.O. WAS

NOT REPEATED TO YOU: TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS:

BEGINS.

PERSONAL FOR PUS FROM GOVERNOR.

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 1211 : CHINESE REPRESENTATION.

I WOULD HAVE LIKED THIS BUT SEE NO WAY OF DOING IT WITHOUT

UNACCEPTABLE SPECULATION.

2. IF ADDIS RETURNS FOR CONSULTATIONS THIS WOULD CAUSE NO REMARK

HERE. BUT IF I 60 TOO AT ANY TIME BETWEEN NOW AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT, AND PARTICULARLY IF I COINCIDE WITH ADDIS, THIS WOULD CAUSE GREAT SPECULATION HERE, WHICH I SUSPECT WOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE ENGLISH PRESS. SINCE THERE IS NOTHING ABOUT THE PRIME MINISTER'S SHORT VISIT TO HONG KONG THAT COULD REQUIRE MY PRIOR RETURN, THE PUBBLIC WOULD ASSUME THE SUBJECT TO BE CHINA/HONG KONG RELATIONS, THAT ESTABLISHED POLICIES WERE BEING RECONSIDERED, AND THAT THERE WAS CONFLICT BETWEEN ADDIS'S ADVICE AND MINE.

I CANNOT THINK OF ANYTHING I COULD SAY THAT WOULD DEFLECT THE PRESS

HERE FROM SUCH AN OBVIOUS DEDUCTION.

3. THERE IS OF COURSE BOUND TO BE SOME SPECULATION HERE BETWEEN NOW AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT, BUT I AM AFRAID THE JOINT CONSULTATION PROPOSED WOULD GREATLY INCREASE AND DRAMATISE IT. THIS WOULD CARRY THE DANGER OF CONDITIONING THE PRESS TO SEE HONG KONG AS THE LEAD STORY IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT, WHICH WOULD BE THE OPPOSITE OF WHAT WE WANT AND EVEN OF WHAT IS LIKELY TO HAPPEN

IN PEKING.

4. I SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT I DISCOVER IT IS VERY UNUSUAL FOR THE GOVERNOR TO BE RECALLED FOR CONSULTATION.

THE ARGUEMENTS ON BOTH SIDES OF THIS QUESTION ARE WELL DOCUMENTE IN TELEGRAMS AND DESPATCHES, AND THERE ARE THE PERSONAL EXPERIENCES OF THE S. OF S, AND MR. ROYLE TO DRAW ON. NOR HAS ANYTHING TRANSPIRED TO INVALIDATE THE REASONING ON WHICH THE S. OF S. BASED HIS LINE. IN VIEW OF THE LIKELY REPERCUSSIONS OF MY RETURN, IF THERE IS ANY NEW POINT ON WHICH MY ADVICE IS WANTED COULD NOT THIS BE DEALT WITH BY TELEGRAM? OF COURSE IF THE PRIME MINISTER STAGES THROUGH HONG KONG ON THE INWARD JOURNEY TO CHINA, WE COULD

HAVE A TALK AT THE AIRPORT.

6. 1 DO NOT KNOW IF YOU WILL WISH TO INSIST ON THIS PROPOSAL

BUT IF SO THE DATES SUGGESTED WOULD INVOLVE CALCELLATION OF TWO MAJOR ANNUAL GOVERNOR'S COMMITMENTS. THOUGH PERHAPS NOT OF GREAT INTRINSIC IMPORTANCE, THEIR CANCELLATION WOULD ADD FORCE TO SPECULATION THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING MAJOR AFOOT.

7. IF IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING YOU STILL FEEL IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT I SEE THE PRIME MINISTER IN LONDON, I THINK THE ONLY CHANCE OF DOING SO WITHOUT MUCH PUBLICITY HERE WOULD BE FOR MY WIFE AND MYSELF TO TAKE CHRISTMAS LEAVE. I MIGHT ADD THAT FOR VARIOUS REASONS I AM NOT AT ALL ANXIOUS TO DO THIS,

ONLY WAY.

ENDS

MACLEHOSE

BUT I THINK IT IS THE

ated as requested ]

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6.3. 143

SCR 4/3371/58

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FEHS

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Dear Andrew.

Colonial Secretariat, Lower Albert Road,

HONG KONG,

27th November 1973

Enter Miss Kelly nig., FED

"Vi" Reserch Dept

How of

some interest

Aes 3/12

After this year's 1st October celebrations

we thought that it would be worth analysing the number of invitations to the main CPG functions received by Government officers over the last two years.

A table was thus prepared, to set out the position, together with a brief commentary on it. The latter includes such information as we could discreetly obtain about UMELCO invitations and acceptances.

of interest to you.

to Morgan in Peking.

am enclosing copies of both, as they may be

A copy of this letter and the enclosures goes

Yours ever. Peter.

(G. P. Lbyd)

Secretary for Security

A. C. Stuart, Esq, CPM,

Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department,

Foreign and Commonwealth Office,

LONDON S. W. 1.

ENCLS: 2.

CONFIDENTA

issued:

INVITATIONS TO COMMUNIST DAY CELEBRATIONS

OCTOBER 1973

There are three distinct levels at, which invitations are

(a)

(b)

(c)

The NCNA reception which is for the most senior and is the most significant. These are marked with an asterisk.

Other receptions by, for instance, the Bank of China, China Resources, NG FUNG HONG and China: Steam Navigation Co. which are of lesser significance but important in terms of day to day relationships between Heads of Departments and Communist Chinese officials.

Receptions at working level, chiefly affecting Agriculture and Fisheries, Kowloon - Cant on Railway, Marine Department and Urban Services Department.

It is clear that different policies are followed for the Spring Festival and the National Day Celebrations, Invitations are more lavishly issued for the former and there are many more parties. It is not however certain that the Spring Festival is used to feel out the ground before extending the scope and scale of invitations for National Day receptions. The comparison is made therefore between National Days in 1971, 1972 and 1973.

One major deduction is that invitations at senior level still tend to be issued to individuals rather than to office holders: this is exemplified by Mr. Cater and Mr. Robson, Another is that the Communists are definitely aiming higher, as the invitations this year to the Colonial Secretary, Financial Secretary and Deputy Colonial Secretary demonstrate. It is to be expected that more senior officers will be invited to the Spring Festivals in 1974 and that the Colonial Secretary will be asked again to the October celebrations in 1974.

UMELCO Members

In 1972, Messrs. SZETO WAU, Q. W. LEE, James

M. H. WU and PC WOO were invited to and attended the NCNA reception for the October celebrations; Mr. P. C. WOO notified us of the invitations and the

intention to accept, He has not done so this year. However, an examination of the published guest list for this year's reception shows that Messrs. T.K. ANN and Q. W. LEE were present, and it is thought that there were very probably others.

Mr. Q. W. LEE, as Social Secretary of UMELCÓ, was asked by a representative of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce which Chinese Unofficials would accept an invitation to a dinner at the Metropole Restaurant on 1st October this year: he was told that Sir Y. K. KAN was definitely going. Mr. LEE contacted his colleagues and all, save himself, Mr. James WU, Mr. Wilson WANG and possibly Mr. F. W. LI, said they could

/and

and would go.

Mr. LEE believes invitations were then sent and the majority of Chinese UMELCO members were at the dinner; he was out of the Colony. His comment was that the CGCC was taking great pains not to be rebuffed by the refusal of a formal invitation. It is, at least, possible that similar tactics will be adopted next year by the NCNA in issuing invitations to the most senior Government officers, i, e. they will try the grand first through some intermediary such as Mr. Percy CHEN or Mr. R. C. LEE,

Security Branch, Colonial Secretariat,

NOVEMBER 1973

Hon. C.S.

Senior

Officers

- (1)•

1973

Senior

Others

Officers

1972

Senior

Others

Officera

F.S.

S.H.A.

D.C.S.

· (1)•

1 (1)•

1 (1).

5. for. Env.

1 (1)

D.P.V.

↑ (1)•

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D.W.S.

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D. C. & I.

↑ (1)*

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P.A.

1 (1)"

1 (1)*

1 (1) 4. (1)"

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1 (1).

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D. of. Immigration

2 (2),

3 (3)

2 (2)*

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1971

Others

A new development. Sir High Norman-Walker was invited but left the Colony on the day of the reception.

A new development. Invitation refused on instructions of the Ag. Gor,

Mr. Cater has attended regularly in the past

A new development

Mr. Robson has attended regularly in the past

(a) DDC & I attended. but not DC & I.

(b) The majority were bidden to two parties but attended only one.

A new departure

Mr. Watt was unable to attend, but has been present regularly in the past. He attended another partyed, kë

mal

The invitation was to DO Tsuen Wan, who was also asked to the Spring Festival. An L.0. was present, in lieu, on both "occasions,

Invitations were addressed to Assistant Director and Staff of Abattoira Division. down to Master Butchers. Representatives Dom Sunday xls attended,

GRPS 515

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER/CAT A

FM HONG KONG 270930Z

SECRET

rol

125/60

pa.

93-95

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 1364 OF-27TH NOVEMBER, 1973.

PERSONAL FOR PUS FROM GOVERNOR.

YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 1211 ↑ CHINESE REPRESENTAT ION.

I WOULD HAVE LIKED THIS BUT SEE NO WAY OF DOING IT WITHOUT

UNACCEPTABLE SPECULATION.

IF ADDIS RETURNS FOR CONSULTATIONS THIS WOULD CAUSE NO REMARK

HERE. BUT IF I GO TOO AT ANY TIME BETWEEN NOW AND THE PRIME MINISTERS VISIT, AND PARTICULARLY IF I COINCIDE WITH ADDIS, THIS WOULD CAUSE GREAT SPECULATION HERE, WHICH I SUSPECT WOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE ENGLISH PRESS. SINCE THERE IS NOTHING ABOUT THE PRIME MINISTER'S SHORT VISIT TO HONG KONG THAT COULD REQUIRE MY PRIOR RETURN, THE PUBLIC WOULD ASSUME THE SUBJECT TO BE CHINA/HONG KONG RELATIONS, THAT ESTABLISHED POLICIES WERE BEING RECONSIDERED, AND THAT THERE WAS CONFLICT BETWEEN ADDIS'S ADVICE AND MINE. I CANNOT THINK OF ANYTHING I COULD SAY THAT WOULD DEFLECT THE PRESS HERE FROM SUCH AN

OBVIOUS DEDUCTION,

3. THERE IS OF COURSE BOUND TO BE SOME SPECULATION HERE BETWEEN NOW AND THE MPRIME MINISTER'S VISIT, BUT I AM AFRAID THE JOINT CONSULTATION PROPOSED WOULD GREATLY INCREASE AND DRAMATISE IT. THIS WOULD CARRY THE DANGER OF CONDITIONING THE PRESS TO SEE HONG KONG AS THE LEAD STORY IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT, WHICH KOULD BE THE OPPOSITE OF WHAT WE WANT AND EVEN OF WHAT IS LIKELY TO HAPPEN

IN PEKING.

I SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT I DISCOVER IT IS VERY UNUSUAL FOR THE GOVERNOR TO BE RECALLED FOR CONSULTATION.

SECRET

/5. THE

SECRET

5. THE ARGUMENTS ON BOTH SIDES OF THIS QUESTION ARE WELL DOCUMENTED IN TELEGRAMS AND DESPATCHES, AND THERE ARE THE PERSONAL EXPERIENCES

OF THE S. OF S. AND MR. ROYLE TO DRAW ON, NOR HAS ANYTHING

TRANSPIRED TO INVALIDATE THE REASONING ON WHICH THE S. OF S.

BASED HIS LINE. IN VIEW OF THE LIKELY REPERCUSSIONS OF MY RETURN,

IF THERE IS ANY NEW POINT ON WHICH MY ADVICE IS WANTED COULD NOT THIS BE DEALT WITH BY TELEGRAM? OF COURSE IF, THE PRIME MINISTER

STAGES THROUGH HONG KONG ON THE INWARD JOURNEY TO

CHINA, WE COULD HAVE A TALK AT THE AIRPORT.

6. I DO NOT KNOW IF YOU WILL WISH TO INSIST ON THIS PROPOSAL BUT IF SO THE DATES SUGGESTED WOULD INVOLVE CANCELLATION OF TWO MAJOR ANNUAL GOVERNOR'S COMMITMENTS. THOUGH PERHAPS NOT OF GREAT INTRIESIC IMPORTANCE, THEIR CANCELLATION WOULD ADD FORCE TO SPECULATION THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING MAJOR AFOOT.

7. IF IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING YOU STILL FEEL IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT I SEE THE PRIME MINISTER IN LONDON, I THINK THE ONLY CHANCE OF DOING SO WITHOUT MUCH PUBLICITY HERE WOULD BE

MIGHT ADD THAT

FOR MY WIFE AND MYSELF TO TAKE CHRISTMAS LEAVE. FOR VARIOUS REASONS I AM NOT AT ALL ANXIOUS TO DO THIS,

BUT I THINK IT IS THE ONLY WAY,

MACLEHOSE

FILES

FED

HKIOD

NEWS DEPT

PRIVATE SECRETARY

PS TO HR ROYLE

PS JO PUS

KR YOUDE

HR WILFORD

SIR D WATSON

[COPIES SENT TO PS TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET AND TO

SIR J HUNT CABINET OFFICE]

-2

SECRET

GR 230 JYMEDIATE

PHER CAT A

FM FCO 261725Z

SECRET

이나

TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG TELNO 1211 OF 26 NOVEMBERLAND TO PEKING

PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR AND AMBASSADOR FROM PUS

CHINESE REPRESENTATION.

1. I ATTENDED A MEETING AT NO 12 ON 26 NOVEMBER FROM WHICH IT

EMERGED CLEARLY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD VERY MUCH WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THIS CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE WITH YOU BOTH BEFORE HIS VISIT. MY ADVICE TO HI!! WAS THAT, IF YOU WERE BOTH TO BE PECALLED, IT WOULD BE BEST FOR THIS TO BE DONE FAIRLY SOON, BUT NOT SO PRECIPITATELY AS TO CAUSE EXCESSIVE DISLOCATION OF YOUR OWN PROGRAMMES, OR TO BE SO DELAYED THAT IT WOULD SEEM TO BE A PANIC BEASURE JUST BEFORE THE PRIME MINISTER'S DEPARTURE.

2. THE PRIME MINISTER'S DIARY BETWEEN NOW AND CHRISTMAS IS VERY FULL INDEED, BUT IT WOULD SUIT HIM IF YOU COULD GET HERE ON OR BEFORE 8 DECEMBER WITH A VIEW TO A MEETING ON THE MORNING OF 10 DECEMBER OR JUST POSSIBLY THE PREVIOUS AFTERNOON AT CHEQUERS. THE SECRETARY

CF STATE WILL UNFORTUNATELY BE OUT OF THE COUNTRY FROM 9 TO 11 DECEMBER ATTENDING A NATO MEETING SO WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE BEFORE

12 DECEMBER. WOULD YOU PLEASE LET ME KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREFORE IF YOU COULD DISENGAGE SO AS TO BE AVAILABLE HERE FROM, SAY, 0 TO 13 DECEMBER?

3. I SHOULD ALSO LIKE YOUR ADVICE, AND PARTICULARLY THAT OF SIR M MACLEHOSE, ABOUT THE REASON WHICH SHOULD BE GIVEN PUBLICLY FOR YOUR RETURN. CLEARLY WE WANT AS LITTLE CAUSE FOR SPECULATION AS

POSSIBLE IN HONG KONG WHERE THE RISK OF RUMOUR MONGERING WILL BE

GREATEST. WE COULD ALWAYS SAY THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WISHES TO

DISCUSS ALL ASPECTS OF HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP TO BOTH CHINA AND HONG

KONG: BUT WOULD THAT GIVE HOSTAGES TO FORTUNE IN HONG KONG?

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES

FED

HKIOD

NEWS D PS/PUS

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET]

PS/MR ROYLE MR YOUDE MR WILFORD

SIR 3 NATSON

SECRET

COPIES TO

SIR J HUNT

CABINET OFFICE

GR 140

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM PEKING 278435Z

SECRET

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NO 1337 OF 27 NOVEMBER 1973 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR

GOVERNOR).

Nje

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 1211 TO HONG KONG.

PERSONAL FOR PUS.

I CAN DISENGAGE WITHOUT DIFFICULTY, BOTH CHINESE AND DIPLOMATIC

COLLEAGUES WILL THINK IT QUITE NATURAL FOR ME TO RETURN FOR

CONSULTATIONS A FEW WEEKS BEFORE THE PM'S VISIT.

2. MACLEHOSE MAY FEEL THAT IT WILL ATTRACT LESS ATTENTION IN

HONG KONG IF I TRAVEL BOTH WAYS BY AIR FRANCE DIRECT SERVICE PEKING/PARIS, AS THERE ARE ONLY TWO AIR FRANCE FLIGHTS A WEEK, TUESDAY AND SATURDAY, I HOPE IT WILL NOT BE TOO LATE IF I REACH LONDON SATURDAY NIGHT 8 DECEMBER, READY FOR ANY MEETING ON SUNDAY. ALTERNATIVELY, I COULD ARRANGE TO TRAVEL VIA HONG KONG AND REACH

LONDON EITHER FRIDAY OR SATURDAY MORNING. AIR FRANCE RETURN FLIGHT FITS IN WELL LEAVING PARIS 2000 13 DECEMBER,

ADDI S

FILES

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING ST]

Copies To

FED.

HKIOD.

NEWS D

rs) pus

PS/MR ROYLE

MAWILFORD

SIR D. WATSON,

MR YOUDE

SECRET'

SIRI HUNT Carinel officĖ.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Grattan

нкі

HKIJA. Toat

19/

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

ོས་

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89A

Mr. Royle has seen a copy of your minute of 15 November to Mr. Wilford and has commented that he is not happy with the passage in the fourth sentence of the amended paragraph in paragraph two of the minute, which begins ".... we ought to be beginning". to the end of the sentence. He would prefer that we said something like " we ought to be beginning to lay the foundation for closer cooperation fairly soon". I should be grateful if you would consider this in preparing the brief in question.

19 November, 1973

c.c. to:

Mr. Wilford

Mr. Youde

Mr. Stuart Mr. Evans

Int? Gust

M. R. J. Guest

Already seen

R.E.

CONFIDENTIAL

301

Ms3/x 91

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

16 November, 1973

Mr Youde

ней

9/11

сво

207xi

Mi Daryo (Pe.spect)

Дабу

The Prime Minister's Visit to China

864

In your letter to Brian Webster of 1 November you mentioned the Prime Minister's request that further work should be set in hand soon to prepare for his visit to China. As you know Sir John Hunt is holding a planning meeting today to consider outline proposals on the objects of the visit and the subjects to be covered by the briefs.

Meanwhile, I am writing to consult you about a particular problem. This is whether Sir Murray MacLehose and Sir John Addis should be recalled for a discussion with the Prime Minister on the difficult issue of Chinese representation in Hong Kong (paragraph 2 of your letter to Webster).

RE. 19/11.

Our own view is that it would only be useful for MacLehose and Addis to return to this country if, after considering the problem and our present policy towards it, the Prime Minister were to decide in consultation with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary that this policy needed to be changed or at least looked at again. We do not think that there would be much to be gained from recalling MacLehose and Addis if the Prime Minister were to decide that there was no need for such a review of our Policy/unless ¿" the Prime Minister felt the need for a discussion in depth in preparation for the strong advocacy of the Chinese case with which he will be met in Peking. There is also a question of timing.

We think that it would in any case be

a mistake to recall MacLehose and Addis at a time near to the date of the Prime Minister's departure for China; this could give the press and others who know about the problem the impression of a crisis or lead the Chinese to suppose that the Prime Minister was contemplating a change in our position.

The Lord Bridges,

10 Downing Street,

London, S.W.1.

/I enclose

CONFIDENTIAL

I enclose a short memorandum which sets out the history of the problem, the arguments used by the Chinese and our reasons for rejecting the Chinese proposal. It remains the view of the Governor of Hong Kong which the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary endorses that the dangers inherent in acceptance of the Chinese proposal greatly outweigh any advantage which might accrue in our relations with the Chinese; and in consequence our recommendation would again be that the Chinese proposal should not be accepted.

We should be grateful if in the light of this you would let us know the Prime Minister's wishes.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Webster.

CONFIDENTIAL

(P.H. Grattan)

CUNI TUENTIAL

FICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

In February 1956, the Chinese Government proposed that a

representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking

should be appointed in Hong Kong. In February 1958 the then Foreign Secretary (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd) told the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires in London that he could not accept the Chinese

proposal, arguing that the state of relations between the two

countries did not warrant its acceptance. The Chinese did not

react.

2. The Chinese Government returned to the charge in March 1972, immediately after the, conclusion of our agreement with them to exchange Ambassadors. Mr. Royle rejected their proposal in May 1972; as did the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary when he visited Peking in November 1972 and when the Chinese Foreign Minister visited this country in June 1973. On the latter

occasion, Sir Alec Douglas-Home gave Chi P'eng-fei an aide mémoire explaining that we could not accept the proposal.

The Chinese argue that the establishment of an official Chinese representative would be appropriate in the present state of relations between China and the United Kingdom and that this would be of practical advantage in resolving admin- istrative problems which arise between China and Hong Kong. Chou En-lai told the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in

November 1972 that it was not the Chinese intention to establish

"a dual regime" in Hong Kong. The British were ruling Hong Kong

/and

CONFIDENTIAL

and were responsible for it; the Chinese did not quarrel with

that.

4. We have three principal reasons for rejecting the Chinese

proposal. The first is that its acceptance would tend to

undermine the authority of the Governor and his administration,

by creating an alternative focus of loyalty in the colony. The

second is that its acceptance would tend to undermine business

confidence in Hong Kong. The third is that there is no practical

need for a change. Present procedures work perfectly well.

Nevertheless it is accepted that a time may come when, if there

is to be a change in the status of Hong Kong, there will have to

be some agreement with the Chinese which could involve the

appointment of a Chinese representative to live in Hong Kong.

But the time for this is not now, since it would lead to a loss

of confidence which the Governor attaches the highest importance

to avoiding.

5. Although the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary gave

Chi P'eng-fei no grounds for supposing that our position might

change, Chou En-lai is almost bound to bring the subject up.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

November 1973

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Evans LSP.E.D.)

Mi Davies.

R.E.

A point tor the

brief for the P.U.S.

PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO CHINA: OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

2011

1. Mr. Royle has seen a copy of your minute of 13 November to the Private Secretary and has commented as follows:

"I think that it is vital that when the Prime Minister speaks on this subject to Chou En-lai he should use the identical words that the Secretary of State and I used last year. This is most important and I know that the P.U.S., the Governor and the department share my view."

16 November, 1973

Mutu Grat

M. R. J. Guest

cc. to: Private Secretary

Mr. Wilford Mr. Youde PS to Pus

HKIOD

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Wilford

CONFIDENTIAL

Chinese Representation in Hong Kong

The Secretary of State has seen Mr. Evans' submission of 13 November. He commented:-

"Let this letter go to Lord Bridges. I suspect that the Prime Minister will want a discussion. The weakness of our position is obvious, that if we want a reasonable settlement with the Chinese on Hong Kong's future we ought to be starting to lay the foundations of closer cooperation soon. The stumbling block is the adamant position taken by the Governor which clearly reflects the opinion of the business Community.

ADH".

The Secretary of State has suggested an additional paragraph for the brief enclosed with the letter. I think that this might go better in the letter in the last main substantive paragraph. This might read, incorporating the Secretary of State's language as follows:-

The

"I enclose a short memorandum which sets out the history of the problem, the arguments used by the Chinese and our reasons for rejecting the Chinese proposal. It remains the view of the Governor of Hong Kong which Sir Alec Douglas-Home endorses that the balance of advantage lies in continuing to reject the Chinese proposal. dangers inherent in it still outweigh the advantages which might accrue in our relations with the Chinese. The weakness in our position is that if we want eventually to arrive at a tolerable future for Hong Kong we ought to be beginning to lay the foundations for an agreement with the Chinese fairly soon. But to agree now to the Chinese proposal would lead to a run-away loss of confidence in the Hong Kong business

/Community

CONFIDENTIAL

894

CONFIDENTIAL

Community. Much more discussion, consultation and

persuasion would therefore be necessary before we could make such a move".

I should be grateful for comments.

Copied to:

PS/Mr. Royle

Mr. Youde

Mr. Stuart

Mr.

Evans

Prioratten

(P. H. Grattan) 15 November, 1973

fee

separate into to Soys

Mar 1"1/xi

CONFIDENTIAL

Private Secretary

Secretary if State Lit The Weller

surfact that "The Pl. will

Bridger - I spicct that

Want a bhiansion. The wackmen of the fcrition

in drsions (le) that if we want a recommable rellement

with the Clean Cre THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO CHINA: OFFICIAL CHINESE REFRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

bist

in Hong Konge eight I be starting to lay the funk dation of

clared

1. We are convinced that Chou Eh-lai will raise the question

Confection

of Chinese representation in Hong Kong, with the Prime Minister sour The stably block in the donant function

January 1974. At a meeting

het

the

when the latter visits Peking in

held recently about the visit of

next weekend, the Prime Minister, in welcoming the new briefing

there addon ċ procedure, responded to a remark by Sir Denis Greenhill by

saying that he would like a discussion of Chinese representation

to be organised in which Her Majesty's Ambassador at Peking and

the Governor of Hong Kong would participate, though he recognised

the difficulty of arranging such a discussion inconspicuously.

2. The Department have considered this point. But neither

they nor Mr Royle, who has commented on the Prime Minister's

idea, think that to bring back Sir John Addis and Sir Murray

MacLehose is strictly necessary, or even necessarily wise,

unless a preliminary discussion of the merits of the case reveals

that the Prime Minister does not agree with the Secretary of

State's present policy. If he were to disagree, it would indeed

become essential to summon the Governor and the Ambassador here,

but we have no evidence that this is the case. We would there-

fore prefer that the matter should be put to No 10 on the lines

of the attached draft letter from the Private Secretary to

Lord Bridges. The letter covers a short memorandum on the

substance of the case.

Fresident Pompidou to Chequers of of the Cushion Con

13 November 1973

Mr Guest

cc Mr Wilford

R.M. Er

CONFIDENTIAL

RM Evans

Far Eastern Department

Mr Youde

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

In February 1956, the Chinese Government proposed that

representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking

should be appointed in Hong Kong. In February 1958 the then

Foreign Secretary (Mr Selwyn Lloyd) told the Chinese Chargé

d'Affaires in London that he could not accept the Chinese

proposal, arguing that the state of relations between the two

countries did not warrant its acceptance. The Chinese did not

react.

7872

2. The Chinese Government returned to the charge in March

1972, immediately after the conclusion of our agreement with

them to exchange Ambassadors. Mr Royle rejected their proposal

in May 1972; as did the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary

when he visited Peking in November 1972 and when the Chinese

Foreign Minister visited this country in June 1973. On the

latter occasion, Sir Alec Douglas-Home gave Chi P'eng-fei an

aide mémoire explaining that we could not accept the proposal.

3. The Chinese argue that the establishment of an official

Chinese representative would be appropriate in the present state

of relations between China and the United Kingdom and that this

would be of practical advantage in resolving administrative

problems which arise Between China and Hong Kong, Chou En-lai

told the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in November 1972

that it was not the Chinese intention to establish "a dual

régime" in Hong Kong. The British were ruling Hong Kong and

were responsible for it; the Chinese did not quarrel with that.

4. We have three principal reasons for rejecting the Chinese

proposal. The first is that its acceptance would tend to under-

mine the authority of the Governor and his administration, by

CONFIDENTIAL

/creating

CONFIDENTIAL

creating an alternative focus of loyalty in the colony. The

second is that its acceptance would tend to undermine business

confidence in Hong Kong. The third is that there is no practical

need for a change. Present procedures work perfectly well.

Although the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary gave

Chi P'eng-fei no grounds for supposing that our position might

change, Chou En-lai is almost bound to bring the subject up.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office-

November 1973

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CONFIDENTIAL

R.-FEx

-FEX 3/70.

Mir Youde

THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO CHINA: REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

OFFICIAL CHINESE

1. Mr Wilford, you and I had a word yesterday about planning

for the Prime Minister's visit to China and about the particular

problem of how we might elicit the Prime Minister's views on the

difficult subject of Chinese representation in Hong Kong.

2. I now submit a draft letter from the Private Secretary to

the Private Secretary at No 10, together with a draft memorandum

on the substance.

9 November 1973

R.M. Evens

RM Evans

Far Eastern Department

5/11

Separare mincie to Private secieiory.

R.E.

13/11.

CONFIDENTIAL

EXTRACT FROM A MEETING BETWEEN H M AMBASSADOR AND THE DIRECTOR OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT, M FA, ON 8 NOVEMBER 1973

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

PEAT stali

1. Mr Wang Tung said he was still of the view that there could be prompt and better solutions to problems of this sort [Hong Kong frontier control] if we were to consider the proposal for the establishment of a Chinese representative in Hong Kong.

The matter had been discussed in London between Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Chi Peng-fel, and there had been informal talk about it after that meeting. Once that question had been solved, it would be possible to go on to find solutions to a series of other questions.

2. Sir John Addis replied that he could not add anything to what the Secretary of State had said to Mr Chi P'eng-fei in June. Mr Wang Tung said that in any case the Prime Minister was soon to visit China: his (Wang's) wish was to see Sino/British relations develop. He hoped that no other problems would be able to have any effect on this development. To speak frankly, the Chinese were not thinking of making any trouble. Both sides should have mutual confidence. It was then easier to solve practical problems. He had said very frankly to Mr Royle in June that if the Chinese had had the intention of making trouble, they would not have raised the question of sending a representative to Hong Kong. It would facilitate liaison over other questions such as the Sino/British Air Services Agreement and communications generally. It would save much trouble over discussing matters in Peking. Sir John Addis mentioned that of course discussions took place in Hong Kong also under existing arrangements.

3. Mr Wang Tung said that we could still discuss frankly the position of such a representative and his duties. These had been touched upon in London. Someone had asked whether it would do if the Chinese set up a Consulate-General in Hong Kong. It would not. China's British friends would understand why they could not send a Consul-General to Hong Kong.

4. Sir John Addis replied again that he could not go beyond the formila used by the Secretary of State in June. Mr Wang Tung said that this was understandable but that the question remained to be solved. (Mr Wang Tung went on to discuss the eleven illegal immigrants.)

Copies to:

RM Evans Esq

Far Eastern Department

FCO

R JStratton Esq

Hong Kong

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 350

ZAMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTI"!

FM PEKING Ø80859Z

CONFIDENTIAL

ام

12/11 TOP COPY

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1973

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NO 1266 OF NOVEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG

FEN 4/1

ใบ

MY TELEGRAM H 1963 AND GEORGE'S LETTER TO STRAIGN OF 9 OCTOBER

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KO.G

1. TOWARDS THE END OF MY INTERVIEW WITH THE CIRECTOR OF WESTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT TODAY AHDWHICH WE DISCUSSED HONG KONG FRONTIER CONTROL WANG TUNG SAID THAT HE WAS STILL OF THE VIEW THAT THERE WOULD BE PROMPT AND BETTER SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS OF THIS SORT IF WE WERE TO CONSIDER THE PROPOSAL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE IN HONG KONG, THE MATTER HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN LOYDON IN JUNE BETWEEN YOURSELF AND CHI PENG-FEI, AND THERE HAD BEEN INFORMA. TALK ABOUT IT AFTER THAT MEETING. ONCE THAT QUESTION HAD BEEN SOLVED, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO GO ON TO FIND SOLUTIONS TO A SERIES OF OTHER QUESTIONS.

2. ! REPLIED THAT I COULD NOT ADD ANYTHING TO WHAT YOU HAD SAID TO CHI PENG-FE1 11! JUNE. VANG SAID THAT IN ANY CASE THE PRIME MINISTER WAS SOON TO VISIT CHINA: HIS (WANG'S) WISH WAS TO SEE SINO/BRITISH RELATIONS DEVELOP. HE HOPED THAT NO OTHER PROBLEMS WOULD PE ABLE TO HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THIS DEVELOPMENT. TO SPEAK FRANKLY, THE CHINESE WERE NOT THINKING OF MAKING ANY TROUBLE. POTH SIDES SHOULD HAVE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. IT WAS THEN EASY TO SOLVE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS. HE HAD SAID VERY FRANKLY TO MR ROYLE IN JUNE THAT IF THE CHINESE HAD HAD THE INTENTION OF MAKING

TROUBLE THEY WOULD NOT HAVE RAISED THE QUESTION OF SENDING A REPRESENTATIVE TO HONG KONG, IT WOULD FACILITATE LIAISON OVER OTHER QUESTIONS SUCH AS THE SINO/BRITISH AIR SERVICES AGREEMENT

AND

CONFIDENTIAL

AND COMMUNICATIONS GENERALLY.. IT WOULD SAVE MUCH TROUBLE OVER DI SUSSING MATTERS IN PEKING. I MENTIONED THAT OF COURSE

DISCUSSIONS TOOK PLACE IN HONG KONG ALSO UNDER EXISTING ARRANGE- MENTS.

WANG SAID THAT WE COULD STILL DISCUSS FRANKLY THE POSITION OF SUCH A REPRESENTATIVE AND HIS DUTIES. THESE HAD BEEN TOUCHED UPON IN LONDON. SOME ONE HAD ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD DO IF THE CHINESE SET UP A CONSULATE-GENERAL IN HONG KONG. IT WOULD NOT. CHINA'S BRITISH FRIENDS WOULD UNDERSTAND WHY THEY COULD NOT SEND A CONSUL- GENERAL TO HONG KONG,

•

5. I REPLIED AGAIN THAT COULD NOT GO BEYOND THE FORMULA USED BY YJU IN JUNE. WANG SAID THAT THIS WAS UNDERSTANDABLE BUT THAT THE QUESTION REMAINED TO BE SOLVED.

ADDIS

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

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CON. IDENTIL

CONFIDENTIAL

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10 Downing Street Whitchull

1 November 197

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Shift Cirk/PS) 'Wilma'/PED HRIDD

Briefing arrangements for the Frime Ministre

This afternoon the Prime Minister held his firmi ... under the new system of briefing arrangements (deseri în Sir John Hunt's letter of 23 October to Sir Denis Greenhill), in the context of the forthcoming visit of President Pompidou. You will wish to know that . Heath said that he auch

Mr. welcomed the now system of identifying the main topics

well in advance of the meeting, as suggested in paragraph: 3(b) of Hunt's letter.

The Frime Minister asked that further work should be set in hend soon to prepare for his meeting with the aut Minister of Denmark, and for his vicit to China. Sir Denis Greenhill suggested that it might be useful if H.H. Ambesat, for in Feking and the Governor på Hong Kong wore to return to fla country so as to take part in a discussion with the Pri

inister about the difficult issue of Chinese representation in Hong Kong; the Prime Minister, while recognising tet it might be difficult to arrange this inconspicuously, said that he would like such a discussion to ba rranged.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Brown (Deperiami of Trade and Industry), Elliott (Foreign and Commonwen th Office), Wilson (H.H. Treasury), and to Nairne (Cabinet Office).

Wooster, Jr.,

BRIDGES

Fen 3/2/1

From the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.I

30 October, 1973

CC with Mr Dalyella

Letter +

may mainte 4 26 Bk.

હું રાધ Any Peking

Thank you for your letter of 16 October, enclosing a cutting from "The Times" about the Chinese proposal for the establishment of an official representative in Hong Kong.

Perhaps we could have a word about this

in the House some time.

Tam Dalyell, Esq., M.P.,

House of Commons,

London, S.W.1.

Anthony Royle

Sir John Addis KCMG PEKING

SECRET

FEL 3/548/17

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

26 October 1973

London S.W.1

FEM 3/3.1-1

نا

THE PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO CHINA: HONG KONG

1. I am sorry that you have not had an early reply to your letter of 6 August about the way in which the Prime Kinister might speak to Chou En-lai about Hong Kong when he visits China. We have, however, been giving very careful thought to the suggestions which you made, in the light both of the considerations which you put to us and of those developed in Hugh Norman-Walker's letter TS2/1126/50 of 16 August.

/if,

2. Your suggestion that, in speaking about Chinese repre- sentation, the Prime Minister should start by explaining the difficulties which we see in the way of the Chinese proposal, but go on to ask Chou En-lai to explain why the Chinese Government put it forward, why they continued to insist on it and what they hope to achieve by it, seems to flow from your views on the central issue (as set out in paragraph 3 of your letter). We have thought again about the central issue, but have come to the conclusion that it would be right to brier the Prime Minister not to broach the subject himself and to stick to the line taken by the Secretary of State with Chi P'eng-fei,/as seems inevitable, it is brought up by Chou En-lai, Our reason, quite simply, is that our purpose is still to persuade the Chinese to sheive their proposal for a matter of years. We still think that it would be imprudent, and perhaps dangerous, to give the Chinese any grounds for thinking that we might be prepared to accept their proposal,

Our in its original or any modified form, at this time. principal concerns are still to maintain the authority of the Governor and of his administration and to preserve business confidence in and over Hong Kong. As it is still the judgement of those concerned in Hong Kong that both the authority of the Governor, and business confidence, would be put at risk by accepting the Chinese proposal, we think that we must continue to stand firm.

- 1

SECRET

13.

SECRET

3. We do, of course, set great store by doing nothing which might damage relations between the United Kingdom and China or between Hong Kong and China. It was because of this that the Secretary of State gave Chi P'eng-fei a piece of paper which explained our worries and which sought to show that the Chinese interest, as well as our own, would be damaged if the Chinese continued to press their proposal. Although we think it certain that Chou En-lai will broach the subject with the Prime Minister, we do not think that he will be expecting the Prime Minister to make any concession; and we judge that our relations with China, and those of Hong Kong, would already have suffered if the Chinese had really intended to make the issue into a test case.

4. We see dangers, too, in your suggestion that the Prime Minister should not confine himself to the limited issue of Chinese representation, but should go on to discuss with Chou En-lai how the future of Hong Kong and its relations with China might evolve over the next five or ten years and up to the end of the century. As Hugh Norman-Walker said in his letter, the Prime Minister would be unlikely to get firm assur- ances and, even if he did, the undertakings would presumably not be written and could scarcely bind the successors to the present Chinese leaders. Besides, our overall purpose is to do nothing which might suggest to the Chinese that we are beginning to think about the day when we shall have to leave Hong Kong. To do this would be to give them a false impression.

5. So much said, I can assure you that we shall have two purposes very much in our minds when the time comes to brief the Prime Minister. The first is that his visit should make

and our relations with China even better than they are now; the second is that his visit should provide the occasion for the really deep and meaningful discussion with the Chinese on world affairs to which you look forward. I do not think that we shall be prevented from achieving these purposes by holding fast over Hong Kong.

Bir Murray MacLehose

KCMG MBE

- 2

SECRET

Kи Wilford

10.

Mr Evand

CONFIDENTIAL

Münster

Mi quesi

MG:

367d.

LETTER FROM MR TAM DALYELL MP: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

(81A 7.

In his letter of 16 October Mr Dalyell enquires about a

recent report in "The Times" about continued Chinese interest in

the Representation issue. The Times report was clearly officially-

inspired in Peking.

2. Mr Dalyell is one of the most active MPs over questions

concerning our relations with China. Although he asks a great

number of Parliamentary Questions about China his attitude to our

efforts to develop good relations with China is generally helpful.

In these circumstances, and since Mr Royle has recently briefed

the members of the British-Chinese Parliamentary Group on the

subject, Mr Royle may wish to explain the problem orally to

Mr Dalyell. Mr Royle may, on the other hand, wish to write and

I submit a draft for this purpose.

3. HKIOD concur.

26 October 1973

cc HKIOD

H L1 Davies

Far Eastern Department

Rin. Evans

29 October, rq$3.

CONFIDENTIAL

Ref: A05306

CONFIDENTIAL

Q2 16/10

CABINET OFFICE

LONDON SWIA 2A5

4th October, 1973

4K100. for aft rep.pe

M: Stark of Copy to: P.S. Miteway cars. Mr Dave) 10

My dear Dawn's.

дел

Sind Walsen /th. Welford M. Youde

FED,

RE. 80.

Yay

پیکری بہار

For 3/2/1

In a minute of 20th September to the Prime Minister, your Secretary of State said that he was concerned about the state of Hong Kong's relations with us, and he mentioned a number of issues which had affected those relations. He asked that in all matters relating to Hong Kong the Departments directly concerned should remember that Her Majesty's Government as a whole have a responsibility towards the Colony and that we must try to reach agreement on a course which seeks to balance the United Kingdom and the Hong Kong interest across the whole field. Copies of the minute were sent to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, the Attorny General and the Minister of Trade and Consumer Affairs.

The Prime Minister has said that the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee should undertake a general review of our rleations with the Colony and that we should seek to resolve any outstanding issues. Since a number of Departments are concerned I think the best way of getting this off the ground would be to set up a group at the official level in the GEN series under Cabinet Office chairmanship which could prepare a report for DOP to consider. I hope that you and the other recipients of this letter will agree to this suggestion and that you will be prepared to nominate someone to serve on the group. I would ask Howard Smith to take the chair and we would provide the Secretariat.

This letter goes also to Douglas Allen, Arthur Peterson, Ned Dunnett, Antony Part and Tony Hetherington.

Yours ever Упать

Sir Denis Greenhill, GCMG, OBE

Im H.

(John Hunt)

HOUSE OF COMMONS

LONDON SWIA OAA

Rec. and Ack. 22/10/73. FED.... Department FE⋅D

for draft reply please

no Rayle.

Dear Tony,

As you know, I have a sustained interest

in the question of our diplomatic relations with

China over Hong Kong. I would be grateful for

your comment on the enclosed.

With good wisher.

16/10/13

Yours sincerely,

Tam

Tam Dalyell, M.P.

↓

Peking pressing for diplomatic post in Hongkong

From Our Own Correspondent Peking, Oct 14

China is standing, by its de mand for a diplomatic represen- tative In Hongkong, although Britain had still not reacted favourably to the proposal, | according to an official source here.

The source said there were many matters which needed dis cussion and the present channels --the New China news agency's link with the political adviser to the flonekoni Government-- were inadeguate. There was no question of opening a Chinese consulate in Hongkong.

Britain lias resisted the Chinere proposal for formal representation in Hongkong for fear that it would undermine the authority of the Hongkong Government

Peking is expected to press its demand when Mr Death visits Chin early next your.

CONFIDENTIAL

BR IT IS H EMBASSY

PEKING

R J Stratton Eaq Political Advi ser Hong Kong

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

9 October 1973

R.E.

The Evans

10/10. 2. THE SHAHRID

3. Enter

The Chinese were not going

to musi

this opportunity of

reverting to thinne Requerentation

1. At dinner on 8 Cetober at John Boyd's flat I was seated next to Chang Yi-chun, the Head of the section in Western European

Quite Department of the M F A which deals with the United Kingdom. unprompted Chang asked me whether we (1 e the Hong Kong Government) found that NCNA in Hong Kong was an adequate channel of communi - cation, I said that the range of topics on which the Hong Kong Government was in a position to have dealings with the Chinese Government was limited, and that within this range we found NC NA quite satisfactory. Chang dragged the conversation back to representation by saying that Chiao Kuan-hua himself was not happy about using NCNA in the present improved state of Anglo/Chime se relations. Accordingly the Chinese Government have proposed that

The Chinese an official representative be posted to Hong Kong. Government thought that it would be helpful to all concerned to have such a representative. What did I think? I said that the subject

had been discussed between Foreign Ministers and there was really nothing that I could add. Chang peral sted however, emphasising the Accord- goodwill of the Chinese Government in making the proposal. ingly I went over the points made by the Secretary of State at his meetings with Ch'i Pang-rei.

2. Michael Richardson, sitting opposite, had a parallel, but less lengthy, conversation with another sestern European Department officiai, Li Pao-cheng. Li also emphasised the goodwill behind the Chinese proposal and said they had reached the a one husion that the posting ɗ a representative would be convenient for all concerned after a close analysis of the situation. To

To this Michael replied that the British Government had also analysed the situation, but reached different conclusions.

3. After some further general conversation the halled City was antioned by another guest, and I confirmed that Kowloon City was accorded a slight ly separate status under the Convention of Peking, and that this was sometimes a nuisance in dealing with problems. Chang Yi-chun then said that in his personal view the separate status of Kowloon City was "rather stupid", and went on jokingly to say that one thing was certain: "When we take over Hong Kong, we shall not allow any special status for Kowloon City".

1 -

CONFIDENTIAL

/4.

C (NFIDENT IAL

raisinstation, C

I not take particularly in the any initiative in raising these topics, but a dficial representation, Chang came with a clear intention to probe. The dinner guesté, incidentally, apart from Chang and his colleague, were from the British Embassy and he felt able to speak openly.

5. The only controversial issue which I raised (in discussing the role of N C N A) was legal immigration into Hong Kong, and I con- firmed that I had spoken to N C N A about this subject. Chang said that he had had a report but I did not pursue the topic.

Copy to:

HL Davies Esq

Far Eastern Departme ot FCO

T JB Gear ge

CONFIDENTIAL

181

1 COPY

HOFEØCK/RT

RR PEKTRO

.GES. 75

CYPHER/CAT A

FM HONG KONG 2184257

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News & me.

Il Stack, 2649

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Sandy ^

TO ROUTINE FEKING TELC 143 OF 21 SEPTEMBER.

FOR BOYD FROM GEORGE, YOUR TELEGRAF 02.

win't Pelang

HKLOD

Reputations only

MANY THANKS. I HAVE NOW SENT PASSPORT TO CHINA TRAVEL SERVICE

FLY ENTRY OF VISA.

2. ALTHOUGH I WILL SPEAK TO CTS AND OTHERS, TX ADVISED BY FTC FROM EXPERIENCE THAT IT WOULD HELP IF YOU WERE TO ASK FOR PROGRAMIZ TO BE ARRANGED FOR ME 11. CANTON. I HAVE NO VERY FIRK IDEAS, BUT HAD THOUGHT TO SEE A COMMUNE IN THE CANTON AREA PLUS AT LEAST ONE FACTORY.

3. GRATEFLL FOR ALL "ILP.

MACLE SC

SEVŰ AL 21/04997-81

( Radouted as requested i

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office London SW1

DTE Roberts CBE QC

Colonial Secretariat HONG KONG

Telephone 01-

Your ref

Our reference

Date

FER 3/2/1

File

(800)

20 September 1973

Dear Darys,

CONSULAR RELATIONS IN DISPUTED TERRITORIES

When you were on leave we discussed the possibility that ad hoc arrangements for consular representatives in Gibraltar and neighbouring areas of Spain might provide some sort of precedent for similar arrangements in Canton and Hong Kong.

Our Research people have looked into the Spanish situation. It is true that until the closure of the border in 1969 we had a British Vice-Consulate in La Linea on the Spanish side. This looked after affairs arising from Gibraltar but it was not in any sense controlled from the Gibraltar side. The Vice-Consul came under the superintendence of the Consulate-General at Seville. A Hong Kong representative in Canton would therefore be in a different category.

3. On the reciprocal aide the Spanish Government did have a Consulate (later a Consulate-General) in Gibraltar from the 19th century until 1954, when it was closed at the time of The Queen's visit to Gibraltar during Her Coronation tour. The decision to close it originated with the Spanish Government. They said it was because of a wish to avoid any discourtesy to Her Majesty but the underlying motive was undoubtedly political and part of the campaign for the return of the Rock. The existence of this Consulate-General was in no sense related to our Vice-Consulate in La Linea. Indeed, when the Consulate-General closed, our Vice-Consulate took over some of the work relating to Spanish workers which had originally passed through the Spanish office in Gibraltar

4. From all this it looks as if, in the Spanish case, we diû not have reciprocal quasi Consulate arrangements across the boundaries of disputed territory. So I fear this does not help very much in considering what to do in Hong Kong.

Yours curat,

Adaw

A O Stuart

Hong Kong & Indian Ocean Department

FERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

180

MREVANS

•9819

Mi Clark

ur Davies. m: Entre 28/4

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY AND THE GOVERNOR OF HONG KONG HELD AT THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE ON FRIDAY, 14 SEPTEMBER 1973

066.

R.E. 2719

I enclose extracts from the record covering those parts

of the conversation which will be of interest to you.

27 September 1973

BECRET

7.6. Come

R B Crovивоп

Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department

FGH

3/1

SECRET

CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE IN HONG KONG

17.

Sir Murray MacLehose said that the Secretary of State had handled the question with the Chinese Government in exactly the right way. The Chinese would continue to raise the subject but it seemed clear there would be no question of confrontation. indications that we had won this round.

There were ample

SECRET

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Group. FCO

FCQ....

Class.

Piece..

1137....

Following document(s) retained in the

Department of origin under Section 3 (4)

of the Public Records Act, 1958

FONO W80 (I PAGE OF MINUTES

(IPAGE INUTES)

THE TIMES

'15 OCT 107%

FÉ

Pustiz

cutting dated

Peking pressing for diplomatic post in Hongkong

From Our Own Correspondent Peking, Oct 14

China is standing by its de mand for a diplomatic represen- tetive in Hongkong, although Britain has still not reacted favourably to the proposa), according to an official source

The source said there were many matters which needed dis cussion and the present channels -the New China news agency's link with the political adviser to the Hongkong Government--- were inadequate. There was no question of opening Chinese consulate in Hongkong.

Britain his resisted the Chinese proposal for formal representation in Hongkong for fear that it would undermine the authority of the Hongkong Government

Peking is expected to press its demand when Mr Heath visits China early next year.

7/10

Miyou dem Minisford. Mi Dari 10

R.E.

FCH

17/10

布政司署

港下亞

畢道

**** Our Ref.:TS 2/1126/50

*** Your REF.:

CONFIDENTIAL

793

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT

LOWER ALBERT ROAD

HONG KON

29 August 1973.

R. B. R. Hervey, Esq.,

Far Eastern Department, F.C.O.

Dear Logen,

FEH

Circuleied

separately)

OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATZÓN IN HONG KONG

Especially in view of the complications surrounding his arrival in Hong Kong (see exchanges ending with Michael Wilford's telegram to the Governor, No 305, of 19 March) you may be interested to see the enclosed extract from "The Hong Kong Standard" of 26 August about the alleged appointment of Li Chu-sang as Head of the New China News Agency in Hong Kong. I was not in fact asked by Stewart, when he eventually got through to me on the telephone on 24 August, about the level of diplomatic exchanges between the Hong Kong Government and the NCNA, but about the significance I attached to the appointment of a diplomatist. My reply was more or less as quoted.

2. I do not know what has given rise this highly speculative piece about Li Chu-sang, who, as the article mentions, has as far as we know been away from Hong Kong since I waved him on to the special aircraft that took back Chang Shih-chao's ashes from Hong Kong. But it will give the consular corps something to talk about.

Tans cons Dich.

R. J. Stratton,

Political Adviser.

c.c. J. D. I. Boyd, Esq.,

Peking.

CS. 41A

CONFIDENTIAL

Eveno

Акалод

Exter

R.E.

319.

Love

зля

Mr. Gark.

~ Davies

R.E.

xtract from The Hong Kong Stand: "l dated 26.8.73

319.

Peking posts diplomat in Hongkong

BY PETER STEWART and BILL WONG

A DIPLOMAT has been appointed to head the New China News Agency operations in Hongkong.

has led to

ment confsets. According to this theory, Mẹ Li has been operating as Chinese "consul" in Hongkong.

A left-wing source who described Mr Li as

a man with widespread speculation

comment to make and that it was a matter we should discuss with the NCNA,

The hush-hush appointment of Mr Li Chu-sang considerable diplomatic experience in diplomatic and left-wing circles.

It is believed to be the first time a bona-fide diplomat has headed the NCNA office here though it is an open secret that the gathering and dissemination of news is only a small part of the organisation's function and its members travel on diplomatic passports.

Mtr le m'a former change d'affaico at the Chinese embassy in Jakarta.

The man he has replaced officially only tempuranly has a military background.

The speculation among diplomats and China-watches akes two forms.

THE FIRST is that Me "Ľ hạ bien sent istir to host the controvertial Chinese representative office that Peking wants to open in the Colony, #f London agrees lu

ach time.

THE SECOND is that in view of oppostles from the Hongkong Gowcument to the idea of à representative office operating openly hers perhaps being viewed as a "second Government House"

and

a secret deal has been arrived at under which a consular style offer has already opened to facilitate governament‐to-go Velti

strongarm man" said he was now outside the Colony, apparently to attend the high-level meetings now bebeved to be taking place in Peking either in preparation for, of at part of, the Nunth Party Congress,

Officially the 62-year-old Mr the number two man at the NCNA; but since the Director, Mr Liang Wei-lin, has been ill for several months and shant from the Colony, Sir Li has been in effective control.

His official title is believed to be "First Deputy Director in churge of Chincie Affairs",

one diplomat commented to the Hongkong Standard last week: "That sounds like a description of a consul to me."

In view of government reluctance to discuss the malter, it is hard to tell which

of either of the two theories concoming Mr LP' presence here is correct.

Asked if he was willing to discuss the question, the Blangkong Government's political idylser, Mr R.J. Strition, said that he had no

Asked directly whether! there had been any change la the level of diplomatic exchanges between the! Hongkong Government and the 1 NCNA since Mr Li's arrival, Mr Station said:

"I have absolutely no comment to make on that at all." Then he repeated: "This is a nulter for the NCNA"

An NCKA officud contacted onofficially by the Standard claimed he did not know why Mr II was here.

But he confirmed bin diplomatic background.

• H

was appointed consul-generat in Jakarta in 1957. later becoming consul and charge d'affaires ad interim, an important post in China's diplomatic corps chat time.

He remained in Indonesia until 1963, two years before the Communist-backed revolution there,

Mr Li first pul in an eppestande in Hongkong in May the year, a month after the dewa was leaked from London that Peking had renewed its 17-year-old request for diplomatic representacion here,

The exzet date of his arrival is not known but that was the

•

Concern

over

role of

NCNA

top man

month when a Trident fetliner of the Chinesa Civil Aviation Authority captured the headlines by arriving at Kultak. unannounced bearing the agning, Mr Cháng Shi-chu.

A number of other men were in the party, that arrived on the plane from Peking.

Whether or not Mr Li was among them, his arrival in the Colony that month was overaliadowcl by the dramatic appearance of the 92-year-old Mr Chang, who was a member

of the Standing Committee of the National People's CongrEKS.

There were widespread rumours then that it was Mir Chang who had come here to set up the representative office, But the elder statesman died, in Hongkong, on July 1.

China has had no official diplomat stationed here since Britain first recognised the Peking regime in 1950, when the Nationalist special Commissioner for Kwangtung and Kwangsi, Mt T.W. Kwok, who was stationed here, left for Brazil.

ק.

Earlier this year unoccupied mansion in Barker Road, owned by the Chinese Goverment, was redecorated and there was speculation that It was being prepared for use by the Chinese mission to Hongkong.

Other sources suggested that If there were to be a Chinese mission in Hongkong, the Government would prefer it to be less centrally lomted, and so less likely to become a centre for protests and demonstra- tlons.

Londra has been officially "considering the renewed Chinese request for an office in Hongkong for five months.

Generally there appears to be enthusiasm for the plan in Britain on the grounds that is would Increase contacts between Hongkong and China, s ease visa and trade restrictions" and boost confidence in the Colony by showing that China was ready to continue accepting is present status. It is

Peking's man in Hongkong

FROM PAGE 1

also clear that since the thaw In Sino-British relations and the increase in trade between the two countries, London is eager to accommodate the Chinese as far as is reasonable.

On the other hand, considerable concem has been į voiced in some influential quarters in Hongkong who feel that even if as Peking claims

there is no intention to install a "Chinese governor of Hongkong", the mission would inevitably become a focal point for protests against the British authorities.

Since the question of the mission was mised in April, information leaked from London has given varying impressions of the progress of the Briuth Government's "consideration" of the proposal, ranging from the headline in the South China Morning Post on Apr 26: "A China office in Hongkong a certainty", to the Chlña Mai's headline of June 2: "Doors close on China's HK office".

It is known, however, that the matter was discussed by the British and Chinese Foreign Ministers, Sir Aléc Douglas-Home and Mr Chi! Peng-fel, at talks in London on June 6. What was agreed at those tiks is not known, Mr Anthony Royl + + Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, was hier quoted as saying the two sides had agreed the talks should remain

"absolutely confidential".

But one diplomatic source 10% the Standard last week; "The Chinese Government bas not sent a man of Mr Li's experience to Hongkong and kept him here for four tenths

·without good tesson,

MR LI CHU-SANG, China's new top man in Hongkong.

[

TS 2/1126/50 II

SECRET

PERSONAL

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT

LOWER ALBERT ROAD

HONG KONG

79A

K. M. Wilford, Esq., CMG.,

F.C.O.

Dear Michael,

! FEH 3/2

18th August, 1973.

FED

TIB

OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

In paragraph 4 of his letter to you of 16 August the Acting Governor suggested that the Chinese may now be disposed to acquiesce in our reaffirmed refusal to accede to their request for an official representative in Hong Kong.!

Yours eva,

Dich.

R. J. Stratton, Political Adviser

THIS IS A COPY

THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION 9(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1968

CS. JIA

SECRET

PROSONA!

... ...

....

CHINA QUARTERLY : JULY/SEPT 1972 (79

Hong Kong and Chinese Foreign Policy,

955-60

Gary Catron

[Innese official

Very useful

Enter

Rep

in H.K

cho1412 Mr Hervey The Cloth Gl

8412

back to me

The argument presented here is that Hong Kong was sometimes, but not always, an exception to the overall pattern of Chinese foreign policy in the second half of the 1950s. This discrepancy existed because to China, Hong Kong was so many things - a British colony and as such an exten- sion of the West, an Asian neighbour, and a territory to be someday reunited with the mainland. By reacting to Hong Kong in different ways the Chinese were using more discrimination than simply applying their grand strategy to each specific case.

The years 1955-60 are especially useful for comparative purposes because of the dramatic shifts in Peking's general line during those years The usual formulation is that there were three distinct kinds of policy adopted by Peking towards the non-Communist world from 1955-60. From the near-universal benevolence symbolized by the Bandung Con- ference, Peking moved to a harder line towards both the West and many Afro-Asian neutrals in 1957-8. The climax of this new posture was the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958, after which China, increasingly preoccupied with internal economic and political problems and its differences with the U.S.S.R. tentatively and gradually evolved a third type of foreign policy stressing better relations with most neutrals without, in contrast to the Bandung era, new approaches to the United States. The ups and downs of China's Hong Kong policy can be examined in the con- text of these shifts and crises in the C.P.R.'s general foreign policy.

Harmony Between Friends, 1955-6

**Is it not beneficial to all concerned if there is friendship between Kwangtung and Hong Kong and Macao, which are adjacent to the province?" The advocate in this instance of peaceful co-existence be- tween China and the colonialists was Tao Chu, speaking in April 1956 to the Hong Kong and Macao members of the Kwangtung session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. However, there was more to China's desire for co-operation than the simple spirit of friend-

1. Harold Hinton, Communist China in World Politics (Boston: Houghton- Mifflin, 1966), Ch. 2, summarizes the literature up to 1966. Although arguments can be raised about Hinton's analysis of cause and effect, the periodization is adequate for the purposes of this article.

FEH

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ship between neighbours. The suggestion that concrete ways should be found in which the province and colony could work together was made, according to T'ao, in view of the casing of the international situation."

The most dramatic event signalling the start of China's moderate foreign policy phase was the Bandung Conference of April 1955. Hong Kong was involved in a diplomatic incident preceding the conference, and the Chinese reaction to this was an indication that the colony was to be included in the era of good will. The Kashmir Princess, an Air India plane chartered by the Chinese to go to Bandung, exploded after taking off from Hong Kong, and 16 men were killed. Later investigation showed that the explosion had been caused by a time bomb planted by a Hong Kong airport employee who had fled to Taiwan with U.S. $100,000 of KMT money and could not be extradited. Chou En-lai, who was supposed to be passing through the colony, was probably the target. The actual victims belonged to the delegation of Chinese journalists assigned to cover the conference, including the director of the Hong Kong branch of the New China News Agency.

Peking's reaction to the sabotage was surprisingly mild, especially considering its charges in 1952 of active collusion between British and KMT agents. The People's Daily emphasized that the bombing was only one of many criminal activities by KMT and U.S. agents in Hong Kong, and the British were at fault only to the extent that they had not been diligent enough in suppressing espionage. No suggestion of British co- operation with KMT agents was made; on the contrary, examples of the Hong Kong police seizing arms caches were cited. On a more concrete level, Peking passed along to the Hong Kong Government some of its information about the KMT network, information which, according to Governor Grantham, might have enabled the local police to have pre- vented the bomb planting if it had been communicated before the event." The Foreign Ministry did not press the matter diplomatically, and Gran- tham was invited to Peking later in 1955. Instead of a British connexion with the KMT, the local Communist press later emphasized that Hong Kong and China had a common interest against Chiang because KMT planes had bombed British ships during the 1949-50 blockade of the Chinese coast. The Chinese, then, almost certainly believed the British version of the incident and their lack of responsibility for the sabotage. For a year and a half after Bandung, the Chinese and British made a series of goodwill gestures and took tentative steps towards co-operation

2. Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong edition unless otherwise noted), 7 April 1956, in Survey of the China Mainland Press (SCMP), No. 1266, 12 April 1956, pp. 29-31.

3. Colonial office statement in Tiger Standard (Hong Kong), 12 January 1956. 4. People's Daily, 17 April 1955, in SCMP, No. 1034, 26 April 1955, pp. 18-20. 5. Alexander Grantham, Via Ports: Hong Kong to Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1965), p. 181.

6. Ta Kung Pao, 4 September 1955 in Review of the Hong Kong Chinese Press (RHKCP) (U.S. Consulate General Hong Kong), No. 165/55, p. 4.

Hong Kong and Chinese Foreign Policy, 1955-60

on a number of issues. "Cultural diplomacy" in particular flourished. group of 24 Hong Kong University teachers was given an expenses- id tour of China, and in return the colonial authorities allowed a Chinese dance team, with its heavily political programme, to perform in Hong Kong. Even cultural exchanges, however, could not avoid some mutual suspicion and restrictions. The goodwill trip led to a heated public exchange between one of the teachers critical of life under socialism and local leftists,' and the dance troupe was carefully confined to the theatre and prevented by the Hong Kong Government from having unscheduled contact with the populace.

On the official level, negotiations were started early in 1955 between Chinese and British railway officials in Canton in an attempt to restore a through passenger service between Canton and Kowloon. Since 1949 passengers going in either direction had had to get off the train on one side of the border, walk across the bridge, pass through customs and immigration, and board another train before continuing their journey. An agreement had been reached in 1950 on technical matters concerning the use and exchange of rolling stock, but Hong Kong insisted on its right to return "undesirables" to China within seven days.* China, of course, refused to agree to accept such an arrangement; to have done so would have negated the basic contention that any Chinese has an unqualified right to live in Hong Kong because Hong Kong is Chinese territory. For the first time since 1949, however, both sides were willing to see if an acceptable compromise could be reached, and talks continued until 1957.

The basic issue of the railway difficulty, the Chinese claim for unre stricted entry and the British refusal to recognize the claim, involved entry rights at all points on the border, not just at railway crossings. Despite C.P.R. opposition, in 1950 the British had closed the border to Chinese not holding re-entry permits issued by the Hong Kong Govern- ment. In 1955 China complained again about the restrictions, and local leftists joined in.' It was argued that the British were wrong not only in principle, but in the reasoning behind the 1950 restrictions, i.e., the fear that the constant stream of refugees, if unchecked, would make life in the colony impossible by swamping housing, the employment market, and public services. According to the Chinese, that prediction was as wrong in 1955 as it had been in 1950, because it was unthinkable that so many people would want to leave New China. Instead, lifting of restrictions would ease the population problem in Hong Kong because the Chinese in the colony would have a better chance to see first-hand the superiority of Canton with its low cost of living, fine parks, etc. Emigration to

7. Tiger Standard, I January 1956.

8. Grantham, Via Ports, pp. 189-90.

9. New China News Agency (NCNA), Canton, 29 June 1955, in SCMP, No. 1080, 30 June 1955, p. 32. A survey of Hong Kong leftist complaints is in Hsing Tao Jih-pao, 28 July 1955, in RHKCP, No. 144/55, p. 3.

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China would take place, and Hong Kong would only have its natural population increase to deal with.

The British responded to the pressure to relax restrictions, but without consulting China first. In February 1956, the quota system (arrivals limited to the number of departures the previous day, plus a token number, usually 50, in excess) was dropped, and any Chinese who had a re-entry permit from the mainland authorities was admitted to Hong Kong. This was apparently done not only to remove an inconvenience but also to respond to reasonable requests from the Chinese, yet it would have been impracticable without the British expectation that conditions had returned to "normal" in the Kwangtung countryside so that the flow in and out of Hong Kong would balance naturally, as it had after previous wars and revolutions.'

However, no such balance occurred. In six months, between February and September 1956, 56,000 more Chinese entered Hong Kong from China than left the colony for the mainland. Since these 56,000 people all had re-entry permits that quickly expired, they became permanent residents in an already overcrowded city. The Hong Kong authorities sent a note through the British chargé in Peking to the Kwangtung pro- vincial government asking that the number of exit permits be limited. There was no reply." After the Chinese refusal to act, the Hong Kong Government re-imposed the old quota system. The British preferred to have co-operation and settlement by quiet administrative action on China's part, but were willing to accept the consequences of unilateral action.

Chinese displeasure was inevitable. Chou En-lai, during a press con- ference in August at Hong Kong airport, said that interference in inter- national traffic should not be permitted. The Canton-Kowloon railway, like the Suez Canal, should be open for the traffic of all nations. After the quota was re-imposed, the Chinese repeated their arguments con- cerning the traditional rights of Hong Kong residents and added that the birth rate, not immigration, was responsible for the increase in the colony's population. Appeals were made to the colony's self-interest; restrictions, it was claimed, would hurt trade and inconvenience local residents as well as mainland Chinese. The Chinese also warned that negotiations on a through train service, then in progress, were futile if the quota was maintained."

Since the train service negotiations were already deadlocked, this was a mild threat supported by mild rhetoric. The appeal to self-interest, international usage, and customary rights was considerably different from the warnings after the 1952 riot of the wrath of the Chinese people in both Hong Kong and the mainland. Violent pressure on the British

10. Hong Kong Government, Government Information Service, Daily Informa- tion Bulletin, 31 August 1956.

11. Ibid.

12. NCNA Canton, 4 September 1956, in SCMP, No. 1365, 7 September 1956, pp. 30-1.

Hong Kong and Chinese Foreign Policy, 1955-60

from Hong Kong residents was explicitly rejected by Peking as an instru- ment of policy. Ta Kung Pao interpreted Peking's instructions to Over- eas Chinese and Hong Kong and Macao compatriots as meaning that "while maintaining their own legitimate rights and interests they must not take part in the political strife of the countries of their domicile, but must respect the local customs and laws." 1a

Official Representation and the Lessons of Macao

China also attempted to "normalize" relations with Hong Kong by a proposal in 1955 for the stationing of an official diplomatic representative of the People's Republic in the colony. The British chargé in Peking con- sidered the proposal a good one; implementation would be a concrete sign of co-operation and a step towards full Sino-British diplomatic rela- tions, still stalled after five years at the chargé level. Governor Grantham disagreed and, in effect, vetoed the proposal. A Chinese representative would in Grantham's view have such ill-defined duties, status, and authority that interference in Hong Kong's internal affairs would be an inevitable result.14

This situation was similar to the refusal to allow a Chinese consul in Hong Kong in 1870. In both cases the Foreign Office official in Peking supported Chinese representation in Hong Kong because of its favourable impact on overall Sino-British relations, while in both instances the Hong Kong Governor successfully opposed the presence of a Chinese official on the grounds that an official could not operate as a normal diplomat." Because the interests of Hong Kong and those of Britain in their relations with China are not identical there is a built-in potential for conflict between the colonial government and the Foreign Office.

After 1949 most functions that an official Chinese mission might per- form were carried out elsewhere. Consular duties, such as visa and immigration affairs, were handled by the Bank of China and the China Travel Service. Some diplomatic communications, such as protests and explanations of action, were performed by contact between the chargé and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking. Direct talks between Hong Kong and Kwangtung covered local problems, such as railways and the water supply.

The colonial authorities were therefore right in their argument that a C.P.R. mission in the colony was not an absolute necessity. But in re- fusing the Chinese proposal, the British not only killed a goodwill gesture but also passed up the chance to establish a formal and direct channel from Peking to Hong Kong without involving London or Kwangtung. Such a channel would have given the colony more diplomatic stature

13. Ta Kung Pao, 8 January 1955, in RHKCP, No. 6/55, p. 2. 14. Grantham, Via Ports, p. 106.

15. Stanley F. Wright, China's Struggle for Tarif Autonomy (Shanghai, 1938, reprinted in Taipei, 1966), pp. 304-5.

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and possibly more bargaining leverage as a virtual third party dealing with both London and Peking.

Governor Grantham himself played a part in an episode which demon- strated the irregular and cumbersome nature of contact without direct channels. The Portuguese, without the benefit of even a chargé in Peking since Lisbon maintained full diplomatic relations with Taipei, planned a large celebration in November 1955 to commemorate the 400th anniver- sary of their settlement in Macao, classified by Lisbon as one of its overseas provinces." China was extremely unhappy about the planned celebrations, which would not only underline the permanence of Macao as Portuguese - the reason behind calling Macao a province - but would also emphasize historical continuity regardless of what regime controlled the mainland. Peking wanted to let the Portuguese know that the pro- posed celebrations would be an intolerable insult, but without publicly backing itself into a corner where direct action would be necessary if some kind of celebration were held in spite of warnings. The solution, since the People's Republic had no diplomatic contact with Portugal or Macao, was to use Governor Grantham as an informal messenger when he visited Peking in an unofficial capacity in September 1955. Since the source of the message was Chou En-lai himself, speaking in such strong terms that Grantham understood that Peking's followers in Macao would use violence if the celebrations occurred, the Portuguese could not miss the point or doubt its authority. The celebrations were cancelled in October, ostensibly on the grounds that the cost was too high."

This incident was followed by one of the strongest public tirades yet launched by the Chinese against either Macao or Hong Kong. In a series of articles condemning the Portuguese, the Chinese went beyond the simple claim that Macao was Chinese territory. "The Chinese people have never forgotten Macao nor have they forgotten that they have the right to demand the recovery of this territory from the hands of Portugal.

The fact that Macao has not yet been returned to China does not mean that the Chinese people can tolerate long continuation of occupa- tion of Macao.""* The Portuguese, and by implication the British as well, were thus warned that China's tolerance was limited. Flaunting their colonial presence would be outside the limits of acceptable behaviour and might result in loss of the colonies. But this statement, the most explicit, sober, and credible issued by China up to that time on the conditions on which the colonies were allowed to exist, and other blasts charging Macao with assorted crimes, were made after the decision by the Portuguese to abandon the celebrations. The Chinese used quiet diplomacy to achieve their aims and the rhetoric of public attacks to record their position and victory.

The post-Bandung era of goodwill accomplished very little. Talks on

16. Grantham, Via Ports, p. 106.

17. NCNA Peking, 26 October 1955, in SCMP, No. 1159, 27 October 1955, P. 36.

Hong Kong and Chinese Foreign Policy, 1955-60

the railway, the request for a Chinese representative, and the open-entry experiment all fell through. The one hopeful trend was the easing of le embargo, that is, the addition of several types of goods that could be exported to China. While the economic effects were important for Hong Kong, the decision was made in London in reaction to an easing international situation, and it did not lead to further political co-operation between Honk Kong and China. The initiatives taken by both sides during the era of goodwill had been mere gestures to be repudiated or dropped when the political atmosphere changed, although they had some value as signs of relaxation to a city in which confidence in the future is such a precious commodity.

The Double Ten Riots, 1956

The rioting of 10-12 October 1956 was the worst internal disorder in Hong Kong from the time of the anti-Japanese riots of 1931 down to the Cultural Revolution. There had been a small scale battle between leftists and the police in 1952, but this was an isolated incident and did not set off further violence. The 1956 riots, however, involved a temporary breakdown of social order in large parts of the colony for several days and had deeper roots than the purely political confrontation in 1952. Surprisingly, the Hong Kong Government and the People's Republic later agreed, by and large, on the sequence of events in 1956. The basic dis- agreement concerned why the riots occurred and who was to blame.

The Double Ten riots started, as disorders in American cities were later to start in the 1960s, by an otherwise insignificant clash with authority. In one of the huge low-cost housing estates in Kowloon a Government-employed manager, a Chinese, tore down a Nationalist flag placed on the side of the building for the Double Ten celebrations because regulations prohibited the display of any political symbol in public areas of the estate. A crowd gathered around the estate demanding that the flag be allowed to stay, and police were called. By nightfall burning and looting had started and spread to other parts of Kowloon. The rioters, who seem to have had a fair representation of all age groups, instinctively adopted the pattern of urban guerrilla warfare. Groups were usually small and mobile, often 100 or less, dispersing when the police moved in and reforming quickly on side streets.

The reaction of the Hong Kong Government seems in retrospect to have been slow and ineffective. Part of the problem was the lack of equip- ment, particularly vehicles, which lengthened the reaction time of the police, and lack of riot training. But there was also a slow reaction time in decision-making. Force was used sparingly at first; the use of guns and calling in of army units was not authorized until the night of 11 October. The official explanation was that in dealing with a population whose co operation was necessary in normal times, the police had to use a mini- mum of force. The army, however, faced no such problem, and the South China Morning Post, a conservative English language paper which

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accepted other parts of the official report, said that forces were not sent quickly enough into the industrial town of Tsuen Wan in the New Territories." The explanation for initial delay of mobilization may well have been that in the absence of the Governor, then in Tokyo, the Colon- ial Secretary hesitated to take such a drastic step if it could be avoided. The report submitted later by the Government makes it clear that the decision to delay (a decision the report supported) was made by the officer in charge and not by the Governor from Tokyo." Governor Grantham was out of touch with his subordinates to the extent that he initially blamed rivalry between pro-KMT and pro-CCP factions as the cause of trouble. The Government in Hong Kong repudiated his statement the next day.**

There was no doubt as to who provided what leadership there was among the rioters. The Triads, most notably the "14K" whose connexions with the KMT dated from the late 1940s, accounted for a fifth of those arrested for violations more serious than being out after curfew. In Tsuen Wan groups of rioters had leaders with whistles, identification armbands, and considerable discipline. There was also no doubt that Communist organizations were the favourite targets of the rioters when specific targets were selected. Among other attacks, the new building of Hsiang Tao school was burned down, the Federation of Trade Unions' clinic was destroyed, and leftist workers in Tsuen Wan were attacked, result- ing in three deaths. If the more "official" organizations, specifically mainland-owned banks and the newspapers, had not been given per- manent police guards, even more serious attacks might have occurred.

The riots ended as abruptly as they had begun. After 13 October there were no major disturbances. There was no way of knowing the total number of individuals who had joined the rioting, but the largest crowd had been 2,000 and a total of 5,000 people were arrested. There were 59 dead, including the wife of the Swiss Consul, whose car was burned by a mob, and H.K. $5 million worth of property damage." All this was accomplished without firearms, the possession of which carries a maximum death penalty in Hong Kong.

It has been noted that although the Hong Kong Government and Peking agreed in principle on the events of the riots, each had its own explanation of the causes. The Hong Kong authorities in their report claimed that "there is no evidence whatever to suggest that the riots in Kowloon were planned beforehand... those taking part were agents of no one but themselves; people of Nationalist persuasion egged on by criminals bent on personal power and gain."" A meeting between Hong Kong Triad leaders and Nationalist officials was going on in

18. South China Morning Post, 3 January 1957, p. 10.

19. Hong Kong Government, Report on the Riots in Kowloon and Tsuen Wan, October 10 to 12, 1956 (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1957), p. iii.

20. South China Morning Post, 13 October 1956, p. 18.

21. Hong Kong Government, Report on the Riots, pp. 45-7.

22. Ibid. p. ii.

Hong Kong and Chinese Foreign Policy, 1955-60

Taiwan when the riots started, but this was simply a coincidence. The meeting was called to formulate plans for future anti-Communist activity

the Triads in the colony, and did not concern immediate action." The British therefore emphasized the non-political, criminal feature of the riots; the pro-KMT leanings of the crowds were treated as incidental. Peking reacted to the riots with the diplomatic version of fury. The British chargé in Peking was called on the carpet twice and three formal protests were made within the first two weeks after 10 October. To the mainland Chinese there was no question that the rioters were in- spired and organized by KMT agents for the destruction of the loyal Chinese organization. The only question was, "what are the exact re- lations between the KMT agents and the British authorities in Hong Kong? "** Peking's answer was that, at best, the British were incom. petent and even cowardly in allowing the riots to run their course. The Hong Kong authorities were also guilty of wilful misrepresentation in ignoring the evidence of their own official report that documented the KMT's leadership of the riots." Another answer, however, was that the British were actually conniving with the Nationalists under the super- vision of the U.S., the master of both. The policy of co-operation with the KMT bandits had been demonstrated before the riots by the Kashmir Princess incident (the first time China had implicated the British in the sabotage) and the return to Taiwan of a Nationalist F-86 plane and pilot in early 1956." After the riots the British had allowed KMT thugs to escape, covered up KMT involvement, buried bodies in secret so the casualty figure would be low, and were secretly glad that the British-KMT common enemy, the ordinary people of Hong Kong and Kowloon, had been hurt."

This furious rhetoric was accompanied by relatively mild demands for the arrest and punishment of the KMT agents, compensation, and the assurance that similar riots would not happen again." There was no mention of the punishment of negligent British officials or police officers, which would have been a logical demand if the Chinese had really believed that the British had looked the other way when violence started. The verbal overkill, then, may have been a way of emphasizing Peking's concern that fellow Chinese, for whom it felt some measure of respon- sibility, should be protected, and a device for prodding the British to

23. W. P. Morgan, Triad Societies in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1960), p. 87.

24. NCNA Peking, 14 October 1956, in SCMP, No. 1391, 17 October 1956, pp. 24-5.

25. People's Daily, 25 January 1957, in SCMP, No. 1469, I February 1957, PP. 39-41.

26 NCNA Peking, 22 January 1957 (Foreign Ministry Statement), în SCMP, No. 1458, 25 January 1957, pp. 24-5.

27. Kuang-ming Jih-pao, October 28-9 1956, in SCMP, No. 1402, 1 November 1956, pp. 20-4, and Kuang-ming Jih-pao, 30 October 1956, in SCMP, No. 1403, 2 November 1956, p. 27.

28. NCNA Peking, in SCMP, No. 1391, 17 October 1956, pp. 24-5.

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take more effective measures. Certainly the British had underestimated the potential danger of the Triads. No special anti-Triad branch of the Hong Kong police existed until after the riots, and Communists with especially long memories might have recalled the speed with which an anti-Communist branch was formed to combat a much smaller CCP threat in the 1930s. The meeting on Taiwan during the riots, coinci- dence though it was, illustrated the potential danger of a KMT-Triad alliance aimed at the Communists. China's signal of alarm, if indeed it was that, had some foundation.

The Aftermath of the Riots and the Taiwan Straits Crisis, 1957-9

The riots in October 1956, whatever their causes, had the effect of changing the way in which China looked at Hong Kong. From early 1957 until 1959, Peking actively claimed the role of protector of the rights of the Hong Kong Chinese. The British looked on China's claims as unjustified interference but could not ignore them. Whether "inter- fering" or "exercising legitimate rights," China made the task of govern- ing Hong Kong considerably more difficult.

The first flare-up came in the spring of 1957 over the Hong Kong Government's plans to move 7,000 people so that the land they were living on could be cleared for construction of resettlement estates in the Jyu Yuan (Chuk Yun) area near the airport in Kowloon. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested on the grounds that the residents were unwilling to move, that people were dragged out of their homes, and that no compensation was planned. The NCNA release reporting the protest also quoted "people familiar with the conditions there" (i.e., the Hong Kong leftist press, which had reported the first clearance efforts) to the effect that other land was available for genuine develop- ment. The real motive behind the clearance, NCNA charged, might be extension of the airport for military reasons.**

The British replied that the Chinese were wrong about the numbers involved (7,000 as opposed to 60,000 cited in the protest), and about the lack of compensation and the alleged hidden motive. The clearance was, in any event, no business of China's. Her Majesty's Government regret- ted that the Chinese "have seen fit to intervene in this way in the internal affairs of another Government and to give currency to the fallacious and mischievous stories which have been circulated within Hong Kong by certain newspapers and by a small group of discredited agitators, mainly landlords."**

Peking could not, of course, allow that dismissal to pass unchallenged.

29. NCNA Peking, 24 July 1957, in SCMP, No. 1529, 29 July 1957, pp. 26-7. 30. Hong Kong Government Information Service, Daily Information Bulletin, 7 August 1957, n.p.

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A second diplomatic protest was made in which China expressed its extreme wrath." The British note was not only a distortion of truth

even worse, had tried "to deny the Chinese government its legiti mate rights to protect from infringement the legitimate interests of the Chinese residents of Hong Kong and Kowloon." The "extreme wrath" seems to have been directed more at British impertinence than at the removal itself; the Chinese demands were only that fair compensation be paid and forceful eviction be abandoned. Cancellation of the entire project was not suggested."1

The British won the area was cleared - but there were indications that 1957 might be only the first round. China's first protest had inspired the inhabitants opposed to moving (the landlords, according to the British) to form a group which China proclaimed the genuine represen- tative of the residents." Local ad hoc interest groups, therefore, had an example of Peking's willingness to champion non-leftist causes against the local authorities. The second Chinese protest also referred to the "traditional rights" of Chinese in Kowloon, which were not defined further. Many other problems could easily fall into this broad area in which China claimed the right of protection for Chinese residents. The British realized the potential for future conflict over similar issues, and in 1959 started a test case in the courts concerning the Walled City of Kowloon, an area in which China's residual rights were unclear. In 1957 the British had been reminded that China was looking over the shoulder of the Hong Kong Government.

Explicit comparisons between the social evils of capitalism in Hong Kong and the marvels of socialism in China began to appear in the local leftist and mainland press in 1957, as they had in 1952. The colony was shown to be a pit of vice, poverty, crime, and cultural degeneracy. One in three children was said to be a delinquent (or ah fei, a teddy boy), and the American cultural influence was also blamed along with capi- talism." The proof of the superiority of socialism, according to Wen Hui Pao, was that the police records for the fiscal year 1955-6 showed 19,000 more people leaving the colony for China than entering from the mainland." This figure was indeed accurate, and the large excess of departures in the early part of the fiscal year was probably one reason why the British decided to ease border controls. Wen Hui Pao did not, however, mention either illegal immigration into the colony or the 56,000 people Hong Kong gained from China in the six months (most of which were not in the fiscal year 1955-6) during which the quota system was relaxed.

31. NCNA Peking, 10 September 1956, in SCMP, No. 1609, 13 September 1957, PP. 41-2.

32. NCNA Hong Kong, 26 July 1957, in SCMP, No. 1581, 31 July 1957, pp. 26-7.

33. NCNA Hong Kong in Ta Kung Pao, 9 November 1957, in RHKCP, No. 210/57, p. 2.

34. Wen Hui Poo, 19 May 1957, in RHKCP, No. 87/57, p. 4.

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Another charge revived in 1957 was that of collaboration between the British and the KMT. The visit of a KMT official ("Chiang's chief secret agent") in connexion with Taiwan's programme of accepting selected mainland refugees from Hong Kong was viewed not only as evidence of a two-China plot but also as proof of a conspiracy of espionage and sabotage in which the British Governor himself was in- volved." This tirade was very different from China's reaction in March 1956, to the forced landing of a KMT fighter in Hong Kong after a mission over the mainland, when it was said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs "believes that the British authorities will not allow Hong Kong to be used as a base and a place of refuge for carrying out destructive military activities against China." China had also circulated the British reply declaring that abuse of Hong Kong's facilities would not be tolera- ted."

These two incidents, the landing of the KMT plane and the visit of a Taiwan official, were separated by a year and a half during which not only the riots but also a basic shift in Chinese foreign policy line took place. The hardening of the Chinese position, generally seen as a response to both the Hundred Flowers episode and the Russian missile success in late 1957, seems to have been responsible for the charges of British collaboration with the KMT. But Hong Kong was already on Peking's blacklist after the riots, and the change in the foreign policy line seems to have intensified rather than inspired Peking's hostility towards the British authorities. An example of the way that external policy considerations served to complicate an already existing local issue was the fishing rights controversy of 1958.

Fishing rights along the Chinese coast and in Chinese waters involved practical and immediate interests rather than principles. From the Chinese perspective, there were two related problems. One was the ease and regularity with which fishermen escaped from China to Hong Kong, where there were higher market prices in addition to whatever political attractions the refugee might see. When fishermen fled, the Chinese not only lost the family, all of whom usually worked on the boat, but also capital in the form of the boat itself. Second, and worse, these refugee fishermen joined with local Hong Kong boats to compete for catches with mainland fishing fleets.

Disputes over fishing territory were not new. Fishermen in South China had fought for centuries either among themselves (particularly over the raiding of fixed oyster beds) or with various governments try- ing to regulate and tax them. Moreover, the majority of fishermen along the Kwangtung coast were Tankas, with little regard for outside authority, Chinese or British. The Communists had already tried in the early 1950s to curb what they considered to be poaching by Hong Kong boats by

35. NCNA Hong Kong, 17 December 1957, in SCMP, No. 1676, 20 December 1957, p. 82.

36. NCNA Peking, 16 March 1956, in SCMP, No. 1251, 21 March 1956, pp. 20-2.

Hong Kong and Chinese Foreign Policy, 1955-60

denying the mainland market to all fish products from Hong Kong. To make matters worse, the Hong Kong Government tolerated refugee fishermen who, even though they were technically illegal immigrants, were not forced to return to China because they were no expense to the colony.

The failure of previous enforcement was evident by 1958. In 1956-7, a total of 1,000 boats, a respectable fleet in itself, came to Hong Kong to escape the early stages of collectivization." Consequently, in June 1958 new regulations were put into effect requiring that a quota of the catch of Hong Kong boats fishing in Chinese waters should be sold to main- land co-operatives, at Chinese prices instead of the higher Hong Kong rates. If poaching could not be stopped, it could at least be channelled. To enforce the new rules, the Chinese levied fines of several hundred Hong Kong dollars, towed away boats, and, according to the appeal for help by the Hong Kong Commercial Fishing Association to the colonial authorities, harassed Hong Kong boats on the high seas.

The problem was compounded by the formation of fishermen's com- munes in August 1958, and China's claim in September to a 12-mile instead of a three-mile limit to her territorial waters." The 1958 collecti- vization drive caused an even larger number of fishermen to flee to Hong Kong; over 1,900 families registered with the Fishermen's Aid Organi- zation as refugees in the first two weeks of August." Furthermore, the British did not recognize the 12-mile limit, and there was an overlap of claims to territorial waters. The danger was that Chinese patrol boats would chase escaping fishing boats or Hong Kong boats evading fines and meet Hong Kong patrol boats in waters where the colonial authori- ties claimed jurisdiction.

Shooting incidents did not occur, as they had in the early 1950s, but the lack of such incidents was due to luck rather than a backing down by either side. The Hong Kong Government began to send armed patrol boats out with its fishing fleet to protect it from increasingly aggressive Chinese patrols. Although the expansion of their claim to territorial waters was connected with the Quemoy crisis, the Chinese were serious about their rights near Hong Kong; according to the British there were at least four seizures of boats within the colony's waters in late 1958 and 1959 before the Chinese were satisfied that the situation had im- proved." There were no official protests on either side despite the risk each was willing to take. This certainly does not mean that protests were exchanged only on issues of marginal interest and that serious interests were backed by force instead of rhetoric. Rather, the lack of publicity from China illustrates that there were issues on which the interests of China did not coincide with those of the Chinese residents in

37. Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), 1 May 1958, p. 565. 38. Hsing Tao Jih Pao, 16 June 1958.

39. FEER, 14 August 1958, p. 216.

40. FEER, 21 August 1958, p. 244.

41. New York Times, 18 May 1959, p. 10.

417

418

The China Quarterly

Hong Kong whose protector Peking claimed to be, and that the Com- munists felt it unwise to emphasize the discrepancy.

The Impact of the Taiwan Straits Crisis

The relationship between China's Hong Kong policy and its other foreign interests was at no time better illustrated than during the second Taiwan Straits crisis, which reached its high point in August and Sep- tember 1958. The Chinese claim for a 12-mile limit to its territorial waters was made with the object of including Quemoy and Matsu in those waters, but it complicated, as we have seen, the issue of fishing rights around Hong Kong. The claim for the extension would also have blocked some access routes to Hong Kong since China occupied several islands around the colony, but China gave no indication of pushing its claim to the extent of cutting off the colony's communications.

China also started an unusually hostile campaign against the British. Official protests and articles in both the mainland and Hong Kong press charged the British with almost every conceivable crime a government can commit: brutality, censorship, repression of legitimate rights of patriotism, and the promotion of decadence and selfishness in their educational system. One Ministry of Foreign Affairs protest over the local authorities' temporary closing of a leftist school for building re- pairs was representative; the Hong Kong Government was said to be systematically persecuting patriotic education and promoting a two- China plot by encouraging KMT schools, texts, and agents. The protest demanded the re-opening of the school, compensation, punishment for those responsible for a scuffle that broke out when students who refused to leave the building were evicted, and the banning of KMT schools in the colony.**

Although the Chinese charges that the British were brutally and syste- matically suppressing patriotic, ie., leftist education were clearly exag- gerated, the dispute over political education in the colony was not invented by the C.P.R. The British, concerned with the widespread use of com- munist books by schools in defiance of the education ordinances, had deported the principal of another leftist school shortly before the build- ing repair controversy. The C.P.R. was in part simply exercising what it saw as its right to be the protector and spokesman for Chinese who would someday be reunited with the mainland.

The Chinese, however, did not limit their protests to the relevant issue of education and were clearly interested in more than local issues. The agitation appears to have been used, in Harold Hinton's phrase, as a means of reminding the British of their vulnerability and the necessity for good behaviour."* China felt it necessary to give such a reminder,

42. NCNA Peking, 27 August 1958, in SCMP, No. 1844, 2 September 1958, pp. 35-6.

43. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, p. 147.

Hong Kong and Chinese Foreign Policy, 1955-60

nce it was itself in some measure vulnerable because of the foreign cupation of Hong Kong. The residents of Kwangtung are often told that because of the presence of the colony they are on the front lines of the battle to combat capitalist ideology, but in a confrontation involving the United States in South China, Kwangtung was likely to become a front line in a real battle, with Hong Kong as an enemy airbase. National- ist planes had made emergency landings in Hong Kong in 1956 and 1958 after flying over the mainland, and China apparently wanted to remind the British of the dangers of allowing hostile planes to use the colony's airports. This seems to have been the purpose of a Chinese protest in August 1958 concerning supposed British military flights violating Chinese airspace. The People's Republic linked these flights with the Taiwan Straits trouble because, the Chinese claimed, the British were carrying out reconnaissance for the United States and the KMT." These protests, and the agitation throughout the summer, were diplo- matic versions of "pointing at the (British) ash and reviling the (Ameri- can or KMT) birch."

London certainly saw the Chinese broadsides and agitation against the colony as involving more than local issues. The military command in London announced in early September, before the crisis passed, that the Hong Kong garrison, generally considered adequate for dealing with internal disorder, would receive another battalion, and that the fleet in Hong Kong waters would be increased."

The Economic "Offensive"

There was a 23 per cent. increase in 1958 over 1957 in the total value of Chinese goods exported to Hong Kong. Since this was accompanied by decreases in prices ranging from 10 to 30 per cent, and coincided with the political campaign in the late summer of 1958, a wide variety of Chinese and British commentators in Hong Kong saw the Communists as starting a systematic attempt to undermine the colony using both political and economic weapons. The Reform Club, composed largely of barristers and other like-minded professionals who were still very much part of the European establishment, complained that the Chinese "dumping" of goods on the one hand and withholding of goods, especially livestock on the other, was meant to ruin Hong Kong food producers and thus eliminate competition." The Tiger-Standard, owned and managed by pillars of the anti-Communist Chinese com- munity, viewed the "dumping" as only one part of a long-range political plan to consolidate Peking's position in the colony, and the liberal

44. NCNA Peking, 27 August 1958, in SCMP, No. 1844, 2 September 1958, p. 34.

45. UPI London, 4 September 1958, in Tiger Standard, 5 September 1958. 46. FEER, 21 August 1958, p. 245.

419

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The China Quarterly

Chinese-language magazine Democratic Front agreed." Even the For Eastern Economic Review, which had been optimistic and generous in its assessment of China in 1949-50, was uneasy about Communist inten- tions and policies in 1958. The Review worried that, besides political and economic pressure, the Great Leap might also lead to population pressure and a new flood of refugees because increased population was regarded as an advantage on the mainland." Charges of dumping were so common in the non-Communist Chinese press that the Chinese Re- form Association, sympathetic to the People's Republic, and the leftist press felt the need to defend the price cuts and increased exports to the colony on the grounds that lower prices gave a higher standard of living to Hong Kong workers and demonstrated the superiority of social- ism."

It seems clear that both the critics and the defenders missed the point. The export spurt in 1958 was not intended to undermine the colony's economy any more than it was motivated by concern for the living standard of the Hong Kong workers. China was in part responding to the challenge of foreign, not Hong Kong, competition and in part follow- ing economically "rational" trends already established. The price of Chinese rolled steel, which Hong Kong did not produce, was pegged at 10 per cent. below that of the Japanese product,** and the 20 per cent. decrease in the price of live pigs, a trade of considerable importance in Hong Kong, was aimed successfully at blocking the 1958 attempt by Taiwan to enter the Hong Kong market." Moreover, there had been an increase in the Chinese export of manufactured goods, particularly tex- tiles, for at least two years before 1958, and exports of these continued to rise in response to increased output after agricultural production and exports fell during 1959-60.** China, then, exported what was available, increasing exports of goods whose production had increased and de- creasing exports of goods whose production fell. A consistent effort at undermining the colonial economy would demand a continued rise in exports at very low prices regardless of domestic production.

Relaxation and Co-operation, 1959-60

In 1959 there were indications that China's Hong Kong policies were changing. Agitation over the school incidents in the summer and autumn

47. Tiger Standard, 3 August 1958, p. 4, and Democratic Front, 26 January 1959, in RHKCP, No. 2459, pp. 4-6.

48. FEER, 28 August 1958, p. 277.

49. Hsin Wan Pao, 22 August 1958, in RHKCP, No. 158/58, p. 3.

50. Hong Kong University, "Hong Kong's trade with mainland China," in Hong Kong Economic Papers, No. 1, June 1961, p. 72.

31. New York Times, 5 December 1958, p. 3.

$2. "Hong Kong's trade with mainland China," p. 72.

Hong Kong and Chinese Foreign Policy, 1955-60

of 1958 was dropped in February 1959. There was no lengthy campaign n the local press and no official complaints at all from Peking concern- ing the deportation of two leaders of a radical farmers' organization in March and the withdrawal of a Government subsidy to leftist schools in June. A more positive and official signal of a possible new era of co- operation was given by Tao Chu in a speech to a group of Hong Kong Chinese tourists in February 1959. Although his speech was couched in terms of China's feelings of responsibility for their compatriots, T'ao let it be known that China would supply water to Hong Kong on the same basis as water was already being supplied to Macao." This was a generous offer, for China had just built a reservoir to supply water to Macao free of charge under an agreement reached with Macao's water works' general manager Ho Hsien (who also wore the hat of Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce).

The Chinese again raised the question of water for Hong Kong in direct contacts at the border in January 1960, when plans for new reser- voirs were being made. In February Governor Black in an official address indicated his desire for talks, and in April bargaining started in the railway station on the border, alternating between the Hong Kong and Chinese waiting rooms." An agreement allowing Hong Kong to buy 5,000,000,000 gallons or a little over 20 per cent. of its annual needs at the time was finally reached in November 1960. The length of time involved in this process, including more than half a year of negotiations, and even the meeting arrangements, indicate the caution with which the contracts were made, but the course of China-Hong Kong relations after 1960 showed that despite initial caution the year 1959 did mark the start of a new period of co-operation and Chinese restraint.

The Hong Kong Tiger-Standard argued that the deflation of Chinese rhetoric and pressure in early 1959 was an outcome of the moderate line laid down at the Sixth Plenum of the CCP in Wuhan in December 1958." The trouble with assuming such a direct link between domestic policy cause and foreign policy effect is that there was no corresponding shift in foreign policy after the return to more radical domestic politics after the Lushan Plenum in August 1959.

A second possible explanation for the apparent shift in 1959-60 is that the Chinese, in the face of mounting economic crisis, wanted the maximum economic benefit from the colony, and for that end normal relations were desirable. Certainly the size of the economic contribution that the colony made to China's wealth was already impressive in 1959- before the trade increase in the early 1960s that made Hong Kong

53. Ta Kung Pao, 11 February 1959, in SCMP, No. 1958, 20 February 1959, p. 24.

54. Hong Kong Government Information Service, Daily Information Bulletin, 15 November 1960.

55. Tiger Standard, 15 February 1959.

421

422

The China Quarterly

China's biggest customer. Added to the large favourable balance of trade with the colony that China enjoyed-H.K. $920 million in 1959 and H.K. $1,066 million in 1960-and the remittance channel through local banks, was the large number of two-pound food parcels from Hong Kong. These parcels numbered 870,000 in 1959 and 3-7 million in 1960.** The trouble with linking post-1958 Chinese policy too closely with the need for resources in the face of economic disaster is that the first firm indication of change, T'ao Chu's speech, came in February 1959 close on the heels of the bumper harvest of 1958. T'ao even offered to in- crease food shipments from Kwangtung to Hong Kong. The agricul- tural crisis was not evident until after the harvest of late 1959, so the beginning of relaxation could not have been a direct response to changes in economic conditions. Moreover, China was not economically "rational" in the sense of maximizing profits at the expense of politics. From the autumn of 1959 to the summer of 1960, China contributed 730 tons of rice to flood victims in the colony, a contribution that equalled 15 per cent, of the total food in parcels sent from the colony to the mainland for the entire 1959-60 period.**

In fact, China's motivation in allowing Hong Kong to remain British was only partly economic. The original Communist decision to leave Hong Kong in peace was made at a time when the colony was a large drain on China's foreign exchange almost U.S. $105 million in 1950, $143 million in 1951.** The colony was a convenient economic outlet to the world, but the embargo on goods enacted by the western allies after the PLA intervened in Korea not only restricted the colony's use- fulness to China but also called into doubt Hong Kong's own economic future. Before Hong Kong emerged as a source of profit, therefore, the Communists indicated a willingness to live and let live, apparently in order to avoid a political and military confrontation with the British and to help divide Britain from the United States on the China issue. At least before the 1960s, careful calculations of profit and loss were not the con- trolling factors in every Chinese decision concerning Hong Kong.

It seems possible, therefore, that the relaxation in 1959 was not the result of a new and positive Chinese policy, but an end, a fizzling-out instead of an abrupt termination, of a period of tense relations. The tension had started after the October 1956 riots and peaked during the Taiwan Straits crisis, after which Hong Kong, previously a danger spot of KMT influence as shown by the riots, or else a potential enemy stag- ing area, faded into the background. Until 1962 or 1963 China did not engage in any active variety of diplomacy but chose to leave well alone.

56. FEER Yearbook, 1962 (Hong Kong: FEER, 1963), p. 67.

57. Wen Hui Pao, 21 July 1959 in RHKCP, No. 35/59, p. 5, and Ta Kung Pao, 22 June 1960, in RHKCP, No. 90/60, p. 3.

58. Alexander Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 198.

Hong Kong and Chinese Foreign Policy, 1955-60

423

Conclusion

Two points should stand out in this account of China's relations with Hong Kong from 1955 to 1960. The first is that there is no one-to-one correlation between the Communists' Hong Kong policy and either their overall foreign policy orientation, or their specific policy in areas such as the Taiwan Straits.

Certainly Hong Kong has at times been both a beneficiary of and a hostage to broad trends in China's reaction to the outside world. In 1955-6 the general benevolence of the Bandung spirit was an advantage for Hong Kong and helped minimize the consequences of a serious in- cident, the sabotage of the Kashmir Princess, within the colony. However, there was an important exception to Hong Kong's connexion with China's general policy. The charges levelled at the British after the October 1956 riots continued and expanded throughout 1957, while the Bandung era did not finally end until late 1957 after the Soviet missile success. The timing here is less important than the substance; China in some measure held the British responsible for the intensity if not the provocation of the Double Ten riots, and relations afterwards were soured.

A connexion between China's policy towards Hong Kong and its policy towards other specific areas is valid for 1958, when Hong Kong suffered the consequences of the Taiwan Straits trouble in which the colony had no direct part. This was by contrast with the first Straits crisis in 1954 which did not produce major agitation in Hong Kong or a cam- paign by the mainland press. The different treatment may be largely accounted for by events that occurred in the interval: the Kashmir Princess episode, the 1956 riots, and the British return to Taiwan of two Nationalist planes that were forced down in Hong Kong. The first two events, and especially the riots, demonstrated the strength and potential for mischief of the KMT in the colony, while the return of KMT planes underlined the possible military use of the colony by hostile forces. Also the difference between the repercussions of the 1954 and 1958 troubles may have been partly based on the Chinese calculation of the actual dangers of conflict. The more serious the danger, the more need for warning bystanders to remain absolutely uninvolved.

Hong Kong, then, can act as an "independent" factor in Chinese policy. That is, the treatment of the colony must be considered along with general trends and specific areas, but China's reactions to Hong Kong cannot necessarily be predicted from other aspects of Chinese policy. China, like other nations, is at times forced to react to situations on an ad hoc basis in a manner that may be out of tune with the general drift of policy.

Hong Kong, of course, is not unique in receiving special treatment at times. For example, the deterioration of China's relations with India in 1959-62 took place at a time of improved relations with other third world countries, and the list of exceptions could be expanded. India,

424

The China Quarterly

however, is a sovereign nation and occupies a sub-continent; Hong Kong, by contrast, is small, dependent, and vulnerable. A special position is thus understandable for India because of its size, but not for Hong Kong.

The reason for this independence of Hong Kong in Chinese policy is a basic one. Hong Kong is, along with Macao, peculiar in being at once a foreign policy problem and a domestic problem. The interde- pendence of nations, the adaptation and blending of domestic with foreign policies is common in international relations, but the degree of intimacy with the two colonies is unprecedented for China and unusual in any area of the world.

This duality is reflected in a number of ways. Organizationally, Chinese concern for Hong Kong is shared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the provincial Government of Kwangtung, and the CCP itself, with 11,000 members in the colony according to one estimate."" Moreover, Hong Kong Chinese are neither fully fledged citizens nor hua ch'iao (overseas Chinese) but belong to the special category of t'ung pao (com- patriots).

Diplomatically, China has acted as the self-appointed spokesman for the interests of the residents of the colony to an even greater extent than for overseas Chinese. Although Chinese protests have often been intem- perate in language and based on exaggerations, the British objection con- cerns not so much the substance of protests but the fact that they were made at all, since Hong Kong is not China's concern. Between the two ex- tremes the C.P.R. view that it has great responsibility concerning the rights of Hong Kong Chinese and the British view that any outside pressure is meddling a balance in actual practice has been reached. In education, for example, the British do not strictly enforce ordinances forbidding political education, but occasionally, as in the deportation of the school principal in 1958, indicate some limits. China tolerates those limits but signals concerns and warnings to avoid real suppres. sion. Therefore, despite changes in general foreign policy including periods of harshness, the C.P.R. has been flexible enough to work out, for political as well as economic reasons, a stable relationship with the colony of a western power.

59. United States Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, World Strength of the Communist Party Organization, 20th Annual Report (Washington: Department of Stato, 1968), p. 81.

Reference

Miss P.M. Kelly, Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department,

CONSULAR RELATIONS IN DISPUTED TERRITORIES

Consulate-General in Gibralter

78A

Work of the Spanish

13/9

To Clark (FED)

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1. At the time of the closure of the Consulate-General in Gibraltar

(May 1954) it was suggested by the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Consulate was "unjustified" as "there were no Spaniards resident in Gibraltar whom he wished to protect". However the Consul- General, in conversation with the British Colonial Secretary, expressed doubt on this although he admitted that in view of the fact that

the Spanish colony in Gibraltar was non-existent he was not called

upon to discharge normal consular functions on their behalf. He did,

however, look after the interests of Spaniards working but not living

in Gibraltar.

Foreign Office minuting at the time said "Spanish workers will now lose a convenient means of negotiating on wages and conditions and a channel of protest". It was further said "we have so far

insisted that the Spanish Consul-General should be the channel for communicating Spanish representations on wages and conditions of employment to the Gibraltar Government. This local settlement of differences has, in general, worked well over the years ...; if the Spaniards now wish to deprive themselves of this convenient method

that is not our business. But they cannot also claim that Spanish workers in Gibraltar will be left without representation, not only can these Spanish workers make their complaints known through the Gibraltar trade unions but the Spanish Government can, on their

behalf, raise any matters either through H.M. Embassy Madrid or through the Vice Consulates at La Linea and Algeciras. But hhe C.O. will have to give careful thought to a new procedure for recruiting Spanish workers; all negotiations have so far taken place through the Consulate..."

Apart from this work for Spaniards employed in Gibraltar the Spanish Consulate-General in Gibraltar was also responsible for issuing six-monthly visas to residents of the colony.

11/9

6 September 1973

semse mills

Denise Hills,

Westem & Southern Suropean Section

Research Department

00: #97261 230643 500M 3/77 ON KOA

SECRET

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Breef for discussin will governer.

'A'

OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

1. The discussion on this subject between the Secretary of State and Chi Peng-fci in June passed off reasonably well. Chi, accepted what the Secretary of State had to say, but put us on notice that the subject would come up again during the Prime Minister's visit to China.

2. We have consulted Peking and Hong Kong for their views on how we should brief the Prime Minister. Mr Royle may wish to remind himself of what Sir John Addis said in his letter of

6 August, and see Sir Hugh Norman-Walker's comments on that letter.

3. We have drafted a reply to Sir John Addis saying that we do not agree with his recommendations that we should brief the Prime Minister to probe Chinese intentions both on the

representation issue and on the future of Hong Kong.

Mr Roylu will wish to rensouro dir Murray MacLehose that we see no reason to change our policy on this issue. He might ask how the Governor's contacts are developing with the licad of NCNA and other Chinese officials in Hong Kong

Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department

7 September 1973

SMCRET

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CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG we were,

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1. Before we discuss Sir John Addis's letter to you of 16 August on this subject, you will wish to see two other papers

which are relevant. They are:

76A

a) Mr Stratton's letter to Mr Hervey of 7 August; and

2. I have myself always tended to agree with Sir John Addis rather than Sir Murray Maclehose over the interpretation of Sa I. Chinese purposes. I am now inclined to accept his interpretation of the reasons why Chi P'eng-fei put forward his suggestion about reciprocal representation during his recent visit to this country. On the other hand, I have always tended to agree with

THIS IS A COF/

944. OF THE PLUS TO PROG ACT 1968

THE ORIGINAL HIS IN THE BEHANI

Sir Murray Maclehose rather than Sir John Addis over the likely consequences of our either accepting or refusing the Chinese proposal. I still do.

suggests to me that

the Chinese may indeed have given up hope of persuading us to accept the proposal. Even if I an right, however, I do not think it follows that Chou En-lai will abstain from pressing the Prime Minister to accept the proposal when he goes to Peking. The Chinese would have nothing to lose and (potentially) à good deal to gain by adopting such a course. In any case it would not be in their nature to avoid the subject altogether after warning us that we can expect it to be broached again.

15 August 1973

R.M. Evons

R M Evans

Far Eastern Department

We shall be presend again by the Chrase whom the P.M. goos to China, but I would not Impport Six J Addio' recommendati

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You will wish to see Mr Royle's minute.

2. I think that our next step should be to send Sir John

I think Addis a considered reply to his letter of 6 August. we owe it to him to explain fairly fully why we do not think that the Prime Minister should go beyond the formula which the Secretary of State used in speaking to Chi P'eng-fei and also why we do not think it would be prudent for the Prime Minister to broach the future of Hong Kong and its relations with China with Chou En-lai. If you agree, I will prepare a draft (for submission to you after clearance with Mr Stewart). I shall refer to Mr Stratton's letter of 7 August

22 August 1973

R.in. Erons

RM Evans

Far Eastern Department

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OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

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Addis's letter to you of 6 August comments on Hervey's letter of 23 July to Stratton about Chinese representation in Hong Kong. We have already sent our comments, on lines agreed by the Governor before he left, in Stratton's letter to Hervey of 7 August

The Ambassador refers to Hong Kong without official Chinese representation as an anomaly and an anachronism. I would say rather that one can make out a case that it is the position of Hong Kong, with or without a representative, which is the anomaly and the anachronism, continuation of which for the foreseeable future is nevertheless in the interests of all concerned. The present arrangements for conducting relations between Hong Kong and China are adequate. And there are no sources of friction which we can be sure that the appointment of a representative would do anything to

remove.

The appointment of a representative would give face to the CPG's operations in Hong Kong, and perhaps infer some official acceptance of their claim to sovereignty over this Colony. There would be a short term gain for Hong Kong and HMG in terms of Chinese goodwill. But we have no doubt that this would be heavily outweighed by the immediate loss of confidence in Hong Kong and its future which would follow the representative's appointment. And it would not be long before grave embarrassment ensued caused both by his activities and by other activities for which he would become a focus. We cannot have two Governors of Hong Kong, which is what will occur. And while his appoint- ment might give a temporary appearance of official approval of Hong Kong's present status, I think it hazardous to argue from that to the smooth evolution of Hong Kong towards 1997.

The Ambassador's interpretation of Chinese silence, in paragraph 2 of his letter of 6 August, may

K.M. Wilford Esq., CMG,

SECREI

SECRET

well be correct; though his letter to you of 3 August suggests to me that there may be another explanation. From the tone of Chi P'eng-fei's most recent remarks it seems that the Chinese may be disposed to accept that in saying, "No" HMG are serious, and that at this point the matter is not worth a major row. Moreover, there is as yet no evidence that HMG's refusal has so far had an adverse effect on Hong Kong's relations with China, let alone those of the United Kingdom. the matter has been taken quite calmly, and such expectation as there was of the representative's arrival seems to have died away for the moment.

Locally,

I am not sure that the appointment of an official representative from China is necessarily relevant at this stage to the eventual negotiation of the future for the Colony. His appointment would initially be seen here as a first step towards the ending of Hong Kong's present status, and I would prefer to keep the two issues separate. You will wish to discuss with the Governor the Ambassador's suggestion that the Prime Minister should discuss with Chou En-lai the future of Hong Kong and its relation to China over the next few years. Subject to this views however, this does not yet seem to me the right time for such a Mdiscussion. We are unlikely to get firm assurances and,

even if we did, the undertakings would presumably not be written, and could scarcely bind the successors to the present Chinese leaders.

вадже

There must of course come a time when we shall wish to discuss the future of Hong Kong. We hope that it will not be in this decade. The point I want to make is that the moment which we would prefer for such discussions is not likely to be the same as that which the Chinese would like. As the years go by, Hong Kong and China are likely to develop in ways which will make them progressively harder to integrate.

Since it would help to ease their problem of absorbing the Colony - if that is the solution they want or of negotiating some different arrangement, the

SECRET

Chinese might welcome a rundown of Hong Kong, through lack of new investment, long after HMG had decided that the moment was ripe to start talking.

It seems unlikely that Mr. Heath would get anything but generalities from Chou En-lai. But I suggest that it would be worth his while to respond to any suggestion that the time was not ripe to discuss the future of Hong Kong with a statement that this was so, but

that the time will come when HMG will, in all probability, wish to take up the matter.

You's Sven

Hugh Momen wahre

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cc: Sir John Addis

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K.M. Wilford, us...., CMG,

Foreign & Commonwealth Ĉffice,

London, S.M.1.

Dean Michael

77A

BRITISH LABASSY,

PLKING.

6 August, 1973.

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OFFICIAL CHILLSL REP TEPENTANCK IN RUNG KONG

Hervey's letter to Stratton of 23 July asks us to begin considering the brief on official Chinese representation in Hön, Kong for the Prime Minister's visit in January. The letter asks in particular

hether the suggestion made by Chi F'eng-fei during his visit to London in June for reciprocal represen- tation of the Hong Kong Goverment in Canton affects or modifies our perce, tien of Chinese intentions. It do for Murray MacLei.c.e to say whether this variant

the proposal any more attractive to him. So Tar cu Chiese intentions in putting foward the Audur! are concerned, I should say it is most

a enuine attempt on their part to get round The ujections to their proposal put forward first by Mr. nuyle and then by the Secretary of State and to imes it up in a way that they think may be more palobulic to us.

it I do not see how it can be construed as a sinister manoeuvre. The variant

roposal of reciprocal representation in Canton is however aælatively minor matter and the main question is how we recommend that the central issue should be dealt with when the Frime Minister comes to Feking in

The rime Minister's discussion of this question with Chou On-lal will be seen by the Chinese as the last court of appeal on the subject. On each occasion that the Chinese proposal for official representation' has been discussed substantively Mr. Royle's visit in May 1972, the Secretary of State's visit in October last year and Chi F'eng-fei's vicit to London ir. June the Chin..cive declined to accept our negative answer as final and hu/C sked us to consider

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Matter further. Chi me it cicar in Lon... Un he would have to refer the Secretary of State's refusal to his Fremier and that he expected Chou EL-lai to discuss the question with the Prime Minister when he cunc to Fenis. Bet.cen the Secretary of State's visit or last Cetuber and Ghi's visit to London in June no senior officiul in the Ministry or Foreign Affairs raised the uestion of Chinese representation in Hong Kong with me; and since my return from leave neither Ch'iao Kuan Hua nor Chang Wen-chin nor Wang Tung, with all of whor. I have had extended discussions, have referred to the

alter at all. I interpret this silences indic: ting their view that the question is now firmly loded at a higher lev.l, first that of the two Foreign Secretaries and now that of the two Frime Ministers, and is therefore not for discussion between Vice Ministers and below and myscif.

As you know, I was not myself in favour of the negative reply to the Chinese proposul which was returned first by Mr. Hoyle and then on the two occasions by the secretary of stute. 1 considered that it would have been more in the interests of HMG and of Hong Kong to have treated the Chinese proposul re constructively, first by asking the Chinese to xplain and define more precisely what they wish to chieve by their proposal and secondly by being prepared to agree to a form of official Chinese :upresentation in Hong Kong if we can secure reason-

bly acceptable assurances on how the new arrangement ..ould operate. These views of mine on the central issue remain unchanged.

4. My recommendation must therefore be that when the Frime Minister comes to Feking he should not simply repeat the refusal which has already been given to the Chinese request for official representation in Hong Kong. To be so entirely negative on this important question affecting the relations between our two countries would not be compatible with what we hope will be the tone of the meeting between the two Frime Ministers. I think it would be right for the Frime Minister to xplain once again the difficulties hich London and Hong Kong see in the way of the Chinese proposal. But I hope that he would then go on to

/ ask

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ask Chou En-lai, who is both the originator of the proposal and the final authority on It, to explain as frankly and in as much detail as possille, why the Chinese Goverment have put it forward, why they continue to insist on it, and what they hope to achieve by it.

5. We know that both Mao Tse-tung and Chou in-lai have a hign regard for Mr. Heati's view on the way in which the state of the world is evolving. For tnis reason he is, I believe, in a better position than any other statesman today to have a really deep and meaningful discussion with the Chinese leaders on

orld affairs and to probe their views and intentions. ..e should not miss this opportunity of trying to get a clearer view of Chinese attitudes towards Hong Kong, both at the present time and in the future I hope

erefore that in his discusions with Cou En-lai the Frime Minister will not confine himself to the limited issue of Chinese representation in Hong Kong but will o o to discuss with him. how the future of Hong Kong and its relations with China are to evolve over the

At five or ten years and up to the end of the ...bury.

Hong Kong cannot stay still but has to evolve. The stability of the evolution will be greatly affected by the extent to hich it diverges from the Chinese Government's views and intentions or is in conformity

ith them.. The present,osition of Hong Kong, without official Chinese representation, is an anomaly

nd an whachronism. To accept the Chinese Government's

oposal or official representation has the advantage for us of placing to some extent the seal of their orficial aproval on the present status of Hong Kong and of Living us some assurance that the evolution of Hong Kong over the next stage will be with the concurrence of the Chinese Government. If, on the other hand, he Fre Minister were to reject the Chinese propos 1 and the Chinese were to accept the rejection as final, t! present state of relative dislocation in the relations between. Hong Kong and China might be extended into an ever-widening breach which would dame not only the interests of Hong Kong but also our relations with China in a wider context.

7. The Chinese request for official representation in Hong Kong therefore, as I see it, places us squarely

/ at

SLCIET

SECKET

at a cross-roads, and the Frime Minister's visit brings us to he moment of decisive choice. In one direction there is the prospect, or at least the possibility, of having the concurrence of the Chinese Government in the evolution of the situation in Hong Kong up to and after the end of the Lease. That concurrence will be an important factor affecting the confidence of the busines com unity and the welfare of the inhabitants of the territory. In the other direction there is

the expectation of a widening breach between the Chinese Goverment and ourselves in our views on the evolution of Hong Kong. As that breach cecomes increasingly apparent it will surely affect the all- important factor or confidence and the climate of investment in Hong Kong. The decision on how the Frime Minister is to handle the issue of Chinese

representation may therefore be quite crucial for the whole future of Hong Kong.

Yours ever!

John Add's

(J.M. Addis)

Copy (personal) to: Sir Murray MacLe hose, KOMIC, LIBE,

Hone KonE.

SECRET

SECIT

BRITISH EMBASSY,

PEKING.

R.E.

1448.

3 August, 1973.

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CHILESE OFFICI.L FRESENTAZICI. IN HONG KONG

It is worth noting that in my hour and a half's talk with Ch'iao Kuan-hua on 24 July he did not take the opportunity to revert to the question of Chinese representation in Hon Kong. It is just possible that right at the end he may have been thinking of Hong Kong when he said that relations between Britain and China were now good. Some questions remained, but these could be taken slowly. There was no need to be uneasy about there being difficulties between

As things were we could open our hearts and discuss all question." But I don't think so. feeling is rather that these words had a quite general ahlication and expressed his view on the desirability of discussing frankly any issues that come up between our two countries.

Lis.

Yours even,

John Addis

Surely not hose spoken in the term she did.

RE.

14/8.

(J... Addis)

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COLONIAL SECRETARIAT

LOWER ALBERT ROAD

HONG KONG

764

R. B. R. Hervey, Esq.,

Far Eastern Department, F.C.O

Зем

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7th August, 1973.

OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

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In paragraph 3 of your letter of 23rd July, you asked for our comments on Chi P'eng-fei's suggestion that the Chinese Government would be willing to consider reciprocal representation of the Hong Kong Government in Canton, We see no advantage whatever in this suggestion, which would be open to just the same objections and pose just the same risks as vould an official representative from Peking. Indeed it would be worse in as much as it would give the Chinese the substance of what they want without the slight compensating advantage of a measure of recognition of Hong Kong which the appointment of a representative from Peking would bestov. The appointment of a representative from Kwangtung might be taken to indicate that Hong Kong was merely a part of that province, whereas a representative from Peking would at least show that Hong Kong was taken seriously as a separate entity.

Chi's proposal does not therefore in any way alter our view of Chinese motives in putting forward their request for an official representative here. We hope that the Prime Minister will be advised to reject all such suggestions in the same terms, and for the same reasons, as were used by the Secretary of State.

3. No doubt you will be discussing this brief with the Governor when he is in London next month.

The us

eva,

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R. J. Stratton, Political Adviser

c.c. J. D. I. Boyd, Esq.,

Peking.

SECRET

Mr Larmour

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SPAIN/GIBRALTAR: IMPLICATIONS FOR HONG KONG/CHINA OF NEW PROPOSALS

1. Mr Donohoe has told me that you would like an early view of the implications, if any, on the relationship between Hong Kong and China of the new proposals for Gibraltar. As I understand it, the proposal would be that HMG would recognize Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar, but that the territory would continue to be administered by HMG under a perpetual lease, terminable at the instance of the Gibraltarians, perhaps on the basis of referenda at 10 year intervals. There would also be some kind of Spanish representation in Gibraltar, though not connected with the administration.

2. This is at least as much a matter for Far Eastern Department as it is for us. I have discussed the question briefly with them, and what follows is our joint first reaction. To produce a considered view would take longer than the time I understand to be available at present.

3. The UK view of the constitutional position is as follows. Under the Treaty of Nanking, 1842, Hong Kong Island was ceded by China to Britain in perpetuity. Under the Convention of Peking, 1860, the Kowloon Peninsular, together with certain islands, was similarly ceded. Under the New Territories Lease of 1898, the New Territories (by far the greater part of the land area) were leased by China to Britain for 99 years. The Chinese, however, do not necessarily accept the validity of these treaties, which they consider to have been unequal ones imposed on a weak and divided China by an imperialist power. They maintain that the whole of Hong Kong is an integral part of China, temporarily under our administration.

4. In the short term, the proposals for Gibraltar might have an adverse effect on Hong Kong's position vis-à-vis China. Recognition of Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar might encourage the Chinese to press us to accept their view that the whole of Hong Kong was an integral part of China. Equally if not more important, if the Spaniards were allowed to appoint a representative in Gibraltar, this might encourage the Chinese to step up the pressure on us to agree to some form of official Chinese representation in Hong Kong. They have been asking for this for some time now, but have been told by the Secretary of State that we cannot agree. The Hong Kong Government see grave objections to the proposal; they think that a Chinese representative might be a form of second Governor. These short term objections should be taken into account in proposals over Gibraltar, but neither I nor FED think that, of themselves, they need be a bar to them.

15.

SECRET

→

•

In the longer term, the proposals, if implemented, might actually be useful to us. As I expect you know, there exists a Top Secret Cabinet Paper on the future of Hong Kong, which I cannot quote from here. But if we did ever wish to try to negotiate an extension of the New Territories Lease beyond 1997, a perpetual lease of Gibraltar from Spain could provide a useful precedent.

6. I think we should tell the Governor of Hong Kong at an early stage of the proposals about Gibraltar. He will be in the Office fleetingly on Thursday, 9 August, and I might perhaps have an opportunity to consult him then.

7 August 1973

cc:

Mr Goodison SED

Mr Clark FED

Mr Donohoe G & GD

SECRET

RB Crowson

Hong Kong & Indian Ocean Department

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference......

Hr. A.C. Stuart, Hong Kong & Indian Ocean Department

CONSULAR RELATIONS IN DISPUTED TERRITORIES

75A

1. There was a British Vice-Consulate in La Linea from 1912, which

came under the superintendence of the Consulate-Veneral at Seville.

There is no evidence that it was 'controlled' from Gibraltar although

no doubt most of its work stemmed from Gibraltar. This is borne out

by the fact that it was merged with the Consulate in Algeciras in

June 1970, following the closure of the border between Gibraltar and Spain by the Spaniards in 1969.

2. A Spanish Consulate (later a Consulate-General) existed in Gib-

raltar from the nineteenth century until 1954, when it was closed at

the time of the Queen's visit to Gibraltar during her Coronation

tour. The Colonial Secretary was informed at the time by the Spanish

Consul-General in Vibraltar that the decision had been taken because

the Spaniards wished to avoid any discourtesy to "er Hajesty. Foreign Office minutes at the time, however, point out that; "The Spanish decision is undoubtedly political and part of the campaign for the return of the Rock, although the Spanish authorities have sought to justify the Consul-General's withdrawal by reference to the fact that

he discharges no proper consular functions, since there are no Spaniarda resident in Gibraltar whom he wishes to protect".

3. If you are interested, we also have some information on how

this arrangement worked in practice.

27 July 1973

Denise will

Denise Mills,

Western & Southern European Section,

Research Department.

c. Mr. Brewer, Far Eastern Section, Research apartment.

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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R J Stratton Esq

HONG KONG

Telephone 01-

Your reference

Our reference

Date

23 July 1973

•

OFFICIAL CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

1. You will have received last month a copy of the record of the conversation between the Secretary of State and Chi P'eng-fei on the afternoon of 7 June, at which bilateral subjects were discussed. Attached to the record was a copy of the aide-memoire on Chinese official representation which the Secretary of State gave Chi. For convenience I attach spare copies of both the record and the aide- memoire.

2. The discussion of this subject with Chi went off better than we had expected. As you will have seen from paras 9-11 of the record, Chi's response was relaxed. In rehearsing the familiar Chinese arguments in favour of a Representative Chi could hardly have said less than he did. The subsequent initialling of the Air Services Agreement suggests that his references to the likely con- tinuance of difficulties in that and other fields were primarily for the record. At all events our negative reply, which the Chinese must have expected, did nothing to detract from the extremely cordial, not to say euphoric, atmosphere of the visit as a whole.

3. The Chinese can, however, be expected to revert to the subject again, if not earlier, during the Prime Minister's visit to China (see the last sentence of para 11 of the record of the talk with Chi). As you are aware, early January has now been proposed as a possible date for the visit. We shall have to provide Mr Heath with à full brief. It would be helpful in this connection to have your comments, and those of HM Embassy in Peking, on the suggestion made by Chi that the Chinese Government would be willing to consider reciprocal representation of the Hong Kong Government in Canton. Does Chi's proposal in any way affect or modify your perception of Chinese intentions in putting forward their request for official representation in Hong Kong; and your views about the nature of the answer Mr Heath should be briefed to give Chou En-lai when the latter brings up the matter?

co: JD I Boyd PEKING

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You will no dubt huve noticed that in the KCN report (070745) of the memorial secting held in Hong Kong in honour of Mr Chang Shih-chno on 7 Fly amongst thoac listed as attend- ing is "Erigadier Rainald Lowthwaite, Director of irotocol of the Hong Kong Government". As far as we know this is the first time we have seen a reference to "the llong Kong Goverment" wither than to "the Hong Kong authorities En checking up the original story carried in the Leople's Daily on e July, in onse there had been a zis-translation, we see that indeed the officiel terz "chengfu" is used.

Since t'.is is a subject on wich the Chinese are in our experience invariably very punctilious it seems unlikely that the term has been used by mistake. Nevertheless we are hesita: t

In to rezd any great significance into this change of usage, one or two other instances recently the Chinese have shown them- solves more ready to recognise in the vords they use the "re:lities of the concrete situation in ilong Kong: for example, Then Thang Ti-chin of last suropawn Department raised the question of the special flight to pick up Chang Jhli-chu:o's ushes he said that the Chinese were "requesting permission" to land in Hong Kong. *e should be interested to know of any other signs you have had of this change of attitude.

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I Walker Esq Research Dept 100

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CONFIDENTIAL

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DAILY TELEGRAPH

719 JUN 1973

cutting dated

CHINA SEEKING REPRESENTATIVE

IN HONGKONG

By Our Staff Correspondent in Hongkong

The Chinese authorities are still pressing for a "representa- tive" in Hongkong. A Commu nist leader told me that they had not pressed the issue during recent negotiations for a Sino- British air service, but it was "ever in their minds."

The Chinese claim they need a "responsible person to be in a pochion to issue visas and represent China as other coup- tries are represented in Hong- kong by a consul-general.

The British reply is that there are already eight or nine major Communist Chinese banks in Hongkong and they, together with the China Travel Service. provide sufficient representation. 1 understand the British would have no objection to the China Travel Service issuing visas.

for fa!

Cha

CONFIDENTIAL

tê ། 100

LAMEEST BETWEEN MIR SHORETARY OF ORATTI POW WOWRIGY AD COLORWEALTH AFFAIRS AND THE CHIVESE FOREIGN MINISTER HELD AT TIDE FOREIGN AND COMMONWPALTH OFFICE OF THURSDAY 7 JIE 1975 AT 10.30am

Present:

The Rt. Hon Sir Alec Douglas-Home KT 10

Fr Anthony Royle MP

HE Sir John Addis

Sir Denis Greenhill

Sir Eric Norris

Mr A A Acland

Mr JEG Leahy

Hr R H Evans

GE Clark

Mr P M Gratton

HE Mr Chi Pleng-fei HE Miss Wang Hai-jung

HE Mr Sung Chih-kuang Mr Weng Tung

Mr Chou Chueh

Hr Kao Chien-chung

Mr Hsu Wei-chin

Mr Chang Yi--chun Mr Ma Yu-chen

Miss Tang Wen-sheng

(interpreter)

Mr Chao Ching-tien

Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that he was very pleased to resume the contacts which he had made in Peking with Chi Pleng-fei. He honed that in their talks they would cover international affairs of common concern and outstanding bilateral questions, He apologised for the fact that he would have to leave London the following day before Chi P'eng-fei's visit ended. With Chi P'eng-fei's permission he would like to begin with a short review of the international scene, and ther hear Chi Plong-fei's views.

2. Sir Alec

Dougles-Home said that, although the United States was our close ally, we were not happy with a world which was dominated by the two super-powers. We were glad that China was now taking an active part in the international scene. We ourselves were determined to play our full part in Europe, where we were building a new economic and political entity. There was also an element of defence in it, but our security must continue to be based on the Atlantic Alliance. The Soviet Union had become so powerful that the unity of Western Eurone was essential; and so was the continuation of the Atlantic Alliance. The Soviet Union did not like the new Europe which was emerging. had tried unsuccessfully to prevent its creation. low the Soviet Union was tryire to weaken NATO by a calculated campaign to create an atmosphere of detente, and to separate Europe from the United States. The members of the European Community would approach the CSCE with extreme caution. Their aim was to make it a negotiation about sub- stance, and to oblige the Russians to agree to a worthwhile rackare. The Russians, on the other hand, were clearly playing on the nomlarity in the Western democracies of disarmament to create an atmosphere in which they could make rains without any corresponding concessions. We did not wish to miss any opportunities for a genuine detente, but we were alert to the dangers of upsetting the existing narrow balance of power.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that he would like to hear China's views on this question. He hoped that the Chinese would appoint a

/representative

CONFIDENTIAL

representative to the European Communities, which would help them keep in touch with European affairs. He would like to hear Chi Peng-fei's views also on the situation outside Europe, especially on the role of Japan, and on developments in Vietnam.

Chi P'eng-fei said that basically he agreed with Sir Alec's views. The two major nuclear nowers wished to maintain their hegemony and to decide the fate of the world by themselves; but of the two the United States was on the defensive now and the Soviet Union on the offensive. The Soviet Union did not however, dare launch a nuclear war, because of the pressure of world public opinion. Nor did it dare to attack China, with the aim of destroying its muclear bases (which it had long wanted to do). The Czechoslovak affair had put the Soviet Inion in a bad light and exposed its ambitions. He also had domestic problems and economic difficulties. Although the joint statement issued by the Soviet Union and the United States last year at the SALT talks was evidence that each wished to divide the world between them, the real Soviet intention was to control the fate of the whole world. As it was unable to launch a major war, its only recourse was to wave the olive branch and carry out a peace offensive. The Soviet Union had put forward a series of peace propocals: the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe; the Asian collective security system; and a declaration on the renunciation of the use of force and the banning of nuclear weapons at the United Nations. Everywhere it was trying to portray itself as an apostle of peace.

But all its proposals were intended to deceive. This was especially true of its proposals in relation to the CSCE here. The Soviet Union was making use of the desire of the European peoples for peace after the disasters of two world wars to make it look as if only the Soviet Union was in favour of peace.

But the Soviet concept of peace was one with nuclear war- heads hanging overhead. If the Soviet Union was genuinely interested in peace, why was it steadily increasing its military expenditure, adding to the numbers of its troops and developing nuclear weapons as fast as possible" The Chinese view was that the Soviet peace offensive was camouflage for their ambitions for world domination, and aimed at lulling people into a sense of false security which would facilitate the division of peoples and countries, the sowing of discord and their absorption one by one. As China was a unified country, the situation in the east was not so easy for the Soviet Union; but Europe was com- posed of many countries with differing views, and it was for this reason that the Soviet Union was making greater efforts there.

5. Sir Alec Douglas-llome said that the United Kingdom possessed a nuclear deterrent, and the French had the makings of one, but only the united force of NATO was an effective obstacle to the Soviet Union. Naturally, the main element in this was the United States. There were pressures for the reduction of conventional forces both externally and within the United States. We would try to insist on balanced reductions by the Soviet side. Unless this happened, there was a real dancer that by reducing the size of conventional forces, we should be bringing the inevitable use of nuclear weapons nearer in the event of a conflict. The United States wished to reduce their ground forces, but he hoped that the Nixon administration would stick to its view that there should be no such reductions unless there were reductions in the level of Soviet forces in Europe.

CONFIDENTIAL

16.

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Sir Alec Dourlas-Home added that he noted a change in Chi P'en-fei's view about the Soviet desire to "take out" China's muclear weapons since their last meeting in October. He fully agreed that a conventional Soviet attack on China would not succeed, and he believed that Chi P'enr- fei was right to say now that the pressure of world opinion would prevent a Soviet attempt to destroy China's nuclear capacity.

7. Chi Plent-fei said that China hoped to see European countries develop their unity on the basis of sovereignty and independence, and on that basis to continue their alliance with the United States. He was aware of the nuclear capability of the United Kingdom and France, but in comparison with the weight of weapons of the Soviet Union it was not sufficient; Europe would continue to have to rely on the "nited States. That was why Chairman Mao had told . Schumann that in a

M. nuclear war Europe would have to rely on the United States. China believed that the United States would stand by her. He referred to the Pompidou-Hixon conversations, and President Pompidou's statement that he did not wish to see an excessive reduction of Western forcer or a unilateral withdrawal of United States forces from Eurone. From the Chinese noint of view, Europe's reliance on the United States was understandable until it could develop an adequate defensive system of its own.

8. Chi P'eng-fei said that he agreed with Sir Alec's view that the reduction of conventional forces could increase the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons. Chinese intelligence suggested that there might be an agreement by which the Soviet Union would reduce its forces by 80,000 men and the United States by 30,000. Even if this were true we could be sure that before the Soviet Union made any reductions that they would. increase their existing total surreptitiously.

9. Chi D'eng-fei continued that the Soviet Union was laying stress on the Felsinki Conference in order to deceive people. Hany Foreign Ministers from Europe had come to China to say that the CSCE(r) could achieve great results (he noted that Sir Alec's views were different), and that China's views about the possibilities were too pessimistic. The Chinese leaders had been at pains to point out that the Vienna Conference was the more important. If force reductions were not achieved there was no point in the CSCE. It would he a bad mistake if people became muddle-headed and lost their vigilance in Helsinki.

10. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that the Europeau Security Conference was not really to do with security at all. The name was a misnomer. The Western aim at the Conference was to establish more freedom of movement of people and ideas between the West and the Soviet Union; for example, to allow journalists to move around more freely there, and to get the Russians to reduce their censorship on books from the West. The only aspect of security which might be settled in Helsinki was a scheme for mutual notification in advance of military manoeuvres, Chi P'eng-fei was quite right: the Vienna Conference was the one which mattered in terms of the balance of power. He thought that other European Foreign Ministers would come in the end to see this.

11. Sir Alec Douglas Home then asked where Japan fitted in. We wanted to see Japanese strength put into the score on the side of law and order. Chinese experience of Japan was perhaps greater than ours, but Japanese economic Elrength had already created problems in Europe and the United States. He wanted to know how the Chinese saw Japan fitting in in the Far East.

CONFIDENTIAL

/12.

CONFIDENTIAL

12. Chi Plong foi said that Japanese economic development had been abnormal. Jänan had been relieved for 20 years from military burdens and expenditure and the Japanese had used this to develop their civil industries. As a result their economy had advanced very quickly. Yet their industry was entirely a processing industry. They had no domestic raw materials: consequently in one sense their economy was very weak.

Moreover, because of their rapid economic development they had pursued a policy of fierce competitiveness abroad. There was still fear of Japan in South East Asia; and this competitiveness had not improved her reputation. The Chinese had often discussed this question with the Japanese and urged them not to repeat the historical mistakes of the Second World War. Japan was at a crossroads: it could continue its economic expansion abroad as at present; or it could try on the basis of equality and mutual benefit to seek a more balanced path of development, for instance by helping the more backward countries. The Chinese believed that this was the better course. On the whole, the Japanese seemed receptive to this view; they too wanted to avoid repeating the mistakes of the Second World Wer. They were also aware of their bad reputation: in South East Asia they were known as "economic animals", which was a hindrance in their expansion. The Chinese virw was that, if Japanese economic expansion continued at its present rate it would lead to political expansion, then military expansion, and finally to a repetition of their earlier defeat. But if the Japanese chose à more co-operative path they could restore their reputation and avoid their earlier mistakes. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that this was our view too, but it was more impressive coming from China which was a near neighbour and friend of Japan. He wanted now to turn to Vietnam.

13. He asked where China's interest lay. He was very disturbed hy Canada's intention to withdrew from the ISSC, on the grounds that the North Vietnamese had made its work impossible. He wondered whether Soviet arms were a factor in the reactivisation of the fighting. Chi P'enc-fei said that it was four months since the Paris conference It was clearly stated in the Paris Agreement that there were two admin- istrations and two centres of power in South Vietnam. But President Thieu did not recognise this. He thought that US intelligence was not very accurate; they reported an increase of military forces whereas in fact there had only been a redeployment of existing forces.

14. The real cause of the continued fighting was President Thieu, who was continuing to launch attacks in South Vietnam. It was no secret that Soviet military material had stopped roing by land through China since March. China of course could not speak about what the Soviet Union might have sent by sea. The Chinese leaders were confident that the North Vietnamese wanted a period of peace and were sincere in their implementation of the Paris Agreement. They wished to heal the wounds of 20 years of war. He believed that Le Duc Tho and Dr Kissinger were continuing their talks in Faris and it was possible that they right reach agreements soon.

15. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that he was very worried by what the Canadiens hau gaid. The Canadians were very public spirited; moreover, they were opposed in general to the United States policy in Vietnam. Yet they laid the whole blame on the North Vietnamese side for the frustration of their efforts to carry out their task in the Commission.

Whenever

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Whenever incidents or complaints took place (according to the Cerediens), the "orth Vietnamese said they would not agree to any investigation; as their agreement was an essential prerequisite to action, the Commission was therefore unable to move. Sir Alec Douglas-Home asked the Chinese Foreign Minister to investigate the matter and use his influence with the North Vietnamese. He was disturbed, too, by the fact that there had been no withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia and Laos as envisaged in the Paris Agreement.

16. Chi P'eng-fei said that he understood that the withdrawals envisaged in the Agreement from Laos and Cambodia were now under discus- sion. It looked as though the explanations now offered for these provisions were quite different from those put forward in Paris four months ago. On Vietnam, he pointed out that there were four countries in the TCCS and there was a two-party Joint Commission. He thought the reports of the other parties would be worthy of study. He admit- ted that one could not disregard the Canadians' report. But the reports of all the parties involved, including those of the "provisional revolutionary government", should be studied. It was unfair to say that only North Vietnam was to blame. Others were also responsible for the situation in Vietnam. The whole situation was worth further study. China earnestly wanted implementation of the Paris Arreement and honed that it would lead to a solution of the Indo-China problem.

17. The Laotian problem, (he continued), did not appear too difficult; both sides were already talking to each other. The main problem was Combodia. It was yet to be resolved who would talk to whom. Prince Sihanouk would not talk to lor Nol; the United States would not talk to Sihanouk. Meanwhile fighting continued, as did United States bombing, Calls for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops were premature while 15 bombing continued. In any case, only a few North Vietnamese were there. The opposition to Ton Nol was mainly Cambodian.

Mr Royle asked whether Sihanouk would talk to Lon Hol if Ion Nol were willing to talk to Sihanouk. Chi P'enr-fei said this was out of the question; Sihanouk would not pardon Lọn Nol for his part in the coup d'etat against himself. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that it seemed there was deadlock. Accounts of the situation obviously differed; but our aim was the same as that of the Chinese, namely to get the Paris Agreement working. Chi F'eng-fei said that this was not a simple issue. The Indo-China problem was greater than the sum of its parts. But if one part were not settled the whole thing would drag on. The focus of Chinese attention was Cambodia. If the fighting ended there, this might be the key to the whole problem. As for Vietnam, the Paris Agreements existed, as did international guarantees. Although mutual accusations were being bandied about and the facts were not cleur he was confident that in time this problem could be sellied. In Iaos, both sides were talking on the basis of the 1962 Agreements. In Cambodia, however, there was at present no prospect of a dialogue. The Chinese Government were considering how they might help; they could not play a big part because the parties directly concerned should settle the issues by themselves without outside intervention.

18. Sir Alec Dourlas-Home then asked about the Chinese attitude to the Korean question. The United Kingdom wanted both sides to talk without outside intervention, unless that outside intervention could be helpful. Chi l'eng-fei commented that at present outside inter- vention existed in the shape of UCURK. The two sides should be

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allowed to solve the question themselves. He believed that conditions were better now for a solution; a dialogue had started, visita and conversations were taking place. China believed that they should actually support these contacts in order to facilitate a solution. He asked what the British Government thought about a UN General Assembly Debate. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that we did not think that a General Assembly Debate would serve much useful purpose; it would arouse emotions and perhaps might spoil the existing contacts. Fr Royle said that we were prepared to wait and see what South and North Korea wanted. If they wanted a debate, we could accept it. The British line on this matter was pragmatic. Chi P'eng-fei said that quiet negotiations were a good thing. But he did not see how the United Nations could create the conditions for a good dialogue. He thought that Korth Koren would want both South and North Korea to participate if there were a debate. It had been unfair in the past that only one side had taken part. When asked how the talks between the two sides were going, he said that the issues under discussion had not yet been solved and were not easy to solve at a stroke. Sir Alec Dourlas-Home said that the fact that both sides were already talking was a sign of hope.

19. Sir Alec Douglas-ilome then suggested that they should talk about South Yemen. This was a more important issue than it seemed. The Russians vere very active; they were aware of the importance to the West of the oil of the Persian Gulf. Trouble could easily spread from South Yemen into the Gulf. The British Government were disturbed by the possiblilities for Soviet subversion of the area. He asked for Chinese views on the situation. Chi P'eng-fei said that the Chinese believed this Soviet activity to be part of a general Soviet strategy. They were obliged to pretend to seek stability in Europe. In the East they faced certain difficulties. They were therefore trying to break out in the Middle East, through Iraq and down to the Indian Ocean. Their activity in the Yemen was a part of general Soviet expan- sionism. They were therefore giving substantial military aid.

20.

Sir Alec Dourlas-Home asked what the Chinese felt about this. assumed that they sympathised with the revolutionary movement in the Yemen which had taken over. But were they so sanguine when faced with a Soviet attempt to disturb the existing situation? He assumed that stability in the Persian Gulf was in Chine's interest. He asked whether China would help the revolutionary movement now in power in the Yemen to prevent itself from being used as an instrument of Soviet subversion throughout the area. Chi P'eng-fei said that the Chinese had never stopped giving assistance themselves, on a small scale, to South Yemen. The South Yemenis had sent delegations to China. China's aim was reunification of the North and the South. Stability vas certainly needed in the area. The Chinese had dreym the South Yomoniet attention to the implications of Soviet assistance. It was clear that the Soviet Union was trying to break through in the Gulf and get down to the Indian Ocean.

21. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that he was rlad to hear that the Chinese had pointed out these dangers to South Yemen. He wanted to turn now to Africa. The Chinese Prime Minister had said in 1964 that Africa was ripe for revolution, and he was in a certair sense right. He believed that the Chinese were still helping revolutionary movements there. But he wanted to ask about their objectives. For example, Somalia had territorial claims against both Kenya and Ethiopi; and

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Lusofor or she pressed them she was stirring up a revolutionary ciluation. Bu onya and Ethiopia were both sensible countries ruled by sensible men (unlike Arin in Uganda), and in our view their continued stability was important for resistance to Soviet objectives in Africa. Sir Alec Douglas-Hone said he could understand why the Chinese wanted to get the British out of Africa they had been very successful in that but he wanted to know why they wished to foment further revolution in Africa now. Chi P'en-fei said that what the Chinese meant by revolution in this context was the anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist movement. The African people were striving for inde- pendence and liberation. China had no objections to the Furopeens having relations with Africa provided they did not practice discrim- ination against Africans. What Premier Chou En-lai had meant was that Africa had been dominated for too long by foreign forces and had a right to be free of them. He was not talking about proletarian revolution. Sir Alec Douglas-Home again asked why the Chinese wished to assist Somelia with arms which would probably be used against Kenya. Any arms or money given to Somalia would probably be used against Kenya or Ethiopia because the Somalis felt very stronely about their territorial claims. Moreover, when the Emperor of Ethiopia died, the temptation to Somalia to attack Éthiopia would be irresistible if they had heavy ares. Chi P'enr-fei said that China did not agree with the territorial claims of Somalia. Foreover, one of the reasons Somalia was so isolated at the recent African Summit was because of her attitude to the border claims. He admitted that China had given some light weapons arms to equip about 5,000 men but the Chinese had made it clear that these were for self-defence and not for use in border conflict. The Soviet Union was the main provider of heavy arms to the Somali army. China was more concerned, however, at the naval bases the Soviet Union was constructing in Somalia, which were aimed at dominating the Indian Ocean. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that he had been pointing out for years the dangers of possible Soviet control of the Indian Ocean, but no one would listen. He hoped that, now that the Chinese Foreign Minister had expressed the same views, they would hereafter.

Small

Chi F'eng-fei said that the Somalis had asserted many times that the port under construction was a fishing port, but it was clear that Soviet naval ships could moor there. In any case it was no secret that Soviet "fishing vessels" were usually armed.

22.

Chi P'eng-fei then said that he would like to raise two issues. The first was South Asia. The way in which Britain leaned towards India was very worrisome to the Pakistanis. Sir Alec Dourlas-Fome said that this was not quite the case. It was a fact of life that India was the most important power in the subcontinert. We, however, wished to continue to be friends with Pakistan. We were trying to use what influence we had to promote a settlement, There was one hopeful factor in the situation now: President Bhutto was no longer required to recognise Bangladesh before the rest of the settlement could be consid- ered.

The only major question outstanding was the return of prisoners of war. India had got rather tangled up on the prisoner of var question. Sheikh Mujib was not the easiest person to deal with. It was not in our interest to see Fakistan further fragmented, We wanted to see an economically strong Pakistan. He was roine to a meeting of the CENTO Council at the end of the week. He hoped to be able to talk to the Pakistani delegate and explain our position more fully.

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22. Chi rllong-fei said that he was -lad to hear that, China heljeveč that influence should be used to help countries settle their own problems. If the prisoner of war question was settled, it would be easier to solve the rest; and if that were settled, it would be easier for China to solve the question of her relations with India and Bangladesh. that Britain would speak out more on behalf of small countries.

He hoped

24. Chi P'enc-fei then asked whether Britain had settled her dispute with Iceland. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that we had not. We had gone to the International Court because we wanted to avoid a dispute. We had asked the Court to set reasonable limits on catches as an interim settlement pending the Law of the Sea Conference in 2 years time. The International Court had proposed a catch limited to 170,000 tons (i.e. 30,000 tons less than normal catches in the last few years). In the interests of seeking a settlement, we had proposed to limit our catches even further to 145,000 tons. To go lower than this would be very difficult for us because of the importance of our own fishing industry. At present, we were fishing on the basis of the interim award by the International Court. British fishermen had been harassed by the Icelanders. There had been some nasty accidents. It was for this reason that we had sent in Royal Navy protection; without it no fishing was possible. We should like to continue negotiations. We had tried to avoid the use of force. We would prefer to talk. The present situation was an unhappy one. We would remove the Royal Navy as soon as the Icelanders promised not to harass our trawlers. Unfortunately, the Icelanders had not accepted the award of the International Court and talked of limiting catches to 117,000 tons which was far too low for us.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home added that he did not think that Iceland would leave NATO over this question; it was a useful threat for a small country to make, but he did not think that Iceland would carry it out.

25. Chi Pleng-fei said that bigger countries sometimes had to make concessions to smaller countries. He was afraid that someone else might use the dispute as a pretext to intervene. He had noticed that Iceland was buying two gunboats from the Soviet Union. He commented that the only thing which the Soviet Union feared was lack of confusion ander heaven.

26.

It was agreed at Chi P'eng-fei's request that nothing about the substance of the discussions should be given to the press, even unat- tributably.

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RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS AND THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER HELD AT THE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE ON THURSDAY 7 JUNE 1973 AT 4PM

Present:-

The Rt Hon Sir Alec Douglas-Home

Mr Anthony Royle MP

HE Sir John Addis

Sir Donis Greenhill

Mr K M Wilford

Mr A A Acland

Mr R M Evans

Mr G E Clark

Mr J G B Weait

Mr P M Gratton

KT MP

HE Mr Chi P'eng-fel

HE Miss Wang Hai-jung

HE Mr Sung Chih-kuang

Mr Wang Tung

Mr Chou Chueh

Mr Kạo Chien-chung

Mr Hsu Wei-chin

Mr Chang Yi-chun

Mr Ma Yu-chen

Miss Tang Wen-sheng

(interpreter)

Mr Chao Ching-tien

Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that he would like to talk first at this session about bilateral subjects; any international subjects which had not been covered during the morning could also be raised. Anglo-Chinese relations were developing well, particularly exchanges on the cultural side. Chinese teachers and students had come in great numbers to the United Kingdom. Indeed, there were more Chinese students in the United Kingdom than in all other European countries put together. We wanted to encourage cultural contacts. We were pleased with the success of the London Philharmonic Orchestra's visit to Peking; we were looking forward to the visit of the Chinese acrobats and to the Chinese Exhibition of Cultural Treasures which would open in the autumn.

2. Trade was going well. We were pleased at the Chinese interest in British aircraft. He understood that tae British Aircraft Corporation had made an offer on VC10s and were awaiting a Chinese reply. On the Spey engine project, we were aware that Sir Kenneth Keith had promised en answer to the Chinese by the end of June and we

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would do our best to see that he was in a position to give such an answer. We would also look with great cara al all the other projects which were under discussion.

Sir Alec Douglas-Home then said that Premier Chou En-lai had asked him in Peking to consider again the question of a Chinese official representative in Hong Kong. He wished now to give Chi P'eng-fei his answer to the Chinese Prime Minister's request. Sir Alec then read from the text attached at Annex A to this record and handed a copy of it to the Chinese Foreign Minister,

4. Chi P'eng-fei said that the Chinese side too was pleased at the increase în cultural and economic contacts between our two countries since Sir Alec's visit to Peking. He was also convinced that they would continue to expand in future. Any problems which existed in these fields could easily be solved by our two Embassies.

5. There was one subject left over from the morning cession which he wished to turn to now; China's contacts with the European Community. He would like to ask questions about some aspects of Community affairs. China was in favour of the Nine-state Common Market. Some people had expressed the hope that it would accredit an Ambassador to the Common Market, either by particular accredita- tion or by the accreditation of an Ambassador elsewhere. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that the best thing was to have someone who could be in close and constant touch with the Commission. He could be an Ambassador already accredited to one of the member countries; but the main point was that he should have regular discussions with the Commission. Mr Royle said that China should act in the knowledge that in the future more and more of the trading negotiations of Western Europe would be carried out by the Commission. Major decisions were of course taken by the Council of Ministers, but they were carried out by the Commission. It would therefore be worth China's while to have a representative in Brussels who would be able to have day-to-day contact with the Commission. China's Ambassador to Belgium would be perfectly suitable. and the other eight members of the Community would welcome the formal accreditation of an Ambassador to the Community.

Britain

Mr Royle said that he understood that the Chinese were a little concerned that there was no Chinese representation in Dublin. Our understanding was that Ireland recognised the Chinese People's Republic as the sole legal government of China and that this was tantamount to having diplomatic relations. He hoped this explanation would help resolve their doubts. Chi P'eng-fei said that he did not think that Ireland was any longer a problem. They had been in contact with the Irish and had received the same explanation.

7. There were some problems in trade relations, however. Restrictions were imposed by the "Paris Co-ordinating Committee", Some relaxation had taken place recently since Sir Alec's visit to Peking, but difficulties continue, There was also the question of high tariffs. He wanted to know how these were fixed. Mr Royle said that Mr Chi might discuss details of this kind with Mr Davies.

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In practice, ordinary trade continued on a bilateral basis between each member of the Nine and third countries, but tariff negotiations

This was why we suggested were now in the hands of the Commission.

Sir Denis

the Chinese should have a link with the Commission. Greenhill pointed out that COCOM had nothing to do with the European Community. It was concerned with a narrow range of strategic goods; its arrangements were totally outside the Community framework and ante-dated it. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that he would ask Mr Davies to give the Chinese Foreign Minister an aide-memoire with the answers to his questions. As he understood the situation, existing bilateral trade agreements would continue as at present

COCOM unless tariffs were involved, when the Commission came in. was a separate body. He could let the Chinese Foreign Minister have a note on that too. The Chinese should not worry about tariffs; the common external tariff of the Community was on average lower than the United Kingdom tariff. During the transitional period our tariff would gradually move towards the level of the common external tariff.

Chi P'eng-fei said that was one question on which the Chinese had not been clear. There was a second question: the Common Market

There was a textile apparently had relations with Chiang Kai-shek. agreement which would expire in 1973. Sir Alec Douglas-Hone said that this was negotiated before Britain was a member of the

He Community. The Chinese should ask Mr Davies about this too. wanted to assure the Chinese that he had been watching developments in the Community very closely. Whatever had happened at the beginning, it was now a very outward-looking organisation and British influence was thrown on that side. It was also a very powerful body in trading terms, covering 41% of world trade. would be well worthwhile for the Chinese to establish relations with it. Chi P'eng-fei said that the Chinese were considering this question seriously; they were asking questions because there were certain issues which had to be clarified before they could make a decision.

9. Chi P'eng-fei then said he wished to say a few words about Hong Kong, even though he accepted that Sir Alec had given his decision. During Sir Alec's visit to Peking, both he and the Chinese Prime Minister had argued in favour of an official Chinese representative. At that time, Sir Alec had expressed doubts about the possibility of a double régime growing up. The Chinese had made it clear that it was not their intention to establish such a régime. They had also made clear their full respect for the present authorities in Hong Kong. Their starting point was that their policy towards Hong Kong should be in conformity with the development of Anglo-Chinese relations and aimed at enabling the prosperity of Hong Kong to continue. They thought that they ought The title of the to have a representative to deal with Hong Kong. representative might be a subject for discussion. In the past, the KMT had sent a Special Commissioner of Kwangtung and Kwangs Provinces. The Chinese did not insist on calling their representative a Commissioner. There was also room for further discussion about his possible functions. These should be carefully defined.

/10.

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The

10. Chi P'eng-fei continued that there were many issues under discussion at present related to Hong Kong: an air link, a direct traia service to China, shipping arrangements and so on. Chinese Government felt that, if there were no one to deal with these problems in Hong Kong, this would not be fitting in relation to the excellent developments which were taking place in Anglo- Chinese relations. There are many possibilities which could be considered: the representative could be a Representative of Kwangtung, or he could be a Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Chinese were also willing to consider reciprocal representation of the Hong Kong authorities in Canton. If such issues were not settled, this would not assist Hong Kong. The status of Hong Kong was not in question. That was a matter for the future. The Chinese regarded the appointment of an official representative in Hong Kong as an aspect of the development of their relations between the United Kingdom and China. Premier Chou En-lai had raised it because of the KMT Special Commissioner of Kwangtung and Kwangs Province in Hong Kong. He could not see why the Chinese People's Government could not send a Commissioner, especially now that relations were so good, if the KMT had been able to send one. The Chinese Government did not share the fears of the British Government. They thought the problem could be settled favourably. The functions of any representative could be carefully defined so that he knew what he should do and what not. Chi P'eng-fei added that, although Sir Alec had told him of his decision and given

an aide memoire, the problem would certainly come up again when Prime Minister Heath visited China. He thought both sides should consider it further in the meantime. The Chinese side certainly did not wish to establish a separate régime in Hong Kong.

11.

The question of an air link between the United Kingdom and China passing through Hong Kong was also under discussion in Peking at present. Whilst the representation issue was unsettled, it was difficult to deal with the other question. Yet flights between Hong Kong and Peking would be advantageous to British air companies; it would give them.wider scope for their activities. The Chinese Government therefore hoped that Britain would adopt a new approach, or rather re-adopt their clder approach. He would in any case report to Premier Chou En-lai, who would take the question up with the Prime Minister.

12. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that he accepted the Chinese purpose was not to establish a double régime; he also accepted their respect for the Hong Kong authorities. He pointed out that in their two meetings he and the Chinese Foreign Minister had established very good relations. But this had been in a very short time. Hong Kong was a very speciel case, and more time as nooded. The KMT precedent had not in practice been a happy one. We would wish to follow a different pattern if we were ever to act on the Chinese proposal. In the present instance, he had considered very carefully what the Chinese leaders had said to him with the Governor of Hong Kong (who was a very good Governor) and his conclusion was that the time was not yet ripe and he hoped that the Chinese would not press their proposal. If Premier Chou En-lai raised it with the Prime Minister, they could of course discuss it.

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He hoped that our answer would not have repercussions on an air services agreement between the United Kingdom and China; if it had, thai was too bad.

13. Sir Alec Douglas-Home then asked whether there were any other bilateral issues to discuss. The issue of the British detainees and the "confrontation prisoners" in Hong Kong was now satisfactorily over.

14. After a brief discussion in which Chi P'eng-fei made it clear that he did not wish to fly in Concorde, the conversation turned to Western Germany and the recent visit by Mr Brezhnev to Bonn. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that he believed that nothing of the essential security of the West had been sacrificed. Mr Brandt had been Mayor of Berlin in the most dangerous years. He had no illusions about the Soviet Union. The Germans had now completed their Ostpolitik. They were now turning to their Westpolitik, in other words the consolidation of Western Europe. He had a slight worry about the role of East Germany in these matters, but he believed that the tendency would be for East Germany to gravitate towards the West rather than the other way round. The reports in the press of German aid to the Soviet Union had been much exaggerated, as was usual in these matters. Chi P'cng-fei commented that in the Chinese opinion matters were not as easy as the Soviet-West German communiqué implied. The boasts subsequently made by Mr Brezhnev to have laid the basis for European peace were do much eyewash. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that the Soviet economy was in a bad way, but that the Russians could still produce armaments in great quantities.

15. Sir Alec Douglas-Home then said that he saw no likelihood of a solution to the Middle Eastern problem before the forthcoming Israeli elections. After them, pressure from the United States might perhaps work to make the Israelis more flexible. But for the moment there was deadlock. Britain had talked with the Egyptians and had even given them defensive arms. Our only hope was that Dr Jarring, or perhaps the UN Secretary General might make some progress at mediation. The Four Power talks in New York had led nowhere, but they might be worth re-establishing. The Chinese had not wanted to join in them last year, and he wondered whether they would be willing to do so now.

16. Chi Pleng-fei said that the Middle Eastern question was a very complex issue; he saw no present hope of progress. China was not in favour of joining in Five Power talks. She did not think she had

a role to play there. Sir Alec Douglas-one said that our own role was limited too, but we wished to put an end to this confrontation and we were prepared to try. Chi P'eng-fei said that he thought that the possibilities of United Nations mediation were very restricted. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that, in his opinion, the Israelis were being very short-sighted. The Egyptians would like to have peace for many reasons; given reasonable terms, they would settle. The Israelis, however, thought that the best thing to do was to sit tight. They might be right after all, but it did not promote a settlement. Perhaps after their elections, there would be some movement. Chi P'eng-fei said that, if the national rights of the Palestinian

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people were not restored, there was no hope of a lasting settlement. Sir Alec Douglas-Home agreed that an overall settlement was needed, Which must include the Palestinians. It would of course cost a lot of money. But this was not an insuperable obstacle if the political will were there. So far it was apparently lacking in Israel.

17. The meeting closed with the usual exchange of courtesies.

Distribution:

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Tokyo New Delhi Singapore Kuala Lumpur

Mr Cradock,

Cabinet Office

PS/Mr Amery

PS/Lady Tweedsmuir

PS/Mr Royle PS/PUS

Sir E Norris

Mr Wright

Mr Wilford Mr Reddaway

Mr Keeble Mr Robinson

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AIDE - MEMOIRE

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I discussed this subject with you and with the Prime Minister when I visited China last autumn. I told the Prime

Minister on 1 November that I would like to think about the matter and I would get in touch with you in due course.

The positions of our two Governments on the status of Hong Kong are necessarily different. But, as I see it, we have two important interests in common. These are to preserve the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong and to preserve the relationship which has developed between our two countries. So far as Hong Kong is concerned, stability and prosperity depend on confidence. Confidence is a tender plant;

it grows only slowly, but can wilt very quickly. share an interest in the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong, it follows that we also share an interest in the preservation of confidence there.

If, as I believe, we

We wish to preserve, indeed to strengthen, good relations between Britain and China. So, we believe, do you. The situation in Hong Kong is a factor of importance in these relations. It follows that we share an interest in doing nothing in, or over Hong Kong, which might unsettle these

relations.

I have given most careful consideration to your proposal since I spoke to you and the Prime Minister last autumn. In

the light of this consideration, I have come to the conclusion that the time is not ripe for a change in the pattern of your

/representation

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representation in Hong Kong. I would therefore ask you nob

to press your proposal. It is my judgement that it will be

some time, before circumstances might change in such a way as

to warrant an alteration in the arrangements which now

exist.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

7 June 1973

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TS 2/1126/50 II

RM Evans Esq

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CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG commend

I enclose a copy of a minute by John Stern about persistent questioning of him on this subject by his guide in Shanghai. This incident does seem a little odd. The incompetence of the guide points to it being a put-up job; though my own brief experience of Chinese guides earlier this year suggests that this is not conclusive evidence.

If it was not a put-up job, we must perhaps conclude that knowledge that this was an issue between us is more videspread in China than we had supposed. Although there has been plenty of publicity about it in Hong Kong there has to our knowledge been no public reference to it in the Chinese press. been mentioned in 'Reference News'.

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Mr. Brewer (FES.R.2). Reference

Mrs, Munn (Research Department)

FEA

CONSULAR RELATIONS IN DISPUTED TERRITORIES

1. During the recent visit there were some discussions, though I believe only on our side, about whether a low level consular exchange could take place with a British representative/consul being based in Canton and a similar regional Chinese representative in Hong Kong.

2. Mr Denys Roberts, the Colonial Secretary designate, Hong Kong has suggested that there might be a parallel in the relations at the local level between Gibraltar and the neighbouring area of Spain. He believes that there was a British consul or vice-consul in Lalinga in Southern Spain wh,although formally responsible to the Embassy in Madrid, was in fact controlled from Gibraltar and accepted as such by the Spanish authorities He is not sure whether any similar Spanish official was ever located in Gibraltar but thinks it possible that this may have been so. It would indeed be interesting to know whether the constitutional impasse has ever in the past been avoided in this way at the local level. Perhaps you and Southern European Section could look into the question and let us know?

ACSE

AC Stuart

Hong Kong & Indian Ocean Department

Copy to:

Mr Bone

(Research Dept)

Mr. Bone, Westina Soucheen tropane feckin-RD). Room $ 86/3

Can you advise indin pon't pleas?.

Hemer

FES.RD.

22/6/73

CONFIDENTIA17793) 897465 400m 1/73 G.W.B.Ltd. Gg.863

CONFIDENTIAL

Far Eastern Department

Hong Kong and Indian Ocean Department News Department

Sir E Norris

Sir D Watson

FEH 3/301/1

لا

BRIEFING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

After my briefing of the representatives of the eight Embassies in London I was asked whether there had been any mention of Chinese representation in Hong Kong which I had not mentioned in my opening statement. I said that the Secretary of State had brought the matter up and that it would continue to be a matter for discussion between us. The Irish representative then asked me whether the Chinese had developed their position at all. To which I replied that they had said nothing which altered the position which they had taken in the past. There were no further questions.

KM Wilford

11 June 1973

vens

Cook

13/0

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be musi Icke the some line (vocnicering nothing). I have already used it in answering a question by

CONFIDENTIAL

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R.E. 176.

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1116

Editorial

For

OUR MAN IN HONGKONG

CHINA is continuing the process of establishing friendly bilateral relations with the countries on its periphery, with the obvious exception of the Soviet Union. It is hardly conceivable that in 12 months' time, China's relations with India and Rangladesh will be as artificially strained as they are today. It is even possible that China will close the circle. Just as Peking's vitriolic attacks on US imperialisia rose to a climax prior to the arrival in China of Henry Kissin- ger, so the level of abuse being directed against Mos- cow today could conceivably presage an attempt to achieve a détente with the "social imperialists."

The revival of the suggestion that China should set up a representative government office in Hong- kong must be seen within the context of China's general campaign to clear the decks of any obstacles that could impede the smooth operation of its for eign relations and foreign trade. Peking has given various verbal assurances to British ministers that the question of Hongkong is of no particular mo- ment and can wait until the problem of Taiwan has been settled. China's need to import sophisticated foreign technology makes ilongkong's contribution to its foreign reserves - now running at about £500 million (US$1,245 million) annually an essential factor in China's economic equation, for the recent harvest setbacks will ensure that Peking will go on importing cereals at least for the next few years, while its generous foreign aid programme also cats into the limited supply of hard cash. An official mission could facilitate the now of trade and could guarantee that Hongkong would more efficiently ex- pand its future role as a "shop window" for foreign technology on China's doorstep, within a commu- nity offering no political challenge to China which obviates the need to have foreign sales representa- tives stationed permanently in Peking or Canton.

Counting tomorrows

At first glance, it would appear that the advan- tages to Hongkong would be even greater than ihose accruing to China. By establishing such a mission, Peking would come close to giving de jure recogni- tion to the "separateness" of the enclave on its coast, thus conferring an even longer term future on

■ community which has until recently been unable to count its tomorrows.

Nevertheless, Hongkong and Britain (which will be the final arbiter of the response to Peking) are de- termined to look this gift home very cautiously in the mouth. The colony's past experience of a Chi- nere commissioner who represented the Nationalist Government until 1950 was not a happy one. Less trusting souls recall the excesses of the 1967 vots and ask themsolves how much more embarrassed the

Is this on file

Hongkong Government would have been had there been a Peking representative in the colony at that time.'

But even if China's foreign policies do not change dramatically yet again, the head of any such mission would be an obvious target for petitions from disgruntled elements in Hongkong's society, from striking schoolteachers and evicted tenants to those resentful of increased Crown rents and the landlords of opium divans and unregistered doctors operating within the "Walled City." Presumably Hongkong will want a fairly waterfight guarantee that the mission would not give Peking's backing to such causes. If not, the Governor could vastly find himself in the situation feared by one of his predi cessors, Sir Alexander Grantham, who was against the proposal (when mooted in 1956) on the ground that it woukl present him with a "rival" governor.

A question of face

On the other hand, Hongkong's colonial, prote-- colaire society does not accord proper prestige to the Government of the People's Republic - diplo matically or socially. It is widely recognised that the heads of the New China News Agency, the Bank of China and of the other branches of China's govern- ment in Hongkong are in every sense official re- presentatives (a fact which in itself disposes of most of Hongkong's worries about how the head of 2 P. · king mission would conduct himself). Inadequate steps are taken to ensure that these distinguishe-l men are accorded their proper importance within the life of the colony.

On balance, it would seem that the gains to Hongkong's status and the other marginal advan- tages which would accrue from such a mission out- weigh the possible disadvantages listed by the cau- tious. Another factor which must now enter into the calculations is the loss of goodwill that would result from a refusal by London to respond to Peking's feelers.

There is one way of swinging the scales defini- tively in Hongkong's favour. London could point out to Peking that Hongkong exists today by virtue of certain 19th-century treaties denounced by China es "unequal" and therefore invalid. If China is to establish an official mission in Hongkong, London could justifiably ask China to take advantage of the occasion to state in black and white that it was will- ing, of its own volition and obviously under no duress, at least to let the New Territories lease run its couse. It would be a fair request, and there is no reason Cluna should remain enigmaftcally evasive en The issue. With such a puarantee, Hongkong could welcome with open arms the unrival of Peking's roan,

Bouch

CHINA MORNING HAY 22ND. 73

POST.

Britain still studying China's proposal

BY KEVIN SINCLAIR

The British Government has still got the question of an official Chinese representative in Hongkong under close study, Me Anthony Royle said in a cable to the S.C.M. Post yesterday.

Mr Royle Under Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, said the British Government's study of the Chinese proposal was not yet completed."

In cable to me from Whitehall Mr Royle said: "As a resident of Hongkong, you will know yourself that the proposal would give rise in vertain problems and for this reason is is

most important that it should be carefully and comprehensively studied.

"Our study is not yet completed, and it would be wrong for me to forecast its likely

outcome.

"I am sure you will understand."

The proposal to establish a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hongkong was first made by the Chinese Government in 1956, and was rejected by the British Government two years later.

After the British Mission in Peking was raised to ambassadorial status last year, the Chinese once again raised the matter of stationing a representative in Hongkong. Mr

Royle's cable said.

Observers in Hongkong last night said Mr Royle's answer reflected the "dilemma" facing Whitehall.

now

Ontheonchand, they pointed out, Britain and China we now enjoying cordial relations, and this has been reflected in conditions in Hongkong. The British Government do not want to offend China by giving a flat "no" in answer to Peking's request.

But, on the other hand, the 'stationing of a senior Chinese representative in the Colony is liable to lead in divided loyskies and confusion among the people of Hongkong, the sources

"The request places Britain in a very difficult position and it is unlikely that a decision will be made in the near future," one reliable source said.

Since Lady Tweedsmuir told the House of Lords un May 9 that the British Government ass still considering the Chinese proposal, there has been little public development in the issue.

Behind the scenes, however, stalf of the Chinese Embassy in London are known to have raised the maller several times in the course of routine discussions with their contacts in the Brush Government.

HONG KONG STANDARD.

MAY 21ST.

73.

HONGKON

10-

Support for China office in Hongkong

Peking's man another Governor, says Ma

A CHINESE office in Hongkong would be beneficial to local citizens, according to the Secretary of the United Nations Association, Mr Ma Man-fai,

Answering a question at the first Hongkong people's forum held at Victoria Park yesterday, Mr Ma said should China send an official representative to Hongkong

it would be like having "two governors," he said.

Petitions could be sent to the Peking official, and the "colonial government** might have to rectify the Issue Co avoid any unfavourable reaction from Peking, Mr Ma told about 100 people,

At the forem, organied by the Liberty and Democracy Party of Liongkong, Mr. Ma was called

man" by ons of

kua audience.

He also spoke on his pot subject: all-government · for Hongkong

"Hongkong is my home, The Governor cannot make thi nor can expatriato civi

government EROL ted by us, nor do we invite

to come in. We mu't sel

to get out Wo have no

ve over 11," said Mr Ma.

He accused the present set of betrayin the omocratic principles

British Government. "What We kuwa here is false British gooda not the real one,

the anti-crime campaign, Me ka mid it would not pluck

out the roots of evil.

"What should be done la to do away with all the [apıl setups that are people to immoral behaviour," he said.

CONFIDENTIAL

VISIT OF THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER : 6 JUNE 10 JUNE

ADDITIONAL DEFENSIVE BRIEF

STATUS OF HONG KONG

It is just conceivable, although unlikely, that during

the talks between the Secretary of State and Chi P'eng-fei,

Chi may make some remarks prejudicial to our view of the

status of Hong Kong. In this case, but only in this case

the Secretary of State will wish to put the record straight.

In doing so it is strongly recommended that he confine

himself to making the following two points:

1) If the Chinese continue to assert their view of

the status of Hong Kong, they should be in no doubt

that we may be forced to assert our view of Hong Kong's

status in reply.

2) We shall continue to act in Hong Kong and over the

affairs of Hong Kong in accordance with our view of

Hong Kong's status and our responsibility for its

administration.

According to our record of the talk between the Secretary

of State and Chou En-lai on 1 November 1972 Chou En-lai said:

"The British were ruling Hong Kong and were responsible. The

Chinese did not quarrel with that. They respected the British

position."7

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TO IMMEDIATE PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 635 OF 8 JUNE, 1973, INFO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR HONG KONG.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 686: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

1. WILFORD WILL BE BRIEFING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DIPLOMATIC

MISSIONS OF THE EIGHT ON CHI'S VISIT IN GENERAL ON 11 JUNE.

HE DOES NOT PROPOSE TO VOLUNTEER ANYTHING ON THE SUBJECT.

IF HE IS ASKED ABOUT IT, HE WILL NOT GO BEYOND CONFIRMING THAT I BROUGHT UP THE MATTER WITH CHI P'ENG-FEI AND THAT

IT WILL CONTINUE TO BE A MATTER FOR DISCUSSION BETWEEN

OURSELVES AND THE CHINESE. WE SHALL ACT LIKEWISE WITH THE AMERICANS (THOUGH WE ARE NOT PLANNING TO GIVE THEM A SPECIAL BRIEFING ABOUT CHI'S VISIT).

2. WILFORD WILL STRESS THE CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF HIS BRIEFING

GIVEN THE PUBLICITY LINE AGREED WITH THE CHINESE.

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for 3/2/1

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NO 686 OF 8 JUNE/REPEATED FOR

INFORMATION TO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR HONG KONG.

YOUR TELNO 557: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

1. WHILE WE WILL OF COURSE HOLD THE LINE IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE TO RESIDENT CORRESPONDENTS HERE, WE SHALL FIND IT DIFFICULT TO DO SO WITH EG OUR EEC COLLEAGUES.

2. GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE BY IMMEDIATE TELEGRAM ON WHAT LINE YOU PROPOSE TAKING WITH THE EEC AND THE AMERICANS.

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AIDE MEMOIRE

I discussed this subject with you and with the Prime

Minister when I visited China last autumn. I told the Prime

Minister on 1 November that I would like to think about the

matter and I would get in touch with you in due course.

Lo.

The positions of our two Governments on the statue of

Hong Kong are necessarily different. But, as I see it, we

have two important interests in common. These are to preserve

the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong and to preserve the

relationship which has developed between our two countries.

So far as Hong Kong is concerned, stability and prosperity

depend on confidence. Confidence is a tender plant; it grows

only slowly, but can wilt very quickly. If, as I believe, we

share an interest in the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong,

it follows that we also share an interest in the preservation

of confidence there.

The

We wish to preserve, indeed to strengthen, good relations

between Britain and China. So, we believe, do you.

situation in Hong Kong is a factor of importance in these

relations. It follows that we share an interest in doing

nothing in, or over Hong Kong, which might unsettle these

relations.

I have given most careful consideration to your proposal

since I spoke to you and the Prime Minister last autumn. In

the light of this consideration, I have come to the conclusion

that the time is not ripe for a change in the pattern of your

/representation

representation in Hong Kong. I would therefore ask you not

to press your proposal. It is my judgement that it will be

some time before circumstances might change in such a way as

to warrant an alteration in the arrangements which now

exist.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

7 June 1973

INMEDIATE

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(FED) 3

1973

TO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELNO 554 OF 7 JUNE/AND TO PEKING.

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

1. THE CHINESE APPEARED TO ACCEPT WITH FAIRLY GOOD GRACE MY EXPOSITION OF OUR POSITION. IN REPLY CHI DEVELOPED ON STANDARD LIXES

THE CHINESE CASE, THOUGH NOTING THAT WE HAD REACHED A DECIDION. HE

REITERATED CHIBA'S INTENTION HOT TO TRY TO SET UP A DOUBLE REGIME

MED ZADE CLEAR THAT THEY FULLY RESPECTED THE PRESENT HONG KONG

AUTORITIES, BE SAV THE PROBLE: AS A FUNCTION OF THE IMPROVEMENT IN

SIN. -VRITISH RELATIONS, HE WAS FLEXIBLE AROUT THE PUOSIBLE TITLE OF

OF A REPRESENTATIVE, SUCCESTING THAT HE MIGHT EITHER REPRESENT

KWALETUIKG PROVINCE OR THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THAT

THE QUESTION OF REVERSE ACCREDITATION OF A HOM KONG RAPdt fat [VI. 1. MAITUL COULD ALSO SE CONSTRAINS. THE FATUS OF JONG KONG 4 14, HE SKIP,

A ATTER FOR DISCUSSION AT THIS TIME. HE THODELE THAT NG FULCTIONS THE PERCSE TIVE COULD SE DEFINED TO ITUAL SATISFACT-

ON. THE LATTER HAS POND TO COME UP WHEN OUR PRIME

TO CHINA AED RE VOULD GO OF THE IRC ABOUT IT. G)

FIGER VÉ

2. CHI SAID THAT IF 19EPRESENTATIGH COULD NOT BE SETTLED THIS ICHT AWTERSELY ZI FECT OTHER PROBLEMS, JUCH AS CO... ULICATIONS, NIGUSELA ALL SERVICES VIIICH RE: "ILD **SISETTLED'',

2. CHI GVIELUBED THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT AGREDIENT COULD LOT HE REACHED NOW AED THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO REPORT 1 SK TO PUKING.

4. ↑ REPEATED THAT I HOPED THE CHILEGE WOULD NUT FILGS THE ISSUE,

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TO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR HONG KONG TEL NO 563 OF 7 JUNE 1973 INFO IMMEDIATE

PEKING.

HY TELEGRAM 10. 557 ? ckINESE REPRESENTATION' IN HONG KONG.

1. WE ARE TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY ABOUT MY EXCHANGE WITH THE CHINESE

FOREIGN MINISTER.

2. AT THE END OF THIS MORNING'S ROUND, CHI PROPOSED THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE SAID TO THE PRESS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT WE HAD DISCUSSED. I AGREED.

3. I HAVE INSTRUCTED NEWS DEPARTMENT TO RESTRICT THEIR BRIEFING TO A VERY GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE TOPICS DISCUSSED. I HAVE ASKED THEM NOT TO CONFIRM, EITHER ON THE RECORD OR UNATTRIBUTABLY, THAT CHINESE REPRESENTATION WAS DISCUSSED, THEY WILL COUNTER ANY SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE TALKS AS A WHOLE BY SAYING THAT THEY HAVE NO

FURTHER INFORMATION TO PROVIDE.

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TO IMMEDIATE GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELRO 557 OF 6 JUNE. 1973 INFO FELING

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 650: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

1. NEWS DEPARTMENT WILL NOT VOLUNTEER ANYTHING ON THE RECORD. ABOUT CHINESE REPRESENTATION. THEY EXPECT TO CONFINE THEMSELVES TO TELLING THE PRESS ABOUT THE CURATION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S MEETINGS WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND ABOUT THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE SUBJECTS DISCUSSED. IF, HOWEVER, THEY ARE ASKED WHETHER CHINESE REPRESENTATION WAS BROUGHT UP, THEY WILL BE BOUND TO SAY THAT IT WAS, BUT THEY WILL NOT GO BEYOND DOING THIS (EITHER WHEN THEY BRIEF JOURNALISTS AFTER THE MEETINGS OR IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS AT ONE OF THEIR REGULAR CONFERENCES).

WHAT NEWS DEPARTMENT SAY UNATTRIBUTABLY WILL DEPEND ON HOW THE CHINESE REACT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S STATEMENT. WE SHALL TELEGRAPH A SET OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (WHICH WE ARE NOW DRAFTING ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS) AS SOON AS WE KNOW THE OUTCOME OF THE DISCUSSION. THESE WILL COVER THE EVENTUALITY WHICH CONCERNS US MOST THAT THE CHINESE LEAK THE FACT THAT WE HAVE GIVEN THEM A DISOBLIGING REPLY AND EMBROIDER WITH THEIR OWN COMMENTS.

3. WE HAVE BRIEFED THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO PROPOSE THAT THE ROUND ON THE MORNING OF 7 JUNE SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WE HAVE ALSO BRIEFED HIM TO BROACH THE SUBJECT OF CHINESE REPRESENTATION HIMSELF DURING THE ROUND IN THE AFTERNOON.

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Mr Winford

Pla

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

R.E.

FEAT

7/6.

1. I submit the draft of a preliminary reply to

Hong Kong telegram No 600. We are now working on the

set of questions and answers referred to in paragraph 2

of the draft.

6 June 1973

cc Mr Stuart

Mr Weait

R.Mh. Evans

RE Evans

Far Eastern Department

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 690 OF 1 JUNE/ INFO PEKING.

MY TELNO 581: CHINESE REPRESENTATION.

AS SOON AS YOU HAVE SEEN CHI P'ENG-FEI IN LONDON WE SHALL BE UNDER STRONG PRESSURE HERE TO SAY WHETHER THIS QUESTION WAS DISCUSSED AND IN WHAT TERMS. I HOPE THE DEPARTMENT WILL BE ABLE TO SEND US, PREFERABLY A LITTLE IN ADVANCE SO THAT WE CAN SAY THE SAME THINGS AS NEAR SIMULTANEOUSLY AS POSSIBLE, THE TEXT OF WHAT THE OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN WILL SAY ATTRIBUTABLY ON THIS ISSUE. IT WOULD ALSO BE VERY HELPFUL TO HAVE BY FLASH TELEGRAM IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS THE TEXT OF ANYTHING THE SPOKESMAN MAY ADD UNATTRIBUTABLY.

2. I NEED HARDLY SAY THAT THIS MATTER WILL NEED VERY CAREFUL HANDLING WITH THE PRESS HERE IF WE ARE NOT TO INVOLVE OURSELVES IN CONSIDER~

ABLE DIFFICULTIES.

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 597 OF 1 JUNE,1973.

YOUR TELEGRAM 487.

SIR Y.K. KAN WILL BE CALLING ON YOU AND MR ROYLE ON 6 JUNE.

I SHOULD EXPECT HIS PRINCIPAL TALKING POINTS TO BE THE REPRIEVE OF TSOI AND CHINESE REPRESENTATION.

2. TSQI. HIS CONCERN WILL BE NOT SO MUCH WITH THE CASE ITSELF, THOUGH HE IS EXTREMELY WORRIED ABOUT THE GROWTH OF VIOLENT CRIME, BUT WITH THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF A DECISION OF THE GOVERNOR-IN-COUNCIL, WHICH CLEARLY ACCORDED WITH THE WISHES OF THE POPULATION, BEING OVERRULED IN THIS WAY. I WOULD EXPECT HIS POINTS

TO BE:-

A) PEOPLE LIKE HIMSELF WILL NOT SERVE ON EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND ACCEPT THE TIME, RESPONSIBILITY AND ALSO THE CRITICISM IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST IF THEY ARE TO BE OVERRULED ON THE THEORY THAT SINCE HONG KONG IS A COLONY IT MUST DO AS IT IS TOLD. APPLICATION OF THE LATTER PRINCIPLE RISKS WHOLESALE RESIGNATIONS FROM EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS AND THE ALIENATION OF THE POPULATION.

B) PEOPLE ARE NOW WORRIED THAT IF HMG MAY OVERRULE THE GOVERNOR-IN- COUNCIL ON SUCH AN ISSUE THEY MIGHT SIMILARLY OVERRULE HONG KONG WISHES ABOUT SOMETHING ELSE, THEY HAVE PARTICULARLY IN MIND THE ISSUE OF A CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE WHICH IS OF ENORMOUS SIGNIFICANCE, BUT ALSO, SAY, ACCESS TO THE EEC.

3. THE LINE I TOOK WITH HIM WAS:

A) THAT IT WOULD BE UNFAIR AND ENTIRELY WRONG TO GENERALISE ON THE BASIS OF THIS CASE. EMOTION ABOUT THE DEATH SENTENCE AMONGST

CONFIDENTIAL / M.P'S WAS A UNIQUE

CONFIDENTIAL

M.P.'S WAS A UNIQUE POLITICAL PHENOMENON, AND WAS AT ITS HEIGHT AT THE TIME OF TSOI'S APPEAL. THERE WAS NO REASON WHATEVER ANTICIPATE A SIMILAR SITUATION IN RESPECT OF ANY OTHER ISSUE OF REAL INTEREST TO HONG KONG, AND CERTAINLY NOT ABOUT A CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE OVER WHOM HMG HAD TAKEN A CONSISTENTLY FIRM AND STATESMAN-LIKE LINE.

B) WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE SCRAPED HOME ON A VOTE ON THIS ISSUE OR NOT WAS A MATTER FOR THEIR JUDGEMENT, BUT IN ANY CASE IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN IN HONG KONG'S INTEREST TO BE THE SUBJECT OF A MAJOR PARLIAMENTARY STORM NO MATTER WHAT THE BASIS FOR THE LATTE

MIGHT BE.

C) IF HE RESIGNED ON SUCH AN ISSUE HE WOULD BE ENDANGERING THE WHOLE BASIS AND STATUS OF THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS AND I WOULD CONSIDER IT GROSSLY IRRESPONSIBLE. FOR MY PART I

WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO CARRY ON HERE IF I COULD NOT COUNT ON SENSIBLE SUPPORT FROM MY FRIENDS.........

4. CHINESE REPRESENTATION. KAN IS FUNDAMENTALLY A SHREWD, FFLEXIBLE AND RESPONSIBLE MAN, BUT HE BECOMES EMOTIONAL WHEN HE BELIEVES HIS OWN FACE OR THAT OF HONG KONG TO BE INVOLVED. ON THIS ISSUE HE ENTIRELY AGREES WITH OUR LINE, BUT HE HAS A NAGGING FEAR, LIKE THE REST OF THE ESTABLISHMENT, THAT H.M.G. AND THE C.P.G. MAY DO A DEAL BEHIND HIS BACK. ONE CAN ONLY INSSIST THAT HIS WILL NOT HAPPEN

AND THAT HONG KONG WILL CONTINUE TO BE FULLY CONSULTED.

5. IF HE RUNS ON ABOUT THESE ISSUES I WOULD RECOMMEND CHANGING THE SUBJECT BY ASKING HIM QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MATTERS SUCH AS THE HOUSING, EDUCATIONAL OR SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAMMES, OR THE REORGAINIZATION OF GOVERNMENT INVOLVED IN THE MCKINSEY REPORT.

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JC) COPY,

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 600 OF 1 JUNE/INFO PEKING.

MY TELNO 5811 CHINESE REPRESENTATION.

ICH

1/2/4

AS SOON AS YOU HAVE SEEN CHI P'ENG-FEI IN LONDON WE SHALL BE UNDER STRONG PRESSURE HERE TO SAY WHETHER THIS QUESTION WAS DISCUSSED AND IN WHAT TERMS, I HOPE THE DEPARTMENT WILL BE ABLE TO SEND US, PREFERABLY A LITTLE IN ADVANCE SO THAT WE CAN SAY THE SAME THINGS AS NEAR SIMULTANEOUSLY AS POSSIBLE, THE TEXT OF WHAT THE OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN WILL SAY ATTRIBUTABLY ON THIS ISSUE. IT WOULD ALSO BE VERY HELPFUL TO HAVE BY FLASH TELEGRAM IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS THE TEXT OF ANYTHING THE SPOKESMAN MAY ADD UNATTRIBUTABLY.

2. I NEED HARDLY SAY THAT THIS MATTER WILL NEED VERY CAREFUL HANDLING WITH THE PRESS HERE IF WE ARE NOT TO INVOLVE OURSELVES IN CONSIDER- ABLE DIFFICULTIES.

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1/6.

604

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7/6

FEH 36

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

1. We have had another careful look at the form of words already

approved by the Secretary of State for use when he gives the Chinese Foreign Minister his answer on the Chinese request to have an

official representative in Hong Kong. It seemed that the third paragraph might benefit from reformulation in the interests of

softening the impact on the Chinese of our negative response.

▲,8,C. have consulted the Governor of Hong Kong and HM Embassy Peking, an) D.

both of whom agree with the suggested redraft.

I therefore submit the revised version. If the Secretary

of State approves it, the Department will substitute it for the

earlier version in the briefing on this question to be supplied

for the Chinese Foreign Minister's visit.

Gellark

GE Clark

Far Eastern Department

You have already approwed the revised rent of paragraph 3(which I have sidelined). We are submitting is because the original vesion was

CONFIDENTIAL

proved

by Mi Royle and the secretory of siate.

Rokrow

June, 1973.

I recomms that sits

ska

approve the revised

formula. Only the wording of para 3 has been

altered.

Kun hotfro

FORM OF WORDS TO BE USED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN TALKING TO THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER

1. I discussed this subject with you and with the Frime Minister

when I visited China last autumn. I told the Prime Minister on

1 November that I would like to think about the matter and I would

get in touch with you in due course.

2. The positions of our two Governments on the status of Hong

Kong are necessarily different. But, as I see it, we have two

important interests in common. These are to preserve the stability

and prosperity of Hong Kong and to preserve the relationship which

has developed between our two countries. So far as Hong K ̧ng is

concerned, stability and prosperity depend on confidence.

Confidence is a tender plant; it grows only slowly, but can wilt

very quickly. If, as I believe, we share an interest in the

stability and prosperity of Hong Kong, it follows that we also

share an interest in the preservation of confidence there.

We wish to preserve, indeed to strengthen, good relations

between Britain and China. So, we believe, do you. The situation

It in Hong Kong is a factor of importance in these relations.

follows that we share an interest in doing nothing in, or over

Hong Kong, which might unsettle these relations.

I have given most careful consideration to your proposal

since I spoke to you and the Prime Minister last autumn. In the

light of this consideration, I have come to the conclusion that

the time is not ripe for a change in the pattern of your represent

ation in Hong Kong. I would therefore ask you not to press your

/proposal.

proposal. It is my judgement that it will be some time before

circumstances might change in such a way as to warrant an

alteration in the arrangements which now exist.

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Not the Used.

OF WORDS TO BE USED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN TALKING T. CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER

I discussed this subject with you and with the Prime

when I visited China last autumn I told the Prime

ron 1 November that I would like to think about the

. und 1 would get in touch with you in due course. "The positions of our two Governments on the status of

Gure necessarily different. But, as I see it, we have portant interests in common. These are to preserve the

y and prosperity of Hong Kong and to preserve the chip which has developed between our two countries. as Hong Kong is concerned, stability and prosperity - en confidence. Confidence is a tender plant: it grows slowly, but can wilt very quickly. If, as I believe, we

an interest in the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong, it follows that we also share an interest in the preservation

confidence there.

"As far as the relations between Britain and China are concerned, there can be no doubt that the situation in Hong Kong

Factor of importance. lf, therefore, we share an interest

in preserving good relations between our two countries, we also here an interest in doing nothing in, or over, Hong Kong which

could disturb the situation there.

"I have given most careful consideration to your proposal since I spoke to you and the Prime Minister last autumn. In the light of this consideration I have come to the conclusion that the time is not ripe for a change in the pattern of your representation in Hong Kong. I would therefore ask you not to press your proposal. It is my judgement that it will be some Liike before circumstances might change in such a way as to

"crunt an alteration in the arrangements which now exist."

·Ipproved by the seciciary of Sicie

R.E.

CONFIDENT YAL

ECRE T

AT A

GRPS 150

FM F C O 241108Z

DED IP

SECRET

TO PRIORITY GOVERNOR HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR) TELMO 51, 24/5/ AND TO PRIORITY PEKING(PERSONAL FOR MORGAN).

MY TELEGRAM NO. 157 TO GOVERNOR HONG KONG: CHINESE REPRESENTATION HONG KONG,

FOLLOWING FROM WILFORD.

I I

1. AS PART OF THE WORK IN PREPARING FOR CHI P'ENG-FEI'S VISIT, 14 DEPARTMENT AND I HAVE BEEN HAVING ANOTHER LOOK AT THE TEXT I DO TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, AS YOU KNOW, THIS HAS DEEN APPROVED SECRETARY OF STATE. WE ARE NEVERTHELESS INCLINED TO RECOMMEND FOR THE SAKE OF LOGIC AND OF A RATHER SOFTER IMPACT ON THE GH THE THIRD PARAGRAPH S11OULD LE AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:-

'WE WISH TO PRESERVE, INDEED TO STRENGTHEN, COOD RELATIONS DI BRITAIN AND CHINA. SO, WE BELIEVE, DO YOU. THE SITUATION IN HOP, KONG IS A FACTOR OF IMPORTANCE IN THESE RELATIONS. IT FOLLOWS THAT WE SHARE AN INTEREST IN DOING NOTHING IN, OR OVER HONG KONG, WHICH MIGHT UN SETTLE THESE RELATIONS"'.

A/...

2. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHAT YOU AND MORGAN THINK

OF PLAY ON 29 MAY,

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES

HD F.E.D.

HD HKIOD

SIR E NORRIS

MR WILFORD

SECRET

IMMEDIATE AFHER/CAT A

300

FII HONG KONG 2809307

DEDIP

SECRET

1973

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 581 OF 28 MAY/INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING.

FOR WILFORD.

YOUR TELEGRAM 517. CHINESE REPRESENTATION.

I AGREE WITH THE SUGGESTED AMENDMENT.

2. SINCE MY LETTER OF 4 MAY THE PRESS HAVE KEPT THE ISSUE ON THE BOIL. THERE HAVE BEEN FEW NEW IDEAS, BUT THE UNDERLYING FEELING AGAINST THE IDEA OF AN OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE HAS, I THINK, HARDENED, AS PEOPLE HAVE INCREASINGLY REALISED HOW THE REPRESENTATIVE COULD BECOME A FOCUS BOTH FOR LOYALTY AND FOR DISCONTENT.

FURTHERMORE THE REPREIVE OF TSOI HAS PROVOKED ANXIETY

THAT H.M.G. MIGHT OVERRULE THE WISHES OF HONG KONG ALSO ON THE ISSUE OF A REPRESENTATIVE, AND THIS HAS CAUSED FEARS TO BE EXPRESSED THAT PREVIOUSLY PEOPLE KEPT TO THEMSELVES.

3. THE LEFT WING PRESS HAVE REMAINED ENTIRELY SILENT. THE LOCAL COMMUNISTS HAVE APPARENTLY REPORTED TO PEKING ALL PRESS COMMENT WITHOUT HOWEVER GIVING A GLOSS ON IT. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE SIGN OF THE ISSUE BEING DISCUSSED AMONGST THEMSELVES. IT THUS APPEARS THAT PEKING HAVE BEEN PLAYING THEIR OWN HAND.

4. CHI P'ENG-FEI MAY DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO SOME OF THE PRESS COMMENTS SELECTED BECAUSE THEY ARE LEAST UNFAVOURABLE OR EVEN SUPERFICIALLY FAVOURABLE. IF SO I SUGGEST THAT WITHOUT BEING DRAWN INTO ARGUMENT THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD REPLY THAT REACTIONS IN HONG KONG TO THIS PRESS SPECULATION INITIATED BY OFFICIALS IN PEKING HAVE IMPRESSED HIM QUITE DIFFERENTLY:-

SECRET

/ A)

SECRET

A) VIRTUALLY ALL COMMENT EMPHASISED THE PROBLEM OF CONFIDENCE POSED BY THE CHINESE PROPOSAL,

B) HIS READING OF THE UNDERLYING FEELING IN HONG KONG CONFIRMED WHAT

HE HAS SAID TO MR CHI IN PEKING.

MACLEHOSE

FILES HD FED

HD HKIOD SIR E NORRIS MR WILFORD

- 2 -

SECRET

Торсору

Top copy +1

124%

PP FCO

FF GOVERNOR LONG KONG

DEDIF

CYPHER CAT A

FM FEKING 261020Z

SECRET

DEDIP

Din Wilford

NO DISTRIBUTIAL

PRIORI.

CYPHER

M'Evans (FED) 29%

TO PRIORITY FCO (PERSONAL FOR WILFORD) TELEGRAM NO 622 OF 26 SAY

REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO HONG KONG (FERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR).

FOLLOWING FOR WILFORD

YOUR TELNO. 517: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

1. | AGREE WITH THE SUGGESTED REDRAFT.

MORGAN

NNNN

SECRET

¡EDIATE HER/CAT A 13 300

FM HONG KONG 280930Z

DEDI?

SECRET

Spoken, MiWork Swierige Pe. speak.

1973

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELKO 581 OF 28 MAY/INFO IMMEDIATE PEKING.

FOR WILFORD.

YOUR TELEGRAM 517. CHINESE REPRESENTATION.

2に

29/5

! AGREE WITH THE SUGGESTED AMENDMENT.

FURTHERMORE THE REPREIVE OF TSO HAS PROVOKED ANXIETY

THAT H.N.G. MIGHT OVERRULE THE WISHES OF HONG KONG ALSO ON THE ISSUE OF A REPRESENTATIVE, AND THIS HAS CAUSED FEARS TO BE EXPRESSED THAT PREVIOUSLY PEOPLE KEPT TO THEMSELVES.

SECRET

/A)

SECRET

A) VIRTUALLY ALL COMMENT EMPHASISED THE PROBLEM OF CONFIDENCE POSED BY THE CHINESE PROPOSAL,

B) HIS READING OF THE UNDERLYING FEELING IN HONG KONG CONFIRMED WHAT

HE HAS SAID TO MR CHI IN PEKING.

MACLEHOSE

FILES HD FED

HD HKIOD

SIR E NORRIS

MR WILFORD

2 -

SECRET

}

SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, LIMITED

TONG CHONG STREET HONG KONG

P.O. Box 47

TELEPHONE 5.620161

CABLES 'POSTSCRIPTI

Mr Anthony Royle,

House of Commons,

London.

May 25

News Departmen

CC FED

HK-10D

Dear Mr Royle,

Many thanks indeed for your cable concerning the

recent developments regarding the Chinese request for

a representative to be stationed in the Colony.

As you can see I have now attempted to enroll Sir

Alex into the ranks of the Morning Post reporting staff,

and I would be grateful for anything you could do which

would help us to get a swift and full coverage of the

discussions between Sir Alex and Mr Chi.

Once again, many thanks,

"ours "aithfully,

Kevin Sinclair

---

Soun

CHINA MORNING POST, LIMITED

TONG CHONG STREET

HONG KONG

P.O. Box 47

TELEPHONE 3-020181

GABLED "POST=CRIPT

May 25, 1973

ir Alex Douglas-Home,

Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs,

House of Commons,

London.

De r år Alex,

There is considerable interest in Hongkong about your forthcoming meeting with Mr Chi Teng-fei, the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, particularly in reward to discussions you may be having with Kr Chi concerning the Chinese Government's request to station a reprenentative of the Foreign Ministry in the Colony.

I would be most grateful if you could arrange with your st: ff for a full account of your discussions with Er Chi concernin Tongkong to be cabled to us as soon as possible after your meeting with him, with any comment on the discussions which you would lil e to add.

Any details of the discussions on the air services between Buitain, ilongkong and China would also be api pecinton,

In advance, many thanks for your ansistance.

Yours faithfully,

Kevin Gincluir, News Editor,

5.0.M.Poat.

PRIORITY

SECRET

CYPHER CAT A GRPS 150

A F C O 241108Z

HD|FED 157

Enici. R.E.

31/5.

DEDIP

SECRET

TO PRIORITY GOVERNOR HONG KONG (PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR) TELNO 517 OF 24/5/ AND TO PRIORITY PEKING(PERSONAL FOR MORGAN).

MY TELEGRAM NO. 157 TO GOVERNOR HONG KONG: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN

HONG KONG.

FOLLOWING FROM WILFORD.

1. AS PART OF THE WORK IN PREPARING FOR CHI P'ENG-FEI'S VISIT, THE DEPARTMENT AND 1 HAVE BEEN HAVING ANOTHER LOOK AT THE TEXT IN FCO TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. AS YOU KNOW, THIS HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE. WE ARE NEVERTHELESS INCLINED TO RECOMMEND THAT, FOR THE SAKE OF LOGIC AND OF A RATHER SOFTER IMPACT ON THE CHINESE, THE THIRD PARAGRAPH SHOULD BE AMENDED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:- **WE WISH TO PRESERVE, INDEED TO STRENGTHEN, COOD RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND CHINA. SO, WE BELIEVE, DO YOU. THE SITUATION IN HONG KONG IS A FACTOR OF IMPORTANCE IN THESE RELATIONS. IT FOLLOWS THAT WE SHARE AN INTEREST IN DOING NOTHING IN, OR OVER HONG KONG, WHICH NIGHT UNSETTLE THESE RELATIONS''.

2. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO KNOW WHAT YOU AND MORGAN THINK BY CLOSE

OF PLAY ON 29 MAY.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES

HD F.E.D.

HD HKIOD SIR E NORRI B

MR WILFORD

SECRET

PRIORITY

EN CLAIR

GPS 15

FA FCO 1711472

UNCLASSIFIED

Ado

(FG)

1973

TO PRIORITY GOVERNOR HONG KONG TEL NO 486 OF 17 MAY/INFO PEKING

YOUR TEL NO 539.

I AGREE.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES

FED

HKIOD

PIK WILFORD PS/MR ROYLE

SIR E NORRIS

[

Reference

FAL 3/2.1. Enter

178

CONFIDENTIAL

Ir prens

• Wreford.

Copyis: The Thelson, Сори

CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

I understand that the Chinese Government have proposed that Chi P'ng-Fei should visit London from 7-10 or 11 June; and that they have been told in return that these dates would be suitable.

2. As I recall it, the Chinese have been pressing for an answer to be given to their request for official representation in Hong Kong; and there have been hints that the progress of civil air services talks would be linked to a favourable reply to this request. The latest of these suggestions was made in the course of an interview given to the Financial Times Far East correspondent (FCO tel. No. 365 to Governor Hong Kong).

3. When this topic has come up in inter-departmental discussions on UK/China A.. we have been told that there was no such link in our minds and that a decision would be taken by the Secretary of State on the question on its own merits. I have also understood that it was the intention to inform the Chinese Foreign Minister of the Secretary of State's decision when they next met, which was expected to be here in London.

4. If, as I also expect, the answer to the Chinese request is in the negative, then could I propose that special attention should be paid to the fact that the UK/China ASA negotiations begin in Peking on 28 May and could still be in progress when the Chinese Foreign Minister arrives here To volunteer at that point that we had decided not to agree to Chinese represen- tation in Hong Kong could possibly provoke a breakdown in Hong Kong could possibly provoke a breakdow in the negotiations for an ASA, with inevitable and unfavourable publicity in relation to the ASA talks and to the Foreign Minister's visit.

5. Unless there are reasons which lead you to believe that we must volunteer such a response, I would propose that:

(a)

་

a negative reply should not be given to the Chinese Foreign Minister unless he again raises the point himself;

(b) that the terms of the reply, while being

negative should not imply finality. II some such phrase as "in present circumstances" even for the foreseeable future" were included this might be sufficient to make it difficult for the Chinese to react in the air services sphere.

/6.

DO 897261230443 500M 3/71 GH NG2

CONFIDENTIAL

6. If there should be any need to discuss this further I hope that we can do so early next week before I leave the Office on my way to Hong Kong.

11 May 1973

J/ Mellon

Line & Transport Dept

Cupies to: Mr Goodfellow, HKIODept

Mr Wilford

yerone

Hr Parry, Legal Advisers

He will have

1. It has now been decided that Chi P'eng-fei should visit this country from 7 June to 10 June. talks with the Secretary of State on 7 June.

2. There is indeed some danger that the delivery by the Secretary of State to Chi P'eng-fei of an unfavourable response over Chinese representation might have an impact on the negotiations in Peking about an Air Services Agreement. But I think that this is a danger which we must accept. I do not myself believe that the delivery of an unfavourable response would put the negotiations in jeopardy; if the Chinese had intended to make the negotiation of an agreement conditional on our giving a favourable response, they would not have agreed to the negotiations beginning before our response had been made.

3. My comments on the two suggestions in paragraph 5 of Mr Mallon's minute are as follows:-

(a)

(b)

I do not think that we could reasonably recommend to the Secretary of State that he should not deliver our response (which will be "negative") unless the subject is brought up by Chi P'eng-fei. The Secretary of State told Chou En-lai at the beginning of November that he would get in touch with Chi P'eng-fei and he will not wish to seen reluctant to broach the subject. In any case, I doubt whether anything would be gained by the use of this tactic, if the Secretary of State does not bring the subject up, Chi P'eng-fei will be bound to do so himself;

The terms of our response do not imply finality (as Mr Mellon will see from the copy of the text which I am sending him with his copy of this minute) Admittedly, the door is left only very slightly

/ajar.

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference

ajar. But I very much doubt whether we could persuade Sir Murray Maclehose to let us open it wider. Besides, the Secretary of State himself has now approved the text.

On studying the text again, however, I have a small change of my own to suggest. I think that the logic of the third paragraph would be improved by the substitution of "disturb these relations" for "disturb the situation there". I wonder whether you agree.

२.

R.M. Frans

RM Evans

16 May 1973

Far Eastern Department

CC Mr Mellon

Mi Wigford-again

be spoke. I now subomi a arqiTelegram To Hong kong and

Peking.

Rin. Evens

24 May, 1973.

Tel. respatched

2015

MicRark. Mi Davies.

CONFIDENTIAL

له

RE. 24/5

(17293) DI897445 400m 1/731 G.W.B.LH. Gp.863

CONFIDENTIAL

Not the Used

FORM OF WORDS TO BE USED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN TAIKING TO THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER

"I discussed this subject with you and with the Prime Minister when I visited China last autumn. I told the Prime Minister on 1 November that I would like to think about the matter and I would get in touch with you in due course.

"The positions of our two Governments on the status of Hong Kong are necessarily different. But, as I see it, we have two important interests in common. These are to preserve the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong and to preserve the relationship which has developed between our two countries. So far as Hong Kong is concerned, stability and prosperity depend on confidence. Confidence is a tender plant; it grows only slowly, but can wilt very quickly. If, as I believe, we share an interest in the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong, it follows that we also share an interest in the preservation of confidence there.

"As far as the relations between Britain and China are concerned, there can be no doubt that the situation in Hong Kong is a factor of importance. If, therefore, we share an interest in preserving good relations between our two countries, we also share an interest in doing nothing in, or over, Hong Kong which could disturb the situation there] these relations

"I have given most careful consideration to your proposal since I spoke to you and the Prime Minister laat autumn. In the light of this consideration I have come to the conclusion that the time is not ripe for a change in the pattern of your representation in Hong Kong. I would therefore ask you not to press your proposal. It is my judgement that it will be some time before circumstances might change in such a way as to warrant an alteration in the arrangements which now exist."

Approved by the seciciary 87-sicie

R.E. 375.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

FM FCO 121846Z

DEDIP

SECRET

E T R.E.

(FE)

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TO PRIORITY GOVERNOR HONG KONG(PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR) TEL NO 157 OF 12 FEBRUARY AND TO PEKING" (PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR) INFO PRIORITY TOKYO (PERSONAL FOR WILFORD)

R.E. 13.

HONG KONG TELEGRAMS NO 133 AND NO 142 AND PEKING TELEGRAM NO 199 (NONE TO TOKYO): CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

FOLLOWING FROM NORRIS.

1. WE ARE MOST GRATEFUL TO YOU SOTH FOR YOUR HELPFUL ADVICE ON

THIS DIFFICULT SUBJECT.

2. THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS DECIDED TO USE THE FOLLOWING FORMS OF WORDS WHEN CHI P'ENG-FEI VISITS LONDON.

BEGINS:

''I DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT WITH YOU AND WITH THE PRIME MINISTER MIEN I VISITED CHINA LAST AUTUMN. TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER 0% 1 NOVEMBER THAT I WOULD LIKE TO THINK ABOUT THE MATTER AND 1 WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH YOU IN DUE COURSE.

THE POSITIONS OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THE STATUS OF HONG KONG ARE NECESSARILY DIFFERENT. BUT, AS I SEE IT, WE HAVE TVO IMPORTANT INTERESTS TH COMMON. THESE ARE TO PRESERVE THE STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF HONG KONG AND TO PRESERVE THE RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, SO FAR AS HONG KONG IS CONCERNED, STABILITY AND PROSPERITY DEPEND ON CONFIDENCE. CONFIDENCE IS A TENDER PLANT IT GROWS ONLY SLOWLY, BUT CAN WILT VERY QUICKLY. IF, AS I BELIEVE, WE SHARE AN INTEREST IN THE STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF HONG KONG, IT FOLLOWS THAT WE ALSO SHARE AN INTEREST IN THE PRESERVATION OF CONFIDENCE THERE.

AS FAR AS THE RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND CHINA ARE CONCERNED, THERE CAN DE NO DOURT THAT THE SITUATION IN HONG KONG IS A FACTOR OF IMPORTANCE, IF, THEREFORE, WE SHARE AN INTEREST IN PRESERVING COOD RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, WE ALSO SHARE AN INTEREST IN DOING NOTHING IN, OR OVER, HONG KONG WHICH COULD DISTURB THE SITUATION THERE.

/ HAVE

SECRET

SCRET

GIVEN MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO YOUR PROPOSAL SINCE

I SPOKE TO YOU AND THE PRIME MINISTER LAST AUTUMN. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS CONSIDERATION 1 HAVE CONE TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE TIME .. NOT RIPE FOR A CHANGE IN THE PATTERN OF YOUR REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG. I WOULD THEREFORE ASK YOU NOT TO PRESS YOUR PROPOSAL. IT IS MY JUDGEMENT THAT IT WILL BE SOME TIME BEFORE CIRCUMSTANCES MIGIIT CHANGE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO WARRANT AN ALTERATION IN THE ARRANGEMENTS

WHICH NOW EXIST'".

ENDS.

47.

HE WILL GIVE CHI P'ENG-FEI A COPY OF THIS TEXT.

3. OUR PURPOSE IS TO PERSUADE THE CHINESE TO SHELVE THEIR PROPOSAL

FOR A MATTER OF YEARS, WITHOUT DOING ANY SERIOUS DAMAGE TO ANGLO-

CHINESE RELATIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE USE OF THIS FORM OF WORDS

WILL GIVE US THE BEST HOPE OF ACHIEVING THIS PURPOSE.

4. WE NOW KNOW THAT CHI P'ENG-FEI VILL NOT VISIT LONDON FROM 22 FEBRUARY TO 25 FEBRUARY (PEKING TELEGRAM NO 157 NOT TO TOKYO).

BUT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WILL INEVITABLY SEE A GOOD DEAL OF HIM

AT THE CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM IN PARIS. WE SHALL RECOMMEND TO HIM

THAT HE SHOULD NOT BROACH THE SUBJECT WITH CHI P'ENG-FEI IN PARIS. WE SHALL ALSO RECOMMEND THAT, IF THE LATTER SHOULD BRING IT UP, HE SHOULD CONFINE HIMSELF TO SAYING THAT HE HAS GIVEN THE CHINESE PROPOSAL MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION AND WILL BE READY TO SPEAK ABOUT IT WHEN CHI P'ENG-FEI VISITS LONDON.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES

HD FED

HD HKIOD

PS/MR ROYLE PS/PUS

SIR E NORRIS '

MR WILFORD

SECRET

*015/02

SEC

池

00 F C O

ADVAN

✪ PEKING

GRPS 199

CYPHER/CAT A

FM HONG KONG 0200502

SECRET

شدم

Refered to

Sii & Norris HD FED

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TGLNO 142 OF 2ND FEBRUARY, 1973. INFO IMMEDIATE

PEKING.

PEKING TELNO 109.

FOLLOWING FOR NORRIS.

Not me intention

R.E. 272.

PARA, 2, 1ST SENTENCE QUITE RIGHT, BUT I MUST ADMIT TO HAVING SEEN COURSE (D) AS A PRESENTATIONAL VARIANT OF (A) SO FAR AS THE FORESEKÁBLE FUTURE IS CONCERNED.

2. THIS ISSUE SEEMS TO TURN ON ONE'S JUDGEMENT OF WHETHER A MORE OR LESS CONTINUING DIALOGUE ON TINS QUESTION WITH THE CHINESE IS THE BEST WAY OF KEEPING THE TEMPERATURE DOWN IF RPT IF WE DO NOT INTEND TO GIVE WAY WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO, HM AMBASSADOR DOES, I DO NOT, EITHER MIGHT DE RIGHT.

2. DUT WHEREAS IF I AM PROVED WRONG WE CAN SHIFT TO HIS LINE, IF HE IS WRONG WE WILL HAVG GIVEN THE GAME AWAY.

MACLEHOSE

MINN

SENT AT 10442/02 EJH

SECRET

Me Evena

(copy gwen

سا

Bolgerven

212

CAT A

* FM PEKING #1881WZ

SECRET

DEDIP

1973

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELEGRAM NO 189 OF 1 FEBRUARY/INFO IMMEDIATE HONG KONG ( PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR)

FOLLOWING FOR NORRIS.

MAYOR)

YOUR TELNO 116 TO TIONG KONG AND HONG KONG TELMO 133: CHINESE

PEPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

1. MY OWN RECOMMENDATION HAS TO BE AS YOU KNOW IN FAVOUR OF COURSE

D WHICH MIGHT HOWEVER BE COMBINED WITH SOMETHING OF COURSE B. THAT IS TO SAY WHILE INFORMING THE CHINESE THAT THE TIME IS NOT

YET RIPE FOR AGREEING TO THEIR REQUEST WE COULD LOOK FORWARD TO CONFIDENTIAL DILATERAL DISCUSSIONS AT A LATER STAGE. SOMETHING OF THIS KIND WOULD I THINK BE THE BEST WAY TO GUARD

AGAINST CONTINUING AND INCREASING PRESSURE.

SIR MURRAY MACLEHOSE IN HIS TELEGRAM SEENS TO ME TO PE REALLY

ADVOCATING COURSE A. I THINK THAT THE ARGUMENT IN HIS PARAGRAPH 2 IS WRONG. IF WE NOW GIVE WHAT THE CHINESE INTERPRET AS A FIRM REFUSAL LOOKING FORWARD TO NO RELAXATION IN THE FUTURE THAT

IS IN MY OPINION THE BEST WAY TO ENSURE THAT PRESSURE WILL CONTINUE AND POSSIBLY ALSO THAT A CHANGE OF POLICY MAY BE

DECIDED ON IN CHINESE CONDUCT TOWARDS HONG KONG.

3. IF THE RECOMIENDATION TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAS TO BE

IN FAVOUR OF AN UNMODIFIED COURSE B THE ONLY CHANGE WHICH I WOULD SUGGEST IN THE DRAFT IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 3 IS TO REPLACE THE FIRST TWO SENTENCES BY THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE: * THE POSITIONS

OF OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS ON THE STATUS OF HONG KONG ARE

NECESSARILY DIFFERENT''.

ADDIS

PILES:

HEAD FED HEAD HKIOD

PS/MR. HOYLE SIR E. NORRIS

SECRET

...IATE

HER/CAT A

TONG KONG

3110322

DELAP

TOP COR

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 133 OF 31ST JANUARY, 1973. INFO IMMED NATE PEKING.

FOLLOWING PERSONAL FROM GOVERNOR FOR NORRIS.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 1161 CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG.

I AM NATURALLY GLAD AND RELIEVED THAT YOU PROPOSE TO RECOMMEND THAT WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO RESIST THIS CHINESE PROPOSAL.

2. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING SEEMS TO ME TO BE THAT IN SPEAKING TO CHI P'ENG FE! THE SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD USE TERMINOLOGY WHICH, IN THE OPINION OF THE DEPARTMENT AND OF HM AMBASSADOR AT PEKING, IS BEST CALCULATED TO ENSURE THAT THE CHINESE DO NOT DEDUCE THAT WE WILL GIVE WAY NEXT YEAR IT NOT THIS, IF THEY KEEP PRESSING. HM AMBASSADOR MIGHT REPLY THAT THEY WILL PRESS ANYWAY, BUT THERE WOULD BE A GOOD DEAL OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEIR HUNTING TO VIEW AND RUNNING A DOUBTFUL LINE.

3. I SHOULD HAVE THOUGH THAT THE BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS EFFECT YOULD BE TO STICK AS NEARLY AS POSSIBLE TO WHAT WAS SAID IN PEKING. THIS WOULD INDICATE THAT ON RECONSIDERATION OUR POSITION HAS NOT CHANGED, AND AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDING BASED ON COMPARISON OF WHAT WAS SAID ON THE TWO OCCASIONS.

4. FOR THIS REASON I SUGGEST YOU SHOULD HAVE ANOTHER LOOK AT THE › LAST 3 SENTENCES OF THE DRAFT STATEMENT. THIS GOES SIGNIFICANTLY FURTHER THAN WHAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE SAID IN PEKING ('TIME IS A HEALER''), WHICH ITSELF WAS AN ADVANCE ON WHAT WAS SAID BY MR. ROYLE, WHO OFFERED NO HOPE OF ANY EVENTUAL CHANGE OF VIEW.

SECRET

/ 5. 1 THINK

SECRET

5. I THINK THAT OUR OBJECT SHOULD BE TO USE WORDS TO WHICH HM HIBASSADOR CAN REFER AS EXCLUDING FURTHER DISCUSSION IF PRESSED BY THE MFA, AND DO NOT EXPOSE HIM OR HIS SUCCESSOR TO RENEWED REPRESENTATIONS, IN THE WAY THE LANGUAGE USED IN 1956 EXPOSED US TO REPRESENTATIONS AS SOON AS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WERE ESTABLISHED.

6. HAVING MADE THIS GENERAL POINT, I WOULD PREFER TO LEAVE IT TO YOU AND HM AMBASSADOR TO DECIDE HOW IT CAN BEST BE MET.

7. YOUR PARA. 4. NOTED.

HACLEHOSE

FILES:

HEAD FED

HEAD HKIOD

FS/MR. ROYLE

SIR E. NORRIS

SECRET

CHER CAT A

FM FCU 33168WZ

DEDIP

SECRET

1973

TO IZNEDIATE G WERNOR HUNG KONG TÆLKO 116 OF 33 JAH./HFO NIHEDIATE

PEK ING.

(PERSONAL FOR GOVERNOR)

FILLOVING FROM HORRIS,

YOUR DESPATCIL OF 11 JANUARY AND SIR JOHN ADDIS'S DESPATCH OF 18 DECE BER: CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN LONG KONG

1.. THE COURSES OPEN TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE WHEN HE MEETS CHI

PLENG

(火)

(B)

(C)

(D)

(E)

(F)

FEI ARE:

TO MAINTAIN OUR REFUSAL TO CONSIDER THE CHINESE PROPOSAL: TO SAY THAT WE HAVE GIVEN VERY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE CHINESE PROPOSAL, BUT THAT VE DO NOT THINK THE THE 1S RIPE FOR THE CHINESE TO PURSUE IT:

TO SAY THAT WE MIGHT BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE CHINESE PROPOSAL ON CONDITION THAT THE CHINESE WOULD DE PREPARED TO DESIGNATE THEIR OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE AS A CONSOL

GENERAL:

TO SAY THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO EXPLORE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHINESE PROPOSAL IN CONFIDENTIAL BILATERAL DISCUS310BSI TO ACCEPT THE CHINESE PROPOSAL IN PRINCIPLE AS IT STANDS:

AND

TO SAY THAT WE NEED FURTHER TIME TO CONSIDER THE CHINESE

PROPOSAL.

2. .R ROYLE HAS AGREED THAT LE SHOULD RECOMMEND COURSE (B) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE. HE HAS ASKED US TO PREPARE THE DRAFT OF A STATE.ENT FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO USE IN SPEALING TO CH P'ENT FEI. THIS FOLLOWS IN PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD HELEGRAPH YOUR CONENTS BY 13007 ON 31 JABLJARY AND IF SIR JOHN ADDIS WOULD TELEGRAPII HIS COMMENTS TAKING YOURS INTO ACCOUNT DY THE SAME THE ON 1 FEBRUARY.

3. FOLLOWING IS DRAFT.

PEGINS:

SECRET

I DISCUSSED

''I DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT VIR YOU AND WITH THE PRIME MINISTER WHEN I VISITED CHINA LAST AUTUM. I TOLD THE PRIME MINI **R

MUL ON 1 NOVEMBER THAT I VOULD LIKE TO THINK ABOUT THE HATTER AND THAT I WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH YOU IN DIE COURSE.

**WE DISAGREE ABOUT THE STATUS OF HONG KONG. THAT IS SOME- TÙNG WHICH IS A FACT ALD WHICH I DO NOT THINK IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO DISCUSS. BUT, AS I SEE IT, NE HAVE TWO 1->PORTANT INTERESTS IN COLD. THESE ARE TO PRESERVE THE STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF HONG KONG AND TO PRESERVE THE RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAS DEVELOPED DET.EEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, SJ FAR AS HUNG KONG IS CONCERĦED, STABILITY AND PROSPERITY DEPEND ON CONFILENCE. CONFIDENCE IS A TENDER PLANTI 11 GROWS ONLY SLOWLY, BUT CAN WILT VERY QUICKLY. IF, AS I BELIEVE, YE SHARE AN INTEREST. IN THE STABILITY AND PROSPERITY OF FONG KONG, IT FOLLO IS THAT WE ALSO SHARE AN INTEREST IN THE PRESERVATION OF CONFIDENCE THERE.

''AS FAR AS RELATIONS LEVEEN DRITAIN AND CHINA ARE CONCERNED, THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT THE SITUATION IN HONG KONG IS A FACTOR OF HVORTANCE. IF, THEREFORE, WE SHARE AN INTEREST IN PRESERVING GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, WE ALSO SHARE AN INTEREST IN DOING NOTHING NI, OR OVER, HONG KONG WHICH COULD DISTURB THE SITUATION THERE.

''I WOULD THEREFORE ASK YOU NOT TO PRESS YOUR PROPOSAL. ME DO HOT THINK THAT THE TIME IS RIPE TO CONSIDER IT. I AM NOT A PROPHET. I CARROT FORETELL THE FUTURE. BUT IT IS MY JUDGEMENT THAT IT WILL BE SOME TIME A NATTER OF YEARS BEFORE CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT WARRANT A CHANGE IN THE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH NOW EXIST FOR YOUR REPRESENTATION IN HONG HONG.**

ENDS.

4. IN RECOMMENDING COURSE (B), VE SHALL ALSO RECOMEND THAT YOU SHOULD HE AUTHORISED TO MAKE THE MOVES IN HONG KONG WHICH ARE OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPHS 20 AND 21 OF YOUR DESPATCH. WE ARE LOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR OFFER. GIVEN THE A QUNT OF TIME AVAILABLE. WE DOUBT, HOWEVER: WHETHER YOU COULD MAKE ANY GESTURE WHICH WOULD REGISTER FIRMLY WITH THE CHINESE IN PEKING DEFORE CHI P'ENG SETS JUT FOR LONDON.

DOUGLAS-HOC

FILES:

FEI

HEAD FED

HEAD HKIOD

PS/MR. ROYLE

SIR E. NORRIS

- 2

SECRET

keren ente

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Prins

Соре

Mi Wilford.

Copy is: Mi chelson,

CHINESE OFFICIAL REPRESENTATION IN HONG KONG

I understand that the Chinese Government have proposed that Chi P'ng-rei should visit London from 7-10 or 11 June; and that they have been told in return that these dates would be suitable.

2. As I recall it, the Chinese have been pressing for an answer to be given to their request for official representation in Hong Kong; and there have been hinta that the progress of civil air services talks would be linked to a favourable reply to this request. The latest of these suggestions was made in the course of an interview given to the Financial Times Far East correspondent (FCO tel. No. 365 to Governor Hong Kong).

When this topic has come up in inter-departmental discussions on UK/China AS.. we have been told that there was no such link in our minds and that a decision would be taken by the Secretary of State on the question on its own merits. I have also understood that it was the intention to inform the Chinese Foreign Minister of the Secretary of State's decision when they next met, which was expected to be here in London.

4. If, as I also expect, the answer to the Chinese request is in the negative, then could I propose that special attention should be paid to the fact that the UK/China ASA negotiations begin in Peking on 28 May and could still be in progress when the Chinese Foreig Minister arrives here. To volunteer at that point that we had decided not to agree to Chinese represen- tation in Hong Kong could possibly provoke a breakdown in itong itong -could possibly provoke a breakdowr in the negotiations for an ASA, with inevitable and unfavourable publicity in relation to the ASA talks and to the Foreign Minister's visit.

5. Unless there are reasons which lead you to believe that we must volunteer such a response, I would propose that:

(a)

a negative reply should not be given to the Chinese Foreign Minister unless he again raises the point himself;

(b) that the terms of the reply, widle being

negative should not imply finality. If some such phrase as "in present circumstances" or even for the foreseeable future" were included this might be sufficient to make it difficult for the Chinese to react in the air services sphere.

/6.

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DO 197241 220443 KOM 377 ON MGA

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6. If there should be any need to discuss this further I hope that we can do so early next week before

I leave the Office on my way to liong Kong.

11 May 1973

Jf Hellon

Fine & Transport Dept

Copies to: Mr Goodfellow, HKIODept

Hr Parry, Legal Advisers

Mr Wilford

It has now been decided that Chi P'eng-fei should visit this country from 7 June to 10 June. He will have talks with the Secretary of State on 7 June.

There is indeed some danger that the delivery by the Secretary of State to Chi P'eng-fei of an unfavourable response over Chinese representation might have an impact on the negotiations in Peking about an Air Services Agreement. But I think that this is a danger which we must accept. I do not myself believe that the delivery of an unfavourable response would put the negotiations in jeopardy; if the Chinese had intended to make the negotiation of an agreement conditional on our giving a favourable response, they would not have agreed to the negotiations beginning before our response had been made.

3. My comments on the two suggestions in paragraph 5 of Mr Mellon's minute are as follows:-

(a)

I do not think that we could reasonably recommend to the Secretary of State that he should not deliver our response (which will be "negative") unless the subject is brought up by Chi P'eng-fei. The Secretary of State told Chou En-lai at the beginning of November that he would get in touch with Chi P'eng-fei and he will not wish to seem reluctant to broach the subject. In any case, I doubt whether anything would be gained by the use of this tactic, if the Secretary of State does not bring the subject up, Chi P'eng-fei will be bound to do so himself;

(b) The terms of our response do not imply finality

(as Mr Mellon will see from the copy of the text which I am sending him with his copy of this minute) Admittedly, the door is left only very slightly

CONFIDENTIAL ·

/ajar.

Kelerence...

ajar. But I very much doubt whether we could persuade Sir Murray Maclehose to let us open it wider. Besides, the Secretary of State himself has now approved the text.

R M Evans

16 May 1973

Far Eastern Department

Mr Mellon

CONFIDENTIAL

(17293) D4297445 400m 1771 O.WALA, Op.163

CONFIDENTIAL

Not the Used.

FORM OF WORDS TO BE USED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN TAIKING TO THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER

"The positions of our two Governments on the status of Hong Kong are necessarily different. But, as I see it, we have two important interests in common. These are to preserve the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong and to preserve the relationship which has developed between our two countries, So far as Hong Kong is concerned, stability and prosperity depend on confidence. Confidence is a tender plant; it grows only slowly, but can wilt very quickly. If, as I believe, we share an interest in the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong, it follows that we also share an interest in the preservation of confidence there.

As far as the relations between Britain and China are concerned, there can be no doubt that the situation in Hong Kong is a factor of importance. If, therefore, we share an interest cy in preserving good relations between our two countries, we also share an interest in doing nothing in, or over, Hong Kong which could[disturb the situation there.

I have given most careful consideration to your proposal since I spoke to you and the Prime Minister last autum. In the light of this consideration I have come to the conclusion that the time is not ripe for a change in the pattern of your representation in Hong Kong. I would therefore ask you not to press your proposal. It is my judgement that it will be some time before circumstances might change in such a way as to warrant an alteration in the arrangemente which now exist."

نا

Approved by The Seciciary of Sicie.

R.K. 376.

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Fir