but
File No.
PART
8C
425
FOREIGN OFFICE
SECRET
CLOSET
DEPT. FAR EASTERN
TITLE: HONG
HONG KONG FOLITICAL AFFAIRS
AFFAIRS INTERNAL GENERAL SITUATION & Poucy.
REFER TO
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REGISTRY Room No. 139.
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DO NOT RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY
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OPENED
CLOSED
24.2.671185.67 FDI/I
that of the highest graded
HIT ACTINIJŲ
SECRET
CLOSED,
HK.
Cypher
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 15th May, 1967.
R. 15th
10002
FCEIVED IN CHIVES No.81 - 1 JUN 1967
←
FLASH SECRET
No. 609.
LAST PAI
ра
Addressed to Commonwealth Office
Repeated
#
Peking No.223
POLAD Singapore No.91
FD i/
(Please pass FLASH to both).
My telegram No. 607.
Hong Kong.
The position on the ground at 1400 hours today 15th May romained quiet. There are no indications of unusual occurrences in the frontier area.
2.
We cannot
But it is clear that as a result of the Chinese M.F.A. 'a statement we are now very near indeed to facing the choices mentioned in paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 600. The demands leave little leeway for negotiation. offer apologies or compensation or even provide effective * guarantees against the occurrence of similar incidents without accepting a situation in which the left-wing here are above the law. Jone of those arrested have already been sentenced and though acts of clemency might be Justifiable in certain cases, they certainly would not be in
Again while the disposal of the 20 original offenders is still within the jurisdiction of the courts and some might be bound over, this cannot of course be guaranteed.
all.
3.
It may well be worth attempting during the next 48 hours (if the court hearings are adjourned) to discover whether behind the demands there is really any scope for negotiation. We are pursuing our efforts in this direction, but it seems unlikely that any thing usefull will result.
4.
If the left-wing stick firmly by the four demanda, we must face the fact that any further attempt to seek a compromise would in the middle-term at any rate mean an abdication of our position here. Hong Kong would almost at once cease to be attractive to investment; the problem of maintaining any control or authority over left-wing activities would intensify; and H.M.G. would not only be discredited but saddled with an increasing economic burden. In my view this position would only be tolerable if our aim was to buy tine in order to negotiate an orderly withdrawal (even if the Chinese allowed us to achieve that).
15.
SECRET
·
5.
SECRET
The alternative policy, of taking a firm but reasonable line in resistance to the demands, of course carries major risks 1.0. of renewed violence, probably on an increased scale, which in the long run we might find ourselves unable to control and finally of physical intervention by the C.P.G. on the other hand, there is just a chance that if we took a very firm line, offering no provocation but explaining our policy clearly to the Č.P.G. there might be some prospect of inducing a change of Chinese attitude. It remains hard to believe that at the present time the C.P.G. could really welcome the prospect of a military clash in Hong Kong or indeed of having to take Hong Kong over, thus losing its economic and other advantages.
6.
A possible line of action might now be to explain our position clearly and in forthright terms to the C.P.G., preferably in London. Our reply night start by stating our refusal to accept the Chinese allegations of "atrocities" (there is plenty of evidence that the police acted with great restraint throughout) and saying that the action that was taken in no way aimed either at the workers or the left-wing whose activities in Hong Kong have always been permitted provided that they remained within the law, The intention of the Hong Kong Government is, and remains, solely to uphold the law, which is published and accessible to all and equally applicable to all members of the community. The C.P.G. must realise that unless the law is upheld and public order maintained the interests of all the population of Hong Kong will suffer. H.M.G. are therefore unable to understand the arguments in the statements of the M.F.A.
7.
A reply in these reasonable, though firm, terms would for the moment preclude drastic action against the left-wing of the sort suggested in paragraph 4 of my telegram No.600, since this would be going further than the maintenance of the existing law. But at the moment it seems that a seizure by us of the initiative along those lines would in the immediate future destroy any slim chances there may be of reaching a reasonable solution; and though preparatione for such action are being made they should not in my view be put into operation except as a last resort in the event of a further breach of the law by the left.
8.
It now seems essential that I should know as soon as possible whether Ministers would wish me to seek a compromise along the lines of the four demands; or whether they would favour a firmer line as in paragraph 6. In any case, there 18 no longer any possibility of treating this as a labour dispute, and hence a visit by Foggon would not in my view serve a useful purpose. On the other hand, 80 soon as Ministers have reached a decision on the point in paragraph 7 above, it would be most helpful if a senior official could come out here immediately to give me the fullest possible picture of what is in their minde.
(Passed as requested)
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D.1.0., J.I,R. Mr. Denson Mr. de la Mare Kr. Wilson Kr. Foggon
SECRET
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
1.
L
HK.
49
DECEIVED
* No.51
-1
Cypher
D. 13th May 1967 R. 13th
1230Z
IMMEDIATE
SECRET
No.600
Addressed to Commonwealth Office
Repeated
Peking No.215
POLAD Singapore No.82
(S. of S. please pass IMMEDIATE
to both)
FOY/1
pajek dui
My telegram No.599.
Kowloon Disturbances.
Left-wing action outside the industries immediately concerned in the disputes has so far been confined to mustering moral and financial support for the arrested workers and the four demands' (my telegram No.557) throughout Left- wing organisations. But secret sources indicate that in many Left-wing circles the line is being taken that the dispute has escalated as a result of deliberate Government action; and that the Left must therefore prepare for a further escalation. Plans are being made to organise the physical defence of Left- wing properties and also of demonstrations in which children (as in Macao) would play a prominent part.
2. We seem at present to be in a stage of psychological warfare in which the main weapon of the Left has been their sustained press campaign aimed (so far quite meuccessfully). at undermining the morale of the policë, as well as at discredit- ing Government and destroying public confidence in its will and capacity to resist. The coat-trailing attacks on myself in the Communist press of 12 May (my telegram No.583) may well have been aimed at placing us in the dilemma of either attacking
'press freedom' or appearing to be meekly tolerating sedition.
3. Probably the Communists have not yet taken the decision to launch an all-out Macau-style attack. There are obviously some elements on the Left who are concerned about the prospect of a head-on confrontation. Our discussions with Left-wing contacta continue, but they have not so far yielded any pointers towards an acceptable settlement. As things stand, we seem likely to be in for a prolonged period of gradually increasing pressure.
A prolonged crisis, however, would be the worst of all possible situations for Hong Kong. Morale here would tend to deteriorate rapidly, capital would depart, and the effects on the economy could be irreparable. If we are to avoid this situation, we may before long have to choose between: -
(a) seeking a solution which would involve the
Hong Kong Government in substantial loss of face and authority, or
SECRET
/(b)
·
+
SECRET
(0)
ourselves taking the initiative against the Left-wing e.g. by taking legal action against the press, arresting key Left-wing leaders and perhaps deporting them to China.
But
5. At an Executive Council meeting today there was a substantial body of opinion (especially among Chinese members) in favour of firm though careful action against the Left. the choice evidently needs deep thought. Solution (a) would in effect put us in pawn to the Chinese and turn Hong Kong into a second Macau; and I would not think it tolerable waless it were linked with a second decision subsequently to negotiate our withdrawal as soon as possible. Solution (b) would clearly involve the risk of an all-out confrontation with the G.P.G.
6. For the time being I shall of course concentrate on trying to hold the present situation in Kowloon while seeking to reach some understanding with the Left that would eliminate the present disorder. But it would be a great help to me if I could have some indication of your preliminary thinking on the issues in paragraph 5 above. It may well be that within the next few days I shall have to advise that a Minister or senior official should fly out here to discuss the problem in detail; or alternatively that I should return home for the same purpose.
(Passed as requested)
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Mr. Denson
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Poggon
SECRET
+
·
T
CONFIDENTIAL
23 May, 1967
Enter
dpa.
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
Sir Alec Douglas-Home cal on the Foreign secretary yesterday primarily to discuss the situation in the Middle East. At the end of the call the conversation turned to Hong Kong and I enclose a copy of the record of that p..rt of the disty:sion.
DM. DAY
- 1 JUN 1967
FD
0. 0. For..ter, Esq., M.V.O., Private secretry,
Commonwealth office.
CONFIDE PIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
FA CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN AND STR ALEG DOUGLAS HOME AT THE DIFICE ON 22 BAY, 1967
Present:
The Rt. Hon. George
Brown, M.P.
The Rt. Hon. Sir Alec
Douglas-Home, K.T., M.P.
H1s
Mr. Brown explained the situation in Hong Kong where be thought the Governor had had matters under control. The Chinese were, however, nsking us to quit Shanghai within 48 hours. instinct was to react against this but the Department was now considering the matter. Sir Alec Douglas-Hone asked whether Mr. Brown thought that the Communists in Hong Kong should be threatened with deport:tion to the mainl. nd. There was some discussion on this point and it was gezerally agreed th t this presented grave difficulties.
CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
197
RF FIVED IN
FARCH 45 No.51
-
-1 Jul, 1967
Cypher
D. 31 May 1967
FD 1/1
R. 31
0800Z
IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL
ра
No.738
pa 12016
Фоль
Addressed to Commonwealth office
Repeated IMMEDIATE to POLAD Singapore No.145
H
ROUTINE
14
Peking No.289 "Washington No.155
(Commonwealth Office please pass to all)
My telegram No.731.
Sitrep as at 31/0900.
On 30 May a two-hour token stoppage by non-essential workers in two waterworks depots passed without incident
or interruption of supplies. There were further stoppages in two textile factories in Tsuen Wan, both of which had stoppages on 29 Kay. In one case R.W. workers were responsible. There was an unsuccessful attempt to delay early morning tram services.
2. There are many rumours that Communist sympathisers are being advised to stock up with two months supplies of food. Communist concerns particularly the Bank of China are known to be building up considerable reserves of rice.
3. Efforts to spread the policy of stoppages to all major public concerns including armed forces depots and hospitals are reported.
4. Action is now being taken to prevent the display of posters on Government buildings and vehicles etc.
(Passed as requested)
(Passed to D.8.A.0. for Messrs. de la Kare, Bolland
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P.3. to Mr. Rodgers Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Bolland
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CONFIDENTIAL
Export Credits Guarantee Department Ministry of Defence (Rm.7365)
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11 (Rm.51 31 )
-
-
--
Mr. C.P. Rawlings
Mr. Henn
Major Koe M.0.2
Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
Australia House (Senior External Affairs
Representative)
Canada House (Counsellor)
Hr. T. Critchley Mr. K. MacLellan
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
RIME
196
OF FIVED ARCHIVES No.*
30 MAY 1967
Cypher
D. 30 May, 1967.
R.
30
0922Z.
PRIORITY SECRET
No. 734.
FD!/!
ре
Addressed to Commonwealth office.
Repeated
Ħ
廿
"Peking No. 287.
"P.A. Singapore No. 144.
"Washington No. 154. (Please pass
PRIORITY to Washington only).
Your telegram No. 1038.
Disturbances.
Paragraph 8. A statement of this kind would be
most helpful here at this time, since some public apprehension still exists as to the real extent of H.M.G.'a support for Hong Kong. To assist with publicity for the statement locally, it would also be most helpful to know when it is likely to be made and its content.
(Passed as requested)
(Advance copies to Messrs. de la Mare, Bolland
and Wilson and Private office (Commonwealth Secretary)).
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-
P.S. to Mr. Rodgers
Mr. de la Kare
-
Mr. Bolland
Mr. Wilson
-
Mr. Denson
Treasury
Export Credits Guarantee
Department
Ministry of Defence (Rm. 7365)
H
H
Board of Trade
#
Rm. 7163)
Rm. 5131)
I
Kr. Foggon
Mr. D. Hawkins
Mr. C.P. Rawlings
Mr. Henn
hajor Koe
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Er. J.A.B. Darlington
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (31r D. Trench)
2117.
95
#FCEIVED IN
CHIVES No.3
30 MAY 1967
FD1/!
Cypher
D. 30 May 1967
03202
R. 30
INVEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL No. 731
علام
Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.) Repeated PRIORITY to: Peking No.284
POLAD Singapore No.141 Washington No.153
(Commonwealth office please pass to all)
Sitrep as at 29 2000 local time.
My telegram No.721.
After a quiet and uneventful weekend there were
stoppages in one public transport and three industrial concerns today. The Hong Kong Yaumati Ferry Company's operations were mainly brought to a halt from 0600 to 0900. In Teuen Wan, three textile factories had token stoppages, in one case repeated in each succeeding shift. There is a strong right wing element in Tauen Wan and representations were made to the police about intimidation. Tomorrow we expect a limited stoppage on two bus routes in Kowloon. We are considering the taking of a stronger line over the pay of a Government employee who joins in stoppages to stiffen the resistance to intimidation of right wing and neutral workers.
The pro-Communist press has today attacked gunboat diplomacy as exemplified by the arrival of M.M.8. "BULWARK". A campaign is also in progress against the police for alloged brutal treatment after the arrest of those in custody as a result of riota etc. This is gaining some ground amongst the local population, and we are considering ways of refutation. The police reverted to a lower state of readiness atand by at 1200 hours on 29 Hay.
-
force
Stop press (30 May). A token strike from 0800 1000 at the waterworks is in progress. Supplies are not affected.
(Paased as requested)
-
(Passed to D.S.A.0. for Hessrs. Bolland, Wilson
and de la Mare and Private Office (Commonwealth
Secretary))
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D.I.O.. J.I.R. P.8, to Mr. Rodgers - Hr. de la Mare
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Mr. Dena on
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Mr. D. Hawkins
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-
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- Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
Australia House (Benior External
Affaire Representative)
Canada House (Counsellor)
Mr. T. Critchley Mr. K.W. MacLellan
CONFIDENTIAL
Cypher
SECRET No.726
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFIC
(The Secretary of State)
FROM MONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 29 May 1967 R. 29
1
· IN
Ricz
5.31
30 MAY 1967
FD 1/1
07552
ра
3.1
194
Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.)
Repeated to:
Peking No.281
POLAD Singapore No.137 Washington No.149
(5. of S. please pass to all)
Your telegram No.1038.
Disturbances.
I am very grateful for your response to my proposals.
2. In present lull, extreme measures are not of course immediately necessary; but we must be careful not to be so over-tolerant as to allow a fresh and different assault to be hatched up in total impunity, nor to lose the initiative entirely. Posters, leaflets and the press are still operating flagrantly outside the law, and the continued and unmolested presence here of the worst of the leaders and agitators remains most dangerous. While we certainly must not be unduly provocative at the present time, it would be equally dangerous for several reasons to show excessive complacency, weakness or apparent vacillation.
3. I am therefore considering what counteraction within the above limits might be taken during this present phase. It could best, I believe, take the general form of a gradual but fairly *(?omission) reinsistence on adherence to the law (either by normal police action or through the courts) in carefully selected cases. In this, it would not, of course, be practicable to consult you on every occasion; but I would naturally consult before doing anything particularly likely to stir up trouble.
4. Your paragraph 3. Possibility of deportees being refused entry at the border has of course been very much in my mind throughout. But, if this should occur, detention or police supervision procedures would in suitable cases, if things got that far be available. For militant emall fry police supervision orders might be a very useful weapon.
-
5. Your paragraph 9. It is difficult to make fire plans without knowning what form a new and serious confronta- tion would take. We are, however, actively planning, with the public utility companies where they are concerned, what we would do to counter widespread and prolonged stoppages in the essential services. This seems the most probable risk at present, apart from a plain recurrence of violence.
SECRET
/6.
SECRET
6. Your paragraph 10. Hy intention to take leave was, of course, made public several weeks ago, well before the present crisis, At the moment, I am simply taking the line, in response to any enquiry that I cannot tell at present whether I shall be able to go after all or not; but I have to make certain public arrangements on the assumption that conditions will permit me to go even if these arrangements have to be cancelled at the last moment.
*(Correction being obtained)
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π
H
H
-
Mr. Bolland
Ħ
Mr. Wilson
忡
+
Mr. Denson
#
1:
Mr. Foggon
Mr. D. Hawkins
Treasury
Export Credits Guarantee Department - Hr. C.P. Rawlings Ministry of Defence
1+
1t
Board of Trade
(Room 7365) Kr. Henn
Room 7163
(Room 5131)
Major Koe
M.0.2
Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
7 SIR.)
SECRET
1
Котон Реск
R
En Clair
6117
93
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 27 May 1967 R. 27
15052
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
30 MAY 1967
FOL/L
No.721
Addressed to Commonwealth Office Repeated to:
Peking
POLAD Singapore
Washington No.148
ро
3./
(S. of S. please pass to Washington)
My telegram No.715.
Sitrep as at 27/1800 hours.
It has been a quiet day. Rumours of impending stoppages in the transport and ferry companies and public utilities have continued to circulate but nothing has happened. Unless there are major developments there will be no Sitrep on 28 May.
(Passed to D.S.A.0. for repetition to Washington and for
advance copies Resident Clerk and Foreign Office
P.E. Dept. and Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Affairs)
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D.I.O., J.I.R.
P.S. tó Mr. Rodgers
Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Bolland
Mr. Wilson Mr. Denaon Kr. Foggon Mr. D. Hawkins
Export Credite Guarantee Department Ministry of Defence (Room 7365)
++
1+
Board of Trade
Australia House
Room 7163) (Room 5131)
-
-
Mr. C.P. Rawlings
Mr. Henn
Major Koe
1.0.2
Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
(Senior External Affairs Representative)
Canada House (Counsellor)
-
Mr. K.W. MacLellan
TTIR :)
I hewing Peak
Mr.T.K.Critchley
TE D
EJ (1626)
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.
+
FO!/!
Minutes.
92
SEE ANNEX
Cypher
INKEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 26 May 1967
R. 26
CONFIDENTIAL
No.715
中醫
1 31 52
Addressed to S. of S.
Repeated
EI
" Peking No.275
11
" POLAD Singapore No.134
Washington No.147
RECEIVEC A-CHIVES V.
FOLL
(S. of S. please pass PRIORITY to all)
My telegram No.705.
Sitrep as at 26/1800.
+
91
Two Government Departments had limited stoppages. 700 postmen are on strike from 260800 to 270600, thus preventing any delivery or collection service except airmail. Counter service remains normal but sorting has been partially affected. Staff of the Marine Department slip-way staged a 3-hour strike from 0800 this morning. This affected some fifty launches and slightly disrupted transport for sanitation and port worka. Port services to visiting ships were not affected.
2. I have had a general warning issued to the public service pointing out that those who participate in stoppages leave themselves open to disciplinary action including dismissal. 3. The only other strike action was the sit-down of some 3.000 workers of the Taikoo Dockyard and Engineering Co. in Hong Kong from 1300 to 1600. This was peaceful and the workers are carrying out an equivalent amount of overtime this evening. Private companies are being advised to take a firmer line on strikers.
4.
5.
Transport services have been fully normal today.
There have been 3 rumours of strike action at the Electric Co. which serves Kowloon, the Telephone Co. and the Hong Kong Aircraft Engineering Co., but there have en no stoppages.
6. In the early afternoon leaflets were thrown from roof-tops and high windows in several parts of both Hong Kong and Kowloon, These carry invective in Chinese against British imperialism and alleged Police brutality. Police are investigating. Two loudspeakers have been intermittently broadcasting but subject matter has not warranted Police action.
7. 18 court cases o' unlawful assembly were heard today without incident. The case "volving a China motor bus employee who was the pretext for an earlier strike was concluded but sentence deferred until tomorrow.
(Passed as requested, also to Resident Clerk, D.S.A.0.
Far East Dept. Foreign Office and Private One re,
Commonwealth Office)
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tr
*E
1+
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1
+
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Denson
Mr. Foggon
Mr. D. Hawking
Export Credits Guarantee Department Ministry of Defence (Room 7365)
H
H
Board of Trade
[E
Australia House
Room 7163) Room 51 31
-
-
Mr. C.P. Rawlings
Mr. Hern
Major Koe
M.0.2
Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
←
(Senior External Affairs Representative) Mr. T.K. Critchley Canada House (Counsellor)
-
Mr. K.W. MacLellan
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
Cyeder
R. 26
D. 26 May, 1967.
1030Z
FLASH BACRET
Used
:17
RECEIVED ARCHIVES No.31
30 MAY 1967
FOUL
No.714
Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.) Repeated
Peking No. 274
81
omponwealth Office please pase IMMEDIATE)
Reference paragraph 3 of Galsworthy's telegram from Hong Kong No.698. The meeting between Ho Yin and Cater did not, (repeat not), take place.
2.
Ho Yin did, however, spend some time with members of local Communist hierarchy discussing the Hong Kong situation.
3.
Later he held joint and separate meetings with R.C. Lee and Q.W. Lee (a senior member of the Hang Seng Bank in whose office these meetings were held, and to whom reference was made as "another Chinese friendly to ua" in telegram No. 698). After these meetings Gater saw the two Mr. Lee's separately, and the following covers the main points of substance.
4.
Ho reportedly said that the local Communists were firm that their "four just demands should be met: that the Communista were aware that "face" had to be given on both sides and accepted that Hong Kong was quite different from Macao and allegedly had no intention of forcing a Macao situation in Hong Kong.
5.
R.C. Lee gained the impression from his discussion with Ho that the local hierarchy wanted first to obtain instructions from Canton: that meanwhile the Communists would not wish to escalate the local situation seriously, but to continue with token strikes.
6.
Q.W. Lee was a little more forthcoming over ..: discussions with Ho. In addition to the commenta at
paragraph 4 above, he reported commenta of Ho to the effect that "time is on our (1.6. the Communist) side" and that Q.W. Lee ahould contact Ho if it were thought that Ho's presence might be of value and particularly "if the Hong Kong Government wishes to modify the demande " Q.W. Lee's assessment of his discussions with Ho are of some intereat:
(1)
On the refusal to let Ho see Cater, he thinks that one, or a combination of the following would fit the case:
SECRET
/(a)
SECRET
7.
8.
(a) The Communist hierarchy, after the events
of the past few days, genuinely do not know what to do:
(b) They have doubts as to the "suitability" of using Họ Yin in the present situation as he is a Macac man and not really well- known in Hong Kong:
(c)
(0)
They are still awaiting instructions from China and, therefore, do not wish to take precipitate action:
A form of blackmail, in that by keeping us waiting they may force us to flap and offer terms which otherwise in the present conditions we should not be prepared to consider.
(11) On "time is on our side", Mr. Q.W. Lee thought
(a) This could be a straight comment on the fact
that, given more time, the Communists would be able to increase their intimidation of the local population and allow the hierarchy time to reorganise their forces for a more efficient and successful operation or series of operations: but
as folloWB:
(b) Knowing Mr. Ho as a wily, intelligent person
who is expert at communist type negotiations, he thought this could well be a "planted" remark for onward transmission mainly to harry us and force us into precipitate action in regard to the four demands etc: that given time with no communist successes locally, the communist forces themselves would be downhearted and the local population increasingly confident provided they were what q.W. Lee termed "nursed along intelligently".
Our assessment of the above is as follows:
(a) Re paragraph 4: there is reliable evidence
that, in fact, the Communists are seeking to achieve a Macao type settlement:
(b) Re paragraph 5: while local Communists
appear to be awaiting instructions as to next major moves, token strikes apart, there is every possibility of a further confrontation with security forces on the ground:
(c) Re paragraph 6: bearing in mind that this
information has been obtained third hand one can but comment upon Q.W. Lee's impressions on the face of it, they appear to be reasonable appreciation of the present circumstances,
Our own assessment of the present situation is
SECRET
/(a)
+
(1)
SECRET
(a) Intelligence derived from reliable and
delicate sources indicates that certain members of the Communist hierarchy consider that they have met with a set-back in their confrontation with Government, not only in respect of their demonstrations but also in the propaganda field, and, most important of all, in their failure to obtain the public support they seem to have expected (either by wooing or intimidation):
(b) It is clear that the Communists anticipate and
are planning for a "long struggle":
(c) Their present tactics are:-
To continue consolidating their position, within their own organisations, in an effort to maintain morale of their supporters:
(11)
To demonstrate to the general public their power by organising token stoppages in the public utilities:
(111)
To intimidate individuals and organisations that are actively supporting Government:
(iv)
To press on with their anti-Government propaganda through the media of newspapers, posters and Kwangtung Radio.
(a) At the time of writing there are no firm
indications as to the next positive action planned by the Communists. It does appear that, having met with greater opposition than expected from Government and the public as a whole, they are having a complete re-think. They may well be waiting for further instructions or what they consider to be a major escalation by Government before they take any fresh steps.
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(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 26 May, 1967.
R. 26
CONFIDENTIAL
No. 709
6117
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
30 MAY 1967
(89)
1050Z
160
Industrial Disputes.
The present position is as follows.
Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works.
ра
-3h
My telegram No. 644.
2.
Injection-moulding department of factory on the island reopened as planned on 20 May without incident. 223 workers, including three of the 92 workers first diamissed, registered for work. None rejected. 220 workers now actually at work on various shifts.
3.
Discussions took place in Labour Department on 19 and 23 May between representatives of management and of group of 240 workers, including 100 petitioners referred to in paragraph 3 of my telegram under reference. Agreement was reached regarding conditions for reopening injection-moulding department of factory at San Po Kong. Registration began on 24 May. Department reopened at 7.30 a.m. today.
84 workers actually employed on day shift. No incidents were reported. 197 workers were registered. None rejected. None of 92 workers first dismissed registered.
4.
Re-employed workers given compensation for period from 1 May to date prior to reopening of factories at rates of 12 dollars a day for island and 10 dollars for San Po Kong. Conditions of employment are those introduced by management on 13 April and which gave rise to original dispute.
5.
Two out of 15 workers referred to in paragraph 4 of my telegram under reference have collected wages plus one month's wages as severance pay in accordance with terms of settlement.
Green Island Cement Company Limited.
6.
Peaceful picketing
No significant developments, continues. Number of workers who have collected severance pay and gratuities has risen from 80 to 100. Local Kai Fong (Street Association) is attempting to mediate.
General.
+
7.
Apart from series of kon strikes in support of Communists with no industrial content, no other major disputes have been reported.
(Passed to D.S.A.0. for F.E. Dept. and Private Office (Commonwealth offi.
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INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
En clair
D. 25 May, R. 25
1967.
0958Z
R117
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
30 MAY 1967
F011
88
PRIORITY No. 702.
Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.)
Repeated
H
FI
Peking No.270
Washington No.143
(S. of 3. please pass Washington)
Hong Kong Disturbances.
Tone of pro-communist press for 25 May
is rather less militant and more defensive. Much of front page of both main papers is devoted to Peking news not connected with Hong Kong. "Wen Wei Po" editorial attacks Government for using new "fascist" regulations for suppression of struggle and emphasises unity of workers in carrying out struggle to the end. A good deal of space is devoted to debunking news items aimed at showing support of local population for Government,
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TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
Sent 25 May, 1967. 1230Z
にいつ
RECEIVER
ARCHIVES No.5 +
30 MAY 1967
FOI/I
ра
FLASH SECRET No. 1038.
-3-h
89
Addressed to Governor Hong Kong.
Repeated PRIORITY for information to Peking.
#
Ħ
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H
Ħ
H
H
86
" POLAD Singapore. "Washington.
Your telegrams 677 and 691.
From Commonwealth Secretary.
Disturbances,
I have now consulted my colleagues and we agree with you that the key to the situation is the maintenance of public confidence and police morale. I would like to congratulate you and your staff and particularly the police force on your success in holding and keeping on top of the situation. On this I am sending you a separate message which you can make public.
2.
We agree our policy must be to continue to deal firmly and fairly with any disorders which the Communista may try to instigate.
3. We also agree that action should be taken about selected Communist leaders so as to disrupt their campaign but have some doubts about your being able physically to deport them. We are advised that they might well not be accepted at the border, and that therefore we might lose face. But we must rely upon your judgment to weigh up the various factors here. say this weapon should not be used lightly and I assume that you would begin with only two or three key leaders at a time. You have authority to go ahead if the situation deteriorates but please keep me informed of any action you take,
As you
4. We also agree that if the Communist presa continueB to carry out or step up the campaign of sedition and intimidation you should use your emergency regulations to close down the printing presses. I would, however, wish to be consulted before any action is actually taken.
5. With reference to paragraph 1 of your telegram 691, it is appreciated that any decisions on action against the N.C.N.A. must fully take into account the position in Hong Kong.
SECRET
16.
SECRET
6. I agree with views expressed in paragraphs 2 and 3. We had already thought of taking up with the Americane a reduction of their use of Hong Kong on the lines you suggest and this will be pursued.
7. It was not in any case intended to make any announcement about the decision to withdraw a major unit (your paragraph 7) till later in the year and, prior to your present troubles, the position was to have been reviewed in June in the light of the situation in China.
The return of Parliament next week will give me an opportunity to make a statement on the situation in Hong Kong and to report H.M.G.'s support for the Hong Kong Government's measures to maintain law and order and of our determination to stay in Hong Kong.
9. We naturally hope that a show of firmness in maintaining law and order will not lead to an all-out confrontation with the C.P,0. We ought, however, to be prepared for this possibility and I am sure that you have already planned how you would meet it. I expect Galsworthy can tell me about your contingency planning on his return.
10. Your telegram No. 698 has just been received. Please do not at present say anything publicly about your intention to go on leave as this may cause loss of confidence just when the situation seems to be improving, paragraph 4 of your telegram refers.
(Passed to D.S.A.0. for repetition to Peking,
POLAD Singapore and Washington)
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INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
117 86
30 MAY 1967
FO
·
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D. 24 May 1967 R. 24
#t
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ра
No.691
Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D. Repeated FRIORITY to: Peking No.263
POLAD Singapore No.128 Washington No.139
(S. of S. please paus
(all)
سلام
82
action.
I.
My telegram No.680 (not repeated).
Following from Galsworthy.
Following is summary of our views on possible future
International Aspecte
1. Any deterioration in our relations with Peking runs the risk of adversely affecting the situation over Hong Kong. We therefore again strongly advise no action be taken against N.C.N.A. in London (Hong Kong telegram No.682).
2. Providing we hold on successfully in Hong Kong and the Communist campaign slackens, it may well eventually become necessary to offer Peking some way out which they at least can clain sayes their face as a means of terminating the whole incident. This, however, we should only do from a position of strength. The enormous difficulty is to find anything suitable to offer as a face-saving gesture and then to find a means of "offering" it, without giving Peking the idea that we are weakening. This would lead to further demands, which we would find it increasingly difficult to resist as did the Portuguese in Kacao.
3. The Governor is considering whether there is anything local which could be used in this way. Another possible course la as follows. It would in any case be helpful if we could work out with the Americans a reduction of their use of Hong Kong for the rest and recreation of their armed forces. As regards naval visits, could these for example be restricted as a general rule to small units, with only occasional and well-spaced visits by major unite? If we could establish such a position, while there could clearly be no question whatsoever of our "negotiating" over this with Peking, it might nonetheless be possible for them to claim it as a success. We would not of course admit this. We reclise the difficulties, but feel it is worth considering.
II.
Internal Aspects
4. The maintenance of law and order here, which is obviously the first essential, seems to us to require that the Governor should be authorised to deport (and failing that detain) selected Communist leaders, if the situation deteriorates to the point of demanding it (see his telegram No.677).
SECLFT
15.
SECRET
5. Although the Governor is reluctant to take measures against the Press (see paragraph 4 of his telegram No.677), Emergency Regulations have been approved by Executive Council, but not yet made, providing powers for dealing with inflammatory posters in public places and for the temporary closing down if necessary of printing pres808. We agree t if a stage is reached at which action against the Communis press has to be considered, this would be a much swifter and more effective method of action than prosecuting them through the Courts. If there were a substantial deterioration in the present situation, we might well have to contemplate action on these lines.
6. The Governor has already been authorised to close selected places if necessary, by means of closed area orders as proposed in his telegram No.662 paragraph 3.
This power has not yet been used in view of the present lull.
7. The presence of U.K. military forces in Hong Kong is one of the basic factors in maintaining public morale, and very directly also the morale of the Police. It would have a most adverse effect here if it became known that we intended to withdraw a najor unit. We feel therefore that this decision should be shelved for the time being.
8. Apart from the suggestion in paragraph 7, probably the most helpful contribution we can make from London at the present moment is to repeat H.M.G.'s support for the Hong Kong Government in their measures to maintain law and order; and to do this in a way which will convince people here that we intend to stay in Hong Kong.
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85
111783
RECEIVED ARCHIVES Nu.SI
30 MAY 1967
FOY/I
Cypher
D. 24 May 1967
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1 335Z
ILLEDIATE SECRET No.693
TI
Addressed to Commonwealth office Repeated
Peking No.264
11
L
POLAD Singapore No.129 Washington No.140
за
(5. of 3. please pesa PRIORITY to all)
My telegram No.678.
79
ŝitrep as at 24 2000 hours.
The
The day has again been one of uneasy calm. emphasis has been on industrial action, mainly in the transport services, with intimidation playing a substantial part. The threat of effective counter Beasures has quietened all pro- Communist broadcasting over loud-speakers except from the Bank of China which was again effectively jamned.
2.
There has been a mainly effective attempt to paralyse public transport on Hong Kong Island. The Tramvay Company has continued to operate at 50% efficiency. Only a very few buses of the Dhina Kotor Bus Company were in operation. In both cases there were reports of successful intimidation. The pro-Communist faction in the Kowloon kotor Bus Company succeeded in keeping all buses off the road until 0900; thereafter services were normal. We do not know what the situation will be tomorrow.
3.
Other developments on the labour front have been a two-hour token strike by workers in the Hong Kong and Champao Dock Co. Ltd. and continued Communist intransigence in the Government workshops where repairs on Police vehicles have virtually ceased. Right-wing and neutral workers have taken leave. Action to deal with this is under consideration.
4.
There are rumours that the Communiata are putting pressure on their supporters, sympathisers and those over whom they have some form of economic control such as small shopkeepers selling mainland goods, to raise money and support for a major effort in the near future. He can foresee continued harassment through industrial action such as we have encountered this week, always with the possibility of a larger scale series of atrikes. Nevertheless we still do not believe that the Communists will rik: alienating the whole population by a general strike or one in any of the major services such as electricity, telephones of water.
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FLASH SECRET
No.690
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D: 24 May 1967
D. R, 24
E
1230Z
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
30 MAY 1967
FD1/1
adopted.
Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.) Repeated
it
14
Peking No.262
POLAD Singapore No.127 Washington No.1 38
(S. of S. please pass PRIORITY to all)
My telegram No.680 (not repeated).
Following (for Garner) from Galsworthy.
82
Following is a summary of the measures already
Maintenance of Public Confidence
2. Support of the Government's actions has been remarkably strong and widespread. Its open expression has been officially encouraged by all possible means and has been widely publicised through the press, radio and television. H.M.G.'s clear support has been of very great assistance in maintaining the momentum of this confidence. As this has been reiterated and as each new step taken here to maintain order is announced there has been a further surge in confidence. This has proved a disconcerting weapon for the Communists and we cannot afford to let it be blunted.
3. The Information Services Department has issued large quantities of useful counter-propaganda material against the excesses in the Communist press and this has been made full use of by the radio and the friendly press. This is bling on the Communist press which is devoting increasing space in attempts to defeat it.
The Department has also had marked success in promptly countering all malicious rumours (e.g. of rice or water shortages, or bank runs) put about by the Communists,
5. The Labour Department's achievement in obtaining a settlement of the dispute in the two artificial flower factories (one of which has already reopened) has had a good effect on confidence. It will continue to conciliate wherever possible but stoppages of work in present circumstances tend to be political not industrial and in at least one case a conciliation officer was driven out by threats of physical violence.
6. The arrival shortly of H.H.S. BULWARK is likely to have a very good effect on confidence generally. Primarily, however, confidence depends on the ability of the police to maintain order.
/Maintenance
SECRET
SECRET
Maintenance of Public Order
7. The Police Force went over to its emergency organisation after the second violent incident at the artificial flower factory at San Po Kong on 11 May. The auxiliary police (some 2,400 volunteers) were called out on the same day. The turnout was 99.5%. The Government Emergency
Control Centre also opened on 11 May.
8. Very great restraint has been exercised throughout. Processions, assemblies in public places and the sticking of posters on public buildings, although unauthorised and therefore unlawful, were tolerated so long as demonstrators remained reasonable despite extreme provocation of the Police by way of shouted abuse, assault and incitement to disaffection. It has, however, been necessary because of increasing rowdiness to prohibit and disperse further unlawful assemblies and processions since 20 May, although until 22 May parties of 20 were still permitted to present petitions personally at Government House.
9. Where violence (stone throwing at the Police, hooliganism, and damage to property etc.) has occurred mini-um force (626 rounds of tear gas, batons and 329 baton shells) has been successfully used to stop it. No firearms have been used (except 3 revolver shots wounding one man by a constable over whom petrol was thrown). It has not been necessary to call upon any military forces to help maintain order.
10. Generally speaking, disturbances have occurred principally in North-east and West Kowloon, in the areas of Government House, the Central District of Victoria, and the Magistrate's Courts. The Emergency Court's Regulations made on 23 May empower Courts to exclude the public other than bona fide press representatives. This has been necessary because chanting and screaming mobs within and around Courts had made hearings impossible.
11.
The Emergency (Prevention of Inflammatory Speeches) Regulations have been made today to enable the Police to deal quickly and effectively with the public address systems which have for some time been operating from private buildings and blaring forth inflammatory and provocative Communist propaganda and incitement to violence and disaffection. Inability to take effective action under the existing law has had a bad effect on public morale.
12. Disruption of public life by official action has been restricted to curfews, the temporary diversion of traffic in areas of disturbances and the temporary closure of some schools. A night curfew was imposed in parts of Kowloon on the nights of 11, 12, 13, and 18 May and in the Northern part of Hong Kong Island on 22 May.
13. Total arrests to date have been 788, of whom 42 were released or acquitted. Of the remainder 439 have been convicted and 307 cases are pending or unconcluded. Known casualties have been: Police 36, demonstrators 70. or these two Police and 14 others were admitted to hospital. Only death has been the bystander killed by a stone.
SECRET
/Other Measures
SECRET
Other Measures
14.
It has not been necessary to call out any units of the (Volunteer) Essential Services Corps to maintain essential services. Apart from some stoppages and reduction in land transport services, all public utilities have continued to function normally. There has been no interruption in food or water supplies from China; rice stocks are at present good. Food prices have remained generally steady.
15.
The Auxiliary Air Force has been called out since 11 May so as to provide "spotter" assistance for the police with its helicopters.
16. Every effort has been made to maintain contact through intermediaries with individual Communists of influence. While at present little can be achieved through these channels it is clearly important to keep them open.
(Passed as requested and advance copy
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==
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Department
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SPORET
+
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
30 MAY 1967
FO1/1
83
Cypher
D. 24 May, 1967. R. 24
1300Z.
ps
FLASH SECRET
No. 688.
Repeated
Addressed to Commonwealth office.
"Peking No. 261. * POLAD Singapore No. 126. H Washington No. 137. (Please repeat
PRIORITY to all).
人
-zv
(82
My telegram No. 680 (not repeated).
Following from Galsworthy.
Following is our analysis and appreciation.
In the present state of overspill from the Cultural Revolution and given the Chinese propensity at this time for irrationality, we cannot be sure what are China's intentions towards Hong Kong or how they will react to any given situation. With this reservation, as seen from here it does not look as though Peking intends at present to force us out of Hong Kong. Our assessment is rather that the local Communista felt that they must act here increasingly in accordance with the principles of the Cultural Revolution (one of the "sins" of the Hong Kong Government is that it had "limited" the effects of the Cultural Revolution in Hong Kong), and accordingly seized the incident at, inter alia, the artificial flower factory as a suitable opportunity for doing so. This seems to have been a mistaken initiative by the local Communists, representing their response to their understanding of current trends of thought in China, rather than a policy deliberately directed from authoritative mainland sources. But once the local communists had committed themselves, Peking, on the basis of misleading reports of the local situation, felt not only that the must react in support, but also that they could exploit the situation in order at least to humiliate us to such an extent as to ensure that in future we would be much more quickly sensitive to Peking pressure (e.g. over U.8. warships), and if possible to force us to accept a Macao-type situation.
2. This situation is therefore essentially political. Although it arose from a genuine labour dispute, it could as easily have arisen from any other incident involving the Authorities here. From the cutset the original labour dispute was taken over and exploited by the Communist press and organisations. Although the management, belatedly, sought the assistance of the Commissioner of Labour in settling the dispute, the Communiste rejected his efforts, maintaining as a matter of principle that the Government has no status or role to play in labour matters.
13
SECRET
SECRET
3. The local Communists seem to have misjudged the temper of the general public in Hong Kong, which has shown itself strongly opposed to the imposition of a Macao-type situation on Hong Kong, and, with Government encouragement, has been aurprisingly out-spoken in its support for Goverment's measures to frustrate Communist pressures and maintain law and order. There is evidence that the Communists (both local and mainland) have been taken aback by the strngth of public opposition. After their earlier demonstrations in Kowloon had incurred much public odium because hoolganism was encouraged and took over, they switched to the Macao pattern of endeavouring to humiliate the Governor within Government House. When this failed, they resorted to fomenting disorders in the central district of Victoria, encouraged by venomous inflammatory loudspeakers, principally from the Peking-owned Bank of China. In the face of firm police action and public disapprobation, these tactics ceased on Tuesday 23 May, which appears to have been a day of reappraisal by the Communists. Today 24 May the emphasis is on a number of stoppages (unrelated to any industrial dispute) in the bus and tram services. So far this action has been reasonably orderly; but there is evidence of strong feeling amongst several Communist unions that more violent
methods should be used in order to create incidents which can be exploited.
4. On the other hand there are indications of some disillusionment and disagreement in the local Communist leadership;
some are reported to be feeling that they have to some extent blundered by exposing themselves too early, by misjudging public reaction, and by underestimating the efficacy of Government's response.
5. If however Communists decide to prese their campaign vigorously, their most likely tactics aeem to be:-
(a) Engineering stoppages in public utilities, Government
Departments, etc., accompanied by intimidation on a considerable scale.
(b) Provoking the police by fresh and more violent
riotous demonstrations using women and children as a screen (as in Macao).
(c) Maintaining a general atmosphere of tension, e-ge by
use of loudspeakers, poster and press campaigns, intimidation by telephone and letter, spreading rumours, and propagandist Red @uard style demonstrations on the frontier.
(4)
-
Attempting by all available means to subvert and intimi- date the police, and over-stretch their resources. (e) Assaulting exposed Europeans and well-disposed Chinese.
The kind of situation envisaged in paragraph 5 above, if it were vigorously sustained over a period of, say, two to four weeks could lead to the exhaustion of the police and of the troops, who in these circumstances would of necessity have been called in (they have not been yet), Before this point was reached, over-extension of e security forces would require them to be used in smaller numbers at each incident; they would then have to use greater force to restore the situation; this would cause mounting casualties and loss of life, and hence a vicious spiral of exacerbation.
SECRET
SECRET
7. This raises the question whether the local Communists capable of sustained and vigorous enough action to over- extend and exhaust the security forces. By themselves they probably are not. But the perennial danger especially in Kowloon and parts of Hong Kong Island, is that any rumpus draws a crowd, and any crowd can quickly become a mob. Communists have in fact used this technique already (paragraph 3) and could revert to it again. If they did so systematically and on a wide acale, we would need to take very tough measures to avoid being swamped.
The
8.
To deal successfully with all this, it will be crucial to maintain general public confidence (which task will get more difficult the longer the crisis lasts), and particularly the confidence and morale of the police. We must continue to show firmness and steadiness here, backed by reaffirmations of H.M.G.'s support for the Hong Kong Government's measures (this latter is vital). We must strive to retain the initiative in Hong Kong, which we have now secured, to help to show that public confidence in us is not misplaced. We must be prepared to counter-attack selectively, taking care to avoid so far as possible direct challenges to the Peking Government of a sort that would oblige them to intervene more actively.
Passed as requested with advance copy
for Sir Saville Garner and to F.E.D.)
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Consular Sept.
Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
7365)-Mr. Henn 7163)-Major Koo 5131) N.0.2.
SECRET
REGISTRY
No.
L
CYPHER
REPETITION OF TELEGRAM
(1) Telegram Section,
FOREIGN OFFICE.
(Despatched).
YT 4
25/1 79.
198
Please repeat to the posts shown below telegram No. 678.
from 40. Hong Kong.
te....
کرد
M.
dated..
0.25 may (81
No.....
(Date). 25
No. 33/
No..........
No........
No......
No.......
En-clair:
Code
Cypher
(2) Division CONCERNED (FOR ARCHIVES).
K.R.
(Signed)......
(Dept.) for Res Clark
2575-
(Date)....
Cypher
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES N. 21
301
FD!/1
FROM MONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 24 May 1967 R. 24
04352
82
PRIORITY SECRET No.680
containing
For Garner from Galsworthy.
Your telegram No.1000.
pa
오라
I am sending later today three telegrams
(a)
our analysis and appreciation of situation;
(b) summary of measures already adopted
by Hong Kong Government to deal with situation;
(c) recommendations concerning further
measures which may have to be taken.
2. These telegrams are being prepared in close consultation with Governor and C.B.F. and are endorsed by Bolland.
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SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COʻKONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 25 May 1967
R. 25
0550Z
** FIVED IN FAPT HIVES No.31
- 1 JUN 1967
FAC
81
FLASH SECRET No.69*
Addressed to Commonwealth Office
Repeated
"Peking No.267 (C.0. please pass)
ра
Following from Galsworthy for Forster.
उँ
Please ensure S. of S. has following information before Thursday D.O.P.C. meeting. Reference paragraph 4 of appreciation in our telegram from Hong Kong No.685.
aph
S. of S. will wish to know that evidence 18 accumulating from several sources in touch with pro-Communists that high level Communist official from Cauton has arrived in Colony to investigate situation. The reports indicate that Peking are gravely dissatisfied with local Communist apparatus for their conduct of recent events. Local leadership is reportedly being criticised for misjudging and misreporting the extent of their own support, of public opposition to themselves and determination of the Government. There are less reliable reports that they are also being criticised for inflating and miзreporting the nature of the "Pascist atrocities" and generally for the way in which they have misled Peking. It appears likely that this man's mission is to report to Canton and to advise on whether a further, all-out effort should be made against Hong Kong or not. Loss reliably, he is reported to have instructed that, pending a decision, some form of pressure should be maintained but that no serious incidents should be fomented.
2. Another (and curious) development is that Ho Yin is now in Hong Kong. It will be recalled that he is a prominent pro- Communist millionaire in Macao who, having played an important part initially in the crisis there, was thought to have been discarded. He has apparently now returned to some degree of favour with Peking. He is said to have been seen by Chou In-Lai in April.
3. It appears that he has come over on the auggestion of R.C. Lee (one of the Governor's intermediaries) and with the approval of Canton where we believe he might have been yesterday. He has been having consultations with the "millionaire wing" ofr the Communist leadership here (who are known to be disturbed oa two counts, first that Peking were not happy about the escalation, second, because the campaign was not going well). He has indicated a desire to make some direct contact with Cater on the Governor's staff: and we are hoping that a meeting between
/Cater
SECRET
SECRET
Cater and Ho Yin, with R.C. Lee and another Chinese friendly to us, will take place at 4.30 this afternoon at the Hang Seng Bank building. (Ho Yin's brother is connected with this bank
4. Frobably nothing but courtesies will emerge from t meeting today. But it could be that Ho Yin may be probing (either for his own reasons or on instructions) for some face saving gesture to enable the Communists to disengage.
The Governor has instructed Cater to go to the meeting primarily to listen. But if this or subsequent meetings go well, Cater has been authorised to make certain points:-
(1)
(2)
that the Governor, knowing a need to save face would arise, had already deliberately permitted demonstrations outside the main gate of Government House which were allowed to reach a degree of unruliness before being stopped that would not otherwise have been allowed (this was in fact one of the Governor's reasons for tolerance):
that a positive indication of good faith will be required of them, such as the physical removal of the loudspeakers from the Bank of China building:
(3) that he felt it probable the Governor would not
wish to take retrospective legal action for offences committed in the last few days provided all Communist action now ceased, although he could not of course intervene where charges had already been laid:
The
(4) that, before going on leave, the Governor night
in a television or radio interview make a generally conciliatory (though not of course apologetic) reference to recent events, including the theme of no victimisation. major part of the subject matter in any such interview would be references to general progress in Hong Kong, including kention of steps to be taken to improve labour relations.
The Governor has some other ideas which could be held in reserve! the above seems enough for a start.
5.
Governor, however, has also asked me to emphasise that too much should not be made of these developments and that, although all is quiet today, Hong Kong is by no means out of the wood.
6. All this provides a further strong reason for not taking action against N.C.N.A. in London.
7. During this lull, though Governor has been preparing for tougher measures he has not had to use any. Since publication yesterday of regulations dealing with inflammatory loudspeakers, there have been virtually no such broadcasta. Governor had not therefore yet had to declare any buildings closed areas.
It is good that he has these measures still up his sleeve. It is important to recognise that, if the Communists decide after this lull to have another go, Governor may have to hit them with all he has got.
8. Bolland would be grateful if copy could be passed at once to Private Office, Foreign Office.
SECRET
/(Passed
SECRET
(Passed to Resident Clerk and Private Office, Foreign Office)
(Passed to Peking an advance copies to Hessrs. de la Mare
and Wilson)
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INWARD TELFORAN
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFIC (The Secretary of State)
S
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
24 MAY 1967
FO1/11
FROM MONG KONG (Information Servicea)
En Clair
D. 23 May 1967 R. 23
+643Z
ро
(80
PRESS
Hong Kong enjoyed a day free from serious incidents today. There were no demonstrations and the main focal point of the "propaganda" war, was the battle of loudspeakers in Central district where Government equipment drowned public address broadcasts from the Bank of China. It is estimated that Communist broadcasts are being made from seventeen or more places in the Colony.
It was announced, towards the end of the day, that people who allowed their property to be used by broadcasts by public address systems for incitement to violence may (repeat may) be prosecuted.
Public transport has operated normally in Kowloon, but on Hong Kong Island vehicles of the China Motor Bus Company did not (repeat not) appear on the streets. Taxia and trams are r'mning normally.
Rumours about a water cut-off have been circulating, but there is no (repeat no) basis for then. And Government have warned people against paying heed to malicious rumoura.
Government has also acted against those who are trying to persuade young workers to join demonstrations by intimidation. Details will soon be announced of how threatened workers can reglater for new jobs.
This morning Government House announced that the British Government stood four square behind the authorities in its determination to preserve peace in Hong Kong.
The statement said Sir Arthur Galsworthy brought with him fullest confirmation of Britain's support.
On the labour front, a management and workers of the Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works met this morning at the Labour Department and agreed in principle to reopen the injection moulding department of the factory as soon as possible. It was also agreed that re-employed workers would receive compensation and terms and conditions in force at the time of the close down would stay the same.
of the two hundre.. and three people arrested yesterday on Hong Kong Island one hundred and ten have so far been charged. Total arrests since disturbances began until eight o'clock this morning stood at seven hundred and eighty one and six hundret and seventy one have been charged.
For Boxall above cable sent.
(Passed to Resident Clerk)
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(D.S.6)
D.I.O., J.I.R. Mr. de la Mare Mr. Bolland Mr. Wilson Denson
Mr.
Kr. Foggon
Mr. D. Hawkins Mr. Boxall
Mr. C.P. Rawlings Mr. C.H. Henn Major Koe N.0.2
SECRET
INWARD TELEGR U
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
Cypher
D. 23 Kay, 1967. R. 23
+
13152
117 @
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31.
24 MAY 1967
FD 1/1
0/11
IMMEDIATE SECRET No. 678.
Bides.
1.
Da
4/25/
Addressed to Commonwealth office (D.T.D.).
"Peking No. 255.
Repeated
H
"P.A. Singapore No. 123.
* Washington No. 134 (8. of 8. please
pasa PRIORITY to all).
My telegram No. 663. -FD 1/1/72
SITREP as at 232000 hours.
It has been a quiet day on both Hong Kong and Kowloon The effective measures taken by the Police yesterday and the new restrictions on processions seem to have robbed the Communist leadership of the initiative.
2. There has been a proliferation of loudspeakers broadcasting from Communist offices and stores. Though they have limited themselves to tape recordings of extracte from newspapers and of music, they are a potential danger and steps are being taken to prevent their use. The main loudspeaker system in the Bank of China has been successfully jammed all day.
3. There has been increased industrial activity. The China Motor Bus Company remained on strike on the Hong Kong side and the Communist trade union in the Tram Company staged a walk-out in sympathy this evening. in bringing the tram workers out: union members continued to work. brief protest strike in shipyard.
Intimidation played a part but most of the right wing There has also been one
4. There have again been numerous rumours of a water shortage and of the P.L.A. maesing on the border. The management of right wing and neutral factories were rung up
during the morning and told that since the C.P.G. was definitely going to take over here and the British were preparing to evacuate, they had better change their policies. An official and categorical denial of this was made over the radio.
5. Right-Wing posters have appeared in a number of places in Kowloon and in two towns in the New Territories. There is, however, no sign at egent of strife building up on a large scale between these two factions.
Whe
6. A crowd, 2,000 strong and including 300 soldiers and some militia was seen on 22 May in China near the border. military element fixed bayonets and paraded up and four near the border. The numbers involved are not unusual though the
SECRET
/presence
SECRET
presence of armed soldiers 18. This demonstration was clearly designed for Hong Kong consumption.
7. A major conference has been taking place all day long between representatives of all pro-Communist and sympathetic unions and circles. Their prolonged deliberations may indicate that they are somewhat unsure of what to do next. The Communist leadership is thought to be opposed to strikes which will inconvenience the population as a whole since they see their major task is winning more public support. Nonetheless the most likely development is more industrial action, backed up with intimidation of both workers and management.
(Passed as requested)
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SECRET
FLAG A
기
Flag B
SECRET
Permanent Under Secretary
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 5,
24 KA: 1:07
FDY!
78
Hong Kong: Governor's Proposed Further
Measures to restore Order
70.
Hong Kong telegram No. 662 attached is self-explanatory.
The Governor proposes two courses of action:
(a) that several of the buildings in Hong Kong
from which the Communist campaign is being
directed should be neutralised.
He would do
this by declaring the area in which they are
situated subject to a 24-hour curfew or,
alternatively, by declaring them closed areas
under the Public Order Ordinance;
(b) to bring the Bulwark on a visit to Hong
Kong. The Bulwark is a light aircraft carrier
and carries commandos and helicopters.
2. The Governor has discussed these proposals with Sir
Arthur Galsworthy of the Commonwealth Office and Mr. Bolland,
the Head of Far Eastern Department, who is also now in Hong
Kong.
They concur. The Commonwealth Office also concur.
The submission which they have put up to their own Ministers
and their draft telegram to Hong Kong are attached.
have sought our views.
Recommendation
They
SECRET
/3. I
SECRET
2
3. I recommend that we also concur.
Copies to: Mr. Rodgers
Sir D. Allen
Private Office
WA. de kukman
(A.J. de la Mare)
22 May, 1967
ривоживой
떡
ile Som S.
Ros
telegram
fuen
sent
day
Blesk.
تا
and
Ja
Je
Recedent
dim jas
23!5
de lag
Mr. de
23/5
ра.
ねる
त
SECRET
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31 |
21967
FAL/I
:
Minister of state
Plazze sce Hong Kong tele roa 622,
The Gov.rmor would like urgent zy, roval of tro courses of, setion.
II Action to neutralice nevurul or the
buildings from which the compaign is being directed, 1,c, notably the Bank of Chinu and the Communist-controlled Fode.ation of Trade Union lieudgifiers,
IV
للحن
that 1,5,5, Bulwark, a Commurdo-carrier, equipped with helicopters, chould visit liong Kong on a "routine visit",
hen the telegram came in this morning I wus le to have a brief word with ir saville G.FIEF
1 his initial reution wus that these two
cuirson should be approved.. You will noe from 2-otaph 9 of the tele、eum în-t
Sir Arthur Galsworthy und Mr. Bolland uppce with t.one ruletione und so coca the Commoner of the
British Forces in Hong Kong,
I have had a brief word with the Hinistry or 2.Ponce, who are urgently amuidering the function of the availability of H ̧ ̧3. Bulrurk, 1 choll ::100 consult the Foreign Crfice.
I submit the drift of a short tele,rom which
I hope we will be able to clor with the Hinistry of
Letence unu the Forsin tarice this uft.rnoon,
1
(H.P. L"11) 22 by 1>67
J
+
A
·
XXXX
عکسن
SECRAT
HÚS KUIG
GOVLAKOR HONG KONG
+
+
POLVD, SINGATESLA PAKILO SASHINATOW
+
Your telegrum No. 662,
Disturbances.
Kinisters approve courses II and IV.
2. On course 11 imposition of curfew might be
preferable to declumtion of closed areas but
inisters leave decision on actuɛl method to you.
En ecurse IV Ministry of Defence are
issuing necessary instructions forthwith.
4.
Contents on other two-coupson will follow
Iuter.
+
+
+
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Information Office)
En Clair
D. 23 May 196 R. 23
21 09Z
PRESS
26
N
ARCHIVES NË 31;
241
Hong Kong Government has decided with immediate effect, no (repeat no) further public processions or public meetings will be perfitted without prior authority of Commissioner of Police. In a statement last night, Government spokesman said although for the past few daya small groups of petitioners have been permitted to move in procession to Government House provided they did so in an orderly manner. disorders have subsequently broken out on each day.
He said any person who in future participates in a procession or nesting in a public place without prior permission in writing from the Commissioner of Police will be liable to arrest and prosecution. He pointed out that individuals who wish to petition the Governor may continue to do so by post.
Latest police report states the curfew which was imposed on Hong Kong Island at 6.30 last night is being observed.
Earlier today, police units on riot duty were issued with special cameras that had been specially fitted with telephoto lens to photograph people taking part in the illegal gatherings. Government loudspeakers broadcasting Cantonese music also drowned out message inciting the crowd which were broadcast from loudspeakers installed in the Bank of China building.
So far police have arrested 167 people most of them on Hong Kong Island. Fifteen people have been taken to Queen Mary Hospital where seven, including one police constable, have been detained for treatment.
All day crowds of "demonstrators" frequently swelled by young hooligans gathered in various parts of central Hong Kong, blocking traffic and singing and chanting outside banka and public buildings. Traffic in central district was also disrupted.
In Kowloon there were a few incidenta.
Another 19 representative organisations have pledged support for Government's firm determination to maintain peace in Hong Kong. This brings to 270 the total number of organisations which have so far publicly stated their support for the authorities.
The education fund for children of junior police officers has now reached almost 400,000 dollars (repeat dls.400,000) and contributions from ordinary citizena continue to pour into the collection office at the Department of Commerce and Industry.
(D.T.D.)
For Boxall, above cable sent Commonwealth Office
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IMMEDIATE SECRET
No. 677.
SECRET
INWARD TELKGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 23 May, 1967. R. 23
H
1005Z
RECEIVED ARCHIVES IN, A
2:
下
For decision bi
780-2577
ро
to Commonwealth office (D.T.D.).
"Peking No. 254.
"P.A. Singapore No. 122.
"Washington No. 133. (Commonwealth office please pass to all).
Addressed Repeated
H
75
Your telegram No. 1001.
Disturbances.
I am most grateful for your very speedy approval of courses ii and iv in my telegram No. 662. At this morning's meeting of Executive Council there was full endorsement of both these measures. We hope to be in a position to implement course il tomorrow (Wednesday).
2. Meanwhile the situation is evolving here. Public opinion is flowing strongly in our favour, is advocating firm measures on our part, and we believe that extent of this aupport has perplexed the other side. So far today has been quiet. The Committee of 17 have been in session most of the day. They may of course be hatching up something fresh to launch on us tomorrow, and this may well be simply the lull before the next atore.
3. Executive Council this morning were unanimously of the opinion that deportation would be the most damaging and effective action we could take against the Communist leadership. They have authorised me to deport all or any of a list of 24 persons at my discretion. It is unlikely, however, that I would wish to deport so many at once and would prefer to use this weapon more selectively. It is of course a weapon which I would not propose to use lightly or necessarily very soon: but the need to do so may arise very quickly. If the Opposition begin tomorrow to act in a more methodical and cc-ordinated manner it may be necessary to act promptly to disrupt their leadership. I very much hope therefore that you will be able to agree to my proceeding on this basis.
4. On Executive Council's advice, I am submitting fairly comprehensive emergency regulations to Council tomorrow, primarily to assist me to combat subversive publications such as posters, public address systems and so on. These regulations will I hope give me better powers to act against the Communist press than those I have mentioned to you so far (my present thought is to act against printing works rather than the newspapers themselves. I am however still reluctant to act against the press and would not do so without consulting you.
SECRET
/5.
SECRET
5. You will be glad to learn that management of San Po Kong artificial flower factory has reached agreement, with Labour Department help, with some 240 of his employees and hopes to reopen factory towards the end of this week.
6. Above, has been discussed with CBF, Galsworthy and Bolland who agree.
(Passed as requested)
(Also passed to Messrs. de la Mare
and Wilson)
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Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Bolland
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Denson
Mr. Foggon
Kr. D. Hawkins
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Mr. C.H. Henn
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IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 23 May 1967
R. 23
06452
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES N. 51
24 MAY 1967
Jiscured falt Fr Hall Co. of Nared.
ра
Bash
64
CONFIDENTIAL No.668
Following for Hall from Galsworthy.
Labour Situation.
We have had long discussion with Governor and Hetherington (Commissioner of Labour).
2.
Background here may be briefly summarised as follows:
(a) When Labour Advisory Board met on 11 May to
consider proposed legislation to reduce hours of work for women and young persons they were completely split employers v. workers
representatives.
-
(b) Events since then have, however, made their
mark on employers, and some at least are likely to be in more receptive frame of mind.
(c) Governor and Hetherington wish to seize this opportunity to push things forward as far as possible.
3. We must recognise that action on labour front is extremely unlikely to have any significant impact on present situation. This is because Communist-dominated unions are basically disinterested in genuine industrial issues, except in so far as they can exploit them for political ends. Indeed, their demand is not for more Government involvement in labour relations, but precisely the contrary, viz. that Government should stay out of all labour disputes and leave it to be settled by direct "struggle" between management and labour on cultural revolution lines. And less than 12% of total working force of about 1.5 million are declared members of trade unions (100,000 favouring the Communist F.T.U., 40,000 the right-wing 1.U.C. and 30,000 neutrals). Paid up membership is smaller (% of labour force), but there are of course other strong reasons for proceeding as in paragraph 2(c).
4. As regarde hours of work for women and young persons, the best of the workers' representatives on the Labour Advisory Board suggested that the approach should be to introduce a 48 hour week, but to permit overtime up to 12 hours a week.
5. If acceptable to Ministers, a possible method would be for legislation to empower Commissioner of Labour (by regulation):
CONFIDENTIAL
/(1)
6.
CONFIDENTIAL
(1) to introduce at once a 48 hour week for
individual industries where this is already the universal practice;
(11) to introduce at once in industries where the 48 hour week is the common but not the universal practice, a 48 hour week with permissive overtime of up to 12 hours per week for individual factories;
(111) to work out a phased programme for the reduction
of standard working week for all other industries, with the object of bringing them all ultimately to 48 hours.
Garment industry would, of course, continue to present a special difficulty for some time to come; steady pressure would need to be exerted to achieve goal by set stages under the phased programme.
7. A scheme embodying certain of these features was put to the office two years ago, and did not meet with a favourable reception. I realise it has its imperfections; but I believe that in the circumstances of Hong Kong it provides the most realistic and promising path to progress (management representatives and Labour Advisory Board are now on record as accepting the principle of a phased programme) and I hope we could look at the proposition afresh.
8. Kore generally, Governor feels this is psychologically the right moment to announce that the Hong Kong Government, with the advice and assistance of H.M.G. (see below), intends to proceed with a review and expansion of its labour legislation, on which considerable preliminary work has already been done (there are about 30 pieces of legislation at various stages of preparation). This would cover such subjects as:
(a) notification to Commissioner of Labour by any party to a trade dispute, whether existing or apprehended;
(b) conferring on Commissioner of Labour power, in any trade dispute existing or apprehended (notified or not notified), to appoint a conciliation officer to examine the dispute on a good offices basis and to require the parties involved to send representatives;
(c)
(d)
an examination of legislative safeguards against discrimination;
more precise definition of the law on illegal picketing. Such a review would no doubt throw up other aspects requiring examination.
9. Governor would welcome expert assistance from us in carrying out this review. He and Hetherington feel that an expert would need to be lent to the Hong Kong Government for a period of between six to twelve months. If it were possible to make available services of Miss Ogilvie for this purpose, that would be very welcome here. Governor would like the review to begin as quickly as possible.
CONFIDENTIAL
/10
CONFIDENT LAL
10. It would be most helpful if we could have very quick preliminary reactions to these ideas, so that, if they look promising, we could try to take them further here this week. None of this has yet been discussed with Executive Council.
11.
Please pass copy to Foreign Office for information.
(Passed to Foreign Office
as requested)
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CONFIDENTIAL
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TO THE COLKONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
RECEIVER
ARCHIVES N 73
24 MAI!
FA
た
En Clair
D. 23 Way
1967
R. 23
01 352
IMMEDIATE No.665
داك
paldaslu
Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.)
Repeated
牌
H
Peking No.251
POLAD Singapore No.118
#
Washington No.132
(S. of 3. please pass to Washington)
My telegram No.663.
72
Uneventful night in both Kowloon and Hong Kong.
The curfew in Hong Kong was well observed other than for a short period in one district where 13 persons were arrested for breach of curfew. No incidents were reported after 21.00.
2, I have decided that no further public processions or public meetings will be permitted without the prior authority of the Commissioner of Police. I have done this to prevent further disorders arising from the small groups of demonstrators who have been allowed to proceed to Government House to petition,
3. China Motor Bus Co. employees are refusing to operate vehicles today and no buses plying at present.
AMBII
on island operating normally and public transport in Kowloon.
No formal strike has been declared and position somewhat confused. Apparently they demand the release of several C.M.B. employees arrested earlier before returning to work.
4. The total arrested in the 24 hours ended 08.00 on 23. 5. 67 was 203 out of whom 110 have been charged. Toral of arresta since beginning of disturbances is 781 of whom 671 have been charged.
(Passed as requested)
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Cypher
D. 22 May, 1967. R. 22
1400Z
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES N.
FD 1/1
172
IMMEDIATE SECRET No. 663.
Addressed to Commonwealth Office.
Repeated
"Peking No. 249.
Ħ
" F.A. Singapore No. 116.
H
to all).
"Washington No. 130. (Please pass PRIORITY
66
My telegram No. 656.
Statue Square was again the main centre for disorder but there were also disturbances in Kowloon and farther east on Hong Kong Island. The first main incident was at 1100 hours when a crowd tried to force its way up to Government House. Over 100 people were arrested. At about the same time a crowd of 600-700 outside the South Kowloon Magistracy, consisting mainly of school children became unruly and had to be dispersed with tear gas. Demonstrators on the Hong Kong side reformed in Statue Square and at the foot of Garden Road, then moved in procession around the central area of the city singing and shouting. Their main aim was to provoke the police. they were encouraged and directed by the loud speaker in the Bank of China.
In this
2. At 12.30 as the lunch time traffic was building to its peak, bus drivers in the area of the Star Ferry and its approach roads on the Hong Kong side abandoned their vehicles completely blocking the roads. Shortly after on the Kowloon side a group of bus company employees attacked the police at the bus/ferry terminus. At the same time, a crowd in the Causeway Bay area on the island speedily grew to over 1,000 when reinforced by school children and had to be dispersed with tear gas.
3. The situation was obviously deteriorating and the Commissioner of Police asked for a curfew in Hong Kong. At 15.15 hours I declared a curfew to cover the urban areas on the north of Hong Kong Island from 18.30 to 05.00 hours.
4. During the afternoon, demonstrators remained in the Statue Square but made no major offensive moves. The drowning of the Bank of China's loudspeaker by an even louder machine playing music from the roof of a nearby Government building possibly helped. By 16.30 hours the situation was quiet and crowds, mainly from offices in the central district, were dispersing towards their homes as beat they could, conscious of the impending curfew and hampered by the dearth of public transport. It is hoped that the curfew will enable the police to rest some of its men. At the same time it may discourege
the onlookers who throughout the day complicated the problem of
SECRET
/crowd
SECRET
crowd control.
Up to time of despatch although some minor incidents have taken place, the curfew is effective.
5.
At 1700 hours today 148 persons had been arrested four policemen and a number, not yet known, of rioters injured. This includes one man who was shot after assisting in throwing petrol over the members of a small police patrol. His condition is described as fair.
Details of arrests and sentences to date are:-
Arrested
convicted
727,
403,
remanded
90,
awaiting trial
193,
acquitted
24,
released without
charge
17.
6. Unions are obviously taking a more direct part in support of demonstrators. The action of the bus drivers in blocking the main roads at a peak period is one example. There have been reports of go-slow tactics and disruption of work at a major Government workshop. The use of children to swell crowds on a large scale is a new tactic and one which it is difficult to counter. It would appear that the local communist leadership has appreciated that a comparatively small number of demonstrators can, with the unwitting aid of onlookers, tie up large numbers of police and cause a dis-proportionate disruption of the city's life. There is no sign of activities of this sort abating.
(Passed as requested)
(Also passed to D.8.4.0. for Messrs. de la Kare,
Wilson and Bolland)
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D.I.O., J.I.R. Mr. de la Kare Mr. Bolland
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Denson
Mr. Foggon
Mr. Rodgers
Mr. D. Hawkine
Mr. C.P. Rawlings
Cypher
SECRET
OUTWARD TELEGRAM
RECEIVED IN ACHIVE
FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICER 144)
(The Secretary of State)
TO HONG KONG (Bir D. Trench)
Sent 22 May, 1967. 22402
LEAUL
71
PLASH SECRET No.1001
2.
Addressed to Governor Hong Kong
Repeated FLASH to POLAD Singapore FLASH to Peking
H
PRIORITY to Washington.
Your telegram No. 662.
Disturbances.
70
Ministers approve courses II and IV.
ро
257
On course II imposition of curfew might be preferable to declaration of closed areas but Ministers leave decision on actual method to you.
3.
On course IV Secretary of State for Defence has concurred. We assume that you will invite C.inG. F.B. to take executive action.
4.
Comments on other two courses will follow later.
(Passed to D.3.A.0. for repetition
to POLAD Singapore, Peking and Washington)
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INWARD TELEGRAM
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FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 22 May, 1967.
Å¢
R. 22
1100Z
RECEIVED
ARCHIVES NË- 81
24
FOY!
70
Helion Taken Reply
Sext avains 3(ii) (iv)
Addressed to Commonwealth office.
Repeated
H
E
" POLAD Singapore No. 115. "Peking No. 248.
"Washington No. 129. (s. of S.
please pass FLASH to Singapore and Peking and PRIORITY to Washington).
My telegram No. 641."
Hong Kong Disturbances.
Over the past two days the situation has deteriorated. There has been an increase in the number of violent incidents, particularly in the central area of Hong Kong; and known pro-communist elemente have been involved in many of these. An important feature has been the continuous broadcasting from the Bank of China (which has not opened for business today) of incitements to violence against Government and Europeans generally, including such slogans as "kill Trench", "police turn your weapons (1.e. against your officera)". The pro-Communist press is giving full and approving accounts of violent action by demonstrators and calling for their extension. There have been token strikes today by the bus companies and taxis.
2.
The key to the situation here is the maintenance of public confidence and especially police morale. The police have stood up very well to the harassments of the last few days, but there are two adverse factors in the situation: (a) fatigue which is now beginning to tell on them; and (b) the constant barrage of Communist propaganda directed specifically to the subversion and intimidation of the rank and file. We believe that Communist tactics over the next few days will be to create incidents in several places at once, so as to extend the police while maintaining the propaganda barrage. Public morale is still holding surprising well, but there is increasing interference with daily life; and there are signs that unless we are Been to take effective action to control the situation, instead of simply acting to block individual communist initiatives, public confidence will slip. A landslide could quickly follow.
13.
SECRET
SECRET
3. We have considered various new measures to deal with the situation. These include:-
(1)
(11)
(111)
(iv)
picking up and if possible deporting, and failing that detaining, a selection (e.g. up to 24) of the known leaders of the present campaign;
action to neutralize several of the buildings from which the campaign is being directed, notably (1) the Bank of China and (ii) the communist-controlled Federation of Trade Union Head Quarters and the Workers' Club. This might be achieved by declaring 24 hour curfews in areas around the buildings, or possibly declaring them closed areas under the Public Order Ordinance (Cap. 245);
action against the principal communist newspaper "Wen Wel Po" the official C.P.G. organ in Hong Kong, for either sedition or inciting police to disaffection;
bring commando ship BULWARK on a visit to Hong Kon
Each of foregoing actions would entail certain amount of risk of escalation, and possible complications with Peking. We face a dilemma, in that:-
(a) we obviously wish so far as possible to avoid
action which could lead to more C.P.G, involvement (and there is some evidence C.P.G. themselves wish to
avoid this); but
(b) holding the situation here requires that Government
should retain the initiative.
Since (b) 18 imperative, we must be prepared to face some risk under (a). On this basis pros and cons of various courses in paragraph 3 above, as we see them are as follows:-
Course (1)
5. The disruption of leadership would be a distinct and positive gain, at least in the short term. It would be seen by our friends here as firm action. But since it is unlikely that China would accept persons concerned as deportees, the probability is that they would have to be detained indefinitely in Hong Kong. This would provide local communists and Peking with a standing grievance, and would inevitably lead to creation of a further "demand".
Course (ii)
6. This would seriously hamper the communist leadership in their control and development of anti-Government operations. For a while they would be bottled up in their existing Headquarters, cut off from outside contacts. At very least
/it
SECRET
SECRET
it would disrupt their communications (e.g. Government could pick up all their couriers). And they might well eventually have to move to other premises where it would be easier for Government to keep them under closer
Burveillance.
Further advantage is that it would enable us to isolate Bank of China without taking direct action against the building which could involve us with the C.P.G.. As an immediate measure I have deployed loudspeakers blaring forth cheerful Chinese tunes to drown the inflammatory broadcasts coming from the Bank. But this is not sufficient in itself, since the Bank building remains one of the principal rallying points for demonstrations; and anyhow we know it is one of the main communist control pointa.
Course (iii)
7. The worrying thing about not taking action against the worst offender among the communist press is that it 18 daily in flagrant breach of the law, and if we continue to ignore this it may well be taken as sign of weakness. But it would obviously be regarded by Peking as a provocation (see Feking telegram No. 483 of 15 May). Furthermore there are 9 other communist newspapers here which could all continue the campaign unless similar action were taken against them.
Course (iv)
8. It would take three and a half days for BULWARK to reach Hong Kong. Her presence here, with a commando aboard, would undoubtedly strengthen public and police morale, and both Commissioner of Police and CBF are strongly in favour. Her arrival here might be represented by Peking as sabre- rattling, although they could have no legitimate grounds for doing so. It would not of course be publicised here as a reinforcement, but simply as a routine visit. Practice here is not to publicise visits of H.M. ships in advance.
9.
Recommendations.
My advisers and I have discussed these courses with CBF, Galsworthy and Bolland, and we all agree in recommending course (11) and course (iv) at this stage.
10.
I am holding a meeting of my Executive Council tomorrow (Tuesday) morning, and I intend to seek their views on courses (1), (11) and (111), but on a contingency planning basis only. However, I would hope that I may have urgently your approval for courses (ii) and (iv) and would welcome your early comments on the other two courses.
11.
Galsworthy will be telegraphing separately about useful discussions held this morning on labour matters.
(Passed as requested with advance copies to
Foreign Office F.E. Dept.).
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69
IN
RECEIVES ARCHIVES
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FO1/11
Services)
FROM HONG KONG (British Information Services
En clair
D. 22 May, 1967.
R. 22
03552
PRESS
ра
Hong Kong Standard on its front page this morning covera yesterday's evente in central district with a story headlined: "Little Force, from action wins day for peace and order".
Standard.
It was the battle of downtown, central, said
The police won.
The paper added: "their superably co-ordinated action nipped in the bud every effort by the mob to break loose from their box after police had manoeuvred them into it.
They sealed off three major accesses. To the east at Arsenal Street. To the west at Jubilee Street near the vehicular ferry pier. And the roads to the Albert Road levels.
In the limited perimeter enclosed, police kept the twisting turning writhing tired frustrated mobs in check. And there, platoon after platoon of supremely disciplined men in khaki, dealt with each emergency in text book fashion".
In addition the papers editorial said: "Not only is there an ever present danger of eruption into lethal violence, but also it is evident that a failure to take effective counter-measures is likely to encourage wilder and more lawlese activities"
The official announcement that further disorderly gatherings will not be permitted is, therefore, to be fully supported by the public.
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K11) (68
FROM HONG KONG (British Information Services)
En clair D. 21 Hay, 1967.
PRESS
* R. 21
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Situation on Hong Kong Island returned to normal this evening after day of scattered incidents which at one time brought central district to a standstill.
Police acting on the announced policy of preventing large unruly groups gathering were constantly in action dispersing chanting demonstrators and nuisance groups. A total of 44 people were arrested. One European who was attacked by a mob was detained in hospital. Six other prople, including five police received hospital
In all treatment but were not (repeat not) detained. eleven gas cartridges were fired today. Crowds gathered at barrier erected to block route to Government House, Police insisted that only orderly groups of not (repeat not) more than 20 people could proceed past the barrier.
They
A mob outside Hilton Hotel unsuccessfully demanded management remove British flags flying from hotel. broke one window and ripped down sign board.
In a chain of events in Central District police clashed with scattered crowds. The area was sealed and traffic diverted. Police broke up biggest groups with tear gas and baton charges. Another crowd burned Union Jack at Harcourt Road fire station.
Order was restrored by 1830 hours when normal traffic flow was resumed. For Boxall above cable sent Chapelries.
(Copies passed to Messrs. de la Kare, Wilson
and Bolland)
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TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
❘ RECEIVED
ARCHIVES No: 31
2^AY 1967
FD //!
FROM HONG KONG (Information Officer)
D. 21st May, 1967 R. 20th
67
1940Z
pa dash
PRESS
Hong Kong Government has announced that it will not, repeat not, tolerate any more disorderly gatherings such as occurred in Statue Square in Central District this (Saturday) afternoon.
Following events of today, Government tonight issued a statement which stated: "During past few days Government has permitted group proteste at gates of Government House to proceed without interference. Until today, demonstrations associated with these protests have been noisy but not, repeat not, violent.
"Today, the demonstrations have lost their orderly and disciplined nature. Groups of demonstrators returning from Government House have mobbed around Statue Square and the Law Courts and have resorted to violence and rowdiness by molesting spectators and by attempting to block the tramlines with rubbish. These activities have been urged on by loudspeaker exhortations to further violence and disorder.
"It has therefore been decided that in the interests of the public, disorderly gatherings of this nature will not, repeat not, in future be permitted. People will, however, be allowed to continue to exercise their right to petition the Governor in small, orderly groups or by post, but disorderly processions or unlawful gatherings will not be allowed". End of statement).
Noisy demonstrations took place all afternoon around Bank of China which has been headquarters for demonstrators marching to Government House.
Following chanting of slogana and pasting of posters around Government House marchers returned to vicinity of Bank where they interrupted the weekend calm of central area by noday shouting.
At times passers-by were molested by the crowd. Photographers were approached and forced to expose their films. However, visits by police parties to the scene prevented serious trouble.
/ At
At a few minutes to six the crowd surged towarda Hilton Hotel. A group saw the hotel manager and demanded the flage, British, American and the hotel flag should be lowered. Hotel manager pointed out it was one minute to six anyway and he always had flags lowered at six. So the flags were lowered as usual by a uniformed pageboy wearing white gloves,
In Kowloon situation is remaining normal.
Commissioner of Labour said today that a series of discus- sions between management of Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works and representatives of various groups of workers have been held in Labour Department during past four days.
As a result of these discussions considerable progress has been made towards resumption of normal work at two factories, one in Kennedy Town and other in San Po Kong, which have been scene of recent disputes.
Spontaneous support for Government's firm maintenance of peace swells today.
More organisations representing people from all walka of life-from small man hawking his wares in street to business executive and professional man have added their names to those who have already come forward publicly to support Government,
Statements of support for the authorities' action were issued by 56, (repeat 56), organisations today.
Contributions to the higher education fund for children of junior members of Hong Kong Police have exceeded $7,500. Director of Commerce and Industry, Mr. Sorby thanked the many persons, firms and organisations who have expressed sup- port for the fund.
For Boxall.
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66
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INWARD TELFORAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
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FROM MONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
RID
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
22 MAY 1967
[FD1/1
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D. 21 May 1967
R. 21
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INMEDIATE BECRET No.656
Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.) Repeated PRIORITY to Peking No.246
rt POLAD Singapore No.114
Washington No.128
(C.0. please pass to all)
My telegram No.655.
165
pd
est
SITREP as at 21/2000.
Access to Government House was limited today to groups of twenty by blocking or cordoning access roads. Demonstrations were therefore kept in the centre of the city. The bottom of Garden Road was the main concentration area, the
crowd building up to about 1,000 by midday. It remained fairly orderly though the main core perhaps half, continued to bait the police and to exhort then to turn on their English masters. At 13.30 hours the mood became more ugly. Some windows were broken and the police moved in to disperse the crowd, which scattered but kept reforming.
2. By 16.00 hours the centre of the disturbances moved about a quarter of a mile to the North West to the water front and particularly the area of the Post Office where a European was manhandled by the mob now about 2,000 strong. Over a period of an hour the police three times had to use tear gas. By 17.30 hours the crowd began rapidly to disperse and there have been no incidents since. Kowloon has remained quiet throughout.
3. Except for the European, who was not badly hurt, no casualties have been admitted to hospital.
The police arrested 44 men the majority of them Left-wing workers living on the island.
ܘܠܵܐ
We have no information on what we can expect tomorrow.
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#
H
Mr. Bolland
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Denson
Mr. Foggon Mr. Rodgers
Cypher
IMMEDIATE SECRET
No. 655
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
F
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
22 1967
[FD1/1]
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 20th May, 1967 R. 20th
14502
火
H
65
ра
|_
251-
Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.), Repeated to Peking, No. 245,
tt
H POLAD Singapore, No. 113,
Washington, No. 127 (Secretary of
State please pass IMMEDIATE to all).
My telegram No. 650.
FO1/1/62
SITREP as at 20/2000 hours.
Gonfrontation with the Left Wing.
Much
After a quiet night without curfew or incident the pressure was once again on Government House, the same drill was followed as yesterday but the demon- strators were in an uglier mood. Numbers involved though never greatly above 3,000, were on the whole larger and there were unpleasant elements who deliberately tried to provoke the police. On two occasions at about 1100 hours and 1500 hours the police cordons had to be reinforced. After 1500 hours there was a new development when crowds denied immediate access to Government House began to move back into the area of Statue Square opposite the Bank of China and also westwards, causing considerable traffic congestion.
2. Soon after 1600 hours Government House, the front of which was plastered once again with posters, ceased to be the focal point which now shifted to the Statue Square area. The crowd here was about 1,000 strong, a considerable percentage appearing to be bystanders. Except for the occasional hooliganism, directed mainly at Europeans with cameras, the crown remained reasonably orderly. A loud- speaker from the Bank of China interspersing offensive propaganda with Communist music tended to raise the general temperature. Soon after 1700 hours the crowd began to dis- perse, westwards and eastwards. The withdrawal of the police to less obtrusive positions probably contributed to this dispersal though it may have given the Left Wing the idea that they had achieved a victory.
SECRET
/ 3.
SECRET
3. At the time of despatch a group of about 300 is still wandering around the Causeway Bay area. It has been plastering Right Wing newspaper offices and the local magistracy building with inflammatory posters.
4. It seems likely that the success of their tactics in the heart of the city could well encourage the Left Wing to repeat their behaviour on a larger scale tomorrow. The use of a loudspeaker by the staff of the Bank of China is bound to exacerbate the situation. The broadcasts at times today had a specifically anti-European tone and included such slogans as "kill Trench" "British murderers", etc. In the present unpleasant
Trench","British circumstances it has unfortunately become necessary for me to instruct the police to take a firmer line with disorderly processions or gatherings. It is still my intention to permit orderly presentation of petitions at Government House by small groups. A warning of our firmer attitude has been given tonight and will be carried in tomorrow morning's newspapers. There seems little doubt that tomorrow will be a critical day.
5. There is no doubt that the heartening news of the Foreign Secretary's strong protest to the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires yesterday has made a most valuable impact on morale, but it may also have contributed to the tougher line of the demonstrators. The danger, however, is that today's disorders have had their effect on public morale and it is even more important that we show our determination to enforce law and order tomorrow.
(Passed as requested and to Resident Clerk.)
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x117
FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
Sent 19 May 1967. 2001 Z
RECEIVED IN
64
ARCHIVES No.31
21/1967
FD1/11
pal
1225h
INMEDIAT SECRET No.967
Addressed to Governor Hong Kong Repeated IMMEDIATE to Peking
14
" POLAD Singapore
Washington
H ROUTINE
Following from Garner,
Your telegram No.641.
Kowloon Disturbances.
nol yet
rearise?
I have discussed the latest situation and your telegram with Commonwealth Secretary. May I say at once how concerned we all are that attack now seems to be concentrating on you, and how very much we admire the calm spirit in which you are meeting it (your telegram No.650)
FD1/1/62
2. We are most grateful for your thoughts on the longer term problems and entirely agree that they will need very serious thought.
3. We all agree that all these matters both long term and immediate need personal discussion. Of course you cannot leave your post at present and we recognise the difficulties in the way of a Ministerial visit. But we are anxious to arrange talks with you as soon as possible and it has been decided that Galsworthy, Carter and Bolland (F.O.) should fly out tomorrow (20 May) by BOAC flight BA.922 arriving Hong Kong 16.00 hours on Sunday. We hope this will be convenient to you and they will give you all the help they can.
24. We are sure you will agree with us that it would be desirable to avoid publicity for this official visit, if et all possible. We hope means can be found of avoiding the Press at airport.
(Passed to D. S.A:0, for Peking, POLAD Singapore and
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INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Press)
IVED P.
ARCHIVES No $1
22 MAY 1967
FOY!
En Clair
D. 19 May 1961 R. 19
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163
ра
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Life throughout the Colony has remained peaceful for the second day running and no (repeat no) violent incidenta have occurred. Left-wing organisations have continued to send groups to the gates of Government House to chant slogans and paste-up anti-British posters but they have otherwise behaved in an orderly fashion. A crowd of about five hundred people began to gather outside Government House shortly after half past two this afternoon,
The crowd later increased to some two thousand five hundred and there was another crowd of six hundred in the slip road east of Government House, singing and shouting.
on.
The crowd started to leave the scene as the day went
Shortly after five, it was reported that the crowd outside Government House had completely dispersed.
A crowd of workers gathered outside the Green Island Cement Works, but the situation is quiet.
Another meeting took place in the Labour Department this morning between the management of the Hong Kong Artificial Flowers Factory and the hundred workers of the factory who presented a petition to the Department on Tuesday.
future.
It was agreed to hold further meetings in the near
Meanwhile more public organisations have expressed their support of the Government in its efforts to maintain peace.
A group of leading citizens representing some two hundred thousand residents and landlords of multi-storey building, met Mr. Sutcliffe, Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police, this afternoon and handed him a letter supporting Police efforts in the current disturbances,
The leader of the delegation said that residents of multi-storey building were vary much disturbed by the unfortunate disturbances in Kowloon.
The Director of Education today reminded school certificate candidates and invigilators for four centres that they should all report to King George The Fifth School at Mission Road to take the papers scheduled for tomorrow.
The school certificate examinations in all other centres will be held as scheduled.
/All
All other schools which normally have Saturday
Borning classes will be open as usual tomorrow.
Today the China Wail published the following editorial: Hong Kong's people have left no doubt about win they stand in this current unrest. They have rallied to the support of the Government in a manner that has surprised every-
one.
This is unusual in a city that is normally rather apathetic in voicing its collective opinion, It is for this reason that the Government places so much importance on this support.
The Governor, Sir David Trench, has received petitions or representation from almost eight hundred thousand people supporting the Government's firm stand for law and order.
There will no doubt be many more.
Compare this to the ten or twelve delegations from pro-Communist Organisations which have been visiting Government House. Many of these delegations contain the same faces over and over.
It is too early to predict victory but we can tell those "voices of doon" to pipe down. Hong Kong is too tough to let a few rabble rousers do permanent damage.
Just look at the plan already organised to reward Hong Kong policemen for their heroic behaviour and struggle on behalf of our people announced this morning. The policemen's educational fund is mushrooming with support coming from ordinary workers as well as big business.
Hong Kong is bouncing back.
For Boxall above copied.
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Office Mr. Boxall
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TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State
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D. 19 May 1967
R. 19
1 325Z
RECET.
ARCHIVI
62
IMMEDIATE SECRET
No.650
22. 1967
FD1/1
Addressed to Commonwealth Office
Repeated
H
Peking No.243
帽
Η
POLAD Singapore No.110
"Washington No.125
(S. of S. please pass to all)
My telegram No.632.
SITREP as at 19/1900 hours.
Confrontation with the Left-wing.
ра
12251-
They
As expected the pressure today has again been on Government House. Throughout the day, starting at about 1000 hours until 1700 hours, with short break at lunch time, groups from a wide range of Left-wing organisations including publishing circles, bankers, trade unions and particularly schools, have demonstrated outside Government House. formed up in the area of the Bank of China, marched in orderly, well-disciplined form up Garden Road to Government House where they chanted, sang the Thoughts of Hao and acted in an arrogant and noisy manner. Posters were again plastered on the walls and gates of Government House, but today they were more violent in nature, some exhorting the public to "beat up the British and foreigners". The demonstrators then marched off again, back to the Central District area, still in orderly well-disciplined form, chanting and singing the while: they dispersed in the area of the Bank of China. No petitions were presented.
2. It is estimated that during the day some 2,000 to 3,000 demonstratore were involved, but that at no one time were there more than 1,000 outside Government House. It is difficult to assess the effect which these demonstrations had on the local population: there was the expected normal Chinese curiosity and interest in such proceedings; some openly thought it a bit of a joke although naturally others were concerned. Particularly as to what might happen next.
3. A reliable source reports that the beft-wing emphasis is now on propaganda. Clearly the recent heartening gesturea of support for and confidence in the Government and in particular the Police has caused the Left-wing concern, hence the importance now placed on the battle for hearts and minds.
SECRET
14.
SECRET
At
So long as the Left-wing demonstrators continue to be well controlled and orderly (apart from singing and abuse) I intend to try letting them develop their full demonstrat: against my gates, and let them see where it gets them. worst, it is confining the trouble to one spot. The risk 18, of course, that the public at large will misunderstand the policy and think it one of excessive weakness. We are trying to counter this by discreet suitable publicity.
5. The position in Kowloon remained quiet. Cases against people involved in recent riots continued to be heard at both North and South Kowloon Courts. There were some crowds outside
the courts but on the whole they remained orderly.
6. I am taking my family to Fanling Lodge this weekend, on advice that my absence may damp down weekend demonstrations and because as much normality as possible is desirable. I shall be remaining quite well in touch and can get back into town very quickly, by helicopter if necessary.
(Passed as requested)
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Mr. Bolland and Mr. de la Mare)
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En clair
INWARD TELEGRAM
+
:.. 31
23 1967
FO 1/1
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Information Services)
D. 19 May, 1967.
R. 19
0335Z
61
pa Dast
191000 Standard Editorial.
For information.
"Hong Kong Standard" in editorial headed
"Mobs and the People" said today (Friday):- "Playing a leading role in disturbances in Kowloon are young stone-throwing and car-burning hooligans at forefront of mobs and agitators inciting them from rear.
Their law-breaking activities are however being given support by large numbers of people who are neither ruffians nor criminals and who in ordinary course of life are law-abiding members of community.
It is to be presumed that these people are taking part in mob action because of resentment against authority.
-
As in 1966 riot many appear to take satisfaction in making some gesture of defiance by ignoring appeals to disperse or by throwing a single stone in general direction of police.
These people may have genuine grievances. What they have failed to realise however is that it is one thing to seek to bring about improvements in a faulty system, it is quite another to strike at the foundations on which the system is based.
If power of Police to preserve law and order is destroyed all people of Hong Kong
of Hong Kong - rich and poor alike will suffer grievously.
Most people in Hong Kong are aware of this but unfortunately minority which has not (repeat not) yet appreciated this point is large enough to have provided trouble-makers with enough crowd backing to achieve their ends.
It is to be hoped that these people will come to realise that they are inviting disaster by giving encouragement and support to rioters and that this awakening process will be hastened as much as possible by all organisations that have the public ear.
Only lawless will benefit if structure of law and order is seriously damaged.
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Mr. Boxall
CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
Cypher
D. 19 May 1967
H R. 19
071 OZ
1
1:57
FD 1/
60
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25/
PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL
No.642
Present situation regarding disputes involving Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works and Green Island Cement Company Limited is as follows.
Hong Kong Artificial Flower Works
2.
Re-registration of workers preparatory to reopening of the factory on the island began at 8 a.m. yesterday. The procedure was carried out without incident and 178 workers out of total force of about 260 were registered by end of day. An announcement was made this morning that the factory would reopen on 20 May.
3. A petition from 100 workers from San Po Kong factory asking for resumption of work was presented to Labour Department on 16 May. Arrangements were made for talks between management and representatives of petitioners and these are in progress.
4. Representatives of 15 out of the 92 workers first dismissed from both factories sought assistance of Labour Department on 18 May. Talks were immediately arranged and a settlement has been reached.
5. No response has been made by Left-wing union concerned to offers of Labour Department to conciliate.
Green Island Cement Company Limited
6. 80 out of 491 workers dismissed have collected gratuities up to yesterday. It is believed more would collect but for pickets outside factory premises. Pickets vary in numbera but do not exceed abount 50 at any one time. No incidents have occurred. Operations in the factory have now been completely stopped. No response has been made by Left-wing union concerned to offers of Labour Department to conciliate.
General
7. The Commissioner of Labour made a public appeal by press and radio on 18th for those not prepared to accept his conciliation services to agree to mediation by independent persone.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
E
CONFIDENTIAL
59
Furi
(1046/67)
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
1 5 MAY 1967
FD1/1
Kear Joher,
1
office of the British Chargé d'Affaires,
PEKING.
29 April, 1967
folio 8
Thank you for your letter of 5 April,
enclosing a copy of a letter from Carter on the best way of dealing with allegations on Hong Kong's constitutional status.
2.
We agree with the line he proposes.
J. B. Denson, Esq.,
Yours wer
lived
(P. CRADOCK)
Copy & it Gaztel
Wiñara
C.o.
Far Eastern Department.
CONFIDENTIAL
fex 251
Cypher
IMMEDIATE
SECRET
No.632
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 18 May 1967 R. 18
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No 31
FD1/1
11 TOZ
p.a
(58
Addressed to Commonwealth Office
Repeated
H
H
H
Paking No.238 Singapore No.106 Washington No.120
(s. of S. please pass to all)
Ky telegram No.626.
SITREP as at 18 1700.
·FD1/18.52
During the night of 17/18 May up to
1700 hours today on the Kowloon side the re
have been sporadic small scale disturbances none of which have demanded major police intervention. It has not so far been thought necessary to impose a curfew,
2. The All Circles delegation which called at Government House on 17th returned today demanding peremptorily to see me. Hy offer to arrange for them to see the D.C.e at the Colonial Secretariat was refused in rude terms. After a period of chanting and singing, during which posters were fixed on the sentry box and outer gate of Government House, the delegation and its accompanying crowd eventually withdrew still singing. There have been several other delegations with petitions all equally arrogant, noisy and demanding, though at this stage still disciplined and avoiding violence. The pressure is now being switched on to me personally and we can expect this to continue with the additional problem that it is spreading disorder on to the island which has hitherto been mainly peaceful.
3. Left-wing sources have seized on a report that Lord Shackleton has announced that H.H.O. 18 prepared to suspend the state of emergency in Aden and release detainees in return for co-operation from Opposition political parties. Two sources have asked why we are standing firm on the question of upholding the law here when we are prepared to suspend it to suit political ends elsewhere. The facts of the case have been explained to them but we should be grateful to be kept informed of developments.
4. There have been fairly heavy withdrawals of bank deposita which appear to have affected the communist banks in aa great or greater measure as others. Bank note issue has been increased by £8 million (S(MK)136 million) since 15th May: the total circulation was 8(HK)1,751 million at 30 April 1967. Remaining reserves of notes in Colony stand
/at
SECRET
SECRET
at about 8(HK)400 million. Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank 18 arranging for further (HK)400 million to be flown to Colo U.S. dollars T.T. price on the local free market has risen to $5.81 as compared with $5.73 on 1st May; the price of gold has risen to $275 (8263 on 1 May).
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FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
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FD 1/1
5)
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Sent 17 May, 1967.
1967. 19502
ра
Leav
INKEDIATE SECRET No. 944.
Following from Commonwealth Secretary.
Kowloon disturbances.
I shall shortly be asking my colleagues to consider the issues raised in paragraph 4 of your telegram No. 600. But I should like to give you my own thoughts at this stage, and there are certain points on which I need your assessment.
2. I am sure our intention must be to remain in Hong Kong as long as it is physically possible for us to retain control of the situation. I wholeheartedly endorse your own conclusion that we should not accept a Macao-type compromise.
3. While we must obviously avoid an all-out confrontation with the C.P.G. if this can possibly be avoided, I recognise that this is unfortunately a risk in herent in the situation. I think therefore that our policy must be to continue to deal firmly with any disorders which the Communists may try to instigate, but at the same time to avoid so far as possible action which could be regarded as unnecessarily provocative. While I realise that in their present mood they will castigate any measures you take as provocative, I think it would probably be wise to avoid prosecutions against the pro- Communist press for e.g. sedition, which is usually difficult to prove and generally provides considerable opportunities for propaganda. The actual measures to be taken to deal with the situation at any given time must continue to be a matter of most careful judgment. I know that you will remain in the closest touch with us, and continue to consult with us about the actual choice of measures.
While continuing to show firmness in maintaining law and order, we must obviously continue with our efforts to maintain contact with the Left Wing, with a view to making clear to them that we are not prepared to face a Macao-type compromise. I agree with you (paragraph 5 of your telegram No. 609) that there is just a chance that by taking a very fire line, avoiding any unnecessary provocation but explaining our policy clearly to the C.P.G., there may be some prospect of inducing a change of Chinese attitude which would enable both sides to disengage without loss of authority on our part. I feel that, however difficult the outlook may be right now, we must keep to this course for so long as there is any chance of success. We do not altogether rule out that we may have to start a dialogue on these lines with the Chinese in
/Peking
SECRET
SECRET
+
Peking (because of the calibre of Chinese representation here there would be no point in our attempting this in London). But, as you know, such a dialogue would introduce several large complications, and for the time being at any rate we still think that the best hope of getting the message through to the Chinese lies in your using your local channels.
5. It would be very helpful to me to have your assessment of the ability of Hong Kong to cope with an all-out confrontation by the C.P.G. short of armed intervention, i.e. widespread disorders in the Colony coupled with the cutting off of Hong Kong's water and food supplies from the mainland, and your assessment of the effect on the morale of the Hong Kong Chinese if this situation lasted for some time, Could you organise alternative supplies of food, and what assistance would you need in this respect?
6. If, in your opinion, it would not be possible for Hong Kong to survive for long in the kind of situation foreseen in paragraph 5 above, once it became clear that the C.P.G. intended to go for all-out confrontation of this kind this might well be the point at which we should have to consider withdrawal from Hong Kong. This whole concept presents huge problems which must clearly relate to the point in time at which withdrawal became inevitable. No doubt you too will have given some thought to this, and we should in due course welcome your views generally on this range of problems.
7. Your assessment of the points in paragraphs 5 and 6 will be of greatest value to me in discussing this whole problem with my colleagues.
8. Finally, I should like you to know how much we admire the way you have handled this very difficult situation. Our thoughts are very much with you and your advisers in these anxious days.
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En Clair
OUTWARD TELEGRAM
FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
1
The Secretary of State)
TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
Sent 17 May 1967. 17352
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES N. 31
191 1967
FD1/1
ра
156
FLASH No.943
Addressed to Governor Hong Kong
Repeated
EF
H
Peking (IMMEDIATE, POLAD Singapore) Washington
(r)}(PRIORITY)
My immediately preceding telegram.
Following is text of statement:-
Begina.
H.M.G. consider it necessary to state the facts about the disturbances in Hong Kong.
2.
The recent disturbances in Kowloon arose from an industrial dispute in April between workers and their employers about wages and conditions of employment involving 650 workers in two factories producing artificial flowers. The injection moulding sections of both factories were closed and the workers were dismissed. A Settlement could not be reached in negotiations between employers and workers. The Labour Department of the Hong Kong Government offered its services in an effort to help the parties to reach agreement, but this offer was refused by both sides.
3. Disturbances broke out on the 6th May outside one of these factories situated in Kowloon. The police clearly informed those involved of the laws governing peaceful picketing, warned them repeatedly of the consequences of disorder and urged them to desist. These warnings went unheeded, and the police were therefore obliged to act to keep the peace. As a result, 21 persons were arrested. Subsequent efforts by the Labour Department to bring the parties together to discuss their difficulties and try to reach an agreed settlement were frustrated by the outbreak of further disorders on May 11th in the vicinity of the same factory. Again after repeated warnings the police were obliged to take action to keep the peace and 143 persons were arrested. There were more disorders in the same area between 12th and 14th May and a further 257 persons were arrested. All cases of arrest are being treated in the normal way in accordance with the due process of the law, By 17th May of those arrested 128 had been charged with riot, 100 with unlawful assembly, 91 with breaking the curfew and 88 with such offences as assault and affray. 14 have been released without charges preferred and 12 have been acquitted.
4. Throughout the disturbances the Hong Kong police, a number of whom were injured in the three days of rioting. have shown great restraint in carrying out their responsibilities and have used the minimum force.
15.
5. In labour matters the Hong Kong Government's policy is to make available the specialist services of its Labour Department to give impartial help to management and trade unions to settle any dispute that may arise between them. It has already done so on this occasion and remain ready to do all it can to facilitate a settlement.
6. The Hong Kong Government has an inescapable duty to maintain law and order as impartially and fairly as possible for the benefit of all in Hong Kong. H.M.G. fully support the Hong Kong Government in fulfilling its duty both in maintaining law and order and in the efforts it is making to bring about a settlement of the industrial dispute. It is emphasised that the original cause of these disturbances is a comparatively small industrial conflict which it should be possible to settle soon if the management and trade unions would sit down together to discuss it in reason and goodwill.
(Passed to D.S.A.0. for repetition to Peking,
PUKAD Singapore and Washington)
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FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
Cypher
Sent 17 May, 1967.
1705Z
PLASH SECRET
No. 942.
Addressed to Governor Hong Kong Repeated IMMEDIATE to Peking
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES Nc 31
11
1967
11/10]
55
PRIORITY
#
H
th FRIORITY
Your telegram No. 620,
Peking Statement.
POLAD Singapore Washington
-F01/1 folio 45
Text of statement that was issued here at 17.00 hours B.S.T. today 17 May is in our immediately following telegram. We are not handing a copy to the Chinese Mission here and we do not (repeat not) wish Hopson to give the Chinese a copy in Peking.
2.
Ministers have considered very carefully the points made in paragraphs 1 and 2 of your telegram under reference. The view 16, however, that if any reference is made to the Peking Statement it will undoubtedly lead to a counter-statement (although we accept that this may be the outcome in any case). We feel that public opinion in Hong Kong will realise that this is a rebuttal of Peking charges.
3.
For similar reasons paragraph 7 of your telegram No. 621 has not been included.
(Passed to D.S.A.0. for repetition to Peking,
POLAD Singapore and Washington)
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En clair
54,
INWARD TELEGRAM
CORKONFEALTH OFFICE..
(The Secretary of State)
RI
FROM HONG KONG (Information Officer)
D. 18 May, 1967.
R. 18
0603Z
RECEIVED 'N ARCHIVES No 31
1 9 MAY 1967
FD 1/1
Hong Kong Situation for Information,
Throughout whole of this morning peace and quiet prevailed in Kowloon. 111 people arrested during night and charged variously with unlawful assembly, common assault, intimidation, disorderly conduct appeared in Kowloon courts this morning but there were no demonstrations. Kost fires set by rampaging mobs of hooligans during night were of minor nature, predominantly rubbish fires in middle of roadways. Fire Services spokesman said the fires caused only negligible damage to property and there was no concerted effort on part of rioters to set fire to properties. An orderly group of about 300 Leftists demonstrated, singing Communist songs and chanting slogans outside Government House at eleven o'clock, About 30 posters posted on Government House gateway entrance.
For Boxall above copied.
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WWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Information Office)
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
19 MAY 1967
En Clair
D. 17 May 1967 R. 17
06152
PRESS
FD/1/1
ро
calv
People of Hong Kong are rallying behind Government in task of maintaining the peace which has been re-established in Hong Kong. Many appeals to residents to remain calm, respect the law and support the authorities have been issued by public organisations. Businessman, trade organisations and leading educationalists called for realistic approach to situation and there was unanimoue agreement that lawlessness should be checked immediately lest they lead to Hong Kong losing its image as business and tourist centre.
Federation of Hong Kong Industries said it had always supported right of labour to negotiate with management but added all labour disputes must be settled round conference table by peaceful means. Federation also recognised Government's role to maintain law and order and that Government does not interfere in legitimate rights of management or labour. Federation deplores disturbancea which could only bring about loss of confidence in Hong Kong's stability. There was grave danger that work done by Federation in interesting overseas manufacturers to bring new industries to Colony would be undermined. Federation added: "Success of Hong Kong industry has been built on co-operation of management and labour. This co-operation must continue and every effort must be made to restore confidence in Hong Kong so that people can continue to find employment and rising standard of living. Only through stability in industry can these be achieved.
Chinese Manufacturers Association said Hong Kong industry was in stage of difficulties. "It will lose foreign markets if peace cannot be restored. We hope a close co-operation between management and workers will be made and workers will be given reasonable wages. This is key to solve disputes between management and workers. If both parties calm down and try their best without any prejudice to seek early, settlement, we are sure that problem will easily be solved."
Tung Wah Group of hospitals, Hong Kong's leading charitable organisation, appealed to all residents to remain calm and called for early settlement of labour dispute. It urged people to co-operate with Government in maintenance of peace.
Hong Kong Teachers Association, with membership of nearly 6,000 appealed to all school teachers and pupils to "take calm look at situation and refrain from taking part in any activities that may likely lead to a disturbanc
Unofficial members of Urban Council last night appealed to residents to remain calm, respect the law and support Government in efforts to find fair and just solution to present difficulties. Livelihood of residents, they said, depended on maintenance of law and order without which there could not be continued prosperity and happiness. Hong Kong had achieved much for better
/life
life of its citizens. There had been quickening tempo of achieve- mentɛ notably in fields of housing, education and provision of recreational facilities. Urban Council members believed even more progress would be made to improve living conditions of communit ̈ if all sections would co-operate closely to achieve this aim.
Hong Kong Tourist Association said disturbances might not affect tourist trade but it was too early to make assessment. Association recalled that Kowloon disturbances last year did not have any such effect. Up to present moment Association had not heard of any cancellations of tours or of tourists leaving because or situation. Colony had gone through many troubles at other times and had always managed to pull through. Association expressed confidence that Colony could do so again,
Many readers letters appearing in correspondence colume supported Government's actions in re-establishing peace and normal conditions.
One hundred workers of the Hong Kong artificial flowers factory at San Po Kong have appealed to Hong Kong's Commissioner of Labour to help them get back to work. signed their names to petition which was taken to Labour Department yesterday.
They
It may be recalled that on 8th May, 6 workers claiming to represent 200 or more workers in San Po Kong plastic flower factory approached Labour Department to convey to management their request to return to work. A joint meeting between these representatives and management took place in Labour Department on 10th May when both parties agreed in principle to resumption of work in Hong Kong and that all acceptable workers would be re-employed. This resumption has not taken place because of disturbances in Kowloon on 11th May. On 11 th May also, management agreed to discussions with Left-wing representatives provided these were held in Labour Department and not in the factory. With the restoration of peace and order, every effort is being made by Labour Department to reopen the negotiations between workers and management.
Heung Yee Kuk, advisory bodies in New Territories, appealed to Hong Kong residents to "approach our present difficulties with calmness" The Heung Yee Kuk said the present situation was not unlike events following bank crisis în 1964 and Kowloon riots last year. These disturbances had radically affected livelihood and wellbeing of Hong Kong residents, the Heung Yee Kuk said, Heung Yee Kuk said it believed majority of Hong Kong people were glad to see that scope of disturbances had not been extended. It said that all residents of New Territories shared its views.
(Correction being obtained)
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52
En clair
PRIORITY No. 626
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 18 May, 1967. R. 18
00452
Addressed to Commonwealth Office Repeated
10
Peking No. 237 and
X117
POLAD Singapore No.104.
My telegram No. 624 refers.
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES NG 31
19 MAY 1967
FD 1/1
&
cşlu
There were a number of incidents during the late afternoon and evening (17th) in the curfew area of West Central Kowloon in which crowds stoned various buildings including hotels, banks and several Government offices in the Nathan Road area and were successfully dispersed by police using gas shells and wooden projectiles. Several small fires started by rioters were successfully extinguished. Some damage done to traffic lights and road signs etc. The situation appeared to have been exploited by known criminal elements who were encouraging crowds of hooligans in a manner which makes clashes with the police inevitable,
2.
Because of regrouping of crowds outside curfew zone, the zone was extended at midnight to include Sham Shui Po, Kowloon Tong, Shek Kip Mei and Lai Chi Kok - that is, North West Kowloon. By 10.30 p.m. the situation in West Central Kowloon was mainly quiet and in the extended curfew zone activity was confined to scattered and comparatively minor incidents. By 01.00 hrs. (18th) peace had returned to the curfew areas and all but two police companies had returned to base. The curfew was lifted at 04.00 hra. Total number of persons arrested between 08.00 on 17 May and 06.00 18 Kay is 131. Four policemen slightly injured, no prisoner casualties, two civilians injured, both hospitalised. 203 gas shells and 125 wooden projectiles fired.
3.
Twelve Kowloon schools in vicinity of the Magistracy where the disturbances recommended will remain closed today. All other schools in Kowloon will be opened.
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CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
Cypher
សំដី
D. 17 May, 1967. R. 17
01302
PRIORITY
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 31
1
1967
FR1/11
51
tot too bad
ཡིག་
CONFIDENT LAL
No. 624.
Addressed to Commonwealth office.
Repeated
サ
H
"Peking No. 235.
"POLAD Singapore No.
1
102.
"Washington No. 118. (S. of S. please
pass to all).
FD1/1/33
My previous telegram No. 618 refers.
This morning two separate cases arising out of disturbances were due to be heard in two different courts.
&
2. At the South Kowloon Magistracy the 20 defendants whose cases could not be heard yesterday because of court room disturbances did not reappear at 9 a.m. The Magistrate delayed the hearing until 10 a.m. in case there had been a misunderstanding but the defendants who are on bail still did not reappear. Magistrate then issued bench warrants for their arrest, but this is not being effected immediately.
The
3. At the North Kowloon Magistracy this morning a film studio photographer appeared for trial but a well-disciplined chanting of Mao made the trial impossible. The case was deferred until 2.30 p.m. and because the demonstrators refused to leave the court room it was decided to transfer the case to the South Kowloon Magistracy.
4. While court hearings proceeded during the afternoon at the South Kowloon Magistracy crowds formed in neighbouring streets. There was chanting and throwing of bottles. When the police intervened they were stoned. Nine police companies were deployed in clearing the streets during the afternoon leading to the arrest of eight persons and the injuring of one police constable. Three baton shells were fired and gas was used.
5. In view of the situation, I authorised the imposition of a curfew over West-Central Kowloon from 7.30 p.m. to 4.30 p.m.
6. During the day slogan bearing posters and copies of Left Wing newspapers have been appearing on a number of walls and shop windows. In some cases these have resulted in incidents which did not however escalate. In addition seven groups have presented petitions at the gates of Government House showing varying degrees of belligerence which has tested patience but has not caused any major incidents.
(Passed as requested:
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FLASH SECRET No. 625.
RECEIVED 'N ARCHIVES NG 31
Rally
1
1967
FO/I
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 17 May, 1967. R. 17
1558Z
ра
50
Addressed to Commonwealth Office Repeated PRIORITY to Peking No.236, to P.A. Singapore No. 103
H
++ Washington No. 119
(Commonwealth office please pass to all)
48
Peking telegram No. 504 to Foreign Office.
I would have no objection to specific reference
to Chinese M.F.A. statement being avoided. Perhaps "H.M.G. consider that the Chinese Government have been misinformed about the actual course of recent events leading to disturbances in Hong Kong.
The true facta
etc"
would do.
(Passed as requested)
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SECRET
ра
Brivate Secretary
" NG KONG
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No 31.
11967
FD1/1
1
¿
49
The Secret¬ry of state has asked why we agreed that the
statement on the isturbances be put out by the Commonwealth
office in London and not in Hong Kong, as he approved on
Monday, 15 Kay.
2. The reasons were:
(a) The Governor of Hong Kong had already made a statement
on Monday without consulting London. As directed by
the Secretary of State, the Governor was asked to explain
Phan-fhi 38 this. Ke did so in paragraph 1 of his telegram No. 12.
accepted that, as he had put out this statezent
les B-pkó (42) (text attached) sajing, inter sligh that "an anrver pust
come from K.M.G. în Lo'don", we should not insist that be
put out another.
(b) The Governor argued strongly thịt the reaction of
ordinary citizens in Hồng Kong to Communist pressure was
going to be cancdal · nd would depend on their judgerent
of H.M.U. C-termination to resist pressure and to
The
upold the Governor in reintaining law and order.
Governor was qui e olear that it was a statement from
London thɛt was needed.
(0) The reason fer our original recommendation that the
staterent be put out in Hong Kong was to try to avoid
a polerical exchange with fo‹ing and to concentrate attention on the local, primarily industrial issues in-
volved. Having accepted he Governor's argurenta in
(a) and (b), the Commonwealth Office and we thought wa
could still achieve this result by issuing a factual non-polericsl statement and having it put out by the
SECRET
/Cormonwealth
BECHE
2.
3.
Commonwealth Office rather than by the Foreign Office.
We decided, however, that we should divorce our own
statement as much as possible from that made by Peking
and therefore did not accept the Governor's recommendations
that we should Lantion the Peking statement and refer
to its "desands".
The Governor recommended that we put out our statement as
soon as possible bac¬se public expressions of support for the
Government which was beginning to make itself falt needed an
additional boost. Commonwealth Office Kiniutera took the view
that in these circumstan es a statement should be issued hers
forthwith. In the secretary of State's absence, we therefore
cleared the draft statement with Mr. Hodgers and the Permanent
Gader-Secretary. I also left copy in the Private Office
with a verbal explsantion of our action as the afternoon box
was just being closed.
The statement was put out by the Commonwealth Office at
5.00 p.m. yesterday.
Mr. Rodgers
P.U.S.
Mr. de la Kare
CHC-ET
(E. Bolland)
18 May, 1967
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
1 8 MAY 1967
FD1/1
ST CRET
Cypher/Cat A
PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno 504 17 May, 1967
SECRET
48
OP COP
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.504 of 17 May, Repeated for information to Hong Kong, Singapore and Washington.
(46)
Hong Kong telegram No.621 to Commonwealth Office.
4
I question desirability of specifically referring to Chinese V.F.A. statement, but if Governor thinks this is important I am content.
Foreign Office please pass Washington 265.
Sent 13482/17 May Recd 14222/17 May
Mr. Hopson
[Repeated as requested]
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K.117
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RECEIVED
ALVES No. 31
Ne
1 7 MAY 1967
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FLASH RESTRICTED No. 623
FDI/1 34
Addressed to Commonwealth Office
Repeated
#
Ħ
Peking No. 233,
POLAD Singapore No.101
and Washington No.101
за
(3. of S. please pass to others Routine)
Peking telegram No. 494.
Hong Kong Disturbances.
Offences with which accused have been charged
are as follows:
Riot : 128
Unlawful assembly: 100
Breaking curfew: 91
Other miscellaneous offences (e.g. assault,
common assault and affray) : 88
Released without charge: 14.
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For
Cypher
FLASH "SECRET No.621
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 17 May 1967
R. 17
0828Z
Addressed to Commonwealth Office
Repeated
Π
H
H
"Peking No.232
RII
"POLAD Singapore No.100
Washington No.116
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
1 7 MAY 1967
Folli
ре
(3. of S. please pass to all)
My immediately preceding telegram.
Peking Statement.
Following is suggested redraft.
"X.M.G. consider that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in making their statement of May 15 about disturbances in Hong Kong are misinformed about the actual course of events. The true facts are as follows:-
2. As in first sub-paragraph 2 of your telegram under reference.
3. Disorders broke out on the 6th May outside one of these factories which was situated in Kowloon. The police clearly informed those involved of the laws governing peaceful picketing, warned them repeatedly of the consequences of disorder and urged them to desist. These warnings went unheeded; and the police were therefore obliged to act to keep the peace. As a result 21 persons were arrested. Subsequent efforts by the Labour Department to bring the parties together to discuss their difficulties and try to reach an agreed settlement were frustrated by the outbreak of further disorders on May 11 in the vicinity of the same factory. Again after repeated warnings the police were obliged to take action to keep the peace and 143 persons were arrested. There were more disorders in the same area between 12 and 14 May and a further 257 persons were arrested. All cases of arrest are being treated in the normal way in accordance with the due process of the law,
4. Throughout the disturbances the Hong Kong police have shown great restraint in carrying out their responsibilities and have used the minimum force. A number of them were injured in the three days of rioting.
5. In labour matters the Hong Kong Government's policy is to make available the special services of its Labour Department to give impartial help to management and trade unione to settle any dispute that may arise between them. already done so on this occasion and remains ready to do all it can to facilitate a settlement.
It has
16.
SECRET
1
SECRET
6. The Hong Kong Government has an inescapable duty to maintain law and order as impartially and fairly as possible for the benefit of all in Hong Kong. H.M.G. fully support the Hong Kong Government in fulfilling its duty both in maintaining law and order and in the efforts it is making to bring about a settlement of the industrial dispute. It is emphasised that the original cause of these disturbances is a comparatively small industrial conflict which it should be possible to settle soon if the management and trade unions would sit down together to discuss it in reason and goodwill.
7. In the light of the facts of the situation M.M.G. aro unable to accept that the demands now made by the Chinese Government are justified."
(Passed as requested)
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Wilaọn, Mr. de la Mare)
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KID
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FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 17 May 1967 R. 17
0809Z
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
1 7 MAY 1967
FDI/1
FLASH SECRET No.620
Addressed to Commonwealth Office
Repeated
H
11
"Peking No.231
" POLAD Singapore No.99 "Washington No.115
(Please pass to all)
FD1/1 (43
Your telegram No.928,
4-5
ра
こん
Peking Statement.
I would prefer to see something more positive in tone. One of my major anxieties at the present time is to do everything possible to maintain public morale and confidence, without which our position here would be untenable.
2. I think therefore that we ought to make it clear:-
(a)
(b)
that we do not accept Peking's charges as a true statement of the facts;
and
demands'
that in the light of the true facta of the matter H.M.G. cannot accept that the are justified.
If we do not plainly state our attitude towards the 'demande, Peking are surely certain to return to the charge.
3.
On matters of detail:
(a) In view of the traditional Chinese disinterest
in the concept of the 'law' I would prefer to avoid the phrase to maintain law and order' in the first and fourth sentences of the
2nd paragraph, and instead to use to preserve the peace'.
(b) It seems necessary to make the point that both
on 6th and 11th May the police acted only after giving repeated unheeded warnings to the crowds;
ê
(c)
In fact, or the 421 arrested up to morning of 17th May, 313 have been committed, 14 have been discharged, 12 have been acquitted and 82 cases are pending. The figures for those bailed varies from day to day as cases are heard and it has
/only
SFC.FT
(a)
SECRET
only ephemeral significance. In general, I am not sure that I see advantage in going into a) these figures in the statement; Peking have already said that over 400 people were arrested and on that point at least they are right.
The reference to the restraint shown by the police night specifically make the point (which has been widely commented on by impartial observers) that only minimum force was used.
(e) The sentence about discussions between management
and trade unions ought to be qualified by the addition of a phrase like 'in reason and goodwill'. Discussions with the Left-wing unions have been rendered valueless in many recent disputes by their use of Maoist tactics of intimidation and the irrational chanting of slogans, etc.
4. A proposed redraft of the statement is in my immediately following telegram.
5. I hope it will be possible to issue statement very soon as public expressions of support for Government have reached something of a crescendo, and timing would be favourable.
6. I have now seen Peking telegram No.494 and will provide figures additional to those in my telegram No.606 as soon as I can.
(Passed as requested)
(Advance copias passed to Mr. de la Mare, Mr. Bolland
and Mr. Wilson)
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CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFIC
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 16 May 1967
R. 16
R117
44)
LIVED IN AYURVES No.31)
1 7 MAY 1967
FDI/I
15302
pay
IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL No.619
FDILI 37
Addressed to Commonwealth Office Repeated
Peking No.229
POLAD Singapore No.98)
Singapore 20UTINE 17
(s. of S. please pass to both)
My telegram No.609.
Hong Kong
Indications are that in the immediate future the emphasis of Left-wing activity will be on the presentation of petitions at Government House in the most provocative and unruly way possible. Today petitions were presented by 11 delegations over a continuous period of six hours and it required the greatest restraint on the part of my ADCs to prevent trouble. The size of the delegations is growing and we believe that for example on 18 May 200 delegates will present a petition from one union.
2. I am accordingly making arrangements to restrict the entry of petitioners into Government House grounds; but I am providing reasonable facilities for the acceptance of petitions at the gate.
3. I doubt however if these arrangements will be effective for long, or that they can be enforced without disorder. It is probable further measures will soon have to be taken to keep unruly crowds away from Government House.
(Passed as requested)
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SECRET
OUTWARD TELEGRAM
FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
TO (1) HONG KONG
2) PEKING
Sent 16 May 1967. 1930Z
(1) N6.928
Addressed to Governor Hong Kong
H FLASH to Peking Repeated for information PRIORITY to:
Fail!
Your telegram No.612.
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No 31
1 MAY 1967
43)
FD1/11
FD!|!
p.a
だん
Polad Singapore Washington
Peking Statement.
Subject to Ministerial agreement, we accept that a statement should be issued in London as soon as possible and a copy handed to the acting Chinese Chargé d'Affaires.
2. We propose the following draft:
Begins.
"The recent disturbances in Kowloon arose from an industrial dispute in April between workers and their employers about wages and conditions of employment involving 650 workers in two factories producing artificial flowers. The injection moulding sections of both factories were closed and the workers were dismissed. A settlement could not be reached in negotiations between employers and workers. The Labour Department of the Hong Kong Government offered its services in an effort to help the parties to reach agreement, but this offer was refused by both sides.
The
Disorders broke out on the 6th May outside one of these factories which was situated in Kowloon, police intervened to maintain law and order and, as a result, 21 persons were arrested. Subsequent efforts by the Labour Department to bring the parties together to discuss their differences and try to reach an agreed settlement were frustrated by the outbreak of further disorders on the 11 th May in the vicinity of the same factory. The police were called in to restore law and order and 60 persons were arrested. There were more disorders in the same area until the 14th May. About 400 in all have been arrested and the law requires that they should be brought before the courts for trial. Meanwhile... persons have been released on bail,
SECRET
/The
J
SECRET
The Hong Kong Government's policy is to make available the specialist servicea of its Labour Departme to give impartial help to management and trade unions to settle any disputes which may arise between them. It has already done so on this occasion and remains ready to continue to do all it can to facilitate a settlement. In the same way, the Hong Kong Government has an inescapable duty to maintain law and order as impartially and as fairly as possible for the benefit of all in Hong Kong The Hong Kong police, a number of whom have been injured in the three days of disturbances, have shown great restraint in carrying out these responsibilities.
Her Majesty's Government fully support the
Hong Kong Government in fulfilling its duty in maintaining law and order and in the efforts it is making to bring about a settlement of the industrial dispute. It is emphasised that the original cause of these disturbances was a comparatively amall industrial dispute which it should be possible to settle soon if the management and trade unions concerned would sit down together to discuss it."
Ends.
3. Grateful for your and Peking's urgent comments. Also for number of persons released on bail for inclusion in statement.
(To Washington only)
4. Previous telegrams on this subject will be in tomorrow's bag.
(Passed to D.8.A.0. for transmission to Peking and
repetition to Washington and Singapore)
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= = =
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D.1.0. J.I.R. Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Bolland
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Denson
Mr. Foggon
SECRET
OSEAGRAM LN LH A
LHX156: 06297 V4255 CD6775
MTIGKONG
338 15 1915 /338 15 1915
ESS
PAPELRIES LONDON
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
1 7 MAY 1967
4-2
En clair
You
Futu
Kon Hongkong (habe
D15.5.67
615.86712327
***AT HONGKONG GOVERNORS STATEMENT FOR
"MATION"://FOT
**MATION
MOST MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC WILL ALREADY BE AWARE FROM THEIR HOST NEWSPAPERS OR FROK FROADCASTING SERVICES THAT A POTEST HAS BEEN HANDED TO THE BRITISH CHARCE DAFFAIRES IN PERING REGARDING THE EVENTS IN HONGKONG OVER THE LAST FEW DAYS TOP
HONGKONG
COE-474245 RT
CREAT
THIS STATEMENT DESCRIPES POLICE ACTION AS QVOJE PERSECUTION " UNQUOTE AUF WOT:"SUPPRESSION LIQUOIE AND, SPEAKS OF JUOTE HOSTILE MEASURES AGAINST CHINA IN HONG KONG "TA MANY PEOPLE. I HAVE NO DOUBT COMMA WILL BL ANXIOUS TO KNOW WHAT ANSWER THIS GOVERNMENT IS GOING TO MAKE TO THESE STATEMENTS
23/50
SIAY THEY MAY BE DISAPPOINTED WHEN ALL WE CAN SAY IS THAT THIS PROTEST HAS BEEN MADE TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN PEKING AND THAT AN ANSWER MUST THEPEFORE ☛ COME FROM HER NAJESTYS GOVERNMENT IN LONDON ¿ STOP YET THIS IS THE POSITION AND NOTHING AT ALL
P4
TE
Sir D. Allen
5
SECRET
(40) Ent
RIVED I ARCHIVES No.31
1 7 MAY 1967
FD1/1
2.
HONG KONG
There are two decisions which we have to take very quickly.
The first, which must be made today, is whether the trial
of the twenty-odd agitators arrested on 6 Hay should proceed
tomorrow (Hong Kong time) as planned.
3. The second decision, which is not so immediate, is how we
reply to the Chinese statement about these disturbances, of
which our Mission in Peking has been handed a copy by the
Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
4. We have discussed this with our colleagues in the
Commonwealth Office. Our view on the trial is that there are
three alternatives:
(a) to postpone the trial for, say, 48 hours
in order to see how matters develop;
(b) to start the trial tomorrow as planned
but to seek an adjournment, perhaps on grounds
that further evidence is required, and to
re-offer bail which the men detained have
already been offered but have refused;
(c) to proceed with the trial as planned and
let the law take its course. Since the
charges are for illegal picketing it does not
appear that prison sentences would be involved.
One of the agitators who pleaded guilty when
tried on 8 May was fined HK$100. We cannot
/be
SECRET
SECRET
2
5.
be sure that some of the other defendents may
not have more serious charges laid against them
but on the evidence we have we assume that
fines of HK$100 (£6.5.0.) would probably meet
the situation.
Our objection to (a) is that if we show weakness from the
outset we believe that the Chinese will instigate the Hong Kong
dissidents to increase their pressure and demands against us.
6. Our objection to (b) is that, as far as we know, the
prosecution has prepared its case and if we ask for an
adjournment for further evidence this also would look like a
sign of weakness.
7. We therefore conclude that we should proceed as at (c).
We accept that in view of the demands contained in Peking'a
statement, one of which is that all the persons arrested
should immediately be set free, this may appear provocative
both in Hong Kong and in Peking and may lead to serious
escalation of the pressures against us.
But our view,
subject to Ministers' decision, is that increasing pressure is
going to be put upon us anyway and that this will be less rather
than greater if we do not give the appearance of backing down
immediately but take the position that the law of the Colony
must be upheld.
8. We shall submit separately on the second decision, i.e.
how to deal with Peking's statement.
CA. de la man
(A.J. de la Mare)
SECRET
15 May 1967
/Copies
L
WOULD BE SAINED BY MAKING OBSERVATIONS FROM HERE
28 /
HOWEVER THERE IS NO REASON WHY I★ SHOULD NOT AD
ECALL THE ASSURANCES WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY GIVEN TO THE PUBLIS
ABOUT THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE AND ORDER
THESE INCLUDE
ASSURANCE FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF LAEOUR THAT THE
* INVOLVE POLICE DO NOT REPEAT HOT AND WILL NOT REPE THEMSELVES IN LAPOUR DISPUTES FUT WILL ONLY ENFORCE THE LAW WHEN IT IS PROKEN OPP THEY ALSO INCLUDE THE ASSURANCE GIVEN ON THE SAME DAY THAT THE POLICY OF THE COVERNMENT 13 NOW AS ALWAYS TO MAINTAIN THE LAW"
LANY
LOJA
I
AS IMPARTIALLY AND AS FAIRLY AS POSSIBLE FOR THE ELNEFIT OF ALL SEMICOLOR THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THIS POLICY OR IN THE GOVERNMENTS, POLICY OF NOT A TAKING SIDES IN INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES
Panda
Hi I MAKE NO APCLOGY FOR PEPEATING
THESE ASSURANCES ALTHOUGH THEY ARE NOT REPEAT
C
AVE, COMMENT UPON THE PROTEST NOTE TO WHICH I HAVE REFERREU STOP IN REPEAT THEM PECAUSE I AM SURE THAT THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE AND ORDER IS THE DEAREST WISH OF ALMOST EVERYONE IN OUR COMMUNITY G'BS INSANT
COL SHED
+
1
P
1
•
+
I
SECRET
41
Flag A FD1/1/1, bal
Flag B
Fri!!
a
0020
Er. de la Mare
HONG KONG
EVED IN
{ARCHIVES No.31
1 7 MAY 1967
Folli
Euti
You referred in your submission earlier today to the problem
of how we should handle the Peking statement. We discussed this
with our colleagues in the Commonwealth Office and decided that
we should set out our preliminary views in a telegram to the
Governor, Hong Kong (copy attached) before submitting to
Ministers.
2.
Briefly, we came down in favour of not replying directly
to Peking's statement but, subject to the views of Ministers
and the Governor, Hong Kong, of the latter making a firm but
non-polemical statement on the situation in the Colony and the
policy we intend to pursue .
3. Just as this telegram was about to issue, we received the
attached press telegram from Hong Kong showing that the Governor
had already issued a statement without reference to London.
We thought nevertheless that our telegram should issue with an
additional paragraph 8, because we still think that any comment
on the Peking statement should be made indirectly in Hong Kong
rather than by a formal reply in Peking or London.
C.0.
P.U.S.
Mr. Samuel
Mr. Carter, C.0.
The
Во
Follan
(E. Bolland) 15 May, 1967
* We have held it pending your
decision.
+
Semaly of State agreed subject to miner свете Amendments. Telegram sent by C.O.-9195 Hong Kong.
SECRET
PA.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(s).
WITH 41
Registry No.
DEPARTMENT
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
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Secret
Confidential
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Dill
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Despatched
Flash
frantediate}
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In Confidence
Cypher
Draft Telegram to:-
No...
(Date)
And to:-
PONI, LUNJkkan coklat m
❤--.--IIJELLJJ.
LLJJIL
[Being despatched by C.O.]
[Security classification] -if any
[
Privacy marking -if any
[Codeword-if any]
Addressed to
telegram No.........
And to
SECRET
L
17
.
.LLINOLJNA
JJ LLOJ - c
]
INPELL -
..
HUNG KONG
.. ------ K DAN StemmITOIRE EL JE
sapa HIT.
----
(date)
repeated for information to
... .
ILI
+Hπ---
PEKING
POLAD SINGAPORE
Saving to.....
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POLAD SINGAPORE
Saving to:-
Distribution:-
JIC EXPL.
Copies to:
Cabinet Office
D.I.O. J.I.A.
F.0.
Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Bolland
Your telegram No. 609: Peking Statement.
We think that Peking will probably be prepared
to engaged in a prolonged war of nerves. It is on
this assumption we have been considering how to handle
the Peking statement preparatory to submitting to
Ministers.
2. There appear to be four alternatives:
3.
(a) for Hopson to return the statement because it
is offensive;
(b) to ignore it;
(c) to refute it in detail;
(n}
(d) to issue a atatement of our own explaining
what has happened and the policy we intend to
pursue.
We cannot see that there is anything to be gained
by returning it: to slam the door in this way would
Mr. Wilson
Kr. Denson
Mr. Foggon
only aggravate the situation.
SECRET
/4.
postope in dicationg
that it was
approved by H.M.9,
SECRET
We cannot altogether ignore it because we
imagine public opinion in Hong Kong will expect
some response and be concerned to know what
Land that any
attitude we intend to adopt
undertainty
about this could very seriously affect local
confidence and morale.
5. To refute it in retail would be to play Be Kings
thefr/game and lay us open to a further round
of polemical exchanges which might cause Peking to adopt a more rigid position and to raise their
demands.
6.
We therefore
Nevertheless, we think that for the reasons
given in paragraph ↳ above you should make
a short statement] along the following lines: outlining the recent events, noting their origin
in an industrial dispute, explaining the means
available for settling such disputes and
confiding our intention of firmly but fairly
maintaining law and order. By this means we would
enn hope to avoid polemics and any reference to the unacceptable demands in Peking's statement,
we' which would be bound to arise were we to try to
explain the position directly to the Chinese Government either here or in Peking (Para. 6 of
your telegram under æeference).
7. Grateful for your views on this assessment
and, unless you see objection to the course suggested, please telegraph urgently a draft
statement for consideration by Ministers.
8.
As we were about to despatch this telegram, we received your prese telegram giving text of
Grateful to know your statement today.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
reasons why you made this statement now.
It
does not invalidate views expressed above and we
would still like to have your comments on them
draft
and a statement.
SECRET
SECRET
- 3-
Copies to: P.U.S.
Private Office
Mr. Rodgers
A similar recommendation
on the
Frial is being submitted in the C.O.
J
that it should be allowed
agree
to proceed.
Denis All."/s.
(P.U.S. har him (pp).
Rivet Sexy
The secretary of Stati has apred.
C.O informed. They will despatch titipe
со
Cum
15/1
pa.
SECRET
E
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
1, MAY 1967
FDI/1
3の
Cypher
D. 15th May 1967 R. 15th
05292
FLASH SECRET No.607
Forli ED
Addressed to Commonwealth Office Repeated
Peking No.221
Reply send. ра p.a.
"POLAD Singapore No.89
(Please pass FLASH to both)
Peking telegram No.478.
Kowloon Disturbances.
ごっつん
The M.F.A. statement, which has been published here this morning in a special edition of 'Wen Wei Pao', seems to take psychological warfare about as far as it can go. We have at present no clear indications of what physical action, if any, will be taken to back it up. But the statement that the "750 million people of China" are behind them will encourage the Left-wing rank-and-file to think that they need place no restraint on their actions; and we know that trade union circles have already been talking about starting disturbances in 6 or 8 places at once in the belief that this would overstretch the police (as it might).
2.
An immediate problem arises from the fact that the 21 workers arrested in the incident of 6th May are due to appear for trial in the South Kowloon Magistrates' Court tomorrow 16th May at 9 a.m. local time. If they do, it will be clear that we have rejected one of the "four demande", and judging by a reference in a "Wen Wei Pao" editorial this morning to the "impermissibility" of prosecuting them, this may be the signal for trouble.
3. It would be possible to adjourn the hearing for a further period. This would have the disadvantage of simply putting off the evil day, while giving more time for the Left to develop their agitation and organise counter-measures. On the other hand, it could provide a breathing space in which to attempt to initiate negotiations. On the whole, I incline to the view that a 48-hour adjournment might be justified, especially as it would also provide more time for views on the major issues posed by the note to be formed in London: on the other hand, if the view is that we should resist the pressure fully it would be better to give no ground by adjourning.
4. I would be grateful for instructions at least on this particular issue in the next ten to twelve hours.
(Passed to D.§.A.0. for Resident Clerk as advance copy
and for repetition to Peking and Singapore)
SECRET
Cypher
FLASH
SECRET To.612
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMON"BALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 16th May 1967
R. 16th
0522Z
Addressed to Commonwealth office Repeated Peking No.224
RECEIVED
ARCHIVES No. 51.
1 7 MAY 1967
西川
ра
" POLAD Singapore No.93 (Please pass IMMEDIATE to Peking
PRIORITY to Singapore)
Fall 130
Your telegram No.919.
38
Peking Statement.
I made the statement referred to in your paragraph 8 because there was great public pressure and need for some explanation of the situation. To have refused or delayed comment could have had a most damaging effect on local confidence and morale.
2.
At a meeting of my Executive Council this morning the point was made with unanimous support that the reaction of the ordinary citizens of Hong Kong to Left-wing pressure (and this after all is going to be crucial during the next few weeks) would depend on their judgment of how H.M.G. in London would react to that pressure, and whether H.M.G. also was fully determined that law and order be maintained. I am sure that if, as your telegram under reference appears to suggest, H.H.G. were to avoid making any statement or reply to the Chinese protest, it would be suspected here that their attitude to the Chinese demande was equivocal and Hong Kong was being left to sink or awin on its own. The invariable practice in the past has been for replies to Chinese Notes of protest to be made in London or Peking, not Hong Kong. Por me to make a second statement on the lines you suggest in paragraph 6 would not be accepted here as a proper substitute for a firm statement of views by H.M.G. and I do not advise it.
3. I entirely agree with your objections to alternatives (a) (b) and (c) of your paragraph 2 and I would hope therefore that Ministers would agree to the making of a firm official statement in London, to include the admirable points made Hopson to Vice-Minister in Peking (his telegram No.482)-But I feel that it is equally important that an oral exposition of H.M.G.'s views should be given concurrently to the Chinese Chargé d'affaires in London. It seems to me essential to try by every means we can to get the Chinese Government (repeat Government) to understand our essentially reasonable position. If the discussion with the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires were used to ram home the same points, it need not be barrenly polemical and it might be possible to avoid detailed discussion of the "demands". Only by the maintenance of personal contacts of this kind does it seen likely that an eventual solution may emerge.
1440
SECRET
25-
SECRET
مبا
If you accept these views, it would seen that a statement would be better drafted in London.
5. Your telegram No.918. We have done this so often in the recent past that I doubt whether it would have any effect at this moment. It is a point we try to keep constantly in front of the public.
(Passed as requested)
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-
Hr. de la Mare
-
Mr. Bolland
H
肿
-
Mr. Wilson
Hr. Denson Mr. Foggon
SECRET
+
Cypher
PLASH BEER T
No. 609.
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO_THE_COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 15th May, 1967.
R. 15th
1000Z
RECEIVED ARCHIVES No. 31
1 7 MAY 1967
pal
Foll1 (39
f
Addressed to Commonwealth Office Repeated
Peking No.223
POLAD Singapore No.91
(Please pass FLASH to both).
My telegram No. 607.
Hong Kong.
The position on the ground at 1400 hours today 15th May remained quiet. There are no indications of unusual occurrences in the frontier area.
2.
But it is clear that as a result of the Chinese M.F.A. 's statement we are now very near indeed to facing the choices mentioned in paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 600. The demands leave little leeway for negotiation.
We cannot offer apologies or compensation or even provide effective guarantees' against the occurrence of similar incidents without accepting a situation in which the left-wing here are above the law. Some of those arrested have already been sentenced and though acts of clemency might be justifiable in certain cases, they certainly would not be in all. Again while the disposal of the 20 original offenders is still within the jurisdiction of the courts and some might be bound over, this cannot of course be guaranteed.
3.
It may well be worth attempting during the next 48 hours (if the court hearings are adjourned) to discover whether behind the demands there is really any scope for negotiation.
We are pursuing our efforts in this direction, but it seems unlikely that anything usefull will result.
40
If the left-wing stick firmly by the four demands, we must face the fact that any further attempt to seek a compromise would in the middle-term at any rate mean an abdication of our position here. Hong Kong would almost at once cease to be attractive to investment;
the proble" of maintaining any control or authority over left-wing activities would intensify; and H.M.G. would not only be discredited but saddled with an increasing economic burden. In my view this position would only be tolerable if our aim was to buy time in order to negotiate an orderly withdrawal (even if the Chinese allowed us to achieve that).
SECRET
15:
5.
SECRET
The alternative policy, of taking a firm but reasonable line in resistance to the demands, of course carries major risks 1.e. of renewed violence, probably on an increased scale, which in the long run we might find ourselves unable to control; and finally of physical intervention by the C.P.G. on the other hand, there is just a chance that if we took a very fira line, offering no provocation but explaining our policy clearly to the C.P.G. there might be sõne prospect of inducing a change of Chinese attitude. It remains hard to believe that at the present time the C.P.G. could really welcome the prospect of a military clash in Hong Kong or indeed of having to take Hong Kong over, thus losing its economic and other advantages.
6.
▲ possible line of action might now be to explain our position clearly and in forthright terms to the G.P.G., preferably in London. Our reply might start by stating our refusal to accept the Chinese allegations of "atrocities
'atrocities" (there is plenty of evidence that the police acted with great restraint throughout) and saying that the action that was taken in no way ained either at the workers or the left-wing whose activities in Hong Kong have always been permitted provided that they remained within the law. The intention of the Hong Kong Government is, and remaine, solely to uphold the law, which is published and accessible to all and equally applicable to all members of the community. The C.P.G. must realise that unless the law is upheld and public order maintained the interests of all the population of Hong Kong will suffer. H.1.0. are therefore unable to understand the arguments in the statements of the M.F.A.
7.
A reply in these reasonable, though firm, terna would for the moment preclude drastic action against the left-wing of the sort suggested in paragraph 4 of my telegram No.600, since this would be going further than the maintenance of the existing law, But at the moment it seems that a seizure by us of the initiative along those lines would in the inmediate future destroy any slim chances there may be of reaching a reasonable solution; and though preparatione for such action are being made they should not in my view be put into operation except as a last resort in the event of a further breach of the law by the left.
8.
It now seems essential that I should know as soon as possible whether Ministers would wish me to seek a compromise along the lines of the four demands; or whether they would favour a firmer line as in paragraph 6. In any case, there is no longer any possibility of treating this as a labour diapute, and hence a visit by Foggon would not in my view serve a useful purpose. On the other hand, so soon as Ministers have reached a decision on the point in paragraph 7 above, it would be most helpful if a senior official could come out here inmediately to give me the fullest possible picture of what is in their minds.
(Passed as requested)
SECRET
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D.I.O., J.I.R. Mr. Denson
Mr. de la Mare Mr. Wilson Mr. Foggon
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BI (187)
I
I
RECEIVEN IN
36
Reference
Confidention
ARCHIVES No 31
1 7 MAY 1967
FDI/I
The Sirmation in Hony Kry
This morning I how a
meeting
with mi. Carrá
to
concert a feping
hag A.
Yo
Hong Kory Tel. M. 589
We
Frili agre
that any appawan
in
ці Ревниц
Wow
be
counter-productive and
ww
attemys shows
be made no sem
Serra Mu
dispute weath.
I allown
a
Drap
Co. Wow
like
Peugium which the
to desperton urgently. Do you age?
Backgrund
2.
The dispute occurred in
Кио
aizivicina junino factoris. Its origins
obscure. The backgrund is given
Соти
مد
Commonweaths
ni prona 4-7 of a
nu porice aganist
B office submission of 11 Mory. As
May FDITIES
resute of action my mu pozice
demonstrators, 127 person howe
Assi
bem
14 migment (Hong Kuy
Yu. no 581!
Singe ter. no. 581. Latert reports describe
me sirmation
гот тим сами
in Hong Kny
OVA
The muthanking are
their regulat
5992
already in touch witn
May I Left Wing contacts.(Hong Yel. No. 684). Steps are also benig Pakin to arrange
a meeting between
the Lyr Way.
!
the
Man
unim concimi
and
agement.
: 3.
There seems everything to the
sout
for prisning the matter beaty, and
wi Peluz
www
I
The line of approach
|
propusz
рално,
5 (b) and (c) f
!
:
Flay A Hong Kry Ver. No 589
alatmmyt.
is
The drags Kellogiam tiefem
Some hav
ajvises A
more cautions
rom
apee
Jm Densen
12 May.
lin
12/5
P.A.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry No.
DEPARTMENT
F1
FDI/I
• Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressed(s)
W-36
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
Eh Nash X
Cypher
Draft Telegram to:-
Hong Kong
No......
(Date)
And to:-
PRIORITY MARKINGS
(Date).
Flash Immedlate
Priority Routine
}
Despatched
Security classification"
any
[Security
if
[
Privacy marking -if any
]
----
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Subsequent in desparch
affel sorm amanda's In Coj nove of Sumraus CONFIDENTIAL
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M......‒‒‒‒‒‒‒
[Codeword-if any]
HONG KONG
Addressed to
telegram No.
And to
IPLI
...date)
repeated for information to PEKING (FLASH)
K÷-------------÷her--------YH
POLAD SINGAPORE (IMMEDIATE
Saving to
[ Man A]
Repeat to:- Peking (FLASH)
POLAD SINGAPORE
(IMMEDIATE)
Saving to:-
Distribution:-
F.0.: 0.0.:
F.E.D. D.T.D.
Copies to:---
Your tel. No. 589.
We agree that dispate appears to be spontaneous
and local in origin.
It seems to us that the
advantage lies in securing a settlement at local.
leval.
2. We think that arly approach in Peking on the lines
suggested will lead to escalation, obliging the
Chinese People's Government to come out in full
support of their sympathisers in Hong Kong. #e
would expect any Chinese reply to our representations
to
to lay the Name entirely on us and insist that we accede to all local demands. In addition, such
an approach would open the dobr wide for Peking to
start bargaining on such matters as the provision of facilities for U.S. ships and visits of troops, the return of illegal immigrants and the handing over of K.M.T. agents. We would expect their reply to be
followed by an all-out propaganda campaign against
/the Hong Kong
(8430) D4.033346 400m 7/64 G.W.BL.sk, Gp.843
the
/Hong Kong Government
3. We much prefer that representations should
be made through local channels (your tel. No.
would movise
592 refers).
Te
We hope that in any further
exchanges of this kind you wil
comparisons
(a) not log
too much empromo
on и
between the present situation in Hong Kong and
recent events in Macau.
have how
ต
4. We should be gri
No 474 ts
Perry Ye
for the bigus of Whim sumppani nu
R.M. Mergé Klaffaires in Peking.
wam vin.
In
12/5
damage to economy of Hong
Labour
Kong by dispers (b) avoid
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
35
Sta
Jona Kame
itten
po
7
* LIVED IN PuraVCS No.3¦ ¦
1 7 WAY 1967
DFD1/1
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Hong Kong telegrams No. 574 und 579 show that on the 11 May, Liter demonstrations outside the artificial flower works, an
illejul meeting of some 1,500 was held, The police were called in beauuse the management feared that the gutes of the fuctory would be pushed in and after attempts to disperse the mouting were unsuccesɛful some 60 persons were arrested, At 6.30 p.m. the police hid "enervi control over the aros and riot squada were being withdrawn
as für sa possible to minimise uny provoc...tion. In a latur tele,ras the Governor reports that the situution hud deteriorated further later in the evening and that he hữu ordered a curfew covering the disturbed area of Korth dust Kowloon only. By 9 o'clock local tise 90 persons had been arrested, at 9.45 four gua shells were fired in one incident in a resettlement estate, but otherwise batons and buton shells were only have been employed so fur.
8.
Attempts are being made to make informal contúat with the left- wing leadership to mplain the position: thut Hong Kong depende for its existence on stability and confidences that the policy is now, as always, to maintain the law impartially: thut chilst the workers and trade unions have every right to act within the law relating to trade disputes, the Gov-mnent must tuks action when bresches of the pesce occur, The main left-wing papers have been Living wi-a coverage to the e disputes and editorials hve taken the line that the workers' struggle is just and their demands should be met by the British authorities.
It is not yet clear whether these developments indicats, or hold, any fundamental change of Chinese policy towards Hong Kong, There are some grounds for thinking that, in the confusion resulting fr a the cultural revolution (particularly in Canton) there may be a weakening, if not temporary cess-tion, of the control hitherto exercised from the uwinland over left-wing organiə"tions and Chinese agencies in Hong Kong and that their presentations reflect their own assessment of the role that it is *za appropriate for them to take in xxx current conditions in China. There is, however, information that the Chairman of the Federŭtion of Trude Unions (F.T.U.) left for Chine on the 7 May and returned at
noon on the 9 Xay.
the 9 May. It
It is not known whether he received any guidance while in China or whether lert-wing leuders ore ştiff sêting on their
E
OF D
OWN
responsibility.
-
BECKET
(il.P. Hall) 11 Max. 1967
2
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RECEIVED
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$967
Telno. 494
17 May 1967
FD
Cory
Onderl
SECRET
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 494 of 17 May Repeated for information to Hong Kong, Singapore and Washington.
Your telegram No. 928 to Hong Kong.
I have following comment on draft statement:-
It would be preferable if possible to mention reasons for arrests made by the police, e.g. offences with which those arrested have been charged.
Otherwise the draft is acceptable to me.
F.U. pass Jashington (Routine) 260.
Kr. Hopson
[Repeated as requested]
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(33
Cypher
CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMON/EALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
R!!
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 16 May, 1967. R. 16
PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL No. 618
H
1250Z
Addressed to Commonwealth office
Repeated
H
H
#
Peking No.228,
P.A. Singapore No.97, Washington No.114
(please pass to all).
Kowloon Disturbancea.
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
17MAY 1967
FDI
لوم
20 persons arrested on 6th May outside Hong Kong artificial flower factory appeared at 10.30 hours at South Kowloon Magistracy this morning. All charged unlawful assembly, 4 additionally charged with common assault and
:
+
2 intimidation. A crowd of about 150 spectators had assembled in court. When Magistrate entered they started chanting Mao's thoughts and a further crowd of roughly the same number who were outside the courtroon joined in. The Magistrate adjourned. Fifteen minutes later he returned but the chanting continued. He again adjourned until 14.30 hours, Director of Public Prosecutions consulted Magistrate and applied for hearing in the absence of general public except press. Magistrate agreed. Court resumed at 14.40 hours. Reporters and 2 men and 2 women representing a crowd of some 200 outside the courtroom were admitted, By 15.30 hours this crowd increased to about 300 with another 800 watching nearby. The crowd in the vicinity of courtroom chanted Mão 'a thoughts and sang revolutionary songs. They appeared well organised. At about 17.15 hours, the court still sitting, the crowd started to disperse. Court closed at 17.40 hours after only 2 prosecution" witnesses had been heard. The 17 persons detained were offered bail and each released on a personal recognisance of H.K. dollars 200 to appear at 09.00 hours tomorrow, 17th May. The 3 on bail have had bail renewed. Remainder of crowd dispersed peacefully.
(Passed to D.8.A.0. for Peking and Singapore PRIORITY
and as advance copies to Messrs. de la Mare,
Bolland and Wilson)
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Mr. Foggon
Mr. Bolland
32
En Chair
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
KHO" HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench}
D. 16 May 1967 R. 16
0930Z
RID
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31.
1 MAY 1967 FD
+
PRIORITY No.617
Addressed to Commonwealth Office Repeated
#
Peking No.227
" POLAD Singapore No.96
هم
120.7/0
The Left-wing papers this morning (16 May) devote
their front pages to the text of the H.F.A. statement and to reports of demonstrations of support in Peking and Canton.
2. The Wen Wei Pao editorial takes the line that the expression of support by the Chinese Government should reinforce the confidence of local patriots, who are today "definitely not alone". It goes on to repeat the allegation that the police action was part of a planned move against the Left-wing and says that
after the event Trench engaged in sophistry in defending 'the law' and the maintenance of 'law and order'. Who will believe these "fine words"?" It concludes: "The Chinese people are not to be trifled with. The Chinese people mean what they say. If the British authorities insist on going ahead they will fall into the great sea of the people's anti- persecution struggle - a tragic end". The Wen Wei Pao also has a commentary about an incident in which it is alleged two reporters of the Ta Kung Pao were beaten up by "plain clothes special agents" yesterday. The commentary says that this incident took place just after the Foreign Ministry had issued its statement and was therefore particularly serious.
"This was obviously the British authorities in Hong Kong using their running dogs and was a planned and premeditated prelude to an escalation of their atrocities"
3. The Ta Kung Pao editorial repeats the standard allegations and says in part that the masses on the streets in the Sanpokong and other areas were not afraid of tear gas or police batons; delegations going to Government House to protest are more and more frequent; anti-persecution struggle organisa- tions are being set up in companies, factories, and units..... therefore the patriotic compatriots throughout Hong Kong are responding to the call of their brother workers, are making all preparations to enter into a new struggle.
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PRIORITY SECRET No.615
38
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
K.117.
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OPPICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 16th May 1967 R. 16th
忖
08302
RECEIVED IN
ול
ARCHIVES No.31
17 MAY 1967
PDI/I
Action Taken
Addressed to Commonwealth Office
Repeated
1
"Peking No.226
"POLAD Singapore No.94
P.C
こん
(Please pass Routine to both)
My telegram No.612.
Peking Statement.
There is good evidence that statement referred to in paragraph of my telegram had a beneficial effect on confidence and was widely welcomed.
2. Further to remark in parenthesis in my paragraph 2, we have been trying over the past few days to stimulate local neutral and non-left-wing organisations and personalities in all walks of life into coming out with public expressions of a desire for peace and stability in Hong Kong, and similar indications of lack of support for present left-wing agitation. I feel sure that if we can stimulate enough of this kind of public comment it could become one of the more effective real deterrents available to left-wing demands being pressed to the limit.
30 As you know, it is not at all easy to get people here to do this sort of thing, but we are so far having an encouraging amount of success, If there are any Hong Kong Chinese groups in England who could be stimulated into the same sort of thing, it would be possibly helpful. Sedgwick might have some ideas.
(Passed as requested)
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INMEDIATE SECRET No.919
FDIN
SECRET
OUTWARD TELFORAM
Ki12
FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
Sent 15th May 1967. 191 52
Addressed to Governor Hong Kong Repeated
30
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
pot.
Р
" Peking (IMMEDIATE
POLAD Singapore (PRIORITY)
Ħ
Your telegram No.609.
Peking Statement.
1B MAY 1967
FDILI
We think that Peking will probably be prepared to engage in a prolonged war of nerves. It is on this assumption we have been considering how to handle the Peking statement preparatory to submitting to Ministers.
2.
There appear to be four alternatives:
(a) for Hopson to return the statement because
it la offensive;
(b) to ignore it;
(c) to refute it in detail;
(d) to issue a statement of our own explaining what has happened and the policy we intend
to pursue.
3. We cannot see that there is anything to be gained by returning it: to slam the door in this way would only aggravate the situation.
40 We cannot altogether ignore it because we imagine public opinion in Hong Kong will expect some response and be concerned to know what attitude we intend to adopt and that any uncertainty about this could very seriously affect local confidence and morale.
5.
To refute it in detail would be to play Peking's game and lay us open to a further round of polemical exchanges which might cause Peking to adopt a more rigid position and to raise their demands,
6. We therefore think that for the reasons given in paragraph 4 above you should make a short statement along the following lines (which might include an indication that it was approved by H.M.G.); outlining the recent events, noting their origin in an industrial dispute, explaining the means available for settling such disputes and confirming our intention of firmly but fairly maintaining law and order. By this means we would /hope
SECRET
1
SECRET
hope to avoid polemics and any reference to the unacceptable demands in Peking's statement, which would be bound to arise were we to try to explain the position directly to the Chinese Government either here or in Peking (paragraph 6 of your telegram under reference).
7. Grateful for your views on this assessment and, unless you see objection to the course suggested, please telegraph urgently a draft atatement for consideration by Ministers.
8. As we were about to despatch this telegram we received your Press telegram giving text of your statement today. Grateful to know reasons why you made this statement now. It does not invalidate the views expressed above though it ma y complicate the drafting of the statement. We would still like to have your comments and a draft statement,
(Passed to D.S.A.0. for Peking and POLAD Singapore)
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RESTRICTED COVERING SECRET
29
FOREIGN OFFICE,S.W.1.
15/May, 1967.
In your atter HWB 13/7 of 8 Kay you asked for our comments on a despatch from the Governor of Hong Kong No. 2879 of 15 December 1966, which was enclosed with a letter from Carter to Bolland FED 150/402/01 of 24 January.
2. I think you will find that we gave our comments on this despatch in a reply from Bolland FD 1/1 of 21 February. In case this letter is missing from your files I enclose a photo copy.
(D. C. Wilson) Far Eastern Department
A. W. Gaminara Esq.,
Commonwealth office
(Dependent Territories Division)
Church Mouse,
Great Smith Street,
8.W.1.
RESTRICTED COURRING SECRET
En Clair
HANOI
Telno 314
TO
FOREIGN OFFICE
15 May 1967
UNCLASSIFIED
TOP COM
RECEIVED IN
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15 MAY 1967
FDI ||
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 314 of 15 May, Repeated for information to Hong Kong, Washington, Saigon.
Peoples' Daily of 14 May protested against "repression of Chinese in Hong Kong by British Authorities" (strikes) adding that this is "associated with United States warships calling at Hong Kong turning Hong Kong into base in service of United States aggressive war".
Mr. Colbin
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Telno. 484 15 May 1967 Heleri culve
UNCLASSIFIED
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erlu
RECEIVED IN
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1 5 MAY 1967 Foll
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 484 of 15 May Repeated for information to Hong Kong, POLAD Singapore, Washington.
Front page of People's Daily of 15 kay carries full text Fol/L. of Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement (my telegrams Nos. @0-478 and 479).
2. Accompanying commentator article alleges that the Kowloon incidents were planned by the Hong Kong authorities. It also points out that the British Government have ignored repeated warnings about the use of Hong Kong as an American base and have conducted 'all sorts of anti-Chinese activities' in the Colony. If the British Government dares to make an enemy of the 700 million Chinese people they will be lifting up a rock to drop on their own feet.
3.
The Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate the oppression of their compatriots in Hong Kong. The oppressive actions of the British authorities only shows their weakness.
4. At present the Hong Kong authorities are not only refusing to recognise their guilt but are attempting to extend the scope of the situation. Article seriously warns the authorities that the Chinese people cannot be insulted and that the debts of blood must be repaid.
5.
Article then repeats the demands made in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement and concludes with a warning that if the Hong Kong authorities do not 'rein in their horses on the brink of the precipice
there can certainly be no good
outcome'.
6. Page 2 carries two NCNA articles datelined Hong kong 14 May. First is a long account of the Kowloon incidents starting from 6 May and second reports protest lodged by the Hong Kong office of NČNA about alleged attacks by Hong kong police on NCNA reporters on 11 May. When NCNA representatives called at Government House' with the protest on 12 ly, the Govenor" (quotation marks in Chinese) refused to see them and sent his Aide de Camp. NUNA protest Note demands (a) severe punishment for those responsible, (b) apologies to the MONA reporters (c) a guarantee of freedom of the Press.
7.
Photograph shows arrested demonstrators in Hong kong police ven in handcuffs and waving copies of "quotations from Chairman Mao", Mr. Hopson Sent 09202/15 kay
Received 1050/15 May
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Telno 483
15 May, 1967
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1 5 MAY 1967
FDI/1
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.483 of 15 May, Repeated for information to Hong Kong and Singapore.
Hong Kong telegram No.595 to C.0. ? Action against Left Wing Press.
Copy
The Chinese Government would naturally regard any action against their mouthpieces in Hong Kong as a further provocative act. I would therefore recommend that if possible no decision on this should be taken for the present until it is seen how the Chinese intend to proceed in Hong Kong, and as long as there is any hope of a compromise. On the other hand I well understand that this may become inevitable if the security situation in Hong Kong deteriorates further.
26
equestrat how co
Mr. Hopson
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15 May 1967
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15 MAY 1967
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25
23
aclon
progren
pot.
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 482 of 15 May, Repeated for information to Fong Kong, Singapore and Washington.
My telegrams Nos. 478, 479 and 480: M.F.A. Statement. .١٩٥
After Lo Kuei-po (who was calm and composed) had finished reading text, in answer to my enquiry he confirmed that he was handing me a copy of a statement rather than delivering a Note. had pointed out that there were a number of passages in the text which I would have regarded as unacceptable in a Note.
I
2. I emphasized that the Hong Kong Government consistently adopted a just and impartial attitude towards labour disputes but had an inescapable duty to maintain law and order. Failure of demonstrators and those committing acts of violence to disperse when warned to do so by the Hong Kong Police had led to further disorders, arrests and injuries wich have clearly made the solution of the labour dispute more difficult.
3. I stressed that the accusation that the incidents had been pre-
I meditated by the Hong Kong Government was entirely groundless. also rejected the charge that the United States Authorities were in any way involved and that Hong Kong was being used as an American base.
4. Pointing out that I was speaking on a personal basis, I suggested that for the disorders to continue would be bad for the people of Hon, Kong and its economy, and harmful to both Chinese and British interests. It was therefore hoped that the CPG would exercise a restraining and moderating influence on their friends in Hong Kong, which would bring about a restoration of an atmosphere of calm.
5. It was quite wrong to suggest, as in the Chinese statement, that the British Government regarded the Chinese as "opponents". The British Government and the Hong Kong Authorities wished to co- operate amiably with the CPG in settling matters of mutual interest but had of course no interest in Chinese internal affairs.
6.
Lo's reply covered the same ground as the M.F.A. statement and emphasized that the Chinese people of today could not be bullied as they could "ten or more" years ago, that the incidents had been planned and organised by the Hong Kon, Government and that the situation was deteriorating.
7. I again stressed that there was no question of premeditation by the Hong Kong Government. It was not for me to comment directly on the "so-called demands" in the Chinese statement, but speaking personally they seemed to me to be unreasonable and unrealistic.
CONFIDENTIAL
I therefore
CONFIDENTIAL
Peking telegram No. 482 to Foreign Office
- 2 -
I therefore hoped that the Chinese Government would reflect very carefully before committing itself to a course which could only have the ill effects which I had already described. Those arrested in Hong Kong would be dealt with in accordance with the due processes of law. The Hong Kong Government could not intervene. Those who were found to be innocent would be released. We did not use Fascist methods. Britain had spent seven years fighting Fascism.
8. A representative of the West European Department of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs intervened at this point to say that Lo Kuei-po had given "an all round and correct answer" to the statement I had made but wished in particular to emphasize that my remarks regarding the mutual interests of China and Britain in Hong Kong not only distorted the facts but were the language of imperialism. The China of the cultural revolution could not be subjected to threats. I replied that there was no question of threatening China.
Foreign Office pass Immediate to Hong Kong 338 and Priority Washington 254.
Mr. Hopson
Sent 0700 15 May
Recd 0940Z 15 May
[Repeated as requested]
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Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.) Repeated
H
H
H
Peking No. 204
P.A. Singapore No. 71
(Please pass Immediate to both)
In order to provide personnel from Auxiliary
Air Force for helicopter observer duties I have given approval to Service Commander H.K. Defence Force making an order for limited call-out of his unit or any part thereof for active service. By midnight area affected by disturbances had returned to normal. Curfor effective and most police units withdrawn although mobile patrols still operating. 127 persons arrested and 14 injured. In all 53 gas shells fired in incidents during afternoon and evening. It is known that discussions now taking place between Left-Wing Federation of Trade Unions and main Left-Wing Uniona. Kowloon Motor Bus Company employees considering token strike action between 0700 and 0900. Although situation now quiet some form of Left-Wing Union activity must be anticipated during the day.
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15 May 1967
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CONFIDENTIAL
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No 480 of 15 May,
Repeated for information to Hong Kong, Singapore and Washington
My immediately preceding telegrams.
We must conclude from the Chinese Government statement that they have decided to risk a direct confrontation with us on Hong Kong. The fact that they took a relatively long time to reach this decision and then published it in the form of a statement instead of a diplomatic Note may indicate that this decision was reached with some reluctance.
2.
On the other hand the Foreign Ministry official who was assisting the Vice-Minister at our interview, when I suggested that a deterioration of the situation in Hong Kong would be bad both for British and Chinese interests there, took me up passionately and declared that we were no longer dealing with the China of even five years ago,
Now that the cultural revolution was in full swing the new China would no longer bow to threats. therefore as if the Chinese Government are "putting politics in command" and may have decided to accept any necessary economic damage
It looks
3. The test will be in Hong Kong itself and in the way the Left Wing play it there. I should be surprised if a door is not left open for some kind of compromise, though it is difficult to see any sign of this at present.
4.
I presume it will be your intention to issue an official statement in London and Hong Kong commenting on the Chinese statement. If so, though it will clearly be important to refute the Chinese cbarges, I hope it will be possible to phrase this in such a way as to avoid provoking the Chinese Government unnecessarily and thus making a compromise (if one is indeed still possible) even more difficult. As seen from here the object should be to bring the temperature down while standing firm on basic principles.
5.
It is probable that we shall get some unpleasant demonstrations against this office. I have taken necessary precautions. We may be in for a very long haul.
6.
Record of my interview which contained no other points of real interest will be in a following telegram.
Foreign Office pass Flash to Hong Kong 336 and Priority to Washington 253.
Kr. Hopson
Sent
Recd
04202/15 May 1967
05512/15 May 1967
[Repeated as requested]
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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 479 of 15 May, Repeated for information Immediate Hong Kong, Priority POLAD Singapore and Washington.
Z!
For My telegram No. 478.
pa. Id
First part of Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement as follows:
2. "On the afternoon of 6 Lay 1967, Chinese workers of the Hong Kong Sanpokong Artificial Plastic Flower Works launched a struggle against intensified capitalist exploitation. To shield capital and suppres labour, the British Authorities in Hong Kong brazenly turned out on the same day more than two hundred armed policemen and "riot police", sanguinarily suppressing the workers of the factory and other Chinese residents, beating and wounding many of them and arresting twentyone persons, afterwards, they also arrested the President of the Federation of the Rubber and Plastic Trade Unions and Workers' Representatives, who went to a Hong Kong police station to protest. On the afternoon of the 11th, the British Authorities in Hong Kong carried out another sanguinary suppression on an even bigger scale by turning loose on the bare handed workers, representatives of various circles and young students large numbers of arred troops, policemen and "riot Police" totalling more than 1,000, who repeatedly attacked them with clubs, riot guns and tear bombs and even turning out military vehicles and helicopters.
On the
Many persons (including newsmen, cameramen and journalists) were arrested. After the 12th the British Authorities in Hong Kong had continued large scale arrests of the demonstrating masses. By the morning of the 14th, more than 400 have been arrested. At present, the situation is still being aggravated. It must be pointed out that these large scale sanguinary atrocities perpetrated by the British Authorities in Hong Kong are the result of long premeditation and are a component part of the British Government's scheme of collusion with United States imperialism against China. one hand, in coordination with the United States imperialist war escalation in Viet Nam, the British Government is continuing to [corrupt word[ the United States with Hon Kong as a base for aggression against Viet Nam in disregard of the repeated solemn warnings of the Chinese Government and on the other, it is steadily stepping up various hostile measures against China in Hong Kong. Particularly since the unfolding of the great proletarian cultural revolution in China. The British Authorities in Hong Kong have carried out repeated military and police manoeuvres hostile to China and aimed at the sanguinary suppression of Chinese residents in Hong Kong, vainly attempting to exclude the great influence of China's great proletarian cultural revolution by high hended tactics. The persecution of Chinese residents and workers by the British Authorities in Hong Kong by making use of the labour capital dispute of the Artificial Plastic Flower Works is big explosive of this criminal plan of sanguinary suppression. Their Fascist atrocities have aroused boundless indignation among the Chinese residents in Hong Kong and the entire Chinese people. The Chinese Government hereby
/lodges
Peking telegram No. 479 to Foreign Office
- 2 -
lodges the most urgent and strongest protest with the British Government against these atrocities. The sanguinary atrocities wholly perpetrated by the British Authorities in Hong Kong show that they mortally fear and bitterly hate China's great proletarian cultural revolution. This great revolutionary movement which is without parallel in history has dealt a telling blow to imperialism modern revisionism and world reaction, completely shattered their dream of counter-revolutionary capitalist restoration in China and greatly encouraged and impelled the liberation struggles of the oppressed peopes and oppressed nations of the whole world. In particular, this great revolutionary movement has caused our Chinese co-patriots in Hong Kong to love still more ardently the thought of Mao Tse-Tung, and they are vigorously unfolding the movement of creative study and application of Chairman Mao's works. Armed with the ever victorious thought of liao Tse-Tung, the masses of our patriotic compatriots are more militant than ever in fighting imperialism. Frightened out of their wits by this, the British Authorities in Hong Kong vainly attempted by violent suppression to restrict the influence of Hao Tse-Tung's thought and to maintain their control, and thus committed the barbarous Fascist atrocities. The Chinese Goverment must sternly warn the British Government that in so doing you have completely miscalculated and misjudged your opponent. Succeeding to the glorious tradition of anti imperialist struggle of over a century, the Chinese workers and residents in Hong Kong armed with bao Tse-Tung's thought are neither to be cowed nor crushed. Holding high the great Red Banner of Mao Tse-Tung's thought, they are resolved [?word omitted] no sacrifice and are surmounting every difficulty to win victory in this struggle against the atrocities committed by the British Authorities in Hong Kong.
Heroic, staunch and unyielding, they have greatly developed the glorious anti imperialist and patriotic tradition and are indeed fine sons and daughters of the Chinese Nation. The British Authorities in Hong Kong are blustering and baring their fangs, but as Chairman Mao, the great leader of the Chinese people, has pointed out, "in the final analysis, their persecution of the revolutionary people only serves to accelerate the people's revolutions on a broader and more intense scale". In sanguinary suppressing Chinese residents, the British Authorities in Hong Kong can only end up like one "lifting a rock only to drop it on one's own feet","
Mr. Hopson
Sent 0210 15 May
Reed 05452 15 Kay
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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 478 of 15 May Repeated for information Flash Hongkong, Immediate POLAD Singapore and Washington.
Kowloon Disturbances.
Vice-Minister Lo Kuei-po
summoned me early this morning
and handed me a copy of Chinese Foreign Ministry statement which is being published.
Following is final paragraph:
'The Chinese Government hereby solemnly declares, the Chinese Government and the 700,000,000 Chinese people firmly support their compatriots in Hong kong in their heroic and just struggle and resolutely stand behind them as their powerful backing. The Chinese Government demands in all seriousness that the British Government instruct the British authorities in Hong Kong as follows. Immediately accept all the just demands put forward by Chinese workers and residents in Hong Kong.
mmediately stop all Fascist messures Immediately set free all the arrested persons ncludi
JOMBIIsts and cameramen (punishi dia Horkers)
responsible for
these sanguinary atrocities, offer apologies to the victims and compensate for all their losses, and, guarantee against the occurrence of similer incidents. The British Government and the British authorities in Hong Kong must immediately and unconditionally accept the above mentioned solemn and just demands of the Chinese Government. The Chinese Government and people are determined to carry the struggle through to the end. Should the British Government and the British authorities in Hong Kong cling to their perverse course, they must be held responsible for all the grave consequences arising therefrom.'
Mr. Hopson
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2.
[Kowloon Disturbances]
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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 474 of 12 May, Repeated for information to Hong Kong and Singapore.
FDILL@
Hong Kong telegram No. 589 to Commonwealth Office. Disturbances in Hong Kong.
1
I see disadvantages in making an approach to the Chinese at this stage. All the indications are that they have been taken by surprise and the fact that the mainland Press has still not reported the incidents suggests that they have still not decided here to play the situation.
2. An approach by us now would be likely to be regarded as an indication of nervousness and weakness and would be an encouragement to the Chinese to believe that they could score another cheap victory on the Macao pattern. Moreover, the cooler heads within the Chinese leadership will already be aware of the considerations set out in paragraph 5 of telegram under reference.
3.
Difficult though it may be, I would therefore recommend that we ride out the storm for the time being.
4. If, nevertheless, a decision is taken to make an approach to the Chinese, I would urge that this is likely to be done more effectively in London than here, where it could well take several days before they granted me an interview.
Foreign Office pass Flash to Hong Kong 330.
Mr. Hopson
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FROM HONG KONG (8ir D. Trench)
D. 12th May, 1967. R. 12th
RECEIVED IN [ARCHIVES No.31
1 5 MAY 1967
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H IMMEDIATE to POLAD Singapore, No. 74
(8. of S. please pass to both).
Your telegram 894.
Disturbances in Hong Kong.
All available information suggests that the disturbances at the artificial flower works on 6th May were not planned in advance by the Rubber and Plastic Workers' Union nor by any other organisation. The rank and file had been encouraged to develop a "struggle" against the management, and what started as peaceful picketing degenerated into violence.
2. I do not believe that the Hong Kong Left wing leadership were at that stage looking for a confrontation with Government. But with the arrests of the workers the dispute became a "political struggle"; and it now appears that the leadership have little alternative but to exert all-out pressure on the Hong Kong Government to accept the demands (paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 557) which have been made in the style of Macao. The Left wing press today publishes a further demand, that Government apologise to the arrested Workers; and no doubt more demanda are likely to be added.
3. There were some indications that the Left wing had been trying, at least until yesterday, to restrict the "struggle" to the places where disputes were actually taking place, notably the cement and the artificial flower works. No sympathetic strike action has yet taken place. However, the leadership have clearly had difficulty in keeping the rank and file under control; and these difficulties are now likely to be increased. Until the Left wing leaders achieve some success which will prove the power of the thoughts of Mao Tse Tung and will also prove that they themselves are loyal followers of the cultural revolution, the "struggle" is likely to be intensified.
SECRET
14.
SECRET
4. The Left wing and Government now seen to be set on a collision course. Even the incidents which have occurred so far could have a grave effect on general confidence in Hong Kong; and they are clearly as little in the interests of th C.P.G. as of ourselves. We have been trying, through the few channels at our disposal, to make this point to local Left- wing leaders. But their freedom of action is very restricted. In the circumstances, you may wish to consider the possibility of making early representations to the C.P.G. in London if not in Feking, to ensure that they are aware of the very serious implications of the situation as it may be developing. I can see that there might be technical difficulties in finding a peg on which to hang a discussion of this sort, but there seênв a serious danger that unless the local Left wing are directed from a very high level to pursue a more moderate policy, things Hay get out of hand.
5.
An approach might take the following lines:-
(a) The Hong Kong Government much regret the disturbances
that have taken place in Hong Kong during the past week. The C.P.G. should know that there is no change in Hong Kong Government policy towards Left-wing labour organisations. The policy is now, as always, to maintain the law impartially and fairly. Govern- ment realise that in some cases workers may well have legitimate grievances. As the Royal Interocean Lines dispute showed, there are ways of remedying these by action within the law.
(b) But if the workers break the law, the Hong Kong
Government mist enforce the law, Hong Kong depends for its existence on stability and confidence. Disorderly action by labour here is bound to attract world attention and to damage, possibly permanently, Hong Kong's economic prospects for the future, The interests not only of Hong Kong Government but of the workers of Hong Kong and possibly also China will be seriously affected.
(c) For these reasons it is impossible for H.M.G. to
acquiesce in a situation comparable with what has recently developed in Macao. Unless more effective control can be exercised over the way in which Hong Kong workers express their grievances, there are dangers of a collision which could destroy Hong Kong as an economic entity and also have serious inter- national repercussions.
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回
En Clair
IMMEDIATE No.583
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 12th May 1967 R. 12th
03502
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
1 5 MAY 1967
FD1|1
Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.) Repeated Peking No.205
H
H POLAD Singapore No.72
Washington No.111
H
My telegram No.581 (not to Washington).
Hong Kong disturbances.
pq.
The Left Wing papers this morning (12th May) devote
the whole of their front page, Hong Kong page and much other space to yesterday's incidents in Sampokong. The reports and photographs are slanted to create the impression of unnecessary police brutality.
H
2. The editorial in the Wen Wei Pao is entitled serious warning to Trench". After a brief reference to the earlier incidents at the walled city and the plastic factory the editorial gives a biased description of yesterday'a incidents at Sampokong. It then goes on "From this series of bloody suppressions it can be seen completely clearly that this was a planned premeditated action with a purpose taken by the British Imperialiat authorities in Hong Kong. This was a challenge by the British Imperialist authorities in Hong Kong to our great Chinese people. This racialist oppression was a serious atrocity committed by the British Imperialist authorities in Hong Kong against our Chinese compatriots in Hong Kong and Kowloon. This was a most brazen anti-China activity taken by the British Imperialist authorities in Hong Kong in carrying out United States imperialism's war policy and amounted to taking United States Imperialism's chestnuts out of the fire".
3. The article adds "And now everything can be seen even more clearly. In the drawing up of this plan the formulation of this decision and the daring to commit auch violence the baton has been in the hands of the highest local authority of the British Imperialists in Hong Kong. Trench is the principal troublemaker behind the racialist oppression of our compatriots in Hong Kong and Kowloon and the series of fascist atrocities! Trench has carried out in Hong Kong the war policy of United States Imperialism and has been the spearhead of anti-China activitiea. All the criminal responsibility for the series of bloody suppressions must be laid at his door"
40 "We wish severely to put to Trench the question: what do you think you are doing in daring today at the door of our great motherland on territory which has been occupied by the Chinese people over the ages to engage in such frenzied
/anti-
anti-China activities to carry out racialist persecution and to suppress bloodily our compatriots? Our great leader Chairman Mao teaches us "We the Chinese Nation have the spirit to fight the enemy to the last drop of blood, the determination to recover our lost territory by our own efforts and the abilit; to stand on our own feet in the family of nationa". We wish severely to warn the highest local authority of the British Imperialists in Hong Kong that the Chinese people who have armed themselves with the ever victorious thoughts of Mao Tae Tung are not to be trifled withi In accordance with the teachings of our great leader Chairman Mao we shall wage a determined struggle "tit for tat and fighting for every inch of territory" against whoever humiliates us or persecutes us".
5. "We severely warn the highest local authority of the British Imperialists in Hong Kong that you must immediately stop this violence and persecution! You must immediately accept all the just demands put forward by our patriotic compatriots. You must immediately stop this bloody suppression, You must immediately release all those patriotic workers and patriotic students barbarously detained by you. You must immediately punish the culprits and apologise to our patriotic compatriots"
6. "If you remain obdurate and do not heed our warning but go your own way the responsibility for all the serious consequences will fall on the shoulders of Trench the highest responsible person in the Hong Kong British local authority".
7. Articles also contain further phrases inciting the police to disaffect.
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CONFIDENTIAL
OUTWARD TELEGRAM
FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
Sent 11th May 1967. 22252
IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL No.895
5771/12
Addressed to Governor Hong Kong Repeated
#
H
Peking "Singapore
↑ RECEIVED IN
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1 5 MAY 1967
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HWB 5/12
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17
Your telegram No.581.
Industrial Dispute.
We are very sorry to hear that you have this additional anxiety and do not wish to add to your burdens at this present time. But it would be most helpful if we could have very early telegraphic report on specific labour background of this dispute leading up to the lock-out. What were the matters in dispute? Were there any negotiations? If so, how and on what points did they break down? Did the Labour Department offer its services or intervene in any way?
(Passed to D.S.A.0. for repetition to Peking
and Singapore)
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
16
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PRIORTTY CANBERRA TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
elno 725 5 May 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
- 9 MAY 1967
ED
Addressed to C.0. telegram No. 725 of 5 May. Repeated for information to Governor Hong Kong, RESCOM GEIC, Wellington and H.C. Honiara.
N Hy telegram No. 709 (No. 23 to Hong Kong).
Nauru Strike.
ра
Ravenscroft of BPC has passed report from BPC Manager Nauru to Australians about a meeting of Chinese strikers yesterday prior to repatriation. Meeting resolved on certain actions to be taken on return to Hong Kong including;
2.
(a) Use of £300 collected on Nauru to hire a solicitor
to go to Court against BPC.
(b) Contacting Hong Kong Communist Unions to seek their
opinion and advice,
(c) Holding a Press conference on their "grievances"
suffered on Nauru.
(d) Seeing Commissioner of Labour Department Hong Kong.
They claim BPC had no right to sack them earlier as they had signed a 12 month contract. Their representative in Hong Kong is to he Tam Kwok Wei, one of the strike-leaders, Hollers have been requested to inform Hong Kong authorities of this.
3. BPC consider it would be useful now with strikers' return to work and in view of above meeting for the Labour Officer from Hong Kong to visit Nauru and have a look at conditions. Australians support this view and have now therefore made the formal request required in paragraph 4 of telegram No. 23 from Hong Kong to me. They have alrcraft available leaving Taipeh at 11 a.m. GMT 8 May.
C.O. pass Gov Hng Kong Priority as my telegram No. 25, RESCOM GEIC 12 and 8.4. Honiara 23.
Sir C. Johnston
Sent 08222/5 May
Recd 08232/5 May
[Hepeated as requested]
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KIDS COLONY, VESTITE PAQUITO. LOFFICE
FFICE (D.S.D.) TELEGRAM HOB.
En Clair
No.561
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 9th May 1967 R. 9th
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RECEIVED IN
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10 MAY 1967
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15
Addressed to Commonwealth Office
Repeated
H
Peking No.198
" POLAD Singapore No.65
The left-wing papers this morning (9th May)
continued to give full front page treatment to the incident at the plastic factory on 6th May. They report that on 8th May the Executive Committee of the Federation of Trade Uniona met and issued a statement condemning what it called police interference in labour disputes and the unprecedentedly serious, bloody and repressive violence. It alleged that about 100 patriotic workers and campatriots who were bystanders were beaten up. This incident was not accidental;
"It occurred
at a time when Hong Kong has become a military base for aggression in Vietnam which is being increasingly used by U.S. imperialisa and when imperialists, revisionists and reactionaries are undertaking all conceivable sorts of anti- China activities; obviously the British authorities in Hong Kong in showing their hand were acting in an organised, planned and premeditated way. The British authorities in Hong Kong have all along tolerated and protected U.S./Chiang elements, fabricated disputes and provoked acts of violence". The statement then referred briefly to the Nanfeng Textile Company, the Taxi Company, the Green Island Cement Factory and the Kowloon Walled City disputes.
2.
The Rubber and Plastic Workers' Union also held an ergency meeting on 8th May and established an anti- persecution struggle comittee' which swore not to rest until complete victory had been achieved
3. The left-wing papers also printed short commentaries which said that the British authorities are attempting to treat the workers who had been unreasonably beaten up and arrested as 'criminals' and to use the law' to deal with them. They conclude that 'whether or not the situation worsens is entirely for the British authorities in Hong Kong to decide. People are closely watching to see how they will act'.
4. The papers also include reports of the proceedings at the magistracy on 8th May which allege inter alia that the authorities attempted to trick the workers into admitting their guilt by raising bail but the workers 'refused to admit guilt and decided to stay in prison and enter into a struggle against the violent persecution of the British authorities'.
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En clair
PRIORITY No. 557.
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 8th May, 1967. R. 8th
៨៥
#
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RM 117 (14)
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RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31}
10 MAY 1967
FDI!
J
Addressed to Commonwealth office.
Repeated
14
"Feking No. 197.
"POLAD Singapore No. 64.
The left wing papers this morning (8th May) continue to give full front page and Hong Kong news page treatment to the incident at the artificial flower factory and publish editorials on this and other recent incidents.
2. The Rubber and Plastic Workers' Vaion met last night and decided to put forward four demands:-
(a) immediate release of the workers arrested,
(b) punishment of the evil doers and compensation,
(c) guarantee of the workers personal safety,
(d)
no interference henceforth by the police in labour disputes.
3. The line taken in the editorials is that the British Authorities in a planned and premediated way have organised a series of bloody repressions of workers and patriotic compatriots in the Kowloon area, amounting to Fascist violence. The workers did not break any law in the artificial flower factory dispute: they were merely demanding the cancellation of some new regulations imposed by the management. If the British Authorities in Hong Kong did not deliberately fabricate this incident and are not attempting to enlarge it, they ought to recognise the error which they committed on 6th May and immediately accept the workers' "few minimum demands".
4. The Ta Kung Po editorial refers to the increased use of Hong Kong by U.2. imperialism as an aggressive base and to the anti-China activities of the imperialists, revisionists and the reactionaries. It goes on to say that after the Macao affair many U.S./Chiang elements concentrated in Hong Kong carry out their activities and that most of the incidents which have accurred have been stirred up by U.S./Chiang elements. The Wen Wei Pao editorial says "we consider that the imperialists who deliberately undertook the violent and bloody repression of patriotic compatriots will definitely come to no good end, nor will those traitorous Chinese running dogs who "help them". We hope that those policemen who, under the protection of the
/Hong Kong
Hong Kong British, assisted in this atrocity in persecuting their compatriots will sincerely pay attention, without delay, turn around and not shamefully do wrong to the people of thei mother country."
5. The 21 workers arrested on 6th May appeared in court today. One pleaded guilty to unlawful assembly and was fined
(HK)100. The others pleaded not guilty and were remanded on ball until 16th May. So far none has yet raised bail and they are all therefore still in custody.
(Passed to D.S.A.0. for repetition to Peking
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Our reference: HAB.13/7
Your reference:
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RECEIVED IN
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-9 MAY 1967
Follo
FD1/1
Dear Wilson,
|
In his letter Fed.150/402/01 of the 24th January Carter wrote to Bolland about a despatch from the Governor of Hong Kong reporting on the principal developments in the Colony over the last
18 months or so.
Can you say when you will be in a position to
let us have any comments that you wish to be
included in our reply to the Governor?
высновы
Yours when
D.C. Wilson, Esq.,
(A.W.Gaminara).
Far Eastern Department,
Foreign Office.
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To
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RESTRICTED
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
Cypher
D. R. 6th
6th May, 1967.
0640Z
RECEIVED IN
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- 8 MAY 1967
西小
ра
pa 104.4.
14/2
RESTRICTED No. 551.
Addressed to Commonwealth office.
Repeated
11
Peking No. 193 (S. of S. please pass).
12
My telegram No. 547.
Kowloon Walled City Incident.
The facts are that a demolition party (of about 90 persons) from Resettlement Department accompanied by about 70 police went on the morning of 4th May to Lung Shing Road which borders on the walled city to demolish a number of sheds etc. which had been erected illegally just outside the limits of the walled city by residents of the walled city. Similar structures have been demolished on a number of occasions in that area over the years. No warning was given of this action as Resettlement Department have found that to give warnings increases the difficulties of dealing with the problems of illegal structures.
2. The demolition was resisted by force by Wong Chun Ping (Chairman of the unregistered Kowloon Walled City Kaifong Welfare Promotion Committee) and other residents, They received no support, despite requesting it, from residents of a nearby resettlement estate. Wong was arrested when he attempted to hit a police inspector with a brick, and a woman, Chan Lin, was arrested when she assaulted a police- woman with a stick. When arrested, Wong shouted "watch out for another Macao" The demolition was completed despite continued opposition.
3. Subsequently, nine members of the KWCKWPC attempted to see Wong at the Kowloon City Police Station, but only his wife was allowed in. Thereafter a group of four adults and 22 children from the school of which Wong is headmaster formed up at the police station, demanding the release of those arrested and chanting quotations from Mao's works. One of then handed in a letter protesting at the demolition and the arrests. The group was told to disperse and when it did not do so, was arrested. The children were released and the adults charged with disorderly conduct. They were remanded on bail until 29th May. Wong and Chan were released on bail and their cases will be heard on 25th and 18th May respectively.
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FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 6th May, 1967. R. 6th
06302
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
- 8 MAY 1967
FD!/
PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL No. 248.
Addressed to Canberra No. 26.
Repeated
" Commonwealth office.
H
да
M
H Resident Commissioner Gilbert and Ellice
Islands Colony No. High Commissioner Western Pacific
No. 306.
Η
Ħ
305.
(8. of 8. please
pass to all).
1
Your telegram No. 725.
Nauru Strike.
Labour Department here at present have their hands full with industrial disputes and would find it difficult to spare an officer to go to Nauru immediately. In any case, as the situation there now appears to be quiet and the dispute is likely to be transferred to Hong Kong, there would seem to be every advantage in keeping the Labour Officer who has visited Nauru here for the time being. Possibility of sending an officer to Nauru at a later stage could be reviewed in the light of developments.
2.
We are similarly reluctant to let the two policemen referred to in my telegram No. 532 depart for Nauru on 9th May, as Australian Trade Commissioner has requested. Intention is that they should be seconded to the Nauru Force for a period of one year for normal duty. But to send them now would certainly suggest that Hong Kong Government were actively intervening in the dispute on the side of the B.P.C. and would tend to aggravate difficulty of dealing with the repatriated strikers here. We have explained this to the Australian Trade Commissioner and said that we would review the problem again in the light of developments here during the next week or 80.
(Passed to D.3.4.0. for Canberra, and 0.E.I.C. and Western
Pacific as 0.0. (D.T.D.) telegrams Nos. 107 and 194 respectively)
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RECEIVED IN
|ARCHIVES No.31
- 8 MAY 1967
FD 1/1
En clair
D. 6th May, 1967. E. 6th
0600Z
PRIORITY No. 547
Addressed to Commonwealth office. Repeated
* Peking No. 190.
pa
10
L
The local left wing press this morning (6th May) give prominence on their Hong Kong newa pages to reports and short commentators' articles about an incident which took place near the Kowloon walled city on 4th May. The incident occurred when police and Resettlement Department workers destroyed illegal structures near but outside the walled city. Residents of the walled city resisted and some were arrested (including the Chairman of the Walled City Kaifong Committee). All have now been released on bail.
2. The line taken by the left wing press is that this incident was deliberately created by the British Authorities and that if they "dared to ignore the just demands of the residents of the walled city and dared to continue to create incidents and violence, then they will be lifting a stone only to drop it on their own feet". The demands put forward
are:
(1) to release the residents and their representatives
who were unreasonably arrested;
(2)
to compensate the residents of the walled city for all their losses, and
(3) to guarantee that henceforth they will not go to
the walled city to commit violence and that no such incidents will occur again. The Wen Wei Po refers to these demands as "preliminary demanda".
Distribution
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Ed (1676)
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.
Minutes.
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
1 8 APR 1967
FD1
Copy of "NEW TIMES
NO.12
MATZ. 22h3, 1967.
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NEW TIMES
+
50th Anniversary of the February Revolution
Marshal Sudets on Soviet-Bulgarian Relations
Dynamics of Modern Capitalist Production
Hongkong Paradoxes
Kiesinger's Bonn, by Leon Szulczynski
12
MARCH 22
1967
A WEEKLY JOURNAL OF WORLD AFFAIRS
Red
Square, Moscow.
NEW TIMES
Founded 1943
A weekly joumel of world alades. published in Russian, English, French, Derman, Spanish, Polohi and Coach by Tred, Moscow.
For
n-language adetions cat with the Russian
No. 12
MARCH 23, 197 (Russian edition March 17)
Contents
1 With Pride and Confidence
3 Standing by Vietnam
Statement by the South Vietnam
National-Liberation Front
6 February 1917-The Overthrow of
Tsordom
Ivan Aluf
9 The Soviet Union and Bulgaria
Air Marshal V. A. "Sudets "Izvestia" Jubilee
11
12 The French Elections: Political
Polarization
Boris Vermin 13 Can You Spare 10 Billion?
Antonin Petrina
14. Kiesinger's Bonn
Leon Szulczynski 17 Dynamics of Modem Capitalist
Production
A. Milelkovsky 20 The King and the Arabs
G. Drambyanis 23 Sukorno Problem-Solved?
Alexander Vacotou
24 On the Other Side
Lev Lyubimov 29 International Noter 31 Hongkong Paradoxes
Vladimir Perventaev 33 Bible for Hawks (Book Review)
G. GerasimiH"
16 People in the News
10 From the Mail-Bog
34 World Events
IN
With Pride and Confidence
IN THIS, their jubilee year, the Soviet people look back on the past with pride-reliving the stormy days of preparation for the world's greatest revolution, remember- ing all the effort and herolim that went into the upbuild- ing of their country. These thoughts of the past mingle with thoughts of the present and future to produca a feel- ing of confidence in the continued advance of socialisms and communism.
It is probably ■ mere coincidence that the elections to the Supreme Soviets of the Russian Federation and of eight other Union Republics were held exactly fifty years after the people of Russia overthrew the tsariat autocracy, But there is something symbolic in that coincidence.
March 12, 1917, and March 12, 1967. The two dates can be regarded as landmarks on the path traversed by our people, from the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies to the Supreme Soviet elections. The years in between have been crowded with significant events and changes. The February Revolution was the prelude to the Great October Socialist Revolution, which transformed the country from a backward into an advanced one and placed It in the vanguard of progress.
This year's election campaign was marked by high polit- ical activity. The numerous meetings at which the candi- dates of the Communist and non-Party bloc met the voters demonstrated anew the firm unity of Party and people. Party and government leaders reviewed the country's progress since the previous elections, analyzed the Interna- tional situation and the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. in the present complex circumstances.
In their organizational and economic activities, the Party and government have in recent years concentrated on raising national living standards. That la only natural. For, as Leonid Brezhnev told an election rally on March 10, "in the final analysis, the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the building of sociallam in our country-once the people had been freed of explo!- tation and oppression-were directed at creating all the opportunities for a free, prosperous, cultural and Interest- Ing life, a life worthy of man and all that great word stands for."
+
The Soviet Communist Party and government have in recent years carried uut a number of measures towards that end. The following are a few examples out of a longer Mat:
higher wages for 20 million people engaged in the
35 Supplement
service industries;
י
pensions for collective farmers;
higher minimum pensions for invalids and additional grants to war invalids and families of men killed in the war;
price reductions on a number of consumer goods:
■ 6.5 per cent annual increase in per capita Incomas in 1965-66;
a nearly 20 per cent Increase in retail sales over these two year;
nearly 22 million people moved into new homes or Improved their housing conditions;
two free days a week for nearly 2 million people, with the shift to the new schedule to be completed in the main this year.
What capitalist country can match that record? Even In the richest cxpitalist countrie we see artificial contraction of consumer de- mand, wage freezing, curtailment of housing programmes, reduction of welfare expenditure. Of course, the Soviet people still have to me- complish much to assure further development of the economy, but there can be no doubt that they will successfully cope with the task.
The election campaign was the occasion also for reviewing the Soviet government's activity on the international scene. Socialism, enjoys Increasing authority and prestige. Soviet diplom- soy, as that of other socialist countries, le skil- fully solving the problem of assuring favoura ble international conditions for the building of socialism and communism in our countries. This la especially important considering the complex international situation and the increased tension caused by activization of the Imperialist forces.
The recent efforts to work out an agreed in- fernational policy of the socialist countries have produced good results. Events have prov- ed that the Warsaw Treaty can play a positive part in European adɗairs. The Soviet Union's relations with other socialist countries, based on revolutionary solidarity and mutual respect, are becoming ever clower and effective. At the same time, the Peking splitters are finding themselves more and more isolated,
Relations with capitalist countries evincing a desire for friendship and co-operation with the U.S.S.I. are Improving too. The Soviet Union has consistently followed policy of peaceful co-existence of states with differing social sys- tems. The record of the past few years shows that that policy can be beneficial to both sides.
The Soviet Union has made a great contribu- tion to world peace and security, and that has told on the new trends in Western Europe, where there is a stronger urge for a détente and good-neighbour relations with the soci■ilst part of the continent. The realization is gaining ground, the Soviet leaders emphasized in their election speeches, that Europe can solve Its security problem by its own efforts.
This does not mean that we can afford to disregard the many dangers to peace. There ja grave concem throughout the world over what is happening in Vietnam, where U.S. Imperial- ism continues to escalate its aggression. With blatant cynicism the United States government continues to extend its operations, bringing new areas in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam into the orbit of its air attacks and barbarous artillery bombardments. In this situation, the Soviet Union has firmly warned that escalated aggression in Vietnam will be countered by Increased all-round assistance to the herple peo- ple of that country. Let no one doubt that the Soviet people will remain true to their internR- tionalist duty and will not leave the Vietnamese in the hurch.
Only a year has passed since the Twenty- Third CPSU Congress which mapped out plans for the continued building of communism. But even in this brief span the Soviet Union har made great strides in economic and cultural development. The new five-year plan is being successfully carried out; economic manage- ment is being perfected. The results of this work are there for all to see.
With pride in their past and firm confidence in the future, the Soviet people are advancing to the half-centenary of their great Revolution,
NEW TIMES TH
Y
public protest against Pentagon war crimes. In
a
Standing by Vietnam mid-February, 100 M.P. tabled resolution
TH
HE U.S. imperialists continue to escalate their aggression in Southeast Asia, sów- ing death and destruction on Vietnam. Their total disregard of international law, their brazen challenge to world opinion, their reliance on brute force are reminiscent of the days and methods of Hitler.
The Vietnamese are fighting with exemplary courage in defence of their land, repelling the aggressor on both sides of the 17th Parallel. It is a hard struggle, requiring the exertion of every ounce of energy. More than a million South Vietnamese have been killed, wounded or consigned to concentration camps. The Demo- cratic Republic of Vietnam has suffered heavy Josses from the air bombings. The U.S. imperial- ists are applying the naziscorched-earth imatics. Vietnam's "fortitude has won it respect and admiration throughout the world. Now every- one realizes that this is not merely a local war, that the International situation, the way things are likely to shape out in the world, hinges on what happens in Vietnam. Its people have the support and sympathy of all anti-imperialists. Defence of Vietnam has become a mass moves ment in every country, the United States In- cluded, and is assuming diverse forma.
Standing by the Vietnamese are numerous public organizations, millions of men and wom- en, many governments, An International Soli- darity Week with Vietnam began on March 19. Initiated by the Afro-Aslan Solidarity Or- ganization, one of its purposes is to collect funds to help the Vietnamese,
Response has come from every continent in the form of protest meetings and demonstra tlone. And as on previous occasions, the Soviet people are especially active In this campaign. There have been máss meetings in support of Vietnam's just cause in Moscow and Leningrad, in the capitals of all the Union Republics and in major Industrial and cultural centres.
The Soviet people unanimouly approve the policy of their government in rendering Viet- ham all-round economic and military assistance, and are themselves giving the Vietnamese mor- al, political and material aid. The Soviet Aid to Vietnam Committes is actively supported by millions of Soviet citizen..
Reports of an expanding solidarity movement come from other countries too. In Britain, where the government has acquiesced in the American aggression, there has been widespread
NEW TIMES " M".
condemning the American attacks on North Vietnam. Money for the Vietnam relief fund is being collected in every part of the country. Many are donating blood for Vietnamese hospi- tals. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament has announced that the chief demand in this year's Easter march will be immediate cessation of the American aggression and the British government's complete dissociation from Ame- rica's shameful policy.
In Australis, leading trade unions are demanding an end to the U.S. aggression and are fully behind the dockers and seamen who have refused to load and man the Boonaroo and Japarit, which were to deliver bombs and other military supplies to South Vietnam.
In France, the General Confederation of La- bour has declared its "full and unqualified sup- port for the International Solidarity Week." In Yugoslavia, university students and instructors have collected 17,000 signatures to a petition urging U Thant to do everything possible to end the aggression against Vietnam. In the German Democratic Republic there have been mass ral- lies in support of Vietnam at factories, offices and schoolk. Protests have come also from Italy, where a huge solidarity rally was held in Flori ence. Many more facts could be added to this Hist.
International women's, trade union, youth, religious and other organizations have appealed for respect of the Vietnamese people's rights and for an immediate halt to the American ag- gression. There is widespread protest in Asia and Africa, where the suffering of the Vietna- mese is especially keenly felt. In both conti- nents there is growing indignation at American Imperialist brutality.
Beyond all doubt, the International Solidarity Week will multiply the strength of the Vietna- mese patriots and will Increase the political and moral isolation of the American aggressors. Of course, one Solidarity Week will not bring the war to an end, or compel the Americans to withdraw and allow the Vietnamese to work out their own future. But what is done in this week will be the foundation for world-wide unity of all the foress opposed to aggression and war. America's policy of escalation has brought the Vietnam war to a highly dangerous point. And to avert the worst, to stay the hand of the aggressor, who la gambling with the future of the world, there must be unity of all who sup- port peace, freedom and independence.
H
Statement by the South Vietnam National-Liberation Front
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The Central Committee of the South Viginanı Makional-Liberation Front published a telement on February 20 selling forth Iti poslilan with regard to the intensited US. aggression in Vatnam. The full text at this statement, which was read out at a press conference in Moscow on March 9 by Nguyen Van Deng, deputy bead of the HLF mission in the US,58, 11 given below.
A
FTER the failure of their schenen
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of dominating South Viakosin key of the puppet administration and army and through the "special war," the US imperiebata have Jor years now brownssly brought their podkissary broaga bato Santh
la vaga see of the BercRL WES wkes ever known in history.
Condemand by the whole of protres-
mankind. Johnern and has tha
smessingly prolazing "dosten for porca." wice in fact obert stały intemdyme and standing WAT OF AETCOMton in South Vickan, cegating a particularly dangerous situs
Against the 10
ted people South Vietnam, the Johnson Admcular tration ba
ing the US, mjuk
aty corps, which from 13,000 men at the end of 1954 was increased to 180200 by the and af 1965 and
the 15 troops permanently mationed
thu nhưpe of the 7th Fleet, at et US bases in Thailand, the Mulippines, Okinawa. Quaet, etc. the total number or US, troops participating in the sour of aggremien in South VietNam no surende half a million, by lat surfan lng the US strength in the war
Troops from variowe US, satelli enantries bass than 20.000 by the and of 1965. have now been increased so over 55,000. The US
$
anda ni adesional U5. troops to South
Vietnam. At the amine time it la Mylng the policy of using the mang Batumi rovovees and Serritory of sla Vatnal countries in Aula and the Pacific LENA for NEETAston in South Vielsen,
Equipped with modern mom of Warfare and sing on a large scale the most barbarous kunde of lethal weapons forbidden by laternational lew, mich an napalm, phosphorus and other types of bomba, woll
Becke add poison gua, mc. the US
and Chels launched hana of thousands of Tam carried out 3-52 bombings everywh from the cost of the South China Sex be the Jeontiges of Lace and Cambodia, from the Mekong data to Quang Til and This Thin provinces, the denile
included.
Commong the methode of modern Warface with the
hand by 198ther and the medieval momercka, the US. Imperiale laka have bony promoting their policy HE TRAIAN, destroy all, wwen áll," come melting the meat bucherov trivas la 166 alean, 137.000 som of bombs were hed apaleat South Vietnamese villag-
theen ting more than in 1965 and by far exceeding the quantity of bombe and in World War 1 in the Paclic
In 1963-88, the US aggran sad that poppets killed or vesaded hundreds of thousands of civilians, among whom thousand ware killed by taxie bar and hundreds of others wien
tortured to death. Many towns and vil
lazer with themmende of sababctants work leveled out.
In an attempt to avert the danger of
dalal la South Vialen, the US. đà pecialists for more than two year have beanly carried out a war of destross Bon against North Vietnam with their air force and navy, prosty encroaching
the sovereignty and independency of
the Democratic Republic of Violgan, piling up new crimes azdinst the entira people of Vietnam. Mors, they hava latterly lakan a sew step of ascalation, saing artibery qua hasad south of the
warships to skall many popolated of North Vietnam. They dominotly mand that the 17 milion people of North Vietnam give up their seerad
night and obligation to support the 36-
pratina strmegle at their kith and ki In South Vietnam. At the same time they contiene denying and pealing the ZOUKANZA VAT within US KRETARIOK foc potional satralen VOZAČ by all strata of the people in South Vietnam under the leadership of the South
National-Liberation
Prost and shamelessly demand that the
In South Vietnam stop byking. hordarson, Uke US imperistiwa have been chusalasly expanding. The "special war" in Laos, mbotaging. The 1962 Geneva Agreemonia de task, re
sily launching quacha and provo- Doka against the Kingdom of Came bodia, in an attempt to turn the whole
of Polo-Chloe todo a thoire of win.
AN the US walk about prece ir abs viously a zene hour: in reality Ukay are lotaneitying and expanding the war, ihent purpose being to cling to South Vietnam at all costs, and to poepelsale the partition of Vietnam. In Die New Yours manage, Johanna declared that would "aland kom su South Vut- and asked the Americag people
pply mois troops and money.
To the NUT, humans policy of He ponding military attachu durkan verioca
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forces to close then runks and merge forward to defeat the second, dry-sea-
strategic offensive of the US expeditionary troops and their puppets. as well as ans scheme which they might devise so as to wis still greater and maer gloriamN VİTTİNG
100
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The people of South VinaaN YOUR for peace, but they are resolved sen to starken their fight so long as the shadow of a nu 24 175 appressor still Temana on the territory of the below ad Fatherland
The South Vietnam National Libera- Tin Tiền an almil ban linh the font want and good will of the pvarsment of the Democratic Republic ut Virtanen Along with our bath and
indiener a que en plat la stay the Maa hint of the US. "z-
that the La
ly and ancesto se dy na bursisng and 19 Phet wat die spopad The Deu cratic Republic of Vietnam, stăm 1 US. and satojauté troops fica South Vatnam, and to the Noch Viermach sette by themteta per beterpal khala in Arrondisce won the platform. of the Scrath Vietnam Saltomat-Talarga Diem Prost, the sie genata representa- Toet of 19¢ South Vozta mese people: I give it more vigorous support, mental, pe stical and mutual lo the residence war against VS. Appression for national salvatina of the South
Varnitine poople in order 15 bring the US aggerwons to rund derval
The South Vattokar Milional Liberas tion front particulats appella su the progressive people of the Uited States, Dar the sake of peace and justzen and the honour of the American peop'N to set will mota ezogetically against the US government's majort and tabte Man war, and to check all its acheoDIN to step up and expand the war of agi gression In Vietnam
With Bra cost dence in the metary
of their past cause and with the strong
support of the pooples throughout the world, the Naturowe Liberation From and the South Vietnussoną people are determined to carry dei litatealy their nght to was then saree Bational rights, and costubule a moby share to the Comana Angela of the worki i pro piti int price and freedom
4
NEW TIMES A
HLA
Nu
H
February 1917-
F
IVAN ALUF
The Overthrow of Tsardom
IFTY years ago, on February 27 (March 12). 1917, the Romanov monarchy, which had ruled Russia for over 300 years, was overthrown by the people.
This climaxed long years of struggle by several generations of revolutionaries. Radi- shchev, the Decembrists, the Narodnays Volya-- numberless were the sacrifices made to bring Russia freedom. But freedom became possible only when there emerged a force capable of overthrowing the detested autocracy-the Rus- sian proletariat and its political party, the Bo ika
By 1917 the situation had become extremely tense. The imperialist war aggravated all the contradictions of Russian life. There was cons ruption at the top, compounded by the evil in- fluance of the monk Rasputin, a succession of heavy reverses at the front, economic disloca- tion, and the imminent menee of famine all these combined to heighten public resentment The country was on the verge of a revolutionary explosion
But, though rotten to the core, tourism did not collapse of itself, az some bourgeois historians claim. A force was needed capable of demolish- ing the whole system of tarist rule.
After the February Revolution. the liberal bourgeoisie claimed all the credit for over- throwing isariam. In his "History of the Second Russian Revolution," the leader of its chief political party, the Cadets, P. N. Milyukor, de- picts the liberal members of the Dumia as revo- lutionaries and the Duma itself as the prime mover of the revolution. For, Milyukov asserts, "It gave the street demonstrations and army mutineers a banner and a slogan, thereby trans- forming the revolt into revolution." That con- tention is shared by A. F. Kerensky, now living In the United States, where he is considered a specialist on Russian history. In his latest book, "Russia and the Historie Turning Point," be maintains that the February Revolution was performed not by the people, but by the so-
called "democratic forces" led by the Cadet Party.
This utterly false version has been taken up by many Western historiana, Thus we find in Palmer's "Dictionary of Modern History" the statement that in Russia "there were two main groups of revolutionaries: the liberal intel- ligentals and the Bolsheviks........ The first group carried out the February Revolution, the second group the October Revolution."
IF
It would be naive to think that these and similar statements are due to ignorance of the facts. They have a dennite political purpose, namely, to counterpose the February to the October Revolution and obscure or discount the organic ties between these two stages of a single revolutionary process.
Kerensky and his friends hold up the Febru- ary Revolution as "their own," maintaining that it gave Russla a "normal" bourgeois constitu- tional regime, and that the October Revolution was an "accident," the result of an "oversight" by the Provisional Government. No wonder these historians try so hard to "excommunicate" the Bolsheviks from the February Revolution. Their contention is that the Bolshevik Party played no role of any significance in the struggle that led to the overthrow of Tear Nicholas 1 and his government.
It need hardly be said that that version bears no resemblance to the facts. And the facts are that the liberal bourgeoisie was frightened by the maturing revolution and convulsively clung to the monarchy. Up to the very last its leaders tried to work out some arrangement with the Tsar's government for a division of power. That was very candidly put by one of the opposition landers, Shidlovsky, at a meeting of the bour grols Duma deputies, a few months before the revolution, on November 16, 1916:
"The government thinks that we are engineer ing a revolution; actually we are trying to pre- vent it."
True, the bourgeoisle had its own accounts to settle with Nicholas II. It was alarmed by the rapid development of the revolutionary crisis
NEW TIMES + N 12
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1
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and the reverses suffered by the Russian armles at the front. It was also frightened by the trar's MINOGLYTES towards a separate peace with Germany. It was angered by the tear's stubborn refusal to make any concessions whatever. The liberal bourgeoisie believed things could be put right by palace revolution. That plan was lavoured by the British and French imperialists who feared that Russia might withdraw from the war.
These opposition manoeuvres naturally tended to weaken and isolate the tsarist regime. But they could not put an end to tardom. That was done by the struggle of the workers and peasants and their sons in the army. Only the Russian proletariat, which had gone through the school of the 1905 revolution and was led by the Bolshevik Party, was capable of ridding Russla of the autocracy.
The working class was the main driving force of the February Revolution. It stood at the head of the popular democratic movement against the war and suldcratie rule. Ils reve- lutionary courage and perseverance in number- less strike struggles inspired the people to rise against tsardom.
At the close of 1918 and the opening weeks of 1917 the strike struggle spread to the entire country. The strikes were especially militant in Petrograd, which became the centre of the mass movement. And it was in Petrograd, with its long-standing revolutionary traditions, that the February Revolution started. This was no re- cident. Trained by the Bolsheviks, the Petrograd workers braved police terror and army mobiliza- tions. They were the backbone of the Russian proletariat, ita vanguard.
The Russian Bureau of the Bolshevik Central Committee had its headquarters in Petrograd and, despite the additional difficulties created by the war, maintained contact with Lenin and the Central Committee Foreign Bureau In Swit- zerland, from where it received Lenin's polley directives.
The Russian Bureau acted principally through the Petrograd Committee, which Lenin regarded as a model of revolutionary work in the com- plex war situation. The Petrograd Committee represented the country's biggest Bolshevik organization, numbering at that time several thousand. Altogether the party had about 24,000 members, all of them steeled in revolutionary battles and able to withstand tarlet terror and persecution.
In discussing the February events, the Men-
NEW TIMES A HAN
sheviks and Socialist-Revolution. rigs (SR's) uzually treat them an unbridled spontaneoLLE setions that came as a surprise to everyone. One of the SR lenders, Zenzinov, wrote: "The revolu- tion came at a bolt from the blue and caught the government, the Duma and public organizations by surprise..., it was a surprise, too, for us revolutionaries.
What revolutionaries? The petty-bourgeois parties were not thinking in terms of revolution and for them the events of February 1917 were indeed a bolt from the blue. The Mensheviks and 58's wanted to resolve all the issues through the Duma, by prodding the liberal bourgeoisia to power. What they feared most of all was street demonstrations and an open clash with the tourist regime,
The Manabarik lender Chkheidze told the Duma on February 14: "Gentlemen, the street is ralging its voice, and we cannot afford to disre gard what it has to say." The Mensheviku tried to frighten the liberals by holding up the Red bogey. They thought they could force them to be more active.
The Bolsheviks were the only party which systematically and consistently prepared the masses for decisive battle with the regime. Late in 1916, the Russian Bureau Instructed the Petrograd and Moscow Party Committees 10 organize mass demonstrations culminating in a general strike. In other words, to prepare for open war against turism, for the transition from scattered economic nad political actions to organized mass political struggle ending in an armed rising of the proletariat. And at fres tory meetings," in leaflets and through other media, the Bolsheviks called for a decisive battle. One such leaflet, issued by the Petrograd Committee, read:
"We must more and more powerfully swing the pendulum of the revolution. From economic struggle against capitalism in the factories the movement must grow into a broad political struggle, a struggle for power, Into elvil war."
The street demonstrations began on Janu Ary 9. 1017, when, in response to the Bolshevik appal, there were strikes and open-air rallies in many parts of the country. The slogan at all of them was an end to the autocracy and the war. About 145,000 downed tools in Petrograd.
After that the movement rapidly gained mo mentum. A high point was reached in Petrograd where, on February 14, in opposition to the Menshevik call for a peaceful march on the State Dume, the Bolsheviks carried out a mang
7
י
political strike Three days later, on the 17th, there was a strike at the huge Puuilov Engineer- ing Works. 1. aan was nearing breaking point.
On February 23 the revolution began. On that day the strikes developed into demonstrations against the regime The Bolshevik slogan of open struggle, of revolution, was being put into practice. From the working-class districts the demonstrators marched to the centre of the city, breaking through pouce cordons and Biling the huge Nevsky Prospect, the capital's main street.
The Bolsheviks took messures to spread the hovement and give it more organization. On February 23, the Ruadan Bureau and the Potro- grad Committee Instructed all Party organiza- tions to give the movement maximum scope. Late at night the Balihevik Izadership met in the Vyborg district. It decided to continue and expand the strike movement, intensify propa- ganda among the troops, and take measures ta arm the workers. It advanced two slogans: the overthrow of the monarchy, and an end to the imperialist war. It urged "all comrades to go to the factories early in the morning and, without starting work, hold belef meetings and bring out the workers in mass demonstrations."
On February 25 the capital was paralyzed by a general strike. On the 37th the movement merged with a revolt by the troops By the evening of that day the workers and soldiers were practically in control of the city. The taarist ministers were arrested. Nicholas abdicated. The revolution had triumphed, and in the next days and weeks spread throughout the vast country,
The February Revolution was an important landmark on the road to the great sosialist reve olution of October 1917, In February the tsarist monarchy wna abolished and Soviets of Work- ers', Solfilers' and Peasants' Deputies set up sil over the country. The socio-political prerequl. sites were thus created for a transition to the
vw, socialist stage of the revolution.
The February Revolution was the first vic- torious people's revolution in the imperiallat wen. Having broken out during the war, it was the first ray of hope for all the working people tormented by the world holocaust. News of the revolution broke through the frontiers of the Warring countries and came as a clarion call for peace and brotherhood. The events is Runda exerted a tremendous influence on the Interna- tional revolutionary and anti-war movement.
However, owing to a number of factors the revolution carried out by the workers and peasants did not result in the establishment of genuine people's government. The Mensheviks and SR's, who commanded a majority in the Petrograd Soviet, voluntarily surrendered power to the bourgeoisie. A Provisional Government under Prince Lvov was formed on March 2. But the Soviets continued to function. They had the support of the armed people and were there- forex foren to be reckoned with. Prince Lvov had to admit that his government was "an authority without power, while the Workers Soviets had power without authority."
The result was a contradictory intertwining of two dictatorships-the bourgeois dictatorship represented by the Provisional Government and revolutionary-democratic dictatorship repre- sented by the Soviets. From the very start the Provisional Government plotted against the people, endeavouring to check the spread of the revolution, eliminate the Soviets and establish the undivided rule of the imperialist bour- geoisie.
The reactionary nature of the Provisional Government was glaringly demonstrated during the so-called April crisis, precipitated by For- eign Minister Milyukov's note to the Allies pledging Russia to continue the war and honour all the obligations assumed by the tsarist gov. emment. This evoked a storm of protest and for several days there were protest demonstrations in Petrograd,
It was not long before the people realized that the Provisional Government www merely continuing the foreign and home policies of the tear. The people wanted pesce, but were being made to continue the criminal war. The pensants demanded land, but the bourgeoisie did not dare to encroach on the big landed estates. The work- ors demanded bread, but the food shortage was becoming worse from day to day. Russla was rapidly sliding into economie ruin.
The revolution did not solve the problems posed by the economic and political situation. They could be solved only by the further devel- opment of the revolution, its development Into socialist revolution. Lenin wrote: "It is impos- sible in twentieth-century Russia, which has won a republic and democracy in à revolution- ay way, to go forward without advancing 10- wards socializzo."
For the Rumla of 1917 soclallem was the only way out of the horrors of war, famine and economic chaos. The Great October Revolution consummated the work begun. In February,
The Soviet Union and Bulgaria
connection with the 19th anniver-
ciaty, on March 18 of the Soviet- Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship, Co-oper-
alion and Mutual Amiatanes. Alt Mure
skat Vladimir A. Sadeta, Vice-Pragkdant of the Soviet-Bulgarian Pilendably do- clety, shared with our correspondent, A. Hạ kh swtories of co-operation between the fordel and Bulgarian pas ple
The Irlandskip of wir two peoples in of long standing, sald Air Mambal Sur das. Mosmaense to the Russian aldiara who fought for Bulgaria's frendom back To the last century are to be seen in her remote mountain villages na wail as on the main aquares of her cities.
Nearly My years ago, when the young Devlet republic was in bart stralia, Bulgaria Communists and prov
Enessiver started a campaign for lun
schoend (hangiver of their own moszte
cocognition and the Bulgariena prople
seppiles of broud to help the fam stricken in the Volga araa
The second wacht war put Šavlate
spite all her aborta, sen Chimany wat
Bulgarian friendship to a hard jest. De-
unable to use Bulgarian armed forces so the masters front. The Bulgarien pro ple take pride in the fact that not a
single one of them fought against the Soviet Union.
The 17th Air Army, which I com- monales, was part of the Sed Ukrainien Frant and took strect part in the Bebt- ing for the liberation of Bulgaria. That scan, I believe, the test apertion in our experience which began without the thunder of an artillery and aur barrage In the morning of Septemiker 8, 1944, Soviet troops crossed the Rumanian- Bulgarian Tenation. A day laing sen learned that a popular uprising had taken place in Bulgaria ağalıon the mor
marcko-fascist clique Political power
was in the banda at the Pathachand Front Gover
There were Hill German troopy in the country, however, and revolutions.
Air Marshal V. A. SUDETS
ry Sola was threatened by the forma- dlow concentrated northwest of the saphat, da Yugoslar terrory, and at The Bulgarian town of Vibe. By onder of the Fatherland Frost Governmban Bulgarian troops and poneilla forma- tion went into action on September 10 In defence of the western Trootkins Bet-
for Bghting masund. At the request el
the people's government the Saviol comesed undertook to co-ordinate the actions of the Bulgarian troops and the troops of the 3rd Ukrainian Front.
On September 11 the fest planes of the 17h Air Army landed at the Softa alleld. Never will I forget the warm welcome we were given be the covence of the next two days our principal voula few
echoes to the Solia and Plovdiv areas. Our bau Rekter reglenka weera detallad to delend Solla agaljaat mesi ale ruldu. Together with the Bulgarian army, Indo wiich the zweritha foma- tions had been incorporatal, the Soviet Groops repolved the mezi sitacks on Sofia and Viêu. With nor al support the Belgarian troops began sa offensive La the northwestern skraction. Simula- moodsly, our pllots covered the advanen of our troops across the Tallum to So- Da. Plovdiv and Vidka, sed in co-opera- tion with the People's Liberation Army et Yugoslavia, and the parrilla paralym
od attempla de trabalar Corsaan waka
by railway and motor road towards Nia and Belgrade.
Our Bulgarian friends, from the pe Prement and the army down in private Individuals la towar and country, helpe ad us greatly. For one dlung, they quarded the athable where our planer
vere baand.
De occasion we were required to carry out raliber untiat sakipunants On the morning of September 17, 1 re member, Marshal Tollukkia phoned me from Tirmavo, where Hka then was. The night before, he told me, the state of
the
mildary missions bad had from Solla and were making Joe Turkey. Wik
a daw makadtors of the
of Bulgaria. They bad taken th acchron and part at the country's gold taserve with them. Our Supreme Command ordered the whole tralaload Kapisa
The same day our Chief of Stall, Gasacal "Brysov, arrived in Sofia We learned that the then ourrying the zunaways then when more than 200, and all wel komod) was ademedy near- ing the Tarikan Tenaline. Sace there were no Bulgarian trooja or quacitias A that ar
we decided to see our
plasen to effect the captors. Haro of the Soviet Union N.V. Kosler, then Captain and deputy commander of the bambar regiment, now a Major General, was placed in charge of the "expedis flow" Pive bombers wecorled by dgkinen duly look of from the Safa alebek,
Kozlow and his group Deve at a lowe abitude. The tallway lam was deert- ad-na maka szywkara. But at the sal Nation of Madera the pilota sighted two trains. The locomotive of
one was pulling staan.
The plane landed, tested up to train sad almond their large-calibre chloe gun at the sasia, Our lounge Tikiots come spiling out of the brush bays The Killers kept circling and
down on the train, ready to open
The Tommy-gunas mond on the tenisa Whan they come even with locomotive. Use bogine drivve and hi MALALANE Mepped down to dent then. They had bona forced in deive the Trata at plašai poist, they said, sad told our mon that 10-15 minutna barnen a group of fascial diplosnata Had absodoned the tenta and Red lowanda. Tukey la beo motorcen.
They did not get far. Pihkan pulmater later two Agklers spotted and berbed them back. Macawhile the diplomata and Daarin who had remained in th train were deemed and deta
Our Buigenaar brochary the aud
Ohe Soviet Army. "You
L
brought us freedom, thank you, Iriends" LE A VENTURANt we bocet from many.
I have been die Buchgärna and
abd Trinida Chocu many thrEL HOCK
neck ume | have vezeKİ Denn deeply jouched by ike Daternal Teslags the Bulgarian people cherish See the Soviet Darm feelings we Soviet people fully reciprocata.
Cher (recky las are deep and
vr. This is to be fall in Bolgarsą at EVITY AND
At the alchukla from which see des De oor antosioms in 1944 wow stand but marion ale lines. They won bulk al Soviet FactOCIAL
1 have the pleasesy of
teking new nem of program. How long ago dal ve kat kaur of Krank
CHINA
Pins Tarhang and his pro mcking the bones at Herestrans
that in which the volate of the operok culture of a motion are destroynet. What ona i leva de common with a genuine catural revakciant. Here in the Sevi Unban the culture revokation brought the Dight of howledge to sublime, in Calm the people are being offered the alander vakama
Bir Vilaga, USSE
the sciences.
P. Domkov
Yastarsday 1 mood in the local papar er dem about the outrageous activam at the Paling jendera. In Chim they roplating. Sovint phat with enth Chinese machines 21 they do
ality of such method. What do the acnee në det. Have lose they have fallen ze their
10
Volkmor Wündschittel
Spetal, the villaga nasz Soča where Il vens decided to build an from and staal wechat Now 35 la producing thonanda of tonn af pig iron and seal annually
and in vil at panling-
ulgarian trinade toll was of the
I remember the Jay with which
struction of a big chemical plant in De- mulzovgrad. Pilean years ago it seemed the some of the country's technical porntial. Recently I saw in Stara Za
gora a far bigger chemical plant pro-
docing fertiline.
We follow Bulgaria's progress with tride. la iha yous of people's governe
nearly half the population, moved inio saw house. The clan kaya expended and grown youngus. And the villagua have truly changed beyond recognition. In fact they can handy be
called villages now, they are more like wall lower with sturdy stone hours All Soviet people are happy to know that our country's aid hai bạon of bezali in Bulgaria.
In the centre of Soba, on Russlan Boulevard, there stands a building over which waves the Bulganes red-white- and-genom fag. li ti the building where ska People's Assembly meets. De kla pediment le this inscription: "la unity there le strength." These supple words eptionalen the wisdom of the people and the kimariest experience of the country.
On the 19th anniversary of the Tematy of Friendship we can say with gradilication that úhla metio hau bean sad remains the cornerstone of the policy of both countrie
From the Mail-Bag
1 dved on the Soviet Daisa many pear before the second world war. During the sear 1 fought at the Treat
en kosmaloyed worker, 1 kartes much From reading Marxist-Lestakt Hjeratori, } was frescosted ta the Chinese ques
I fought in the war opaliet Japan and
Den in those daya. And round about...
la October 1945 wa dhehazard. Da
way back do Bulgaria 1 saw the loaded with food and opclpment going the other way. To the question "where jo" we were given the preLNÍ
"
GANG, Bit for the Chinese people. Iven in these hard times, exhausted They were by the war, the Sevier
people were mindful of their Interne
Develet duuty, Shame on thom who can Intget this
Bulgaria
P. Uzunov
Recently my wife and I had the pant Joraszna to visit Mascom a ma bern of a German-Soviet - Friendship Society delegation. There were many non-Party people among tin, but wher
ontered the Lande Mausoleum And
FORE CAR GRterstand how and we taken at the news of the estrapon committed by Chisam citam DE well of thai shrine.
an old veteran of the Party, Way back in the poentira, when i wat
1950 † enia dezake a very curious book: "Sue Yelena Last 101 and Tasimesen!". From le 1 lægraed of the life and work of the great son of the Chasm people
friendship for the Soviet Union, at ka alfarte do promote co-operation between the Chinese and Soviet pengina Sobar- quently Chiang Kababek chose to sever
prophra
The bands which unites these bisa great
of the
ening in China now det af trenchery Jowards the Soviet Union. But the Chieme lenders are thereby also koylag the intsoner of theirown propİL
Fritz Fengler
Woltersdorf, GDR
Can anyone doubt that if the Peking Jenders were not undermining the unity at the internallomal Commerkt ond working-chan movement, Wite met Joli jowing a divisie policy. The United States could not operate on high-hand-
H down in Vialaku
Prague,
V. Blazek
"Izvestia" Jubilee
THE 50th birthday of Izvestia, organ of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the USSR., is a landmark in the history of the Soviet press and of Soviet public aksira. Izvestia fist appeared in Petrograd on March 13 (February 28 by the old-style calen- dar), 1917, the day after the February revolu- tion which overthrew the tsarist autocracy. The first issues, published by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, mirror for us today the complex character of the dramatic events of those days, when the genuine revolu- tionary forces not only had to beat back the furious attacks of the bourgeodale but conduct
■ stubborn struggle against the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who were ready to betray the cause of the workers and peasants, After the victory of the Great October Social- ist Revolution favestic became the chief organ of the Soviet government and played an impor tant part in the evolution of the world's first working people's state.
i
Many historical documents, including the fa- mour Decree on Peace, the Decree on the Land, and Lenin's article "The Chief Task of Our Day," were first published on its pages. Among its permanent contributors were such outstand- ing leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet state as M. I. Kalinin, G. K. Ordjonikiḍ- ze, M. V. Frunze, G. L. Petrovsky, N. K. Krups- kaya, M. 1. Ulyanova, V. V. Kulbyshev and A. V. Lunacharsky. The founders of Soviet Ute- rature-Maxim Gorky, Vindimír Mayakovsky, Demyan Bedny-wrote for it. Many publiciale
извѣстія
HEPPATPATCHANO BURSTA
Рабочихъ депутатовъ.
Its sacenada Derporpsan u Pecabs,
4
The first issue of "levesha" put out on the day allar tha February Revolution,
choslovakia
NEW TIMES A DA TE
NEW TIMES A KI
of the Leninist school left on its pages remark- able specimens of their work, in which pro- found Marxist thinking was combined with simplicity of exposition. Contributions from worker and peasant correspondents were always given much space.
Izvestia's services were outstanding in all crucial periods: during the early Ave-year-plan periods, in the grum days of the Great Patriotic War, in the postwar reconstruction period. Many of its correspondents died the death of herows in battle with the nazi Invaders. And other talented young journalists appeared to take their place.
Izvestia'" circulation of 6,670,000 is an indi- estion of higher cultural and political levels, At the same time, the paper unquestionably owes its popularity to the professional stiil of the men and women who make it.
Izvestia raises vital questions, conducts frank discussions on problems of the day, maintains broad contact with its readers, responds to their letters promptly. Its coverage of foreign policy questions deserves special mention. It works consistently for the triumph of the cause of peace and sociallam, for international co-opera- tion; it exposes the aggressive designs of impe- rialist powers, supports the national-liberation struggle of the peoples. Extensive information on the latest events on our planet are to be found in its columns.
In recognition of its outstanding services the government has marked Izvestia's 50th birthday by conferring the Order of Lenin upon it.
Congratulating the editorial and publishing staff, its worker and village correspondents, ita contributors and readers on the anniversary, the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Pres- dium of the USSR. Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers note that "true to the tru ditions of the Leninist Pravda, Izvestia has at all stages of the development of the Soviet slate energetically helped and today continues to help the Party lo carry out its Leninist gen- er line and to work for the vital interests of the people." And further: "It is the mission of Izvestia to keep its readers informed of the for- eign and domestic policies of the Communist Party and Soviet government, international re- lations, the national-liberation movement, and to expose the anti-popular and aggressive na- ture of modern imperialism."
H
In behalf of its readers both at home and abroad, New Times takes this opportunity to add ita voice to the chorus of congratulations to in- verfia on its golden jubilee.
$1
I
I
I
T
The French Elections:
HE parliamentary elections in France reveal
a definite picture of political polarization. To properly assess its extent we must analyze the outcome of the first and second rounds.
The following table shows the number of volos, and percentages of the total, polled by the various parlles in the 1958 and 1982 elections and in the first round, on March 5, 1967,
UNE and UDT
Popolar Republicat
National Centre of
Independence
Dover parties
+
-
- -
+
+
4
·
•
BOTIN
J
RE CHENKRA | mittion
18.0
13
47
11
195
1.1
17.5
+
ILF
-
119
L
3.2
02
-
·
+
D
BORIS VESNIN
Political Polarization
sented primarily by Jean Lecanuet's Democratic Centre (its two component parties, the MRP and National Centre of Independents, also fought the 1958 and 1982 elections separ- ately). Its programme was for a return to Atlantic foreign policy
VODKA
#124
5.0
23 15
7.79
224
1679
23
12:34:
1J
1774
20
1274
13
$35
The table sugests, first of all, a considerable strengthening of the Communist Party and the Left forces generally. The Communists Increased their vote by one million. It might be mentioned In this context that the maximum Communlai vote, in the early postwar democratic upsurge following the defeat of naziam and the victory of the Resistance, amounted to 3.7 million. The Communist vote in the first round, on March 5. was an unqualified victory.
It also showed that the policy worked out at the 17th and 18th Congresses of the Party was the correct one and that its programms of demo- cratic regeneration, accords with the interests of France's working people.
The Democratie and Socialist Federation (ite two components, the Socialist Party and Rad- lenis, fought the 1958 and 1962 elections sepa- rately) and the United Socialist Party likewise increared their vote. This, too, is evidence of a growing desire for more democracy in Fronch 16r.
That is the conclusion one should draw from the defent of the Right-wing forces, repre-
12
and adoption of a more renc- tionary home policy. The voters rejected that.
Lastly, the first round rent- firmed the elability of the political forces supporting the present regime. Evidently this was due to the following factors among others:
A favourable foreign policy position resulting
resulting from the government's efforts to streng- then France's independence vis- à-vis the United States, promote relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and work out constructive solutions for major International problems, particularly Vietnam;
Definite progress in economic development, which, though not attended by a corresponding rls in Iving standards, has strengthened France's independence.
Prosident de Gaulle's popularity doubtlessly played a part too, and he hinted in his election speeches that a vote for the ruling party would be a vote for bl.
The flext round was important because it de- termined the alignment of the main political forces
In preparation for the second round, the Com- munist Party and the Democratic and Socialist Federation decided on joint candidatos, in sc- cordance with their December 1966 agreement. The United Sociallate accepted that arrange ment. As a result, there was a single Left candi- date In 370 constituencies, the choice falling to the man who stood the best chance, Irrespective of party affilation.
NEW TIMES A
H
The second round, on March 13, determined the composition of the National Assembly, a shown in the following table:
Communit
+
Democrație and Secialist
Federation
+
+
United Socialusis and other Lat
·
L
ghomepa Pro-government, pazins Democratic Centre
+
+ +
L +
+
74
1963 1967
.10
L
41
101
LIS
19
251
201
24
152
1
The figures for 1958 and 1962 have been grouped to bring them into accord with the pres ent composition of the Assembly. This will enable the reader to get a clear picture of the political line-up,
Again the figures show the increased strength of the Left democratle forent, which now have 199 seats, or nearly 50 more than before. To this should be added that the distribution of sents mirrors the undemocratic nature of the present electoral system. With proportional representa- tion, the Communists would have had 305 sents Instead of their present 73.
The election results are convincing proof of
Yes,
can you spere 20 billion Well- Garman market. Or at least 76 bil- Hon! We could do with dollars log- 19 or
20 bilden LLS. dollars, regular exchange rate.
This is the sum Czechoslovakia owes Federal Germany, or rather tha Sudeten Garman Council.
How did we run up this huge debi It appears, we haven') met our labilmes under the Munich agreement. True, the uncalled-for
activities of the Soviet Army against the Third Reich hav rendered the agreement mull and vold. But we haven't compensated the Bers mans rusabled from our franslar areas. The blame for the resettling is sho shared by the U.S. and Britain, which entered into collusion with the Soviet Union at the Yalta and Peredam Conferences, and by France, which joined them later.
The claim is made by the Sudoran- deutsche Zeitung, on behalf of tha maltreated mattian.
Fab. 10 it wrote: "Presidium memberi Richard Reitzner and Hans Schöte of
ZEPTUL MAGN
the
how effective co-operation and alliance of the Left can be. Proof, also, that a considerable part of the electorate regards this as the path France should follow. And the suspensa of the Left would probably have been greater still if t presented an agreed political programme, for which the Communists had vigorously came paigned. However, the outcome of the elections offers a good basis for continued strengthening of the democratic forces and for future suỌCI
The ruling party still has an absolute though reduced majority. This might create certain difficulties, especially in home-policy debates. However, the future will show how things work out. The Right-wing groups lost even more In the second round than in the first.
The outcome of the elections, as Indicated above, shows that there has been far-reaching political polarization between the force of de- mocracy in the broad sense and the forces of monopoly. The elections have reaffirmed the via- Ellity of an anti-monopoly alllance as express- ed in the election bloc of the Left parties. Now they are faced with the task of strengthening their alliance and creating the prerequisites for democratic regeneration.
CAN YOU SPARE 80 BILLION?
Committee for the Protection of Sudeten German Interests, percursor of tha Sudatan German Council, told a news conference early in 1940 that the loscas incurred by the Sudeten Germans
as a result of their resettlement amount-
ad to $19,000 million.......... In the late Gilles the Sudalan German Counci aakad aconomic experts to check the 1948 Figuras Their estimate confirmed that the losses ranged between 76 and 60 billion marka..."
Trus, there are people who do sel believe any compensation is due the re-
tellers. But the latter's claims meal with
full understanding in Benn. On February 21, representatives of the Sudeten Garmen Council were received by Chancellor Kissinger to discuss improve- ment of relations with Czechoslovakia. They were of course the night people de consul. Who should know bullge then the Sudeten Germans, with their experience at 1936-45, how to deal with the Caschat
As was only le be expected, the Council representatives urged that the question of the debt sheuld be glvan absolute priority. Reporting on meeting, the DFA news agency says. Chanceller assared them nothing would be underlaken without the resettlers!
The resettlers were quick to show thair appreciaken. On February 27 Franz Böhm of the Sudeten German İratomily, an achvial of the Haslain perly in the Munich days, Forchheim, Tavaria, audience that the resellers "fully trusted". Kimslevone.
Dann is seemingly not averse to cashing in an Mhoss bulliana. They could be used in give a shakin-be-am la Krupp, whe kampant to be in dificult viralis at the moment, or le lisence the West-Barman nuclear bank.
March
Antonin Petrina, Caschoslovak Jouraslor
13
Kiesinger's Bonn
to
THE whole world knows by now that Weat
Germany's new government operate a new, an entirely new foreign policy. That word "now," however, has been worn rather threadbars by now. Beneath the fading "grand coalition" varnish the corrosion caused by the policy of the Federal Republic's previous governments is showing more and more distinctly.
Through the long years of the cold war that policy eminently suited the Federal Republic's Western allies, particularly Washington. The Bonn rulers' demands to have the status quo in Europe changed, their claims to the territory of the GD.R, to West Berlin, to the Western areas of Poland-all this was seen across the Atlantic as an instrument of political and military black- mail in relation to the socialist states. Bonn's Aggressive stance. Its nuclear ambitions, ita de magogic clamour for frontier revision In the Fast fitted admirably into the "rollback of Com- munism" doctrines of those days.
With the progressive bankruptcy of the cold- war doctrine, however, as the trend towards détente began to prevail, the "bastion" on the Rhine became more and more of an anachron- Samm. It la an essential feature of a bastion that It does not move, it stays where it is, and in a moving and changing world immobility inevi tably means falling behind. Eventually this began to reguler with the commanders of the bastion too. It was none other than West Ger- many's former Foreign Minister Schröder who described his government's foreign policy as a "policy of stagnation" and proclalised a "policy of movement" instead.
What was this "movement" by which Schröder and the more enterprising of his col- leagues proposed to rescue the becaimed Bonn. ship?
In their talks in allied expitals, West-German representativen spoke more and more often of "Hexibility." Boon realized that its old policy was a failure and that persistence In It would doom the Federal Republic to lentation in the West as well and reduce it to a political back- water of the world.
And so the "policy of movement" appeared. But its aliators bore a remarkable reser-
14
LEON SZULCZYNSKI
Polish Journalist
blance to an opera singer singing loudly about how boldly he is striding ahead while never stirring from his spot on the stage.
All three main divisions of Bonn's foreign policy, namely, ie Westpolitik-policy towards the Western states, Deutschlandpolitik-policy towards the G.D.R., and, Istly, Ostpolitik- polley towards the other socialist countries, are closely interlinked. There can be no significant change of its foreign policy without change of policy towards the East. That, however, would Involve giving up the sims which the socialist states rightly regard as endangering their secu- rity and which other European nations also con- alder an obstacle to the establishment of listing pesce in their continent.
This the West-German rulers proved incapa- ble of doing. Recognition of existing European frontiers, recognition of the German Democratie Republic, abandonment of the attempts to get access to nuclear weapons appeared to them too high a price to pay to save the Federal Repub- lie from Isolation.
Only the Semblance of Change
So it was a case of aquaring the circle: they wanted to overcome the stagnation re ponsible for the polley failures without giving up the aims responsible for the stagnation. That being the case, the much-publicized "movement" was bound to be purely verbal, spurious, fletitious. Instead of real change there was only a sam- blance of change.
One move along these lines was the "Peace Note" of the Erhard government. That Note was supposed to convince the Poles that though it did not renounce claims to one-third of their coun- try's territory, the Federal Republic was nonetheless a potential friend who in no way threatened them,
The Czech and Slovaks were likewise to be convinced that there was no danger to them from the Rhine. True, Bonn still held to the view that the take-over of the Sudetenland under the Munich agreement was perfectly legi- Himate, but now that agreement was no longer valld and the Federal Repubile did not mean to bring up the matter in future.
The Soviet Union, Rumania, Hungary, Bulga- ria and the rest of Europe were to believe that the spirit of peace and co-operation bad
How Tabs
triumphed on the Rhine: we have no aggressive intentions, Bonn averred, all we want is to be allowed to reunite Germany on our terma. Con- sent to the take-over of the German Democratic Republic-that was the price the "politicians of movement" demanded for cessing to torpedo European détente.
The offer was not accepted, as we know. The crisis of Bonn policy deepened. That was when they started thinking about a helmsman who could fill the drooping sails of the Bonn ship with fresh wind. But before he was chosen, the old crew prepared detalled na- vigating instructions.
Metamorphosis of a Doctrine
One of the sponsors of the so-called flexible policy is Ernst Majonica, member of the leader- ship of the Christian-Democrat group in the Bundestag. His political conception, already set out in his book "German Foreign Policy" in 1965, is based on an unshakable belief in what he calls the growing strength of national com- munism in the East-European countries. This, he declared, would result in time in weakening the political and military ties between the so- cialist states.
To encourage this process of disintegration, Maĵonica said, was one of the most important tasks of the Federal Repubite's foreign policy, and Bonn should accordingly seek rapproche- ment with the European socialist countries. Tho G.D.R., it need hardly be said, was to be exclud- ed from this process of rapprochement. What is more, improved relations with the other social- ist states were to lead to the laolation of the G.D.R. in its own camp. It was the characteristic method of the wolf-pack, cutting off the intend- ed victim from the flock.
Two years went by, The Erhard government was succeeded by the new Kissinger team. And behold, through the fresh cost of varnish there peered the priming Majonjon had spread on Statements about "rapprochement with the East" came thick and fant. There followed the establishment of diplomatic relations with Ru- mania, already promised by Erhard in his day.
This diplomatic step was meant to convince the world that the Eastern policy of the Kie- singer government was really a new one, so new that it was even modifying the Hallstein doctrine, a key element in the old polky frame-
work.
NEW TIES = Ka 18
Very Interesting is the plastic surgery the Kiesinger government has performed on this doctrine. The estener of the doctrine was that the Federal Republic claimed the right to sole representation of the German people. With countries that recognized the government of the Democratic Republle Bonn refused to estab- lish diplomatic relations and broke them of where they already existed, as in the case of Yugoslavia and Cuba. The one exception, dating back to Adenauer's day, was made for the So viet Union,
The Kissinger government decided to mod- ernize this previously sscrosanct doctrine. It offered to take up diplomatic relations with European socialist states even though they had G.D.R. Ambassadors accredited to their expitals,
But at the same time it officially warned the capitalist and Third World countries that if any of them established diplomatic relations with the G.D.R.. this would be considered an un- friendly act. And to leave no doubt in anyone" mind that the essence of the Hallstein doctrina remained as before, the day after the establish- ment of diplomatic relations with Bucharest Chancellor Kiesinger made this statement in the Bundestag:
"The establishment of diplomatic relations with the Socialist Republic of Rumania implies no change in the German legal view, reaffirmed In the government declaration of December 13, 1966, that the Federal government alone has the right and duty to speak for the German people. We count on this unaltered view of ours being understood and appreciated as hitherto."
+
Reiner Barzel, Chairman of the Christian- Democrat parliamentary group, made matters abundantly clear in last month's Bundestag debate, when he categorically denied that there could be any question at present of remodelling the Federal Republic's foreign policy.
"Our positions remain unchanged," he said. "Only our methods exa change. .......
So what we see is a single line of develop- ment of Bonn polley, started by Chancellors Adenauer and Erhard and their Foreign Minis- tere von Brentano and Schröder and carried on by the present govemment.
Klesinger's Men
In his speech at Katowice Wladyslaw Gomul- ka made it clear that Poland does not intend to help the Bonn politicians strengthen their old
15
poutions by new methods which they think inore effective. For those old positions, designed to change the status quo in Europe, are a dan- gor to the security of our continent, where every such attempted change would inevitably lead not to loud conflict but to total war.
With this in mind, the Poles are convinced that the frontiers of their security lie not only on the Oder and Neisse but on the Elbe. And that an Indispensable element of that security is total and unconditional West-German renup- elation of nuclear weapona. Let us see if the Kiesinger government's much-talked-of "new policyTM has shifted from the old positions at lakat on this last point,
Unfolding his vision of an integrated Western Europe allied with the United States, Ernst Majorien wrote in his book:
"The United States would also have to be prepared to make available to its partners the Information gained in nuclear weapon develop- thent but important to technology in general, Without this information there can be no modern industries. If Washington's partners are denied it, they will have to go in for nuclear weapon development of their own, in order to get the experience for economic and technologi- cal purposes."
The theme was carried further by Franz Josef Strauss in his book "The Grand Design":
"Besides strong conventional forces, a mill-
PE
EOPLE
P
IN THE NEWS
Nguyen Tho Chan
Hauyan The Chan, the new Ambass sador of the Democratic Republic of Viasaan la Mascom, been in 1922.
He joined the nailasal Iberaller mevement while shift in school and had
bu arage his studies because of parece Kan by the secret polico, in these days.
a member al venous damo- cratic and porriade organisations. In 1939 bu jained the Communist Party of hina, far his revolullanary achevin
16
ח
tarily self-sufficient Europe will naturally have to have tactical and strategle nucleur wespons
What for? Strauss says what for:
"The policy of maintaining the status quo in Europe is fundamentally irreconcilable with a policy of European unification; there can be absolutely no doubt that every step towarda political unity, and therefore towards the strengthening and autonomy of Europe. will involve a change in the status quo-naturally in favour of the West'
H
AZALI,
It is now quite a long time since Strauss published these recommendations. The "grand coalition" has come into being, a new govern ment has emerged and has proclaimed policy." Speaking for that new government. West Germany's ambassador to Nato, Dr. Grews, recently declared:
"Nations without nuclear weapons will not be able to aspire in future even to the role of *secondary power. The only solution in the long term is the formation of a collective nuclear force."
Grewe is still the Federal Republic's ambas- sador to Nato. Majonica is one of the principal directors of the "grand coalition" government's foreign polley. Strauss is once again a Minister in that government.
In proclaiming his "new policy." Kiwinger did not have to take a rib from Strauss, ad in the biblical case: he took the whole of Franz Joset and his policy.
Kas he was beica Jalled by the Franch colenlakers-from 1943 to 1945 the Art Hima and from 1951 to 1954 ta recond
From 1942 to 1953 Nouyen Tho Chan was Best Secretary at the Hadang Pre-
vincial Committee of the Communist Party of Indo-China and then First Secretary of the Hanol Party City Com- mitive. During the war al Resistance to the Franch coloniallıh he was Deputy Feel Secretary of the Saigon Party City Committee.
In 1955-59 he was in charge of the Manpower Department of the D.RY. Ministry of Labour, în 1959-40-Deputy Best Secretary of the Hanoi City Con- milies of the Working People's Party al Vielsam and in 1960-66-Aral Secretary of the Party's Provincial Connettes In Chuang Minh, the DRV, coal centre.
The Third Congress of the Working Pompla's Party in 1960 elected Nguyen The Chan an alternada member of the Central Committee,
Dynamics of Modern
A. MILEIKOVSKY Corresponding Member, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences
every
PRACTICALLY article dealing
with the sensommier of postwar
world capitalism and cking Agora on
the dynamics of Ka Industrial produc sion leaves the reader with many andwered qusations. Why, for instance, did annual output galas steadily bas crease in the period 1940-06 (with
tha sole exception of 18561 Or what in the explanation for the relatively high rate of growth for the capitalist world as a whole?
The figures de show that the dynamica of postwar capitalit production deller considerably from the penwar period. In the twenties, the United States was the only country to show an apprecia ble rise in production. By 1929, whạm the crime broke out, loading West-Eu- ropean cowstring had hardly surpassed. the prewar level and Bettata had not even achieved tut. The United Suom rogained the pre-crisis level owly in 1937. In 1929-307, the annual production gain for the capitalist world as a whole. was approximately 0.5 per cent, about half the annual population in-
We get an altogether different picture la the postwar period. In the Ahlen. several Wan-European countzios and Japan showed high growth rate In the slating this gave way to a down
ward trend, with the Delled States P
maining the only rising curva soda. Rei economy, li mitt on the upgrade, and, the duration and inienalty, the situation le rowishecool at the "prosperous
NEW TIME AN
Capitalist Production
In 1948-57 the average annua) je dustrial production gain for the copicals Het world as a whole was 57 per the Agure for 1957-63 was 52 per viel. the gala in 1964 amounted to 72 par cost, and to $3 per cont la 1955, the preliminary Igure for 1956 in between 6 and 7 per CHIL
The question le somethin How can this astonishing change in world capitalist production be squared with the Marxist theory of eyetics) crk
seet And how can we spank, in the light of theme facta, of the deepening of the
general crisis of cipitation? These ques Ilona (hangh few and far between) are evidence that obsoleta conceptions of capitalism still persist. And to a curlula extent, they relect the complaint that
METYEV DČen concentrate on specific and trainings Taesars. These com explain one or another phane la cap- Babat Deonomic trade but they okk pot explain long-range Cranda. However, ONE ZERBOL Cavid at these warenys, foe newspaper or magazine articles de sne allow et an analysis la depth.
Be that as he may, since mich qua tomm are asked. I le only propor In provide an answer. The mugha nocemi- late referring the reader to certala damental trekke which are oben ov looked in the waiter of new facts. Un- doubtedly, bourgeon propaganda, which contrasts to Mantien the theory that capitakiem i bolag "rejuvenated" and
wvigoratek" plays a part 100,
Averoga Indicators
In discussing the dynamics of capetal-
Industrial production, tet
delse what is mesat by the term "cap-
Ballet world" About 30 par nest of Ite indumcial outpot comes from developed cowetzina sermenting for only about 24.
per cost of la population, and to
counting for about 70 per cent of
comt from underdeveloped countelen
captallet world population.
Statutical handbooks class thee Thiral World as a separate entity. But, wo nomically and socially, the Thiel Woch cambot be tznated separately from the world capitalul scoarmy. Most of the ex-colenses, and semi-colones SER NOW politically independent of the imperial: let countries. They can work towards schoomic ladependence, relying on the massive mpport of the sociale Inson But that does not mean that have coceed to be part of the capitalisa workt
Only 7 per cert at these experts go lo socialet countries. The age-old pattern of explotiation, baand in the rapttabet dernisa of labout, mencely tied than to the imperialal power, and there thea cannot be seveced in a short ting. For the imperalit powers the Third Workt TURALES, A DÈjeri në vorspoel, trade and
CONRANC DKDLanes. What we bare a new form of imperiutat suonopoly ri- valy for the aconsent and territorial sdsdsson of the world with the ven of
Pcolonialni methods
In this segment of the capitallet world
scotomy, and notably in arene where monopoly rule is strong suit haspers social ručnem, thorn in pedeng zi bung a high rane it goesch. Chane the contrary, there las bare a shoulouse in production, sagALIAN, MAN Heneghaj ment, hunger and poriety in all their tragle and ugly reality. The chief sacker in Industrial prowik kern in the ponduc
}}
Hon of oil and other mineral raw mate
Blake in manufacturing, the dogmant alamant le procming of taw materials and production of traditional goods that do muc
machinery or high white
And je de la 10m Than World that capitatam has revealed sa foabdity to setre social problema tavolving the well-being and future of approximately kalf of the human race. Na wonder the very word "captable? la bere equated. with the most talkiom forms of aco mac and politiet appenades. And no wander the propies of thes
Ben 10 atracted by societies, has proved that the evil legacy of nor omic and cultural backwardanas can be wiped out in a historiosity abort apar
The position
the Third World
of the general crime of caplichém pod
the decisa at the expitalis
incurable Molody
The processes that are despa ginical crisis of capitalion are at work. though not always apparent in Imabaya trial countries son. They are revealed by
Kalymn of new phenomena la the metics and politica of advancest cap- Kallat countries. But Best abandon certala dogmatic conceptions. and not particna which prevant on lcom memung the ew facts in the Tight revolutinaazy dalection What le ad, la skari, le an unblaned and raci
amination of the mat change that
kavu taken place in the vựcid.
A typical misconception is that the doopening of the general crisis of ceph- jalima, in allewetty dependent upon length and intonanty of cyclost Por a long tone the bebet jurmMES drawn-out and proínunć cycles) and contraction of brom periode Inevitable features al
There was aan serpretation of the law that production relations must correspond to the nature of the production força. This left out of
18
The ability of modern capital- tam to adapt, within
bovenda, production relations to the needs of the new production foros. And captialiam possesses that ability. The tạchoological zevolution has sharply accelerated the thuanilion from monopoly caphalem so slide-monopoly capitalion, an inevita bility predicted by Lasin. In all develop-
exprahat
countries
Anti-crisis
mestores bere become a key factor the nose its poder of the Aud Everything is done to keep a boom economy under control, for il coplabor ika embryn of eri
And, with the competition of the two systems, the monopoly hourgnolia especially fearful of economie, celana and rassitant mas umanployment. Con- separatly, the capitalin sate keeps watchful eye on the economy and usea
the machinery at the command to at test the apesad of crisis symptoms. The bobel that high business activity must pena laad so a profound sconesite crlalu le not confrmed by the facts
But notwithstanding anti-erials maak aces, the caphullet cycle, albeit le die- tocked form, misina la validity. United States has since the ver through low scoponic crland and kaya bean rocosalona, partial erism, in other capitallet comtries. The a00 cycle, unstable economic development,
aa locurable malady of capital- The growth of production in the capitalist world as a whole teada to obscure the manilatation of the malady because of the mantan deenlopennt of capitation and because due the wat the cycles in differnet coupezian kava not coincide. The production for badhidual countries brings thle pul will subkelent clarity.
The so-called Perpasion policy" operated la most indiestrial countries through consonic programming exerting an incnsuring tathumner on the dynamics of ospitalet production. sendially, the line la to encourage long- Sermm government and mozapały
ridussed investment programmen for
major industrias da fact, wilkop
BOYNERONE ambulance, and
without
much crosduation, it would be impos
sible to re-equip the econo with tha new technology-
The chief reason for advancing this expansion policy," capitalist spokesmen
la to meet the "challenge of social- "* However, the "argansion policy" la tecreasingly becoming an Instrument of Imperialist rivalry. The cometry that
makan marianza non of the new tech-
sology stands the boat chance on the capitalist world market. It le not fortal- bow that la several West-European countries and in Japan sconesale pro- gramming has become an important vw of strengthening the competitive
power of export goods.
Forced Concessions
Lastly, labour's nestaload and soccass ful struggle for higher living standarda, and the resultant growth of alloclive dossand, has been a salient factor la boosting production. That, of course, marmot de pogarded as one of capital bem's "virtues." On the contrary, N shown to what extent capitakan bar weskused under the impact of general crida.
#!
Pronomic development in the indus trial Wast je nove detecmined not only by capitalism's latest dynamism, but slo by the new laws governing world development, and those stan from the competition of the ben gystand, and the trasaltional nature of our ars. This lays a deep Isspelet on the operation of the economic laws of expiration
Socialien has become a powerful catalyst and accelerator of social pro-
He lefsenes artanding to all the procesam taking place in the explizitat work. The momentous achievements of sociation hava, in those postwit yours, created skeclutely new conditions for labour's struggle for acopomic and social demands. And more than over before the towls of that struggle an determined not only by the afforts of Individual detachments of the working claw, but also by the competition of the two systems, the decisiva form of clas stevezle on the Taidetational sema. Insa pecialiom le faced with the maguard of
MEN TRES * Ma
t
the working class, the socialal world
myslem.
That is why the organised labour movement in developed capitales comb tries has scerad such big surČNEGA TE economic struggle. Real wage here. have borg rising ever since the end of the war. Jusikably fearing deep social upboevali, the monopoly bourgenlala Anda Harli compelled to make economic and social cohensiuni la masinlala kasti la power. However, concessions to the
working clam do not eliminate the class
Bruggle. U sanyllung, they demonstrate to the workers that adly determined
abil persevering afort la defence of thair Interest will win them a worthy
place in society.
Crowing oftactive demand by the truckera has been a very significan factor in market expansion, and thin ap- phim back to the home and foreige market. Por, parallel with the quanti- lative growth of effective demand since
the war, there have beso far-reaching
qualitative changes. The workse nave buys not only the bare omonlala nand- od for himself and his family, but shem
a wide range of consumer durables--
refrigeratora, Television a, Tadion automobiles, ole. In prissat-day condi Lam thane are ladispensable social and moral factors in the effective function- ing of labour power. The market for consumer darable bar stimulated the growth of ses Inchaettios and services. This has had a chain reaction and has madded the entire nennomic structurg of industrial capitalist countries.
In short, many of the phenomena
NEW TIMES •* No 12
14
which, at first right, might weggest that devolopac capitalki countries advancing from progress to program. pravila no evidence of the weakening of the general enek. A careful ezzel. nation will clearly show the affect of the cardinal changes in international class relationships and the continwows
maturing of the malenet and social
conditions for the victory of socialiom
In Industrial capitalist counLCHL
Economic Militarization
The growth of state-monopoly capitat kam, with tựu attendant iṣerakan la the property and neonomic functions of the state has demonstrated that, unless private monopoly ovsorship is roušet. eil, modern production camont be reg ulated through the automatically ope rating spontaneous laws of the capital- let market
The need for soch zmarletion and for
the elimidation of monopoly dominar tion, la accentuated by the monopoly policy of giving Mala interfacenes marked reactionary character. This glaringly manifested by senponic tarkation la comettim where the nopolim kaya made war contracts the chist source of high prodia. The nutra- ry-industrial complex exochi a powerful scononte nad political influence in the Unlied States and, more recently, has strengthened its positions in West Ber many. It in the most dangerous reach Bonary forco, ibe meni dengerous soures of non-fascion and miliary ATEIN sion, and Throatone mankind with
ET.
The "Free World"
Labour-capital partanbly
Monde Nueva (Tuby)
Capiallat eronomiats have sought to Juality militarisation by claiming that Simulator production. The Cars, konevar, in that nearly everywhere. It
vanud seadet per vogope PRUE PRE
The latter, Incidentally, sen siso part of deliberata monopoly policy. Every Waga cike won by the workara la de medistely countered by higher prices. Every Sternene of the prość Lax-and The government has to do this to obtama budgetary revive is
countered by higher pries. In Uher way, the bulk of the tax burden le posed on to the workar.
Indationary price rises have become A becomeary shot to the arm for the modern capitalet oconomy. They make it unprošlable to save money; in fact, the tendency in for Thuney to rolrest Iako 2000%." This, 150, hosets produe tion, and has led some scogonists so conclude that "regulated sallation" Sea good production simulator. Wat je la bot at all tway to control hereeping Taksoon" ait prevent it from growing Iako "innaway Indation." A mece for mīdable problem still u how to avert the sharpening of social antagnalons re- pulting from "creeping inflation "
H
In the Charles Keyam invented "regulated karletion" policy at the best way of conciling the depromios, af road waga. Uplike an outright amanki on were levels, this would not be thought, evoke much protest. He mar wrong. The trade sain vigilantly watch peker move nga and through strike action try to being wages into
conformity with prices.
Kalatively high smployment and a powerful stoka
background of high business activity, kere folded monoply allmpla loredaca wega. Bu Indation and seating pelvor MAČITALA APENAt exports. That le why la recoel years the big monopolies hava ned to put bolo mager by increasing playment. The Keynesian wa- iployment | noene" is 4 per cent of the labour force; SUN IONE sa leik of a 10 per cool "peau". The monopolies are making wider wie of such a "an dane Wapor se semi-umemployment. In War Germany, britma and other
+
19
le stepped for a
the workörs from "ampaud kaaki
daya" or shifted le a shorter work week
THE KING AND THE ARABS
babad the façade of relatively high kantuan activity we can discern the growing antagonism of capitatem. Symptoms of maturing cycles! eripla already evident in Wat Germany, USA. Bobia. The La
Diane Spires for the growth of the gross national product: West Germany-11 per cent
25 a 1994. m
USA-SI 53
neckmated 2 per
-2.2
35
Historical Perspective
Production cute în auch kay industrias MORAL, ALTOURbutes said housing art reported doom practically all capsulat
Nor
Dar accidental. Capitalist pro
growth hawa, at Marr
+cret
by expical teelt. For capital aes Recomachy pespected
worker, rediction of law consumpter
med tun ha thu and emends the growth
ina.. The creates the economic for capotabiom's Mevitable replace-
That s the claar Katorical paspec
Howeve, i veuld be wrong jo everlook the fact that shoeREDBO) capraham vest has ampla meseTNYTİN
rves Vier should we overlook fact that the advaalaga at staallam da pot operate miomatically... To brag
structive offers. Only la Uhat way can DA KİVANTAJA be ultant to the fall. That, in fact, is the purpose of the wo monic riforme now being curied out le
other socialet countries. They nat wady maka le higher athelancy, and
and material roosting but olen beleg cut voire Jhandly than humane pris
4 system under which the
chial shu of prediction is the
baing of the propia.
NOT
far from the low-lying sandy
shores of the Persian Gulf Hande
the town of Dakrat, considered by many foreign okservice the mačkelal cupstal of Saudi Arabia. This is where The US-operated
(Arab
American Ost Co; has is general offen and where is 1,200 American mimin kultative and bechoral personnel Hya sa kauciens villas in · surrounded with barbed wire and prints with seper-markate, chale cinemas showdag Hollywoost Alam.
Aramen har 30s own skipu, be
AND MERCER, ie and TV NA tion. I ako kas ir own secret police de enforce law and macular order Kwong, the 2000 Anche werking in der
The American oil bernes' path to Arabian, and was paved with money.
It was that promies of bucrative dole
Jer
ka--they bed offered a divat
Man die Beleidsthat an 1993 decided the late King That Sand be great them all
Bern Dieu peSDRAMION-WALL A. D. 2005. Cal a Latviory of 11 näthos square kilometres, which is about the slas of Texas and Calforma put together.
The concession Bas over a vigencia per al on, mitinased by specialista al 1,000 auton kom warly double total wil marens of the United State The company Hast), which pumped 117 vilian lan or black gold out of Smak Araba in 1965, in one of the Metal in the wachd. Azomcn, lecidon- tally, in the only oil makapsly in the Shdalle. Esat that dom sot speak with
Özfeed accept it in 108 per cent Americas-70 per cent at the shares are held by theme Rockskefer cONCITDA, Sulard Ol of California, Standard Oil of New Jersey and Socony Mobil Chl. Her comandar by Tazze Cat
The quarter at si plank, which have struck deep root in Saudi Arabia.
enjoy the all-round support of the US. BOVENIMASE, for which Aramco la The main link between Riyadh and Wi ington. "There can be no doubt," the Baru Monde commented last June,
Bovernment are tatimojaly bowod wich show of the all company and naj only because the latter comics fabulous prot-
the to the Thanet Sater or because
+
Sauk Arabum sod contains depoons of oil but became the PRYČI BOONEén influence allows Wash- ington to play a political role of para- muzej len portance in the Middle Tat To any cama. 20 le a fact that the Unit- od States and Aramco render nach achter sumocon and valuable service"
What these "valuable services? apa le bacúly a secret. The all monopolisa. particularly the Rockefeller Standard Oil, determina Washington's holeda Fest policy. In ha book "The Topta at Oil" Americia acosombat Harvey O'Connor sud that the rise and fall of U.5. presidents and vecretaries of stata wwe werbly states in die kustory of Standard OLL
buy any case, cresten af akle climate?" The Alance la Sauch Acable and preservation of y akce Dhark vere and suit arm an US diplomacy's clust concern in the Arsh Best. The Aramco bosson, in their tara, are sealous vnterine of Washing- Lou's a@prelve Middle East policy and do everything they on jo tera
Szem Araba sato an iiselnoment of
05. jokey aimed against the Arah pooplus" notional-liberation movement and into a spelaghostel for an asmault on the oil position of their Bertuah
The alliance between the uncrowned
klags of America and the anointed
kings of Saudi Arabia la band an cossos interest in the expiollation of Arab oil wealth. Every ye Arossco
G. DRAMBYANTS
pays the Saudi Arabian
* goodly portion of this fum gom site the pockets of the royal family. The company tall naturally pockets a great deal moce In short, the well-being ni the Saudi Jules depende andrely on dollars And the political allance with Wakungion Sesak a
SAUDI
"Medina
*Macca ARABIA
A PAITAPORE of the cortived existence of a moci- bund. Teulal theocratic regime of the
worst hum
For a long time, the victÜON MAIN bad boch Araneo and Riyadh. Bot when the chlazlanuts" spřece of domi- malen in the Azzle. That began to ide mind and shake
after another, the Western specialiaka amergoed Saudi Araby (and other fee-
regimes) a bigger role as a polikar cal ally and a weapon agalami (he national-liferation avevamat. From a mumer reserva, Sauk Araba gradually grew lalo one of the bulwarks of Washington's and London's polley in this part of the globa
The West realand. kowever, that before this
uut kungsiom, which
DEAR MRAT anachronam against the backginend of the regenerating Arab wocht, could be brought out on to the Arah political stage it should here ja face lifted. Sipecially slaen the dac- reaching socio-economic relevan unde taken by the United Arab Republic, Syria and Algeria were exortING A TOW stationary Induance open the Arab Best and weakosing the positions of the backward feudal repues (include Sag the Saudi) at home and abroad. The revolution in the Yem
A
YCHED
ADENOMA
JADEN (BADE
*
IRAN
Die temaerne ate estimated at approxi- mately 2.000 million tons), oll in 200 practically the only thing extracted,
and that by Joneign companies. Some
speciebats say that besides the dex of all under the sands of the Arabien Pommeula Uhare in strangu na it may
PROM A SON of water. One of the apbe
LABIAR SEA
terranean laker south of Riyadh has ORDER WALDRE than the whole of the Perman Gull. These welke resources, which could transform the desert, art still ancapped, and this when the country imports alsoč 10 per cent of The Jonfitulis vt consumade.
In the social Bald. Fasal's reforma neo half-maavure that have lalt the Taustation et tka Teodal reglass vis Jually swłach At least one-third of Saadi Alaba's pupulation (3 to 5 mil
alarming danger opwal. The dined pos shany that the medieval FoundationE of Saudi Arabia might collapse and. what is more important, for Joc the Tata of Arunco's huge prokta impelled Washington to take metion to data tha forces devoted to the alliance with Imperialkam.
The host move in the direction was the palace coup in Riyadh in 1964. "Allah's choice" or rather Aramco's. (all on Palsal, who was commdured "more tractable" than kan bratha Baod. The American press Tasaded the
new king and proclaimed the advent
of an "are of Liberalisation" in Sawaki Arabia's socio-mennamic
What did this "liberalisation" bring?
The widely publiczané steps taken by Pawal to "cosoweto the country" actually did not affect agriculture, and 时刻
Juma ledustry They provided mataly for the development of frank port and communications. The con- struction of a deep-water port at Dyar men han practicily book completed and it in planned to enlarge the port nt Faciala, ballad a network of aerodromes,
hea: The actual number is not know
siker en Lamase has ever bann taken) ale Milosata
Madonna One-quarter dwell ia cum ma biva la much the Kaing way an huer ancestors did veniu- met apo zinaing dates, vegetables and train Even the facial cholition of slas very 10 lasted well talo our two) bes practically speaking changed nothing becawen 12 Man it retaforsæt economi- cally.
The status of women, too, has barely
thangal. Akkorgh the government has opened schonda for girls jan official en- rolment of SLDEN). Women slowmed to a bite of seclusion from the age of am Thury commol go out without a veil and kaya na say in the choice of
■ husband. There is a law forbeldiag women to dense aus Tree, the kase kanały weet n not enough now for his vriće to be stones for Hellulity. The new law requires Tour witnesses to prove it. Azochet Saman Klund
20 that
caught stealing has im arm cut all by
a mergeon's knife and met a butcher's axe, and them only 1 1 1 kis third alance.
In Mon, Famati reforms are limited, In say the lessat. They have not abiarad
and add 6,000 kilometram of reada
the socio economic struction of Trudals
to the 2,000 kilometres of ballast roed the country now has.
Although Saudi Arabia le rich le gold, silver, phosphates and Irba des
ses and fanatician and what is mock, thay preserve the privileges of Aramen. The dollars posted Into Saudi Arabia have not sided her tornible backward-
20
NEW TIMES e Nat
AYU SEHEL MUN
21
1.
DONE IN Gas me my dele or pap'e GE THE TARIK në skanauha at the powe get and most underdeveloped countie be but planet
+
Goring Set Araba a more
Diva Mage
KAS The musta in W De speak n undertaken by and Workington to re, nesee the JA
There a
Drupal
The
n
MATRANKE VA tonsequently. The boy altum
Having th
strengthened the same po march francia by, the Wagi at nut to aim the conte At the end a task. Washington and London concluded an agreement with Revadite log the delivery to selen semeth of wat matenel Leter. This apren
was supplemented by a $ind Beltran malbany contract with the LAT Stares and 4 Elan mulon Contract
חי
At the same tema, Wahington and Loaden began in puh Seat Alaba ino all sorts of foreign policy wantares Aware of Falsafiy cherished em bénop to play the role në the leader of the Arab world, they entrsted his help in Chate aforts to resantute the Baghdad. Part sandae. The name of "hdante Bart' and somsolidate the erectionary trudal fere- an in the Arab Fad. They new PACE they hoped would spen The Arah
distrust and bewachoy. shoot then, and divert their attention from the struggle for complete national Überallem and social je
The Saudi tulung stemmen rely increase
on the Riyadh Amsen aus Pala voet by Jondan at the beginning of Whey put an end to the Iněty youur' lead
een the two countries and led to the virtual nataliebeant at a close
and political albanen.
Aat King Hansen's vill lo Spuddi Araba abis February revealed ones again that than the Magnarchian actively Implement penumpanabat pobrim and
nemaive Arab Wales
22
greaworthy that before Klement.
Ing with Tersal Hume's had raka wan
'יניו.
I
The Persian Gull Beherrs deally dark ad to chase to Souto KATRINA Dita Vempti la marahhah contud swe Ķe Pastern and southern parts of Ar Me Fal Nur fatherly invested ponudi
Nowa and World Report water that
silvered by a growing
Paul and material support Now the US and N-tan, he has been playing The key role in a multi-nation poles designed to keep the entire Arabian De nomada WI Laila' te Names and other revolutionary Azab leaders" in other words, he wkoła ty keep of the ideas of the AND smperialist, anty feudal na
mal-liberatia tendaten
The reboň The 'Takamit Part" plan has Mới vịth in Arch countries has appare ently umpelted To Western spuukets to redirect the Saual malere" remign policy. Kuwandy (he Arabian Passoula, where The gerund is slipptag money and more 115de marker the colonialista" Towel
The men object of the woven by the imperialists and the local Posetionary Torque in the region in the republican Yemen in actively supporti Ing the Yemeni monarchista, supplying then wok Western made weapons and building haars në aggtrasion next the Yaman's northern fronther and aggrave- Ing Tanton there, the Sauli ruling va bent are acting as accomplices of the
teel (napizens of the and Temeni tagli
Non-The Varied Stain and Bokar
The 1967 revolution in the Ye which had a powerful lorpart on the nas Donal beration movement on the Are blam Pantomila was the cause of the reconciliation and subsequently. The merret congue between Riyadh and London Thro
ow of the Yemeni monarchy. they restored diplomatie relations, which
severed when British trobeu secand the Buranit Casus clarmed by Soul Arible Today. Betra and Saudi Arabia have buried the hatcher sad pulled Jorem ta korp the mediumakna
an Terakan.long foram ki.
J
ד
1:45
ין: י וף
է: ..
Aden in
15
וי
DJ E
יו
ד ו
....
Two Lond
1.
While
CANAL DE CVETAL walls amal Dry as the Persian Call by sellNE
! ס ווו קי
Natulog ambitious plana tanjunge | Bolt conul ș The
have neque Le Male into Herrains
JONARYLODI without dating ada waha
drawal They have muzbijahed
CONTACT Wein the pupper governme of the federation af havada Arabia abul Jam sa n owenal and materiai sup.
200 +
gradually paying the way Allence with The South Acaban village and shankha with a view to abg Lema
against the Yodern.
Scudi Arabia also has far-reaching plans for The British controlled sulta Katma in the Percan Gult ares. The au Dahlahment of close contacts with the rulers of Sabrem, Qatar and other sui- Sabetes has been prompted by the dedre to reinforce these loudat repakes and get them to take part in the templetsety lation of importulat plans. An attempt de cimerly being made to expand the base of the METUONIT Arab Turas in the struggle against the prxpressan Auch Hum The extenera of Saudi lær fuence to the Pervan Gull scan obertus by falls in wich Aramon's plan to ge-a
en to the ed rich sultanates from which it is now being kept out by it In nach rivals.
The Saudi rulere policy militates atalpet the Arab peoples' Aspirations li serves only the interests at the Wespec kanporatuta, who are sung the archang feudal regime de bara backs the tone is në
the Arab Tart
New Tents & Not
Sukarno Problem-Solved?
ALEXANDER USVATOV
THE Provisional Peoplet. Consulte
tive Congress, Indonesia's supréma policy-making body, met in Djakarta on March 2-12 at the insistence of the al- Frame Rightttt to decide President Su- karno's fate. His opponents accuse him el being involved in the Septembar 30 avanes and claim that he is responatla for the country's economic plight and la hemparing the establishment of order."
The Congress session opened axtramaly Tania political atmosphere, In some part of the country, notably In Central and East Java, clashes occuri red between Sukama's supporters and opponents. The latter had repeatedly Shreatened to take "drastic steps" if the Congress did not diantes him and pul him on trial, Sukarno's supporten, ins cluding those in the armed forces, had prepared for action loa.
The military authorities, seeking to calm the raging passions, leak précaus Hovery measures marlier this month. All meetings and damonstrations were ban- ned in Djakarta and certain other areas. The commander of the 7th Miltary Arsa in Central Java forbade the population to spark sither for or against Sukama for the duration of the Congress sas- sion. The Sanajan Sporty Hall, where The Congress mel, was surrounded by tanks, armoured cars, anti-aircraḥ gum and hoops. The capital's garrison and the warships lying in the Djakarta bay were ordered to stand by.
The Congress was asked to spon the Indonesian Parliament's lution of February 9, demanding Su- karno's dismissal, legal investigation of his role in the September 30 and hu triek
Sukamo was sharply attacked by Many Congress members. One of them, repreventing the KAMI student organi Ization, want so far as to declare That "President Sukame is the source of all the country's current difficulties."
Most of the mansbars of the National 1st Party and certain others, including the military, look a moderate sand. Gai neral Suharto, who opened the debate, affirmed that, according to available lach, Sukamo did not know "exactly" beforehand about the approaching Saps tambar 30 avant, and that him chlad mlataka constated in
an attempt to seva the principles of NASACOM-CO- operation of the Nationalak, the
感
gy and the Communists. (France Presse has given a diferent version of thir part of Suberto's spasch, saying that Sukamo had been informed of prapera tion for a "communist coup" on Sep- lember 30, 1965, but took no counter maksaraa) The General wamed that Sukama dik enjoyed "some popular support," both among civilians "and in the army, as the man who "pul Indo- nasia on the International map," and acked the Congress to avoid any action that would "erbate more conflicts,"
Caution in deciding Sukano's Faba was also advocated by other high-rank- Ing officers Police General and Mini- ster Sutjiplo Judodihardjo urged resolu Hons which would not be "beyond the amed forcer capability to safeguard" and which would ensure pasca in the country. Air Vice-Marshal Rusmin Har Jadin, Minister and Commander of the Air Forca, declared that the task balora the Congress was the solve the con Niet situation and defintiely not to cre
a new condict situation."
The healed dabalar which, pers report, farad up at both plenary and closed cassions, led to the adop- Hon of compromise formulations.
H
The Congress decided to strip Su- kamo of all power and barred hims from all political activites until the general election in 1964. The argument given was that he had "ndirectly bas come Involved in the abortiva 1965 communist coup" and "did not properly carry out the mandate given him"
The Congress resolutions thus andens ad the situation which developed after Sukama had handed over his power as head of govemment la General Su- hario by decreas of March 11, 1964, and February 20, 1967. In appointing Su- harts acting President, however, the Congress turned over le film Sukarnot presidential functions
The Congress deprived Sukamo of hi fifle of "great leader of the Indonesian revolution" and decided to review his "political mandado" of 1959 In which he had laid down the basic guideline Jar Indanesian policy.
As for the demand of the mara bals Egement elements that ha be tried an a "trailer," the Congruas left for General Suharto te decide.
Outlining his
govemments pro- gramme aber ha had been sworn in au
acting President, General Subario bald stress on Indonesia's economic rehabili tation and, in foreign policy, an "struggle against Imperialism." At the same home, in his speeches he insist on the continuation of the ant policy al koma
of
It is a noteworthy fact that the word "diminal" dose not figure in the Congress resolution le sirs Sukarı his presidential power. The resolution. Is vaguely worded and even now, far as one can judga leem Indonesian press report, it may be interpreted in diferent ways. From the legal point of view, those who hold that Sukarno pas mains President, though nominally, ara probably right. Speaking over Radio Djekaria on March 13 General Sukario declared that he regarded "trasidant Sukamo as a president without powers." Sukamo's opponents have apparen failed to pel vetalaction of their mand for his unconditional dis and his supporters have had to sent la his being deprived of power.
The real power is now in the hand of General Subarto who will act as Pres ident unit the general election in 1968, He is also Charman of the Cabinet's Presiding Committee, Chial Münaslar far Defence and Security, and Minister and Commander of the Land Forces.
Despite the adoption of the Congress resolutions, the political siluakan in In- donacia ramana tanca
CHINA
From the Mail-Bag
In 19465 1 fought in the battles for the Iberation of Menchuria. Thoumat of
men and Commanders
A PAND
thear battles. Never setti 2 forget ther Time. Nor will I forget the Chinese cities, where we were welcomed with
open arma and cries of joy, with awacha of love and gratitude. The Peking lead- ere are muletaken if they think that by their tiky Then about the Soviet Dakur they will crner from the memory of the Chinem what the Soviet people dit for
A. Varagushin
Frases, USSR.
On the Other Side
Notes
of an Eyewitness
LEV LYCCIMOV
THE
Analyzing the causes and development of the revolution in fussa, Lacin described the barst empire as the weak link in the chain of imperialium. Under the impact of the war the disintegraben and coruption of the ruling alte and the autocracy's unbra bureaucratic machine reached that ulkonata limit. Populer dscentant also mounted to the critical point. The miling classes wara kemijad of the revolution, they prepared to drawn # in blood, but were powerless to
debet i
These notes by the worse and publicist Lav Lyubimov are interesting in that they show the background to the February Revolution at sean from the other side. They are the laskmony of an spawania who himself belonged to Russia's upper social stratum and observed is damtegration and decay at close quier
ters.
Together with his parent, Lyubumov, a youth at the hoa, Bad from the revolus Hon la Franca, where he was active in Whits émigré politics. He began as an anamy of the revolution. But under the Influence of his own experience and of Sovial druggle and achievement, his preconceived notions gradually fall away, and he had the moral courage to re-examine bly values and take up the covered ties with het country. In 1948 be returned to the Soviet Union as a Soviet citizen, He reminiscences of While sm-get inner life and evolution here attracted tha notice of the Sovial reading public, and his book "On Alien Soll, has had two aditions here. The "Notes öf an Epawnnnase" of which this is the Bror Instalment make no claim, al course, lo be a comprehensive analysis of the posihon in Russia an the eve of the revolution; but we think nonetheless that they are of value because of the uthor's intimałe knowledge of the milieu ha so skilfMy parindys
THE BACK OF Tær Mcholar 3 la 1455 was a palatul
The vitalen that he caught cold while spending troops on their way to the datance of Sevanapol
tac than that the reverse of the Crimean compuuja 30 lacorated has pride that he committed notenda. But, though sufering physically and morally, he did not Janowken the baled that Roma's salvation lay in the antheratic rule seluck he was the most conabsant exponent. When sprock caturmed to be just before the and. De mustered kin strmoth be my to the Crown
"HORS A AIL, AN
And accomponent Use werd werth an
be sent ligh
emplatie gesture
By birth and upbracing 1 belonged in that section of Hamisa society for which weck zoyal
Ing that deter
the Maslogy. I have written about my Landly
reverting to the subject in order to
samples what this social stratum, which was mamatay at the throws, represented, what I believed
make clear that the old hereditary tocracy had long coaned to be the top ancial stration The DONAS NË some of the prmenty kaasas kad Bank ve boy that many at ther members were reduced.
sce than moden sana and had lost all connection the foul and conveniently with "ugh society" by Taka od konks Peter the Gover het laid down the drisons of the educated clones. As our leading pro omare hatuna. V 0 Klyuchevsky points out BRANE ACTompanying in Table stated that although
of the highest nokulary would by virtue of thale
have tree accme in the Court and it was destrakla "thel mhachd le all things ha magazine in merit in others,
24
of them shall PICHÈVE ANY Tank by virtue of birth
singe, but sady upon rendering service to thair soveralga and obweary." Later, Post | had every reason to declare.
H
"The animecrala la kunda are those I speak 10, and
while I speak to them."
And my status determined solely by proximity to the onal Dasscmined by the opportunity of accom at least
to the sont oÈ I.
That Throws, Levmillag all around it and at the same time alltacting endi elerating, appeared to me the rodent augme
Russian statehood.
family
we try to illustrate with the sample of my own
kly paternal grandfather, N. A. Lyskonov, was exised to the nobility, not born fata 1. His sarvion me profémor of physer for many years at the Unversity of Moscow are geortally recognised. As the editor of a biserary magazine, he mainconad regular contact with practically all the load- Ing wrlines of his line, notably, ovat a particularly long parsed, walk Dostoyeraky, who groudly ruspected kiva. But that was not what amored bu social secast. He was la
a pubiicies of extremely conservative Imagings, betí an important position in the government Service ADİ
Sty Lather was a povemoment digatary of even higher maak, a Swaator and the holder of a high port at Court. 1 mant salarii. that an a youth † was incised to be even Valber of that than of the centuries-old nobiny of my mother's family, the Tugan Barscavitys.
Lastly, I myself was educated at the Alexandrovsky Lycée mode un Cases by Pukkia, an exclusive Instite- Lige open saly to som of the mobility and the alma ma-
To the highest of high society my family did not belong, at is true a lacked the title for that. But in bad very high towards the end of the umpina, so then ↑ Jake
1
NEW TIMES ANAL 12
deaned to 15% za solve part in governing the empire in
We know that beng decrevités COOKSOMMAR ....... My farij, med everyone in our circles, were naturally wedded to the noder of things which gave them so deviable a po- signs Pd how was this expramen ideologically! To dark soy, nat we were monarchats merely became wa profiled by the monarchy would of course be a vulgatis Lie every dra, the class that ruled Randa had Ha ova pred Dhuanised by our bong, it was deeply maged la ad m
P
AND Dan waring a pet a Navakal study but merely jerne modes by a cjawiłemu of the events that had ju the immuable detest of the ruling claws. And I will try to show, taking moel and my family and french an oxum ples, How and why that claw was in the end swept of the scales of bhler.
My Daber often rosu to me some remuka ot my trend- Fathers about the legendine revolution which I think very dewly expressed the ideology of the ruling clam and brught out the wasting of those last words of Mich ula 1 to try son, "Hold x ali!' In the years before the revolution ke pead them to me as a Waching, then, sher i had taken place-ar proof of my grandfaiber's accurate judgment et al long before it blomphed. I may say that Those tomatka deeply unpensued me. They came from the book "The Pull of the Monarchy to Prance" which my grandlaiber publabel in Moaraw in 1980-a collection of
logues" on the Bra French revolution which had ap-
·
peated in the Junky Vestnik in 1889, is the preface to the book he had writion:
Between the great historie want that was the Franch ravolature and the unhappy revolutionary stirrings be our Country Thaid in a vast dißgrance sot only in importance bol to the prenatal nature of the two things. The Preach revolutee, whatever the view taken of H, was a contei- petit treg the revolutionary policies adumbrated la tha Orsary Air Pentially centislupat The Pranch revoluc bobaly cry was for the unity of France, what saved France A revolution that rules out petilotami cen only being rais. And the Rus mus bevnction we are promised is of just that order. Thi Russian revolution, is quite simply Kuuban faintegration. We have witnessed our act of # in the troubled time
În toad of celebs wat patriotisan
I
colminating in the Polok teroh në 1863, which our seva-
hallonists sa magadly acclaimed what was 1. They worked dic I not the fragmentation of Rupain, the eradication of Ruslan patriotism, ali posable opposition to sational pol- Scheel. The Baskan zevolution can by its nature only be centrifugal, whether it sets out la benak up the whole coun try into small and independent best and places or des corn. Hoell with the more immediate qusition at right= and Pomellatonal governman."
H
Ti je ali qalka dearly stated. As my grandfather saw it. the revolution would mean the duntegration of then-
NEW TIMES * H 10
sand-year-old Rowla Anti-patriote by the very nature. I would escribe the laweka z Kanto as a state.
It was an tsa revolt of a rabble that was incapable of allylung constructive and was trampling op Hossia's har torical past that the revolution was received by the social stratum to which I halouped. And allerwards, in the long
amugh yours, the member of that stratum coutlined 10
see in the new order caly abolika avik, the negation of Russia sasabood and Russian culture, and deamed 11 bas math their ignity to wody uke bistencil procmess in th new Russia, for they were paciunded once and for all that ware but stage in the Jaal duinta- gration and collapse of a inte great and glorious nation.
The passage i have quoted from my grandfather's write ing porn | Tak, the stready at the aid of the last contury, the ideology of the Roman teling class was depr thakdal by pamie Ther of the revolution, schach they
would spell bàn of Tuana Malekood
+
While tear of the revelation was conversat in the top Achafone of tsarist Karma, opiniõhu ja to kèw the danger could best be averted diffecad emuderably
In my father's testiscescu jetonepts from which I have publiked in Savies penedical) there is a detailed account of an argument sa jaet this point between blindator of the Interior V. K Palive and Vichear of Prince S. Y. Witte Plehve was a rigid unheading adherent of repcen- sive policies, Work, a man of conumerable vision who rạn alised that the monarchy, of which he was a Arm support- er, needed so wig both the young bot zaplly growing bourgeoise and the intellectual who more and more loudly challenged the
The argument took place in need-Delalaer 1902 over diar per at Plohvita in Yalta, most my fathat, who was head of The Mostry at the interior Chanestiary, was also prae-
The conversation turned to the position in the country In view of the growth of the revolutionary movement, and Witie attacked Plelive in his aparted way, saying that no amount of rapesemine and police carbs would achieve says thing. The movement went fer desper thea was bebevel, be went on, and it had outgrown the curbs the Minimer of the Interser kød at las comissad. Da rooli ley se our part. the humoriste roots in the zetorme of Alexander (1 The structure bad hasa zabal, while the dome remained tan- touched, than the sign to crown the adides, the device for liberties, self-government, a voice in legislation, wat D derstandable. It was to be feared that if denied a legal outlet. This montiment whiskt had another vent. Accord lagly, the government should not only respond to the
rament but suénerom to load said than control H. Puls lie opunkon, coslal nai be ignored. The govensavent had to win the educated clames Whom could 11 jaan on obat The people? Why, that was part a phrase--and Witte gave A
kind of hopeless shrug,
25
·
+
i
1
Plobre, imperturbabia za ovit, and with a slightly var cratic smile, aneveiced secsething dia tun
"Carwinly the ano
sa demper than is bakeved by many, though not by me? (Raay" stared in the pecularly bushed some which he always saad when speak- ing of mysky). "That it has zoola la the past is likewien Indebatable. It may well be that great upbarish which will rock the sale are on the way. Bet fớc that very row: non | Chak that we not only can but maat ght. If we crasot alter the busterical trend of events, we met ple barriers in the palk in costala it, not swim with the strains, trying to be out ahead. If we shoubi, God forbid, Save
lucion, it would not be like the revolution in the The man gorsement, say what you will, experiance and trededene of ervaring. What would public opinion leaders who replaced it have? Only the desire for pavit, team if taformed with what they behave in love of country. They would never be able to control The movement. They would not be able to hold on if only became they have handed out so many promises that ta ment than they would indestly have in aqtve lo any and EYECY CONCESION........ What would happen then? It deber the imagination. Accoringly, all com most be kipped in the bud 1 do not
should be no riforma, bạt 1 um protondly com that the only ensacy capable of moderating Busin
historically evolved absolute monarchy. The prossesi
En against officialdom in a cloak for mother
male. That, actually, in the whole purpose of the present movement. How that can
Munster at the Interior, inALEN
combating that
YOU SEEN? .
"Much of what you say in al
CIA
Herklock in the New York Herr
Tribune. Washington Post
returned. "bat Į never recommend sa a robation that the Selcer of the Undector should bicoma ika bandar of A MOYNBROČ muaifestly opposed to the government of which | have the honour to be a member. I said the gove atamani needed to gain control of the movement, which la a vary different mester. And I will spain repeat that say ŽOVOCORSET, AR absolute monarch's me any other, mast have the sympathy and support of publie oplafón, other. wise it functions in a kind of vacuum. The reason for most zeročutions w the fallura of the government to respond in time to maturing seeds. A cominder from public opinion that this Thee ja runing out la noi sapostidad. But above all the pevecumang nanda the public's sympathy, which al this moment it dow not anjay. And what could that syn- pashy centre on when the only manasia bolag taken are repensive?... We met gain that sympathy, Whom in the Minader of the Taberior to lean on unlaw we do? After all. ble Ministry officials and gendarme alicers are ant
Anticipating somewhat, let me say that all the emigrá debeles sabenquently carried on in Constantinople. Bocītu, Paria, Prague Shinghat, New York wille impresentatives of these two trends still lived were emmetally no mor then a repetition or amplilextion of the views Witte and Plobre had exprmend all the way back in 1802.
Witse was of course a statoman of presto calibre Than Plakve and theoretically his plan for saving the monarchy
probably the more očlective of the two; it had werk- od elsewhere. In practico it all fell out differnally, how- over. Mada Prima Malater at the end of 2905,
proved quite unable to "pala central" of the app:
Inovenant whose mosnasium territed him no less than Habra. It was under him that the moveman swelled in menacing proportions. The surging sorrest throalased to
Two carlenes typical of warki prese roschien le ha disclosures that the CIA
Isallesetty Beancing student organizations.
9.5.
The "Free World"
Campus Scene, U.S.A.
"There are a low students who are not working for the CIAT
Male in the Stockholm Alonbladet
NEW TIMES A DA
:
Маринат
burst its banks. And at that point Whe fell back on
of the Interior P. N. Dursova,
P polated at Witte's own insistence although abominated by the liberal Intellectuals for bis past record. Dersovo did bla ugly work of suppraming the revolution by the most drostle and ruthless methods, which Wute deplored in private bol did nothing to opport
Durnova himself stated by paluon to my father in thoma wordar
"This is no longer the stage of usenet, but of cavolollant the Agure of revolution la already quite clear. Everyone in power wanted to strike not at it but kung back; all of them, with Coues Wille at the hand, are afraid of public
opinion and the press, afraid of not being considered 60-
ligblanod stalammen. But I have nothing la kose, particularly where the pres la concerned, and 1 have struck out at tha Agure of revolution and set an example to others..... It the only way in the present situation, and one of the purest in geonca), particularly bare in Rosula."
The Brot Russlaa revolution was crashed, and the torin goverment gained a breathing-space.
די
H
With the liberal intellectuala my family had done con- lact through my uncle Prot. M. 1. Tugan-Baranovsky, the well-known scopomlet and exponent of "legal Martian." Politically be loaned towards the Constitutional Democrats, or "Cadela" 1 remember how he loved F. N. Milyakov's famous speech in the Duma edoua monthu before the Fabr ruary revolution, which smalled the "dark forem?" that se the Raspulla claque, naked whether the government's poli Joy was "folly or trasson." and practically pointed Enger at the tsarina. To my uncle that speech, and parties ularly the Impression. It made, was the harbinger af Patents that would be Runda's salvation", the formation of a responsible Ministry or else a palace coup to set up a constitutional monarchy. He apparently weased no
la retrospect. Milyukov's speech was often held up as an event that had kastened the fall of marties, if not actually as the prologue to the Pebruary revoloton. In the fur skoye Slave of March 5, 1917. ↑ And a place wikten shout the new Viinistars by Alexander Yablonowsky, a well- known columnist of the day. † kanw Yablonovsky wall in the émigré yours, when we both wrote for the intermely conservative Vorroridemia, which regularly attached MI- lyukov from the Right. But la this article Yablonovsky was all enthusiasm for the Ministers of the Provisional Government set up in place of the overthrown terlet ad- munistration. Of Milyakov, in particular, be had this to say: "Can one imagine the Russian revolution, the Rus alan constitution, the Russian Constituent Assembly out Milyukov!"
But let us see what role Müllyukay really played. On the evening of March 2, 1917, wearing an ordinary cost instead of the Lycée velforja, † stood among the sole dies and worker who crowded Mielay Prospect. Baten-
NEW TIMES * No, th
ing eagerly to what they asid. The order | ka 1 teen brought up to revere had fallen, and I wanted with at the Intensity of youth to tad out what was in store for Rus sa. One of the ankdiers angrily shood Miyukov for "wanting to put Michael in Nicholas's placet." I remember being horrified by this casual reference to the mat. The soldier was referring to Milyakov's Teurida Palace spooch. to the representatives of the revolutionary people, made before the bar had abdicated. I quote from a wewapapar report of that speech:
"The despot who has brought Russia to total zula wit relinquish the throne voluntarily be will be deposed (Applause) Power will pass into the beade at the Grand Duke Michael at regul. The baly welll be Alexis Damer- jection: "They the oột dyan?"). Ya, gentlemen, it is tha old dynasty. You may not like 16, and 7 may not lika
It either. But it is not a matter of likes and dialiisa. Wa
cannot leave the question of the form of governmeė) KTADI overed, undecided. What we mvlage is a parliamentary and constitutional monarchy. It is powrble that others envisage something else, but if we start arguing about k now Instead of settling things at once, Russla will be on- pulled in civil war."
In Duma eireles Milyukov had been dubbed the "god of lactinasma." And even a youngster lika me had only to see the soldier' and workers' faces as they discussed bla. speech to realne how out of key it sea.
When Nicholas abdicated in favour of his brother tha
Grand Duke Michael instead of his son, Milyukov, practic- ally alone among the delegation that called on the Grand Duka, begged-even they my implorad-kian not to ab dicate in tora
Ta émigré circles Millysków war on the republican side. Tesling that restoration of the monarchy in Russia wa already pol at the question. But when added how this ne pubilcasion Sited with his quondam monarching -dkplay- ed, what is more, at the most unsuitable moment-and how that la tatu Alled with the famous speech that had kastened du monarchy's fall, ha dudutety stated that the purpose of his speech had not basa in bring on revolution but, on the contrary, to avert it, by allaying popular anger through the formation of a responsible Ministry, ana
billyukov was a son of considerable inévitert. If some what dry and doctrinaire. I am pere be rusbend from the Arsi day of the February revolution what the majority of ble supporters did not, namaly, that that revolution, war only the prelude to another and far greater cos, which he Milyukay, Foared no less than Folive and Witte in Their day. And for that reason, though he melt have gummed that It was hopeless, he clung chvulsively to the dynasty's already nonexistent proelige, like a drowning man clutching
At a straw.
1 have said enough in show that the more farsighted lande en both of the government comp and of the liberal Intel Ugentsia did everything in their power to avert a gemeina popular revolution, and did so, paradoxical as it may se
27
sila behaving that willmately. It enekl not be averted.
The migre aubon MA Ajdanov, a writer of kusouiCO-
huluanphical novels, polated out on ost occasion that að bag Kumkan Hatimae had the feeling that everything
gomą la rack and ruck
WHAT LE MIE a sum of doom and despair sparka la these bom of a memorandum shuck. Waste prestated to the last la October 1905.
The march of komory a tremurulle. The idea of civil libe erty will (asumpk-if not through reform, then through re- alation, but in Un later erant it vil ting from the wreckage of an Akahiloted thousand years. The rabble in sansala sad ruthlem rebellion will reduce everything to diet. What Thanks, wall coverge from the unexampled actual the mind fuses to leagine the horrors of the Runden rabble to revok could marjan alt kastory kan evt knows. Poweszła foreign intervention will turn the country to places Antimpla lo roshan the ideals of theoretical socialism-which will fat destroy tha arty, the whole
of
Back to Anastasia
EVERYONE celebrates jublens in his
own way, Alexander Karensky, far bromanca, marked the lifel sary of the February Revoluhan by gin ing intervenes lo Anencan newspa and magazines in which he tried prova lar the umpteenth those hat be
none viber had been chosen by the Kinghty Himself to save Russia
that the ungrotakut Russians refused la escagniga ham at the Mosiah The Wash-German, juchovary marked
ven by bandeg down their daard decision in the case brought by AME Anderson of the Schwarzw villaga að Undarlanganhardt.
Back on Janszary 1925, a hall-alemwond young woman was tagged fram tha Landwehr Canal in Barli, in hospital, the would-be sicde sunned he dec
by claming that the war Grand Duchess Anamaze youngest daughter at Tuan Nicholas 1, and that she had miraculously escaped logo Russia. The pencakan was sweed upon by the prses: alvar all, bark was a diesel hour to
The news created an incredible for race among the While Russian émigrés They and into two camps. One gave impact to be newly-läund Anastasia. The amar declared her an imposter. Among the letter was Duchess Barbara van Macklenburg who, being a distant
28
That was what Wilte bellaved, and Kislyakov sa wall to both revolution dealt only destruction. It was what the bar believed, joo, and the same sense of fatality, of the servitab- thay of the revolution, marked his thinking.
Nicholar 11 was not a striking personality. But he had some characternates that are worth noting: reticuace, sell- command, Delward anlability, lastly, a stubborn lanarity, not always clear of purpose, and coupled with a doom.
In the extremely internating 100 - Before The Judgement of History," m which V. V Shulgin, who was sent to ade the last to shdsexin, kinsaalt appears, there a an iphoide that particularly impressed me. Shalgia relates that
after the plication had been signed be mat ika bar's eyk
and exclaimed in aptation:
"AX, Your Majesty, why did you not do it moder?" Be seas referring to the fact that befoen abdicating bar had exproved comment to the formation of a ren Ma Memielty.
"You think I would have kalpądē". Nicholas replied...
(To be concluded)
relative of Empress Alexandra, consid ared herself the legchmale heir and as such had received considerable wea From the money deposted by the to
inovs in German bankı
The Anastacia casa next cropped up in court, in those days, hard work quite a few people in the West who beloved it possible to restore tha archy in Russia and not the Romanovs back on the throne. The Whele émigrés, pekenland by high-placed palliicians, were especially interested in the 20 millien gold rubles. Nicholas D supposed to have deposited in the Bank of England.
By the Mona the court sat down to hear the would-be Anastasie's Ju aganal Barbara von Mackenburg, the Romanas family shares had dropped bad- ly. But, it is said, there is nothing persistant in the world than the German couts World War Il come and The hearings continued. Anastasia vali fed down in Watt Germany and was new kneum as Arma Andarson.
Her chances, however, seadily clined, especially aber the appearance of another claimant to be role of Brand Duchess, this time in the United States. That lady did things in a big way: she wrote a book and Hellywoai
news rachad Schwarzwald, they got buy foot the
recull was a scenario and another pit- kurs, anil-Soviet. The case of the pseu- do-knastasia thun lumed into a cheap Tarea with definite political aims.
With a perseverance worthy of a bet bar cauta, the West-German Courts con- binded_wish_the hearings, although the absurday of Frau Anderson's claims had all along been evident. For one thing. sha calegorically refused to utter a pan- gla word in Russian or to undergo medical examination which could shad light on her blyth. And so, on February 21, a Hansburg court throw out the
That does not mean, however, that we have heard the last of Anastasia. Wen-German newspaper report that whan Judge Petersen had read the var dict and "Frau Anderson's lawyer had declared that his client would appeal against it, a grey-haired woman dood up in the courtroom and loudly pre claimed:
"All you say here le not true. To the real AnestesiL"
H
The reportant rushed over to her. She send she was Maria Scholz of Hannan, Westphalia, 67 years old.
And to it looks as if everything will Had all over again. The glossins will print another sertar al handranding socies, there will be another film about the claimant to the Russian throne, and another court quit that will and just in time for the centenary of the over throw at the Russian aut
HOW TIMES •
O.V.
ELS.A.
INTERNATIONAL NOTES
Problems-Political and
Technical
The forthcoming Western HemispYTLA Summit le giving President Johnson's close associates quite a baadache. The original plan was for him to visit solve Latin-American capitate on his way jo Pronta del Esta in Uruguay, where the conficance la alated to be bold, but the idan har had to be dropped.
H
"An exhamive study," the New York Timer tactfully explains. "han convinc od oficials that Mr Johnson could SOC COUME DC a unpowerally warm recap- log in South America" And the paper TOM
on to say that I har bác
Ti hasp dreaming I'm home burning My drab card,"
Garel in the Wall Street Journal
NEW TIES 2 N. 12
---
would develop in a number of
countries."
Washington therefore decided agains the visits. Whereupto another problem,
404, LTD. A fight from The Dead Sute Uruguay, it turns out, pressati Ja dification, but a return non-stop flight 14 imponible. While the United States har alstrips whose length allows planer CARTYRE Okongh best for a 6,000-mete hop to take on. Uruguay kan mat
Öfkelle in Washington are racking their braise in an effort to solve the problem. Some have suggested that on ha way back the President stop over De refuel on the Dutch suland of Con çək. Ülkəri veriles Max Basket of the New York Times, propose that be "hum
Ülke diplomatie rak of a fuel stop in
Colombia or Venecuela."
AYO A
Perkaps verons will Bord vans say, the reconstruction of dtkoajan ankrigs with All Jer for
SWEDEN
To the Point
In a pulis diccourse in SurAhola on YOUNG 40 what be acikately Lalki Pompalaratat de VeloNA.
1% Ambasador Gabim Prtiva en preken simpleware with the Swedish
-
mon to Youth at Apa. The reply came yumlar thua he had thought and from
kal probably
1
Il cane in the form of a Sweden Gene Det tajripi podicy Halama! (a) vla de Mader on March 1
*ING Kartu government seulekus da view that the Thite! Shume should ktup Lamb,-
H
The posumption of na raske and subs
request bademScation of operatione
INCHORAG fears that the condict whit a more dangerous stage Tha
makes it all the spere
out the possibility of peace negatubens. The of Violasa should Bally be given the right to decide their mum
dist Lay."
H
In the debate which followed that statement, the demand that the rada on the Democratie. Repoble of Vietnam should be stopped before any search se undertaken for wags of achieving peaceful settlement. backed by Mēs of all parties
in Vietnam tad
world. solidarity with a little country which, Lotwithstanding privations and suffer- Ing. is Mandung up to a super-power With
Foreign
Mwater Tontia. Nilsson
The Riksdag's condamnation of the US. agression in Vietnam je zubactiva of public sentiment 12 Sweden, and a reply to the US. Ambassade a state
mend it la cortalały to the potat
G.F.R.
Amazing Changes
"The Quiber klemorandum? " Bell- take dalam produkand by Minhas Anderson from a povel by Adam Hale, vecandy decwant some amazing change. The
is about the adventures of an who run to sarth the
ola voceptestoval anO-BA
sison la Want Berlin. Past IT SE
players, it proved to be a bok-olice hot in Wastora Furope and attracted The attention of Wast-Garmua dustribut- ore. But before releasing K. Uhey decide
ad to alter IEA DAL, AN votkout
ado turned the manoes the hero husthug deva Ilo Com
I
The man rasponsible for doctoring the Alm Fruit Kruger, said he did not 1k+
Kic
nu depleting a beret terroral organization in Was Berlin bersine it was
זולו
mal, moreover, showed War Germany, which la areosed of man-maniam by the "Communist countries," in a bad light. And so the Wart-German dutributors Kisarad JC to mix their purpose.
AFRICA
Dollar Escalation
The African pres la alarmed by the lakturation of 15. capital
African continent, particularly into the joet kawa sa Magkrok. On February 27 Uk Alesian weakly - Revolution Afridine devoted two articles to th problem. headlining
Escalates."
Tika Maghreb countries, long con sidered a French preserve," je weiten.
Tara begening to Interest more and
sence the State Department and Amar- Stan benammad. The internet bas grova perceptibly of leta, se evidenc by various political and diplocosile
The United States, the journal says, has made the biggest incoada la
Morocco, which it has helped in the Test Year with 1500 multion
sting direct miksery kid). Chun, thin hospcial offenstva dosr
slop at the wwwteen frontier of
ana. 25. capital bar found ferile Bollan Tolga and Tomely a wall.
ng to Revolusjon Atrientia, Waliszen a prompted to Na African done by andre to keep the Maghreb within the capitalial orbit. "Taking Advantage of their posities," pays. Tika Unican States le trying to pr 24 Ka Bermonie doctrine
of
at hud
The idea of
slavel pagate sox-capkalimi İses"
magazine says.
bad bunot lost ka baam
Prance the thawed States in planning
qa and supply is military logi :- The Maghrab barocom wid
Libye!
חוו.י
Ja me menu there are more enough ponuda for African ADLER.
A
Retraction à la "Figaro"
2f a recent lesua New Times exposed "This information will be of interest as a canard a story carried by the to readers only if they know that Paris Figaro, in which the well-known through a regrettable misunderstanding Soviel scientist V. A. Traihkaya was this dialinguished scientist was described. described as a "Mata Hari of the Seas." In the Wastam press as the Soviet Mala A weak or se lakse, on March 1, the Harl who attempted, in mysterious tim Farks paper indirectly admitted its mis- cumstances, to recover the A-bomb at Haka by publishing the following them Palomares, La cigned by in Moscow commpondant, Sacha Simon.
+
+
*H appears, however, that the only submargaocas. Mms. Troffskaya affected Hyme. Troitskaya, Vice-Chairman of in the Mediterranean ware of a purely the U.5.5.R. Academy of Sciences Geo- official character: she was invited to physics Committee, Coming to Paris take part in the deep submergences of Moscow, February 28 (From Our Special the bathystapha Apthimada in the Tou- Correspondant). Mema, Valeria Tro- Jon roadstead, it is to be added that she inkaya, Dr. Sc.. Vice-Chairman of the has a fine sense of humour: she over her USSR Academy of Sciences Geo-
now able of spy.
physics Committee and member of the
International Geophysics Union, is dus
De arriva in Paris shortly to resurse the
unjustly conferred
upon her, with a bund of laughter."
As the reader can see, Figaro's ad- researches she has been conducting for mission of quilt is implied rather than many years at the National Telecom. frankly skoled, but at least the paper munications Centre in co-operation with has had the grace to deny it awn faisa French scenich.
story.
An American Tragedy
Pub
PARENZA
Hela
Deutsche
Volkanattung (West Germany)
NEW THE HA
Hongkong
VLADIMIR PERVENTSEV-
Paradoxes
HONGKONG i reputed to have me
of the finest barbours in the world...
I saw I first from the deck of the Soc Vial motor vanel Balkal, which opened The Nakhodka-Yokohama Hongkong pur senger han. Pour days out of Yoko- bama we dropped säckor in the lovely bay framed green hilla Do which the selling aun tave a telech tinge
t
semi corda of
At the foot of the kille white-willed balkjes moisted close all along the como Jet kan tok of with a roat from a mateka dam Azing the dosena of ocean Unari anchored in the harbour trusted the gray hotke of warships. Inzumerable junki wanted about numb- ly. With a fresh beerne dlling their webbed soils, they looked like huge butterfing as they skimmed over the water. There were big jonka and small, sub-pored and sub-steroad, Mahing junka and houseboat Jenks
One salled close to the side of the Buckal so that I could me the venen planks of hi deck. Az siderly women good at the balm. Two girla sebo were probably her daughters were cooking In the stars. Near them an old man sal
with the burg feel hanging over the
side. The bank var thale home. Like chowanda of other Hongkongers. Ikar never had and wover will hava smother. They were born on la harving dack Before his death, the ok father would
well the 1:59 in Na drughters. It will
be they only doway. And some day
NEW DOES * Nat
they, Uke their parents, will draw thale fast breath on it
The same Hongkong nasas "Fragran Bay," 11 has an bronie ping today. The original "Tragrance" kas burned into a bad odour. Hongkong as a contra for oplum and baroka smuggling, for gun- rekkers and counterfeiters. From it, In the dark hour of the night. pitale schoonery salt for Malaysia and Tadoor-
Hongkong's I lame you back to 1841, the line of the Opium War, when Britats solsed Hongkong baland from China and venda i her crown cel way, Later London wrestať from China a place of the mainland. the present- day Koulson, and joint x to Hong- kung. Later aull, I leseed another part of the mainland north of Kowloon, Une so-called New Territorial. The leagu kan tharty worn yours la rus. What will happen when it expires is hard to fore-
en, bat maukschule Peking and don them to have found a quage in Hongkong.
In any case, the Brklaust Hongkong louit agesom make rlem that la Hongkong "The powerful Waat meria the sigmatic Earth Frees The says of one of Hongkong's 10% geln a pond wieve of thứ keper
Amaral petolama në scrapers along the count anti
De the best bag to fin bath, the fem Der det at the fuse 1: 29% M] VOY
TRAVEL NOTES
much at home to 30 rak my Dư day they do buruan pay mike and lear De pe mamang and place, by light they s ANY by in the R:12 Hotal ACPE Sega Ni soter Clien Sohyu sati sident the impai deng
AL LIST | The Log ala Hongh
1. ..
...
FIG
חר
L
71
K..Adm weave in and not an ode the streame of Paskamer, A. Dat burn and green truncats. Everywhere to all the
trada la driven Tvery single person
houses are perspeed by big and small shops where use can buy literally eve- rything, from the latest creations of the Per couturiers to a trained make. The crowdy flow by in an emoties strokes, carefully skirting the beggars sealed on the pavednéATE.
Une beggar was wrenching on a page PRI MAL 11 was hard to call his set. The sleeping child he hebt det har arma ban- pered bla mevements. He could not de much bowing but he kept shaking ble tia can, making the few corza in 11 zat- dhe | have man beggars la Turope and la Ametice but saver have | Jhon nach appalling poverty soudit in mach hutos
Most appalling of all la the poverty in Kowloon City, the slum area where tity themand UN and cardboard hovels stand R. Med together. The
dentity of a population is 16 times
greater than in New York's Manhattan, man kanak * her my post dysrap ers Throena et 1. malam prople sleep night in the PINE
There are no proper stresla in this
area, enty narrow partipeways brorena the brut The post kwam. Ühers day et night. All her weary, maciated Born May eely ezen muugh for angle bowl at time a day. Appatsally i
31
I
.
higher suleida tote la 101 ergh Alle
at holds the pecunt fer
ku a population of porn a
kły attent
THE
+
י
crowd of gala veny 12 suspended trade one. ders. Thay veuen queuing up for walet Kowloon in short of ware Fo the dog
ser moncha there in none at all 20 be had. Al the least sign of tuin time sands of tagged people mish mut of Henr havels to set out time card pads to catch the precious Zapa
1 Kowloos | now children crawling underfoot in sesech of retina. Had key
That rym stared out selje from thr Bum Linde facer. Soms kept hudled closely together ca the ground beside the house with Fiber
Belle olen it
7
lagu teada al that
abitat all the kinda rom were bred by Ja piece of wring the writs of their
older brothers or plans. T
old f
"The persees kandid
나
glad to be rid of their en, LON
Teme but they are cho Lab tu kawe Khoya fer the ma hạng the good luck so attract a child boyer to this accum- od arms a child a vased at drum fer to 180 dollars depending
sace and the weste
Kushan kan itu dalam 2.A det, among them the
-
*
Then on the same k pe dren of Chiang Kai sheki * Lafrekin) and impovaniched Dat
2
Barn a munch whah d
In recent months the populace
Kowloon has been ergiled by
from China sho
wood be
·
. [.
nearly 200 men, mulai perta Kowken. The
32
1
The "Red Quintet
bad beec HT- merring them. They decided not to go
kowate wire in the sadda there. They
now live on their junks in the Hong
kong harbour.
From the shume 1 went on to the port Almost all the work than in dres by Spot The Bettiah authorities evidcally Dad Cut proktakie Women CASTYLEZ 12ten on their backs Lrundia 1.:20 barvy cases. The babear my but the mothers igure then-they have thetr wtek (volan bu roach.
I walked shout Ave kilometros along De volerede. Everywhere people were bouling coolzinars and bales of goods. carrying kada on their shoulders, ther backs or thau koala.
The Bestleh buatneverian's port of item prosperity reless in the ectas Commercial Arms, banking bowel clipa
ing companies, oplum merchanh, sensees of shady done and mugglers ara ali raking in mounting pendla Hongkong stands on a bany corset cl The mucil Now the war in Vietnam also Longing it a pretty ponny Virt
la no great ditoner away. At ngM the whole skirt of the Ammiran navl
ratings are to be seen cost Rep.
that are shefing
The Hung
DJ Evropues that American Siya replent) angst
Magkong zat du et vou domy plasma undergo Zegna tad tike du fet ve in Kal Tak ashel balen, what hap pets the 25 vagtmand to NATIONA
stbeinely placed se trobioon and the payal bene of its colony at the door peral of the American oidery.
Beklaga representatives have elan bean sorted ample facilites in Hong kowi in vastly money street I saw Bain- Bus Agery often wuk partibula of Miao Tretung in pse mundens Special
kong volia mga 12 m AND CAN'T
Cureley NJ
wh.... the Degan bung, g Farm Wo At mege
bute to N Doza 15 US p Ps
The average. Art.
بيا والسداد
י ל!
bustling crowds. In the Nort The ships of the US. Fà Est stand songida. Transporla the mean ch
American I. STAN
1--------
CHINỊA
-
NEW TERRITO
P
14
k. 1.
!
..
W
10
זי
17
J:C
r
י
150,000 Amer
se there an
T
די ד ו
L P
i
T
+
F
!
I
J
=
HONAKONA
paren la espa
-
SOUTH CHINA SEA
P!
+
:
L
Z
+
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Tho
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1
!-- 201
· Ma 1
է
G. GERASIMOV
Bible for Hawks
NATHAN Twining le not me of those
zetind panevale who spend their kamą stowing rows. Siaca kin pelira meni un Chairman of the Jalat Chuada of Staff in 1900 he has apont bla time. At any tale much of it, making bellicoss stalaisesta. Many have bem brought together in ble book," which prest reviewers have described as "the Bible of the Hawka."
It la june trat. für author sets out the thinking and planning of America's Pasctionary slucent
For General Twining the world is divided into "goodies" and "backing" The Commanists, of cover, come moder the latter category. They must be
eliminated. The United States govern-
meni kas beno criminally slow in doing the job. It is fully both of sodachsen and cowardice. Mors, 2 kay refused to beed the counsale of men
how the jab should be done. Ceneral Nathan Twining among them. Indeed, the government la inclined in gap the generals, he complatos
Ka political philosophy, nech sa 36 36. and that of his friends ja Hanked to bghting mythical "Communist ploča."
Twining reviews the pastion in the
Barly postwar years. He hade that the
demobiliation of the US Army and the cute in achitary speading were the Kirst boka la a long chain of actors Then came more acrons-the United States displayed deplorable indecision la Korea when I začneed to employ stomic weapons. When he was Chatz-
an of the Jown Chiels of Star,
says, be wat prevented from taking *ews sellor la dealing with Cotta" And now Washington la displaying the
lack of kraunama
where, in Twining's opinion it should Maka
buckar wwpon
"andactive"
Twining was Chief of Staff of the US Ak Porca in 1953-57 and in Due
**Nollbar Liberty Nor Salecy. A Hard Look at US. Hildary Pokey and Suaregy." Holt, Rinehart and Winacon, New York, 1966.
NEW TIMES - No, th
BOOK REVIEWS
book be across the Defence Depart DEK
of underestimating the seport- ance of the war sceapon it a future war. Naturally, be in vakaamally opposed le tulling duwa dha uber of bomberk, which are now being replaced by intercontinental mhathan. Ia le alo pond to the Defence Department's approach to new anos, lo is malbed of correlating the price of warpone la their shectivesen. All this, he believes,
le the result of an uncritical infatuation
with chanczalne, and the experiments a "potential danger to the future security of the nation."
Н
Hu own approach je mach stapler: work wwpons the batter. Indent ke describes America's pessoal drive as "creeping
lạ khu rabid Hatred of Camesele, Twining object to any disarmannal talka whatever and to the partial
nuclear-best-ban tronly. But he wall for
wing outer space for military porposac
نام
foreign policy, ba unga more resolute action, even if it levolves a dekolte risk. He writes "h, would seem axiomatic that the best peisciple of por national security' policy would be to uning and Hautala the patiative in all drmansions of modden war; to include the economic, pychological, poklical military, and the technological". Aaf the Brat step towards that and he wig- gala, would be to break off diploi malic relation with the Soviet Hium; at my rate. There is nothing America
socialist country.
ne may siber
That policy, he conceder, would not make the US. more popular abroad. But he has the answer to that too: "No one seoma to love un anyhow. We can- not kay love, but at least we might re mutabbak respect." In other Twining wasta American policy to be basad though the present bulasses of world strangih make that an absolutely hope- Jesu, prospect
on fear of the Unked
אבוקד
Bare
Twining gives the render the besede of kan views on military theory. Hu chied largot here are the intellectu
"Total of nine anany Biled, Sihirliva Viet Cong and foor at ser own Hegrees."
Nurimar Gamema (USA)
39
babama that disaster can be arot-
ad by working out a concept of limitad wan. He rejecta thatt war in wan di de
belag lasted by the petricians, they did that in Kors and are now doing tka dame in Viethart. The military,
must be able to wage any WAT WILD The slabost resolution. Hi
kan në van for the "passimauske" argia
manda shout there being no victor im a socialt war. No, a nuclear war con be wou if the country in wall prepared fort
Among theen dieqalelo which coa only be described sa var hysteria. Ihara remark about World War 1, mikrospect, KODE NË DI Can really deny that, with all of the allert on the slythan front and all of the sacrifice and
March
6
Colonel Pdal Sancher Harmander,
formar Homa Malsint, la
sident of El Salvador.
The UN.
Now on Human
heid and sela up
Again the bewal treatment of the indlessous population by the South African authorities,
mernational Women's Day.
A Soviet-Ellopian trading com. pery la natukkaked in Addis Ababa. It will take care of Soviet exports to Bilopla and Bhiopian exports to the USER
Sexing la Patus of an agr the launching by the United States attabel garth satellite to be gned by specialists
HYRJ s-Zaropsen conALTHER
10 Colombian authorities strat
bersu Vape, Cameral Sacratory Camel Constage of the Comune
best Party, and CC members Juan Fran- checo Midles, Marlin Lafont. Trodowo Varela. Jana Viana, Oukava and Julie Fonda.
The monthly deal in the United Bacar le to be sharply increased. In the Best half of this year the Poolagon
17. Maly Puriskonsky,
+
foscose, 1-6, 2552
karolan on the lighting frost, we ar a nation, lessted the affair (World War DĮ particularly in la closing days,
a football game than a deadly contest for survival" That wai sald by others long before Twining.
Norbert Whamar, in his book. "3 Az
Mathematician" remarked on the strong inndency in Asserica "o meani a war in the light of a glonded football
The gambler prychology is one of the
characteralle trake of Twining and
other reactionary pomocula. That prob- ably explains the tempossible bellicos By of his book.
That has botu noted in the New York Times review: "To and Owneral Twin- bị b là bạ tripod out o Ha ra
WORLD EVENTS
plans sa call up 101,000
second half-120,000.
An interactional Vietna fact-fading Hanol
WAT
11 The UN. Commission on Human
Rights meczimowly vobis to hold
an international day of struggle against
radial discrimination.
Haman (1 of Morocco
Opening in Cairo of the teach
of the Joint Arch Decence Council, attended by all the Amb tue members with the exception of Jorden, Tuning, and Saudi Arabia.
12 Declama
republican Supreme Soviets and local Soviets of Working People's Deputies la Russian Feducation, the Ukrama, Byslo- vonia, Uzbakutan, Kassahatan. Mekda via, Latvia, Tajikistan, and Turkmania.
world of compilerted interrelationships
Among people and natione (..
+
enters a fanitary world derland to meet
the requirements of war games. The
art of surviving in this world in so have more of the better zume and Dewat scruples about wing than whenever the odda favour your killing more on The cośny side than be can kill on young."
The profmalopal cretinian of these Americas generals could be decskend as a bad joka, were it not for the fact that their purpose la to influence US. policy. True, Twining and the other Hawks are not yet a declava fores, but their volor is becoming louder and its minator gcho can be heard In the macalation in Vietnam.
Second round of National Assembly elections.
French
* Indira Gandhi la slanted leader of
The Indian National Congress - Parlias meatory group. In accordance with the Comtution, she automatically becomes Prime MinistRY.
* Indonesia's Provisional People's Consultative Congress strips President Sukamo of all poster and appointe Gen. Subarto acting President.
* Opening in Vienna of the tradis Donal International Spring Pain, with 31 Countries taking part
* Wat Barlinam go so the polla to elect the Cay Assembly,
13 Todor Zlvkov, Pirst Secretary of
the Bulzerian Communist Party and Premier Zhivko Zalvkov, CC Pobtieni Baraan Member and Pleat Deputy Premier, and Taxo Isolov, CC Political Bureau Mimber and Deputy
Promler, arriva la Moscow DE AD VA
ockelat visit at the tavitation of the CPSU Central Commisan.
special military court in 200 passes the death absentis on focsint. Congolese Premier Moun Takombe on a charge of treason. 14 Austrian Chancellor Josef Klaus
artbym in Moscow on an alkekal fall at the invitation of the USSA.
Editor-in-Chief: NATALIA SERGEYEVA seaclara. Editors: V. barnahkar, L. Saska, N. Sheteker, 1. Andrgaan, L. Berymansky, P. Elmov, M. Kramney, 1. Trodmeva, D. Velsky,
DOCUMENTS
Resolutions of the 8th Council Session of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization
Nicosia, Cyprus, 13-17 February, 1967
General Declaration
The Eighth Seation of the Council of the Afro-Falan Peoples' Solidarity Organization meeting in Niccola. Dive capital of Cyprus, from Pabroary 13-17, 1967, szinten Übe memory of the martyrs who have laid down their lives for the creation of a neur Africa and a new Aala, fram að DR- periafine bondage, slarvention, blackmail and propterea
We are meeting la a land whose people's fight for gom- plate national liberation, against imperialist bases and i tervention her won them the admiration and the gratitude of the whole world. h as in Quis Inspicing country, nein with the determination of a people which refuses to yield to imperialist prostures whatever may be the cost, thạt this
US imperiaħna to the No. 1 somy of Afro-Asiaa proples. To mobilize the tremendow andi-tapecialia forces and direct them in the struggle agann US5, serpecialisin the amančių lack of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement. We declare our uncompromising opposition to sapert alium, colonialism, ao-coloulaban and racialiom and we reaften our faith in the consolidation of Independiece and salons) Jorsengity, in the onclewry of imperialist wam and the winning of liberty and peace for all UN peoples
It is these principles that conscriure the bedrock of the Solidarity Movenant of the peoples of Asia and Africa. IN la theon principles, that have strengthsond our Movement In order that we may deliver more devastating blows at the many of all mankind-the forest at hoperialiam reaction now led by the 1.5. Imperialista.
The Sea time when the International staation kan bay coma purucularly grave. The throats by the imperialati so ondoeak a world war barn reached new heights. The most barbarie methods are being used in Table offorts to appress the claleg tale of Uberty which seeps through nur two contibonin. The mighty onslaught of the pewnę ful national-bbacation revolutiona je mroeplag aveny the last seats of colonial slavery, Porcul in retreat weder De Pakenčiama poslaught, the imperialists have lausebad
COURGET-OCTANve against the Hghters for freedom and in- dependence,
The deparate aggresiveness of impartallum grown precisely became unpertatio la conézonded with morning detention and contradictions. An it ratesalk, ita frenzy Crows, ka Violunca inccossen. But despite all na storia, the balance of forces in the wedd arena more and more Tarka abeant imperalno, and by favour of the struggle for trendom and Independence and world peace.
Afro-Asian peoples are not alone:
With them in their struggle for ustional and sovereiERİY
ibe Erant comp of socialist
Together with an ace the lighting peoples of Latin Asun- rick, our comrade and brothers in the ballos we are wate DE The Huggie of the perples of Latin America against the onslaught of 15. Imperialum and reaction has westi
kukacy of the freedom mOYRESNIČA the world.
With us are the world-wide democratic movements of the peoples of all counting, the workers, intellectuals, the met apd women in every country who oppose oppress in all is formes
With we are de vocking people and the democratic forces iven of the countries in which the impenalists are setrenched. With so are the programeve turces of Great Buten, France. Portugal Spain and Wase Germany. Wak VA HAM a growing number at people in the United States, they are batting against the policies at their govnen ments which saudave and makipagate, directly de Indiewelly, the peoples of Ann and Altea
We seek to strengthen the solidarity at the Afro-Asian peoples with these mighty allies of our movement. Por H na this solalaray that will altumataly and meritably destroy impacialum root and brauch, so that we can build the new world of our chersabad Mosta
Printed in the Union of Svetes Socialist Republics
I
NEW TIMES • No. 17
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1
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The imperiali erandre. Pensive kar saktan various forme
subvers and paralyte de pe igressive government a unit 1 Be eration movemmals Panah (pth and watta Applesion They ln mejretat teach are empe. They hare de
spired mardees and stand bestad forms of Blackmat
Jeelauto.
We draw the situation of peoples to the methods syw tomatically permed by imperitem sasking to destroy physically prislotenary Hoodies and decapitate popular se
Fantalone. The tragic Ben Barka alger, fotomez de
erience that the political gangstaziam pruched by the CIA ja Lata America has been extended to water disch- Baker Kivething against impertahun
They are trying in forge an litamk Pact -a Malater attempt in distort and debaan religro lath and loyaltima for pondieal prepons devgne) la tororjataka foula) ce
acownary region lawn a miktary alluate le comtİTECE
The Eighth Semen of the Council of the Alto-Aslan Peopled Solidanzy Orgalaction has devoted particular sion to the magist head je usanally and consolidate
the peopleć wpport of the basic stripple at the Vieto
samese people aqua
importalim.
The US Legemston in Visini
l
tional crima, a loana violation of the elementary rules of sternational Law People that weicht wene have branded BAK ARZTARDOn an herbark and kental. The
US Mace a Vietnam je universal and De US imperiebals are becoming more and
Wa prosiły Casales the odious crimes perpetrated by US impacialem against the Vietnamme people and against humanity. We bendy únosnon the "prace sakka" plotted by the US government. We support the 5 pasal statement of the povernment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Spani declaration of the South Vietnam National- Liberation Front, the sole authente repro kou of the people of Sewah Vietnam.
We demand that the USA put on and be sur war against the Vistuimme people, cansa Ma
sad delastety te houding and at other mutary optalk agusel. De Despachable. Republic of Vietnam Wakkawa)
Be troops and those of the satellites and war materials from Nowak Vietnam, lauring the Vietnamese people Tree meurnal altues wilkook foraga bar
terlerance
The UE importabatą kavą revived Japanese militar İnan Bacī seek sa milan it at a "kock-brigade" in these ng Erresita in Ass. They here grouped the Teponer alltury. From with the South Korea puppets and proceeded through this grouping in veg up the North Best Aala mil Mary alliance: Japanese militarism, which taken (la cue from US hiperackim, bas
-
monal plan envisaging the invast of Kues and akár countries in Aum, but has alrendy pre ended in external sta tentacles to South Korea. Japanese militarida are actively participating in the US appression in Vietnam. Alna Asia peoples should combat Japanma mekkariem,
In Alnico, by force of arms and cruel reprumah, the Forr paguane coloratats, supported by the specialet powers groeped within Nato, are waging a subanal war of gene
ocide in an attempt to strangle the armed strezzle at the
propia of Angola, Mosambique and Chénes (anoo).
Mobilund sind led by low national organerations in it? Movement: ikese peoples are dealing rrushing Bower to the retrograde Portuguese colowafuel forver and have alr
pesady liberated van regions of that countries and their
people arouging salinnal renalezie reactionary Portugues regime is kit ined by the m
sto powers.
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We declare our solidandy with the people at the Porque qume colonies and we pledge entselves in grem nem tá-
The aluation in the Conga Mashasan whole developed en your age as a resucht of the petasbeni avalikon në z portabati konded by the US emporten heightens the laysecurity of the Altican peoples that conabatily qacing world peace.
On behalf of the valeat peoples of After and AGL WE lomily prociam var determination to uphold in all holde our Congolese brothers who despite merne and tha
our dificulta they are facing, rostame the viruczla for which our martyr Patrice Elaboraba kottitzed ka na Our Congolese benibers may rely on on We stand by ibra
everywhere and at all times
ני!
In Shodasta, Die fuaciat clique of law Sex 14 han vesih copačvance of the Wilson pavaramant, inclared DA KY called "telepondence." The travelsat bak at markala by Bestain was sever intended in evethrow the sungil ans gine vare facut South Africa and Portugal stre free to sabotage the ecosoKLE MENCITUR. Tan Sauth vegane je enabled to survive only because of the support if the cotiem from ka leading trading partnera, Bedam USA, and West Germany, and thanka who to the tripartita Aliante of Rhodessa, South Africa and Portugal. The final bleva for freedom will be delivered by the purple of Zimbabwe themselves, and they can count on the wastinted mustan e and solidarity of the perpins of Asia and Alica
The sparted regime of South Africa in law developing
imperishable ambulism by the use of clila economic pase-
tration and military iiresti. Pereby menacing the neigh boucing newly sadepaadion Altian Bale, and ludne) Tha whal of Africa. This is part of the Imperialal glokal strategy to make that regime the arsenal and bulwark of Imperialism in the part of me world with a new ta do minating and exploiting the peoples of South Alries, Le- soche, Frankenst. Balewada and Yeah West Alter and
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threatening the Independence, peace and security of Africa. and the world.
We condemn the scandalous judgment of the Bague Court which condoned the brusen annotation of Sooth West Africa by the South African Fascist regime and wa regard this as a travesty at justice.
Raciallay is an outrage against humanity and le a then-
ace which must be fought and destroyed. Concentration camps where the courageous enemies of the apartheid res Elma languish today must be broken open before the heroic prisoners are murdered by their captors.
ulent of imperiallem has been completely times.
troyed for all
To this end, we shall do everything in our power to
strengthen our unity and solidarity by unling our attoria,
Irrespective of ideology, religious boliale, nationality or race, for comason objectives on which agreement can be reached. To this and, our peoples should resort to all the means at their disposal, Including armed struggle. The Council recognizes sroved struggle as an effective sesame of confronting the sacrassing aggresives of Imperialists and liberating the people from impecialist domination.
The Council considers that all progreserva Inrces in the
barael is engaged in unerasing sets of boasen provoca-
world should form a united sed solid from to oppose to
tion and aggression against the Arab slation and particularly zooka to subvert the progressive govorament in Syria, late- el la a dangerous canker in the heart of the Arah lands.
The people of Palantion, ruthlessly diivan from their native soll and striving for the restoration of their home- land, have the support and solidarity of all peoples, and ver reallem our unstinted support to the brave Palestinians
A new type of impactalien has come into belog and is penetrating our contionals. Econoosie ald, whenevad given by imperialist powers, is badged around with political strings. The impactalists seek to strangla the economies of developing independent. Atro-Asian countries. They arbitr- zily rides the prices of the materials essential for the new Industries of developing countries; they import competitive products at trade rates favourable to themselves; they ma- nipulata International markets; they create a drain on for- eign exchange reverem and national capital in the form
dobta, bigh Interest rates and excessive prolis.
We oppose the military blocs, bassa and parts, as we are fully convinced that they undermine particularly the lan dependence of the newly liberated countries, accentuate regional tensions and endanger world peace.
An active accomplice of the USA. in the plundering of Afro-Aslol countries and implanting pro-imperialist gimos is the aso-colonialism of West Germany,
The adventuristic designs of the West-German revanchlets meland far beyond Europe. H. le no longer a secret thal Wigs Germany made money, worpora, munitions and man cenaries to many countries of Asia and Africa je suppre
national-liberation struggles
We shall Malalt and defeat the ageroestve designs of the 05. Imperialists and the West-Garmen revanchista.
We, the people of Aala and Africa, vigorowly the manufactura, uen, Tasting and mockpiling of mucioar weapons, and we wețe the conclusion of a treaty that would ban the me of mucinar weapon by all skoule pewnes,
Wa, representatives of the peoples of Aata and Africa, soimmaly prodala our delamination le continus the straggle against serparlalism, racialium, colonlabam and Deo-colonistas, zelenilowly and without rupta, 10 the
actionary Imparkailan.
The unlly and cohesion of all delachments of the Afro- Aslan Solidarity Movement is the mon vital neconty for
the victory at me cause. We declare our Su resolve to
combat, with all our strength, all attempts by the imperi- alist powers to split or weaken our Mormonal
The Eighth Spurion of the Council of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization realkross its Meadfast fasth In the vitality and odlocilvanam of the principles of the treal Sobdarily Movement. We extend
hand of friendship to the peoples of the whole world who ballle for the principles of freedom, equality and pasca.
The days of imperialisms, colonialism and neo-coloniativa are coming to an end. Perward in the freedom, Indepens-
doncs, peace, and social program of which our martyrs
dreamed and for which they suffered and died.
The Council appeals to organizations loc
Afro-Asian solidarity
1. expose the methods of imperialiam, colonialism and
-colonialiam all over the world through KROMÍRATA,
conferuata, papers and the widest possible circulation of the facta in people everywhere;
2. being promare to hear on their governments for the Implementation of the Afro-Aslen Solidarity resolutions and the Tricontiennie? mankučica:
3. organim the supply of malaria) ald for all people Righting for thele melional Uberalien;
4 appeal to the new free stalón of Africa. Aasa and Latin America to volta la struggle sealant cologichem, lo And ways of bringing to an and the brutal oppression that still exista in their own continents, because division Ne serving the inktreets of kupecialiam,
The Cecil believes that the Afro-Aslan Solidarity biovement should taka new and more active forms, COAL- prising all kinds of practical aid to all Iberalico mover
The political Überation of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America should be backed by social and mie Überation la
ensure completo victory over impari- Net comptacles.
30
HOW THAT • Hart
NOW TIMES
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1
Resolution on Vietnam
The Counsel at the Afro-Aslan Propleť šokudurity Basantion at se bh masson, Nicoma Mypont, Habenszy 12-17, 1987, kas kaund and fully approved the two reports by the delegation of the South Vietnam National-Libera tina Front and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
The Council
1. For more than twelve yÀRIA DEN, DE
at the 1951 Camera Agreements on lado-Cl, the US. paperalata have been pariatantly passing
AL ALETINION and talaverant in Vietnam na wall
hghbouring Laos and Cambodia. During the last six years, especially the past two pack, in furtheronen of thei mao-coloniabal enterprise in South Vietness they have bom vaɛng the broadest war of aggression, the biggest of Ja Mina in the world today
After entering bitter defnete in South Vietnam, Portalasta openly extended theke war le North
lacing air and naval forem in zoyand-the-
saat ara proparing for new escalation
도
with the presunt dinner. The aur and nevat wear af bon against the Democratic Republic of VieEKAL, pendent and serocaron country, 3 de June as vel au facto a war at aggression against in Viacrammate people.
2. The pemant war of aggression of the AmTICAN
inds in Vietnam is the most barbacom and the bralel war ever known in Kwory. The US. Imperialists surpassing the Bitlania Jaachta in barbarian, beve
barberton and vile methods, including toric
konku, prohibited by minn
law. They hav
Thak Kuang Ngai province), and Ben Sac (The Dan MOL provinces. In so doing they have ene
ing the Amapesa propia.
Sprint Sumanity and here bana by all the wochťa propios, saclad-
3. The Vietnamese people in the South
the North
have to struggle, some in hands, for their own survival and rights. They have
to suletused Üheir fundamen (2)
deeled the 15. komportabat
their local war. Their berate
struggle to day by day procnedi
towards deal victory. by the harvy blaves ladicted
ok enemy of Aala African peoples, as well as the peoples of the world at stubation to the singuardag Jorge-are making a grant
The überation movement of the pro-
wochi psack, ples of Adries, Aala and Latte Ar
Bradle Mount supporting the capellating Al-AMER
lity and defending woche
4 The US.
and paksimal daduate here not throw up thair
dengan On The one bead they make hosty preparations beng new rainforcements, intonally and "internationally" their seerumine and destruction war and commit
artona spans the Vietnamese people. On the hand, they reasset to nese "pasce lalka" MASONISTES jeder lo crmoulage these dengaroni plans and la soft- the anger of the American people and the world's peoples
The
maaslanously:
E. Warmly congratulates the Vietnamese people on the brithani victories they have scored and expenses. The brig conviction (at US. Imperialloy la bound to fall in Vietnam and that the Vietnamese people will triumph in their legi-
2. Strongly condemns the odiowa celovor perpetrated by US. imperialism ageisal the Vietnamese people and against humanity.
Strongly dessence and condemna 411 "peace talks" sancemem by the US, governed.
3. Wholeheartedly supports the 4-point position of the povestment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the 5-point dichtation of the South Vietsen Natkoal-Labaras Lion Front, the pole and paculos representative of the South Vietnamese people.
4. Strongly demanda that the USA, should:
Put us and to ter aggressive war against the Vietnamese people:
Dedostały and unconditionally case bombings and al acts of war against the Dissociadle Republic of Vietnam:
Completely withdrew di US. and satellite troops from South Vielsan, dismantle all US milluzy basen In Bouth Vietnam, and US milkary alliance with the puppet regime, Jaava iha Virtsamma people free to settle their internal affales without foemen Inkarlar pics.
5. Pully upholds De Vietnamese people in their berole struczle to realet the aggression of US, imperialism with view to Traving South Vietnam, defending North Vielsam and safeguarding the scend and talissable rights of the
sation to independence, sovereignty, unlly and territorial
Insegrity as stipulated in the 1954 Guava Agrammenta
The Afro-Amina Solidarity Council adopts the following
1. The Afro-Astea Solidarity Committee will organisa "Week of Solidarity with the Vietnamser Propla" which selt take place in March 13-18, 1967, and during which win be organised meetings and demonstrations of the trade
youth, students and vocee's movements, etc
2. The Solidarity Committens will collect during one month and during the current your base sa money and goods to help the Vietnamese people in their struggle.
I
:
9. The Solidarity Committees will prepare tiste of volien- teens ready to Rækt by the side of the Vietnamasa people. when this will be requested by the National-Eberating Frosl
4. The Council aska the Solidarity Commitless to u take, with the mam organizations, avacy setion to kinder in their country the transport of US. troops and equipment. 5. The Council sign all organisations of Alto-Anas Peopler Solderity to form in their respective countries. committene for denouncing the erlange committed by US aggresants and their lackeys in Vietnam.
4. The Coutell sign all and imperial Forc Hrengthen their unity and co-ordinate their adorts both on The regional and on the letaceational level to diveir struggle against US. regression and in the rendering of practical sasiatance to the Vielzamas patriots.
Sene in the various countries
The Council appeals to all Afro-Aman Sobdarity Commali nd peoples of both contineATE indictaka urgent actions and lasach large-scale KASH Die to mapport the Vietnamese people in all Balda and by all meine until their tal victory.
The 50th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution
The Eighth Afro-Asian Peopleť Solidarity Council Ses sion, on hakalf of the peoples of our coullamta, wholehan edly congratulater the peoples of the Soviet Union on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Great October So glalat Revolution which tiêu die this year. The Great Octa- ber Sociabet Revolution ushered in a new epoch in world history, * breached the continuous chain of Internationa! Imparatom and gave fresk impeter to the world-wide sËNDË
jelu against suplollation, for
ines, and socket
progress. The October Revolution brought about remarken bla achievements in the U.533, in the hall of acosony, enitors and social lila, acortar eigantic successes in sciaDER
kachnology.
These tremendous paine had a great impart not only on The Tran of the Soviet people but an mankind as a whol
Organizational Resolutions
The Eighth Cosmeti Session of the Organisation for Alto- Aslan Peoples' Solidarity, meeting la. Nicosia from 13th so 17th February, 1967, after having studied items 11 and 111 of the agenda, has adopted the following resolutions.
1. Bettricies of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation and de Pezpectives for the Futura, in the Framework of the Political Struggle
The Council kes studied the contents of the Secretary- Gusaral's report on the past acilyttim of the Secretariat and tus perspective for the future.
The Cousell record with mutisfaction the activities of the Permanosi Secretarit la carrying out he tack and calle upon the Permanent Secretarial to spare no effort in reali ing the programmes of work embodied in the report submalt- red to the Council by the Secretary-General, and in apply- Ing staalf to the lot of facrassing and consolidating la contacta with the affliated organlantion, to strengthen, sol- Marly song than the the restination of the slave of the Organisation.
2. On the Fecond Afro-Askin Women's Conference
The Council has taken sote of the steps takzes for the code vocation of the Second Afro-Asian Wo n'a ConferesCE and the thresmalance. Ihat led to i
DOW.
The Council sxpressos de gratitude to Algeria for com wing the Tevelation to hold the Conference in Algiers. The Council calls upon the Prestason: Socraterial to com Hone Ka co-operation with the Algerian Afro-Aslan Com witter and to take the necessary positive stijl for the com Vocation of the Conference, and cequanto all national vor Mittens to send their contributions to the Permanent Secre tardat of the Afro-Aaken Proplar Solidarity Organisasies
1. The Fifth Conference of the Orpantastion
Taking bato coudération that noder the present decisi sance the implementation of the Wingeha declalon, on the Pith Conference in tepomble, the Council decides to muchos rise the Permanent Secretariat to take all the necmary. Mendures to convene the Pill Conference in Alqueri In 1967.
4. The Seccad Trkombaemial Conferance
The Consul has taken note of the complete
between the Pecananent Secretariat of AAPSO 18 the Provisonal Teseoaúmanial Exsculivu Secretariat in Bavas me, soil calle upon the Permanaal Secretariat of AAPSO 10 extend its fall co-operation for Second Tricontommal ConfereOČE,
HEYOCELIOS of the
11 recommends that the co-operation should be conclawed between the Havana Secretarial, the Cales Secretariat and
NEW TIMES * N* **
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NEW TIMES E NA HE
39
the Afro-Aslan Solidarity Committee of the ULAR. The hou country, to ensure the athic and convocation of the Confer obry end to create conditions, conducive to ili MIODI
5 The Polaroi Situations of the Droenlandia
The Count approves the report of the Finance and
Central Centaniline (Kreek Mall, Moeneen, and the Serre- bury General) which recomanenche
4. The radication of the budgeta pronsted by Usa ParaN- ment Secretariat.
b. Appealing to members to cover the deliciu of the pervious Confervace which antovant to about BE-50,000.
e Appealing to membara to contribute to the ammug! or the Permanent Secretariat to enable (0 to increase The activism, whether la la publication and pamphlets or to cover the expenses of the aut commutesL
The Council adrian members who had dilleulues in the
brander of these contributions to contact the Secretariat.
4. The Afro-Asia Solidarity Fund
The Council ella spon all its members to strengthen the Fund by sending their Knancial contributions so that it cal cany out de platos ofic
7. Contradictiam Among Afro-Asian Countziar and Their Cofequences on the National-Liberation Movements the Strengthening at Alta-Kata Salidoriy
The Council lakes note of the spick of solidarity and the desire to safegused. Be unity of the Movement which were
refected in all the discussions of the Council and
missions. The Council apposin to all
organisations to spare no effort is upholding the principl of the Afro Asian Solidarity Organisation which have spired in strupele azalmi impnelalium, colonialism and cokonalem and for world peace.
The Council
Toss the importance of rislag above any contradictions which may exist among the Afro-Aslen countries, and alerts members of the Afro-Aslan Peoples'
Solidarity Organisation to the great dangers of such ca tradictions in the devsiopasest of the national-bileration
4. Membership Tunset
The Fighth Council. Shaston bar examined the applications for memberskup submitted to it and decided that.
A. The following organizations are admitted as members
at the Organisation:
1. The National-Liberation Movement of Comora,
2. The Sla Tomé e Príncipe Liberation Committee.
3. The National Revolutionary Movement of Gabon.
4. The Popular Söng of Equatorial Gulam, replacing the National-Liberation Mormant of Squatorial Ouses which ceases to be a member.
5. The South West African People's Organization ISWAPO), replacing the South West African National Union (SWAN) which couame to be a member.
6. The Smgapore National Committee of Afro-ASS Peoples Solidarity, place the paleon d'être of the Malayan Peoples' Alma-Aalen Committee bar cosed to be valid, bu usequence of the separation of Singapore from Malaysia.
7. The Alto-Asian Solidarity. Comasitões of Ceylon. bead- od by Saramankara with MA. Azlı, Secretary, an the member organisation from Ceylon.
B. The applications for membership sabesitted by the following organizations were referred to the Ad Hoc com- mittee for further Lavestigations.
1. The National Union of Chak
2. The Movement for Self-Detectortion and Independe ance of the Canary Islanda
3. The Popular Liberation Usted Prest of the Ivory Coast.
4. The Liberation Moviment of Eritrea.
5. The National Liberation. Preat of Zadar.
:
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FDI/1.
CONFIDENT I AL
FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.
5 April, 1967.
8
I enclose a copy of a letter which we have received from Bunny Carter in the Commonwealth office, containing guidance on the question of Hong Kong's constitutional statua as requested in Peking telegram No. 306 of 20 March.
2. We think that he is right saying that we should concentrate on stating our intentions broadly and not allow ourselves to be drawn into detailed arguments about the meaning of terms that may or may not have been used in the past, or to answer any of the specific Chinese allegations as reported, for example, in Hong Kong telegram No. 355 to the Commonwealth office. Do you agree? Fortunately the Chinese do not at present seen interested in the matter.
P. Craddock Esq., Peking.
(J. B, DENSON)
•
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
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Registry FDI No.
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P. Craddock Esq., Peking.
J. B. DENSON
Telephone No. & Exc
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RECEIVED IN Commonwealth Office M Cradocks.
ARCHIVES No. 31
S.W.I.
Our Ref. #B.1/12
31 MAR 367
31st March, 1967.
Dear John,
Foil (6)
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In Feking tele,ram lo. 306 we were asked for indediate guidandé i case Hong Kong pros: allegations about "plot to turn Hong kong into a country" were taken up in any official Chinese protest. This hes, I am afraid, been overlooked. But the immediacy has passed, since the recent Chinese note was confined to visits of U.3. naval vessels.
2.
Should the matter ever be raised by the C.I.G. I a. sure we ast avoid any detailed arguments about the leaning of the words "country" and "nationals" and our loose uspe of tilam, or about the implications of participating in international conferences and trade fairs etc., and must co:.centrate on the nub of the matter that concerns the Chinese, namely Long Long's constitutional status. They might be told that it has been nade quite clear publicly that there is no intention of changing Hong Long's status us a dependent territory, and their attention could be drawn to a statement to this effect in the louse of Commons on the 21st March when the Commonwealth Secretary answered a question in the following teras:
3.
Because of Hong Kong's special circumstances, it is not possible to think of normal self-government in the Colony, nor to consider an elected legislative Council."
I az sending a copy of this letter to Anthony Elliott who may wish to comment, and enclose an additional copy in case you wish to seni one to Faking.
J. Denson Esq.,
Foreign Office,
S...1.
Yours
Bunny
(.5.Carter)
[
Cypher/Cat. A
CONFIDENTIAL
TOP COPY
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
20MAR 1967
IMMEDIATE PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
西小
Telno. 306
20 March 1967
FD1/1
FDION(
CONFIDENTIAL
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 306 of 20 Karch, Repeated for information Immediate to Hong Kong.
Hong Kong telegram No. 355 to Commonwealth Office.
There has been nothing further in the Peking Press so far about American ships in Hong Kong since 17 Karch (my telegram No. 298) and in particular nothing about the so-called "plot to turn Hong Kong into a country". Never- theless they may be cooking something up on this subject so I should be grateful for some immediate guidance as to what I should say if these allegations are included in an official Chinese protest.
Kr. Hopson
Sent 05122/20 March 1967 Recd 08152/20 March 1967
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TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 18th March 1967 R. 18th
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博
05.00 hrs.
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RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
20 MAR 1967
FD1/1
See mint below
more
Frill
PRIORITY CONFIDENTIAL No.356
Addressed to Commonwealth Office (DTD) Repeated "Peking No.124 (please pass)
My immediately preceding telegram.
Chinese attitudes towarda Hong Kong.
P.a. %
It seems possible that this attack, which is on entirely new lines, has been promoted by recent views and comments expressed by members of the public and in the press about the desirability of developing representative institutions, introducing Elected Members into the Legialative Council and the creation of some form of "Hong Kong citizenship". as well as by the very full accounts which have appeared here of Mr. James Johnson's opinions on similar themes in the House of Commons Adjournment Debate on 27th February. The C.P.G. may well feel it necessary now to leave us in no doubt about their attitude to moves in the direction covering a "third China".
2. I do not think we need yet assume that these attacke indicate that there would be objection to moves towards a better system of true local authorities. ?
3. We have hitherto always been cautious about explaining publicly the basic reason why Hong Kong cannot develop fully representative institutions, and as a result there is a good deal of confusion on the point locally, as well apparently as in the minds of certain Members of Parliament who have visited the Colony The very clear statement on the subject by the Minister of State (Mrs. Hart) in her reply to the Adjournment Debate has received practically no publicity in the local press. I understand that Mr. Rankin has put down a parliamentary question, for answer on 21st March, asking why Hong Kong is not to have an elected Legislative Council. It would be most useful in present circumstances if the reply could make use of the formula employed by the Minister of State:
"Because of Hong Kong's particular relationship with China it is not possible to think of normal self-government in the Colony nor to consider an elected Legislative Council". Perhaps the now very apparent dangers of continuing to press on these lines could also be explained privately to Mr. Rankin and others.
(Passed as requested)
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CONFIDENTIAL
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
20 MAR 1967
FD!|!
M
Cypher
D. 18th March 1967 R. 18th
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PRIORITY
CONFIDENTIAL No.355
The is a
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F. undereing new line 727/3
well paradoxically be of great value of the
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Hong hang, Gove.
Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.)
"Peking No.123 (Please pass)
Repeated
Sin
The two leading Hong Kong left-wing papers of 17th March devoted much attention to an alleged "plot to turn Hong Kong into a country". The argument is that although Hong Kong is in every respect a part of the territories of China, a number of persons, notably the "British authorities in Hong Kong" have lately been claiming Hong Kong as a "country". Examples by the papers given
are: -
(a) an official statement in the Legislative Council discussion on the Bill establishing the Hong Kong Krport Credit Insurance Corporation that "Hong Kong would be the 25th country" provided with such Facilities;
(b) alleged statements attributed to you in your
interview with Radio Hong Kong and your press conference during your recent visit here that "Hong Kong....might be said to be a small country as it had a population of nearly four million", and that "Hong Kong has already attained the qualification for becoming a small atate";
(c) Hong Kong participation in many international
fairs, e.g. the 1964 Trade Fair in Milan, as a "country",
(a) references by official members in the Legislative
Council budget debate to Hong Kong "as a country" and to Hong Kong residents as "nationals";
(e)
references during 1966 by the "Soviet Revisionists" to Hong Kong as a country in international meetings of textile and garments workers and international plantation workers.
2. The papers comment that there is a "serious political plot behind all this; the aim is to reject the right of China to claim her sovereignty over Hong Kong. There is a link with U. S. imperialist intrigue to put their hands on Hong Kong and to turn Hong Kong into one of their bases for aggression; and "with the plot against China planned jointly by the U.S. and the Soviet Revisionista" "No-one should attempt to create a so-called country in any part of Hong Kong and no-one could ever succeed
/in
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
in alienating Chinese residents in Hong Kong from the 700 million Chinese people in mainland China" If the British authorities
the power of China for granted and continue to plot intrigues. an attempt to provoke the Chinese people, "they will be taking up a stone to hit their own feet".
ke
(Passed as requested)
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3
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21 February, 1967
2012
1
Thank you for sanding me a copy of the Governor of Hong Kong's despatch No. 2879 of 15 December last. Το found it very interesting.
2.
We have no particular corments on it, except to say that, as you will realise, there is clearly some confusion in paragraph 11 about official Chinese protests at United States activities in Hong Kong- There were two official protests during the period under review: the first in September 1965, following the aircraft incident referred to in paragraph 10, and the secund in February 1966.
The reason for the second was the presence of a considerable number of United States novel vessels. There have bear. other "complaints* in the Hong Kong left-wing press since then, which havebeen taken up in the mainland press, but no further official protests.
These
3. Since the despatch was written, there have of course been some important developments in the external field having a bearing on Hong Kong, to which you night wish to draw attention in your formal reply to the Governor. are the Chinese campaign against Macao and the intensification of the Cultural Revolution which took place when it was extended to industry. This began in late December 1966. Having extracted the maximus concessions from the Portuguess, the Chinese stopped short et actual occupation of Maoso. There is some reason to believe that a contributory factor in the Chinese decision may have been their assessment that euch sotion would affect confidence in Hong Kong, which is valuable to them economically and for intelligence purposes. Te have no evidence to suggest that there has been a change in the basic Chinese policy of
T. S. Carter, Esq., C.7.0..
Hồng Kong and Test Indian Department 'C',
Dependent Territories Division,
Commonwealth Office.
SECRET
/maintaining
desp!!.
ни
SECRET
maintaining the status quo in the Colony. The example of Macao, together with the elerents of irrationality and xenophobie which hve manifested themselves in the Cultural Revolution in its latest phase do suggest, however, that the Chinese at present are abnormally sensitive to external events. If, therefore, some incident, however spontaneous, arose in Hong Kong, the Chinese might react more strongly than normally and take up a position from which they could not retreat. It is therefore, we think, important to avoid any sources of friction with China and to try to ensure that there in a period of calm while any loss of morale resulting from the Macao affair is recovered.
(E. Bolland)
SECRET
Mr. de la Mare
tr. de le
SECRET
miembr
HONG KONG
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
23 FEB 1967
FDI/
Mr. Rodgers may be interested to see the attached despatch
from the Governor of Hong Kong containing a review of the
principal developments in the Colony between April 1965 and
December 1966. Paragraphs 9-17 eal with external relations.
2. We have no particuler comments on the despatch, except that
there is clearly some confusion in paragraph 11 about official
Chinese protests at United States activities in Hong Kong.
There were two official protests during the period under review:
the first in September 1965, following the aircraft incident
referred to in paragraph 10, and the second in February 1966.
The reason for the second was the presence of a considerable
number of United States naval vessels. There have been other
"complaints" in the Hong Kong left-wing press since then, which
have been taken up in the inland press, but no further official
protests.
IT
3. The two rein developments in the external "ield having
a bearing on Hong Kong which have occurred since the review was
C
written fre the Chinese campaign against Zacao and the
intensification of the Cultural Revolution which took place when
it was extended to industry. This began in late December 1966.
Having extracted the maximum concessions from the Portuguese,
the Chinese stopped short et actual occupation of Macao.
There is some reason to believe that a contributory factor in
the Chinese decision may have been their assessment that such
action would affect confidence in Hong Kong, which is valuable
to them economically and for intelligence purposes.
no evidence to suggest that there has been a change
We have
in the basic
/Chinese
SECKET
SECRET
Chinese policy of maintaining the status quo in the Colony.
The example of Macao, together with the elements of irrationality
and xenophobia which have manifested themselves in the Cultural
Revolution in its latest phase do suggest, however, that the
Chinese at present are abnormally sensitive to external events.
If, therefore, some incident, however spontaneous, arose in
Hong Kong, the Chinese might react more strongly than normally
and take up a position from which they could not retreat. It is therefore important to avoid any sources of friction with
China and to try to ensure that there is a period of calm while
any loss of morale resulting from the Macao affair is recovered.
4. It was with the above considerations in mind that the Chiefs
of Staff recently recommended that the cut in the Hong Kong
garrison agreed by Ministers last year should not be put into
effect immediately and that any announcement of it should also be
deferred for the moment. If the savings on the garrison
contemplated are to be made in the 1967-68 financial year, it is
likely that an announcement will have to be made in September.
By this time the dust will have settled after the Macao affair
and, although we can only guess about this, the atmosphere in
China may also have calmed down.
5. I will reply to Mr. Carter's letter of 24 January along
the lines of paragraphs 2 and 3 above when you have seen.
20 February, 1967
I doubt whether the Rodgers need see This despatch now. It is now more than
SECHET
Pro
متما
two months old. It book the C.o.a month to send it to us, and it has been fer almost a month before being
sath itted.
We should bear the despatch in mind for what it say about M.s. Elliott, in "Cass that lady causes, us
by causes as further trouble but othowrie no action except to reply to hn Carter as you propose. In Bolland.
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hello T-Yr Caw him 21/2
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Our reference: FED.150/402/01
Your reference:
Dear Eddie
着
SECRET
COLONIAL OFFICE
GREAT SMITH STREET, LONDON S.W.I
Telephone: Abbey 1266, ext.
RECEIVED IN
24th January, ARCHIVES No.31
23 FEB 1967
FDI
I enclose, with apologies for the delay, a copy of despatch No. 2879 of 15th December, 1966 from the Governor of Hong Kong reporting on the Frincipal developments in Hong Kong over the last eighteen or so months. We are arranging to print
it.
2.
We shall be sending a formal reply in due Please let us know if you have any comments for incorporation.
course.
Of Demen
We sprine You
تلتكم
пр
Dunnyz
بسلا
We have entrilon (W.. CARTER)
a more ticklesh period vis-à-vis Chine siner
this despatel was out. Poul. The main
E.Bolland Esq.,
Foreign Office, conclusions
2.
8.4.1.
slill sländ, I think.
SECRET
Plean Tal me
still
China's attitude
detailed commit;
any
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for To Cort. We shld also let for Rodgers
thes: so
please prepore ро
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25
SECRET
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
-9 MAR 1967 FDBZ1
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT"
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE PRINT DISTRIBUTION
CO Ref.: FED 150/402/01
February, 1967
Copy No. 53
HONG KONG: A REVIEW OF PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
Governor of Hong Kong to the Secretary of State for the Colonies
(No. 2879. Secret? Sir,
Government House, Hong Kong IS December, 1966
I have the honour in this despatch to attempt a review of the principal developments that have taken place in Hong Kong since my last periodic despatch dated 23 April, 1965,*
2. The main excitement was undoubtedly the three days of rioting in April this year. By the standards of other countries it was a minor affair and the injury to persons and property was slight. Its significance lies in the fact that it happened at all. Since the clash between Communists and nationalists in 1956 Hong Kong has been free from mob violence. Nearly 4 million people contrive to earn a living in this crowded territory and they have managed to rub along without producing more than an occasional spark, and when disturbances did flare up there was a disproportionate feeling of shock and apprehension.
3. The ostensible cause of the riots was a proposal to increase the first-class fare of one of the cross-harbour ferry services by five cents (the equivalent of three farthings). On 5 April a youth called So Sau-chung staged a hunger strike in protest at the Star Ferry pier. His action came as jam to the Press, who excited public interest in him and in the issue generally. His arrest, for obstruction, increased the tension and led to a peaceful, but excited, protest march (mainly by teenagers and children) through Kowloon on the night of 5/6 April. Tension continued to grow and further demonstrations on the following night degenerated into violence, which, however, did not spread beyond the south-west quarter of Kowloon. A curfew was ordered and by the early hours of the morning order had been restored. Violence, however, broke out again the following evening, though it was confined to a smaller area, and a curfew was again imposed. Precautionary curfews were ordered for the following two nights and there was no further trouble. One person was killed as a result of police fire and 16 injured persons were treated in Government hospitals. Others were no doubt treated privately. 1,465 persons were arrested; of these 905 were charged with various offences (790 with breach of curfew alone).
4. So much for the actual events. The underlying causes-the "groundswell of discontent" as The Times called it--are not so easy to analyse. A Commission of Enquiry was set up and has completed hearing evidence. I do not want to anticipate the Commission's conclusions, but a sketch of the background is necessary for the riots to be seen in perspective.
5. Before the war and for some time afterwards the population of Hong Kong, both Chinese and European, was essentially transient. However long people lived here, their roots and their real homes were elsewhere. But now not only are there far more people but they are a more settled community though not necessarily from choice; many young people are growing up who have never known and have no foreseeable hope of knowing another home. They live in a quite appallingly overcrowded city, in a fiercely competitive environment, where poverty and considerable wealth are seen side by side. Real wages have been rising much faster than the cost of living but, while there has been a considerable improvement in living conditions generally, this in itself has inspired the desire for still further improvement.
• Not printed.
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2
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6. These feelings have been encouraged by a small group of the less responsible of our local politicians. They have so far failed in their efforts to arouse any genuine political-mindedness among the population, and their talents are mainly employed in trying to persuade people that they are discontented. They ignore the advances that have been made in social welfare represented. among other things, by the provision of Government housing for a million people: and concentrate their attention on what has not been done.
7. I had hoped to avoid personalities in this account. It is, however, impossible not to refer to the prominent part played by Mrs. Elsie Elliott, a school teacher who was elected to the Urban Council in 1963 and since then has filled the role of chief censor of Government. It was Mrs. Elliott who organised, and fanned, the opposition to the increase in ferry charges, by collecting signatures and encouraging demonstrations. And it was Mrs. Elliott, and her counsel, who for long periods monopolised the attention of the Commission of Enquiry. She was accused by one witness of bribing a youth to foment a riot; she countered with an equally improbable allegation that the police had manufactured the riots in order to discredit her. Eventually, Mrs. Elliott was held to be in contempt of the Commission for blatantly failing to disclose the source of the information on which she based her allegation against the police. One section of popular opinion still holds that she was unjustly persecuted; more thinking people regard her as slightly off her head; but mud always sticks and she has succeeded in giving the impression to many that the police, who acted with a restraint that was favourably remarked upon at the time, are brutal and corrupt.
४. There is no evidence that these disturbances were inspired by outside political influences. Indeed, although the local Left-wing Press gave mild support to the agitation against the increase in ferry fares, it denounced the riots and (in striking contrast to the stand it look after the 1956 riots) made no attempt to complain about the effectiveness of the methods used to suppress them.
9. Indeed, the colony's position vis-à-vis the CPG could be said to be reasonably satisfactory. It is now clear that a review of Chinese policy towards Hong Kong followed President Johnson's decision in the early summer of 1965 to commil greatly increased numbers of troops to the Viet-Namese theatre. The conclusion was apparently reached that although the colony was an integral part of China, and must sooner or later be returned to it, it would not be in China's economic or political interests if it were taken back now. Hence even if the Viet-Namese war were expanded, Peking would wish the status of Hong Kong to remain unchanged. But there were three basic conditions: Hong Kong must not be used as a base for "aggression "either against China or against Viet-Nam, and "patriotic workers and organisations "in Hong Kong must not be
persecuted ".
10. Almost immediately afterwards, by an unfortunate coincidence, a United States military aircraft taking 70 soldiers back to Viet-Nam from leave in the colony crashed in Hong Kong harbour with much loss of life of those on board. Chinese reactions were quick and harsh. A Note handed to Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Peking contended that Hong Kong was increasingly being used by the United States as a base of operations for their war of aggression and that this was an increasingly grave threat to Chinese security. Unless Her Majesty's Government immediately stopped "all the activities of the United States aggressor forces in Hong Kong" they would, in the familiar phrase, "bear full responsibility for all the consequences arising".
**
11. The violent wording of the protest created the impression that Peking was determined once again to make things difficult for Hong Kong. Official Chinese complaints were made at the same time about two further incidents and the local Left-wing Press began a campaign against United States activities of all sorts in the colony. There was however no sustained effort to bring about a change in the Hong Kong Government's policy and, although the local pro-Communist Press continued to complain whenever large United States ships arrived in the harbour, it became clear that these protests were becoming a matter of routine. During the last nine months there has been no formal Chinese protest against United States military activities in the colony.
SECRF1
SECRET
3
12. Any incident which could possibly be construed as support for the idea of "Two Chinas" has remained a constant potential irritant in relations between Hong Kong and the CPG. In fact, as Peking is certainly well aware, Hong Kong has continued to achieve great success in suppressing the most important and most dangerous nationalist activity here, which is the use of the colony as a base for sabotage activities against the mainland. Between April 1965 and May 1966 over 70 Kuomintang Intelligence Service agents were arrested; and several large illegal caches of explosives and offensive weapons. often stored in crowded areas at great risk to the safety of the public, have been seized by the police.
13. Few other of the traditional (if trivial) bones of contention between China and the colony have caused trouble. Indeed the Chinese have on several occasions taken positive action to co-operate with the Hong Kong Government at a working level.
14. In the economic field the Chinese have made great efforts to expand their trade with the colony, now their largest export market in the world. In 1965 their total exports to Hong Kong increased by 17 per cent over the 1964 level, and over the first eight months of 1966, despite a slight recession in exports during the first two quarters, there was a further 11 per cent increase as compared with the previous year. At the same time the CPG continues to invest in the colony, largely in retail trade. By mid-1966 there were for instance some 34 large department stores trading solely in mainland products.
15. In short, although the intensification of the war in Viet-Nam initially resulted in greater sensitivity on the part of the Chinese about United States activities in Hong Kong, there has been no sign at all recently of increased aggressiveness by local pro-Communists in other directions,
16. It is a question how far this policy will be affected by the most recent developments in the Chinese Cultural Revolution. The appearance in the middle of August of the Red Guards, and their initial rampage through China, were watched with fascination and apprehension in the colony. Chinese visiting the mainland from Hong Kong were reported to have had their hair forcibly cut and to have been made to discard their Western-style shoes and clothes. The Red Guards announced that Hong Kong would henceforth be named Ch'un Ti- "Expel Imperialism City".
17. But by the beginning of October nothing had happened to suggest any change in Chinese policy towards Hong Kong. One or two minor incidents occurred on the frontier in the month following the emergence of the Red Guards; nevertheless, there was fairly clear evidence that the Chinese authorities were determined not to let the situation get out of hand. For the time being realism still seems to be the basis of Chinese policy towards Hong Kong.
18. In this somewhat delicate state of equilibrium any major constitutional changes in the colony are out of court: this is generally accepted by responsible opinion. There has, however. been a growing interest in the machinery of Government and a growing criticism of some of its aspects which, though ill-informed for the most part, indicates that further steps are desirable to promote better understanding between the Administration and the people: differences in culture and language will always be a barrier requiring unusual measures to overcome. It is probable that feelings of this kind, whether conscious or unconscious, were in the minds of some of those who took part in the riots: others were mere hoodlums, It is nevertheless easy to assert, and virtually impossible to rebut, that one of the principal causes of the outbreak was Government's indifference to, and neglect of the wishes and aspirations of the people.
19. Against this background I have recently tried to stimulate public interest in the possibilities of improving the system of local government, which, as one outcome, may permit an increased measure of popular participation, and so ought, in theory at least, to increase and strengthen the links between Government and people. The political implications of a development of this nature are, of course, considerably less significant than corresponding changes in the structure of the Central Government. But, political considerations apart, the introduction of a more up-to-date and effective system of local government ought to offer substantial administrative and other advantages.
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20. There are formidable difficulties to be overcome before any effective changes in this system can be made. A major factor is the very novelty of the concept that the mass of the population should take an active part in any processes of government. This concept, indeed, is not in keeping with the traditional Chinese view of the proper relationship between government and governed and, while times are changing, it is possible that the popular response to the requirements of the new system will be slow: it is even possible that this response will be unfavourable.
L
21. One of the arguments put forward against the increase in ferry fares was that it would cause an inflationary spiral". This argument could not be justified by the trivial increase proposed but it was said to be part of a general pattern of rising prices and economic depression; and it gained ground among those who had been affected by the events of the early part of 1965 when two Chinese-owned banks failed and there was a run on others. I referred to this briefly in my last despatch but it was not then possible to assess the situation fully.
22. The lack of confidence in Chinese banks did not cease with the end of the run, and it was not until a controlling interest in the largest (and, in fact, onC of the soundest of these banks had been voluntarily offered to and acquired by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, and certain others had received support from that bank, the Chartered Bank and Government, that a still uneasy calm redescended on the banking world sad the process of rebuilding confidence began.
23. In retrospect, it can be seen that the break had come in consequence of an over-rapid expansion of credit and of the unsound leading policies of certain banks, of over-speculation in real estate and of over-speculation in stocks and shares a picture similar to that in many other financial centres during the last year or two.
24. These events constituted a considerable check to progress. Something of a credit squeeze developed, partly because of the relative slump in real estate (many developers being left with unrealisable assets in the shape of completed or half-completed schemes); partly because the financing of small industry and business was disrupted by the loss of deposits experienced by the smaller Chinese banks, their normal source of credit; and partly because banks as a whole became cautious, and eager, not only to restore, but also to increase their liquidity.
25. It seems probable that economic growth, which had in recent years been in the range of 10 per cent to 14 per cent a year, fell to somewhere round 6-7 per cent (which, to the business world, appeared severe depression). These circumstances affected not only the development of trade and industry but also revenue receipts. Both economic activity and revenue began to recover somewhat towards the end of the year. The final out-turn of the public accounts for 1965-66 was a deficit of £84 million, the first deficit since 1960,
26. The 1966-67 Budget forecasts a further deficit of £12 million, in spite of increased taxation (including the first increase in income tax since 1950) designed to produce an additional £54 million. Economic recovery appears, however, to be accelerating again (a spectacular increase in tourist traffic being one of the elements) and it seems likely that while there will be a deficit, it will not be as large as forecast. Even the real estate market is showing some signs of recovery at the cheaper end. Business confidence is returning and the existence of a state of depression is no longer an article of faith in the business world.
27. There has continued to be a substantial inward flow of funds, although partly, but only partly, offset for a time by an outflow to the United States during sterling's difficulties. Bank deposits have continued to grow reasonably fast. although their policy on advances is still cautious. In the year ended 31st August, 1966. deposits rose by 14 per cent but advances by only 3 per cent. The liquidity ratio of the whole banking system is now 48 per cent against 29 per cent prior to the bank run of February last year.
28. Throughout this difficult period there has been constant pressure on Government, and a constant temptation, to use surplus official funds held abroad to buttress the ailing parts of the economy, in particular, the real estate market.
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This has been resisted; even the deficits have been financed by running down official deposits with commercial banks in Hong Kong. It has been painful medicine for the economy, but it has been fast-working medicine. Events have administered a powerful purge, which has, I believe, restored our body economic to a healthy state from the overstrained and, in some sectors, unsound position it was in 18 months ago. While the process was painful for many, progress, although slowed down, was never brought to a halt and, while wages and employment in the over-inflated construction industry came down to earth, the general level of wages and employment has not been adversely affected. And, while economic growth is unlikely ever again to reach the spectacular levels of the early 1960s, we have now, I believe, a more solid base for steady expansion- always provided the channels of international trade remain open and there is no worldwide slump.
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I have, &c.
TRENCH.
FED
Ref: SCR 1/4841/55
Nc. 2879
Sir,
SECRET
CHIEF REGISTRAR'S OFFICE 2.; DEC 170
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, DEPENDENT TERRITORIS
DIVISION.
GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
HONG KONG.
‹ December, 1966.
1
I have the honour in this despatch to atte: pt a review of the principal developments that have taken place in Hong Kong since my last periodic despatch dated 23rd April, 1965.
2.
The main excitement was undoubtedly the three days of rioting in April this year. By the standards of other countries it was a minor affair and the injury to persons and property was slight. Its significance lies in the fact that it happened at all. Since the clash between communists and nationalists in 1956 Hong Kong has been free from mob violence. Nearly four million people contrive to earn a living in this crowded territory and they have managed to rub along without producing more than an occasional spark, and when disturbances did flare up there was a disproportionate feeling of shock and apprehension,
3.
The ostensible cause of the riots was a proposal to increase the first class fare of one of the cross-harbour ferry services by five cents (the equivalent of three farthings). On 5th April a youth called $0 Sau-chung staged a hunger strike in protest at the Star Ferry pier. His action came as jam to the press,
who excited public interest in him and in the issue generally. His arrest, for obstruction, increased the tension and led to a peaceful, but excited, protest march (mainly by teenagers and childrea) through Kowloon on the night of 5th/6th April. Tension continued to grow and further demonstrations on the following night degenerated into violence, which, however, did not spread beyond the south-west quarter of Kowloon,
A curfew was ordered and by the early hours of the morning order had been restored. Violence, however, broke out again the following evening, though it was confined to a smaller area, and a curfew was again imposed. Precautionary curfews were ordered for the following two nights and there
no further trouble. One person was killed as a result of police fire and 16 injured persons were treated in Government hospitals. Others were no doubt treated privately. 1,465 persons were arrested; of these 905 were charged with various offences (790 with breach of curfew alone).
WEA
4.
So much for the actual events. The under- lying causes - the 'groundswell of discontent
as
/the Times.........
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
FREDERICK LEE, M.P.
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the Times called it are not so easy to analyse. A Commission of Enquiry was set up and has
I do not want to completed hearing evidence. anticipate the Commission's conclusions, but a sketch of the background is necessary for the riots to be seen in perspective,
5.
Before the war and for some time afterwards the population of Hong Kong, both Chinese and
However long European, was essentially transient, people lived here, their roots and their real homes were elsewhere, But now not only are there far more people but they are a morc settled community though not necessarily from choice; many young people are growing up who have never known and have They no foreseeable hope of knowing another home live in a quite appallingly overcrowded city, in a fiercely competitive environment, where poverty and
Real considerable wealth arc seca side by sidc. wages have been rising much faster than the cost of living but, while there has been a considerablc improvement in living conditions gcnerally, this in itself has inspired the desire for still further improvement.
6.
These feelings have been encouraged by a small group of the less rcsponsible of our local politicians. They have so far failed in their cfforts to arouse any genuine political-mindedness among the population, and their talents are mainly employed in trying to persuade people that they are discontented. They ignore the advances that have been made in social welfare (represented, among other things, by the provision of Government housing for a million people) and concentrate their attention on what has not been done.
7
1.
I had hoped to avoid pcrsonalities in this account. It is, however, impossible not to refer to the prominent part played by Mrs. Elsie Elliott, a school teacher who was elected to the Urban Council in 1963 and since then has filled the
It was role of chief consor of Government, kīrs. Elliott who organised, and fanned, the opposition to the increase in ferry charges, by collecting signatures and encouraging demonstrations And it was Mrs. Elliott, and her counsel, who for long periods monopolised the attention of the Commission of Enquiry. She was sccused by one witacss of bribing a youth to foment a riot; she countered. ith an equally improbable allegation that the Police had manufactured the riots in order to discredit her. Eventually, Mrs. Elliott was held to be in contempt of the Commission for blatantly failing to disclose the source of the information on which she based her allegation against the Police. One section of popular opinion still holds that she was unjustly perse- cuted; more thinking people regard her as slightly off her head; but mud always sticks and she has
/succeeded...
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succceded in giving the impression to many that the Police, who acted with a restraint that was favour- ably remarked upon at the time, arc brutal and corrupt.
8.
There is no evidence that these disturbances were inspired by outside political influences. Indeed, although the local left-wing press gave mild support to the agitation against the increase in ferry fares, it denounced the riots and (in striking contrast to the stand it took after the
about the 1956 riots) made no attempt to complain effectiveness of the methods used to suppress them.
9.
Indeed, the Colony's position vis-à-vis the C.P.G. could be said to be reasonably satisfactory. It is now clear that a review of Chinese policy towards Hong Kong followed President Johnson's decision in the early summer of 1965 to commit greatly increased numbers of troops to the Vietnamcse theatre. The conclusion was apparently reached that although the Colony was an integral part of China, and must sooner or later be returned to it, it would not be in China's economic or political
Hence even interests if it were taken back now. if the Vietnamese war were expanded, Peking would wish the status of Hong Kong to remain unchanged. But there were three basic conditions; Hong Kong must not be used as a base for "aggression" either against China or against Vietnam, and "patriotic workers and organisations" in Hong Kong must not be "persecuted".
10.
"all
:
Almost immediately afterwards, by an unfortunate coincidence, a U.S. military aircraft taking seventy soldiers back to Vietnam from leave in the Colony crashed in Hong Kong harbour with much
Chinese reactions loss of life of those on board.
A Note handed to H., Charge were quick and harsh. d'Affaires in Peking contended that Hong Kong was increasingly being used by the U,S, "as a base of operations for their war of aggression" and that this was an increasingly grave threat to Chinese security. Unless H..G. immediately stopped the activities of the U.S. aggressor forces in Hong Kong" they would, in the familiar phrase, "bear full responsibility for all the consequences arising".
11.
The violent wording of the protest created the impression that Feking was determined once again
Official to make things difficult for Hong Kong. Chinese complaints were made at the same time about two further incidents and the local left-wing press began a campaign against U.S. activities of ali
There was however no sustained sorts in the Colony. effort to bring about e change in the Hong Kong Government's policy and, although the local pro- communist press continued to complain whenever large U.S. ships arrived in the harbour, it became clear that these protests were becoming a matter of routine. During the last nine months there has been no formal Chinese protest against U.S. military activities in the Colony.
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In fact,
12.
Any incident which could possibly be construed as support for the idea of "Two Chinas" has remained & constant potential irritant in relations between Hong Kong and the C.P.G. as Peking is certainly well aware, Hong Kong has continued to achieve great success in suppressing the most important and most dangerous Nationalist activity here, which is the use of the Colony as a base for sabotage activities against the mainland. Between April 1965 and May 1966 over 70 Kuomintang Intelligence Service agents were arrested; and several large illegal caches of explosives and offensive weapons, often stored in crowded areas at great risk to the safety of the public, have been seized by the police.
13.
Few other of the traditional (if trivial) bones of contention between China and the Colony have caused trouble. Indeed the Chinese have on several occasions taken positive action to co-operate with the Rong Kong Government at a working level.
14.
In the economic field the Chinese have made great efforts to expand their trade with the Colony,
In now their largest export market in the world. 1965 their total exports to hong Köng increased by 17% over the 1965 level, and over the first eight months of 1966, despite e slight recession in exports during the first two quarters, there was a further
& 11% increase as compared with the previous year. At the same time the C.F.G. continues to invest in the Colony, largely in retail trade. By mid-1966, there were for instance some 34 large department stores trading solely in mainland products.
15.
In short, although the intensification of the war in Vietnam initially resulted in greater sensitivity on the part of the Chinese about U.S. activities in Hong Kong, there has been no sign at all recently of increased aggressiveness by local pro-Communists in other directions.
16.
It is a question how far this policy will be affected by the most recent developments in the Chinese Cultural Revolution, The appearance in the middle of August of the Red Guards, and their initial rampage through China, were watched with fascination and apprehension in the Colony. Chinese visiting the mainland from Hong Kong were reported to have had their hair forcibly cut and to have been made to discard their Western-style shoes and clothes. The Red Guards announced that Hong Kong would henceforth be named Ch'un Ti "Expel Imperialism City".
-
17.
But by the beginning of October nothing had happened to suggest any change in Chinese policy towards Hong Kong. One or two minor incidents occurred on the frontier in the month following the emergence of the Red Guards; never- theless, there was fairly clear cvidence that the
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Chinese authorities were determined not to let the situation get out of hand, For the time being realism still seems to be the basis of Chinese policy towards Hong Kong.
18.
In this somewhat delicate statc of equili- brium any major constitutional changes in the Colony are out of court; this is generally accepted bcen by responsible opinion. There has, however, a growing interest in the machinery of Government and growing criticism of some of its aspects which, though ill-informed for the most part, indicates that further steps arc desirable to promote better understanding between the administra- tion and the people: differences in culture and lenguage will always be a barrier requiring unusual measures to overcome. It is probable that feelings of this kind, whether conscious or unconscious, were in the minds of some of those who took part in the riota: others were mere hoodlums. It is nevertheless easy to assert, and virtually impossible to rebut, that one of the principal causes of the outbreak was Government's indifference to, and neglect of, the wishes and espirations of the people
19.
Against this background I have recently tried to stimulate public interest in the possibilities of improving the system of local government, which, as one outcome, may permit an increased measure of populer participation, and so ought, in theory at least, to increase and strengthen the links between Government and people. The political implications
of a development of this nature arc, of course, considerably less significant than corresponding changes in the structure of the central government. But, political considerations apart, the introduction of a more up-to-date and effectivc system of local government ought to offer substential administrative and other advantages.
20.
There are formidable difficulties to be overcome before any effective changes in this system can be made. A major factor is the very novelty of the concept that the mass of the population should take an active part in any processes of government. This concept, indeed, is not in keeping with the traditional Chinese view of the proper relationship between government and governed and, while times arc changing, it is possible that the popular response to the requirements of the new system will be slow: it is even possible that this response will be unfavourable.
21.
One of the arguments put forward against the increase in ferry fares was that it would cause an 'inflationary spiral'. This argument could not be justified by the trivial increase proposed but it was said to be part of a general pattern of rising prices and economic depression; and it gained ground among those who had been affected by the events of the early part of 1965
/when.....
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1
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6
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when two Chinese-owned banks failed and there was a run on others, I referred to this briefly in my last despatch but it was not then possible to assess the situation fully,
22.
The lack of confidence in Chinese banks did not cease with the end of the run, and it was not until a controlling interest in the largest (and, in fact, one of the soundest) of these banks had been voluntarily offered to and acquired by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation; and certain others had received support from that bank, the Chartered Bank and Government; that a still uneasy calm redescended on the banking world and the process of rebuilding confidence began.
24.
23,
In retrospect, it can be seen that the break had come in consequence of an over-rapid expansion of credit and of the unsound lending policies of certain banks, of over-speculation in real estate and of over-speculation in stocks and shares a picture similar to that in many other financial centres during the last year or two.
These events constituted a considerable check to progress. Something of a credit squeeze developed, partly because of the relative slump in rcal estate (many developcrs being left with unrealisable assets in the shape of completed or half-completed schemes); partly because the financing of small industry and business was disrupted by the loss of deposits experienced by the smaller Chinese banks, their normal source of crcdit; and partly because banks as a whole became cautious, and eager, not only to restore, but also to increase their liquidity.
25.
It seems probable that economic growth, which had in recent ycers been in the range of 10% to 14% a year, fell to somewhere round 6% - 7% (which, to the business world, appeared severe depression), These circumstances affected not only the development of trade and industry but also revenue receipts, Both economic activity end revenue began to recover somewhat towards the end of the year, The final out-turn of the public accounts for 1965-66 was a deficit of £81⁄2 million, the first deficit since 1960.
26.
The 1966-67 budget forecasts a further deficit of £12 million, in spite of increased taxation (including the first increase in income tax since 1950) designed to produce an additional £5 million, Economic recovery appears, however, to be accelerating again (a spectacular increase in tourist traffic being one of the elements) and it secms likely that while there will be a deficit, it will not be as large as forecast, Even the real estate market is showing some signs of recovery at the cheaper end, Business
/confidence...........
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confidence is returning and the existence of a state of depression is no longer an article of faith in the business vorld.
27.
There has continued to be a substantial inward flow of funds, although partly, but only partly, offset for a time by an outflow to the
Bank U.S.A. during sterling's difficulties, deposits have continued to grow reasonably fast, although their policy on advances is still cautious. In the year ended 31st August, 1966, deposits rose by 14% but advances by only 3%. The liquidity ratio of the whole banking system is now 48% against 29% prior to the bank run of February last year.
28.
Throughout this difficult period there has been constant pressure on Government, and a constant temptation, to use surplus official funds hold abroad to buttress the ailing parts of the economy, in particular, the real estate market. This has been resisted; even the deficits have been financed by running down official deposits
It has been with commercial banks in Hong Kong. painful medicine for the economy, but it has been fast-working medicine, Events have administered a powerful purge, which has, I believe, restored our body economic to a healthy state from the over- strained and, in some sectors, unsound position it was in eighteen months ago. While the process was painful for many, progress, although slowed down, was never brought to a halt and, while wages and employment in the over-inflated construction indstry came down to carth, the general level of wages and employment has not been adversely affected. And, while economic growth is unlikely ever again to reach the spectacular levels of the early 1960's, we have now, I believe, a morc solid base for stoady expansion always provided the channels of international trade remein open and there is no worldwide slump.
J
-
I have the honour to bc,
Sir,
Your most obedient, humble servant,
Bench
GOVERNOR
1
906
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