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The ending of this jacket i
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FOREIGN
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TITLE: HONG KONG
GENERAL SITUATION & POLICY OF
POLITICAL
INT.
AFFAIRS.
REFER TO
REFER TO
REFER TO
DEPT.
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DATE
DEPT.
NAME
DATE DEPT.
NAME
1.
PD
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the same as
The appropri
PART
D (284)
DATE
IWIL
-------
I
HK. TO CO. 2015
FIDENTIAL
of
Y 249, CONFIDENTIAL
AESEED CO TELNO 2015 OF 23RD SEPTEMBER RFI PEKING.
EMRE TELEGRAM 871 : DETAINEES.
AFRAID THAT I MUST NOW WARN AGAINST THE EXTENT TO WHICH TY
ANG SUGGESTED THAT DETAIKEES CAN BE USED AS POLITICAL S. THE LEGAL POSITION IS STRAIGHTFORWARD: THESE PEOPLE WERE
- AS SEING A THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE COLONY. THE
CRITERION FOR THEIR CONTINUED DETENTION SHOULD BE WHETHER
RECEIVED IN REFIVESINO.31
25 SEP 1958
FOUT
- NOT THEY REMAIN A THREAT. IF SO, THEY SHOULD REMAIN IN CUSTODY: FOT, THEY SHOULD BE RELEASED. I HAVE TRIED THROUGHOUT TO
ERE TO THIS PRINCIPLE AS FAR AS POSSIBLE CDIFFICULT IN APPLIC-
бары
25
415)
·
-
L
* THOUGH IT 19) WHILE ATTEMPTING AT THE SAME TIME TO MEET
DESIRE TO MATCH RELEASES ROUGHLY WITH VISAS: BUT I HAVE HAD
ADIVINGS CVER THE RISKS TO SECURITY AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE
DANGER OF BLURRING THE PRINCIPLE FOR THE SAKE OF EXPECT AST PAPER
PAR, IT HAS BEEN POSSIBLE TO ERR LEGALLY ON THE RIGHT SIDE
TO JUSTIFY THE INTRUSION OF EXPEDIENCY BY ACCEPTING RATHER
: SECURITY RISK IN KAKING RELEASES THAN WAS PERHAPS
RABLE.
STRICTLY
IF, HOWEVER, THE PRINCIPLES STATED ABOVE ARE NOT CAREFULLY
IN HIND, WE MAY LAY CURSELVES OPEN TO THE DANGER OF AN
TION OF PUBLIC CRITICIS HERE AND ELSEWHERE FOR MISUSING
-
ION PROCEDURES. THE MORE OEVICUS THE CONNECTION BETWEEN
+
TS AND VISAS IS MALE BY THE MATCHING OF NUMBERS AND TIMING,
EATER IS THIS DANGER, HOWEVER CONSCIENTIOUSLY WE IN FACT
ACT.
THE PRESENT PERICU, WHEN THE COMMUNISTS ARE DOING THEIR TO USE THE TIME BETWEEN KOW AND MID-OCTOBER FOR ORGANISED
STRATIONS OF SUPPORT FOR THEMSELVES, THE ACDED DANGERS OF IS A MUMBER OF DETAINEES, OUT OF WHOM A GREAT DEAL CF
P
-
י
CA COULD BE MACE SHOULD THE COMMUNISTS SO DECIDE, ARE
J
MjS PROTED IS OVER, AND IF ALL GOES WELL, I HAVE MADE
L
1
EASONABLY SAFELY RELEASED, AFTER THIS, 18 DETAINEES IN ALL
LAST FAZER
COFIDENTIAL
/(NOT ALL
+7
+
.
ند
+
CONFIDENTIAL
2
OT ALL PRENATURELY NOR ALL ASSOCIATED WITH THE ISSUE OF VISAS) LL HAVE BEEN RELEASED AGAINST 22 VISAS RECEIVED, IT MAY BE DSSIBLE TO RELEASE A FEW MORE LATER IN THE MONTH OR EARLY IN OVEMBER, BRINGING THE NUMBERS UP TO APPROXIMATELY THE SAME LEVEL. FTER THAT, NO DOUBT OTHER RELEASES WILL BE FOSSIBLE FROM TIME TO IKE, BUT WE SHALL SEFORE VERY LONG BE GETTING DOWN TO THE REALLY ARD CASES.
IN SHORT, BY ASCUT NOVEMBER THE BALANCE BETWEEN DELAYED VISAS AND TOTAL RELEASES MAY HAVE BEEN APPROXIMAT_LY STRUCK. THEREFORE E-CONSIDERATION OF RELEASES SHOULD BE DIVORCED FROM EXTRANEOUS ACTORS AND BASED STRICTLY CN THE PROPER CRITERIA OTHERWISE WE
IK SONE WELL-HEANING PERSON CR ORGANISATION ATTACKING US FLICLY ON WHAT WE HAVE BEEN DOING AN ATTACK AGAINST WHICH
MIGHT NOT BE AT ALL EASY TO DEFEND OURSELVES: PARTICULARLY 17 THE ACCUSATION TAKES THE LIFE THAT WE ARE CUNDERLINE NEXT WORD) STTAINING DETAINEES FOR USE AS BARGAINING WEAPONS.
J
FINALLY AS YOU ARE AWARE, ! CUITE SERIOUSLY DOUBT THE VALIDITY C. THE PREMISES ON WHICH KUCH OF THE LATTER PART OF PEKING TELEGRAM
1. NBER 871 IS APPARENTLY SASED.
PLEASE PASS ROUTINE PEKING.
5...
5. D. TRENCH
C.0.
LA PURATED AS REQUESTED]
DE. ANYTENTAL DISTRIBUTION
H.A.D.
:.:.D.
DIFTINU DIPT.
YEAD DE. 7.
PERSO, WEL DEMA,
3.9.
U.X.D.
CONSILAR DEPT.
I.F.J.
I.R.D.
NEWS DEPT.
CONFIDENTIAL
H
+
I
I
Cypher/al A
CONFIDENTIAL
FLESIVED IN ~CHIVES No. 31
j 20 SEP 1968
19 September 1968
EDYI
PRIORITY PILING TO FORZIGN OFFICE
Te
871
CONFIDENTIAL
Addressed to F.C. telegram No. 871 of 19 September
Repeated for information to:
413
Hony Kong.
Hong Kong telegram No. 1084: Detainees.
+
414
F
прагра
I regret my error in over-looking two detainees released on 15 August. The total is 7 not 5. Nevertheless, this is scarcely the "larger gesture involving a minimum of ten persons" suggested in paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 1562 10 Hong Song.
3%%%
2. As Governor pointed out, september will have seen no increase in the rate of rele ses, I think this unfortunate when September has seen en important watershed in the treatment of this mission, i.e. the fulfilment of Chinese undertaking of 27 July and granting of all outstanding exit visas. The fact that 49 confrontation prisoners happened to be released on 9 September is in no way a substitute; nor will Chinese regard it as such. These prisoners have served their terms; we are making; no concession in setting them free.
3. The above argument relates only to this mission. It takes no account of the release of the Selfs which is of considerable importance. Recognition of this by releases of detainees should favourably influ- ence the Croziers' chances and possibly even the treatment of Johnston. We have everything to gain by marking this point.
I am sorry to see that after 27 September the Governor is unwilling to make any further releases until after 10 October and then only depending on how the Nation 1 Day celebrations of 1 October and 10 October go, with implication that if there are any disturbances no detainees will released. It is quite possible there will be some disturbances then, e.. because of continuing ban on fireworks. However, far from withholding releases because there is such a risk, it would seem in our interests to Fre-empt trouble by releases before the critical days, especially since in so doing we should be reminding the Communists of what they have to gain by avoiding further provocation
5. In general I fear we are not using releases of detainees as positiv ly as we could. By increasing the rate of releases we have a chance of underlining the point that better treatment of this mission and of British subjects does bring dvikords. c would not be making any major concession in so doing, nor would we be making prior concessions. We would be responding to Chinese moves, though the effect would be at the sam ime to provide insurance against further trouble in
CONFIDENTIAL
/Hong Kong
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2
-
Hony: Aong and to encourage the Chinese to further De-escalation in the treatment of British subjects.
F.0. pass Routine Hong kong.
Mr. Cradock
F.0.
[Repeated as requested]
DEPARTY NTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.E.D.
U.N.D.
Consular Dept.
I.P.D.
I.R.D.
News Dept.
0.0.
H.K.D.
Defence Dept.
News Dept. Personnel Dept.
77777
CONFIDENTIAL
EE/CAT A
LOFITY HONG KONG
TELEGRAM NUKSER
LIVED IN
CHIVES No. 31 CONFIDENTIAL 17 SEP 1968
413
COP COPY
1084
TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
17.SEPTEMBER 196€
Not.
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED CO TELECHAM NO. 1084 OF 17TH SEPTEMBER REPEATED PEKING.
Weftshed.
409
PEKING TELEGRA" NO. 051 : DETAINEES.
Jupa 1714
WE HAVE BEEN SLIGHTLY KOFE LIBERAL THAN IS INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH
3. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVEN FELEASES SINCE 12 AUGUST (TWO ON 15 AUGUST,
THREE ON 20 AUGUST AND TWO ON 5 SEPTEMBER) : AND IN ANY CASE I
DO NOT THINK WE SHOULD BRING THE EMBASSY WIVES AND CHILDREN FULLY
INTO THIS EQUATION SEMICOLON BUT CONSIDER THE MATTER MORE IN TERKS
OF WHOLE FAMILIES.
MY
2. IN ADDITION TO NO. 1 WHO WILL BE RELEASED 0 27 SEPTEMBER
TELEGRAM KO. 1064), WE HAY BE ABLE TO RELEASE A SECOND DETAIKEE
CHO. 3, TSE SHU PINGO AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME SEMICOLON HOWEVER,
THE CASE FOR HIS CONTINUED DETENTION AS REMAINING A SERIOUS
SECURITY FISK IS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION.
}
3. I AM RELUCTANT TO MAKE ANY FURTHEP FELEASES BEYOND THIS ONE OR
POSSIBLY TWO UNTIL AFTER. WE HAVE GOT THE NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATIONS
OF 1ST AND 10TH OCTOBER OUT OF THE WAY. AFTER WE SEE HOW THESE GO, I
WOULD CERTAINLY BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER SONE MORE FOR FELEASE IN THE
LIGHT OF WHAT HAPPENS.
/4. ALTHOUGH
COM
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
4. ALTHOUGH SEPTEMBER WILL HAVE SEEN! BC INCREASE IN THE RATE OF
RELEASES, THIS FACT MAY BE CESCURED BECAUSE 49 CONFRONTATION
PRISONERS HAPPENED TO BE RELEASED FROM STANLEY PRISON ON
9TH SEPTENCEF AS THEIR SENTENCES EXPIRED.
FO PLEASE PASS PRICFITY PEKZ
PEKING.
BIR D. TRENCH
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
P.O.
F.E.D.
0.0.
H.K.D.
C.O.
NEWS DEPT
DEFENCE DEPT
CONSULAR DEPT
I.P.D.
I.R.D.
F.0.
NEWS DEPT
DSAO.
PERSONNEL DEPT
CONFIDENTIAL
1
Ger Ref AWAD/5. Mr Bond
This is
With the compliments of
useful
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
Hling King Wahl.
Ends to Hong Kong (4.1 Action) lette dated 2/7/68 sent to the Dorgd under caps a 11/7
LONDON, S.W.1.
11 Schtbaho 1968
FEDIVA PI make 2 р
ра
сорий
&
inten
pafs 2015
RECEIVED IN FARCHIVES No.31
13 SEP 1968
NAME
CHUNG Wan (1728/ 7189)
SECRET
CONFRONT VITON JUBAINISS
JATH
(Listed according to date of expiry of detention orders)
DATE OF ARREST
29. 9.67
ACTIVITIES
A leading organiser of the Tai Po Anti-Persecution struggle Committee (A.P.3.C.), directed anti-Government activities in the New Territories.
AIR....URE 'A' to GEN/14/268/133 dated 20th June, 1963.
DARE E/D ORDER
LAYIRES
DATE E/D ORDER
ISSUED
28. 9.67
27. 9.68
2
TAH Pan (6223/1755)
29. 9.67
Co-Chairman of the Cheung Chau A.P.5.C.. intimidated the Cheung Chau Rural Committee.
28. 9.67
27. 9.68
3
TSE Shu Ping (6200/2885/1627)
29.9.67
Vice-Chairman of the Sai Kung A.P.S.C., directed anti-Govern- ment activities in the Now
28. 9.67
27. 9.68
Territories.
4
LAM Yuen (2651/3293)
3. 8.67
A leading member of the Tai Po A.P.S.C., supplied explosives for a bomb attack on the Tai Po Rural Committee Office.
28.11.67
27.11.68
5
LI Kai Kau (2621/ 0163/3808)
23.11.67
Member of Plumbers' Union,
6.12.67
5.12.68
supplied bombs to a 'Fighting Group' operating in the North Point area.
ON
6
CHUN Yuen (4440/3293)
23.11.67
Famber of Motor Transport "orkers' Union (China Motor Bus Branch) Propaganda Officer and Assistant Organiser of a 'Fighting Group' operating in the North l'oint area.
6.12.67
5.12.68
SECRET
7
/2.
↓
SERIAL
NAME
DATE OF ARREST
SECRET
ACTIVITIES
7
TAM Kuen (6223/ 2938)
19. 7.67
Manager of the San Po Kong Branch of the Shun Cheong Co., a subsidiary of the forkers' Children's education Promotion Association, directed riotous activities among employees.
DATE 2/D ORDER
ISCULD
12.12.67
Dale S/D ORDER
EXPIRES
11.12.68
8
LI Wing Hong (2621/3057/1660)
19. 7.67
Foreman of the San Po Kong Branch of the Shun Cheong Co., directed riotous activities among employees.
12.12.67
11.12.68
9
CHAN Yuk Fong (7115/5148/6721)
19. 7.67
Salesman of the San Po Kong Branch of the Shun Cheon;; Co., directed riotuus activities among employees.
12.12.67
11.12.68
10
TSE Kwong (6200/ 0342)
1. 8.67
Fald Secretary of the Government Armed Forces and Hospitals Chinese Jorkers' Union, assisted in for- mation of a Union A.P.S.C. and directed its activities.
12.12.67
11.12.68
11
Wai shing CHEUNG Wai Shing (1728/0251/1004)
8.12.67
Member of a 'Fighting Group' and an A.P.S.C. in the Sai Kung aroa
21.12.67
20.12.68
engaged in the manufacture and storage of bombs.
12
13
IU Shui Hing (1202/3055/5281)
LAU Man Shing
(0491/2429/2052)
1.12.67
1. 8.67
FI
軒
Η
21.12.67
20.12.68
5. 1.68
4. 1.69
Prominent member of the Gavera- ment faterworks Chinese Employees' Union, incited employ- ees to strike and commit acts of violence.
SECRET
13.
SERIAL
NAME
DATE OF ARREST
14
LAM Kat Fat (2651/ 0679/4099)
16. 7.67
15
LUNG Tin Kwai (7893/1131/2710)
19.12.67
16
LUI Wun (0712/3562)
1.8.67
17
LEUNG Kin (2733/0256)
14. 7.67
SECRET
ACTIVITIES
Part-tire 'Security Officer' of the Federation of Trade Unions Workers' Club and mcmber of a
'Fighting Group' operating from those premises.
Member of a 'Fighting Group' in the Yuen Long area, planned to assassinate the Divisional Superintendent of Police, Yuen Long, and to blow up a helicopter on H.K.I.
DATS E/D ORDER
ISSUED
DATE E/D ORDER
EXPIRES
5. 1.68
4. 1.69
8. 1.68
7. 1.69
Chairman of the Government ärmed Forces and Hospitals Chinese Workers' Union, formed a Union A.P.S.C. and directed its activities.
11. 1.68
10. 1.69
23.1.68
22. 1.69
Propaganda and Education Officer of the Kowloon Dock Workers' Amel- gamated General Union, founder member of union A.P.3.0., intimidated workers and led an illegal demon- stration.
18
WAT Lau (1448/3177)
16. 7.67
Vice-Chairman of the Motor Trans- port Workers' Union (Kowloon Motor Bus Branch), formed a union A.P.3.C., directed acts of intiai-- dation, ascault and arson.
10.2.68
9. 2.69
19
LAU Wing (0491/2837)
16. 7.67
Paid Secretary of the Motor
10.2.68
9. 2.69
Transport lorkers' Union
(Kowloon Motor Bus Branch),
assisted in formation of a union
A.P.S.C., attended meetings of
Fedoration of Trade Unions officials planning confrontation.
SECR
14.
:
SERIAL
20
NAME
KWAN Wai Yeung (7070/ 0251/2254)
DATE OF ARREST
SECRET
ACTIVITIES
16. 7.67
Paid Secretary of the botor Transport Workers' Union (Kowloon Motor Bus Branch), incited members to strike and directed acts of violence.
DATE E/D ORDER
TEJUED
12. 2.68
DATE E/D ORDER
EXPIRES
11. 2.69
21
WONG Ying Cheung (7806/2019/4545)
16. 7.67
Office-bearer of the Motor Transport Workers' Union (Kowloon Motor Bus Branch), incited members to strike and directed acts of violence.
12. 2.68
11. 2.69
L
22
CHAU Nuen (0719/2541)
16. 7.67
*
ti
I
12. 2.68
11. 2.69
23
LEUNG Yip (2733/2814)
18.10.67
Prominent member of the Motor Transport Workers' Union
19. 2.68
18. 2.69
(Kowloon Motor Bus Branch),
member of a union 'Fighting
Group', advocated the use of bombs.
24
Lar Kwok Hung (7812/0948/7160)
22.12.67
Member of a 'Fighting Group' in the Sai Kung area, engaged in the manufacture, storage and planting of bomos.
19. 2.68
18. 2.69
25
NG Kuen (0702/2938)
26
FU KL (0265/1142)
22.12.67
15. 7.67
1:
H
++
19. 2.68
19. 3.68
18. 2.69
18. 3.69
Leading film actor of the Great Wall Movie enterprises Ltd., and member of the All Circles A.P.3.C., prominent in anti-Government demonstrations and stage perfor
mances.
SECRET
15.
4
SERIAL
NAME
DATE OF ARKEST
27
CHEK Hai (F) (4258/ 1979)
15. 7.67
SECRET
ACTIVITIES
DATE E/D ORDER
ISSUED
DATE E/D ORDER
EXPIRES
18. 3.69
Loading film actress of the Great wall Movie Enterprises Ltd., assisted her husband FU Ki fr anti-Government demonstrations, stage performances and inciting workers to join the 'struggle'.
19. 3.68
28
CHEUNG Cho (1728/0146)
15. 7.67
Member of the Printing Trade workers' Union, spread anti- Government propaganda and attempted to instigate a strike in the Govern- ment Printing Department.
3. 4.68
2. 4.69
29
LING Wang Yan (0407/1347/0088)
15. 7.67
Headmaster of the Sai Kung Public School and organiser of the Sai Kung A.P.S.C., attempted to incite civil disorder and strikes.
3. 4.68
2. 4.69
30
SHING Fo Yeung (2052/ 3499/9502)
9. 4.68
Vice-Chairman of an A.P.S.C..in the Clearwater Bay area, directed its activities which included painting slogans and manufacturing weapons.
19.4.68
18.4.69
31
LAU Sam (0491/0005)
2. 2.68
4. 5.68
3. 5.69
|
·
Chairman of the Stone workers' Uzion, member of the All Circles and All Trades A.P.S.C.s, and leader of a Fighting Group' in the Yuen Long area responsible for the murder of a Police Constable.
SECRET
/6.
4
:
-
SERIAL
NAME
DATE OF ARREST
38
CHEUNG Lit (1728/3525)
11.10.67
SECRET
ACTIVITIES
DATE E/D ORDER
ISSUED
DATE E/D GRDER
EXPIRES
14. 5.69
15.5.68
Chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions Recreation Committee, Jecretary of the Coppersmith "or- kers' Union and a member of the All Circles and All Trades A.P.S.C.8, diracted Federation of Trade Unions' confrontation uctivities.
39
LJI Nam (0712/0589)
4.8.67
Paid Secretary of the #.K. #lec- tric Company Chinese workers' Union, assisted in forming a Union A.P.S.C. and incited workers to disrupt electricity supply.
21. 5.68
20. 5.69
40
WONG Kin Lap (7806/ 1696/4539)
4. 8.67
Headmaster of the Hon Wa Middlo School, Vice-Chairman of the All Circles A.P.S.C., Chairman of the Educational Circles and the Hon Wa School A.P.3.C.s, assisted in planning confrontation.
21. 5.68
20. 5.69
41
CHAN On (7115/1344)
16. 7.67
Paid Secretary of the "orkers' Children's Education Promotion Association, assisted in Federation of Trades Unions confrontation acti- vities and published seditious articles in 'Knowledge for Youth' magazine, holds important position in covert labour network.
21. 5.68
20. 5.69
42
LAM Sui Yung (2651/ 3843/5816)
16. 7.67
Paid Secretary of the prkers' Children's Education Promotion Association, assisted the All Circles A.P.S.C. and attended meetings of Federation of Trade Unions officials planning con- frontation.
21.5.68
20. 5.69
SECRET
18.
+
SECRET
SERIAL
NAME
DATE OF ARREST
ACTIVITIES
DATE E/D ORDER
ISSUED
DATE E/D ORDER
EXPIRES
32
TONG Ping Tat (3282/ 4426/6671)
21. 7.67
Treasurer of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, and a Standing Committee member of the All Circles A.P.S.C.. assisted in planning confrontation.
6. 5.68
5. 5.69
33
ONG Cho Fan (2806/ 4371/5358)
2.12.67
Headmaster of the Chung ña Middle School, member of the All Circles and the Educational Circles A.P.S.C. and Chairman of the Chung Wa School A.P.S.c.
6. 5.68
5.5.69
34
LOK Tin Sung (7482/ 1131/6623)
15. 4.68
Leader of a 'Fighting Group' in the Sai Kung area, engaged in the manufacture, storage and planting of bombs.
6. 5.68
5. 5.69
35
LLING Shu (2733/2873)
16. 7.67
Secretary of the Taikoo Dockyard Chinese workers' Union, founder member of Union A.P.5.C., directed strike action etc. among members.
8. 5.68
7. 5.69
36
CHEUNG Ah Chun (1728/ 0068/3160)
19. 8.67
english Secretary of the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce and Secretary of the All Circles A.P.S.C.
13: 5.68
12. 5.69
37
LAM Shu Man (5663/ 2985/3046)
16. 7.67
Office-bearer of the Taikoo Dock- 15. 5.68 yard Chinese Workers' Union, founder member of Union A.P.S.C., directed strike action etc. among workers.
14.5.69
SECRET
M.
SERIAL
NAME
DANE OF ARREST
43
CHAN Chíu Hong (7715/ 3564/1660)
4. 8.67
44
LAU Ping (0491/1627)
29. 8.67
SECRET
ACTIVITIES
Chairman of the H.K. Miec- tric Company Chinese workers' Union, formed the Union A.P.S.C. and incited workers to disrupt electricity supply.
Office-Bearer of the lotor Transport Workers' Union (China Hotor Bus Branch), member of Union A.F.S.C., incited workers to strike and commit acts of violence.
DAT E/D ORDER
ISSUED
23. 5.68
DATE E/D ORÐ.R
EXPIRES
22. 5.69
23. 5.68
22. 5.69
45
LIU Yat Yuen (1675/ 0001/0626)
15.11.67
46
CHONG Yau la (5445/ 0645/5478)
27.11.67
Chairman of Board of Directors of Phoenix and Sam Luen Fila companies, Standing Committee member of All Circles A.2.3.C., assisted in planning confrontation.
Teacher in the Chung a Middle School, respons.ble for indoc- trination of students and manu- facture of explosives in school prezises.
23. 5.68
22. 5.69
23. 5.68
22. 5.69
47
YAM Yee Chi (F) (0117/1942/0037)
15.11.67
Director of Phoenix Film Company, 29. 5.68 Standing Committee member of the
All Circles A.P.S.C., assisted in planning confrontation.
28. 5.69
E
SECRET
19.
•
SERIAL
NAME
DATE OF ARREST
48
IP Hon Lam (5509/3352/ 2651)
11.12.67
49
IP Nam (F) (5509/2809)
2.10.67
50
YOUNG Wai (2799/0251)
25.11.67
51
TSOI Wai Hang (5591/ 3555/0077)
18. 7.67
SECRET
ACTIVITIES
Member of a Chinese Reform Association 'Fighting Group' in the Yuen Long area invol- ved in the storage and planting of bozba.
Paid official of the Manyang Brothers Tobacco Company Chinese Employees' Union, member of a covert labour network responsible for spreading propaganda resul- ting in violence, attended meetings of senior Federation of Trade Waion officials.
Member of Plumbers' Union, supplied bombs to a 'Fighting Group' operating in the North Point area.
Secretary of the Chinese Reform Association, member of the All Circles A.P.S.C. and Secretary of the Chinese Reform Association A.P.S.C., incited members to engage in civil disorder.
DATE E/D ORDŁA
ISSUED
29. 5.68
DATE E/D ORDER
EXPIRES
28. 5.69
11. 6.68
10. 6.69
11.6.68
10. 6.69
15. 6.68
14.6.69
52
TSOI Hing Cheung (5591/ 5281/4382)
24.11.67
Employee of communist wine-shop, leader of a 'Fighting Group' involved in the manufacture and planting of bombs in the urban
15. 6.68
14. 6.69
area.
SECRET
Top copy on Fezz7
(85
Cypher/Cat A
CONFIDENTIAL
com
m
PRIORITY PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno 837
9 September 1968
411
TOP COP-
RECEIVED IN
? FJARCHIVES No.31
12 SEP 1968
the FDILL
Fail14
性
273
CONFIDENTIAL
Addressed to Foreign office telegram No. 837 of
9 September
Repeated for information to Hong Kong
Hong Kong telegram No. 1005.
Since last release of detainees (on 20 August) we have received exit visas for 10 persons, comprising 4 members of staff (including 1 senior member - Appleyard) and 6 wives and children. There would seem to be a case for a further early release of detainees [group undec] policy in telegram under reference of matching trickle of visas with a trickle of releases.
Foreign Office please pass Hong Kong (Priority).
Hr. Cradock
[Repeated as requested]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN RCHIVES No. 31
SEP 1968
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
-6 SEP 1968
pa FDI/I
410
CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY HONG KONG
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1942
CONFIDENTIAL.
TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
31 AUGUST, 1968
ADDRESSED CO TELEGRAM NUMBER 1842 OF 31 AUGUST REPEATED PEXING.
PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 767 TO FOREIGN OFFICE.
IT IS TRUE THAT THESE EARLY RELEASES OF CERTAIN SELECTED YOUNG CONFRONTATION PRISONERS WERE UNUSUAL, BUT NO USEFUL CONCLUSIONS CAN BE DRAWN FROM THEM VIS-A-VIS ADULT PRISONERS BECAUSE:- (1) THE BOARD OF REVIEW WHICH RECOMMENDED SLIGHTLY EARLIER RELEASE IN THESE CASES DID SO ONLY WHERE THE PRISONER HAD NO PREVIOUS CONVICTION, HAD BEHAVED WELL IN PRISON, WAS RETURNING TO A FAVOUR- ABLE ENVIRONMENT AND HAD REASONABLY GOOD PROSPECTS OF REHABILI- TATION AMONG THOSE RELEASED FROM STANLEY PRISON, THE ARGUMENTS FOR EARLIER RELEASE ARE REINFORCED BY THE DIFFICULTIES OF ACHIEVING COMPLETE SEGREGATION OF THESE YOUNG PRISONERS FROM ADULT CONFRON- TATION PRISONERS, AND INDEED OF SEPARATING HARD-CORE YOUNG PRISONERS FROM THOSE LESS COMMITTED SEMICOLON
(2) NO PUBLICITY SURROUNDED THE EARLIER RELEASE OF THESE YOUNG PRISONERS SO THE QUESTION OF PUBLIC REACTION DID NOT ARISE SEMI-
COLON
(3) THESE YOUNG PRISONERS DID NOT HOLD ANY POSITIONS OF IMPORTANCE IN COMMUNIST CIRCLES AND HENCE ARE IN A SEPARATE CATEGORY SEMICOLON (4) THE RELEASE OF THESE YOUNG PRISONERS WAS IN FACT ADVANCED BY ONLY THREE TO SIX WEEKS, EXCEPT IN ONE CASE WHERE TWO MONTHS REMISSION WAS GRANTED.
CONFIDENTIAL
/ 2.
L4
مر
CONFIDENTIAL
2 -
2. THIS IS A CONTINUING PROCESS AND IT IS LIKELY THAT BOARD WILL RECOMMEND FURTHER RELEASES IN THIS CATEGORY OVER THE COMING MONTHS. POLITICAL CONCESSIONS ARE NOT INVOLVED BUT RATHER THE INTERESTS OF INDIVIDUAL YOUNG PRISONERS WHO HAVE SHOWN THEMSELVES
NOT TO BE HARD-CORE COMMUNISTS AND TO HAVE REASONABLE PROSPECTS OF REHABILITATION, AS WE COME TO REVIEW THOSE WITH LONGER SENTENCES LARGER AMOUNTS OF REMISSION MAY BE JUSTIFIED ON THESE GROUNDS.
F.O. PLEASE PASS PRIORITY PEKING.
SIR D. TRENCH
DEPARTIENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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409
ONSHER/CAT A
FROM PRIORITY HONG KONG
TELEGRAM NUMBER/064
TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
9 SEPTEMBER 1968
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 31 9 SEP 1968
FDY
CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED COMMONWEALTH OFFICE AS
Y TEL NO. 1064 OF 9TH SEPTEMBER
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PEKING.
Gol
MY TELEGRAM NO. 1605 : DETAINEES AND EXIT VISAS.
IN VIEW OF THE ISSUE OF FURTHER VISAS TO MISSION STAFF I HAVE
RELEASED TWO ORE DETAINEES TODAY.
2. THEY ARE NO. 2. TAK PAN, CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE CHEUNG CHAU ANTI-
PERSECUTION STRUGGLE COMMITTEE, AND NO. 13, LAU MAN SHING, A MEMBER
OF THE GOVERNMENT WATERWORKS CHINESE EMPLOYEES UNION.
3. A FURTHER DETAINEE, NO. 1, CHEUNG WAN, WILL ALSO BE RELEASED IN
THE NORMAL COURSE WHEN HIS DETENTION ORDER EXPIRES ON 27TH
SEPTEMBER
PEKING.
CO PLEASE PASS PRIORITY TO FEKING.
SIR D. TRINCH
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CONFIDENT IAL
86.8.
CONFIDENT LAL
H
• RECEIVED IN ¡ARCHIVES No.31!
For
408
Sir D. Milen
10 AUG 1968
Fre/
CONVICTED COMMUNIST PRISONERS IN HONG KONG
We know that the Chinese Government regard the communists
now held in custody in Hong Kong as a result of last year's
troubles there, as a key issue in their relations with us,
They probably make no distinction between the detainees and
the convicted prisoners, since they regard both as being held
"illegally". Te have recently been considering with the
Governor of Hong Kong the question of release of detainees.
The premature release of convicted prisoners (who number some
650) presents much more serious difficulties for us; but it is
very relevant to securing the release of Mr. Grey and possibly
also in the context of any possible general accommodation with
the Chinese over Hong Kong. It may therefore be useful to
set out the relevant salient facts about the convicted prisoners.
Conditions of Imprisonment
2.
Some 300 (including the journalists) are in single cells.
Some 200 are three to a cell, The remaining, mostly young
offenders, are in dormitory accommodation.
No prisoners are
in solitary confinement. Those who work are in constant touch
with fellow inmates. Those who refuse have one hour's
exercise per day. Up to late June the majority refused to
work and were therefore kept locked in their cells except
during exercising periods.
They apparently then received new
/instructions,
CONFIDENT IAL
CONFIDENTIAL
2
-
instructions, and all prisoners are now working in the normal
Even in their period of recalcitrance all prisoners
way.
were allowed regular privileges such as monthly visits.
There is no regular day for such visits, and visitors can go
on any day once a month without notifying the prison authorities.
Visits last 15 minutes. Prisoners have access to the prison
library.
Unlimited quantities of books (three at any one
time) and magazines may be sent to the prisoners.
Dates of Release
3. The approximate release dates of the prisoners (excluding remission which may be up to 1/3 of the sentence) are as
follows:-
1968
422
1969
147
1970
30
1971
27
1972
5
1973
20
1974
4
4. The dates of release of the two N.C.N.A. prisoners (who
are particularly relevant to the
follows:-
case of Mr. Grey) are as
Heueh P'ing (Sit Ping) 17 November, 1968 (or
18 July, 1969 without remission)
Lo Yu-ho (Lo Yuk-wo)
12 September, 1969 (or
12 September, 1970 without
remission).
CONFIDENTIAL
/5. Among
CONFIDENTIAL
-3.
5. Among the other prisoners there are still, as far as we
know, 13 of the "newspaper workers" to whom the Chinese
insisted on making special visits before they allowed acceas
to kr. Grey. Their release dates are:-
Hui Wan-ching
Wong Chak
Wong Ling (female)
Wong Yat-Lou
Chan Tae-Fung
Shum Kai-Lam
Lee Siu-Hung
Ng Taoi-Shing
Tu Tai-Cha
Poon Wai-Wəi
With remission
Without remission
9 October, 1968 - 9 June 1969
2 February, 1971 - 3 October 1972
12 September, 1969-12 September 1970
12 September, 1969-12 September 1970
12 September, 1969-12 September 1970
4 January, 1969 4 September 1970
6 September, 1969- 6 September 1970
12 September, 1969-12 September 1970
3 September, 1969- 3 September 1970
6 September, 1969- 6 September 1970
Chan Yin-Kuen (female) 6 September, 1969- 7 September 1970
Chak Luen-Fai
Cheng Fook-Hing
6 September, 1969- 6 September 1970
28 December, 1968 29 July 1969.
Thus the last of these would be due out of prison, with full
remission, in February 1971.
Copy to: Miss Deas
M- Folly may wn today Ras
Who
Cort
Janne
Zmazya
(James Murray)
23 August, 1968.
Thank
tosa
CONFIDENTIAL
Stam
you.
26
Да
2842718
Deb/20/8 Meme M
NTF
De
STORM
This all seems roomable.
for a copy to
女
Sa
CA
To Carter (c...) (opy sent. 1.4 24/8.
fnd
Dawny.
+
Enter a B.v. di Mr. Boys of
RA office of the British Chargé d'Affaires,
PEKING.
13 August, 1968.
-
ि
407)
RECEIVE ARCH VI.
read with interest the accounts of Ho Yin's conversation with Paul Ts'ul and T. K. Li which you sent with your letter TSX 15/64 of 26 July.
2.
20 AUG 1968
FD:||
It seems likely that Ho was put up to talk to Ts'ui and Li with the aim of passing a particular message to us. The fact that he rade the running is interesting, particularly as he apparently rejected an earlier approach from our side last year.
I doubt if he was simply speaking off his ow bat. Katurally, what he had to say included the usual communist propaganda and distortion. I agree with much of Special Branch's commentary on his remarks, particularly on the questions of the economic value of Hong Kong, the real cost of confrontation and the power-holders in the ommunist hierarchy. But I think we can still extract some valuable points from the conversation.
3. Ro's message was broadly as we would have expected. The comunists are interested in withdrawing gracefully from the present impasse and have no intention of resuming violence unless they are forced into it. To enable them to withdraw successfully they require some form of face-saving compromise with the Hong Kong Governaont. They are well aware that there is no hope of extracting major concessions from us on the lines of Macao. Ho appears to have tacitly admitted this. To this extent they are prepared to settle for a *paper victory" and Ho's insistence on the need to save face was probably intended to convey this point. At the same time they have difficulty in keeping their militants in check. The nub of the issue remains detainees and convicted prisoners. I think we can afford to pay less attention to the rest of Ho shopping list. I doubt if the communists really expect major progress immediately on reinstatement, though it is certainly in our interests to defuse this issue as far as we reasonably can. Still leas can they expect progress over rice.
But as Ho implied, they do hope for some progress on detainees at least.
At
On this issue, the communists appear to be taking a fairly realistic line, though as usual their arguement is dressed up in aggressive phraseology. They are well aware that we can make a gesture on detainees without giving much AWAY. Ho's message appears to have been that if we were prepared to start a steady flow of releases the communists would play their part by not waking unacceptable propaganda on the issue. So far this has proved to be the case, the same time it seems clear from Ho'a remarks that the communists regard moves on the detainee question as a sigäificant effort by us to keep the temperature down. On the more long-term problem of convicted prisoners Ho appears to have gone as far as he could towards guaranteeing that the communists would not ask for too much there either. This last point may have important implications for the case of Tony Grey.
A. F. Maddocks, Esq.,
Hong Kong.
STOUM
15.
SECRET
5. While it would be wrong to overestimate the value of these contacts, I think we might take advantage of what igpears to be an initiative from the other side. As far as I know, though you will be able to confirm this, Ho is a reasonably reliable go-between; it is very much in his interests to be one, I am sure that F. K. Li'in correct in his comment that Ho's remarks about his frequent trips to Hong Kong were intended as a hint that he will be available for a continuing dialogue. We could probably derive positive advantage from this opening by using it as an opportunity to state our own terms, particularly since the situation in Hong b/ Kong is now relatively cala and we would/seem to be speaking from strength. We could point out with some force that the Hong Kog Government would find it easier to take a more flexible attitude on certain questions (the implication would be detainees) if the communists helped to create the right atmosphere by avoiding further incidents, toning down their influrnatory anti-Government propaganda, and by refraining from making constant "demands" on the authorities. Although we shall have to see how the Chung Wah issue develops, the communists have already contributed something to keeping the temperature down by their restraint on publicity about those detainees who have already been released and by their general avoidance of open clashes with the Hong Kong Government. might be prepared to make greater efforts if we were to hold out the possibility of reciprocal steps on our side. It is in our interests to convey the thought via Ho Yin, or any other suitable intermediary, that, given maintenance of reasonable order in the colony, we would be prepared to consider further de-escalation, particularly on detainees and perhaps on convicted prisoners.
They
I am copying this letter to Janas Murrony in Far Easteım Department.
(P. CRADOCK)
Cypher/Cat A
JORITY
Telno 767
I copy for entry in .f....Dept.
Sev
CONFIDENTIALent1·
Hang..lang..Dept.
RECTIVO
ARCHIVES No.5
PEKING
TO
FOREIGN OFFICE
21 August 1968
22 AUG 1968
+
FD
CONFIDENTIAL
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 767 of 21 August, Repeated for information to Hong Kong.
I understand from Hong Kong that as a result of recommendation made by Board of Review for long term prison sentences, 13 young confrontation prisoners were released in April this year some weeks before their due dates of release. Another 10 were released in June or July, 6 weeks before their normal release dates in 9 cases and 2 months in remaining cases,
2.
Although these cases were in a limited and special category, I am very glad to learn that they were possible. It also seems, although Hong Kong will be able to correct me, that there has been no adverse public reaction to these premature releases of convicted prisoners. his has considerable
relevance to our general discussions and effect of earlier releases.
3.
I hope I can be kept informed of any further moves.
Foreign Office pass Priority Hong Kong.
Kr. Cradock
[Repeated as requested]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
C.O.
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DIS MOD
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4067
AR
Mr. Murray
Prisoners in Hong Kong
21.
568
FOIll
小
There are over 600 prisoners. Some 300 (including the journalists) are in single cells, Seme 200 ure three to a coil. The remaining, mostly young offenders, are in dormitory accommodation. No prismara are in solitary confinement, These who work are in constant contact with fello: innates. -Those who refuse have one hours exercise per day, Up till h te June the majority refused to work and were therefore kept looked in their cells except during exercise periods. At that point they apparently received new instructions and all prisoners are no. working in the nersal way ven during the recalcitrant period all prisoners were allowed regular privileges" such an nonthly visits, There is no regular day for such visits and visitors can go at any date onos a month without notifying the prison authorities. Visite lust 1ɔ minutes. Prisoners lave koossa to the prison library. Unlimited quantities of books (three at any one time) and sagažinea muy be sent to prisoners #2. The dates of release of the two 2.0.‚ prisoners are as follows:-
Hauch F'ing (61t Ping)
17 Bovember, 1968 or 18 July, 1969 without remiusion.
To Yükle (Lo Yuk-wo) 12 September, 1969 or
12 September, 1970 #ithout remission.
2. Approximate release astes of other prisoners
1968 1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
བྷཱུཏྟེRཊྛགསྶཝ
pwardly mol
This means that after 1969 only a negotiable propertion of the confrontation prisoners will be bold.
3. Included in the above list are 11 sale journalist prisoners. There are size 2 fenala prizonezklin this dutagory held in a womens gaol. Details of the Pelease of these 13 prisoners are as follows (the first date is the date of release with remission the second in the date of relosse with- out remission):-
/Hai wan-ching
Hui Lan-ching
Wong Chak
P seng Ling
Wong Yat-Lou
Chan Tae-Fung Shum Kai-Lan
Lea "iu-"ung Kg Taoi-Shing
Fu Tai-Chow
Poon ifaź-ini
F Chan Yin-Knen
Chak Luan-Fai
Cheng Fook-Wing
9 October 1968 - 9 7me 1969
2 February 1971 - 3 October 1972
12 September, 1969 12 September, 1970 12 September, 1970 12 September
12 September, 1969 12 September, 1969
-
4 January 1969 - 4 September 1970 6 September 1969 6 September 1970 12 September 1969 - 12 September 1970 3 September 1969 - 3 September 1970 6 Suptember 1969 - 6 September 1970 6 September 1969 - 7 Eeptember 1970 6 September 1969 - 6 September 1970 28 December 1968 29 July 1969
(J. D. I. Boyd) Far Eastern Department
16 August, 1968
Mr. Denson
Mr. Carter (C.0.)
CONFIDENTIAL
21 AUG 1968
9CR 6/2621/67
Ente.
404
Byth Mr. Royd 79.4.
Kory for Tam
золу сору
"15th August,
M
1964.
12%
I am sorry as to having been so slow in answering your lefter PEX/4 of 22nd July about confrontation prisoners. The research has taken longer than I expected.
2.
There were certainly not "over 1,000 agitators" still in jail on 16th July. The total mæber of male confrontation prisoners including young prisoners remaining on 1st August was 495 (including the 3 under life sentence). 259 of these are dus for release by the end of this year, the breakdown being as follows -
August
69
September
79
October
49
November
33
December
30
3.
In addition there were 58 female prisoners left on 1st August, the rate of release in 1968 beingt-
August
September
October
14
7
3
November
December
3
8
(I give these figures separately to avoid confusion: the figures quoted by Anthony Elliott in his letter of 16th April were for male prisoners only. You will note that both these figures and those in paragraph 2 differ slightly from those quoted in Hong Kong Saving Despatch No. 973. This is because changes in remission etc., affect release dates the figures in fact need constant revision).
4.
You also asked about Cheung Sha lian playground arrests. From 11th to 14th June, 32 arresta were made as a result of incidents at the playground. 6 of those arrested were released without being charged; 8 were charged and subsequently released; and 18 were convicted. The sentences imposed on those convicted varied from a maximum of 18 months to being bound-over. 7 of the 18 are now in jail.
G.G.K. halden, Esq., Peking.
CONFIDENTIAL
5./...
NTE
I
I
C
F
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
5.
Altogether since 15th April there have been 98 arrests
(excluding those in connection with the Cheung Sha Wan incidents)
which might be placed in the "confrontation" category. These included arrests for wilful evasion of tram fares, and for various hawker offences, as well as illegal assembly, etc. of the total of 98 prisoners arrested, 37 were released without being charged. The remainder have been charged and sumonsed but I have not yet been able to get details of the sentences (some cases have not yet come to court).
6.
You asked whether it would be possible for the prison authorities to supply a monthly analysis of confrontation prisoners. I have spoken to Garner about this but he says the task would impose to much of a burden on his small staff. He would be prepared to supply up-to-date figures every three months; would this meet your need?
7.
There is me other development about which you should know. In January this year the Governor directed that the records of young confrontation prisoners should be reviewed to see whether any could be released early. As a result of recommendations made by the Board of Review, Long Term Prison Sentences, 13 young prisoners were released in April this year some weeks before their due dates. Another 10 were released in June and July, 6 weeks before their normal release dates in 9 cases and 2 months in the remaining case, I am sorry that we omitted to inform you about this before but the fact that these early releases have been taking place has only just come to my notice. It is only fair to add that there is unlikely to be a useful precedent here. I understand that adult prisoners are very rarely released before their due time, and then only when they are ill.
c.c. J.D.I. Boyd, Esq.,
Far Eastern Department,
Foreign Office, London, S,W,1,
(R.J.T. McLaren) Assistant Political Adviser.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
HLUD 1/31
Fars
With the compliments of
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
Kong Weht
khong khong
dang
а
8 August ralt
LONDON, S.W.1.
CONFIDENTIAL
༣།
6 AUG 1968
2600027 4.8. 204
CONFIDENTIAL
SAVING DESPATCH SAVINGRAM
RECEIVED IN ARCAS No 31
From the Governor, Hong Kong
Commonwealth Affairs
To the Secretory of State for the Golnaies
21 AUG 1968
973
403
No.
Repeated fo:- Peking
No.
8
FD
Cepeated to:
Do
14 July, 1962.
My Reference.......
CR 14/581/67
Your Reference........
DUPLICATE
No.
Communist Prisoners
A Committee was set up earlier this year, under the Chairmanship of the Deputy Colonial Secretary, to determine the appropriate follow-up treatment on discharge for individual consumist prisoners on discharge convicted of offences arising From the recent disturbances. It was contemplated that they might be givon a degree of family assistance or help in obtaining work and re-integrating themselves into society.
2.
A small working group comprising staff of the Prisons, Social Welfare and Labour Departments was set up at the same time to interview individual prisoners, to assess their personal convictions and political outlook and to put forward to the Committee proposals for the appropriate form of follow-up action in the case of those prisoners who were agrooable to receiving assistance in this way.
3.
The number of these prisoners due for release from prison during July
December 1963 are:-
-
July
August
September
October
November
December
4.
Adult prisoners
Young prisoners
Total
Hale Fezale
Vale
Female
27
2
7
0
53
69
HO
14
16
1
10
41
9 2 7
2
7
1
21
ง
8
3
N
13
6
X 38 8 **
86
50
32
62
The Committee has so far reviewed those cases due for release in July and August in the light of interview reports prepared by the working group. It is quite clear, from experience so far gained, that these prisoners, apart from one or two isolated excoptions, are not propared to accept any offer of assistance on release. Their attitude varies from polite disinterest to truculence and definite hostility, but in almost every case they reject any offer of holp. They are in general reluctant to give any information concerning their own past background or their future intentions,
CONFIDENTIAL
E
kf
CONFIDENTIAL
2
It also appears from their attitude that they are confident that they will be able to obtain support and assistance from the communist organisations or unions to which they belong.. Some of them will, of course, return to their previous jobs in left- wing organisations, whilst the younger prisonors may be expected to return to their studies in left-wing schools. coumunists who have lost their jobs but who are clearly under instructions from their leaders not to accept assistance from the Government.
5.
Others are
In brief, many of these prisoners are hard-oore, dodicated communists and no amount of persuasion is likely to wean them from their convictions. Othors, no doubt, are less convinced; but their livelihood and family connections are so closely tied to the communist movement in Hong Kong that they, too, are unlikely to break away from it.
6.
Despite the negative results produced it is felt that the information obtained has been of value and it is proposed that the Committae and the Working Group will keep the cases of the remaining prisoners under review and continue to make offers of assistance.
I
"YPHER/CAT A
CONFIDENTIAL
AMATE HONG KONG TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
PELKO 1010
20 AUGUST, 1968
RECTIVED IN ARCHIVES No.311
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED CO TELNO 1010 OF 20TH AUGUST RFI PEKING.
MY TELEGRAM 1005: DETAINEES.
401
20 AUG 968
FD1/I
Pa
THIS AFTERNOON WE SHALL RELEASE NO. 7 TAM KUEN, MANAGER OF A BRANCH OF THE SHUN CHEONG CO., NO. 41 CHAN ON, PAID SECRETARY OF THE WORKERS' CHILDREN'S EDUCATION PROMOTION ASSOCIATION AND
,
NO. 49 IP NAM (F), PAID OFFICIAL OF THE NANYANG BROTHERS TOBACCO CO. CHINESE EMPLOYEES UNION.
FO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE PEKING.
SIR D. TRENCH
(REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
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RITY HONG KONG TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
Telno. 1005
CONFIDENTIAL
17 August 1968
A
1 9 AUG 1968
FD 1/1
Addressed to C.O. telegram No. 1005 of 17 August Repeated for information to:
Peking.
Your telegrams Nos. 1362 and 1386
348
Detainees and Exit Visas.
2
Provided there are no unusual developments in the meantime I propose to release another three detainees next Tuesday, 20 August.
2. I appreciate the point made in paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 1386. I should in any case see some local advantage in releasing detainees in small groups rather than in a single group of 10 or so. I propose therefore that we should follow the policy of matching the trickle of exit visas with a trickle of releases of detainees subject to examination of the circumstances at each time and without aiming at arithmetical equality. I think the increasing flow of releases will still be noted by the Chinese even if they are in small groups and that we shall not lose anything in comparison with the alternative of releasing in a large group of 10 or so.
3. Hopson has seen this telegram and agrees.
F.O. please pass Priority Peking.
Sir D. Trench
pe
19/8
[Repeated as requested]
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foo
14 AUGUST, 1968
FD1/1
CONFIDENTIAL
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 748 of
14 August. Repeated for information to Hong Kong.
(21
F4240 Hong Kong telegram No. 988.
390
Although original proposal in Peking telegram No. 698 was for release of a number of detainees (10-20) if all outstanding, exit visas were issued, I hope we can consider grant of Sir D. Hopson's visa a sufficiently important step in that direction to warrant a response in itself, in the form of release of some detainees even while remaining applications are outstanding. (This would be over and above the two scheduled for release on 15 August). Such a move on our part (quite apart from its value in broader political context) should encourage grant of remaining viges, at which point a small group of detainees could be released. This would not affect size of the package, merely its presentation.
2. I hope we can take fairly flexible attitude on this. telegram No. 1362 to Hong Kong envisaged the possibility of releases in instalments. The Chinese have taken a big step in the right direction. Let us encourage them to continue, particularly when Chung Jah issue may incline them to be difficult.
Foreign Office pass Priority Hong Kong.
Mr. Cradock
Repeated as requested
Your
FILES
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Personnel Department.
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CONFIDENTIAL
TU COMMONWEALTH WEINE
Ich conÂN NUNDER 977
9 AUGUST 1960-
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.3 1
1 2 AUG 1968
CONFIDENTIAL
ADUKESSED CU TILEGkm nu. 9/7 OF 9TH AUGUST xepeated Peking.
399
COPT
YOUR TELEGRAM "U. 1302 : PULIVY Juwanus Chbaa.
I WOULD HOPE TU DE AULE TU Agkee geneRALLY WITH These PROPUSALS,
BUT IT WILL TAKE c A LITTLE TIME TU EXAMINE THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS IN SUFFICIENTLY CLOSE DETAIL TO ENABLE ME TO REPLY MORE SPECIFICALLY. I WILL TelegraPH FURTHER IN ABOUT 10 DAYS AT LATEST.
2. MEANWhile we STILL PROPUSE TU Release TJU MOKE IN THE EVENING OF
THE 15TH AUGUST (VIJE HY Telegram NO. 968 PARAGRAPH 2).
FO PLEASɛ PASɔ ROUTINE PER ING.
SIR D. TRENCH
/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/
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(398)
CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM. HUMBER 1362
340)
CONFIDENTIAL.
CONFIDENTIAL
TOP COP
TO HONG KONG
8 AUGUST 1968.
AL
PAD IN
Ne 31
(*) AUG 1968 :
pumppu i Edili
ADDRESSED TO GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELEGRAM NUMBER 1362 OF 8 AUGUST
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PEKING,
PEKING TELEGRAM NO. 6981 BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS CHINA,
AS WE VIEW THE SITUATION FROM HERE, AND SUBJECT OF COURSE TO YOUR VIEWS AS REGARDS THE KONG KONG END, WE SEE FORCE IN SIR D. HOPSON'S
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THE RELEASE OF A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF
DETAINEES AS ** AN ACT OF DEESCALATION "', PROVIDED THE CHINESE
IMPLEMENT IN FULL THEIR UNDERTAKING TO GRANT ALL OUTSTANDING VISAS
FOR THE MISSION. YOU HAVE ALREADY INDICATED BROAD AGREEMENT WITH
THE STUDY ON DETAINEES (YOUR TELEGRAM 802) WHICH RECOMMENDED THAT CONSIDERATION DE GIVEN TO THE UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE WITHIN THE
COLONY OF A SMALL GROUP OF THE LESS IMPORTANT COMMUNISTS AND -
DEPENDING ON COMMUNIST AND PUBLIC REACTION TO A PHASED RELEASE PROGRAMME BASED ON THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF RELEASING, FIRST, THOSE WHO ARE LESS IMPORTANT AND HAVE BEEN DETAINED THE LONGEST. COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO THE FIRST FOUR RELEASES SEEM TO HAVE BEEN MINIMAL AND SATISFACTORY FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. WE SEE ADVANTAGE THEREFORE IN MAKING FURTHER RELEASES AS HOPSON PROPOSES. THE CHINESE LEADERS NO DOUBT REGARD THIS LATEST SHIFT ON VISAS IN PEKING AS A CONTRIBUTION ON THEIR PART TO REESTABLISHING A MODUS VIVENDI WITH US, AND EXPECT RECOGNITION OF THIS ON OUR PART. IF THEY DO FULFIL THEIR UNDERTAKING ON VISAS, IT MAY WELL SIGNAL THE BEGINNING OF AN IMPROVE- MENT IN SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS WHICH WE WOULD NATURALLY WISH TO ENCOURAGE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE AND WHICH WE COULD REASONABLY EXPECT TO BE REFLECTED IN THE CHINESE ATTITUDE TOWARDS HONG KONG. SPEEDING-UP OF RELEASES COULD THEREFORE REASONABLY BE PRESENTED NOT AS A CONCESSION TO CHINESE PRESSURE, BUT AS AN ACTIVE CONTRI- BUTION ON OUR PART TO A RETURN TO SOME DEGREE OF NORMALITY IN OUR RELATIONS. WE AGREE THAT THE RELEASES WOULD NOT NECESSARILY YIELD DIRECT RESULTS, BUT THEY WOULD IN OUR JUDGEMENT IMPROVE THE ATHOSPHERE OF SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS, AND SUCH AN YIELD SOME DIVIDEND IN HONG KONG.
IMPROVEMENT SHOULD
/2.
WE HAVE
CONFIDENTI AL
$6
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
2. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE POINT THAT BY THE RELEASE OF DETAINEES IN THE WAY PROPOSED, WE WOULD BE UNDERLINING UNDULY THE LINK BETWEEN BRITISH SUBJECTS IN CHINA AND OUR POLICIES IN HONG KONG, AND THẦY THIS MIGHT ENCOURAGE THE CHINESE TO TRY TO BARGAIN FURTHER AND LARGER RELEASES OF DETAINEES AGAINST THE RELEASE OF BRITISH SUBJECTS IN DETENTION IN CHINA. HOWEVER, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HONG KONG IS NOW SO CLEAR THAT THERE SEEMS LITTLE ADVANTAGE IN TRYING TO PLAY IT DOWN. MOREOVER, WE ARE SURE THAT THE CHINESE WOULD NOT CONSIDER THE RELEASE OF DETAINEES AS AN APPROPRIATE QUID PRO QUO FOR THE RELEASE OF MR. GREY, AND WE DOUBT VERY MUCH WHETHER IT WOULD DIRECT- LY INFLUENCE THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS OTHER BRITISH SUBJECTS EITHER. WE RECOGNISE THAT THERE IS NO MOMENT WHICH FROM THE HONG KONS POINT OF VIEW COULD BE REGARDEN AS IDEAL FOR MAKING CONCESSIONS, BUT SINCE NEITHER WE NOR YOU WOULD JUDGE RELEASES OF THIS SORY TO BE A MAJOR CONCESSION, WE WOULD HOPE THAT THEY COULD BE MADE AT A TIME WHEN THE SITUATION VIS-A-VIS THE LOCAL COMMUNISTS IS NOT UNFAVOURAM E'' (YOUR TELEGRAM 938).
YOUR TELEGRAM 938). IF YOUR WERE TO SEE STRONG OBJECTION TO THE SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE OF THE NUMBER OF DETAINEES HOP SON PROPOSES, WE THINK THAT THE RELEASE OF SEVERAL SMALL GROUPS OVER A PERIOD OF WEEKS WOULD ALSO BE BENEFICIAL. BUT IN THE LIGHT UP THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, AS SEEN HERE WE BELIEVE THERE COULD HS SUBSTANTIAL ADVANTAGE IN A LARGER GESTURE INVOLVING A MINIMUM OF TEN PERSONS.
4. WE SHOULD BE HOST GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD CONSIDER THESE SUGGESTIONS AND LET US HAVE YOUR VIEWS.
5. IF THE CHINESE HONOUR THEIR UNDERTAKING ON VISAS AND WE MATCH IT BY A GESTURE ON RELEASE OF DETAINEES, THIS MIGHT CREATE THE SORT u ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH WE COULD WORK TOWARDS A SOLUTION TO THE INTRACTABLE PROBLEM OF GREY. WE SHALL BE TELEGRAPHING SEPARATELY ABOUT THIS.
CROSEC
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398
Registry No. 11
Top Secret ябл
PRIORITY
EMERGENCY IMRENA
Confidential
PRIORITY
ROUTINE
with
Relected Open-
without
DEFERRED
-priority
• Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addresse={1}
CYPHER
Draft.
Telegram to:--
GOVERNCH/HONG
X Ng136.
(Date)
And to :-
KONG
8/3
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
[Sec
Security classification -if any
CONFIDENTIAL
[Codeword-if any]
Address 10.........
POMBEROR HONG KONG...
telegram No.-
(date)
repeated for information to-
کیو
Repeat to
PEZING
Ex Slair.
Code
Cypher
Distribution :- 7.2.D. Newa
Consular
FLAG
Defence PLAG C JIPGD
Coples to :-
coi Hong Kong
Nowa Defence D.1.3.
Peking telegram No. 698: British policy towards
China.
!
As we view the situation from here, and
aubjact of course to your views as regards the
Hong Kong end, we see force in Sir D. Hopson! as
arguments in favour of the release of a signi-
cent number of detainees as "an act of de-
escalation", provided the Chinese implement in
full their undertaking to grant all outstanding
visas for the Mission. You have already indi-
oated broad agreement with the study on detai-
nees (your telegram 802) which recommended that
consideration be given to the unconditional
release within the Colony of a small group of
the less important Communiste and depending
on Communist and public reaction to a phased
../release
-
-
CONFIDENT IAL
(9335) WL 47403;47: 200m 1/64 Hw.
release programme based on the general principle
of releasing, first, those who are lese important
and have been detained the longest.
+
Communist
reactions to the first four releases seem to
have been minimal and satisfactory from our point
of view. Te see advantage therefore in making
further releases as Hopson proposes. The Chinese
leaders no doubt regard this latest shift on
viess in Paking as a contribution on their part
to reestablishing a modus vivendi with ue, and
expect recognition of this on our part.
If they
do fulfil their undertaking on visas, it may well
signal the beginning of an improvement in Sino-
British relations which we would naturally wish
to encourage se much as possible and which we
could reasonably expect to be reflected in the
Chinese attitude towards Hong Kong. Speeding-up
of releases could therefore reasonably be pre-
septed not as a concession to Chinese pressure, but
as an active contribution on our part to a retura
to some degree of normality in our relations.
+
agree that the relases would not necessarily
yield direct results; but they would in our judet
ment improve the atmosphere of Sino-British relat
tions, and such an improvement should yield some
dividend in Hong Kong.
2.
We have considered the point that by the
release of detainees in the way proposed, we
would be underlining unduly the link between
British subjects in China and our policies in
Hong Kong, and that this might encourage the
Chinese to try to bargain further and larger
../releases
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
FLAG E
releases of detainees against the release of
British subjects in detention in China. However,
the significance of Hong Kong ie now so clear
that there seems little advantage in trying to
play it down. Moreover, we are sure that the
Chinese would not consider the release of detal-
nees as an appropriate quid pro quo for the
release of Er. Grey, and we doubt very much
whether it would directly influence their atti-
tude towards other British subjects either.
3. We recognise that there is no moment which
from the Hong Kong point of view could be regar-
ded as ideal for making concessions, but since
neither we nor you would judge releases of this
sort to be a major concession, we would hope
that they could be made at a time when the situ-
ation vis-à-via the local Communists is "not
unfavourable" (your telegram 928). If you were
to see strong objection to the simultaneoue
release of the number of detainees Hopson pro-
poses, we think that the release of several
small groups over a perios of weeks would also
be beneficial. But in the light of the fore-
going considerations, as seen here we believe
there could be substantial advantage in a larger
geature involving a minimum of ten persons.
4. We should be most grateful if you would
consider these suggestions and let us have
your views.
5. If the Chinese honour their undertaking on
visas and we match it by a gesture on release
of detainees, this might create the sort of
atmosphere in which we could work towards a
../solution
+
solution to the intractable problem of Grey.
We shall be telegraphing separately about this,
:
8
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
[
Fool's
53
A
SECRET
HONG KONG TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
12 JULY, 1968
Par
(397)
P. Denim Rm q...
TELEGRAH MO, 648 : POLICY IN HONG KONG.
NO.
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
-19 AUG 1968
FD1/1
西川
TREET THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE CURRENT PHASE OF CONFRONTATION
1
OP AT A HIGH LEVEL HAVE ALREADY INSTRUCTED INFLUENTIAL
IAL JORKUNST LEADERS TO DROP VICLENCE AND CONCENTRATE ON BROADEN-
-ING THE CASE OF COMITUNIST CUPPORT. THIS ATTEMPT TO WIN OVER
ABREMENTS 15 OF COURSE A POLICY OF MANY YEARS STANDING AND IS
ODVIGUSLY ONE WHICH WILL NEVER EE AGANDONED. TO THIS LIMITED
BE
ד
T
JATENT ME ARE ALREADY DACK TO NORMAL, WITH CONFRONTATION IN HONG
KUVA LARGELY OVER FOR THE TIME BLING: BUT THE PROPAGANDA ATTACK
17 MORE OVERT AND MORE DITTERLY PROSECUTED THAN PRE-1967, AND
(0) ......TOVER VE 00, ACTIVE CONFRONTATION COULD START UP AGAIN AT
ANY TIME IF THE CALANCE OF INFLUENCE WITHIN THE CPQ CHIFTS.
THE POLICY IN (A) HAS GENERALLY SPEAKING BEEN SUCCESSFULLY
[POSED UND, PARTLY AG A RESULT, MORALE IN LABOUR CIRCLES PARTIC-
LY IS LOJ: SUT THERE ŘEZAIVO A HARD CORE OF THE MILITANTLY
15. THIS MILITANT HARD CORE WILL ALWAYS SEEK TO MAKE TROUBLE,
ARE GERTAINLY NOT INTERESTED IN ANY ACCOMODATION WITH US EXCEPT
OLLY ON THEIR OWN TERMS. THE AUTHORITY OF THE MODERATE LEADERS
IN ... CPG AND SLE IS NOT SO COM/LATE THAT THEY CAN ENTIRELY
|
J
C
LISTAŁE THE MILITANTS. THEY CANNOT AVOID SOME EENDING TO
1
A LITA AT VID.C, NOA AVOLO SIVING THEN SOKE OSTENSIBLE SUPPORT. IT
1. 1000 ARQUADLE THAT THE SUNKUNIST LEADERSHIP MERE IS AT PRESENT
+
17 QUITE GLAD TO SEE US OCCASIONALLY TAKE A FIRD LINE WITH
copied
oria.
KESINT POOR STATE OF SINO-DRITISH RELATIONS, WITH ALL THE
FLOW THAMISWON, RESULT COGONTIALLY FROM A
CHÍNÁ SPRÍ
ALME FERLANG OPEN. LAMH OF SUCCESS IN HONG KONG
AMERICAN
t
SECRET
2.
AMERICAN CONNECTIONS SEMICOLON AND THE RITUAL NEED TO BE BOTH
ANTI-COLONIAL AND ANTI-CAPITALIST.
(E) AS FAR AS HONG KONG IS CONCERNED, THE JOKER IN THE PACK IS (5)
THIS IS WHAT WE MUST GUARD OURSELVES ACAINST, AND BE IN A BETTER
POSITION TO MEET IF IT HAPPENS.
·
2. WHERE IN THIS MIXTURE DO FURTHER SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS ON
HONG KONG'S PART, OR A SEARCH HERE FOR MEASURES TO END CONFRONTATION,
COME IN ? SUCH MEASURES COULD NOT HELP TO MODIFY THE GENERAL STATE
* KIND OF THE CHINESE NOR UNDO THE EVENTS OF LAST YEAR.
Y CANNOT EXPECT TO PERSUADE LOCAL COMMUNISTS TO STOP OR
STANTIALLY MUTE THEIR ATTEMPTS TO GAIN ADHERENTS AND STRENGTHEN
THEIR INFLUENCE: CONCESSIONS WOULD ONLY HELP THEM IN THIS.
ITHER THE MILITANTS HERE NOR THE MODERATES WILL EVER BE PERSUADED TO BE ANYTHING BUT BASICALLY HOSTILE TOWARDS US. CONCESSIONARY
NOTES WOULD NOT BE HELPING THE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP TO ENFORCE THEIR PRESENT TACTIC OF AVOIDING MILITANCY, WHICH WOULD ONLY BE
ENCOURAGED SY PROSPECTS OF 'VICTORY'.
L
1. POSSIBLY A HIGHLY CONCESSIONARY ATTITUDE MIGHT STRENGTHEN THE HANDS
THE MODERATES IN THE CPG AND THUS AVOID THE HYPOTHETICAL
QND STUALITY OF A CHANGE IN POLICY LEADING TO HILITANCY AGAIN
THE PARAGRAPH 1(8) SITUATION). BUT IT IS JUST AS
ARGUMILE THAT WE WOULD ONLY DE PROVIDING AMMUNITION FOR THE MILITANTS
JOULD CLAIN THAT PRESSURE HAD BROUGHT RESULTS. IF THIS OCCURRED HODLO HAVE WEAKENED OUR PUJITION FOR NO GAIN, AND IRRETRIEVABLY.
MAIS, THE BENEFITS TO BE OBTAINED ARE VERY CERTAIN, THEREFORE,
I CANNOT SEE MUCH SE.SE IN RICKING IT.
SECRET
1
SECRET
HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO. 884 TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
3.
IN ALL THE ABOVE I AM REFERRING TO MAJOR CONCESSIONS AND THEIR
EFFECT IN HONG KONG. SHALL CONCESSIONS, IF NOT TOO DAMAGING TO
PUBLIC CONFIDENCE AND TO OUR POSITION, GENERALLY, CAN SOMETIMES
HELP TO MUTE THE STRIDENCY OF THE COMMUNISTS BY CUTTING THE GROUND
FRON UNDER THEM, SUCH CONCESSIONS CAN ALWAYS BE CAUTIOUSLY
ATTEMPTED TO TEST REACTIONS AND TO MATCH EITHER CONCESSIONS
+
ON THEIR PART OR TOUGHER ACTION BY US IN SOME OTHER SPHERE, WHEN SUCH ACTION IS NECESSARY. THE SEARCH FOR SUITABLE MINOR CONCESSIONS
HAS CONTINUOUSLY ENGAGED OUR ATTENTIONS: IT IS HOWEVER AN AD HOC JUSINESS, IN WHICH DAY-TO-DAY CHANGES OF SITUATION PLAY A CONSIDERAELÉ
PART. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY CAN BE COMPREHENSIVELY PLANNED IS
LIMITED.
5. BUT MINOR CONCESSIONS, WHILE THEY HAVE THEIR PLACE HERE ARE
UYDENIABLY UNLIKELY TO RESULT IN ANY SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN
SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS GENERALLY. IN ANY CASE, THE SCOPE FOR REAL
YEMENT SEEMS SHALL, WHATAYER WE DO. AS MENTIONED IN
ZARAGRAPH: 100), WE ARE UNALTERAGLY OPPOSED ON SEVERAL BASIC ISSUES:
1.:DEAD THE CHINESE MAY WELL NOT CARE VERY MUCH WHAT THEIR
PENEKAL RELATIONS WITH THE U.K. ARE.
2. JOULD MAJOR CONCESSIONS HERE IN HONG KONG, THEN, HAVE THIS LAST
OFTECT? VERHAPS: IF E VIRTUALLY SURRSIIDERED OUR AUTHORITY
PONICONDITIONALLY. I DO NOT BELIEVE ANYTHING MUCH LESS WOULD DO: NOR
+
20 1 PINK THAT EVEN THIS WOULD BE ANY GUARANTEE OF PROPER BEHAVIOUR
7.7 FUTURE. HAVING SĠULIZED US THROUGH THE MISSION AND BRITISH
BARDOTI SUCCESSFULLY ONOL, THEY WOULD ALWAYS BE TEMPTED TO TRY ANTH FOR ANY NEW PURPOSE THAT SUITED THEM. 1 THEREFORE BELIEVE OUR
ї.
LE LIES IN TRYING TO FIND HEANS OF PERSUADING JIEN THAT, IN
JI, IT IS NUTÍ ADVANTANEOUS TO CONTINUE TO BEHAVE LIKE MID THAT NOT UNTIL THIL LESSON HAS BECH LOVÁNT WILL THẸRE ŚC
JANY
من
SECRET
4.
نا
+
ANY CHANCE OF THEM BEHAVING DECENTLY IN THE LONG TERM. THERE MUST
SE ELEMENTS IN THE CPG WHO FEEL THE SAME WAY. I DO NOT DOUBT ALSO THAT THE FORTITUDE OF THE MISSION STAFF HAS IN ITSELF PARTLY TAUGHT
THIS LESSON: THAT THEY ARE EMBARRASSED BY WHAT THEY DID: AND WOULD LIKE TO UNDO IT IF THEY KNEW HOW WITHOUT TOO MUCH LOSS OF FACE:
**DEKANDS'' IN HONG KONG NOW BEING IN TRUTH PARTLY DESIGNED TO COVER THEIR EMBARRASSMENT. IF WE CAN FIND WAYS TO DRIVE HOME THE LESSON THAT ILL GEHAVIOUR DOES NOT PAY BY MEANS E.G. OF
AN EFFECTIVE DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE OF THE KIND NOW CONTEMPLATED: BY PUBLICITY: OR BY ANY OTHER SINILAR MEANS WE CAN THINK OF
AND
THEN, AND ONLY THEN, DO WE
HAVE SOME CHANCE OF BEING ABLE TO ESTABLISH A RELATIONSHIP OF
PREFERASLY EVEN MORE TELLING ONES
REASONABLE RESPECT: WHICH IS THE ONLY KIND THAT CAN PERHAPS ENDURE.
SIR D. TRENCH
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·
Kr Wilkinson
o.c. Mr. Carter,
Hong Kong Dept.,
C.0.
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Jura878
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.51 |
- 8 AUG 1968
FD
RELEASE OF DETAINEES IN HONG KONG
(396) зав
FLAG A
PROBLEM
In Peking telegram No. 698 Sir D. Hopson proposes that as soon
as the Chinese grant the outstanding exit visas for members of the
Mission which they have promised, we should respond by releasing a
sizeable number of detainees in Hong Kong. We have to decide
whether to pursue this proposal.
RECOMMENDATION
I
2. I recommend that the Governor of Hong Kong be asked whether he
would be willing to act on the lines Sir D. Hopson proposes.
attach a telegram which was drafted in collaboration with the
Commonwealth Office and already has their approval.
BACKGROUND AND ARGUI
3. It has become increasingly clear that of the various "demands* which the Chinese made at the time of "confrontation" last year in
Hong Kong, the one to which they attach the most importance and which would in consequence contribute most significantly to an easing in
Sino-British relations is the release of prisoners.
The Chinese pro-
bably do not differentiate between convicted prisoners and detainees, as they regard both as having been "illegally" detained. point of view, however, the problem of detainees is much easier in
From our
SECRET
../ that
SECRET
that they are being held under emergency administrative regulations
and can be released at any time. They are normally held under war-
rants valid for 12 months which can, if necessary, be renewed. At
present there are 48 detainees, four having recently been released.
FLAG B 5. A study (attached) has been made by the Special Branch in Hong
39 Kong about the possibility of arranging the return of detainees to
China or their release in Hong Kong. Its recommendations (paragraph
21) were that:
(a) No attempt should be made to return detainees to China unless
the Chinese took some initiative in that direction. (Experience in
attempting to deport two film stars and statements made to Sir D.
Hopson by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Peking amply
bear out that the Chinese have no interest, at least at the present
time, in any form of disguised deportation though efforts in this
direction might be pursued at a later stage if relations in general
improve.)
-
(b) Consideration should be given to the unconditional release
within the Colony of a small group of the less important Communists
held under the Emergency detention orders.
(c) If the Communist and public reaction to this initial release
were acceptable to the Government, a phased release programme should
be planned, based on the general principle of releasing first those
who were less important and had been detained the longest.
(d) The political climate and the level of Communist activity, as
well as the individual potential threats posed to security by detai-
nees, should dictate the extent to which the release programme was
effected.
../ (e)
SECRET
SECRET
e) When practicable, consideration should be given to "spoiling
operations" against one or more detainees prior to release.
FLAG C The Governor has indicated in Hong Kong telegram No. 802 that he
agrees broadly with these recommendations, but has made no commitment
as to the timing of releases.
5. The Governor has already begun to act on the recommendations by
releasing four detainees. The local Communist reaction has been mini-
mal, though in Peking the releases may well have been a factor in
inducing the authorities to shift their position on exit visas for the
Mission. Communist exploitation for propaganda purposes would
undoubtedly be greater if a significant number were released at once.
But as the Hong Kong Government is at present in a strong position
vis-à-vis the local Communiste, now is probably as good a time as any
to make a concession, particularly as it is in response to an "act of
FLAG D de-escalation" by the Chinese (see paragraph 4 of Peking telegram No.
699). I see considerable force therefore in Sir D. Hopson's recom-
mendation in Peking telegram No. 698 that in the interests of restor-
ing as great a degree of normality as possible in relations with China, we should make some significant response to the decision to grant all outstanding exit visas, provided that the Chinese honour
their undertaking fully. He suggests that ten to twenty detainees
should be released at once. The exact number must be for the Governor
to judge in accordance with the criteria set out in the recommend a-
tions of the Special Branch study; but in order to have a significant
impact, I think the number should be not less than ten.
FLAG A
6. We have considered the point that by the release
of detainess in
../ the way
SECRET
SECRET
the way proposed, we would be underlining unduly the link between
British subjects in China and our policies in Hong Kong, and that
this might encourage the Chinese to try to bargain further and larger
releases of detainees against the release of British subjects in
detention in China. However, the significance of Hong Kong is now so
clear that there seems little advantage in trying to play it down.
Moreover, we are sure that the Chinese would not consider the release
of detainees as an appropriate quid pro quo for the release of Mr.
Grey, and we doubt very much whether it would directly influence their
attitude towards other British subjects either. I very much doubt
whether they would, for example, consider releasing Mr. Watt of
Vickers-Zimmer or the two Kerchant Marine officers in exchange for
detainees. (The Merchant Marine officers may well be released in any
case if they make suitable confessions.) The chances of securing the
release of detained British subjects as a whole are however likely to
improve if relations in general improve, and for this reason alone,
the release of detainees is to be encouraged. If the Governor argues
that he has not got ten "lese important" persons according to the
criterion referred to above, we will have to be content with the
release of as many as he can offer. If he considers that the release
of ten or more at once would of itself be too dramatic a gesture
which might be exploited unduly by the local Communists, he might be
asked to release smaller groups over the next few weeks. However,
the impact would be far greater if a larger number were released
and I think that he should be pressed in this direction.
-
SECRET
../7..
SECRET
7.
We considered suggesting to the Governor that the arrival of
Sir D. Hopson in Hong Kong might be a suitable occasion for the
release of a group of detainees. But this might go too far towards
implying an exchange of "hostages".
leaves open the matter of timing.
The draft telegram therefore
James Wannay
(James Murray)
7 August, 1968
Telegram
M: Toby.
Si D. Allen as his
prabuniary view
leave.
that
you
what
was obtained before you
I think the least we
Chit
is to put them proposal to the Converans.
If he jibs, we shall han to suck som
compromise
ရွာ
but this is clearly by for the
most megetiable camercy for wiching with
Peking
Sunt fut desparth
2018/8
Синен ку
air perbally all they will acupt.
Apeed of
7/8
SECRET
Philkinson.
7/vm
HWD 13/
With the compliments of
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
Hong Kong Deft-
1/
July 1968
LONDON, W.1.
Jumil
기
CS. 41C
2600079
1000-1/67-852147
SECRET
From: Major J.A. Harrison,
M.B.E.,M.C.,R.A.
No.
SCR 1/8/2621/67
Dear faminara, Заспитани
395
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT,
LOWER ALBERT ROAD,
HONG KONG.
2nd July, 1968.
Six copies of a Special Branch paper on selective release of detainees are forwarded for such distribution within Whitehall as you think fit.
Copies have been sent to Singapore, to Michael Wilford in Washington and to Peking; the last without annexe having had the more sensitive paragraphs
expurgated.
your sincerel
A.W. Gaminara, Esq., Commonwealth Offiće, London, S.W.1.
(J.A. Harrison)
SECRET
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
- 8 AUG 1968
EDI
GET/14/369/133
Subject:
SECRET
Copy llo.29 of 33
Special Branch,
hong Long.
20th June, 1968.
Study of the future disposal of persons held under Enerzenty Botention
Regulations either by departure fros Hon. Kopi ("retien to thipal) or relanse in the Colony.
Not eucherad
+
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines two issues, firstly the peasibility of
arranging the return to Ching of the detainees at present held in
the Vistoria Road Centre, under some formula acceptable to both the
Hong Kong Government and the Chinese People's Government (9.8.0.)
and secondly the alternative of their release in Hong Kong in a
manner most advantageous to this Government (Governor'e Committee
Minutes No. 292/58 and 324/63 refer).
2.
At present 52 persons are detained at the Victoria Road
Centre under varrants valid for 12 months issued under the provisions
of Section 31 of the Emergency (Principal) Regulations Gep. 222. The
first of these vorrents expires on the 27th September, 136" and the
final one on the 14th June, 1959. The nares of these detainess, dates
of their arrest, relevant detention orders and a brief resme of the
activities which led up to their arrest and detention are contained
191
in ennaære to this paper.
PARTON TO CHINA
Fenlaret Bollar of the 2.5.0.
3.
In considering the possibilities of enforcing the return of
any of the detainees to Chins it is pertinent First to study the
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history of the C.P.G. policy towards deportation, for during the last
few months it has been indicated by the 3.P.G. that they consider any
such action amounts to deportation.
4.
For many years the Chinese have been reluctant to accept
deportees from Hong Kong and though the Hong Kong Government has been
able to enforce Deportation Orders, from time to time, the Chinese
attitude has been one of acquiescence rather than active co-operation
and then only in cases where it was generally in the interests of the
C.P.G. to accept such persons. The most recent deportstions from
Hong Kong to China involving persons engaged in communist subversive
activity took place in 1959 at the time of the de-registration of the
communist controlled Society of Plantations. In 1960 the physical
deportation of criminals to China came to a complete halt, and the
only category which the Chinese continued to accept were persone
arrested in Hong Kong for their involvement in espionage activity on
behalf of the C.P.G. The last case in this category occurred in early
1965.
5.
It should be pointed out that the absence of any deportations
to Ching for such long perioda was not so much the result of any
declaration of opposition by the C.P.G. but rather that the
circunstances had not arisen in which it had been necessary to attempt
to enforce deportation. However, with the onset of communist
confrontation with the Hong Kong Government last year and following
several recommendations by Vegistrates, upon convictions in open Court,
that prisoners should be considered for deportation to Chine, the 6.P.3.
nade known, in unaistakable terms, its attitude towards any further
attempts to deport Chinese Nationals from the Colony. This was done
through an announcement by LEUNG Vsi Jam, Director of the Hong Kong
Branch of the New China News Agency, in a bulletin on the 15th June,
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which reed inter alia
Recently the British authorities in Hong Kong went so far as to announce their intention to deport patriotic compatriots. According to news reports carried on June 9th in the South China Morning Post, the spokesman of the British authorities in Hong Kong said on June 8th: "Deportation orders had been served on three persons and similar action was being contemplated against others as a result of the recent disturbances". This measure of the British authorities in Hong Kong to persecute our patriotic conpatriots is illegal and is part of their fascist suppression. The Chinese people will not tolerate such crimes by the British imperialism. We lodge the most emphatic and strongest protest against the British authorities in Hong Kong.
If Chinese compatriota in Hong Kong themselves request to return to the interior, the people of the Homeland will welcome them at any time. But the Chinese people and compatriots in Hong Kong will never permit the British authorities in Hong Kong to make false charges end deporting (sic) Chinese compatriots against their will by force. It is the inviolable and inalienable right of the Chinese people to reside in Hong Kong
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This statement was given wide publicity both in the communist press
in Hong Kong and in China,
Attemta to return detainesa to China
6.
On 14th March, 1958 it was decided to test G.P.G. reaction
when the two communist film stars, Shek Wai and Fu Ki vere presented
for "release to China" at Lo i on the 14th March. After making some
propagando capitel from the situation, the .P.G. condermed this nove
as a dismised form of deportation, Imanded it as a "nev instance of
persecution" and it became the subject of an official protest to the
H.M.G. Representative in Peking. The protest included a clein thet
it was the "sacrei right of patriotic compatriots to live and work in
Hong Kong" and demanded that no further attempts should be made to
send the two film stars "to any place outside of Hong Kong on any
pretext against their will",
7.
In view of the post C.P.G. policy of continuing to accept
prisoners involved in Chinese espionage activities, en approach was
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made to the local branch of the llew China News Agency on 15th May,
1963 offering to release a person, at present detained at V.R.C. and
arrested in July last year for Chinese espionage activity, on the
understanding that the N.C.N.A. would make arrangements for his return
to China. It was pointed out that arrangements could be made to avoid
any publicity if this offer were to be accepted, After some delay
the reply from the M.C.H.A. categorically denied all knowledge of the
detainee concerned and stated that any attempt to deport him to China
would be unacceptable!
Possible means of arranging retum to China
8.
During the last months a careful study has been conducted
of the 52 detainees to ascertain whether they include any person who
might be important enough to the C.P.G. to be considered es a
bartering point, perhaps for the release of British Nationals detained
in China. The conclusion reached is that there is no such person at
present detained by Special Branch. Although sore are senior
officials in various spheres of local comunist activity none is
thought to be in possession of such important knowledge or holding
positions of such note that the 3.F.G. would be willing to relax
their present principles concerning deportation in order to obtain
his return to China; indeed, the C.P.G. might well consider that to
do so would only be to highlight to us the importance of the detainee
concerned.
9.
A deep study has also been rade of the possibility of
arriving at some formule for the release of detainees which might be
acceptable to the C.P.3. with the implicit understanding that they
return to China. For example:-
(a) release at Tsim Sha Tsui or Lo 'hu railway station on
the understanding that they return to Ching until the period
of their energency detention order has expired, when
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consideration would be given to allowing them to re-enter
the Colony;
(b) release within the Colony, but to be handed over to
local Chinese co-mist Representatives who would then
arrange for their return to China. (Many of those who have
completed their prison sentences have, of course, paid
trips to China immediately following their release from
prison);
(c) action as in (a) and (b) above allowing the C.P.G. to
choose which detainees could be released within these
conditions or alternatively offering all detainees for such
treatment.
It is
All these formulas of course involve extensive negotiations with
Representatives of the G.P.G. and their observance of any conditions
て egread upon. Additionally it is almost inconceivable that the C.P.G.
would not also wish to extract other major concessions from Government
before agreeing to any acceptance of detainees to China.
considered that the categorical statements made on this question over
the lost year and the reaction to epproaches made so far support the
view that there is little or no likelihood of any fruktful discussion
on this matter, unless the Chinese theraelves take some initiative in
this direction.
10.
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Hention must also be rade of the likelihood that one or more
of those detained may offer voluntarily to be repatriated to Chine.
In the early stages of their detention this might have been possible,
but, following the experience of the two film stars and the regular
visita all have received during their detention, they are in knowledge
of the communist official ettitude on this question and it is
considered that no detainee at present in V.R.C. would offer or agree
to return to China without direct instructions from the C.P.G. or its
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Representatives in Hong Kong. Clearly to do so against the known
wishes of the Chinese authorities would be to invite at least
censure and serious repercussions, even were he to be accepted across
the border which at the present stage appears highly improbable.
11.
In brief, the Chinese comranists have made it abundantly
clear during the last year that they will not accept any attempt by
the Hong Kong Government to effect the deportation of Chinese Nationals
from this Colony to China. They have also indiceted, in unmistakable
terms, that they consider any return of such persons to China, under
whatever guise it may be offered, is tantamount to deportation and
therefore unacceptable. The relative importance of the detainees at
present held is such that it is felt that no formula can be arrived
at for their return to China which would be acceptable to the C.P.G.
end to the Hong Kong Government, at the present tine.
·
RELEASE T HOT KOG
+ SE FEEL
Legal considegations
12.
The Hon. Attorney General has edvised that, upon the expiry
of the 12 month detention orders issued under the provisions of Section
31 of the Emergency (Principal) Regulations Gap 232, further detention
· orders could properly be issued following the submission of such :
recommenäntion to the Hon. Colonial Secretary. (Paragraph 9 of
Special Branch Pager GE/14/353/155 of the 22nd Kay, 1963 "Frocedures
governing the continued detention of comunists ......" refera),
There would appear, therefore, to be no legal bir to continued and
indefinite detention of the comunista currently held. Also there is
no procedural difficulty in effecting their release; Hon, C.S. can
cancel the current detention orders at any time and there are no legal
considerations, such as those which affect persons serving prison
sentences.
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Security and Political fretors affecting release
13.
Before studying the question of release in Hong Kong it is
pertinent to re-consider the grounds which support continued
detention. The detainees are dedicated communist agitators who have
openly declared that they do not recognise the right of the Hong Kong
Government to exercise its authority within the Colony, and they have
shown no relaxation in their attitude, in this respect, during their
detention. Thus they present a continuing threat to the security of
the Colony. While these are valid grounds for the issue of a
detention order under the Emergency (Principal) Regulations it must
now be taken into account that other and more senior militant
communists are still at liberty within the Colony and, on occasion,
openly voicing their opposition to the Hong Kong Government. In the
absence of any resurgence of violent communist activity in the Colony
it will become increasingly difficult to justify the continued
detention of those at present in the Victoria Road Centre.
14.
The release of prisoners has been a major communist demend
since the onset of confrontation lest year and little distinction has
been made between those held under Emergency Regulations and those
· serving prison terms, although in recent weeks there has been
increasing attention drawn to those held under the former provisions.
It is doubtful, however, if the general public dra:s any real
distinction between prisoners convicted in Court and those held under
emergency legislation. It could be said that the release of any
detainee will be hailed by the communists as a victory and encourage
increased communist agitation and at the same time be viewed by the
general public as a major concession to the comunists. While
this stand point might apply in the event of any large scale release
or if the detainees concerned were the more prominent ones, such es
members of the All Circles Anti-Persecution Struggle Committee, it
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seems likely to be less valid in the c-se of a small number of the less
Important detainees. In this context prisoners have been released,
from jail after completing their terms of imprisonment, as an almost
daily occurrence over the past few nonths, Each release has been
hailed as a victory and the prisoner greeted as a hero with due
publicity in the communist press, but the propaganda impact has
gradually died down and is now attracting little or no public
attention.
15.
It seems likely that communist agitation in connection with
the release of persons generally will continue indefinitely. Indeed
it may increase and be joined by pressure from organisations both
locally based and in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, which express
concern for "detention without trial", As mentioned above,
(paragraph 13), it may become increasingly difficult in view of the
communist policy of non-violence to justify the continued detention
of all our detainees and thus some move towards selective release not,
or in the near future, may represent less of a victory for the
communists then release at a much later date.
16.
It may be considered that some form of conditional release
should be arranged, for example:-
(a) placing the released person under conditions similar
to those applying to Police somervision, or
(b) excluding the detainee from entering or residing in
particular geographical areas of the Colony.
However, the experience of the last four months in respect of supervision
orders issued against released communist prisoners shows that it is
extremely unlikely that these restrictions would be observed,
although any failure to comply would, perforce, drive them under-
ground and thus restrict, to sona extent, their motivities. However their
failure to comply would present the commmists with a further field
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for propaganda exploitation and at the sene tine necessitate re-arrest
flours
action if they are not to be allowed to flaunt Government's authority.
In these circumstances it is considered there is no advantage to be
gained in imposing conditions of this nature.
17.
The release within the Colony of a small number of the less
important persons would present a means of judging communist reaction
and that of the general public. Should this reaction be acceptable
then a phased release programe could be planned taking into account,
of course, the political climate and the level of communist activity
generally. Should the reaction be unfavourable the vast majority
of the detainees, including the more important ones, will
atill be in custody.
18.
Frotors to be taken into account when selecting prisoners
for release should be:-
(a) their relative importance in their respective spheres
of communist activity and the threat they pose to security;
(b) the extent to which the communists are likely to give
publicity to their release in view of (a) above;.
(c) the date of their arrest and subsequent length of
detention; and
(d) the date of expiry of their detention orier (in many
cases this is not linked to the date of Frrest).
It is suggested that the general principle upon which selection should
be based is early release of the lesser important communists and,
where possible, those who have been detained the longest. However,
this latter factor should also be allied to the date of expiry or ano
the detention orders to avoid the need, if possible, of applying for
new orders.
19.
If selective release within the principles set out above is
to be considered some further advantage could, perhaps, de obtained
by endeavouring to suggest that one or more of the released detainess
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had been co-operative with the authorities and thus compromise his
further use within the local comunist organisation. This requires
careful consider tion and is part of a present study by Special
Branch. It will also require a carefully planned and subtle "build
up before the release to avoid the communists realizing the neture
of the operation. "e shall also, of course, have to take into account
the need not to compromise currently productive sources or to imply
the extent of our knowledge of communist organisations.
20.
SUBCKEY
(a) The 52 communist confrontation prisoners at V.R.C.
are held under 12 sonth detention orders issued under
Emergency (Principal) Regulations. The first expires on
27th September, 1968 and the last on 14th June, 1969;
(b) the C.P.G. hes stated in unequivocable terms that it
will not cocept the deportation of Chinese Nationals from
Hong Kong to China;
(c) the Chinese authorities have made it quite clear
that any attempt to arrange the return of detainees to
China is tantamount to deportetion and therefore
unccceptable;
(d) there is no detainee whose importance to the co-munists
is such that they might be prepared to retract the
stetements et (b) or (c) above to effect his release from
detention, and it is considered that there is no formula
acceptable at the present time to both the 0.3.G. and
the Hong Kong Government which will result in the return
of detainees to China;
(e) while there are security end political gro mia for
continuing to hold the detainees et present in V.R.C.
this will become more difficult to justify in future,
if present co-munist policy of non violence continues;
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(f) the general public place little distinction between
those held under Energency Reguletions and persons serving
prison sentences. The release of the letter category has
now become a regular occurrence and communist propaganda on
this issue is attracting little public attention, thus the
rele:se of the less important detainees is less likely to
be viewed as a major concession;
(c) released detainees are unlikely to observe any
restrictions placed upon them;
(h) the release within the Colony of a small number of the
less important detainees would provide an opportunity to
judge communist and public reaction. If this is acceptable
a phased release programme could be planned, selecting
generally the least important end longest detained for
early release, taking into account the political climate
and the level of communist activity;
(1) an attempt could be made to compromise one or more of
those released.
RECOMMENDATION
(a) No further attempt should be made to arrange the
return to China of detrinees, unless the Chinese take
some initiative in this direction;
(b) consideration should be given to the unconditional
release within the Colony of a small group of the less
important commmists held under the Emergency detention
orders;
(c) If the communist and public reaction to this initial
release is acceptable to Government s phased release
programe should be planned based on the general principle
of releasing first those who are less importent and have
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been detained the longest;
(d) the political climate and the level of communist
activity, as well as the individual potential threats
posed to security by detainees, should dictate the extent
to which the release programme is effected;
(e) when practicable, consideration should be given to
considering "spoiling operations" against one or more
detainees prior to release.
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Mr. Murray
CONFIDENTIAL
RECFIVED IN I
Reference. No 31
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Гроно
Release of Detainees in Hong Kong
394
In Peking telegram No. 698 (attached) Sir D. Hopson suggests that if the exit visas for the Mission now outstanding are granted the Governor should release "say ten to twenty detainees at once". without prejudging a full consideration of possible action in Hong Kong which might improve the position of Britisn subjects in China, I think that this proposal deserves to be examined now. The release of four detainees by the Governor may well have been a factor in the Chinese decision to grant exit visas to members of the Mission. At any rate it would have helped the case of those in the Chinese leadership (assuming they exist) who wish to see a return to greater normality in Sino- British relations. The release of further detainees is therefore likely to be generally helpful. I have some doubts as to whether it would be prudent to release ten to twenty at once as a kind of direct quid pro quo for the granting of visas, but I would see advantage in the Governor continuing to release small groups of detainees at fairly frequent intervals if he feels at all able to do BO. There would be no need to link the release of detainees directly with the grant of exit visas. A few more might be released now and others in succeeding weeks.
We are
2. I suggest that we should explore this possibility with the Commonwealth Office. also committed to considering the question of the release of convicted prisoners in the context of Mr. Grey.
Jam Denson
(J. B. Deneón) 1 August, 1968
Discussed intin Mi. Mussing,
Draft Submission món copy to
Mi
Ми стати оби
Co.
иде
भा
Јарича
CYPHER/CAT A
ITY HON KONG
TELEGRAP 10. 960
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PERSONAL FOR CALEISTRY,
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390)(39
muste
TOP COP":
TC COMMONWEALTH OFFICE.
2 AUGUST 1968.
DERING TELETHALS ARE AND EN : POLICY IT HONG KONG.
RI RIVED IN
(393)
ARCHIVES N. 31
- 5 AUG 1968
FD1/1
WHILE MASON LAS DELA 3 CENTLY FE ADVISED THAT IT WORLD HE PELPFUL
IN THIS TO YOU IF I CONTINUED TO COMENT ON THE PERINC TELEGRAMS SERIES. IV'AVE ACCORDINGLY SEEN DOING SO, AND HAVE LEEN TRYING TO KEEP MY TELEGRAMS CONS TRUCTIVE ANL AS FREE OF ARCUMENTATION AS POSSIBLE. DIT WHATEVER I SAY, IT IS IN THE NATURE OF TELEGRAMS DRAFTED FOR HLEVITY THAT THE IM VITAILE MINOR INCONSISTENCIES
OF PHRAS INE, WHICH OCCUR LAY THEMSELVES OPEN TO DISSECTION:
WITHOUT THE LASIS OF THE CLICITAL CONTENTIONS REALLY FEING
IMPALLE AT FIL.
2. VILE I 27 of Coppe AXIOUS NOT TO LET OW SIDE. IN THE
EJSCUSSION AS LY IFZVLT, IT IS TOE BECOMING DIFFICULT TO CONTINUE VARIND A USEFUL CONTA 103 105 LAR VONDERING THEKEFCHE WHETHER YOU : PALLY WANT FURTHER DETAILER COMMENTS FROM ME ON THE
LATEST EXC!ANCE.
3. T
I TUOLIT DELTARS HOY: VER TAKE THE COMENT (PAKING TELS'GAAN 100 REFERS) THAT APY PINT THAT KONG KONG KAY, IN ITS SHOUATION, SE TREATED AS THE TAIL TO THE U.Y. DOC IS, AS I AR SURE YOU APPRECIATE, 7. FLELY LIAT SOL PO · MATCHES CUT FOR ANT FEARS. IT IS WELL
+
子
UNDERSTOOD THAT HONG KONG INTERESTS CANNOT BE AUSCLUTELY PARA-
HOUT, AIR-THAT SOLETUIS MY PAVE TO DA MİYET AWAY IN THE COMEINED U.F./P./. INTEREST, BUT ANY AWARENESS HERE OF AN INTENTION TO SUBORDI"ATE PONG ZAR INTERCE TO ANSTHER THAT THIS COULD WELL
HAVE DISASTROUS RESULTS.
SIR D TRENCH
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION F.O. F.E.D.
C.U. H.K. DEPARTMENT
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Деа Това
42
Mr. L.C. Smith
Emm
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT,
LOWER ALBERT ROAD,
HỒNG KONG,
24th July, 1968
Entis
Copy to mu
Wilson, IRD
L
11
and if PUSD Thank you for your letter of empt.
10th July enclosing a minute dated 10th June by Leslie Smith.
2.
I would go further and suggest that if Smith can be positively discour- aged from having further contacts of that kind in Hong Kong it would be beneficial.
Jy5/8
3.
I was surprised to hear that he had been in Hong Kong as recently as 29th May. If you happen to hear of any further visits by him we should be glad to know of them.
You
eve
Atla
(A.F. Maddocks)
J.B. Denson Esq., 0.B.E.,
Foreign Office,
LONDON S.W.1.
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 31 ** JUL 1968
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JM 1/2 391
тебник
RE. EIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
31 JUL 1968
FD1/1
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 699 of 30 July Repeated for information to:- Hong Kong
(390 My immediately preceding telegram and Hong Kong
368
telegram No. 928. [British policy towards China]
It is suggested in paragraph 8 of Hong Kong telegram under reference that release of detainees and earlier release of prisoners would be a major concession without good grounds for expecting a response and therefore (?grp omitted] "minority concessions made with specifio and limited tactical aims." I question the reality of this distinction. The concession would certainly be important, but the Chinese have repeatedly made it clear to us that release of prisoners is the root of the problem. To make concession on this would therefore not be acting in void. We would be responding on a key issue and could confidently expect a return. As I pointed out in my telegram No. 671, there is little doubt for example that release of news workers in Hong Kong would ensure the release of Grey.
2. Paragraph 8 of telegram under reference argues that we must wait until the Chinese come to us and propose whatever it is they want and when we know this we might be able to meet them at least partially, but in fact the Chinese have already made themselves perfectly plain. Of five demands release of prisoners is only one with any real content. In the light of our experience over last year (e.g. over lifting of our movement restrictions) we are most unlikely to get them to give more explicit undertakings of what they will do if we release prisoners.
3. Paragraph 3 of telegram argues that we should not rush things. Release of some prisoners on New Year's day 1969 could hardly be so described.
4. I am puzzled by the arguments in paragraph 4 of Hong Kong's telegram under reference that the public would find it harder to accept the need for major concessions now since the situation in Hong Kong is not unfavourable. Hitherto it has been argued strongly that concessions could not be made because the situation was unfavourable and that any concessions would therefore be interpreted as a sign of weakness, e.g. Hong Kong telegram No. 928 paragraph 3. This amounted to saying (if I understand the argument aright) that when we are under pressure concessions are precluded because they will be seen as a sign of weakness and when we are not under pressure they
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are precluded because it is hard to persuade the publio of the need to make concession. Surely if the situation is now favourable this would make it a safe time to make gesture: which would come, and be seen as coming, from strength.
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5. Paragraph 4 also suggests that concessions aimed at improving Sino British relations might not be well received in Hong Kong since they would suggest subordination
of Hong Kong to United Kingdom interests. I recognise that public opinion in Hong Kong must be an important factor, but with respect would not this be a case of the tail wagging the dog? I would think that the British public and Parliamentary opinion would be concerned to think that such an important issue as Sino British relations was being subordinated to public opinion in Hong Kong.
But
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in fact concessions should bring benefits in Hong Kong in the form of reduced tension, whereas so long as confrontation persists there is always a greater risk of renewed trouble in the Colony. It is argued that there is little evidence to suggest that concessions already made have significantly influenced the political atmosphere in Hong Kong.
I think the simple answer is that so far we have not made concession on key issue that might produce results. In other areas + as paragraph 7 recognises, we have on occasions gained something from concessions.
F.0. pass Priority Hong Kong.
Sir D. Hopson
[Repeated as requested]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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31 JUL 1968
30 July 1968
F81/1
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 698 of 30 July, epeated for information to Hong Kong.
Hong Kong telegram No. 928:
British policy towards China.
The key concession to bring about the benefits of better relations and therefore the concession on which we should concentrate is the release of Chinese in custody (detainees and prisoners convicted in Court) In this telegram I shall deal with the detainees, My immediately following telegram deals with earlier release of some convicted prisoners and general points raised by Hong Kong telegram under reference.
2.
Detainees seemed to be the sector in which we can with relatively little difficulty make restures bearing on key issue. We have flexibility. The detainees have not been sentenced to a set term so that there is strictly no question of "premature release". The release of four so far has gone smoothly and Press reaction has been encouraging.
3.
As regards dividends from such release, Hong Kong telegram No. 850, paragraph 3, agreed that tangible results were not very likely from a trickle of detainees, so that it can hardly be a matter of complaint now if we have not yet seen any obvious dividends from the release of four (paragraph 1(a) of telegram under reference). In fact, however, I think there may well have been dividends since this release has probably been a factor in the resumption of exit visas for this Mission.
4.
*his leade me to recommend strongly that "rgent consideration be given to the possibility of releasing a sizeable number of detainees in response to the granting of exit visas to the staff of this Mission, if, as we now expect, the Chinese carry out their promise of 27 July (my telegram No. 691). It is very much in our interest to show them that acts of de-escalation on their part are likely to be followed by a suitable response on ours. In this case we should for once not be making the first move. The effect might also be to encourage the Chinese to make further concessions e.g. over British subjects detained in China in the hope of a further response from us. I very much hope, therefore, that if the current outstanding exit visas are granted the Governor would be prepared to release, say, 10 to 20 detainees at
once.
Foreign Office pass Priority Hong Kong.
Sir D. Hopson
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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C.O.
News Dept.
Consular Dept.
I.P.D.
I.R.D.
Defence Dept.
H.K.Dept. News Dept.
Defence Dept.
DIS MOD
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Category AC: no unclassified reply or reference
CONFIDENTIAL
From:
CBP Hong Kong
Tot
MOD Army
Infot
MOD UK
CINCFE
FARELF HOLP
389 2)
2703002 July
Date: 27.7.68
Read:
04442
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
30 JUL 1968
Foll!
PES 3149
WARNING
PARAFERASE NOT REQUIRED
NO UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR REFERENCE
1.
References: A. Our HTT/1906502 Jul/3139.
3. Your PO2/24/2414302 Jul. (NOTAL,
Use of letters to describe different weapons in reference A only of local significance. In fact it is misleading and we expect Hong Kong Government to inform Commonwealth Office shortly. The references to MACE D and MACE O were to some samples of aerosol tear gas spray of Australian origin waich should not have been described as chemical MACE at all. These are not in use and there is no intention that they should be.
GOBC stands for General
2. What has been referred to as HACE A, is the only one in question. It has marking "General, Mark IV, Chemical MACE, COEC". Ordnance Equipment Corporation of America.
3.
Bach weapon has its own serial number on its base.
TIM Distribution ABP ↳ (AD) Action
INW/164/96
2703002
Distribution authorised by DOC.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
Category AC: no unclassified reply or reference
kr 388
Enta &pa при
CONFIDENTIAL
From: GBF Hong Kong
190650z July
ED IN
AR:.
- No.31
Date: 19.7.68.
To:
CLC FR
2- JUAL 308
Recd: 10252
Info:
MOD UK
MOD Amy PAREIF
石川
HQIF
1.
WARNING
PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED
NC UNCLASSIFIED REPLY OR REFERENCE
HIT 3139
Reference TIX/2505452 Jun/SEASEC 18
Savingram 941 from Governor to Commonwealth Office, of 17th July 1968, is repeated for information.
1,
"Your Saving despatch No 374 and my 855 of 24th June 1968,
Chemical Mage.
I am now able to confirm that no patients admitted to Goverment hospitals for treatment of injuries sustained during disturbances last year suffered adverse effects from the mace used by the security forces.
2. The type of equipment in use in Hong Kong is mace A which contains the substance chloroacetophenone, We have consulted the Government Chemist and the Professor of Chemistry at Hong Kong University (who has been previously employed as a Soientific Training Officer and Scientific Adviser to United Kingdon Government Agencies). In their experience and after reference to printed material available to them here, they state that although lachrymation and conjunctivitis result from the use of this substance, these effects are caused by tear-gas generally, and in any event would normally be temporary.
3. We understand that the results of using different types of equipment - maces B and C - which emtain oil of capsicum, are far more serious. But we have only received samples of these manes and they have not been used. The Government Chemist states that mace & ejects a liquid jet which does not atomise, and when the full amount of chloroacetophenone in mace-150 MG is sprayed it does not distribute itself in the atmosphere, but falls rapidly to the ground. Even if it could disperse in the air and gravitate slowly, the discharge of the contents of six oans would be necessary to give an atmospheric concentration of 350 MG per cubic metre in an average size room (12 foot by 12 foot by W foot). The literature available here indicates that such a concentration - for a period of five minutes is considered to be a tentative safe maximum,
We have asked the bassy Washington to provide us with more information on the maces used in the United States which gave rise to the report contained in the enclosures to your Saving despatch No 374. When we have received this information we may be in a position to send you more specific details about the mace at present held in Hong Kong",
TIM Distrib CONFIDENTIAL
190650Z
LW/170
CYPHER/CAT A
ROUTINE HONG KONG
TELEGRAM NO. 940
RESTRICTED
Even + relin (38)
сора
т?ри
RE IV:
י
"ARCHIVES N. 31 29 JUL 1968
TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
27 JULY
1968
FDI/I
RESTRICTED.
ADDRESSED COMMONWEALTH OFFICE AS MY TELEGRAM NO. 949 DATED 27TH JULY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PEKING, AND BY SAVINGRAM TO POLAD SING-
APORE AND WASHINGTON.
Maeda
MY TELEGRAM 901: DEEP BAY INCIDENT.
N.C.N.A
THIS MORNING PASSED THE FOLLOWING TELEPHONE MESSAGE FROM
**THE RELEVANT KWANGTUNG AUTHORITIES** IN REPLY TO THE MESSAGE IN
MY TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE:-
BEGINS.
IT 15 KOUTINE AND NORMAL DUTY FOR CHINESE PATROL BOATS TO PATHOL
THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF OUR OYSTER FARMS IN ORDER TO PROTECT OUR
FISHERMEN IN THEIR PRODUCTION. THIS IS A KIND OF NORMAL ACTIVITY
THAT NOBODY HAS THE RIGHT TO INTERFERE WITH. ON THE EARLY MORNING
OF JUNE 30TH, WHEN THE FISHERMEN FROM HONG KONG INTRUDED INTO THE
OYSTER FARMS OF OUR FISHERMEN TO UNDERMINE THEIR PRODUCTION, IT WAS
JUSTIFIABLE FOR OUR FISHERMEN TO DETAIN THEM FOR EDUCATION. BUT THE
BRITISH HONG KONG AUTHORITIES HAD BROUGHT IN A GUN-BOAT TO THE
VICINITY OF OUR OYSTER BEDS, THREATENING THE SAFEY OF OUR
FISHERMEN. THIS IS AN ACT OF PROVOCATION AGAINST OUR FISHERMEN. TO
PREVENT THE INCIDENT FROM DEVELOPING OUR PATROL-BOAT WAYED THE
BRITISH GUN-BOAT TO GO AWAY. SUCH IS THE ATTITUDE WE HAVE ADOPTED
TO PREVENT A CLASH. IT SHOULD BE EMPHASISED THAT THERE IS NOTHING
WRONG WITH OUR PATROL-BUAT CARRYING ON ITS NORMAL DUTY TO SAFEGUARD
THE PRODUCTION OF OUR FISHERMEN. YOUR ALLEGATION AGAINST OUR PATROL-
BOAT IS QUITE UNREASONABLE AND WE FIRMLY REFUSE SUCH AN ALLEGATION.
**THE FREQUENT SNEAKING INTO OUR OYSTER FARMS TO UNDERMINE PRODUCT-
ION BY SOME FISHERMEN FROM THE HONG KONG SIDE HAD AROUSED INDIGNAT-
ION AMONG THE LOCAL FISHERMEN, ESPECIALLY AS SOME OF THE INTRUDERS
/HAVE
RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED
-2-
HAVE CARRIED OUT SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES AGAINST CHINA AND HELPED BAD
ELEMENTS TO ESCAPE TO HONG KONG. THIS TIME MOST OF THE TRANSGRESS II
FISHERMEN WERE RELEASED AFTER THEY HAD ADMITTED THEIR MISTAKES AND
GUARANTEED NOT TO COMMIT AGAIN SUCH ACTIVITIES ENDANGERING THE
SOCIALIST CAUSE OF THEIR MOTHERLAND, AS TO THE FEW WHO ARE STILL
UNDER DETENTION, SOME OF THEM HAVE BEEN FOUND OUT TO BE U.S.- CHIANG
KAI-SHEK AGENTS WHO HAVE BEEN CONSPIRING SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES AGAINST CHINA: SONE AKE EITHER PIRATES OR POLITICAL PRISONERS OR CRIMINALS.
THE RELEVANT DEPARTMENT OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT CERTAINLY HAS THE
RIGHT TO PUT THEM UNDER TRIAL ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF THE CHINESE
GOVERNMENT.
ENDS.
CO PLEASE PASS PEKING.
SIR D.TRENCH
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
C.O.
7.0.
H.K.D.
U.X.D.
POL AFFAIRS DEPT.
F.E. & P.D.
NEWS DEPT.
F.E.D.
DEFENCE DEPT.
P.U.S.D. DIS MOD
{ REPEATED AS REQUESTED}
RESTRICTED
+
+
T
GY÷HER CAT A
PRIORITY HONG KONG
BULJER 928
+
SECRET
TO
TOP CO
HOMEALNI OFFICE
RECEIVED MY 1968
CHIVES No.31
26 JUL 1968
Fellash
포리어
F2-3/3.
ADRESSEO CO TELEŠKAI. NO. 928
251. JULY EVEATED PEKING.
418
Jest
+
A. TELEGRAM "C. 671 : POLICY 1: HONG KONG.
THE ONLY CONSIDERALLS CONCESSIONS WE HAVE SO FAR THOUGHT AJOUT
ACE, 18IEFLY:-
+
CA) CONVICTED PRISONERS AND GETALASES. THERE ARE STILL SERIOUS
OBJFOTIONS TO RELEASING THE FIRST CATEGORY BEFORE SENTENCES
LESS RELISSTON ARE COMPLETED, OR TO HNCREASING THE REMISSION,
KATE. THE E IS RELATIVELY LESS DIFFICULTY OVER THE DETAINE
AND I An, OF COURSE, KEIMIRS THE CONSTANTLY UNDER REVIEW.
HAYE "101 KPLEASE) FOUR DETAIMEES PAZMATUKELY SELICOLON
PARILY FO# Ime20IATE TACTICAL PURPOSES WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT
HAVE BEEN PARTIALLY ACHIEVED SERICOLOW SUT #2 HAVE YET TO SEZ
ANY Day |ULS OLYDENU,
(3) RET::STATEMENT OF YORKERS.
1
THE CONNUNISTS ARE ON THE 01 T OF ANETTIK THAT THIS CALPAIGA
HAS FAILED AND NO CONCESSION HERE SEELS USEFUL, OR 1. PRACTICE,
AT ALL FEASTPLE.
(C) U.Š. MAYAL VISITS.
+
I HAVE ELSZUHERZ EXYNESSED BY DOUBTS ABOUT THE VALUE OF ANY HPHC-
ix
−7]J< 13 FREDDENCY CẠY TELEGRAL, NO. 383 REFERS).
(D) COMMUNIST SCHOOLS.
THERE IS NO USEFUL CONCESSIOR AVAILASLE HERE SI.03 EVEN
LY THE CASE OF CHUNG WAH, 2 HAVE NOT YET FOUND ANY ACCEPTABLE
MEANS OF PREVENTI 4 THET. FROM MAIRTALITAS AD LDEED INCREASING
THEIR ACTIVITIES LA SCHOOLS. I STOULD AUD THAT OFFICIAL
FERGERS AT A RECENT MEETLAG OF EXECUTIVE COUNCIL EXPRESSED GAVE
CONCERN AT THE LACK OF CONTROL OVER THESE SCHOOLS: AND IN THIS
THEY WERE UNDOUTZOLY VOICIES A SENEKAL, Orl :108.
*
F
SECRET
1
/(E) VISITS
(2) VISES TO PRISONERS.
SECRET
-2-
THESE ARE ALREADY GENEROUS AND COMMUNISTS ARE NO LONGER MAKING I
AN ISSUE OF THE. THEY HAVE HOT, FOR EXAMPLE, RESPONDED SO
FAR TO PEKING'S OFFER OF ANOTHER SPECIAL VISIT.
(F) GIFT RICE AND PRISONERS' CLOTHING.
5
WE OFFERED SUBSTANTIAL CONCESS10.S HERE BUT THEY WERE NOT ACCEPTED.
BOTH QUESTIONS HAVE NOW BEEN VIRTUALLY DROPPED
+
2. IT WILL BE SEEN THEREFORE HOW LIMITED IN PRACTICE IS THE SCOPE
FOR CONCESSIONS HY HONG KONG IN THESE MAJOR AREAS.
3. TO TURN NOW TO PEKING TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. 1 AGREE OF
COURSE THAT SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS ARE BAD ANU SHOULD BE IMPROVED IF POSSIBLE. BUT WHILE WE MAY HOW HAVE ESTABLISHED' A CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION OF SORTS CHY TELEGRAMS 895 AND 896 REFER), WE DO
NOT YET SEEN TO HAVE FOUND ANYTHING BUCH IN THE HONG KONG SITUATION
TO DISCUSS, AND AN IMPRESSED BY THE ADVICE NOT TO RUSH THINGS, -
REPORTED IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF MY TELEGRAN NO. 895.
+
•
1.
I
:
A. THE PRESENT SITUATION IN HONG KONG IS NOT UNFAVOURACLE, WITH
THE ACTIVE PHASE OF CONFRONTATION ENDED AND COMMUNIST MORALE
GENERALLY SPEAKING LOW. THIS, OF COURSE, IN SOME WAYS MAKES IT
ALL THE HARDER FOR THE PUBLIC TO ACCEPT THE NEED FOR MAJOR
CONCESSIONS. IN PARTICULAR CONCESSIONS MANIFESTLY AIKED AT
**BRINGING ABOUT THE BENEFITS IN PARAGRAPH 2(A), (B), AND (C)
OF THE TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE MUST BE APPROACHED WITH EXTRELE CARE.PUBLIC OPINION HERE IS WATCHFUL FOR ANY SUGGESTION THAT
IMPORTANT HONG KONG INTERESTS ARE BEING SUBORDINATED TO U.K.
INTERESTS, AND ONLY TOO READY TO SEARCH FOR A DOUULE HOTIVE IN
DOUBLE-MOTIVE
ALL YE 00. FURTHERIORE THERE IS LITTLE EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAN THE CONCESSIONS WE HAVE BAD HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUE:ICED THE
·
POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IN HONG KONG CHARAGRAFO 200) REFERS),
OR THAT ANY HE COULD MAKE WILL DO SO.
SECRET
/5. AS
1
I
#1
11
SECRET
HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO.928 TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
-3-
5. AS PEGAHDE TE (5104 ON THE 201E, CONCESSIONS BY US 13 HONG
ARE MOT REALLY KELEVANY. THE LOCAL VILLAGERS ARE RABID MILITANTS AND THE KEY FACTOR HERE IS THE CONTROL EXERCISSO OVER
THEN BY THE BORDER AUTHORITIES.
L
I THINK WE SHOULD JE CA:EFUL OF THE VIED THAT VE SHOULD HELP THE
CALVESZ SAVE FACE, UNTIL ME KOTIVES SEM NO THE HITS DE HAVE
+2CEIVED ARE CLEARE, FOR THE MASSELT I THỊ X - SHOULD LEAKE IT TO
+
THEM TO SAVE WHAT PAGE PHEY CAN F.4O. SUCH CO402581pes AS TE ME
PREPARED TO MAKS,
1. Das OF COURSE THAT ON JOGASIDUS HE HAVE GALLIED SOLET.HAS
CONCRETE FROM PARTICOLAR OC IDESST945, AT A FLICE. ON THE STROM BAD,
THERE HAVE BEEN VERY LANY 1052 0CCMStons Dund 3G THE LAST YEAR 'HEA
WE HAVE, PY AGO-TLIG REASONABLE BUT 712. ATTIVOIS, A:0 MAKLA 30
ÞACCEPTABLE CONCESSIONS, INDUCED THE COMMUNISTS TO DACK-TRACK.
S. MIALLY, GEM IS A SIGHIFICANT DIFFERENCE 1, K1.0 BETWEE LIHOR CONCESSIONS HADE WITH SPECIFIC AND LILITED TACTICAL AMS, WIGH HE
CONSTAVILY SEARCH FOR CAMO AVVE GADE) AUD) VIDEK CONCIS=10.15 LADE 14
THE GENERAL HOPE OF LAROVEO ABLATION. I DJ NOT JELIEV? LIAT THE
*INE FOR LATTER HAS YET COME. FOR THE PRESENT, WE SHOULD LEAYE DI
TO THE CHI LESE TO COME TO us 1. ME15ONABLY SPIVIFIC TERUS ABU PROPOSE
WHATEVER IT IS THEY LIT. VAS, HE X:0: TH13, HE MIGHT FIU SUMSELVES
ABLE TO WEST THEN PARTIALLY AT LEAST, CHS IS LEVITALY A DELICATE
Zuol358, Juï If is MrORTAIT ALSO TO PLAY TALLS THE CALLIESE WAY
AND NOT ALTOGETHE.... În dues.
CO LEAST PASS PRIGA1(7 PEKING.
SIR D. TRENCH
[REPETITION TO PEKING REFERRED FOR
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION DEPARTMENTAL DECISION]
F.O. F.E.D.
C.O. HONG KONG DEPT.
F.O. NEWS DEPT.
CONSULAR DEPT.
I.P.D.
I.R.D.
DEFENCE DEPT.
C.O. NEWS DEPT.
DEFENCE DEPT. DIS MOD
SECRET
I
1
SEORNT
(70 1/1)
Dien
LB 19/7
FOREIGN OFFICE, 8.#.1.
18 July, 1968.
Please refer to my letter (unnumbered) of 10 July about Lealie Smith's contacts with the communista in Hong Kong. I enclose a copy of a further minute from Leslie Smith from which you will see that the system has laboured only to produce a mouse. Cradock has of course already tackled the Chinese about Grey's mail facilities (Peking Tel. No. 453, reporting the interview of 18 May at the K.P.A.).
(J. B. Denson)
Far Eastern Department
A. 7. Maddocks, Esq.,
HONG KONG.
c.c. Mr. Carter, C.0.
P.U.8.D.
SECRET
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
DJ. 12635 14 (4200)|
cair Carièr
PusD
co
SECRET
To Af Maddocks En
Hay Kum km
for modenam
"Please refer li
Cellr
my
(unmubent) of 10/2wen
asme Leslie Smitht
cominci
win in comasumises in
comayumisio
funnier mingle from Lostý
Henry Kong
Il cu un
пий
h
Snum
smim from
amin
you
will
هتمام
inne / The sysüm has
lasoured fring
in furomu рыбол
Cradock
has of
люби било
conne/ already Tacker in
Chinese
ado. Srey's mane
い
ректи
-facilities (Pekin, TH NO
45/3, reporting in interview
of MM
at in MFA)
383
r. Boyd F.E.D.
+
Reference
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
f 19 JUL 1968
FDI./1.
I enclose a minute by Leslie Smith in connection with his recent visit to Hong Kong in June, referred to in my minute of 10 June.
384
CODE 18-76
(C. Wilson)
4 July, 1968,
This showed also go in Hory Kamy.
î
attach
ики и
ی
до
frinin drsife
im Maddocks.
Jonno 16/7
in daysty
ра
To: Colin Wilson From: Leslie Smith.
SECRET
Reference.....
AR
(383)
FIND PA
1 July, 1968, 19 JUL 1968
FDY!!
When I was in Hong Kong last month I made a suggestion,
to be passed on to the Communists there through my usual
channel of communication that Anthony Grey, the Reaser
correspondent in custody there, should be permitted to
write freely to his mother. (Reuters told me that she
had received a letter at Christmas only).
A reply has come back which has been passed on to me
by post to the effect that although no reply had been
received on this subject from Peking by Fei Yi-zing,
publisher of the Hong Kong Communist daily Ta Kung Pao
to whom the message was sent, he thought that if a
request to this effect were to be made by H.M. Charge
d'Affaires in Peking it would be granted.
318
Cada 18-75;
SECRET
FDI/
SECRET
Encin
182
FOREIGN OFFICE,
S...1.
10 July, 1968.
Mr. L. C. Smith
We do
You may be interested to have the enclosed copy of a simte recently received in the Department from Leslie Smith, the former R.1.0. in Hong Kong. not think this link with the Communists is a particularly reliable one and, if approached again, do not, subject to your views, plan to offer Smith any particular encouragement in his endeavours. We do, however, remain interested to learn of any messages from the Communists coming through better established channels.
[Copies to: Kr.Carter,
P.U.S.D.
Mr. Carter, C.0.7
A. F. Maddocks, Esq.,
HONG KONG.
SECRET
(J. B, Denson)
Seur Al
AuR.
"/>
KENZIE TRA
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry FDI/I
No.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential
Restricted.
Unclassified.
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidenc
DRAFT
To:
AF Maddocks ст
нте кто
cc the Caver
32
Type 1 +
M. Denson
From
Telephone No. & Ext,
Department
co. PUSD
MuLc Smin
You may
inversão cô
have in enchard copy of
a
minuity recorithy receives in ine Deportment from leslie Simm, in former RIO.
in Hory King.
Think This link / is
not
partioiioncy
We do
with the Commuvusią
rehable are
"if appramil' ayamn,
and / shant water cucomaye
пок
Sato pa do not, para
Ensjeer in your views,
Siam
10
рат
offer
Sumin anny
portionina encouragement
in his endeavours. We do,
YAMH
however, remains
J
interesûd To leam of any
mennyes from in commmmons coming in rouyn berüer
esinblished channels.
Ed (5084)
I
Reference....
+
Coven Spanel.
ik- De
Degten
+ -------
381
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
15 JUL 1968
FDIT FDiff
INGRANGERS
Mr LC Smith's
conl'acti
HKC
My Murray sano minule befme going
my
the agreed to m
that coprès ma so
Icone and Peking.
|||
ih. Imith's
Leave
m
жиный
нте
ű
Он
reflectim I Think copying i Peking with only vanis fame
will
hopes and slimmials furine-
in andud of cutter's
vu
in HK
нк
I attain
cove
a ɣrafın
eng lelum to the that docks
ті нк
The draft has
тр
been cleared win the co
جب
în malûr win
I disunod in malin
спод
^^
The Ethioli weshdan, and
he agreed that the Imiîns
channe
""
in
commumili
was higits unrehabe
Jan
Ponyo 5/7
+
ORIG. Copy ON FC21/4 (13)
Cypher/CaL A
PRIORITY HONG KONG
TO
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
380
Telno E62
8 July 1968
10 JUL 1968
SECRET
Fall!
377
July,
Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No. 862 of
Repeated for information to Peking.
My telegram No. 849: Detainees.
FD1/1 (37
Release of the two detainees named in my telegram No. 322
to Peking took place as planned.
2.
We know that local Communists are aware of the release but there has so far been no (repeat no) report or comment in the Communist Press.
Commonwealth Office please pass Priority Peking.
Sir D. Trench
трист
[Repeated as requested}
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
H.K.Dept.
C.O.
S.A.D.
F.E.P.D.
News Dept.
Consular Dept.
3.0.
F.E.D.
U.N.Dept.
Defence Dept.
P.U.S.D.
I.R.D. News Dept.
T
BECRET
2.
:
375
Copy xendy
379
SECRET
CYPHER/CAT A
Japa
RECEIVED IN
DV: 5 No 31
PRIORITY HONG KONG
HO KONG TELEGRAM NO. 322 TO PEKING
TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
CALL 1068
5 JULY,
1968
SECRET
ADDRESSED PEKING TELEGRAM NO. 322 OF 5TH JULY REPEATED CO.
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 453.
PERSONS CONCERNED ARE:-
(A) CHEUNG CHO (1728/0146), A MEMBER OF THE PRINTING TRADE WORKERS'
UNION WHO SPREAD ANTI-GOVERNMENT PROPAGANDA AND ATTEMPTED TO INSTIG-
-ATE A STRIKE IN THE GOVERNMENT PRINTING DEPARTMENT WHERE HE WORKED.
(B) CHEUNG AH CHUN (1728/0068/3160), ENGLISH SECRETARY OF THE
CHINESE GENERAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND SECRETARY OF THE ALL
CIRCLES ANTI PERSECUTION STRUGGLE COMMITTEE.
FO PLEASE PASS PRIORITY BEKING.
SIR D. TRENCH
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED).
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
C.O.
H.K.D.
F.O. F.E.D.
F.O. CONSULAR DEPT.
U.N.D.
DEFENCE DEPT.
P.U.S.D.
I.R.D.
NEWS DEPT.
C.O. F.E. AND P.D.
S.A.D.
NEWS DEPT.
SECRET
En Clair
ORGI
Ma-espyon.
E244
CONFIDENTIAL
PRIJ VY PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Te?
631 4 July 1968.
UNCLASSIFIED.
об
RECEIVED IN [ARCHIVES No.31
- 9 JUL 1968
க FBI/1
RECEIVED IN
CHIVES No.3.1
- 8 JUL 1968
Addresscă to Foreign Office telegram No. 631 of
4 July. Repeated for information to Hong Kong.
Hong Kong telegram 345 [ Detainees] para. 3.
I agree.
Sir. D. Hopson.
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION.
376
مهبل
7つ
F.0.
F.E.D.
C.0.
H.K.D.
F.C.
Consular Department.
U.N. Department.
0.0.
Defence Department.
P.U.S.D.
I.R.D
News Department.
F.E.P.D.
S.A.D.
News Department.
CONFIDENTIAL
Oran copyon: FC24/4 205
CYPHER/CAT A
-
INMEDIATE HONG KONG
TELEGRAM NUMBER 849
CONFIDENTIAL
TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
4 JULY 1968
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
- 9 JUL 1968
347
Juparny
REC
13565
L
5501/1
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED-CO TELEGRAM NO. 849 OF 4TH JULY REPEATED PEKING.
пори
Серундове Copy het gel the
#
MY TELEGRAMS NOS, 845 AND 848: DETAINEES.
UNLESS I HEAR FROM YOU TO THE CONTRARY, PROPOSE TO RELEASE THE
FIRST TWO DETAINEES ON THE EVENING OF SATURDAY, 6TH JULY.
FO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE PEKING
SIR D. TRENCH
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED).
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
C.O. H.K.D.
F.E. AND P.D.
S.A.D.
NEWS DEPT.
CONSULAR DEPT.
F.O. F.E.D.
U.N.D.
DEFENCE DEPT.
P.U.S.D.
I.R.D.
NEWS DEPT.
ADVANCE COPIES SENT.
CONFIDENTIAL
F
¦
•
+4
+
Opis copy
on: F21 44 204
376
-
L
LINE AG KONG
EGULIBER 845
ANTIAL
SERVED WI
TO COMI
COMMONWEALTH OFFICERSEVES N.31
3 JULY 1968
! RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
- 9 JUL 1988
ๆๆ
FDI/I
ADVA
F.P.
TP.S.
P.U.S.
Siv> Allen M. Welko
HUGED CO TALNO 845 OF 3RD JULY KFI PEKING. Healy FET.
TILLERIA 639 : DETAINEES.
<8 JUL 1960
·C.A.D.
+
P. 5.
P.U.S.
Sin A Cindweithg
Mw. Murelios
:
Head of NEWS DO'Y "Henny Hag kay D "HE NEWS DEPT
A.MA SHEN AN NONA REPORT REPRODUCED BY AP STATING THAT THE
O...ESS GOVLANIENT INTEND TO DEPORT CAPTAIN POPE AND MR.
+
나
"D.Y.JONES.
: 5:OULD BE CRATEFUL FOR THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE NOTICE OF
TELL MERIVAL AT LO QU OR ALTERNATIVELY CONFIRMATION OF THEIR ACTUAL
LYN ITUNA FROS CHINA IF BY SONE OTHER ROUTE.
+
+
IT SEEMS TO ME THAT SONE ADVANTAGE HIGHT BE GAINED BY TIMING
... RELEASE OF THE FIRST TWO DETAINEES TO FOLLOW AS CLOSELY AS
T
MOLLE AFTER THE ACTUAL EXPULSION OF POPE AND JONES, ADMITTEDLY,
J
11. OF THE DETAINEES PROPOSED IS IN A PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT
...OSITIVE CATEGORY AND I WOULD NOT HANT TO HAKE UNSOLICITED
LIDITY OF THEIR RELEASE BUT I FEEL THAT THE COINCIDENCE WOULD
JADO UNNOTICED BY THE COMMUNISTŠAND THAT WE MIGHT BY THIS
KING LAVE A BETTER CHANCE OF GAINING SOMETHING WITHOUT STANDING
TO UPC. MRYTHING.
TO GLEASE FASS IZAZDIATE PEKING.
SEN
94552 3 JULY
K200 04552 3 JULY
+
+
וי
.
י
1
ypher/Cat A
PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
I copy for entry in ES...Dept. H.K. Dept.
Top copy sent to
SECRET
AR
RECEIVED IN
-
- 5 JUL 1368
FD!|!
Peking telegram No. 453 to Hong Kong
SECRET
41
Фариду
3 July, 1968
F
Addressed to Hong Kong telegram No. 453 of 3 July, Repeated for information to Foreign Office,
Your telegram No. 839 to 0.0.
It would be useful to know names and professions of those proposed for release.
Foreign Office pass Hong Kong.
Sir D. Hopson
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
C.O. H.K. Dept.
F.O. F.E.D.
F.0. Consular Dept.
U.N. Dept.
Defence Dept.
P.U.S.D.
I.R.D.
News Dept.
0.0. F.E. & P.D.
S.A.D.
News Dept.
[Repeated as requested]
WWWWW
SECRET
CYPHER CAT A
SECRET
PRIORITY HONG KONG TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TEIM 39
2 JULY, 1968
Received IN (ARCHIVES No.31
- 8 JUL 1968
FD1/
SECRET
ADDRESSED TO CO TELNO 639 OF 2ND JULY RFI PEKING.
374
Jaipur/>
PEKING TELEGRAM 691 : DETAINEES.
A COPY OF THE STUDY IS BEING SENT TO YOU AND PEKING BY BAG: IT
MAY BE NECESSARY TO PARAPHRASE PARTS OF THE PEKING COPY FOR SECURITY
REASONS.
2.
PARA 4. THE PROPOSAL IS THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO NEUTKALISE1'
ONLY A VERY SMALL PROPORTION OF THOSE RELEASED.WE SHOULD OF COURSE
ACT EXTREMELY CAREFULLY. THE OBJECT WOULD BE SUBTLY TO THROW DOUBT
UPON THE CONTINUED RELIABILITY OF ONE OR TWO. THERE WOULD BE NO
EFFORT TO '*TURN** THEM.
3. MY INTENTION IN MAKING A FEW RELEASES IS IN PART TO DEMONSTRATE
A DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY TO OUTSIDE OPINION E.G. INTERNATIONAL RED
CROSS. NATURALLY I HOPE ALSO THAT A FEW RELEASES MAY HELP TO
IMPROVE THE GENERAL SINQ-BRITISH ATHOSPHERE BUT I AGREE TANGIBLE
RESULTS ARE NOT VERY LIKELY. LOCALLY I DO NOT EXPECT THIS ACTION
TO HAVE AY BENEFICIAL EFFECT AND HOPE ONLY FOR NO SERIOUS ILL-
EFFECTS.
4. I PROPOSE TO RELEASE TWO DETAINEES DURING THE NEXT FEW WEEKS
AND ANOTHER TWO SHORTLY AFTERWARDS. THE EXACT TIMING WOULD BE
DECIDED IN THE LIGHT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. I SHALL, OF COURSE,
GIVE YOU AND PEKING NOTICE.
15.
SECRET
.5.
SECRET
2.
ON THE BASIS OF THE REACTION TO THESE RELEASES AND OTHER
RELEVANT FACTORS I WILL THEN CONSIDER WHETHER WE CAN CONTEMPLATE
GOING ANY FURTHER.
b. I FEAR THERE IS NOTHING I FEEL I CAN USEFULLY ADD TO WHAT I
HAVE ALREADY SAID ON THE OTHER ISSUES IN THE TELEGRAMS UNDER
REFERENCE. HOWEVER, I WILL OF COURSE CONTINUE TO BEAR THESE VIEWS
IN MIND AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPS HERE.
F.0. PLEASE PASS PRIORITY PEKING,
SIR D. TRENCH
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED).
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
0.0. H.K.D.
F.E. AND P.D. SOUTH ASIA DEPT. NEWS DEPT.
F.O. F.E.D.
CONSULAR DEPT. U.N.D.
DEFENCE DEPT.
P.U.S.D.
I.R.D.
NEWS DEPT.
+
SECRET
F
•
+
+
RESTRICTED
"PHER/CAT 'A *
PRIORITY HONG KONG TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
JENO. 828
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES N..31
- 8 JUL 1968
373
28 JUNE 1968
Fall
Jupa of
わっ
RESTRICTED
ADDRESSED CO TELEGRAM NO. 828 OF 28TH JUNE REPEATED PEKING
PA SINGAPORE AND WASHINGTON.
BETWEEN 23 AND 28 JUNE 22 (TWENTY TWO BADLY DECOMPOSED BODIES
WERE RECOVERED FROM THE SEA OR WASHED UP ON THE SEA SHORE IN BRITISH
TERRITORY, NEARLY ALL WERE CHINESE MALES BETWEEN THIRTY AND FORTY
YEARS OF AGE. TWO WERE FEMALES AND IN ONE OR TWO CASES IT HAS BEEN
IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE SEX.
SEVENTEEN OUT OF THE TWENTY TWO BODIES RECOVERED HAD THEIR HANDS
BOUND BEHIND THEIR BACKS. IN MANY CASES THE ROPE ALSO PASSED ROUND
THE NECK. ONE BODY WAS FOUND WITH A BLINDFOLD AS WELL AS BEING
BOUND, AND HAD WHAT APPEARED TO BE A HOLE ABOUT TWO BY THREE INCHES
IN THE RIGHT CHEST.
3. AUTOPSIES HAVE BEEN PERFORMED ON FOUR OF THE BODIES BUT THE RES-
-ULTS ARE NOT YET KNOWN. THEIR GENERAL STATE INDICATES THAT THEY
WERE IN THE WATER FOR TWO OR THREE WEEKS BEFORE BEING RECOVERED.
RESTRICTED
/4. MORE OF
RESTRICTED
• 2
4. MORE OF THE BODIES WERE RECOVERED IN THE WESTERN AREAS OF THE
COLONY. THE INFERENCE IS THAT THEY CAME FROM THE PEARL RIVER
ESTUARY AND ARRIVED IN HONG KONG WATERS, INSTEAD OF BEING SWEPT
OUT TO SEA, BECAUSE OF UNUSUAL TIDE CONDITIONS. IT IS HARD TO
ESCAPE THE CONCLUSION THAT THEY ARE VICTIMS OF FACTIONAL FIGHTING
IN KWANGTUNG PROVINCE, OR CONCEIVABLY KWANGSI, WHERE THERE HAVE
BEEN PERSISTENT REPORTS OF VIOLENT STRUGGLES.
5. THE STORY HAS AROUSED INTENSE INTEREST IN THE LOCAL ENGLISH
LANGUAGE AND RIGHT-WING CHINESE PRESS, BUT THE BODIES HAVE RECEIVED
NO CREPEAT NO MENTION SO FAR IN THE COMMUNIST PRESS.
PEKING
FO PLEASE PASS ROUTINE PEKING AS MYTEL 315, AND WASHINGTON AS
KITEL Bộ
SIR D. TRENCH
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
C.O.
H.K.D.
F.E. & P.D.
I.R.D.
NEWS DEPT.
F.0.
F.E.D.
DDDDD
S.E.A.D. NEWS DEPT.
D.I.S.K.O.D.
+
RESTRICTED
CYPPEF/CAT A
KONG
andidiasinl
TC: COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
T: 627
*2;
'28 JUNE, 1968. •
ECONFIDENTI AL
AVED IN
.VES N..31
- 8 JUL 1968
西小
FDILI
ACLFESSED CO TELEGEAN NO. 827 CF 28TH JUNE REPEATED PEKING.
372
دية
PEKING TELEGPA C. 01 TO FOREIGN OFFICE.
UNTIL RECENTLY THE MAJORITY OF COMMUNIST PRISONERS REFUSED TO WORK, AND ALTHOUGH THEY WEFE ALLOWED PRIVILEGES SUCH AS THAT OF RECEIVING VISITS IKE) WERE KEPT LOCKED IN THEIF CELLS EXCEPT DURING
EXCEFCISE PEFICDS. OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS PRISON STAFF HAVE
TFIED TO PERSUADE THER TC WORK, BUT NO PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE, LARGELY BECAUSE THE PRISONERS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO IMPOSE UNACCEPTABLE
CONDITIONS.
2. IN THE LAST TWO DAYS THERE HAS BEEN A COMPLETE CHANGE OF ATTITUDE.
ALL COMMUNIST PRISOXELS, INCLUDING THE JOURNALISTS ARE NOW WORKING
IN THE NORMAL WAY. THEY ARE NO LONGER BEING KEPT LOCKED IN THEIR
CELLS.
3. THE FEASON FOR THIS DEVELOPMENT IS NOT CLEAR, BUT THE ARGUMENT
THAT COMMUNIST PRISONERS ARE BEING GRANTED PRIVILEGES TO WHICH THEY ARE NOT ENTITLED CE.G. PARAGRAPH OF OUR TELEGRAM NO. 591) IS
NO LONGER VALID.
FO PLEASE PASS ROUTINE PEKING AS MYTEL 314.
SIR. D. TRENCH
Í REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
C.O.
F.C.
HONG KONG DEPARTMENT. F.E.D.
C.O.
SOUTH ASIA DEPARTENT
F.E.P.D.
NEWS DEPARTMENT.
F.0.
U.N. DEPAETLENT
DEFENCE DEPARTMENT
P.U.S.D.
I.R.D.
NEAS DEPARTHENT.
CONSULAR. DEPARTLENT.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
CYPHLR/CAT A
PRIORITY HONG KONG
LEGRAN NUMBER 779
CONFIDENTIAL
Galit nemm
marju
TH
TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
18 JUNE 1960
RECEIVED IN
*-> No.31
19 JUN 968
ADDRESSED PEKING TELNO 295 OF 16TH JUNE RFI CO PA SINGAPORE.
TOUR TELEGRAM 412 (571 TO LONDON NOT TO SINGAPORE.
·
ARRESTS ON 11TH, 13TH AND 14TH JUNE AT CHEUNG SHA WAN. READ IN
FOUR COLUMNS (A) ARRESTED (B) RELEASED SEFORE TRIAL (O) CONVICTED
(D) HELD PENDING TRIAL.
11TH JUNE (A) 3 (B) NIL (3) 1 (D) ?.
13TH JUNE CA) 13 (B) 3 (THAT NIGHT) (0) 1 (0) 9.
14TH JUNE (A) 14 CB) 1 (THAT NIGHT, 7 AFTER INVESTIGATION) (C) 2
402 6.
TOTAL (A) 32 (8) 11 (3) 4 (D) 17 ALL CONVICTED PLEADED GUILTY.
FO PLEASE PASS PRIORITY PEKING 295.
BIR D. TRENCH
(REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
C.O. HONG KONG DEPT.
F.O. F.E.D.
C.0. F.E. & F.DEPT.
F.O. P.U.S.D.
I.R.D.
CONSULAR DEPT.
I.P.2.
GUIDANCE DEPT.
NEWS DEPT.
CONFIDENTIAL
!
I
CONFIDENTIAL
бей созыл
mela
370
ka 2576
была
TO COMOWKALTH OFFICE.
CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE BONG KONG
TIJA (AM NO. 715
RECEIVED IT.
!ARCHIV: No : 1 24 JUN 1968
01/1
* JOEL 1968
CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED COMMONWEALTH OFFICE AS KY TELEGRAM NO. 705 DATED 20TH JUNE,
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO POLAD SINGAPORE AND PEKING.
MY IMEDIATELY PRECEDINO TELEGIAT: CHEUNG SHA VAN.
DURING THE NICHT 15/16 JUNE AN URBAN SERVICES WORK PARTY REMOVED TWO
PORTRAITS OF HAC, RED FLAGO AND A UANTITY OF PROPAGANDA HATERIAL
FROM A CORNER OF THE PLAYGROUND WHICH HAD BEEN THE FOCUS OF COMMUNIST
DISTURBANCES. THESE ARE NOW HELD IN THE LOCAL POLICE STATION AWAITING
CLAIMANTS.
CO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO PEKING AS ¡YTEL. 10. 208.
SIR D. TRENCH
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
ADVANCE COPIES SENT
C.O.
H.K.D.
F.O.
F.E.D.
0.0.
F.E.P.D.
NEWS DEPT.
CONSULAR DEPT.
I.P.D.
GUIDANCE DEPT.
I.R.D.
F.0.
P.U.S.D.
NEWS DEPT.
CONFIDENTIAL
EN CLAIR
F
IMMEDIATE HONG KONG TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELNO 784
20 JUNË, 1968
budilogy
A rela
RE
Jana (369
ARC
2516
24 JUN 1500
ADDRESSED CO TELEGRAM NO. 784 OF 2011 JUNE REPEATED PEKING AND
PA SINGAPORE.
(368)
PEKING TELEGRAM NO. 418 : CHEUNGSHAWAN,
1. 13TH JUNE.
ABOUT 500 PEOPLE GATHERED IN THE PLAYGROUND, SANG AND CHANTED REVOLUTIONARY SONGS BUT DISPERSED QUICKLY WHEN ORDERED OUT BY A POLICE RIOT COMPANY AT 2030. THE PLAYGROUND WAS CLEARED AND LOCKED. FOR THE NEXT TWO HOURS SMALL CROWDS FORMED NEARBY AND HARASSED POLICE PATROLS, OCCASIONALLY THROWING STONES AND BOTTLES AND SETTING FIRE TO BASKETS IN THE ROAD. LATER SIX SMALL GROUPS GATHERED, FOUR DISPERSING OF THEIR OWN ACCORD WHILE TWO WERE BROKEN UP BY POLICE WITH TWO ARRESTS. AT ABOUT 2300 A CROWD OF ABOUT 300 FORMED NEAR THE PLAYGROUND SINGING AND CHANTING. POLICE MADE 12 ARRESTS IN DISPERSING THEM, 4 ARRESTED WERE DETAINED IN HOSPITAL, NONE SERIOUSLY HURT. NO POLICE CASUALTIES. NEITHER FIREARMS NOR TEAR SMOKE WERE USED. ALL WAS
QUIET BY MIDNIGHT.
2. 14TH JUNE.
BY 2100 A CROWD OF 1,000 HAD GATHERED IN A WIDE CIRCLE AND BEGAN CHANTING. A POLICE RIOT COMPANY CLEARED AND LOCKED THE PLAYGROUND. AGAIN SHALL GROUPS HARASSED POLICE PATROLS IN NEARBY STREETS IN THE SAME PATTERN AS THE PREVIOUS NIGHT THOUGH MORE INTENSIVELY, BY 2330 THE AREA HAD BEEN CLEARED WITHOUT USE OF FIREARMS OR TEAR SMOKE. 16 PEOPLE WERE ARRESTED INCLUDING TWO STUDENTS FROM A NEARBY COMMUNIST SCHOOL, 5 RECEIVING MINOR INJURIES. 6 POLICE OFFICERS WERE SLIGHTLY INJURED.
/3. ON
-2-
3. ON 15TH AND 16TH JUNE THE PLAYGROUND WAS LOCKED AT ABOUT
1800 EACH NIGHT AND REOPENED THE NEXT DAY WITHOUT INCIDENT. SINCE
17 JUNE IT HAS REMAINED UNLOCKED AND TROUBLEFREE.
4. A POINT OF NOTE IS THE NUMBER OF MALCONTENTS, ALMOST CERTAIN
NOT COMMUNISTS, WHO TOOK PART IN THE DISTURBANCES. OBVIOUSLY THE
PLAYGROUND HAD BECOME A MAGNET FOR UNRULY ELEMENTS.
5. SEE ALSO MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.
FO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE PEKING AS MYTEL 297 AND PA SINGAPORE
(ROUTINE) AS MYTEL 117.
BIR D. TRENCH
C.O.
F.0.
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
H.K.D. F.E.D.
0.0.
F.B.P.D.
NEWS DEPT.
CONSULAR DEPT.
I.P.D.
GUIDANCE DEPT.
I.R.D.
P.U.3.D.
+
F.0.
NEWS DEPT.
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
ADVANCE COPIES SENT
368
CYPHER/CAT A
Second copy for entry
Top copy sent to
CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO. 575
Rc.
in
FE
на
...opt.
ARCHIVES No 3
19 JUN 1968-
19 June, 1968
1
Dept.
CONFIDENTIAL
Addressed to Hong Kong telegram No. 418 of 19 June, Repeated for information to Foreign Office.
Note Your telegram No. 295.
Grateful for immediate information on events of 13 and 14 June. Your telegram No. 284 referred only to 11 June.
Sir D. Hopson
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION.
CO: H.K.D.
FO: F.E.D.
CO: F.E. & P.D.
FO: P.U.S.D.
I.R.D.
Consular Dept.
I.P.D.
Guidance Dept.
News Dept.
PPPPP
CONFIDENTIAL
JYPHER/CAT A
CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELNO. 571
CONFIDENTIAL
17 June, 1968
TOP COPY
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES Mo 31
الكان 17
J
FONI
Addressed to Hong Kong telegram No. 412 of 17 June. Repeated for information to Foreign Office.
According to NCNA of 17 June (Item 061610), three June and over twenty people during incidents at Cheungshawan-
if so, how many of those arrested
people were arrested on 11 Arrested on 13 and 14 June Are these figures correct? are still held?
Sir D. Hopson
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
FO: F.E.D.
CO: H.K.D.
PO: P.U.S.D.
1.R.D.
Consular Dept. T.P.D.
Guidance Dept. News Dept.
CO: F.E. & P.D.
FDI/1
Janaras
My
р
tulâ
Hung Kury file (in
amedi
thom
an
:) Js
Jazon 2020
PPPPP
CONFIDENT LAL
EN CLAIR
IMMEDIATE
HONG KONG
ΤΟ COMMONT, EALTH OFFICE
19 JUNE 1968
ры
28
366
REC ED IN ARCHIVES No.31
20 JUN 1968
FR/1.
TELNO 782
UNCLASSIFIED
ADDSD PSKING AS HYTEL 296 DATED 19 JUNE RFI CO WASHINGTON
AND SINGAPORE.
ONE
YRTEL 416 PEOPLES DAILY REPORT OF CHEUNG SHA WAN INCIDENT.
NO ONE (REPEAT) NO ONE WAS KILLED OR SERIOUSLY WOUNDED IN
THESE INCIDENTS.
NONA REPORT OF 16 TH JUNE DATELINED HONG KONG AND
OTHER VERSIONS OF INCIDENTS IN LOCAL COMMUNIST PRESS MADE
NO CREPEAT) NO SUCH ALLEGATIONS.
SIR D. TRENCH
DEPA. TRENTAL DISTRIBUTION
3.0.
F.2.D.
C.U.
H.h.b.
F..
S.E.A.D.
DEFENCE DEPT.
P.U.S.D.
NELS DEFT,
C.0.
P.A.D.
1. & G.D.
I.R.D.
NEWS DEPT.
DIS MOD
ADVANCE CUPIES SENT
L
_]
r
H
CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY HONG KONG
Guena y cream
ни
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
1 - JUN 1968
19/3
CONFIDENTIAL
西
TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 751
12 JUNE 1968
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED CO TELEGRAM NO. 751 OF 12 JUNE REPEATED PEKING.
IT BECAME NECESSARY LAST NIGHT TO TAKE ACTION TO DISPERSE UNRULY
AND NOISY CROWDS CHANTING COMMUNIST SLOGANS IN THE SHAMSHUIPO
AREA. IN THE PROCESS 11 GAS SHELLS, ONE BATON SHELL AND ONE
CHEMICAL MACE WERE DISCHARGED SEMICOLON ONE MAN WAS INJURED.
2. COMMUNISTS HAVE RECENTLY BEEN HOLDING NOISY ASSEMBLIES IN A
PUBLIC PLAYGROUND IN THE SHAMSHUIPO AREA DURING THE EVENINGS, AND THESE HAVE BEEN THE CAUSE OF COMPLAINTS FROM PERSONS IN THE
NEIGHBOURHOOD. THEY ALSO APPEARED TO BE INCREASING IN FREQUENCY
AND SCALE AND THERE WAS A GROWING RISK THAT IN THIS VERY CROWLED
AND ROUGH NEIGHBOURHOOD A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS BREACH OF THE PEACE MIGHT RESULT. POLICE RECENTLY ISSUED A WARNING TO A UNION BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN SUCH GATHERINGS, AND ATTENTION
WAS INVITED TO THEIR ILLEGAL NATURE AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
PUBLIC ORDER ORDINANCE.
CONFIDENTIAL
13. A
CONFIDENTIAL
2
3. A CROWD OF ABOUT 400 WHICH WAS JUDGED TO BE AN ILLEGAL ASSEMBLY
AS WELL AS A NUISANCE WAS TOLD TO DISPERSE. A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER
OF THOSE INVOLVED DID DISPERSE BUT HARD CORE COMMUNISTS REMAINED.
CHANTING AND SHOUTING CONTINUED AND ACTION WAS TAKEN TO DISPERSE
CROWDS IN THE NEIGHBOURING STREETS WHICH REFORMED 3 TINES BEFORE
FINALLY DISPERSING. ONLY FOUR RIOT PLATOONS WERE INVOLVED
AND IT WAS SIGNIFICANT THAT THERE WAS NO SPREAD OF THE DISTURBANCE
IN A VERY HEAVILY POPULATED AREA WHERE THE COMMUNISTS MIGHT HAVE
HOPED FOR A DEGREE OF INVOLVEMENT OF THE GENERAL POPULATION.
FOREIGN OFFICE PLEASE PASS PRIORITY PEKING AS HY TELEGRAM NO. 284.
SIR D. TRENCH
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
C.0.
H.K. DEPT. F.E. & P.D.
I.P.D. I.R.D.
DEFENCE DEPT. NEWS DEPT. O.P.A. O.L.A.
F
F.O. F.E.D.
S.E.A.D. NEWS DEPT.
D.1.8. M.O.D.
FFFFF
CONFIDENTIAL
(PD 1/1)
D = D.
SECRET
(364)
FOREIGN OFFICE, 8.W.1.
R. Q.
2915
29 May, 1968.
357
Thank you for your letter of 23 Xay (BWB 13/7) enclosing a copy of a letter from Anthony Elliott in Hong Kong querying a passage in the Commonwealth Secretary's Daspatch of 16 April. As you point out, paragraph 3 of the Despatch was based on the view I had expressed in my letter FD 1/1 of 8 Xarch.
2.
I agree with Anthony Elliott that there can be more than one view on this matter. It is difficult to predict future events in China and I suppose we cannot totally rule out a further wave of radicalism at some time in the future which would take observers by surprise as did the Cultural Revolution. Such an event seems improbable in the next fow years; and with the departure of Mao from the scene it should become that much less likely. As for the Cultural Revolution itself, we here do not how give the more radical elements much chance of taking the initiative for the rerainder of the movement. We have, however, taken Anthony Elliott's point and I share your view that no useful purpose is to be served by continuing the exchange.
W. S. Carter, Esq., C.V.0.,
Hong Kong Department,
Commonwealth Office.
SECRET
(James Murray)
3853
Copy also on FDX/38
RECEIVED IN I ARCHIVES No.347
2
358
En Clair
PRIC.......PY KUALA LUMPUR TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
Pelno 624
CLASSIFIED
20 May. 1968
RECENED
ARCHIVES No.31 29 MAY 1968
FDI/!
Addressed to Peking telegram No. 1 of 20 May. ranted for information to: Hong Kong
This is on
FETEST
0.0.
ри
Peking telegram No. 321 to Hong Kong (No. 446 to F.0.). Fullest text available here is as follows from Straits Times
My min
TRA
18 Kay.
Begins:
An effective British garrison will be maintained in Hong Kong Whatever happens in Singapore" Hong Kong's Governor
Sir David Trench said here today. Sir David made a brief stop over at Subang Air Port after three weeks routine consultation talks with officials in London on defence and devaluation of sterling.
"I met the Foreign Secretary Mr. Michael Stewart and the Commonwealth Secretary Hr. George Thomson, and we discussed the implications of the rundown of British troops in Singapore" he said.
"It has been decided that an effective garrison will be
maintained in Hong Kong whatever happens in Singapore".
=
Speaking on the possible date when the colony would achieve Independence, Sir David said it would not be for a long time due to China's present difficult mood.
He also met British Treasury officials to discuss the after
Mfects of sterling devaluation on the Hong Kong dollar.
"Hong Kong's economy however is better than before because our exports went up by 22 per cent in the first three months of this bar and our growth rate increased by 16 point 9 per cent.
rigts
"There has been no loss of confidence in Hong Kong among the ciness community in spite of last year's rigts in fact the world inous more about the colony than it used to đồ and the people are
Shired for their stand against the Communists.
"The people are fed up with the Communists though they are still eaving trouble with all sorts of propaganda moves like complaining
inst the salinity of the water".
3ads.
1. Walker
- EPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
3.0. Hong Kong Dept.
Defence Dept.
F.3. and P.D.
C.F.P.D.
0.7.D.
Research Dept.
I.P.D.
Guidance Dept.
News Dept.
... F.E.D.
S.3.A.D.
Defence Dept.
:
I
7
363
ון
Fall.
CYPHER/CAT -A-
ROUTINE HONG KONG
TELEGRAF NUMBER (61
CONFIDENTIAL
شاملة تناسب
"Enter th
(So schlimens
KNK
362
RECEIVED IN ¡ARCHIVES No.31 28 MAY 1968
TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
25 MAY 1968
Fr
1
вираж
-
Notez Brand.
CONFIDENTIAL.
"ADDRESSED UKREP KUALA LUMPUR AS MY TELEGRAM NO. 12 DATED 25TH MAY
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PEKING AND THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE.
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 2 TO PEKING.
CAN FALLE SAY WHETHER THE PERSON SEATED ON HY LEFT AT LUNCH AT
AIRPORT WAS A MEMBER OF THE PRESS? IF SO I AM AFRAID THAT I DID
NOT REALIZE IT, AND THOUGHT HE WAS A MSA REPRESENTATIVE: HENCE
HIS-STATEMENT IN MY TELEGRAM 238 TO PEKING FOR WHICH I APOLOGIZE.
2. OTHERWISE I CANNOT RECOLLECT TALKING TO THE PRESS AT KUALA LUMPUR
AT ALL.
Fo/1(359
CO PLEASE PASS KUALA LUMP
LUMPUR 12 AND PEKING 207.
SIR D. THENUN
[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
0.0.
11.K.D. F.E.F.D.
NEJS DEPT.
7.C.
F.4.D.
CONFIDENTIAL
1
+
I
Ed (4296)
•
I
!
|
Reference.
FD4/11 (361)
TRANSFERRED TO
4
FD19/1 @
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31,
2 - HAY 1968
Frill
CYPHER/CATA
Second copy for entry in
F
for entry in .........D
HW
Top copy sent to
CONFIDENTIAL
ROUTINE SINGAPORE POLAD
TO FOREIGN OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 348
7
23 MAY 1968.
360
Dept.
Jummarys
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED TO PEKING TELEGRAM NO 15 OF 23/5 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
TO FOREIGN OFFICE KUALA LUMPUR HONG KONG AND SAVING TO BRC SINGA?
HONG KONG TEL NO.238 TO YOU.
CINCFE ACCOMPANIED SIR J. TRENCH TO THE AIRPORT. HIS RECOLLECT.OX
IS THAT ONE MAN APPROACHED THE GOVERNOR AND ASKED HIM SOME QUESTIONE.
CINCFE DID NOT HOWEVER HEAR THESE OR THE ANSWERS.
PERVAG
FO PSE PASS PERKIC AS MY TEL NO15
DIR D. MAISON
PILLS
0.0.
H.A.D.
7.0. V.E.D.
5.0. F.2. & P.D.
NEWS DEPA,
(REPLATED AS REQUESTED'
CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY
PRIORITY HONG KONG
359
TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No 31
TELED NUMBER 633
20 MAY 1968
22 MAY 1968
A
CONFIDENTIAL
ADDRESSED PEKING TELEGRAM NO. 238 OF 20TH MAY REPEATED
CO, PA SINGAPORE, AND HO KUALA LUMPUR.
[ads. H. K.Jpt.]
Japa
28/15
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 321.
O
I MADE NO STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS IN KUALA LUMPUR. IN SINGAPORE
2
I WAS ASKED (INTER ALIA) WHEN HONG KONG WOULD BECOME INDEPENDANT. IN REPLY, I REFERRED TO STATEMENTS MADE IN PARLIAMENT BY MINISTERS POINTING OUT THE DIFFICULTIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADVANCE IN HONG KONG ARISING FROMH
ROTHONG KONG'S PECULIAR POSITION,
I WAS ASKED 'DOES THIS MEAN HONG KONG WILL NEVER BE INDEPENDANT? ' AND REPLIED 'NEVER IS A LONG WOR
новоро
. CERTAINLY NOT IN MY TIME.
RESPONSE TO FURTHER PRESSING 1 SAID SOME THING TO THE EFFECT THAT IF HONG KONG HAD BEEN A FURTHER 100 MILES OUT TO SEA, SHE MIGHT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE INDEPENDENCE BEFORE.
IN
IT HAS
2. ABOVE IS TO THE BEST OF MY RECOLLECTION AND IT WAS FAIRLY CLEAR REPORTERS PRESENT WERE UNLIKELY TO GRASP FULLY ANYTHING SAID TO
THEM. SINGAPORE MAY BE ABLE TO ELABORATE FURTHER FROM RECOLLECTION
OF OFFICERS PRESENT AT INTERVIEW.
FO PLEASE PASS PRIORITY PEKING AS MYTEL 238, AND PRIORITY HC
KUALA LUMPUR AS MYTEL 10.
LUMPUR
(Repeated as requested
Files
Jepr 17 x
co. H.K. Jt.
H.K.b. 4
F.E.P K/
Sir Drench
GOVERNOR
Fillo
Jopr 17 x
co. H.K. It.
F.E.P...
News
FO FE.
4
5/
5
1 Hd. Sommo. Ipt. 3. A.D.R.
+ Top R. 117
SENT 04152/20
Q 04152/20
Y.T.1
1
+
I
P
P
LU F 307
27002
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No S 22 MAY 1968
FO
Znd
Copy for Cartry Top Copy with Hw.
-
348
FP HOPEL
HUXSF
DEKING
P
1604252
[Adv. HK.
JB 2018
HR.DK.]
біра
FR ISOLLY 44638
30/3
KONG
ADDRESSED TO HONG KONG TEL NO.321 OF 18/5 EPTD FOR INFO TO
FOREIGN OFFICE AND KUALA LUMPUR.
CRATEFUL FOR TEXT BY TELECFAM OF FEXAFKS EY GOVERNOR IM
KUALA LUMPUR 17 MAY ON FUTURE OF HOKC KONG.
HOPSON.
Files
co. H.K. Dpt. 4.
Top + 18 x
1
ро
PO FE.
5
со гер
News
i Hd. Comms. Opt.
R. 129
3 A. D.R.
2+
Top
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+
1
312
Subuni w
SECRET
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
27 MAY 1968
HWB 13/7
;ear James,
PDI ||
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE,
FD1/1.
London, S.W. 1.
23 May, 1968
357
I enclose a copy of a letter from Anthony Elliott, in
which he queries the assessment in paragraph 3 of our Despatch
of 16 April replying to the Governor's Despatch No. 239
reporting developments in Hong Kong since June 1967.
We based this paragraph in our Despatch on your letter
to me (FD.1/1) of 8 March. It does not seem that a reply is
expected, and I must leave it to you to decide whether it
would serve a useful purpose to continue the argument.
Yours
Bunny
(W. S. Carter)
For commander.
J. Murray, Esq., CMG., Foreign Office.
На Вороб
Пе
SECRET
Mess
(23 Mary
COPY
SCR.1/4841/55
SECRET
Colonial Secretariat
Lower Albert Road Hong Kong
16th May, 1968
Dear Bunny,
I hope it is in order to let you know that the Local Intelligence Committee had some doubts about one passage in Mr.Thomson's despatch HWB 13/7 of 16th April, 1968, commenting on H.E.'s despatch No. 239 of 15th February; and we though
it might be useful to put them on record informally. I am signing this letter in the absence of the Secretary through illness.
2. We do not wholly agree with the theory in paragraph 3 of the despatch that it should be possible to rely indefinitely on the P.L.A. or the more moderate elements in the Peking leadership to prevent a return to the extreme policies adopted towards Hong Kong in 1967, The basic point is surely that the relative strengths of the three major power groups mentioned cannot be assumed to be static. The extremists, for example, seemed to have regained a good deal of influence in internal policies during the last month or two. We agree that factional disturbances in the Chinese provinces, even including Kwangtung, are not likely to have a very significant effect on Chinese policies towards Hong Kong. But the problem really is how far an increase of extremist influence at the centre in Peking would lead to a recrudescence of extreme and violent policies here. On this point it seems to us that it would be rash to make any easy assumptions.
W.9. Carter, Esq., C.V.0.,
Foreign Office,
Downing Street,
London, S.W. 1.
Yours ever,
(Sgd.) Anthony Elliott
(T.A.K. Elliott)
SECRET
$56)
1
Foill
CONFIDENTIAL
Me Dedsa
29 thard. 16th
16th April, 1968
Mo Boyd 12 1975 pr. (343
закрыта
Thank you for your letter of 25th March (PEX/3) asking about the numbers of confrontation prisoners still in custody in Hong Kong. Below is a list giving numbers due for release in the next few years. I hesitate to add that in addition to those listed there are three prisoners who are under life sentence for bombing offences.
Release Dates of Prisoners due for Release. Ova * Stanley from 1/4/1968
Year
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
Number due for Release
422
147
30
27
3
86
5
-|
20
4
I am sending a copy of this letter to James Murray in the Far Eastern Department.
(T.A.K. Elliott)
P. Cradock həq., C.M.G.,
Office of the British
Chargé d'Affaires,
PEKING.
c.c. J. Murray Esq., C.M.G.
Far Eastern Department, Foreign Office.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
354
Flag A
är. Vilkingom
Sir D. Amen
Mr. Samual
Sir D. hobill P.YS.
¡ RECEIVED IN
ARCHIV-3 No.31
7- MAY 1968
F&
FBI/I
HONG KONG
In the course of discussions which I had with the
Governor in Hong Kong last January, he expressed concern
lest, now that the campaign of violence had been dropped,
Whitehall would be only too happy to forget about Hong Kong
and sweep its problems under the carpet. I assured him I
had noticed no tendency whatsoever on the part of the Common-
wealth Office to do this, and that we in the Office were well
aware that there were no grounds for complacency.
He said,
however, that he was more concerned about other Departments
like the Board of Trade which, to judge from correspondence
which bis officers were receiving, seemed to take it that
everything in Hong Kong was now back to normal. I told him
that I would do my best to arrange for a formal communication
to him to the effect that H.K.G. were fully aware of the
continuing threat to Hong Kong and saw no grounds for complacency,
and for the distribution of this communication to the relevant
Departments in Whitehall.
·
6308
2. The Governor's despatch of 13 February reviewing develop-
ments since last June seemed to provide a suitable occasion,
and I proposed to the Commonwealth Office that in their reply
they should bear in mind my undertaking to the Governor.
The
/reply
CONFIDENTIAL
Flag
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2
(*349
reply (despatch HWB 13/7 of 16 April) was a long time in
preparation. But it does meet the requirement;
been given an appropriate distribution.
James Many
(James Murray)
1 Kay, 1968
and it has
These are
important despatches.
all
E
The most significant passage of perhaps in the Governor's last paragraph,
which reminds
W
that the shadow of 1997
New Territories lease) is already falling
iend of
the yo
younger generation of Hong Kong
Chimese.
Denis Allen. Yr
рис
DrGreenhill 6/5
び
3
CONFIDENTIAL
6.6/5 pm.
353
CONFIDENTIAL
Japu 251+
Cypher/Cat A
PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno 347
CONFIDENTIAL
24 April 1968
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
25 APR 1968
FDIL!
343
Addressed to Hong Kong telegram No. 215 of 24 April Repeated for information to Foreign Office
Political Adviser.
Grateful for an early reply to Cradock's letter PEK/3 of 25 March, In particular grateful if you could telegraph details concerning two NCNA prisoners and
dept possible information on other Communist prisoners in
summarized form.
Foreign Office please pass Hong Kong
Sir D. Hopson
[Repeated as requested]
FILES
F.O. F.E.D.
News Dept.
C.O. H.K. Dept.
News Dept.
S.A.D.
F.E. & P.D.
J.I.P.D. J.I.G.D. I.R.D.
FFFFF
CONFIDENTIAL
CYPHER CAT A
IMMEDIATE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELNO 678
CONFIDENTIAL
TO HONG KONG
A By No 51
+
22 APR 1968
FD1/1
18 APRIL 1968 (FED)
352
pa 24/4
CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO GOVERNOR HONG KONG TELEGRAM NUMBER 678 OF 18 APRIL
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PEKING,
251 YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 491: PRISON VISITS,
WE ARE CONCERNED AT THE POSSIBILITY THAT, WERE N.C.N.A. TO SUCCEED IN THEIR EVIDENT OBJECTIVE OF EMBROILING US IN DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PRISON CONDITIONS IN HONG KONG, THE CHINESE AUTHORITIES IN PEKING MIGHT USE THIS AS AN EXCUSE FOR FURTHER DELAY IN ACCESS TO
GREY.
+
2. WE LEAVE IT TO YOUR DISCRETION WHETHER YOU AGREE TO A FURTHER MEETING WITH N.C.N.A., BUT THINK THAT AT ANY SUCH MEETING YOUR REPRESENTATIVE SHOULD DO NO MORE THAN NOTE THEIR POINTS WITHOUT HOLDING OUT ANY PROSPECT OF A REPLY.
CROSEC
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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NNNNE
#CF
NEXI
REF
351
CONFIDENTIAL
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
8/4
17352
His
Registry No.
FED
DEPARTMENT
FD
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION PRIORITY 'MARKINGS
Top-écret
Emergency Immediate.
Confidential Restricted
Bh Clair.
[
Security classification
(Date)
Despat
* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(s)
(352
CONFIDENTIAL
- I
➖➖ILIU.
77H
Gode Cypher
Draft Telegram to:-
GOVERNOR HONG
Addressed to..
[Codeword-if any]
GOVERNOR, HONG KONG
No.
(Wale)
ZONG 678 1.814
telegram No.
678
I.
...(date)
mh
18/4
And to..........
repeated for information to
PEKING
And to:-
Saving to
A
Repeat to:-
PETING
√379
Saving to:-
c.o. concur
Depre
Distribution:- FE.D. Consular
Kuanta
H.K. (c.o)
Copies to:-
Your telegram No. 491: Prison Visite.
We are concerned at the possibility that,
were N.C.N.A. to succeed in their evident
objective of embroiling us in discussions about
prison conditions in Hong Kong, the Chinese
authorities in Peking might use this as an
excuse for further delay in access to Grey.
2. We leave it to your discretion whether you
agree to a further meeting with N.C.N.A., but
think that at any such meeting you should do no
more than note their points without holding out
any prospect of a reply.
A & More.
.
HEID 3/2
籽
With the compliments of
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
Nong Kong Wahl.
25
April 1908
LONDON, S.W.1.
I
CONFIDENTIAL
351
Cypher/Cat A
IMMEDIATE HONG KONG
TO
RECEIVED IN
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE ARCHIVES No.31
23 APR 1968
Teino 491
18 April 1968
CONFIDENTIAL
Jano
FDi/i
18 April,
pe 24/4
Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No. 491 of
Repeated for information to Peking.
N.C.N.A. contacted P..'s office today requesting meeting tomorrow to "raise several points arising after the official visits to Stanley and Laichikok". In reply to our request for clarific- ation, they produced the following four demands:
2.
(a) Patriotic prisoners at Stanley had been in "strict
isolated confinement" for 5 months.
This must cease.
(b) Women compatriots at Laichikok had recently been beaten up and "seriously wounded" by other prisoners belonging to TRIAD societies. The prison authorities must prevent such incidents and give immediate and effective medical treatment to the injured. (See our telegram No. 471).
(c) Food at Stanley is inadequate and irregular. must be taken to improve the supply of food.
Steps
They
(d) Compatriots' health has been "seriously affected" because
of isolated confinement and inadequate nutrition. must be given effective medical treatment.
We said we would consider N.C.N.A.'s request for a meeting
but gave no undertaking to see them tomorrow.
No. 172.
Foreign Office please pass Immediate Peking as my telegram
Sir D. Trench
[Repetition to Peking referred for Departmental
decision"]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
ADVANCE COPIES SENT
C.0.
H.K.Dept.. I. & G.D.
News Dept..
*LF
F.0.
F.E.D.
352
J.I.P.G.D.
NNNNN
J.I.R.D.
O.L.A.
News Dept.
CONFIDENTIAL
:
:
7
·
I
·
RELIVED IN
?ARTH-VES No.31
EN CLAIR
FD
侧
6B
PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
ING 390
UNCLASSIFIED
6 MAY 1968
گا
355
ADDSO TO FO TEL NO 390 OF 6 MAY RFI HONG KONG.
PEOPLE'S DAILY OF 4
HAY AND NCNA OF 3 MAY CARRY AN ARTICLE
REPORTING THE CELEBRATION OF MAY DAY BY HONG KONG WORKERS.
ARTICLE QUOTES A SPEECH BY LEADING MEMBER OF HONG KONG AND KOWLOON
FEDERATION OF TRADES UNION ON 30 APRIL .
SPEAKER SAID COMPATRIOTS WERE RESOLVED TO QUOTE AROUSE THE
MASSES BOLDLY, AND WITH POWERFUL SUPPORT OF PEOPLE OF THE MOTHER-
LAND WIN ULTIMATE VICTORY UNQUOTE IN STRUGGLE AGAINST BRITISH
PERSECUTION.
SIR D. HOPSON
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.0.
F.E.D. S.B.A.D.
D.D.
P.U.S.D.
I.R.D.
I.P.D.
NEWS DEPT.
C.0. H.K.D. S.A.D.
DIS KOD
Crfize MTR. Reached maxx. 75.
Jr. p. 7/2
Ed (4206)
Reference.
FD1/1 3.50
TRANS. → FD13/163
:
#
2018 13/7
CONFED INTIAL
IVED IN
#VES No 31
1 9 APR 1968
FD1/1
COMMON... LTH OFFICE,
LONDON, 0...1.
16 April, 1968
349)
sir,
I have the honour to refer to your Despatch No.239 of 13 February, 1968 in which you review the principal developmenta tɛat have taken place in Hong Kong since June 1967.
2.
I consider your report to be an admirably accurate and objective history of events during the paried inder review. It was regrettably inevitable that it should need to be very largely devoted to reperting on the course of Communist confrontation in the Colony. The account of the build-up of the Communist osmpaign last year, the degree and manner of suppert from the Chinese People's Government and in particular, the way that the incident of 8 July at the Tau Kok triggered off the subsequent campaign of violence, confirm the view that the confrontation was an overspil11 of the cultural revolution in China. This, among other things, resulted in a weakening of the channel of control over local Hong Kong Comminists. Bit for the admirably Firs and patient policy of the Hong Long Government and the strong beking it received from the great majority of the people of Hong Kong, the Chinese People's Government might have been tempted or obliged to give full support to the efforts of their local supporters te disturb the status quo and to undermine authority in the Oolony.
3. I do not dissent from the conclusions in paragrɛph 35 of your despatch consarning internal developments in Chine, but my advisors and I do..bt whether Mas Tse-tung and the extremists would be allowed by the more moderate elements or by the People' a Liberation Army tɔ mount ɑnother campaign a silar to that of last year, even if they wishod to do so. The present disturb.nces in certain areas of China, incl:ding the Kwangtung Province, though eansiderable, seem to be less viclent than those which took place last ye r¡
and although it may be some time before order and stability can be restored, they appear unlikely to influence Chinese policy adversely so far as Hong Kong is scneerned.
4. However, the fact that, apart from isolated incidents, the losal Communists have new abandoned the use of violence to achieve their ends in the Colony mat leɔve us under no misapprehensions, There is, perhaps, a danger that the efficiency and affectiveness
GOV KSON,
SIR DAVID Theidi, x.c.V............, K.C.
Thời, X.C.V.
ETC.,
AAC.,
TC..
/with
with which the demumist sinilmge iɛat your ru
soupled with the remarkable resilionea displayed by the
5.
and evert 26,
Kong ooozamy, may sreete the ingrosalón that the danger is and tast vičilanno son be relaxed, 1 ons assure you that
part, I and my selles use are fully alive to the fact the Commnist tärest to Tong Long zemine very real, and vi lä mee unabated, albait in a different form, and that there are grounds whatevür for complacency on our part.
Pubile tribute has deservedly bom paid in Parliament are then saa seuraión de the moar in which the people of Beng Kong, under your lenderahiy, met and withstood the che 2,1 ange presented to then by ommunista; and to the errielaney with mich the Hong Kong Felice, with the nasistanee of the Colony' a garrison, dealt with the situation. It is, ɛowever, fitting that
should sonskade 1:18 despytek by confirming and recording the appreciation of Her Majesty's Govwroomt for the tanner in which jou, your advisers - both offisial and inofficial - the ferEDS law and order and the general publie of the Oslony faood up to and overeano the dangers siten eɔafy nted Hong lang during the your 1967.
I have the honour
sir
Your
obodieni
en Shaman.
Ed (4206)
!
Reference.
FD
Frill (348)
See Annex.
346
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN
Cypher/Cat A
ARCHIVES No 31
4- APR 1968 TOI
PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno 272
4 April 1968
FIL!
Jasht
CONFIDENTIAL
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 272 of 4 April Repeated for information to Hong Kong
My telegram No. 258: Hong Kong Prison Visits.
Message passed to Ministry of Foreign Affairs by telephone
on 3 April.
Sir D. Hopson
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.O. F.E.Dept.
D.D, & P.U.S.D.
Consular Dept.
Passport Control Dept.
J.I.R.D.
O.L.A.
News Dept.
C.0. Hong Kong Dept.
News Dept.
DIS MOD
ра
CONFIDENTIAL
لا
Cypher/Cat A
CONFIDENTIAL
IMMEDIATE PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
30 258 30 March 1968
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
5 APR 1968
やり
FDU/L. JB5/4
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 258 of 30 March Repeated for information to Hong Kong
Your telegram No. 570 to Hong Kong: Prison Visits.
J
I agree and would propose to pass message (as suggested in
per
paragraph 5 of Hong Kong telegram No. 395) to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs by telephone if possible in order to avoid giving them opportunity of raking over the whole subject again.
I should be grateful therefore if Hong Kong would inform me when they intend to make contact with NCNA so that we may pass our message more or less simultaneously.
Sir D. Hopson
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
0.0. Hong Kong Dept.
News Dept.
F.O. F.E.D.
D.D. & P.U.S.D.
Consular Dept.
P.C.D.
J.I.R.D.
O.L.A.
News Dept. DIS MOD
ADVANCE COPIES SENT:
+
CONFIDENTIAL
+
I
+
(: K/3)
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES N. 31 4- APR 1368
Fol
WICTED
Приме
(343
Office of the Briti.... Charge d'Affaires,
PERKING.
25 arch, 1960.
I should be grateful is you could let us know the number of political or communist prisoners still in custody in Hong Kong, the length of their sentences and an estimate of when, allowing for normal remission, they might expect to be relenced. You will understund that the subject is one of more than aendedzic interest to us here.
I am sending a copy of this letter to James Hurray in Far Zastern Department.
.liott,
(1. CRADOCK)
Hong Kong.
RESTRICTED
CYPHER/CAT A
FDY/1
CONFIDENTIAL
IMMEDIATE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO HONG KONG
ELNO 558
27 MARCH, 1968 (F)
O COPY
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No 31
2. HAR68
CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO HONG KONG TELEGRAM NUMBER 558 OF 27 MARCH REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PEKING. 328 * x 14 288
PEKING TELEGRAMS NOS. 239 AND 240: PRISON VISITS.
SINCE THERE DOES SEEM TO HAVE BEEN GENUINE MISUNDERSTANDING TI ABOUT EXACT MEANING OF QUOTE JOURNALISTS UNQUOTE (THE POSSIBILITY OF WHICH YOU NOTED IN YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 366), WE THINK THAT, UNLESS YOU SEE OBJECTION, TALKS WITH N.C.N.A. MIGHT PROCEED ON THE BASIS THAT THEIR LIST OF 21 PRISONERS IS ACCEPTED. THIS MIGHT BE FOLLOWED AFTER SUITABLE SHOW OF HESITATION BY COMPROMISE ON THREE VISITORS TO EACH PRISONER.
2. WE ARE NEVERTHELESS ANXIOUS NOT TO COMPROMISE ON POINT THAT CATEGORY OF PRISONERS ELIGIBLE FOR SPECIAL VISITS IS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE TO BE DECIDED IN PEKING. SUBJECT TO YOUR AND HOPSON'S VIEWS, WE SUGGEST THEREFORE THAT, SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH (IF NOT PRIOR TO) RESUMPTION OF YOUR TALKS WITH N.C.N.A., HOPSON SHOULD INFORM CHINESE OF DECISION TO ACCEPT THEIR INTERPRETATION ON THIS POINT, REPRESENTING IT ON LINES INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 2(D) OF PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 240.r
CROSEC
بیان
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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D.D. & P.U.S.D. NEWS DEPT. J.I.R.D. O.L.A.
H.K.D. NEWS DEPT.
CONFIDENTIAL
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry No.
DEPARTMENT
FDY/I
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION PRIORITY MARKINGS
Top Secree "Secret
Confidential -Restricted
Unclasified
En Clait Code Cypher
Emergency?" Immediare Priorley, Restina
Security classification
[Sec
any
{Codeword-fany].....
(Date)
* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressce(s)
27/3 Desparched 248.
‒‒‒‒‒AN AJAAN ·
ER
CONFIDENTIAL
Draft Telegram to:-
Addressed to
Hong Kong 558.
telegram No..
...(date)........
HONG KONG
55.8 2713
No.
(Date)
And to:--
And to....
repeated for information to... Peking
-- IL
חודי-זי- --- -
27 handi
Repeat to:-
PEKIN
Saving to:--
295
Distribution:-
Departmental
(As for Peking
tela. no9. 239 and 240)
Copies to:---
Saving 10.
-++++
Peking telegrams nos. 239 and 240 : Prison
Visits.
Since there does seem to have been genuine
misunderstanding about exact meaning of
"journalists" (the possibility of which you noted
in your telegram No. 366), we think that, unless
you see objection, talks with N.C.N.A. might
proceed on the basis that their list of 21
prisoners is accepted.
This might be followed
after suitable show of hesitation by compromise
on three visitors to each prisoner.
2. We are nevertheless anxious not to compromise
on point that category of prisoners eligible for
special visits is a matter of principle to be
decided in Peking. Subject to your and Hopson's
views, we suggest therefore that, simultaneously
with (if not prior to) resumption of your talks
with N.C.N.A., Hopson should inform Chinese of
decision to accept their interpretation on this
point, representing it on lines indicated in 3 paragraph 2(d) of Peking telegram No. 240.
Flag B
Departmental Da"/".
dist.
IMMEDIATE CUTITIT
CYPHER/CAT A
INNEDIATE HONG KONG
TELEGRAM HUMBER 363 .
+
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
2
28 MAR 1968
FDY1
:
अचा
ADVANCE COMES
F.O.
P.S.
P.U.S.
R.O
Sie Dr Allen M Hall
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• Crussalas 104 at News
TO COMMONWEALTH OFF ICE
22 MARCH 1968
P. U, S.
Six I. Jchuiton
Hd. H.K.D.
News Deh
-t
P
CONFIDENT VAL
ADDRESSED CO TELEGRAM NO. 363 OF 22ND MARCH REPEATED PEKING.
+
; I; Flag I
MY TELEGRAM NO. 357: PRISON VISITS.
Guertaken by or Re
Flag K
A FURTHER MIETING WAS HELD WITH NONA ON MARCH 21ST. POLITICAL
ADVISER PUT FORWARD A PROGRAMME CWORKED OUT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE POINTS MADE IN PEKING ON THE LINES OF PARAT (CA) OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 3479 FOR VISITS EARLY NEXT WEEK TO 14 OF THE PRISONERS. HE POINTED OUT THAT OF CHINESE LIST OF 22 ONE
HAD ALREADY GEEN RELEASED SEMICOLON 5 WERE LABOURERS · CEMPLOYED
BY WEN VEI PAOD AND 2 CAGED 17 AND 14) WERE NEWSPAPER SELLERS ONLY. NONE OF THESE WERE BONA FIDE JOURNALISTS AND THEY WERE
THEREFORE INELIGIBLE FOR VISITS UNDER THE PEKING PROPOSALS.
·
2. NONA CONCEDE THE IMPORTANT POINT THAT VISITS SHOULD BE TO INDIVIDUALS, NOT GROUPS BUT THEY SAID THAT THE PROGRAMME WAS
GROUPS 30
-
UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE
(A) THEY CONSIDERED THE NUMBER OF VISITORS SHOULD BE FOUR
NOT TWO. (THEY POINTED OUT THAT THREE PEOPLE MIGHT GO ON NORMAL.
VISITS TO PRISONERS).
(D) THEIR INSTRUCTIONS WERE THAT ALL "PATRIOTIC NEWSPAPER EMPLOYEES'
VERE ELIGIBLE FOR VISITS.
IN ADDITION, THEY REPEATED (THOUGH WITHOUT MUCH ARGUMENT) THEIR DEMAND (Q> TO BE ALLOWED TO BRING IN THE WORKS OF NAO AS GIFTS
TO MIBONERS.
2. POLÍTIONE ADVISER SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO REPORT THE
MZ IGUANA, CANLANIN (IV), ALOVE MISHE BASJA, FARTA OF
4
+
349
-
MJI
3. POLITICAL ADVISER SAID THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO REPORT THE
SICATIO!!
SILLATION BACK. POINTS CA) AND (B) ABOVE WERE BASIC PARTS OF
THE PROPOSAL MADE IN PEKING AND WE HAD NO AUTHORITY TO DEPART
FROM THEM IN HONG KONG. ON POINT (C) WE WERE NOT PREPARED TO
GIVE WAY
4. ONLY A FEW OTHER MINOR POINTS ARE OUTSTANDING. NONA REPRESENT-
ATIVES'RE REASONABLE AND SEEMED ANXIOUS TO SETTLE QUICKLY
WITHO
FEEL,
"BATHER REFERENCE TO MTA, HOWEVER, THEY WILL NO DOUBT
ED TO REPORT BACK TO PEKING, AS THERE WAS OBVIOUS
DISAG. INT BETWEEN OUR TWO VIEWS OF WHAT CONSTITUTED
144
DETAI TO BE SETTLED HERE, AS WELL AS WHAT HAD ALREADY BEEN
SETTLED IN PEKING.
+
FO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE PEKING
KEHYTEL
MÝTEL 124.
GOVERNOR
SENT AT 22/05592 MARCH
RECD AT 22/06002 MARCH
1
•
J
+
Sir D. Mlen
CONFIDENT LAL
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
2 8 MAR 1968
FDI1
340
Flags A, B
PRISON VISITS
Peking telegrama noa. 239 and 240 reporting a meeting
Fe 3/3 (287) between the Chargé d'Affaires and an official of the Chinese
+298 Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicate that there has been a
misunderstanding about the categories of prisoners to be included
as "patriotic journalists" in the context of additional prison
visits in Hong Kong. N.C.N.A. in Hong Kong had presented a
list of 21 persons which, beside the 2 N.C.N.A. correspondents
and 12 journaliste, included 5 labourers and 2 newspaper sellers
employed by a communist newspaper in Hong Kong (Hong Kong
Flag C/ telegram No. 363). The Chinese argue that the term translated
as "journalist" in fact means literally in Chinese "newspaper
workers", We should therefore agree to grant additional visits
to all the 21 persons listed. The Chinese have also supported
a request of N.C.N.A. in Hong Kong for the number of visitors
to each prisoner to be no less than three, not two as we had
proposed. We have to decide whether to agree to what the
Chinese ask.
Recommendation
2. I recommend that subject to the views of the Governor of
Hong Kong, we agree that visite should be allowed to all the persons listed by N.C.N.A. and that three visitors be allowed
to each prisoner. I submit a draft telegram on these lines
drafted by the Commonwealth Office.
CONFIDENTIAL
/Background
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2
Background
Flag CO Politi
Flag D
3. After protracted exchanges in Peking we agreed that
additional visits would be granted to the 2 N.C.N.A. corres- pondents and an unspecified number of "patriotic journalista"
in prison on the understanding that access would be granted
to Mr. Grey, the Reuters correspondent. Agreement in principle
having been reached, it was left that the detailed arrangements,
including the submission of the list of prisoners,would be
handled by N.C.N.A. in Hong Kong. At the meeting with the
Political Adviser on 21 March (Hong Kong telegram No. 363),
the N.C.N.A. produced a list of 22 prisoners. One had already
been released and the remainder contained the names of five
labourers employed by the Wen Wei Pao and two newspaper sellers.
We considered that these seven did not fall within the category
of bona fide journalists to whom we had agreed visits might be
granted, although the N.C.N.A. argued the phrase had been "patriotic newspaper employees" not "journalists". They also
raised the question of the number of visitors to each prisoner
asking that it should be four and not two as we had stipulated.
4. The Chargé d'Affaires was instructed (Foreign Office
telegram No. 283) to raise these points in Peking, pointing
For 13/2ut that in the case of categories of prisoners the N.C.N.A.
Flag A
appeared to be diverging in principle from what had already
been agreed between him and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sir D. Hopson reports (Peking telegram No. 239) that the Deputy Director for Western Europe at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs supported the N.C.N.A. claim that all 21 prisoners
/should
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3-
should be allowed visits because the Chinese words consistently
used for "journalists" literally meant "newspaper workers" as
the N.C.N.A. said. The Deputy Director also supported the
N.C.N.A. demand that more than two visitors be allowed on each
occasion, pointing out that in the case of normal visits three
were allowed. He concluded by saying that the number should
in any case be "no less than three".
Argument
5. It seems that there has been a genuine misunderstanding
as the Chinese words can only be translated as "newspaper
workers" or "newspaper employees".
The misunderstanding
apparently arose as a result of the English translation by the Chinese interpreters in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
in Peking. In view of the importance of defining the category
accurately, it is surprising the discrepancy was not picked up
by one of our Chinese speakers. But I think we must accept
that the Chinese are acting in good faith. Since they seem
anxious to settle the matter and it is equally in our interest
to gain access to Mr. Grey as soon as possible, I think we
should agree to visita to all 21 persons. As Sir D. Hopson
points out, the degree of discrimination in favour of a certain group of political prisoners will be no greater if we include
the extra seven.
6. As regards the number of visitors, itis correct that
three are allowed for routine visits. The Governor of Hong
Kong has already agreed that if the Chinese press we can
/accept
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
-
4
accept three. There therefore seems no reason to hold out
for two. To concede four as the N.C.N.A. aak would I think
be wrong in principle as it would be bowing to pressure on
a point which cannot be of prime importance to N.C.N.A.
Moreover the Chinese in Peking seem disposed to accept three.
Humaya Jauns Manag
(James Murray) 27 March, 1968
Copy to Mr. Carter, C.0.
AL Mn Mushing
Lénk's
І
agree
28/3
sa"
28 Maande
3
CONFIDENTIAL
Ed (4206)
Reference
H. Sharland
KE VED IN ARVES No.31
27 MAR 1968
FD1/1
川
I have prefered the attached craft in
response to a request from ou
い
Office (Mi Machers) - Mr Mechod's
1329
Private
muick to
Mr Arbuthnott
7
19° Mach
1
refers.
also preparing
noter for sufflementary questions
22.
You
will no
doubt be engaged on
similar exercise
d
I thought it
a
wise if
HOTL
got togatures. for
The material
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affice by
is required by time
27"
March.
ANE
25.3.68
Amendment's gund
with M. Sammana.
Beter af...
+
Spay
Ching/Bong Kong
Draft Note for the Minister of State for his address to the Comsomrealth Parliamentary Association on Thursday, 29 March, 1968 on the subject "World Security Problema"
There is little doubt that the disturbances in Hong Kong last year vere
There is an overspill of the revolutionary ferment on the Chinese mainland,
no evidence to show that they were in any way instigated by the Chinese
the latest
Government in Peking, although thay subsequently gave strong propaganda
encouragement and certain financial assistance to their supporters in the
colony.
2.
1
The change of taches comes with the warming revolut my im
enversam on the Maratons and the TEASSam
A randiņa, dimin mered had virtually abandoned dolen By the end of the year, the communlets had virtually abandoned violence
in their confrontation with the Hong Kong authorities although isolated
contramed for some the time after last selis incidents involving violence #9422-devufiyat, cand are heath to recur. j
I this forum factor and
the efficiency with which the 3.
There noens Ittle doubt that apart from the afficiandy with which the
• mayal
A
This
Hong Kong Government dealt with the disturbances, the faoton/which led to
this change in commentet Tactica vas the reaction of the general public
in the colony to the use of violence by the trouble unkers. There was
overwhelming public support for the maamires adopted by the authorities to
deal with the situation and when the communists resorted to terrorista
tactics this served only to antagonise public opinion still further.
general reaction appears to have come as a surprise to the local communist leaders. They had perhaps forgotten that a very substantial proportion of the people of Hong Kong consistdof refugees from the communist regime in China who had "voted with their feet" for the way of life with which Hong
Kong could provide them.
The econogy of Hong Kong has shown quite remarkable resilience in the face of the Afficulties which confronted the golony during the last & right months of 1967. It has offered certain set backu as a result of the
disturbances but its final trade figures for last year speak for themselves. Hong Kong's imports, domestic exports and re-exports for 1967 all showed increases over the corresponding figures for 1966. In the case of domestic exports the increase was 17%, a Figure which represents the highest growth
/rate
rate since 1961,
5.
Exjaciatio
But the abandonment of violence does not mean that the communists
have ceased their campaign of confrontation in Hong Kong. The iáležíhout
in the Ca
is that their efforts to undermine the authoritige/will continue unabated. These efforts however will probably take the form of a long term idealogical struggle for the "bearte and winde" of the people of the Colony. 6. It may be thought that the recent decision by Her Majesty's Government
to withdraw their military presence from the Far East by the end of 1971
But there is no vill cause the comunista to redouble their efforts.
intention of reducing the strength of the Hong Kong garrison and with our
withdrawal from Singapore steps will be taken to ensure that the effectiveness
of the garrison remains unimpaired.
7. It has already been publicly stated that the Hong Kong Government vill
contáme to take such measures as may be necessary to maintain peace, order
and good government. In so doing they will continue to have the full support
and assistance of Berkajesty's Government.
M Shagam
Draft Suppleambar Notes for the Minister of State for his Address to the Commonwealth Parliamentaar Association on Thursday, 29 March, 1968. on the subject of "World Security Problems".
Chinn/Hong Kong
A
What will happen to Hong Kong when the lease of the
How Territories expires in 1997î
It is quite impossible to envisage what situation
will obtain in thirty years' time and it would be
a ranh man who would attempt to do so. Meanwhile,
H.N.G. have every intention of maintaining their
position and authority in the Colony, and vill
continue to give the Hong Kong Government all
possible support for any measures that they may
consilar necessary to achieve that object.
This
CS
the other half
Q.
What would happen if China were to launch a
military attack on Hong Kong?
A.
That is a hypothetical question to which there is
you
the notes that I sent
this morning
J5
63.
Chinese action....
bithello havies mŸ that then hame
no point in replying at this stage. In fact,
balor
there is no reason to suppose that China
will have any intention of launching such an attack.
It is the desire of the Hong Kong Government and of
Her Majesty's Government to live on friendly termG
with China and we shall continue to work to that
and.
Q.
Are the Hong Kong Government taking any measures to
give the ordinary people of the Colony more
opportunity of participating in the conduct of the
affairs of the Colony?
/A.
A. Yes. Normal constitutional progress towards
A.
Mand
self-government is not possible in the particular
circumstances of Hong Kong; nor are the people
asking for it. But the Government are exploring
waya and means of giving them a bigger say in the
affairs of Government and of ensuring that the
views of the ordinary nan are made known to those
in authority. One possible way of doing this is
through the medium of local government; another
possible means is the recently inaugurated system
of dity Mistrict Officers in urban areas about
which a statement vas sade in Parliament on
12 March by the Parliamentary Under Secretary of
State for Commonwealth Affairs.
Is it not the case that the low vage rates and
poor living conditions of the masses in Rong Kong
represent a security hazard which demands early
action?
The disturbances in Hong Kong last year were in no
way the result of such conditions, But it is
accepted that there is room for improvement in the
whe
sphere of labour relations in Hong Kong and steps
are being taken to remedy the situation.
Hong Kong Labour Commissioner announced on
14 February a liberal programs of labour
legislation: action has already been taken to
strengthen the staff of the Labour Department an
and legislation was
Generally
recently introduced to reduce, over a period of
time, the maximum permitted working hours for
women and young persona in industry,
speaking the Hong Kong authorities are fully
alive to the need for certain reforms in the
sphere of labour conditions and relations.
12.
A.
Why does H.N.G. perit United States warships to use
Hong Kong as a base for their attacks on North Vietnam?
Ever since the last vorld war the warships of a member of
countries, including those of the United States, have been
in the habit of visiting Hong Kong for rest and recreation,
No warlike facilities of any description are provided
de not conside that
sasen-now-why they-
during these visits and H.M.G. s98-20
should be discontinued.-
Hong Kong is in carry way
Над
being used by the thrited statis as a
base
for attacks on
North Vietnam.
En Clair
PEKING
Telno 234
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
FOREIGN OFFICE
TO
25 March 1968
TOP. E
RESIVED IN ARCHIVES/N,.31
20 MX d
FD
320
Addressed to Hong Kong telegram No. 164 of 25 March, Repeated for information to Foreign Office.
F23/3278)
Foreign Office telegram No. 283 to me. [Prison Visits]
Paragraph 2. Do you agree?
Sir D. Hopson
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.0.
F.E.D.
Consular Dept. P.C.D.
D.D. & P.U.S.D.
News Dept.
J.I.R.D. O.L.A.
0.0. H.K.Dept.
News Dept. DIS MOD
NNNNN
CONFIDENTIAL
Mr. Wilkinson
PROBLEM
CONFIDENTIAL
+
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
26 MAR 1968
FD1/1
DEPORTATION OF FILM STARS FROM HONG KONG
327
The two film stars whom the Government of Hong Kong tried
to deport to China as a test case returned to Hong Kong on
15 March having spent 31 hours on the border bridge. The
Chinese made a serious protest to the Chargé d'Affaires in
Peking on the same day against the attempted deportation and
demanded that the two persons should be declared innocent and Flag A318/set free (Peking telegram No. 207). Sir D. Hopson, in rejecting
the protest, pointed out that the Hong Kong Government saw their
action as a means of making progress and relieving tension and
not raising it as the Chinese had done by exploiting the
incident. The Governor of Hong Kong has proposed (Hong Kong Flag B(322 telegram No. 344) that we should pursue this line with the
Flag
Chinese through various channels simultaneously in order to
emphasise that we consider such deportations as a useful way of solving our mutual problems. Sir D. Hopson has advised 321) (Peking telegram No. 223) that initially at any rate we should
pursue this through one informal channel only.
RECOMMENDATION
2. I recommend that we should pursue the Governor's proposal
in the manner favoured by Sir D. Hopeon. We should not, however, include in our approach any reference to the talka
now going on in Hong Kong with the New China News Agency
/(N.C.M.A.)
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2
(N.C.N.A.) about prison visits. I attach a draft telegram
in which the Commonwealth Office concur.
BACKGROUND
3.
The Chinese first raised the question of the film stars
in a conversation with Sir D. Hopson on 31 December in
referring to a report that they were to be deported to Taiwan.
The film stars are under detention in Hong Kong in connection
with the recent troubles in the Colony. In January Sir D.
Hopson advocated a major act of clemency in Hong Kong including
the release of left-wing prisoners as a means of improving
Sino/British relations and easing the position of Mr. Grey and
the Kission. The Governor of Hong Kong saw grave dangers in
releasing prisoners in the Colony, but was prepared to agree
to release prisoners on deportation to China in fairly large
numbers if this was thought to be helpful. The two film stars
were considered good candidates and it was therefore agreed
that they should be used as a test case. If the Chinese
accepted them this might open the way to an eventual exchange
of Mr. Grey for N.C.N.A. representatives.
It was agreed that the film stars should be taken to the
border and left on the bridge so that they could cross to
China if they so wished and if the Chinese would accept them.
Although they had shown no unwillingness to return to China,
they had earlier refused to give any written or oral agreement
to deportation. A few days before the operation the Hong Kong
authorities notified their intentions to the China Merchants
Steam Navigation Company, the a communist-controlled organisation
/dealing
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3-
dealing with travel to China. The film stars were taken to
the border on 14 March but after considerable discussion with
Chinese officials they eventually returned (to detention in Flag D(326) Hong Kong) the next day. (Hong Kong telegram No. 338). On
15 March the Chargé d'Affaires was summoned to the Ministry
Flag A(318) of Foreign Affairs in Peking (Peking telegram No. 207) to
receive a "gerious protest" from the Chinese Government about
our attempt forcibly to deport the film stars and a demand
that they be declared innocent and set free and that in future
they should not be sent anywhere outside Hong Kong against
their will. In replying, Sir D. Hopson reminded the Chinese
that it was they who had first raised the question of the film
stars and that in seeking to deport them the Hong Kong Govern-
ment were trying to relieve tension. The Chinese on the other
hand were making propaganda capital out of the incident and
rendering the solution of our mutual problems more difficult. Flag B(322)The Governor in Hong Kong telegram No. 344 states that he
thinks the best way of following up the incident and trying to
turn it to our advantage would be to pursue very much the same
line taken by Sir D. Hopson, more in sorrow than in anger.
The detailed line he proposes is given in paragraph 4 of this
telegram.
5. The Governor suggests that the Chinese should be approached
simultaneously in Peking and London and in Hong Kong through
the Chine Merchants Steam Navigation Company and through a
delicate Bank of China channel referred to in Hong Kong Top Secret telegram No. 331 (withdrawn from circulation and not
therefore attached). He doubts whether we should use the
/talke
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
-4
Flag C (32/
talks between the Political Adviser and N.C.N.A. about prison
visits for this purpose. He also suggests that these approaches
be coupled with harder publicity about the position of our
Mission and Mr. Grey.
Sir D. Hopson agrees (Peking telegram No. 223) that we
should follow up the incident along the lines proposed by the
Governor, but in view of the attitude of the Chinese as
evidenced in their protest of 8 March he considers that our
approach should be confined in the first instance to the Bank
of China channel, He is doubtful about the wisdom of any
publicity at this stage.
ARGUMENT
7.
Deportation of left-wing prisoners to China, if successful,
might be an important way of meeting Chinese grievances in
Hong Kong and at the same time securing the release of Mr. Grey.
We should certainly not lose the opportunity to emphasise to
the Chinese that this was a serious attempt to make progress.
But we share Sir D. Hopson's doubts about taking simultaneous
action on a number of fronts. If we pursue the matter through
formal channels (i.e. in Peking and London) we can expect the
Chinese to take up the hard propaganda line shown in our most
recent formal exchanges with them. By handling the matter
informally through the Bank of China channel we make it possible
for the Chinese to consider the proposition without striking an
attitude. Moreover it would involve no commitment by either
side at the initial stage. The China Merchants Steam Navigation
Company is a less informal channel than the one proposed and
in any event proved unsatisfactory on a previous occasion.
CONFIDENTIAL
/8.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 5-
8. We agree with the Governor that it would not be wise to
bring this question into the current talks with the N.C.N.A.
in Hong Kong about visits to communist prisoners. I therefore
think that the reference to those talks in the proposed
Flag B322) approach to the Chinese (paragraph 4 of Hong Kong telegram
No. 344) should be omitted.
9. The proposal for harder publicity will have to await a
decision on the reply to be given to the Chinese Vice Minister's
statement to Sir D. Hopson of 8 March on Sino/British relations
as a whole.
James Manag
(James Murray)
22 March, 1968
Copies to:
Sir D. Allen
Mr. Sanual
Mr. Carter, C.0.
I
despatched the telegrams;
will wish to be
Alsam
of the background.
Thank you
you.
Cam.
but you
مگر
22 Maul
/ биений
I must the
CONFIDENTIAL
2573 Emas
1
Cypher/Cat A
CONFIDENTIAL
IMMEDIATE HONG KONG TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
Telegram No. 338
CONFIDENTIAL
16 March, 1968
PECEIVED IN
*ས་་
西山
Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No. 33 of 16 March,
Repeated for information to Peking.
My telegram No. 323: Film Stare.
The two film stars left the bridge at Lowu yesterday at 3.05 p.m. having waited some 31 hours, They returned of their own free will and boarded a Kowloon train at Lowu accompanied by China Travel Service representatives.
They were removed from the train at Sheung Shui and placed in custody. They did not resist arrest and seemed quite happy to be back. In fact the girl had even taken the opportunity while on the train to move all the Mao badges which had been presented to her by the Chinese border guards.
2. As they left the bridge the following broadcast was
made from China :-
"These two people have done nothing wrong and it is absolutely unreasonable of the British authorities to attempt to expel them to China. They now wish to return to their own residence and the British authorities will be fully responsi- ble for all the serious consequences if anything is done to present them"
Foreign office pass Immediate Peking No. 113.
8ir D. Trench
[Repeated as requested]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
C.O. H.K.D.
News Dept
I. & G.D.
F.O. P.E.D.
J.I.R.D.
J.I.P.G.D.
O.L.A. O.P.A. News Dept
DIS M.O.D.
*****
CONFIDENTIAL
ADVANCE COPIES SENT
I
·
J.
CYPHER/CAT A
325
CONFIDENTIAL
MONWEALTH OFFICE TO HONG KONG
TELNO 531
CONFIDENTIAL.
22 MARCH 1968 (HKD)
FDY
ADDRESSED TO HONG KONG TELEGRAM NUMBER 531 OF 22 MARCH REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PEKING,
EKINGY (222)
YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 3441 FILM STARS.
WE AGREE WITH THE LINE PROPOSED IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 4. WE CONSIDER, HOWEVER, THAT THE REFERENCE TO NONA SHOULD BE OMITTED IN ORDER THAT THIS EXERCISE MAY BE KEPT SEPARATE FROM THE QUESTION OF PRISON VISITS WE ENTIRELY AGREE IT SHOULD BE KEPT OUT OF THE POLITICAL ADVISERS 32) TALKS ON THAT SUBJECT.
2. HOPSON'S ARGUEMENTS IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 223 AGAINST PURSUING THIS THROUGH FORMAL CHANNELS SEEM TO US CONVINCING. Nữ BY HANDLING IT INFORMALLY THROUGH THE CHANNEL REFERRED TO IN YOUR
TELEGRAM NUMBER 331 WE MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE CHINESE TO CONSIDER THE PROPOSITION WITHOUT STRIKING AN ATTITUDE: AND IT WOULD INVOLVE NO COMMITMENT FOR EITHER SIDE AT THE INITIAL STAGE. WE DOUBT THE VALUE OF USING THE CHINA MERCHANTS STEAM NAVIGATION COMPANY FOR THE REASONS GIVEN IN PARAGRAPH 3(C) OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. WE CONSIDER THEREFORE THAT INITIALLY WE SHOULD USE ONLY THE CHANNEL REFERRED TO IN YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 331.
3. WE ARE STILL EXAMINING THE QUESTION OF A REPLY TO THE CHINESE VICE MINISTER'S STATEMENT OF 8 MARCH ON SINO/BRITISH RELATIONS. WHETHER PUBLICITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE TROUBLES OF THE MISSION AND MR GREY WILL BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THIS CONTEXT. IN THE MEANTIME THERE WOULD BE EVERY ADVANTAGE IN YOUR GOING AHEAD AS PROPOSED ABOVE.
CROSEG
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
0.0.
H.K.D. I. & G.D.
NEWS DEPT.
F.0. F.E.D.
J.I.R.D.
O.L.A. O.P.A.
J.I.P.G.D.
NEWS DEPT.
CONFIDENTIAL
Registry No.
DEPARTMENT
भि !!!
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Confidential
PRIORITY MARKINGS
(Date)
Flash Immediate Priority
Routine
Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram shojɗd
reach addressce(s)
Despatched 3
93/3
325
HEHER
CONFIDENT TAL
CT, D
HIT Her
10
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
דיהידוויידי.
Honcho ---JLL-
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
En Clair. Code Cypher
Draft Telegram to:-
HONG
TRONG
No.
(Date)
And to:-
[Sect
Security classification" -if any
[ Privacy marking
-if any
[Codeword-if any]
Addressed to
telegram No...........
1
531
And to....
---..
22/3
repeated for information to
Saving to
PRO----➖➖.........▬▬▬....
HONG KONG
FILIDINI
(date)
PEKING
Repeat to:-
PEKING 986
Saving to:-
Distribution:- H.K. Dept. I.& 3. Dept. News Dept.
FED, JIRD, OLA, OPA, JIPOD, Newe Copies to:- Dept.
Flare B
Your telegram No. 344: Film Stars
We agree with the line proposed in your
paragraph 4. We consider, however, that the
reference to NCNA should be omitted in order that
this exercise may be kept separate from the question
of prison visits. We entirely agree it should be
kept out of the Political Advisers talks on that
subject.
2.
Flow, C
We feel,
paragraph 1 of Peking telegram No.223 against.
Seem to us Convineme
however, that Hopson's aruments in
pursuing this through femas
༡/
By handling it informally through the channel
referred to in your telegram No. 331 we make it
possible for the Chinese to consider the proposition
without striking an attitude; and it would involve
no commitment for either side at the initial stage.
We doubt the "alue of using the China Merchants
Steam Navigation Company for the reasons given in
/paragraph 3(c)
paragraph 3(c) of your telegram under reference.
We consider therefore that initially we should
use only the channel referred to in your
telegram No. 331.
3. We are still examining the question of a
reply to the Chinese Vice Linist r's statement
of & Warch on Sino/British relations.
trouble of the e188ion
Whether publicity should be given to the
and Kr. Grey will be taken into account in this
context.
In the meantime there would be every your
advantage in /going ahead as proposed above.on the
Wine Tag Lêng that we should sive no publicity
to the epproach itself.
(8430) D4.833246
1/64 G.W.B Lai. Op 163
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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
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RECEIVED IN M
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ARCHIVES No.31 i 22 MAR 1968
;PDI/I
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Mr. Saarzen
Mi.
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DESPATCH
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GOVERNOR,
ĐÔNG KI
CONFIDENTIAL
and the strong backing that it received from
the great majority of the propre of Hong Kong
sir.
I have the honour to refer to your Despatch Mo. 239
of 13 February 1968 in which you review the principal
developments that have taken place in Hong Kong since
June 1967.
2. It was regrettably inevitable that your despatah
should need to be very largely devoted to reporting on
the course of Communist confrontration in the Colony.
However, I consider your report to be an adairably
accurate and objective history of events during the period
under review. The account of the build-up of the
Commmist campaign last year, the degree and manner of
support from the Chinese Central Government and in
particular, the way that the incident of 8th July at
Sha Tam Kok triggered off the subsequent campaign of
violence, confirm the view that the confrontatim vas an
overspill of the cultural revolution in China. This,
among other things, resulted in a weakening of the channel
of control over local Hong Kong Communiste. But for the
admirably fire and patient policy of the Hong Kong
Government), Paking might have been tempted or obliged
to give full support to the efforts of their loosl
supporters to disturb the status quo and to undermine
authority in the Colony.
CONFIDENTIAL
13.
CONFIDENTIAL
3.
I do not dissent from the conclusions in paragraph 5
of your despatch concerning internal developments in
Chin. but
but my advisers and I doubt whether Mao Tse-tung
and the extremists would be allowed by the more moderate
in buration elements or by the Chinese-Peoples'/Army to mount another
campaign similar to that of last year, even if they
wished to do so. The present disturbances in certain
areas of China, including the Kwangtung Province
to be less violent than those which took place last
yours and although it may be some considerable time
before order and stability can be-sonpletely restored,
they appear unlikely to influence Chinese polisy
adversely so far as Hong Kong is concerned.
4.
However, the fact that, apart from isolated
incidenta, the local Gemminista have now abandoned
the use of violence to achieve thoir ends in the Colony
must leave na under no illisżona, There is, perhaps, a
и
danger that the efficiency and effectiveness with which
the Communist ohallenge last year was met and overcome,
coupled with the remarkable resilience displayed by the
Hong Kong economy, may create the impression that the
danger is past and that our vigilance can be relaxed. I
vish to assure you that I and my ministerial colleagues,
to whom copies of this exchange of despatches are being
circulated, are under no illusions on the subject. We are
fully alive to the fact that the Communist throat to
Hong Kong remine very real and will continue mabated,
albeit in a different form, and that there are no grounds
whatever for complacency on our part.
mough consumme
CONFIDENTIAL
15.
CONFIDENTIAL
5.
Public tributs has deservedly been paid in Parliament
on more than one occasion to the mmer in which the
people of Eong Kong, under your leadership, wet and
withstood the challenge presented to them by the
Commulate; and to the efficiency with which the
Hong Kong police, with the assistance of the Colony's
garrison, dealt with the situation. It is, however,
fitting that I should conclude this despatch by
soafiraing and recording the appreciation of
Har Majesty's Government for the manor in which you,
your advisers both official and unofficial
the forces
of law and order and the general public of the Colony
ир
Inced to and overcame the dangers which confronted
най сай བ་
Hong Kong during the-inet vévez mouthuvaź 1967.
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED
323
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IV DIATE HONG KONG TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
Telno 342 16 March, 1968
RESTRICTED
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
22 MAR 1968
FD!!!
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.342 of 16 March, Repeated for information to Peking.
My telegram No.338: Film Stars.
At a Press briefing on 15 March we emphasized the following:- (a) The film stars were not being deported but were being released to China;
(b) China;
(c)
They had indicated that they were ready to return to
We had informed the Chinese authorities through the usual channels on Monday, 11 March that the two film stars would be released at the Border on Thursday;
(d)
That they left the bridge at Lowu of their own free will.
Foreign Office please pass Peking 116.
Sir D.Trench.
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(322
[ARCHIV.... Në 31 20 MAR KD3
FDY/1
Telno 344
18 March 1968
CONFIDENTIAL
Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No. 344 of 18 March
Repeated for information to Peking
My telegram No. 342: Film Stars.
I have been considering how best we could make capital out of this exercise and what follow up action we should now take.
2. The incident naturally aroused considerable Press interest here and the Communist Pres has been expectedly vituperative on the subject although there are no signs of protest meeting and so on being organised. The neutral and Right-Wing Press, while making a few criticisms, has not, on the whole, said anything particularly damaging nor is public opinion particularly disturbed.
I
3.
Other factors are:-
Not yer
Рособо
3,8.
(a) Chinese at Lo Wu could have made much more of a
demonstration there, had they wished, in a number of ways:
(b) The protest in Peking seems from Peking telegram
No. 207 to have been reasonably mildly worded: (c) Our contacts here seen to have bungled, at least to some extent (at NCNA meeting referred to in my telegram No. 333 Liang and Poon appeared to know nothing of our prior warning of what we intended to do and to be surprised what we had given it; reference was also made by them to our having used "the wrong method" but without further elaboration there may be eventual scope for some different arrangement with the Chinese here):
-
(d) There is some evidence from observation of the gestures, etc., of the border guards and the relaxed attitudes of the film stars themselves on return that they themselves were nat particularly keen to cross and this may have had some effect on the final outcome.
4. I suggest, therefore, that we might now press fairly hard but not publicly along a general line Charge d'Affaires has ∙lready taken (Peking telegram No. 207 refers) namely that we were annoyed and disappointed at the Chinese reaction. We had
CONFIDENTIAL.
/given
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1
CONFIDENTIAL
2-
given them time to consider their attitude to our offer of the film stars: and had given them an opportunity to claim that they had obtained the release of these people. We were prepared quietly to do the same for others of those we held in custody; but it was absurd to suppose we would release anyone in Hong Kong except on expiration of a sentence imposed by the Courts. Our object was to provide them with an earnest of our desire to reduce the area of disagreement between us, as should have been apparent to them. Instead, they had tried to make capital out of the incident, and we would now be justified in having serious doubts about the bona fides of their renent approaches to us. Moreover NONA were now trying to go outside the understandings come to in Peking on prison visits. However, we were aware of the possibility that there had been bungling on their side and would suspend judgment on their bona fides pending an indication from then on whether they wanted those in custody released early or not, we were well aware of their difficulties over "deportation" and, while not accepting their attitude, we would neverthelesa not formally deport provided we had their cooperation in discouraging any attempt to return until the situation was fully normalised. In general, our attitude in such approaches would be one of annoyance but willingness to try again; and we should try to hold the dialectical initiative.
5. Keanwhile the film stars should be placed in formal detention under Colonial Secretary's order (maximum period is one year under this legislation) and those under deportation orders after release from prison should continue to be held pending arrangements for their deportation. This I am arranging to do.
6. I suggest further that we should take the line I am proposing through all the channels available to us more or less simultaneously: in London and Peking, and here through the channel referred to in my Top Secret telegram No. 331, and the China Merchants Stean Navigation Company (with whom we originally dealt). I am very doubtful however of using the Political Adviser's talks with NCNA over the prisoners also. He could mention our feelings to them perhaps, but I an not anxious to inflate their quasi-diplomatic position.
7. We might couple these approaches with a harder publicity line over the position of the Mission in Peking and Grey as suggested in paragraph 8 of Peking telegram No. 179, to emphasise our displeasure.
8. Finally, the chances of a more favourable Chinese attitude emerging very quickly as a result of this course of action are perhaps not particularly good, but I cannot suggest
/anything
CONFIDENTIAL
P
די
I
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ر
:
CONFIDENTIAL
Hong Kong telegram No. 344 to Commonwealth Office
- 3 -
more likely to bear results at present.
Certainly I do not think we should yet contemplate further concessions until we have first tried something a little harder, and see if they have any suggestions to make.
Commonwealth Office please pass Immediate Peking 117.
Sir D. Trench
[Repeated as requested]
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RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.35
321
IMMEDIATE PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno 223 20 March, 1968
CONFIDENTIAL
20 MAR 1968
FDY/1
F
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 223 of 20 March Repeated for information to:- Hong Kong.
322
Hong Kong telegram No. 344:
Kot Mach, F. Deportees.
I agree we should try to get message in paragraph 4 of telegram under reference across, but for the present at any rate I think this would be best done via channel referred to in Hong Kong telegram No. 331. The attitude of the Chinese in Peking (or à fortiori London) is likely to be the propaganda line of last Friday's protest. When I tried to get over something of this idea on 15 March Hsueh simply read back parts of the protest Note. I may be able to say, something more if a suitable opportunity arises but
I would prefer not to make special approach myself at this stage.
2. Paragraph 7 of telegram under reference. As explained in my telegram No. 211 I would not favour a harder publicity Tine or indeed any deliberate publication at this stage.
P.0. pass Immediate Hong Kong 156.
Sir D. Hopson
[Repeated as requested]
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CONFIDENTIAL
Now w
submission
EN CLAIR
FO IN
No 31
1 8 MAR 08
PRIORITY
ELNO. 214
UNCLASSIFIED
PEKING
TO
2
FOREIGN OFFICE
18 MARCH 1968
B20
تا
ADDSD TO FO TEL NO 264 OF 18 MARCH RFI TO HONGKONG POLAD
SINGAPORE AND WASHINGTON.
PEOPLES DAILY AND NONA OF 17 MARCH CARRY ONE ITEM ABOUT THE TWO FILM WORKERS FU CHI AND SHIH HUT. ARTICLE ALLEGES THAT PERSONS CONCERNED WERE QUOTE KIDNAPPED UNQUOTE WHEN THEY REACHED
SHEUNGSHUI FAILWAY STATION ON THEIR WAY BACK FROM THE BORDER
AND THAT QUOTE FASCIST POLICE UNQUOTE USED VIOLENCE AGAINST
NONA AND PATRIOTIC REPORTERS. ARTICLE SAYS THAT QUOTE UNDER THE DIRECTION OF STEVENSON DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION SERVICES UNQUOTE, POLICE HANDCUFFED AN NONA REPORTER AND A WEN HUI PAO REPORTER AND PULLED ANOTHER FEMALE NONA REPOFTER FROM THE
TRAIN EUT ANDS THAT THEY WERE SUBSEQUENTLY FREEP. ARTICLE
REPORTS THAT PATRIOTIC CIRCLES HAVE PROTESTED QUOTE AT
KIDMAPPING UNQUOTE AND ALLEGED PERSECUTION OF PATRIOTIC
REPORTERS AND HAVE DEMANDED THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE TWO
FILM WORKERS AND ALL OTHER COMPATRIOTS DETAINED ON MOUNT
DAVIES, AND AN END TO PERSECUTION OF HONGKONG COMPATRIOTS.
THE
SIR D. HOPSON
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$$$$$
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En Cla
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES NË,31
1 8 MAR 1968
FO
IMMEDE AUR LEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno. 210
16 March 1968
F
319
UNCLASSIFIED
Addressed to Hong Kong telegram No. 146 of 16 March, Repeated for information to Foreign Office (Immediate) Washington, POLAD Singapore
My telegram No. 204.
People's Daily of 16 March carries an account of the protest about the attempted deportation the two film stars made to me by Hsuch of the West European Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 15 March (NCNA English No. 031518).
L
2. This article is accompanied by a news report on the deport- ation attempt which alleges that Fu Chi and Shih Hui were "kidnapped" on 15 July and were later detained in a "concentration camp" on Mount Davis. Report also refers to protest about deporation lodged with Political Adviser by NCNA Hong Kong in the afternoon of
15 March (NCNA 031517).
Sir D. Hopson.
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Pe
Mr.
de Jul for
mr attemps to cam
(318
situation for
CONFIDENTIAL
B
Cyphe $t
THMF'
ARCO FOREIGN, OFFICE
exfox. F
Telno. 207
1 8 MAR 103
16 March 1968
CONFIDENTIAL
किill
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 207 of 16 March, Repeated for information to Hong Kong.
Ky telegram No. 204.
Hauch began by saying that attempt forcibly to deport the two film stars on 14 March was another act of persecution against compatriots. Their sacred right was to reside and work in Hong
Kong
8 The Chinese Government made a serious protest about thin. On March the Charge d'Affaires had said that the British Govern- ment wished to take concrete steps to bring the situation in Hong Kong back to normal, However this unreasonable measure, so far from being step to relax tension would arouse strong indignation of Hong Kong compatriots and masses at border and would lead to renewed tension in Hong Kong and on border. The Chinese Government provided all Chinese with free movement facilities between Hong Kong and the rest of the motherland but must oppose deportation no matter where. We must stop these unreasonable practices and guarantee that there would be no recurrence in the future. The Chinese Government demanded that the two film workers be declared innocent and set free, that their safety and freedom from any further persecution be guaranteed and that they should not be sent anywhere outside of Hong Kong against their will, otherwise we would have to bear all the consequences.
2. In my reply I reminded Hsuch that on 31 December he had raised the question of these two film workers and alleged that it was intended to deport them to Taiwan. I had said that nobody was being forcibly deported from Hong Kong and later on a Note had informed Ministry of Foreign Affairs that allegation about the film workers was groundless. Nor was there any attempt in the present instance forcibly to deport the two film workers. They had been told of Hong Kong Government's intention to enable them to return to Chine and they had not expressed unwillingness. They had freely crossed the bridge. Therefore the Chinese Government's scousation was groundless. Referring to my interview with Lo Kuei-po on 8 March and to "measures to relax tension", I said Chinese had often referred to prisoners in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Government saw their action as something intended to relieve tension not to raise it. It appeared that the Chinese Government had not agreed to accept the two film workers. This attitude was not going to facilitate a solution of our mutual problems.
/I therefore
CONFIDENTIAL
JONFIDENTIAL
2
1
I therefore rejected his protest.
3. Hauch replied that while persons concerned naturally did not refuse repatriation because all compatriots wanted to be able to go to the motherland, this was not the point. The British Authorities regard the two persons as prisoners and were attempting forcibly to deport them as such. The Hong Kong Authorities had used deceptive tactics to lure the 2 film workers to the border, saying that the matter of their return to China had already been arranged. Case of the 2 film workers was only an example. It we wanted to relax tension this was not the method. Hsuch then repeated the Chinese Government's demand as in my paragraph 1 above.
4. In answer to my enquiry he refused to disclose whether the Chinese Government would publish their statement.
Foreign Office pass Immediate Hong Kong 143.
Sir D. Hopson.
[Repeated as requested]
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IMMED LATE' PEKI GRECEIVEBO IN
Telno 204
UNCLASSIFIED
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(317)
ARCHIVEJ NË AF
15 March 1968
1 8 MAR 1968
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 204 of 15 March, Repeated for information to Hong Kong.
I was summoned this evening to receive a serious protest from such, Deputy Director Western Europe on the attempted deportation which was described as another measure of persecution against compatriots. Chinese Government demanded that 2 persons concerned should be declared innocent and released and not sent anywhere outside Hong Kong against their will.
2. Hsuch refused to say whether Chinese would publicise his protest. Fuller account follows.
Sir D. Hopson
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Teln 184
CONFIDENTIAL
11 March 1968
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RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES NGJY
1 1 MAR 1968
PBY!
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 184 of 11 March. Repeated for information to Hong Kong.
Hong Kong telegram No. 298 to you.
[Deportation of Film
Stara).
I agree we should go ahead.
315
за
Sir D. Hopson
We telegraphed agement to go ahead.
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315
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CATE HONG KONG TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
Telno 298
CONFIDENTIAL
9 March, 1968
க
#WB 3/2
Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No. 298 of 9 March, repeated for information to Peking.
NIE Your telegram No. 427: Deportation of Film Stars.
The two film stars were interviewed yesterday at some length. Both refused to commit themselves, without instructions from the authorities in China, to any statement, written or verbal, as they consider release to China in such circumstances is tantamount to deportation.
They said however that they would return if the CPG wished them to do so: and that on the other hand, if it was decided to despatch them without option across the border, they were "in the hands of the Hong Kong Government".
2. It is our assessment that the couple would cross into China without any physical protest if it were apparent to them that the CPG border officials were prepared to accept them. The key to the situation, therefore, remains the willingness of the CPG to accept them if and when they are presented at Lo Wu.
IN D
7/3
3. It is possible that the CPG might regard presentation of the film)
might regard presentation of the film 32
stars as a deliberately negative reaction to their statement to Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, reported in Peking telegram No. 174, In the sense that it indicates a rejection of the "demand" that prismas be released in H.K. in ay case, given the present atmosphere and past statements by the CFG concerning
deportation it does seen probable that the CPG will indicate their unwillingness to accept the two film stars in these circumstances (but just possibly also their release might be taken as a gesture toward them). However, we cannot hope to conceal indefinitely the fact that we have taken the initial step of discussing with the film stars the question of their release to China, and any deferment of the next steps might thus be construed by the CPG as a sign of weakness related to the Vice-Minister's reiteration of the "demands". There is the additional factor that we do not want to give the impression that detainees have only to indicate their unwillingness to return to China on a voluntary basis for the matter to be dropped. On balance, therefore, having set
this exercise in motion, we feel we should see it through.
Subject, therefore, to your views and those of the Chargé d'Affaires in Peking, we would propose to act on Monday 11 March as in paragraph 1(b) of my telegram No. 150, indicating to the China Kerchants Steam Navigation Company (contact that we would be presenting the pair at the border at 8 a.m. on Thursday 14 Karch, for release to China. If we are
/ questioned
284
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Jtem 285
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.י
CONFIDENTIAL
HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO. 298 TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TL
+
questioned (as we may be in view of previous CPG statements that any Chinese who is willing to return to China will be acceptable) as to their willingness to return to China, we would confine ourselves to the statement that they have indicated they would be willing to cross the border if presented. Thereafter we would act as in paragraph 1(c) to (e) of my telegram No. 150..
FO please pass immediate Peking 94.
Sir D. French
Repeated as requested/
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:
CYPHER
3144
¡A
RECEIVED IN
AVES No.31
¡ 12 MAR 1968
Fami
PRIORITY
CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY HONG KONG
TELEGRAM NUMBER 302
TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
11 HARCH 1968
CONF1DGENTI AL
sent to
Dog-
ADVANCE COPY
Hd.. Hong Kong Hal FE Dapor
ADDRESSED CO TELNO 382 OF 17TH MARCH RFI PEKING.
YOUR TELEGRAM 427 ↑ PRISON VISITS.
IN PRINCIPLE, I AGREE THAT IF THE NONA TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN
RAISING THE QUESTION OF VISITS WITH US WE SHOULD GO AHEAD WITH
ARRANGEMENTS AS IF NOTHING HAD HAPPENED,
2.
ON THE WHOLE, HOWEVER, I WOULD PREFER NOT TO TAKE THE INITIAT-
I'VE JUST YET IN STIRRING UP NONA ABOUT THE MATTER. WE ARE JUST IN
THE NIDDLE OF ANOTHER INITIATIVE ABOUT PILN STARS AND THE ARGUMENT
OVER GIFT RICE CONTINUES. I THINK IT MAY BE BETTER NOT TO PRESS THE
CHINESE ON TOO MANY PROBLEMS SIMULTANEOUSLY. IF ALL GOES WELL.
HOWEVER, I WOULD HOPE THAT HE COULD IF DESIRED RAISE THE QUESTION
OF PRISON VISITS TOWARDS THE END OF THIS WEEK,
PO PLEASE PASS PRIORITY PEKING TELHO 96,
GOVERNOR
we agree.
* I home tow M, Carry we
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BENT AT 11/11132 MARCH
RECO AT 11/15915 MARCH
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HONG KONG MARCH 7. REUTER-THE NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY ACCUSED THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES IN HONG KONG TODAY OF HAVING
PERPETRATED NEW ATROCITIES IN THEIR PERSECUTION OF PATRIOTIC MINESE NATIONALS.
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Mr Marsam
IN A HONG KONG REPORT. THE AGENCY ALLEGED THAT THE AUTHORITIES CALLED OUT RIOT POLICE TO ATTACK A CROWD LAST TUESDAY AND UNREASONABLY ARRESSTED EIGHT CHINESE FOLLOWING A DEMONSTRATION BY 200 MINI-BUS DRIVERS.
CRIOTING ERUPTED IN THE INDUSTRIAL TOWNSHIP OF
KJUN TONG IN KOWLOON AFTER TWO POLICEMEN ORDERED A GROUP OF MINI-VAN DRIVERS, WHO WERE TRYING TO PICK UP PASSENGERS AT 4 BUS STOP. TO MOVE ON).
THE AGENCY SĄ IEMMZCZC EPB 680
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1310: ATROCITIES:
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HONG KONG MARCH 7. REUTER-THE NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY ACCUSED THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES IN HONG KONG TODAY OF HAVING
PERPETRATED NEW ATROCITIES IN THEIR PERSECUTION OF PATRIOTIC CHINESE NATIONALS.
the
IN A HONG KONG REPORT. THE AGENCY ALLEGED THAT THE AUTHORITIES CALLED OUT RIOT POLICE TO ATTACK A CROWD LAST TUESDAY AND UNREASONABLY ARRESSTED EIGHT CHINESE FOLLOWING A DEMONSTRATION BY 200 MINI-BUS DRIVERS.
CRIOTING ERUPTED IN THE INDUSTRIAL TOWNSHIP OF
KJUN TONG IN KOWLOON AFTER TWO POLICEMEN ORDERED A GROUP OF MINI-VAN DRIVERS, WHO WERE TRYING TO PICK UP PASSENGERS AT 4 BUS STOP. TO MOVE ON).
THE AGENCY SAID THE MINI-BUS DRIVERS LODGED A PROTEST WITH THE AUTHORITIES AND PRESENTED A THREE-POINT DEMAND FOR COMPENSATION AFTER A DRIVER WAS ARRESTED BY TWO POLICEMEN WHO INTERFERED WITH HIS WORK AND BEAT HIM UP.
MORE RGC/CM 1322
NNNN
ZCZC EPB 687
YY CCC UKP
1315: ATROCITIES 2 HONG KONG:
! RECEIVED IN ¦archives No.31
: 1 MAR 18
FDITI.
REJECTING OUT-OF-HAND THE JUST DEMANDS OF THE
DRIVERS. THE BARBAROUS BRITISH HONG KONG AUTHORITIES CALLED OUT ABOUT 100 'RIOT POLICE' AND INSTRUCTED THEM TO ATTACK
THE DRIVERS AND AN ASSEMBLED CROWD WITH TEAR GAS BOMBS,
BOMBS. BATONS AND SHIELDS, THE AGENCY SAID.
THE POLICE UNREASONABLY ARRESTED EIGHT PATRIOTIC CHINESE ON A CONCOCTED CHARGE OF 'ILLEGAL ASSEMBLY'.
REUTER RGC/CH 1324
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(312)
CONFIDENTIAL,
FOREIGN OPPICE, S.V.1.
AG1
8/3
8 Karch, 1968.
308
Thank you for your letter HWB 13/7 of 28 February enclosing a copy of the Governor of Hong Kong's despatch No. 239 reporting the principal developments in the Colony sinos June last year.
2. We think that the report is admirable. I agree with you that printing it with your reply should give the Governor any assurance he wanted that Ministers are aware that, although the danger of violence has apparently passed, the longer-term Chinese threat remains and we may expect local communiste to work away to erode our position and try to create a "Nadao- type" situation.
3. The account of the build-up of the communist campaign last year, the degree and manner of support from the Chinese Central Government, and in particular the way the incident of 8 July at Sha Tau Kok sparked off the subsequent campaign of violence confirm our view that the confrontation was an overspill of the Cultural Revolution in China which among other things resulted in a weakening of the channel of control to local Hong Kong communiste. But for the admirably firm and patient policy of the Hong Kong Government, Peking might have been tempted or obliged to give full support to the local attempt to disturb the status quo and undermine authority.
We would not dissent from the Governor's conclusions in paragraph 35 about internal developments in China, but we doubt whether Kao and the extremists would be allowed by the more moderate elements and by the army to mount another campaign on the 1966/67 model, even if they wished to do so. The present disturbances, which contime in some areas of China, including Kwangtung Provinos, seen to be less violent than those which took place during last year, though they do suggest that it may be some considerable time before order and stability can be completely restored. They are not, however, likely to influence Chinese policy adversely from the Hong Kong point of view.
ра
(James kurray)
W. S. Carter, Beq., C.Y.O.,
Hong Kong Department,
Commonwealth Office.
CONFIDING LAL
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PRIORITY PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Talno 168 7 March 1968
CONFIDENTIAL
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 168 of 7 March Repeated for information to Hong Kong
My telegram No. 152: Prison visits.
If there has been no approach from NCNA (Hong Kong) to Political Adviser by end of this week I suggest that Political Adviser might make contact with them, reference my conversation with Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 1 March, enquiring when they are likely to be able to provide detailed information on basis of which visits can be arranged. My reasons for suggesting are:
(a) NCNA (Hong Kong) may through some misunderstanding be expecting Political Adviser to approach them rather than vice versa;
(b) Or they may insist first move come from him;
(c) We shall get some idea of NCNA (Hong Kong's) attitude,
which may enable us to go back to Ministry of Foreign Affairs here to iron out any difficulties.
Even if reason for NCNA's inaction is simply slowness of Chinese machine I do not think that such an approach would do harm.
Foreign Office pass Priority Hong Kong 108.
Sir D. Hopson
[Repeated as requested]
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IMMEDIATE PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno 153
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1 March, 1968
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.3!
- 1 MAR 1968
FD!!!
Вос
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 153 of 1 March, Repeated for information to Hong Kong.
My immediately preceding telegram.
After discussing prison visits I raised with Hsueh our porposal to swap Hsuch P'ing for Grey. I reminded him that this proposal had now been made on an official basis and asked if he had had any reply for me. He said he had noted our proposal, but today he had no news.
F.O. pass immediate Hong Kong 100.
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[Repeated as requested]
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IMMEDIATE PERKING
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no 152
1 March 1968
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P
همه
FDI
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 152 of 1 March, repeated for information to Hong Kong.
Your telegram No. 193: Prison Visits.
I failed to obtain an interview with Mr. Hsueh, Deputy Chinese Minister Western Europe yesterday afternoon but saw him this morning when I spoke according to instructions in your telegram No. 347 to Hong Kong.
2. In reply Hsueh at first complained that original Chinese request had been made for Spring Festival and expressed dissatisfaction at delay. He then said that he agreed that detailed arrangements for visits should be made between New China News Agency and Political Adviser in Hong Kong. Only mattersof principle could be discussed in Peking. In reply to my question as to how many "patriotic journalists" would be involved he said he did not (repeat not) know but this would be no problem. He asked me to clarify our proposal for visits to "patriotic journalists". I had said that visits could be made either by employer plus one other official of the newspaper or by employer and an official of New China News Agency. Were arrangements mainly for NCNA or for employer? I side-stepped this question by repeating that visits could be carried out either by employer plus another official of newspaper or by employer plus an NCNA representative, whichever the Chinese preferred. Hsuch then asked whether this meant two visitors for each prisoner and I confirmed that this was 30.
3. He went on to say that Bank of China in Hong Kong had reported when making visit to some of their employees in prison they had met with "cruel treatment and obstruction". When I asked hi to explain this he said that Bank officials had brought some fruit and candies with them but were not allowed to hand them over to the prisonera. The prison officials said that they would store them until prisoners' release. Obviously fruit would go bad. In any case, the prisoners diet was inadequate and so was their clothing. The Bank officials had also brought some extra clothing for prisoners, but prison officials had once more said that this could only be stored until prisoners' release. I remonstrated at this and said that I knew both diet and clothing were adequate in Hong Kong prisons, most prisoners gained weight and so on. Hsuch then said he hoped when NONA officials made their visits they would not meet with similar badtreatment and unreasonable obstruction. I replied naturally rules of the prison must be observed.
4. No more was said on this subject but from what Hsuch said I think we may assume NCNA will now approach Political Adviser in Hong Kong to arrange visits. I stressed to Hsueh that "journalists"
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must be bona fide and his remark that number should be no prob is encouraging. I understand prison regulations must be observed but I hope it will be possible to introduce some flexibility in the matter of parcels as this will persumably determine what we are allowed to take to Grey if we are accorded a visit.
5. I should be grateful if Hong Kong would keep us urgently informed of further developments.
Foreign Office pass Immediate Hong Kong 99.
Sir D. Hopson
[Repeated as requested)
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HB 13/7
Dear James,
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
- 4 MAR 1968
FDI/1.
Commonwealth Office
SW.1
28 February, 1968
Pl. liten have draft comments
W 3308
(308)
308
Entel &
Submit with
pps soon.
मू
11/3
M29
Mar Fab.
Meason. Dings to Mr. Carver
I am enclosing a copy of despatch No.239 of 13 February from the Governor of Hong Kong reporting on the principal develoments in the Colony since June, 1967. We are arranging
for the despatch to be printed.
We shall be glad to know if you have any comments for inclusion in our reply to the Governor. Our only comments
at this stage are to observe that the despatch makes (somewhat predictably) rather a meal of devaluation and that paragraph 27 contains some information about the water supplies
from China which is news to us.
Sea
473
FD7/1
You spoke to me about your recent discussion with the Governor in Hong Kong and his fear that Ministers in charge of departments other than our own might think that the danger was past in Hong Kong. You suggested that he was looking for some assurance on this point. Our reply to this despatch is the peg on which we could hang that assurance and circulation of the two despatches in printed form will ensure wide currency
in Whitehall.
J. Hurray, Esq., CKO.,
Far Eastern Department, Poreign Office.
Yours
Bunny
(.s. Carter)
un
#E:
312
EX
P.a. Su 312
CONFIDENTIAL
Summary
FD1/1 (30B
西川
1. The communists are still continuing their campaign of opposition to the
Government though the phase of violence now appears to be over.
2.
In June the removal by the Administration of inflammatory posters caused
rous incidents and stoppages of work.
3. The communists declared a 'eneral strike' on the 24th June.
This was
entirely a political manoeuvre and did not arise from industrial disputes.
It had some success particularly among the transport companies but it did
not succeed in causing serious disruption.
4. The general strike' was followed by a four-day 'food stoppage' at the
and of June and a boycott of the port on 17th July. No major disruptions
resulted from either.
Five
5. On 8th July a mob attacked a Police post near the border with China.
Police officers were killed and eleven injured. The post was relieved by army
units. Encouraged by this incident, which was interpreted as military support
for confrontation by the C.P.G. (which it was not) the communists staged
widespread demonstrations and violence in the streets of Victoria and Kowloon.
From the 12th July onwards the Police mounted successive raids on
communist centres, seizing stocks of weapons and subversive literature and
disorganising communist leadership. As a result communist action noticeably
decreased and was virtually confined to the planting of bombs. On Christmas
Day bomb attacks also ceased.
6.
7. Children from communist schools in the Colony were increasingly employed
in confrontation. A school that was being used as a centre for manufacturing
bombe was closed in November.
8. There was a severe drought during the summer. Water up; lied from China
by agreement was turned on at the due date (1st October) but there was a
possibility that it might be cut off. Given average rainfall the Colony's
own resources are sufficient to continue to provide an adequate, though
rationed, supply.
9. The C.P.G. continued to issue protests following confrontation incidents.
In August the British Embassy was sacked in retaliation for the arrest in
Hong Kong of N.C.N.A. reporters and the suppression of pro-communist newspapers.
It was, however, increasingly plain that the C.P.G. was not prepared to
intervene directly in Hong Kong.
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10. Conditions in many areas of China deteriorated during the summer.
Because of the resulting disruption of communications the import into the
Colony of foodstuffs from China was severely affected between July and
ember
Comparative order has been restored in China by the Army though
the disorders in Kwangtung delayed the opening of the Canton Fair by one
month.
11. There is evidence that the influence of Chou En Lai and the moderates
in Peking is increasing.
12. The Colony's economy has remained unimpaired.
Bank deposits increased
in each of the last four months of the year, and the value of exports rose
by 16.9% over 1966. Imports on the other hand, recorded a slower growth rate
of 3.5%. The effects of the devaluation of sterling; and the revaluation of
the Hong Kong dollar, however, were severe.
13. The communist effort seems to have moved from violence to attempts to
increase support by finding popular grievances to exploit. This could be
potentially dangerous, but the communists have much leaway to make up.
14.
There is reason to hope that confidence in the Colony will be maintained.
Public morale is good, but educated young people in particular are antiers
about their future.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Colonial Secretariat File: SCR 1/4841/55
DESP: 239
19FEB1968
ta
DIVISJOIL
FDHI
GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
HONG KONG,
13 February, 1968.
w.308
DUPLICATE
Sir,
I have the honour in this dispatch to attempt a review of the principal developments that have taken place in Hong Kong since my last periodic dispatch dated 23rd June, 1967.
山西小
2.
・FDI/l (157)
Events continued to be dominated by the communist confrontation which at the time of writing is still with us, although the phase of general violence, bombing and stoppages of work appears for the moment to be over. Although they have had little or no real encouragement from Peking and have succeeded in rousing the overwhelming majority of the people against them, the communists, depleted as they are, have by no means abandoned their campaim of opposition to the Government.
H
3. My last despatch took events up to 4th June, 1967; but perhaps I may follow popular precedents by first providin; a brief recapitulation of earlier events. The first wave of protests and token stoppages of work in May was organised by the communists as a show of strength. It was followed, in June, by a more or less spontaneous outbreak of stoppages set off by the 'poster war*. On 1st June the law relating to the display of inflammatory posters was strengthened by emergency regulations and action was taken to remove the extensive crop that had appeared on Government buildings, public vehicles and elsewhere. In the doctrine of the cultural revolution strect posters are regarded as the visible expression of the thought of the omnipotent 'masses' and must not be tampered with. On this issue communist employees of the Star Ferry Co, stopped work. A minority of the workers at the Tai Koo Dockyard and Engineering Co, also downed tools and surrounded and detained the General Manager and two senior European staff members for several hours. Employeus of the Government Mechancial Workshops in Kowloon and of the Hong Kon; and China Gas Co. armed themselves with iron bars and other weapons, barricaded themselves in the buildings, and had to be forcibly evicted by the Police. There were also similar stoppages of work at the Marine Departmont and Water-
works.
4. In mid June it became apparent that the Communists would risk antagonising the public by a major disruption of the life of the community, and what was called a 'general strike' was proclaimed for 24th June. This decision no doubt reflected the views of the more extreme communist faction, encouraged by the widespread reaction to the removal of posters as well as by a commentary in the Peoples Daily of the 10th June which advocated support by "workers, peasants, the People's Liberation Army and the 'revolutionary masses1 in China for the struggle in Hong Kong".
5. On the oVO of the proposed stoppage, communist morale must have been shaken by an incident that occurred in Kowloon. After a small party of Police were viciously attacked by a ring of men who subsequently retreated into the premises of the Plastic Workers General Union, strong Police reinforcemente were called up who, after meeting fierce resistance and suffering some casualtios, forced an entry into the buildin; and arrested over fifty people, This drastically brought home the fact that union promises wore not, as the communists had supposed, immune from attack; and the fact that four of those engaged in the fight died from the injuries that they had sustained aust have had a deprossing effect on communist spirits.
6.
Nevertheless, the stoppates of work began as schedulod, her ›lded by a suitable fanfare from the People's Daily, and supported by the promise of
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lavish payments by the communist unions, whose funds had been augmented by n contribution of $10 million from the All China Federation of Trade Unions. Despite wide-spread intimidation the answer to the strike call was patchy
ANN
the effect of the stoppages limited. Those companies or organisations th had boen affected by stoppages arising from the display of posters had refused to re-engage or had dismissed the men responsible and they had no further trouble. The transport companies had the most absentees, but they managed to keep some services going; and the public contrived, with their usual resilience, to carry on much as usual. Some delays occurred in the working of ships because of intimidation of the crews of tus and lighters but Hon Kong still continued to provide one of the fastest turn-round of ships in the world, The utility companies were fully able to operate effectively, while industry was barely affected.
7.
These stoppages were sheer political manoeuvres and bore no relation to legal strikes arising from industrial disputes. Accordingly, from the early days of the first stoppages Government servants and the employees of many private companies had been warned that if they took part they would bo liable to disciplinary action, Emergency Regulations to protect workers against intimidation were promulgated. he a result of these measures loyal and neutral employces quickly returned to work,
8. As a footnote to these events, the workers who wore dismissed for walkin; out' are still claiming Istrike pay' from their unions and it is believed that by the end of the year the communists had paid out more than 320 million in this why. By then communist unions were donandin; that the Government should find employment for 10,000 men whom they alloged wore unemployed or semi-cmployed. In fact it is thought that the great majority of the mon concerned have since found other jobs, There are 4,000 vacancies in industry and another 1,000 vacancies in non-industrial occupations, which indicates clearly that anyone genuinely seeking work has a good chance of finding it.
9. & further attempt to disrupt life in Hong Kong took the form of a four day food stoppage, At the end of June local communist importers refused to handle foodstuffs (mainly pigs and vegetables) arriving from China, though by an apparent lack of co-ordination some supplies continued to arrive at the border, There was a scarcity in Hong Kong and prices rose temporarily, but the public was not seriously affected.
10. By the beginning of July the iden of a general strike had been treitly abandoned but efforts to paralyse the port persisted for many weeks. A boycott was called on 17th July combined with a stoppa, o of work by seen. In spite of widespread intimidation and strenuous efforts by the communist Sonmen's Union to make the stoppage effective, a steady flow of applicants for new berths continued; and although some men walked off ships arriving in the port they were replaced without difficulty. The boycott did have n sort of sour success in that Chinese fargoes awaiting transhipment in the port were hold back by communist shipping agents, to nobody's real disadvantage Uxcept the owners. Foodstuffs continued to bo brought in by river boats, although no cargo arrived from China in ocean-going ships. But the communists' claim that the port was at a standstill was not only quite without foundation but could be observed to be nonsensical by everyone in Hong Kong. During the period from Hay to December the tonnage of cargo discharged at the port was only 6% lower, and the tonnage of cargo loaded (which included Chinese transhipmont cargoes) 35% lower, than the figures for the same period in the previous year,
11.
The period of relative calm that followed the collapse of the *general strike" was ended by an incident that took place at Sha Tau Kok on 8th July. ShЯ Tau Kok is a village that lies astride the land frontier
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On
with China; it is a sensitive area at the best of times; and, since confrontation began, it has been the scene of a number of incidents. 8th July, a mob which included members of the local Chinese militia and which was armed not only with sticks and stones, but also with rifles and li machine guns, attacked the Police post. For five hours the Police
1
convingent in the rost, as well as another Police company in the near-by Rural Committee Office, were pinned down by machine gun fire. Eventually, a battalion of the Gurkhas and some armoured vehicles of the Life Guards wore called in to relieve the Police, who by then had suffered five dead and eleven injured.
12.
These events received wide publicity and attracted a number of alarmist and exagerated reports in the overseas press, It was a most serious and tragic incident, but it was not an attempt at an armed invasion of the Colony. The Peoples Liberation Army certainly did not take part, the affair being purely local: that is, it was or anised by villagers in the border area; it was probably not co-ordinated with the activities of the urban communists; and all the evidence su costs that it came as a complete surprise to the C.P.G.
13.
This did not, however, revunt the communist press in Hong Kong from interpreting the incident as militant C.P.G. support. Fla için; communist morale rose, and moderate counsels were overborne. For the next four days there was a succession of incidents, with militant communist ;roups attackin;; trams and buscs, ambushing Folice units, and generally lookin; for trouble. Durin: this period one roliceman and seven rioters lost their lives.
14. The 12th July marked a turning point in this phase and indeed in the whole carraim of confrontation. On that day the acting Colonial Secretary announced in the Legislative Council that the Government was determined to
rasp and maintain the initiativo, and pressure was at once put on the communiste. Strong parties of Police, backed up by army unite carryin. out cordon duties, mounted a succession of raids against Communist centres, which included trade union promises, schools and department tores. In the course of those raids they scized a considerable quantity of home-made woa, ons and explosives, as well as inflammatory posters and pamphlots, and they took into custody many communists already wanted for various offences. They also provided the Police with much useful documentary material for intelligence purposes. As a historical note, and one perhaps of some interest to readers militarily inclined, it is believed that the problem of assaulting; a modern multi-storey building was first tackled in the course of these operations when a combined force of British infantry and (mostly Chinese) Police landed on the roof of a 27-storey buildin, from Royal Naval helicopters and carried it from the roof downwards. This operation was a remarkable example of inter-service co-operation executed at short notice, and one for which every Constable in the Bay Vlow Police Division volunteered,
15. Theau counter attacks had a considerable adverse effect on communist morale and on its leadership and planning. At the same time they had a tonic effect on the morale of the Police and on the public generally. Tho initial Police raids were fiercely resisted and resulted in communist casual- ties, but thereafter there was little resistance and, with the constant threat of police action, communist leaders abandoned their usual mcotin:: places and were stondily driven under round. Sporadic violence continued during July but showed an increasing lack of direction and was more the work of individual extremist groups.
16. The communist prcas, however, continued unabated its virulent campaign of abuse, threats and calls for armed insurrection. In August it became Reconnary to suppress three newspapers and to prosecuto their uditors for sedition. This action, together with the arrest for criminal activities of minor employees of the New China News Agency, brought about a violent
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reaction from Peking. In July the Reuters correspondent in Peking had been rut under house arrest in retaliation for the arrest of an N.C.N.A. roporter. In August a strong protest was made to London demanding the release of all N. A. employees arrested, and the withdrawal of action against the newspapers and their editors within forty-eight hours. The protest was rejected and the C.P.G. retaliated, not against Hong Kong, but by setting a mob on the Office of the British Charge d' Affaires in Peking...1
17. Since the middle of July, with the continuing police raids on centres of subversion, the cause of confrontation steadily deteriorated. With the growin; realisation that they must stand on their own feet, the communists began to talk increasingly of 'a long hard struggle', In August they threatened a wave of terrorism by publishing lists of prominent persons in the Colony who were marked for assassination. There had in fact been only ono victim, a prominent Chinese commentator on the Commercial wireless programme who specialised in ridiculin the communist caUBE. But the manner of his death was particularly vicious: he and his cousin were stopped while driving to work, drenched in petrol and burned to death - an action which aroused much public indirantion and contoupt,
18.
From assassination they turned to boats, sometimes specifically directed against the Police and other targets but more usually placed at random in busy thorou;hfares. These bombs' varied in dogrev. Most of them were harmless imitations; many of the explosive ones contained only gunpowser extracted from firoworks and consequently were more noisy than dangerous; some were deadly. There was no way of distinguishing; one from another and the same precautions, with consequent frustratin; disruptions of traffic in the vicinity, had to be applied to all. They came to be accepted as an additional hazard of life and they had little effect on this bustling and energetic community; indood, people who would have been horrified at the thought of bombs six months ago, now calmly drove round them. But the casualties that they caused, which included children and other innocent passers-by, reduced still further the support for the perpetrators, and popular demands were made for more severe punishment to be inflicted on those responsible.
19.
-
The phase of boab attacks came to a climax in October and November, when the disposal teams were quite seriously stretched, and to an end in December the last explosivu bomb bein; found on Christmas Day. Since the campaign began the Police and Armed Services bomb disposal teams dealt with 8,074 suspected bombs of which 1,167 were genuine. There were 253 uncontrolled bomb explosions which caused the death of 15 people of whom two were policemen and one an army screant. Four men died through the explosion of bombs that they themselves were carryin;. The total casualties from confrontation at this date were 51 dead, of whom 10 were policemen, and 832 injured, of whom 212 were also policemen.
Their
20. A later disquieting feature was the increasing employment of children in confrontation activities including; holding noisy demonstrations, distribution inflammatory literature, and carryin; and planting bombs. truculent attitudes gave an impression of strength far beyond their actual number, which is about 18,000 pupils or some 2% of the total school population. Comunist schools have been used as centrus for communist activitics and Police raids on them have unearthed stocks of inflammatory literature as well as bombs, both simulated and real. On 27th November a youth was seriously injured by an explosion at one of those schools while trying to manufacture explosive material for bombe, and the school wan clonod. This nction led to a protest by the C.P.G., which affected to bulieve that the closure mounted to persecution of those who wished to study Mao's Thoughts an activity which has in fact throughout remained legal and permissablo. communist schools present a difficult and sensitive problem but there aro indications that this incident had some effect in restraining their excessos.
15...
The
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21 After the Sha Tau Kok affair the border area remained unsettled and te was a succession of minor incidents, mostly arising from the passage of villagers across the border at the road bridge at Man Kam To and at other places. At the end of September two Police constables who had inadvertently crossed the border while off duty wero detained by the Chinese authoritics. In mid October a Senior Police Inspector was seized by a group of villagora near the border at Man Kam To and was hustled gross to Chinese territory. After this latter incident the bridge at Man Kam To was closed by us, for the second time. This inevitably led to protests as before from theo Chinese side, which claimed that villagers had the right to cross at this point nt any time they chose to cultivate their land on the British side.
I andy red 22
22. At the suggestion of the Ministry of Foreign affairs at Peking, a series of discussions was held in November with Chinese border officials. Those discussions dealt with tho closure of the Man Kam To bridge, the release of the policemen detained and other border matters, after prolonged negotiations, it was agreed that the bridge would be re-opened and an ox gratia award of some $75,000 paid to the Chinese farmers who had been unable to cultivate their fields in British Territory because of the closure; and that the three policemen would be exchanged for five Chinose nationals who had been arrested for various offences in British territory. The Inspector in fact contrived to escape, after bein; detained for 36 days, and succeeded in makin; his way back to the Colony. The exchange of the other two police- mon was duly effected.
23. In China conditions steadily deteriorated during; the su mcr.
In many areas the bitter struggles for power amon; rival factions led to conditions of near chros. During July and Lupust, when the battle between the warring factions was at its height, the rail service between Canton and the border was constantly interrupted, with a serious effect on the Colony's food supplies. A reluced quantity of pigs and vegetables continued to arrive at irregular intervals by road and by ava, but there was a general scarcity and prices rese significantly.
24.
The situation did not improve until September, when conditions in China generally started to turn for the better. In Centon the rival combatanta wore ordered to stop their internecine war to allow the Canton Fair to cjun on 15th October; the opening nevertheless had to be postponed until 15th November. When the fair was over, and national prestigo no longer at stake, there was some renewal of disorders, which still continue in this aren.
25. Durin; this period no attempt was made to put pressure on the Colony by withholding supplies of food, In spite of the difficulties, such sup livs as could be made available continued to arrive; and as soon as comparative urder was rustored in Kwangtung the volume of imports quickly returned to долг погоni.
26. In supplying water the Kwangtung authorities have been more equivocal. The rainfall in late 1966 and the early summer rains of 1967 were the lowest on record, and by the ond of June, although we had drawn our full quota of Chinese water and an agrced addition of 1,800 million allons, our reservoirs were dangerously low, In May we had asked for a further 2,000 millión galluns for the month of July but, although so far as we were aware it could well be spired, we hal n. reply. Subsequent requests in June and July were also unrnoworod and the general ration had to be reduced to four hours overy fourth day. Fortunately it rained in time to retrieve the situation, and we were able to rovert to a four hour daily supply for the rest of the summer.
29. Somewhat to our relief the supply from China was reintroduced on its Que date of 1st October, but broad hints were dropped that wo were expected
16.
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revert to a 24 hour supply. This wo have done; but as a prudent precaution have added to the supply saline water from Plover Cove, our newest and Dirgest, reservoir constructed from an arm of the sea, in which the water Enclosed still has a high salinity. The resulting mixture is salty to the taste (though well below the maximum acceptable to the World Health Organ- isation) and the local communiste have worked up a campaign to stop this 'contamination', claiming that it is injuricus to health. Their motives are clearly to force us to use up cur own resources so that we become dependent on further supplies from China on their terms; and, as a further move in
←
this direction they have, without offering any explanation, reduced the maximum daily draw-off from 62.5 to 55 million gallons. They have also 80 far refused to accept payment for the water drawn in November, December and January because we have refused to risk sending a foreman into Chinese territory over the Man Kam To Bridge, (as we used to do, but are under no obligation to du) to reconcile accounts. There remains the possibility that they may cut off supplies completely. In that event and given normal rainfall next summer we can hope to get by, with rationing, until the salinity in Plover Cove is sufficiently reduced by the inflow of fresh water to allow it to be used without dilution,
28.
In the economie fiell, the Colony's productive performance has remained substantially unimpaired. Exports of domestically produced gools in 1967 were up by 16.9% on 1966, This is the highest annual increase this decade, books for 1968 deliveries are also reported to be in z satisfactory state,
Orler but on the other hand, profit margins generally may, have been materially reduced. Impcrts only execeded the 1966 leval by 3.5% for three reasons: namely, the interruption of food supplies from China during the summer months; the running down of manufacturers' and traders' inventuries; and the continuing depression in the building and construction industries. Recently, however, the China trade has shown sins of recovery. This has had a beneficial effect un food prices which are now almost back to their pre-May levels. Probably the most si,nificant development recently, however, was the boginning pf a restoration of confidence: after falling in May, June July and August bank deposits have increased and the currency in circulation his declined now for four successive months. The net amount of money estimated to have been transferred out of the Colony over the year had declined to 3165 million by the end of October, compared with the peak of 1450 million at the end of July.' By the end of November the position had further improved: a net amount of $140 million had been transferred in,
29.
Generally, then, our economic and fin¬ncial situation had begun to take a more favourable turn and it was highly unfortunate that a further severe shock had to be absorbed as a rosult of the devaluation of the round sterling by 14.%. The Colony's official reserves and those of the banking systom are at prosent, largely ne a ecnsequence of our culonial status, maintained wholly in sterling. Indeed, Hong Kong is one of the world's largest holders of sterling, with between £350 million and £400 million held in that currency. Moreover, the greater part of the trading and financial relationships of both the business world and the private eitizon are based on sterling and wero, until now, predicated on the assumption of a constant rate of exchange between sterling and the Hong Kong dollar.
30. The devaluation of sterling imposed an immediate and unavoidablu 1098 on the Colony which any be estimated at £60 million. The Hong Kong dollar was itself in no way under-valued in terms of international exchanges and, as we rely almost wholly on imported supplius, internal prices are peculiarly susceptible to changes in exchange rates. We were faced, therefore, with the dilemn of either, on the one hand, following storlin; down, thereby impcoin; an immediate increnso in costs (almost to the full extent of devaluation) and a consequential reduction in our hardly won standard of living; as well as, in the field of commerce, an immediate, fairly severe and totally unnecessary worsoning of the torme of trade; or, on the other
17..
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G.F. au
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7
hand, maintaining our existing parity in terms of gold and thereby imposing a substantial immediate loss on the official reserves, on the banks, and to all others with sterling assets and existing or future Hong Kong dollar 1bilities.
31. Our final solution was to devalue to the extent of 5.7% only, thus revaluing aminst sterling by 10%. It was hoped that the effects on costs and on terms of trade of devaluation of this magnitude would not be too severe. But it was also necessary, both because of the non-availability in the sterling area system of my cover against storling riska and in order to prevent any loss of confidence in the banking systom, to provide banks with a substantial degree of compensation from official funds for their consequential losses. The total cost to official resurves, both directly and indirectly by reason of this compensation, is estimated at £30 million. These reserves now lost had been earmarked to help to meet the cost of the substantial programmes of social (and, to lesser extent, economic) development which aro in train; and their loss is likely to result in some curtailment, or at least substantial postponement, of some of these plans. Our partial devaluation, will, therefore, also affect the living standards of the people; although not au directly or immediately as would have a full devaluation. Quite apart from the actual effects, aterling devaluation has put a most powerful political propaganda wanpon in the hands of the communists and the caly undeniably true political propapanda wanpn they have. It is one they are still brandishing vigorously
months after the event,
Conclusion
32. On the home front it appears that, while the communist effort is fer from over and it is certain that their aim remains to reduce the Hun: Kong Government to a satisfactory degree of subservience, nevertheless thu nesault on us has probably moved to a non-violent phase, with the communists concentrating their efforts on increasin, their local support by trying to find popular ";rievanços to exploit, Obviously this new tactic could be very dangerous but the communists have lost much ground and it will take them time to regain even the logrue of public support they had before Hay last year.
L
33. Hong Kong has weathered the test of this summer's events mainly because the public as a whole, frot, highest to lowest, openly declarod by word and deed that the Hong Kon Government had its over-wholmin,; confidence and support in preference to the communist minority who sought to force us to kowtow, foolings wore in turn reflected throughout the Public Service, whose members
Those responded with outstandin loyalty and efficiency to the calls made upon them. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the response of the Police Force, who performed their duties with the highest efficiency and firmness coupled with vizirable restreint. They became public heroes, and were in turn sustained by public confidence in them,
34. The present change of front in the ccnfrentation thus mainly derives, first, from the countering of every preceding move by the combined determination of Government and people and, secondly, from pressure from Peking; to restore the economic damage caused in China. These are solid and continuin; reasons militatin; against a recurrence of last summer's violont offensive aminst us, and give г130 to enutious optimism for the immediate future.
35. The signs now apparent of some return towards less chaotic conditions in China can be enutiously welcomed. Some observers believe that the cultural revolution has probably failed and will soon be abandoned; but it is equally possible that Chairman Kno hra ande no more than a tactical retreat. are, however, many indications that Chou En Lad and the 'moderntos' in Poking
There are for the moment mining the upper hand; and it is to be hoped that this will bring about a roturn to more rational relations - ab ut the future actions of a country which gives every appearance of having
Although any prodictions one through an attack of domentin are obviously rash. A stablo China, more- over, will not necessarily prove any loss dangerous than a China in chaos; one can only hope that it might.
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18..
Gr. H
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36.
- 8.
The economy, after weathering the storms of riots and work stoppages, is still sufficiently robust to accept the adjustments required by devaluation and we can at least express a cautious optimism that economic confidenco
the Colony will continue to be maintained.
37.
Public morale is good except perhaps amongst the educated young, to whom 1997 is a real date and a time when they expect to be in the prime of life. The events of last year have undoubtedly aroused or re-aroused in many of them a moat anxious and understandable questioning of what the future may hold for them here. On this they seek answers with increasing urgency from their elders and from the Government, but they find no satisfaction.
¡
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
G. M. THOMSON, M.F.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient, humble servant,
+
GOVERNOR.
CONFIDENTIAL
FD!|!.
CONFIDENTI AL
PHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE
TO
PEKING
TELNO 193
28 FEBRUARY 1968 (F.E.D.)
CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 193 OF 28 FEBRUARY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO HONG KONG,
306)
C.O. TELEGRAM NUMBER 346 TO HONG KONG: PRISON VISITS.
AS SOON AS THE GOVERNOR OF HONG KONG HAS NOTIFIED YOU THAT HE HAS NO OBJECTION, YOU SHOULD TAKE ACTION WITH THE CHINESE ON THE LINES OF C.O. TELEGRAM NUMBER 347 TO HONG KONG.
SOSFA
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DEPARTMENT
FDY/1.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION PRIORITY MARKINGS
* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(s).
T
Top-Secret
i
Secret
Confidential
Immediate
Routine
Destriered
thickened
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
En Clair. Code
Cypher
Draft Telegram to:-
No.
PEKING
(Date)
And to:-
193
(Date).....
. --- . ➖➖➖
AN
app -------
CYPHER
[Security classification
if any
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any
[Codeword-if any]
Addressed to
telegram No.
And to
יח
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CONFIDENTIAL
1
Peking 19.3
(date)
28/2
र
2812 repeated for information to Hong Kong.
Immediate
Repeat/to HONG KONG
зна
Saving to:-
Distribution:-
DEPARTLENT AL
Copies to:-
Saving to
--[A]
Kanuumba k
0.0. telegram No.
зав
to Hong Kong: Prison
Visits.
As soon as the Governor of Hong Kong has
notified you that he has no objection, you should
take action with the Chinese on the lines of
C.C. telegram No.
to Hong Kong.
347
[B]
JM 20 46.
28
Departmental dist.
Coyalso on ED 1318188
CYPHER/CAT:
развит
IMMEDIATE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO
HONG KONG
TELNO 346
RELIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
29 FEB 1968
FD
Bob
ל ב
28 FEBRUARY 1968 (F.E.D.)
CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO 346 OF 28 FEBRUARY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PEKING,
(30)
YOUR TELEGRAM NO 2417 PRISON VISITO.
WE ACCEPT THE COURSE OF ACTION IN PARAGRAPHS 5 AND 6 OF YOUR TELEGRAM
UNDER REFERENCE SUBJECT TO TWO MODIFICATIONS:
(A) SUBSTITUTION IN PARAGRAPH 5 OF AN ADDITIONAL VISIT'' FOR
''A SPECIAL VISIT TO EACH INDIVIDUAL. (THIS WOULD ALSO INVOLVE THE OMISSION OF THE WORDS AS A SPECIAL CONCESSION AND CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS IN THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 1(A) OF OUR TELEGRAM 297 NO 324):.
L
(B) DELETION IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE WORDS AFTER AGREEMENT ON THE NUMBERS IN PEKING''. SINCE WE ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO RESTRICTING THE
SCHEME TO BONA FIDE JOURNALISTS, WE DO NOT SEE HOW IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO GET AGREEMENT ON NUMBERS IN PEKING BEFORE YOU HAVE
CONSIDERED LIST OF NAMES IN TIONS K-NG. WE A REE WITH YOU THAT WE MUST NOT GIVE THE CHINESE IN PEKING THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO ALLOW VISITS TO AN UNLIMITED NUMBER (PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE) BUT WE WOULD HOPE THAT THIS IS
MET BY HAVING THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN PEKING STRESS THAT THE PEOPLE CONCERNED MUST BE BONA FIDE JOURNALISTS,
2. YOUR PARAGRAPH 1.
THE FOREGOING TAKES CARE OF YOUR POINTS (111) AND (V). WE ENTIRELY ACCEPT THAT YOUR POINTS (TI), (IV) AND (VI) ARE MATTERS FOR YOUR ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION IN THE LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES AS THEY DEVELOP.
3. YOUR PARAGRAPH 2.
WE SEE THE FORCE OF YOUR ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE RISKS OF SUBSTANTIVE
33) DISCUSSION IN HONG KONG. HOWEVER CONDITIONS (1) TO (IV) IN
PARAGRAPH 5 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO 212 WOULD NOW BE MADE IN PEKING UNDER THE MODIFIED APPROACH IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE, AND YOU HAVE AGREED THAT CONDITION (V) NEED NOT BE MADE SPECIFICALLY. THE ONLY POINTS NOW LEFT OPEN, WHICH MIGHT HAVE TO BE HANDLED IN HONG KONG, ARE:
CONFIDENTIAL
/(A)
CONFIDENTIAL
(A) THE POSSIBILITY OF VISITS BY NONA ALONE. (IF THE CHINESE ASK SIR DONALD HOPSON WHETHER VISITS BY NCNA ALONE ARE TO BE ALLOWED, HE COULD AT THIS STAGE CONFINE HIMSELF TO SAYING THAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS ARE THAT AN NCNA REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE ALLOWED TO ACCOMPANY THE EMPLOYER IN EACH CASE. IF THE CHINESE CONTINUE TO PRESS THIS POINT, WE WOULD THEN CONSIDER WITH YOU AND DECIDE WHETHER IT WAS BETTER HANDLED IN PEKING OR HONG KONG).:
(B) THE BONA FIDES OF NAMES ON THE CHINESE LIST ON THIS MUST IN THE FINAL INSTANCE REST WITH YOU 4. YOUR PARAGRAPH 4.
-
AND A DECISION IN HONG KONG.
WE FULLY SHARE YOUR WISH TO MINIMISE THE PROPAGANDA OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE CHINESE, AND WE HOPE THAT THE SUBSTITUTION PROPOSED IN PARAGRAPH 1(A) ABOVE HELPS TO MEET YOUR POINT.
5. AS THIS HAS BECOME SO INVOLVED, M.I.F.T. SETS OUT THE PLAN OF ACTION FOR HOPSON IN TELEGRAM NO 324 REVISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS TELEGRAM. HOPSON IS BEING INSTRUCTED TO APPROACH THE CHINESE AS SOON AS YOU HAVE CONFIRMED THAT YOU HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THE CHANGES.
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Registry No.
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
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Confidential
Pesericest Unclassified
PRIORITY MARKINGS
(Date).
Immediate
Priority> Roudne
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
En Chir? Gode Cypher
Draft Telegram to:-
HONG KONG No. BHb нь
(Date)
And to:-
[Sec
* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
Despatched
Security classification" -if any
[ Privacy any
Privacy marking
[Codeword-if any]
Addressed to
]
reach addressDC(1)..
28
ம
----------
GTM --------NAME-po
POTER
- Hong Kong
telegram No. 346.
And to...
P-TIPPL➖➖LL.
CONFIDENTIAL
➖➖➖ ➖ ➖..................➖➖JI-LILL
(date)
28/2
2812 repeated for information to
Immediate
Repeal to :----
PEKING |Q|
1/28/2
Saving to:-
Flay I
Distribution-
DEPARTMENTAL
Copies to:-
Saving to...
Your telegram No. 241 Prison Visits.
T
Pans Verk endapang pa
We accept the course of action in paragrapła 5
and 6 of your telegram under reference subject to
two modifications:
(a) Substitution in paragraph 5 of "an additional
visit" for "a special visit" to each individual.
(This would also involve the omission of the
amendments words "as a special concession" and cbnsequential
in the second sentence of paragraph 1(a) of
our telegram No. 324);
(b) Deletion in paragraph 6 of the words "after
agreement on the numbers in Peking".
Since
we attach importance to restricting the scheme
to bona fide journalists, we do not see how
it would be possible to get agreement on
numbers in Peking before you have considered
a list of names in Hong Kong.
We agree with
/you
2.
you that we must not give the Chinese in
Peking the impression that we are prepared
to allow visits to an unlimited number
(paragraph 3 of your telegram under reference)
but we would hope that this is met by having
the Chargé d'Affaires in Peking stress that
the people concerned must be bona fide
journalists.
Your paragraph 1
The foregoing takes care of your points (iii)
and (v). We entirely accept that your points (ii),
(iv) and (vi) are matters for your administrative
decision in the light of circumstances as they
develop.
3.
Your paragraph 2
We see the force of your arguments about the
risks of substantive discussion in Hong Kong.
However conditions (1) to (iv) in paragraph 5 of
your telegram No. 212 would now be made in Peking
under the modified approach in paragraph 1 above,
and you have agreed that condition (v) need not be
made specifically. The only points now left open,
which might have to be handled in Hong Kong, are:
(a) The possibility of visits by NCNA alone.
(If
the Chinese ask Sir Donald Hopson whether visits
by NCNA alone are to be allowed, he could at
this stage confine himself to saying that his
instructions are that an NCNA representative
will be allowed to accompany the employer in
each case. If the Chinese continue to press
this point, we would then consider with you
and decide whether it was better handled in
Bookieef Hans, Hong.);
/(b)
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CONFIDENTIAL
(b) The bona fides of names on the Chinese list -
4.
and a decision on this must in the final
instance rest with you in Hong Kong -
Your paragraph 4
We fully share your wish to minimise the
propaganda opportunities for the Chinese, and
we hope that the substitution proposed in
paragraph 1(a) above helps to meet your point.
5.
As this has become so involved, m.i.f.t.
sets out the plan of action for Hopson in
telegram No. 324 revised in accordance with this
telegram. Hopson is being instructed to approach
the Chinese as soon as you have confirmed that
you have no objections to the changes.
Висока.
28
Departmental dist
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Mon to
ape
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Copies also on F413/8 (157 and FD 13/882
Enter.
305
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31)
28 FEB 1968
FDI
-
Kr. Samuel
ACCESS TO COLUNIST PRISONERS IN HONG KONG AND
TC MR. GREY
Problem
The Governor bas suggested some modifications to our
proposals about how the matter of access to prisoners should
be handled in Hong Kong and Peking; but he also takes the
opportunity to repeat his warning that the concessions and
arrangements may run us into dangerous repercussions in Hong
Kong. His suggestions involve a rather more precise statement
in Peking of the conditions under which we are prepared to
allow visits to prisoners in Hong Kong, but they do not radically
alter the substance of our approach. The Chargé d'Affaires in
Peking has proposed one modification
and ourselves
-
-
acceptable to the Governor
and has pressed for early instructions. The crux
of the matter remains whether the importance we attach to
obtaining access to Mr. Grey justifies the risks involved in
the concessions we would be making to the Chinese over access
to prisoners in Hong Kong.
Recommendation
2.
I recommend that
(a) we accept the Governor's proposed modifications,
particularly since they seem to go some way towards
reducing the risks in Hong Kong to which he has
drawn attention;
(b) subject to the Governor's final concurrence, we now
instruct Sir Donald Hopson to take action with the
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/Chinese.
CONFIDENTIAL
2.
Flag M FC13/8 (156
Flags H, I,
J
296
2297
304
Flag K
301
Chinese.
I attach draft telegrams to Hong Kong and Feking. Commonwealth
Office have already concurred.
Background and Argument
3.
The background is set out in my submission of 22 February.
Our proposals, on which the Governor has now commented, are
in C.0. telegrams 323, 324 and 325 to Hong Kong.
4. The Governor has from the start been most reluctant to
allow N.C.N.A. access to non-N.C.N.A. journalists in prison.
He has, however, already accepted (as he acknowledges in
paragraph 1 of his telegram No. 241) that access to Mr. Grey
is a compelling reason for special treatment of the latter
category. The points at issue in telegram No. 241 are therefore
not of principle (though he takes the occasion to remind us
strongly that he conceded the issue of principle only reluctantly),
but a matter of tactics. The Governor has from the outset been
anxious that we should spell out in detail to the Chinese in
Peking the conditions under which we were prepared to allow
visits. His concern was that if we did not do so and there
were subsequently difficulties over detail in Hong Kong, we
would be charged by the Chinese with bad faith. Sir Donald
Hopson has thought that detailed points were better dealt with
Flag G (299) in Hong Kong (paragraph of Peking telegram No. 133). Pre-
Flag J
304
sumably he has been concerned lest the whole exercise might
founder on an argument over detail in Peking. For reasons set
out in paragraph 3 of Commonwealth Office telegram No. 325,
the Commonwealth Office and ourselves decided on balance that
/it
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-3-
Flag_L
300
it would be better that discussion of detailed arrangements
should take place in Hong Kong. However the arguments advanced
in paragraph 2 of Hong Kong telegram No. 241 about the risks
of substantive discussion in Hong Kong are impressive. I
think therefore that we should be prepared to meet the Governor
over this; in particular I think he is right in stressing that
we should avoid entering into any commitment with the Chinese
about more than a single visit to each prisoner until we have
achieved the quid pro quo in respect of Mr. Grey.
5. The Governor's proposals meet the only point of substance
which Sir D. Hopson raised (in Peking telegram No. 147) on
our original proposals. I sent a personal message to Sir D.
Hopson that we would get instructions to him as soon as possible,
but that they could not arrive in time for action on 27 February.
6. The risks which the proposed concessions and arrangements
involve are discussed in paragraph 9 of my submission of
22 February, to which I have nothing to add. In view of the
importance of obtaining access to Kr. Grey, I think it is right to accept them. As I see it, the purpose of the Governor in
his latest telegram has not been to call in question the decision
that the of principle, but to remind us and Sir D. Hopson
difficulties he has been making are not merely obstructiveness
on his part.
Copies to:
Sir D. Allen
Mr. Carter
-
June вить гламу
(James Kurray)
27 February, 1968
Incuased with To Rodgers who appurzae Інстал draft Abs.
CONFIDENTIAL
Вязать
SFB.
the
Copier also on
Fer312 153 FD131800
pa
CONFIDENTIAL
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO HONG KONG
CYPHER/CAT, A
RIORITY
TELNO. 325
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
28 FEB 1968
西小
23 FEBRUARY 1968 (H.K.D. & F.D.)
CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO GOVERNOR HONG KONG TEL NO 325 OF 23/2 REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO PEKING,
FOLLOWING FROM GALSWORTHY.
YOUR TELEGRAM NO 234: PRISON VISITS.
YOUR TELEGRAM WAS RECEIVED AFTER OUR TELEGRAMS NOS 323 AND 324
HAD BEEN APPROVED.
2. WE AND FOREIGN OFFICE FULLY ACCEPT POINT IN LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. YOU WILL SEE THAT THIS IS REFLECTED IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF OUR TELEGRAM NO 323.
3. WE REALISE THAT YOU WOULD PREFER THAT NOTIFICATION OF CONDITIONS (1) TO (V) SHOULD FIRST BE MADE TO CHINESE IN PEKING (PARAGRAPH 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE). WE AND FOREIGN OFFICE HOWEVER STILL FEEL ON BALANCE THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER THAT THE DISCUSSION OF DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN HONG KONG. WE RECOGNISE THAT WHEREVER THE NOTIFICATION IS MADE THERE IS RISK OF FURTHER ARGUMENT ABOUT THE CONDITIONS, AND ALSO OF CONFUSION BY THE CHINESE IN TRANSMISSION BETWEEN PEKING AND N CNA. BUT OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT ON THE WHOLE THE BEST CHANCE OF SETTLING THIS ASPECT OF THE MATTER LIES IN DIRECT EXCHANGES WITH N CNA IN HONG KONG, WE TAKE POINT IN LAST SENTENCE OF YOUR PARAGRAPH 3. WE SUGGEST THAT HOPSON SHOULD ADD (PARAGRAPH 1(A) OF OUR TELEGRAM NO 324) THAT THE SPECIAL VISITS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT ON ADMINISTRATIVE DETAILS BETWEEN THE POLITICAL ADVISER AND N CNA. A PHRASE OF THIS SORT WOULD GIVE SOME PROTECTION AGAINST CHARGES OF BAD FAITH IF THE CHINESE PRODUCED A LIST OF SUCH LENGTH THAT IT COULD NOT BE ACCEPTED IN TOTO AND THE WHOLE ARRANGEMENT BROKE DOWN IN CONSEQUENCE.
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14.
CONFIDENTIAL
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 325 TO HONG KONG
4.
2.
YOUR PARAGRAPH 4. WOULD WE NECESSARILY WANT TO REFER AT THIS
STAGE TO A SINGLE VISIT? CLEARLY IT WOULD HAVE TO BE UNDERSTOOD
THAT THERE COULD ONLY BE ONE SET OF CHINESE VISITS IN EXCHANGE
FOR ONE VISIT TO GREY. BUT IF WE ACHIEVE A VISIT TO GREY ON THE BASIS NOW SUGGESTED, WE MIGHT WELL WANT TO TRY TO REPEAT THE PATTERN
ON A FUTURE OCCASION OR OCCASIONS. WE FEEL THEREFORE THAT IN
ENDEAVOURING TO MOUNT THIS OPERATION WE SHOULD USE LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD IMPLY NEITHER THAT WE WERE THINKING PURELY AND SIMPLY IN TERMS OF A ONCE FOR ALL OPERATION, NOR THAT WE WERE INTENDING IT NECESSARILY TO BE A PRECURSOR OF OTHERS TO FOLLOW.
5. YOUR PARAGRAPH 5. WE THINK THAT IT MAY BE NECESSARY FOR THE VISITS ALL TO TAKE PLACE WITHIN A REASONABLY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME, SINCE THE CHINESE MAY REFUSE ACCESS TO GREY UNTIL THE VISITS HAVE ALL BEEN MADE OR AT ANY RATE ARRANGED. WE FEEL THAT YOUR POINT SHOULD NOT BE MADE TO THE CHINESE UNTIL WE KNOW WHETHER OR NOT THE NUMBERS INVOLVED MAKE SPACING A NECESSARY STIPULATION.
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CONSIDENTIAL
IMMEDIATE HONG KONG TO COMMONWNAUTH OFFICE
30
香
TELEGRAM NUMBER 212
FIDENTIAL
19 FEBRUARY 1968
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
28 FEB 1968
ADDRESSED CO TELNO 212 OF 19 FEBRUARY RFI PEKING.
FDI/I
PEKING TELEGRAM TO FO 129: PRISONERS.
IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HE TO TRY TO CLARIFY JUST WHAT IT IS
I AM BEING ASKED TO CONCEDE FOR GREY'S SAKE.
2. THIS DOES NOT APPEAR TO ME TO BE AN ARGUMENT ABOUT THE
GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF VISITING BUT ABOUT CA) WHAT IS OR IS NOT
A ''FORMAL'' VISIT SEMICOLON AND (B) TO HOW MANY PEOPLE ''FORMAL''
VISITS CAN BE MADE.
3. THE RULES ABOUT VISITING WERE SUMMARISED IN PARAGRAPH 2(A) OF MY TELEGRAM 1908 OF 23RD DECEMBER. THIS TELEGRAM PERHAPS ERRS IN NOT MAKING IT CLEAR HOW LIBERALLY THE RULES ARE NORMALLY
INTERPRETED. IN DETAIL:
(A) ALL PRISONERS ARE, OR CAN BE, VISITED REGULARLY ONCE A MONTH. MORE OR LESS ANYBODY WITHIN THE CATEGORY OF RELATIVES AND FRIENDS CAN BE LET IN TO SEE THEM ON THESE VISITS PROVIDED THEY DECLARE WHO THEY ARE, WHICH IS A SIMPLE SECURITY PRECAUTION ON THE ONE HAND AND A PROTECTION FOR THE PRISONER ON THE OTHER. THE PRISONER MUST ALSO AGREE TO SEE THEM SEMICOLON OBVIOUSLY PRISONERS CANNOT BE FORCED TO SEE PEOPLE THEY DON'T WANT TO SEE. (B) EXTRA VISITS TO INDIVIDUAL PRISONERS CAN BE APPROVED FOR REASONABLE CAUSE AT THE PRISONER'S REQUEST. AGAIN, ANYBODY WANTING TO SEE A PRISONER FOR ANY SPECIAL REASONS IS OF COURSE FREE TO ASK TO VISIT HIM SEMICOLON IF THE REASONS ARE COMPELLING, THE VISIT CAN BE ALLOWED AGAIN SUBJECT TO THE PRISONER'S
=
AGREEMENT. A PARTICULARLY RELEVANT EXAMPLE IS THAT AN EMPLOYER IS USUALLY GRANTED ONE VISIT TO AN EMPLOYEE. THUS, ON 14 FEBRUARY WHEN THE MANAGER OF THE COMMUNIST YIEN YIEH COMMERCIAL BANK ASKED TO SEE SIX EMPLOYEES HE WAS ALLOWED CACCOMPANIED BY TWO OTHERS FROM THE BANKS ONE VISIT TO EACH OF THEM (UNDERLINE NEXT WORD) INDIVID- UALLY.
CONFIDENTIAL
/(u) TO
+
CONFIDENTIAL
HONG KONG TElbbrük NO. 212 TU COMMUNALAIHH OFFICE
2
(C) TO COMPLETE THE BACKGROUND, OR RULES GIVE ANY PRISCI
RIGHT OF ADESS TO HIS CONSULAR REPRESENTATIVE AT ANY TIME:
BUT THIS A COURSE REr'ano Tu a FORMAL REPRESENTATIVE.
THE QUESTION 18 mislila akdawunkinfo run THIS "FORMAL"
VISITS REQUESTED BY THE CHINESE CAK BE MADE "ITHIN THIS FRAMBJURA
OF THE NONKAL VISITING PATTERN GET OUT ABOVE. I mm NUT AT Alda
CLEAN "ARMISHE CHINESE INTEND THE WORD "ru than" Tu kre: DELİ-
COLON BUT TRUE QÜR PULT of view THÊue and TWO POINTS THAT IT is
ESSENTIm To Avoid coNUMDİNG:
L
(A) ANY ADLIšsium or a ruRNAL RIGHT or REPRESENTATIVES OF COILUNIST URGanISATIONS TO VISIT FRISCHERS, PARTICULARLY WIDE AND
ILL-DEFINED CATEGORIES or PhiSukERS ON GROUPS OF FRISONERS
TOGETHER SEMICOLON AND
(B) THE IMPLIED ADMISSION or Suke PURE OF QUASI-CONSULAR STATUS
FÜR NGA A
ALAHOUGH WE MAY HAVE USED & F u URGAND AS CHANNELS FOR COMUNICATION FROM TIME TO Tike, I Stila PEEL HE NEED TU DE
VERY CAREFUL IN THE LANGTERM İNTEREST OF HONG KONG ABOUT CONCEDING
QUASI-CONSULAR STATUS TO THEM. THE CONCESSION THẬT WE HAVE ALREADY
kavĒ, UF ukaoTlm Að a NA VISIT TO NOMA'S OWN EMPLOYEES
CAN BE JUSTIFIED UNDER OUR EXISTING RULES.
5.
ON RECONSIDERING THE LATIÊM NOW, IT DEELS TU ME THAT IT MIGHT
BE POSSIBLE FOR US TU wand a hún raUPUSAL TO THE CHINESE THAT WOULD
GU SULE MAI TorniDS KhelING THEIR REQUEST "ITHOUT CONCEDING EITHER
OF THE LU PRIVIPLES ABOVE. 1 #OULD SUgvEST TELLING THEM THAT IN
THINKING FURTHER ABOUT BILIK REQUEST PUR VISITS TU JOURNALISTS (Pakaurach 1(A) or Pining Indobrak 84) IT OCCURRED TO US THAT THERE
MIGHT HÄVE DEEN A MISUNDERSTmulaG. TWO POINTS WERE NUT CLEAN TỤ
US:-
(1) WHAT THEY MEAST BY " 'Furkal' viSIT AND
(11) TU FugvuSELY "HIGH INDIVIDUALS THEY "JSHED THE VISITS TO BE
PAID.
WE WERE ALWAYS READY TUO APILY QUR MULES FUR PRISON VISITS IN A
REASONABLE MÄNNER. Ir dieY WOULD SUPPLY US WITH THE NAMES OF THE
ADDITIONAL JOURNALISTS [?r. OMITED] WESTION, HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER PLAKUSTING SINGLE VIŠTIS TO BÁCH OF THEM
INDIVIDUALLY BY :IS EMPLOYER AND/UR A RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL OF THE
ORGANISATION REPLOYING HIM, SUBJECT TO THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:-
THE PRISONER LUST "UT UBJEJT,
(11) EACH VISIT MUST BE TO A PiiSuned iNDIVIDUALLY,
CONFIDENTLÁL
/(111)THE
CONFIDENTIAL
HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO. 212 Tu COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
-3-
1) THE NUMBER OF VISITORS TO EACH PRISONER AT ANY ONE TIME MUST
BREASONABLY RESTRICTED, 1.E. TO TWO OR THREE VISITORS.
(17) THE TIMING MUST BE CONVENIENT TO THE PRISON AUTHORITIES.
(7) VISITS SHOULD NOT NORMALLY LAST MORE THAN 15 MINUTES EXCEPT WITH
GOOD REASON (THIS LIMIT IS APPLIED GENERALLY TO PRISON VISITS IN THE
INTERESTS OF VISITORS SINCE INTERVEWING FACILITIES ARE NOT
UNLIMITED AND LONGER VISITS WOULD OFTEN MEAN VISITORS WAITING LONGER)
6. VISITS ON THES BASIS (WHICH BIN CHARGE COULD MAKE OUT WERE RATHER
SPECIAL CONDITIONS IF THIS WOULD HELP) WOULD NOT BE AN EMBARRASSMENT.
THEY WOULD ALLOW 'PATRIOTIC JOURNALISTS' TO BE VISITED BY THE
ECITORS OR MANAGERS OF THEIR PAPERS COR SOMEONE SIMILAR) BUT NOT BY
THE N.C.N.A. PER SE. IF HOWEVER THE CHINESE MAINTAIN THAT 'FORMAL'
VISITS MEAN SOMETHING MORE, I SHOULD HAVE TO RECONSIDER WHEN THEIR
EXTRA REQUIREMENTS WERE KNOWN.
7. ON THE OTHER HAND IF, BEFORE MAKING AN APPROACH, H.M. CHARGE WOULD
VISH ANY FURTHER CLARIFICATION, OR ANY MODIFICATIONS WITHIN THIS
FRAMEWORK, I WOULD OF COURSE BE GLAD TO TRY TO MEET HIM.
POSSIBILITIES ARE :-
CA) TO HINT THAT AN N.C.N.A. OFFICIAL COULD ACCOMPANY THE EMPLOYER
AND
(B) TO ARRANGE THAT INTERVIEWS TAKE PLACE IN THE ROOM WHERE LAWYERS
SEE PRISONER CLIENTS, WHICH IS SOMEWHAT MORE COMFORTABLE THAN THE
NORMAL ARRANGEMENTS AND MIGHT BE THOUGHT MORE 'FORMAL
I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE IT CLEAR HOVEVER THAT I WOULD PREFER NOT TO
MAKE THESE CONCESSIONS WHICH WOULD RATHER TOO GREATLY DISTINGUISH
THESE PEOPLE FROM ORDINARY PRISONERS AND I WOULD WISH TO CONSIDER
BEFORE FINALLY AGREEING.
8. THE OPPORTUNITY MIGHT ALSO BE TAKEN TO ENQUIRE FURTHER ABOUT THE
PROPOSED HSUEH PING/GREY EXCHANGE.
F& PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE PEKING. AS MYTEL 69.
SIR D. TRENCH
(KEPETITION TO PEKING,
KËFERHED FÜR DEPARTMENTAL DELISION]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION G.. H.A. DEPT. F.U. F.E.D.
NEWS DEPT. 0.L.A.
PPPPP
CONSULAR DEPT. F.U.D
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ADVANCE COUPLES SENT
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CONFIDENTIAL
FDI/1
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110 EDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE TO PEKING
Telno 189
CONFIDENTIAL
TOP CC
26 February, 1968
(F)
Зод
300
Personal for Hopson from Murray.
Noi
Your telegram No. 147 [of 26 February]:
Prisoners.
You will now have seen Hong Kong telegram No. 76 of 26 February. We are trying to obtain authority for you to go ahead as soon as possible, but we very much regret that we shall not be able to get instructions to you in time for action on 27 February.
30S FA
DEPARTHENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry No.
DEPARTMENT
FD/I
FAR FASTEIN
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
PRIORITY MARKINGS
(Date)
Top Secret Secret Confidential Restricted Unclassified
Emergency Immediate,
Routine
En Clair.
Code Cypher
Draft Telegrin to:-
PEKINS
No
189
(Date)
And to:-
* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addresson(s)
26/468
Security classification -If any
CONFIDENTIAL.
[Codeword-if any]
Addressed to
telegram No.........
And to......
26/2
repeated for information to
Saving to
Repeat to:-
Saving to:-
Distribution:-
Sefentantal FE.D.
Copies to:-
181??4/22
9/22
..(date)
P
....... זו חוו--וו-ו.יו
1.
TILLI'II
IMEI
PERSONAL for HOPSON fine MURRAY
Your tel No 147 [1/26 feb ]: Prisoners.
You will now have seen Hong Kong tel. No 76 of 26 February.
We are
trying to oftami authority for you
+
Al-
go abead
مه
Sain
مين
possible, but we
very much regul
that
Sunc
shall not
be able
to
get instructions to
you
in time for action
on 27 Feb.
Jul 26
26 Fut.
[
CYPHER CAT A
Copies also
IMMEDIATE HONG KON
TELEGRAM NO 241
IDENTIAL.
F213/1 (153) + FD12/9 (78
CONSUETIA
TO COMPA
L
TOP CU
Bo
RECEIVED
ARCHIVES NO Y
OFFICE
26 FEBRUARY 1968
27 FEB 1968
1
I
西
ADDRESSED SECRETARY OF STATE RFI PEKING MYTEL. NO. 76 DATE!)
26TH FEBRUARY.
1296
6292
YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS. 323, 324. AND 325: PRISON VISITS.
I AM NOT ANXIOUS TO PROLONG THE DISCUSSION, BUT YOU NO DOUBT
APPRECIATE THAT THESE TELEGRAMS SUGGEST SIX ADDITIONAL CONCESSIONS WHICH, IN VARYING DEGREE, WILL DISTINGUISH THESE PRISONERS AND WHICH I AM ACCORDINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT MAKING- (I) THE INCLUSION OF N.C.N.A. IN THE VISITS AT ALL, WHICH I HAVE HOWEVER ALREADY INDICATED I WOULD ACCEPT IF NECESSARY:
USE OF THE SPECIAL ROOM, WHICH COULD WELL BE AWKWARD IF CONSIDERABLE NUMBERS ARE INVOLVED WITHOUT ADEQUATE SPACING. HERE AGAIN, HOWEVER, I AM PREPARED TO SO ARRANGE,
ALTHOUGH
I SEE LITTLE REASON TO VOLUNTEER THE PROPOSAL: C111) YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 323, PARAGRAPH 3. TO ALLOW VISITS
BY HOWA ALONE WOULD BE A FURTER MOVE AWAY FROM OUR CURRENT
PRISON PRACTICE AND IN THE DIRECTION OF GRANTING NCNĂ A SPECIAL
STATUS. I DO NOT MYSELF SEE WHY WE SHOULD THINK IT NECESSARY
TO CONCEDE THE POINT IN ADVANCE, LET ALONE TAKE THE INITIATIVE
IN PUTTING THE CONCESSION INTO THE MINDS OF THE CHINESE, SINCE
VE ARE PREPARED TO ALLOW A RESPONSIPLE OFFICER OF THE EMPLOYING
ORGANISATION TO BE SUBSTITUTED FOR THE EMPLOYER:
CIV) YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 323, PARAGRAPH 4. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES
PERHAPS IT WOULD BE BETTER TO SAY NOTHING INITIALLY ABOUT TIME
LIMITS, AND LEAVE IT TO THE CHINESE TO RAISE THE POINT:
NEVERTHELESS THIS IS UNLIKELY TO BE A PROBLEM UNLESS THE
NUMBERS ARE LARGE AND CANNOT BE CONVENIENTLY SPACED:
/(V) YOUR
CONFIDENTIAL
COKULENTI AL
HONG KONG TELEGIAL . PAL TO COMPONERAUTZI OFFICE
CV) YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 225, PARAGRAPH 4. OBVICUSLY THE MORE
OFTEN 'SPECIAL VISITS' ARE REPEATED, THE MORE WE DISCRIMINATE
IN FAVOUR OF COMMUNIST PRISONERS, AND THE GREATER RISK OF
EMBARRASSMENT HERE. I WOULD NOT ENTIRELY EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY
OF LATER EXCHANGES OF VISITS IF THE FIRST SET WENT WELL AND WE
ACHIEVED THE QUID PRO QUO IN RESPECT OF GREY: BUT I WOULD
SUGGEST THAT WE ENTER INTO NO COMMITMENT ON THIS POINT IN
OUR FIRST APPROACH TO THE CHINESE:
CVI) YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 325, PARAGRAPH 5. 1 WOULD DO MY BEST
TO ARRANGE VISITS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, BUT THIS DEPENDS
ON NUMBERS AND WHETHER ANY ADVERSE INTEREST IN THESE VISITS
15 AROUSED PUBLICLY.
2 I WOULD STILL PREFER NOT TO CONDUCT THESE NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH
NONA IN HONG KONG SEMICOLON BUT IF WE DO SO I WOULD STRONGLY ADVISE
THAT IT BE DONE BY EXCHANGES OF MESSAGES CAT LEAST AT FIRST) BECAUSE
CA) IF WE DISCUSS POINTS OF SUBSTANCE CAS OPPOSED TO PURELY ADI11N-
ISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS) WITH NCNA HERE WE ACCORD THEM IN EFFECT THE
QUASI-CONSULAR ROLE THAT CCF PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM 323) WE
WISH TO AVOID CONCEDING.
(B) THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE MORE INTRANS IGENT ABOUT HONG KONG PROBLEMS, THAN THE MFA AND OUR CONTACTS WITH THEM ON OTHER MATTERS HAVE BEEN RESTRICTED TO EXCHANGES OF MESSAGES ON THE TELEPHONE. IT COULD BE DIFFICULT AND TAKE TIME TO GET A TWO-WAY DISCUSSION ARRANGED. (THERE
COULD GASILY BE LONG ARGUMENIG ABOUT FERTING PLACES).
(C) A DISCUSSION WITH NCNA COULD BE MORE EASILY REPRESENTED BY THEM
AS FORCING US INTO NEGOTIATION HERE, THIS IS NOT TO SAY HOWEVER THAT
IF PROPOSALS FOR A DISCUSSION AROSE NATURALLY AND WITHOUT RISK OF
EMBARRASSMENT WE COULD NOT CONSIDER IT.
3. YOUR TELEGRAM 324, PARAGRAPH 3.
I SEE CONSIDERABLE RISKS IN GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE
PREPARED TO ALLOW VISITS TO AN UNI, IMITED NUMBER CAS PARAGRAPH (CA)
OF TELEGHAN JA SEI NG TO IMPLY) IF WE ARE TO ARGUE ABOUT THE MATTER
IN HONG KONG LATER. I AM ALSO CONCERNED THAT WE SHOULD NOT OFFER
CONCESSIONS ON MATTERS WHICH ARE OF SUBSTANCE TO US BEFORE THE
CONFIDENTIAL
/CHINESE
-
፡፡
CHINESE HAVE PRESSEI US TO DO 30, AND "ITKOUT OUR HAVING ANY
AURANGE THAT AS A ESULT WE SHALL GAIN ACCESS TO GREY.
4. YOUR TELEGRAM 324, PARAGRAPH 10A),
Į SUGGEST WE NEED TO STRIKE A CAREFUL BALANCE ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH
WE REPRESENT OUR TERMS AS SPECIAL CONCESSIONS. I CONCEDE WE CANNOT
REPRESENT THEM AS BEING PERFECTLY NORMAL CESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE
ATRITIONAL CONCESSIONS NOT ITUPOSED) AS THIS WOULD BE BOTH TOO
TRANSPARENT AND UNLIKELY TO SATISFY THEN, BUT TO MAKE OUT THAT THEY
WERE QUITE UNUSUAL CONCESSIONS WOULD BOTH HAND THEM A FROPAGANDA
VICTORY AND CUT THE GROUND CUT FROM UNDER MY FEET HERE, WHERE I
MUST DO MY BEST TO REPRESENT THEM AS NOT UNDULY ABNORMAL.
5. AS A CONCRETE PROPOSAL, I SUGGEST SUBSTITUTING FOR THE LAST
SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 1CA) AND FOR PARAGRAPH 1(8) OF YOUR TELEGRAM
324 IF THE NAMES OF THE JOURNALISTS AT PRESENT IN PRISON ARE
SUPLIED TO US, WE ARE PREPARED TO AGREE (PROVIDED THAT THE PRISONER
DOES NOT OBJECT) TO A SPECIAL IS IT TO EACH INDIVIALLY BY HIS
EMPLOYER AND ONE OTHER OFFICIAL OF THE NEWSPAPER EM LOYING HIM
SEMICOLON OR ALTERNATIVELY ONE NCNA REPRESENTATIVE, IF THIS IS
PREFERRED1
6. H.M. CHARGE WOULD I HOPE STRESS THAT THOSE IN QUESTION MUST BE
BONA FIDE JOURNALISTS, AND HE MIGHT THEN GO ON TO ENQUIRE THE
NUMBERS LIKELY TO BE INVOLVED. HE COULD THEN SUGGEST THAT AFTER
AGREEMENT ON THE NUMBERS IN FEKING THE NCNA IN HONG KONG SHOULD
COMMUNICATE TO THE POLITICAL ADVISER THE NAMES OF THE PRISONERS
AND THOSE PROPOSING TO VISIT THEM, IN ORDER THAT APPROXIMATE
TIMES OF VISITS AND OTHER DETAILS MIGHT BE COMMUNICATED TO NONA.
7. FINALLY, I CAN ONLY REPEAT MY WARNING THAT ALL THESE CONCESSIONS
AND ARRANGEMENTS MAY RUN US INTO DANGEROUS REPURCUSSIONS HERE, BUT
I CANNOT OF COURSE SAY UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT THEY WILL DO SO.
F. 0. PLEASE PADS PEKING 76.
SIK.
DEPARTMENT?
F.O.
F.E.D.
C.O. H.K.D.
NNNNN
EMI WA DILAKTIENTAL DECISION]
ADVANCE COPIES DENT
ITIAL
copy also on
FD1318
CONFIDENTIAL
pr
PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
трам
オFEB
26 February 1968
FD1/1
Cypher/Cat A
IMMEDIATE
Telno 147
NFIDENTIAL
300
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 147 of 26 February. Repeated for information to Hong Kong.
197
Hong
Your telegram No. 324 to Hong Kong:
Prison Visits.
In making approach here I shall have to refer to conversations with Hsueh on 28 January and 31 January in which he questioned that arrangements be made for "responsible officials of NONA" to visit NONA and "patriotic" journalist prisoners.
Hauch will assume we are prepared to meet Chinese on this
It will question and that therefore NONA will be making visits. therefore be necessary for me to state at outset that a NONA representative will be allowed to accompany employer in each case in calling on patriotic" journalist, rather than be asked, as your paragraph (b) suggests.
2. I have no other comments and hope I may now receive authority to make approach if possible tomorrow 27 February.
Sir D. Hopson
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
F.0. 0.0.
F.E.D. H.K.D.
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CONFIDENTIAL
ADVANCE COPIES SENT
I
[Signature]
[Date]
Sufil's to FED XHKD
49782), 035441, 1,200 pads. 1/67. P. & 5. Gp 999/167, 19966), 391936. 1,000 pads. 4747. F. & S. G§.9991167,
Gode or Code R
7 299 DSX 16 8.c. 1272 299
INWARD TELEGRAM
Cypher/OTP Cars
Paling
FROM
Simy. Hopave
146
No.
"26 Febmary RITY.
[Priority]
+
Confidential.
[Distribution
Heading]
[ARCHIVES N" 31
TO. FOL FDI/I
R
0220 hrs. 0805 hrs.
26/2
way t
(296
297
•
Your telnos. 323,324 and 325
to Hong Kong.
It would be helpind if future such telegrams could
be repeated
DISTRIBUTION
on
23
me
ANCE
هار
me
immixte
ripeal immediate. Those under reference though despatched
Jebruary did not rach until 25 February (Sunday) This frequently happens when your telegrams to me marked only priority.
FO
се
yeas
مگر
'Teht!
FED 5 нко I DSAO. bomis. 11.
DWS. 12
1-R129
F-AIR Tahti- R117
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are
1. Comm's (Examinits
1
--All Cornish)
185
copies also on F# 13/8
CONFI.....
(208)
Pc. Bh
TOP COP
Cypher/Cat A
IMMEDIATE PEKING
ΤΟ
FOREIGN OFFICE
REC
Telno 145
24 February 1968
JARCH
2 FEB 1968
CONFIDENTIAL
FDI
607
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 145 of 24 February, repeated for information to Hong Kong.
325
Hong Kong telegram No.-234: Prisoners.
In view of the considerable delays to which a solution of this question has already been subjected and of Importance generally of getting perpetuating movement as soon as possible, I trust I shall be receiving very early authority to proceed as suggested in paragraph 3 and paragraph of telegram under reference. I attach great importance to the inclusion of NCNA representative.
Foreign Office pass Hong Kong No. 94.
Sir D. Hopson
DEPARTMENTAI, DISTRIBUTION
F.0. F.E.D.
6.0.
Consular Dept.
P.C.D
D.D. & P.U.S.D.
J.I.R.D.
News Dept.
H.K.D.
1. & G.P. News Dept. O.L.A.
[Repeated as requested]
NNNNN
CONFIDENTI AL
ADVANCE COPIES SENT
[
Copies also on F13/8/152
+ FD 1318 75
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES N. 31
58
все
CONFIDENTIAL
2.
FD!!
CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO HONG KONG
(297)
TELNO 324
23 FEBRUARY, 1968 (F & HKD)
CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO HONGKONG TELEGRAM NO 324 OF 23/2 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PEKING.
MY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TELEGRAM:
296
PRISON VISITS,
SUBJECT TO YOUR COMMENTS AND THOSE OF PEKING, I SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING PLAN OF ACTION:
(A) SIR DONALD HOPSON SHOULD SAY TO THE CHINESE THAT WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO SEE HOW SOME PROGRESS COULD BE MADE OVER THE QUESTION OF VISITS TO IMPRISONED NCNA AND OTHER JOURNALISTS,
ALL THESE PRISONERS HAVE OF COURSE BEEN RECEIVING REGULAR VISITS BUT, AS A SPECIAL CONCESSION, WE ARE NOW PREPARED TO MAKE ADDITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR SPECIAL VISITS TO SUCH PRISONERS, THE DETAILS (INCLUDING THE NUMBERS OF JOURNALISTS INVOLVED)
COULD BE ARRANGED IN HONG KONG BETWEEN N CNA AND THE POLITICAL
ADVISER WHO HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THEM,
(B)
IF ASKED, HOPSON SHOULD ALSO SAY THAT THE QUESTION OF VISITS
BY NCNA TO NON-N CN A JOURNALIST PRISONERS SHOULD NOT BE A
MAJOR DIFFICULTY, ADDING THAT ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE FOR REPRESENTATIVES OF NCNA TO BE INCLUDED IN VISITS BY THE EMPLOYERS OF SUCH PERSONS.
(c)
HOPSON SHOULD FOLLOW THIS UP BY SOME FORM OF WORDS INDICATING THAT WE EXPECT TO HEAR FROM THE CHINESE SOON ABOUT ACCESS TO GREY. (WITHOUT MAKING VISITS TO PRISONERS DIRECTLY CONDITIONAL UPON ACCESS TO GREY, WE WISH TO LEAVE THE CHINESE IN NO DOUBT THAT WE SEE THE TWO AS CONNECTED.)
2.
THE HANDLING OF THE APPROACH TO NCNA IN HONG KONG WOULD
DEPEND ON WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO ENGAGE IN A TWO-WAY
.
!
CONFIDENTIAL
/DISCUSSION
CONFIDENTIAL
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 324 TO HONG KONG
2.
DISCUSSION OR WHETHER IT MUST BE ON THE BASIS OF SINGLE MESSAGES. IF (AS WOULD SEEM DESIRABLE) THE FIRST IS POSSIBLE, THEN EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO EMPHASISE THAT IT IS THE EMPLOYERS OF NON NC NA JOURNALISTS WHO ARE BEING GRANTED ACCESS AND REPRESENTAT- IVES OF N CNA ARE BEING ALLOWED TO GO ALONG AS AN ADDITIONAL CONCESSION AND NOT AS A RIGHT. IT WOULD ALSO BE POSSIBLE TO WAIT FOR N C NA TO MAKE THE RUNNING ON WHETHER THEY WOULD BE ALLOWED TO REPRESENT NON-AVAILABLE EMPLOYERS. IF, HOWEVER, IT IS ONLY POSSIBLE TO PASS MESSAGES TO N CN A, THEN PRESUMABLY IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO STATE FROM THE OUTSET THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF N CNA CAN BE INCLUDED IN VISITS BY EMPLOYERS AND POSSIBLY ALSO THAT NCNA CAN REPRESENT THE EMPLOYERS WHERE THE LATTER ARE UNAVAILABLE.
3. THE CHINESE MIGHT PRODUCE A LIST OF QUOTE PATRIOTIC JOURNAL- ISTS UNQUOTE WHICH INCLUDED LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE WHO WERE CLEARLY NOT JOURNALISTS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE ACCEPT THAT YOU WILL HAVE TO DELETE THESE FROM THE LIST AND TELL THE CHINESE THAT ACCESS WOULD BE ALLOWED ONLY TO THE REMAINDER, BUT IF IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THE CHINESE WERE PREPARED TO MAKE VISITS ONLY TO ALL OR NONE, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN DEMONSTRATED THAT THEY WERE NOT SER- IOUSLY INTERESTED IN A REASONABLE QUID PRO QUO FOR VISITS TO GREY.
GRATEFUL FOR URGENT COMMENTS.
CROSEC
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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C.O.
H.K.D.
CONFIDENTIAL
23
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry No. FDI To await C.O.
DEPARTMENT
led cices
t
And time (31.12.) telegrum should
HWB&F Far Easter each addomete
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Sacred
educrat
Confidencial
Bestricted
Unclassifed
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
PRIORITY MAKIN (Date)...
Flash Immediate
Priority Routine
}
MITHUN
Despatched...
24/2
0245
+
LIJILI PE
[B]
CYPHER
Security classification"]
[Security
CONFIDENTIAL
En Clair
Code- Cypher
Draft Telegram to:-
[
Privacy marking -if any
]
[Codeword-if any).
Addressed to Song Kong
-------
324
telegram No...
HONG NOA No
HONG KUNG
(date)
23/2
324
23/2
And to
repeated for information to
Peking()
Saving to
(Date)
And to:-
PRIORITY
Repeat to PHING 184
Saving to:-
Distribution:-
Departmental
FED HKD
Copies to:-
M.i.p.t. : Prison Visits.
Subject to your comments and those of Peking,
I suggest the following plan of action:
(a) Sir Donald Hopson should say to the Chinese
All
that we have been trying to see how some progress
could be made over the question of visits to
imprisoned NCNA and other journalists.
these prisoners have of course been receiving
regular visits but, as a special concession, we
are now prepared to make additional arrangements
for special visits to such prisoners. The
details (including the numbers of journalists
involved) could be arranged in Hong Kong between
NCNA and the Political Adviser who has been
instructed to make contact with them.
(b) If asked, Hop on should also say that the
journalist question of visits by NCNA to non-NCNA prisoners
should not be a major difficulty, adding that
/arrangements
TH
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Dd. 32853 BU NESSU
CONFIDENT IAL
arrangements can be made for representatives
of NCNA to be included in visits by the
employers of such persons.
(c) Hopson should follow this up by some form
of words indicating that we expect to hear
from the Chinese soon about access to Grey.
(Without making visits to prisoners directly
conditional upon access to Grey, we wish to
leave the Chinese in no doubt that we see
the two as connected.)
2.
The handling of the approach to NCNA in
Hong Kong would depend on whether it is possible
If (as
to engage in a two-way discussion or whether it
must be on the basis of single messages.
would seem desirable) the first is possible,
then efforts should be made to emphasise that it
is the employers of non-NČNA journalists who are
being granted access and representatives of NCNA
are being allowed to go along as an additional
concession and not as a right. It would also
be possible to wait for NCNA to make the running
on whether they would be allowed to represent
non-available employers. If, however, it is
only possible to pass messages to NCNA, then
presumably it will be necessary to state from
the outset that representatiges of NCNA can be
included in visita by employers and possibly also
that NCNA can represent the employers where
the latter are unavailable.
3. The Chinese might produce a list of
"patriotic journalists" which included large
/numbers
CONFIDENTIAL
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
13. 32555 88 (4200)
CONFIDENTIAL
numbers of people who were clearly not journaliste
We would hope that, In these circumstances, it accept that
you will have
would be possible to delete these from the list
and tell the Chinese that access would be
allowed only to the remainder. But if it became
clear that the Chinese were prepared to make ri
visits only to all or none, it would have been
demonstrated that they were not seriously
interested in a reasonable quid pro quo for
visits to Grey, and we should have to reconsić
the position.
4.
Grateful for urgent comments.
Dam
CONFIDENTIAL
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CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO HONG KONG
FD!/1
TELNO 323
23 FEBRUARY, 1968 (HWB AND F)
CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO 323 OF 23/2 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PEKING,
NOT need.
295
YOUR TELEGRAM NO 212 AND PEKING TELEGRAM NO 133: PRISON VISITS.
! THINK THAT THESE HELPFUL SUGGESTIONS PROVIDE A POSSIBLE WAY FORWARD IN TRYING TO SECURE ACCESS TO GREY AND THAT WE SHOULD MAKE FULL USE OF THEM,
2. I UNDERSTAND AND SHARE YOUR CONCERN LEST N CN A SHOULD ESTABLISH ITSELF IN A QUASI-CONSULAR ROLE WITH A RIGHT OF ACCESS TO BROAD CATEGORIES OF PRISONERS OF CHINESE RACE, BUT I HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO PLAY OUR HAND AND WORD OUR APPROACHES
TO THE CHINESE IN SUCH A WAY THAT WE CONCEDE THE MINIMUM ON THIS FRONT, THE SUGGESTION IN PARAGRAPH 3(C) OF PEKING TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE SEEMS A GOOD WAY OF DOING THIS.
3. IDEALLY
IDEALLY, I WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO GRANT ACCESS TO QUOTE PATRIOTIC JOURNALISTS UNQUOTE, ONLY BY THEIR EMPLOYERS: BUT, AS PEKING HAVE POINTED OUT, WE RISK DESTROYING THE WHOLE BARGAIN BY INSISTING ON THIS. I AM GRATEFUL THEREFORE THAT YOU ARE
PREPARED TO INCLUDE NCNA IN SUCH VISITS IN SOME FORM, I THINK THAT WE MUST BE PREPARED TO COMMIT OURSELVES TO THIS BY TELLING THE CHINESE THAT VISITS TO QUOTE PATRIOTIC JOURNALISTS UNQUOTE WILL BE ALLOWED BY THEIR EMPLOYERS ACCOMPANIED BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF NC NA AND, IN ADDITION, THAT VISITS BY N C NA ALONE WILL BE ALLOWED IF THE EMPLOYER IS UNAVAILABLE (ALTHOUGH WE WOULD HOPE THAT THIS LAST SITUATION WILL NOT ARISE).
4.
I AGREE WITH ALL THE CONDITIONS SUGGESTED IN THE LATTER PART OF PARAGRAPH 5 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, ALTHOUGH I THINK IT WOULD BE WISER NOT TO INSIST ON A TIME LIMIT SO SHORT AS 15
CONFIDENTIAL
/MINUTES
1
CONFIDENTIAL
C.O. TELEGRAM NO. 323 TO HONG KONG
2.
MINUTES PER VISIT SINCE WE WOULD NOT WISH THE CHINESE TO
INSIST THAT VISITS TO GREY SHOULD BE LIMITED TO SUCH A SHORT PERIOD. IT MIGHT BE EASIER TO DEAL WITH THIS IF VISITS ARE MADE IN A SPECIAL ROOM AS SUGGESTED IN PARAGRAPH 7(B) OF YOUR TELEGRAM.
5. I DO NOT THINK THAT THERE IS MUCH TO BE GAINED BY ASKING THE CHINESE TO DEFINE THEIR MEANING OF QUOTE FORMAL UNQUOTE VISITS. ON THE CONTRARY IT MIGHT ENCOURAGE THEM TO INCREASE THEIR DEMANDS. IF WE CAN ACHIEVE ACCESS TO GREY BY MEANS OF VISITS OF ANY SORT, SO MUCH THE BETTER, AND IT DOES NOT MUCH MATTER WHAT THE CHINESE CALL THEM. I SUGGEST THAT WE OURSELVES SHOULD USE THE WORDS QUOTE SPECIAL VISITS UNQUOTE TO EMPHASISE THEIR EXCEPTIONAL NATURE AND MINIMISE THE RIGHT OF THOSE CONCERNED TO MAKE THEM.
6. IT IS RECOGNISED HERE THAT IF THIS FAILS IT IS AS FAR AS WE SHOULD GO IN MAKING CONCESSIONS IN HONG KONG TO GAIN ACCESS TO GREY. TO GO FURTHER MIGHT PUT AT RISK OUR POSITION IN HONG KONG: WE WOULD BE ABANDONING A POLICY OF FIRMNESS IN OUR DEALINGS THAT HAS BROGHT US THROUGH THE RECENT TROUBLES AND WOULD ENCOURAGE CHINESE HOPES THAT WE CAN STILL BE PUSHED INTO MAKING SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS THERE
7.
-
DETAILED SUGGESTIONS ON HOW THIS EXERCISE SHOULD BE HANDLED WITH THE CHINESE ARE CONTAINED IN MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.
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Lode
Cypher
Draft Telegram jø
HONG KONG
No. C
(Date)
And to:-
323.
[Codeword-if any]
Addressed to
------LI ILL.I
HƯNG ĐỪNG
telegram No. 323
LILL-.
(date)
23/2
And to
23/2
repeated for information to
Z
Peking (Runity).
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
PRIORITY
Repeat to
PEKING 183
Saving to:-
Distribution:-----
DEPARTMENTAL
FED HKD)
Copies to:-
Soving to
non moriririk YIHA
Your telegram No. 212 and Peking telegram
No. 133: Prison Visits.
that
I think/these helpful suggestions provide a
possible way forward in trying to secure access to
Grey and that we should make full use of them.
2.
I understand and share your concern lest NCNA
should establish itself in a quasi-consular role
with a right of access to broad categories of
prisoners of Chinese race, but I hope that it will
be possible to play our hand and word our approaches
to the Chinese in such a way that we concede the
minimum on this front. The suggestion in paragraph
3(c) of Peking telegram under reference seems a
good way of doing this.
3.
Ideally, I would have preferred to grant access
to "patriotic journalists", only by their employera;
but, as Peking have pointed out, we risk destroying gratight the whole bargain by insisting on this. I am gled
/therefore
1815
23/7
Ind. 32955 Ed (4200)
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
t
CONFIDENTIAL
therefore that you are prepared to include
NCNA in such visits in some form. I think that
we must be prepared to commit ourselves to this
by telling the Chinese that visits to "patriotic
journaliste" will be allowed by their employers
accompanied by a representative of NCNA and, in
addition, that visits by NCNA alone will be
allowed if the employer is unavailable (although
we would hope that this last situation will not
arise).
I agree with all the conditions suggested
in the latter part of paragraph 5 of your tele-
gram under reference, although I think it would
be wiser not to insist on a time limit so short
as 15 minutes per visit since we would not wish
the Chinese to insist that visits to Grey should
be limited to such a short period. It might be
easier to deal with this if visits are made in
a special room as suggested in paragraph ̈7(b)
of your telegram.
5.
I do not think that there is much to be
gained by asking the Chinese to define their
meaning of "formal" visits. On the contrary it
might encourage them to increase their demands.
If we can achieve access to Grey by means of
visits of any sort, so much the better, and it
does not much matter what the Chinese call them.
I suggest that we ourselves should use the words
"special visits" to emphasise their exceptional
nature and minimise the right of those concerned
to make them.
CONFIDENTIAL
/6.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Dd. 32955 Ed (4290)
6.
ம்
CONFIDENTIAL
It is recognised here that if this fails
it is as far as we should go in making concessions
To go
in Hong Kong to gain access to Grey.
further might put at risk our position in Hong
Kong;
we would be abandoning a policy of firmness
in our dealings that has brought us through the
recent troubles and would encourage Chinese
hopes that we can still be pushed into making
substantial concessions there.
7.
Detailed suggestions on how this exercise
should be handled with the Chinese are contained
in m.i.f.t.
Dazy.
CONFIDENTIAL
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Cypher/Cat A
IMMEDIATE PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Подат
The reason for Miki chage of lan were di enveed bulwen T. Rogan The Rom
Серегай вибитий
ov 21 PÅ,
See
RECEIVED IN ¡ARCHIVES No.31
21 FEB 1968
FDIN
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.133 of
Telno 133
20 February, 1968
CONFIDENTIAL
20 February, Repeated for information to Hong Kong.
ре
Not feed.
Any
Hong Kong telegram No.212: Prison Visits.
I am however
I am grateful for this clarification. surprised to learn that under the existing rules it has all along been possible for an extra visit to a prisoner to be granted to an outside person (given compelling reasons and prisoner's agreement) without the prisoner having first to ask for such a visit and that an employer is usually granted one such visit. The position as stated in Hong Kong telegram No.1908 was that special visits could only be granted on the P12/1 51 prior request of Biz/35 prior request of prisoners themselves.
informed the Chinese on 31 December. sticking point in the negotiation.
2.
On instructions I so This has been a major
I think it a great pity that we should not have been informed of these possibilities in December when prison visits were first discussed, or even a few weeks ago when the question arose of access at Chinese New Year. Much valuable time would have been saved and we could almost certainly have secured access to Grey.
J
30 Proposals now put by the Governor in his paragraph 5 fall short of the first Chinese demand of 28 January (access to NCNA and "patriotic" journalists) in only one important respect i.e., it is suggested that employers and not NCNA would visit the "patriotic" journalists. I strongly recommend that we should include the NCNA in such visits 1.e., propose a visit by the employer plus an NCNA official, for the following reasons:
(a) As for holding out on this one point we would endanger the whole deal;
FD1374 41
(b) As pointed out in Hong Kong telegram No.206, in some cases the employers of the "patriotic" journalists are themselves in gaol and may not be easily available;
(c) By allowing the NCNA to participate in these visits we would not be making any admission of the NCNA's quasi Consular status. We could in any subsequent discussion justify our actions and if need be distinguish this from Consular access by pointing out that the NCNA was allowed visits to the journalists because it is a Press organization and that such visits did not mean that they had any right to visit other categories of prisoner.
/(a) I note
CONFIDENTIAL ;
T
CONFIDENTIAL
Peking telegram No.133 to Foreign Office.
-2-
(a) I note that the Governor considers the possibility of including an NCNA official among the visitors (paragraph 7 (a) of telegram under referen
(e) In the end our object is quick access to Grey. I consider such access important enough to justify slight straining of the rules in the above sense.
6.[sic] If above is agreed I could make an immediate approach to the Chinese, though I would not propose to go into detailed points at the end of paragraph 5 which I think would be better dealt with in Hong Kong at time arrangements are made.
This approach would not cut across expected Chinese reply on visas and on Grey-Hsueh-ping exchange, though we might hear something, particularly on the second point, at the same time. Again I think it most important we should move quickly if we want to avoid the danger of joint communications expiring.
Sir D.Hopson
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294)
Seen I sqs.
RY OF STATE'S MEETING WITH COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY
Wicol
ON 16 FEBRUARY
AP
19FEB 1968
19:15
HỒNG KONG
FD
Present Situation
The situation is now quiet. In December last year the
Chinese apparently made a policy decision to change their
tactics in Hong Kong by abandoning violence in favour of a
long-term "struggle". There have been no significant incidents
in Hong Kong or Kowloon since Christmas. The border has also
remained quiet apart from occasional stone-throwing from the
Chinese side. A high level of propaganda has been maintained
in left-wing newspapers against alleged maltreatment of
political prisoners and against the salinity of the water.
(Because of water shortage it has been necessary to draw on
reservoirs which contain a noticeable but acceptable proportion
of salt water.)
Gift of Rice and Clothing from China
2. ▲ body in Kwangtung Province called the "Kwangtung
Provincial Support Hong Kong Patriots Committee" has given
5,000 tone of rice for distribution to "needy residents" and
1,000 suits of winter clothing for the inmates of Stanley
prison. The Hong Kong Government would not normally permit
extra clothing for prisoners and any gift of rice would have
to be set against the normal import quota.
Difficulties could
arise if the Chinese try to insist on distributing the rice
and clothes, particularly if a Chinese Red Cross delegation
is sent from China to do so. The local communists in Hong
/Kong
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2.
This 18
Kong are apparently awaiting a decision from the authorities
in Canton as to whether the plan shall go forward.
a striking example of the restoration of the normal channel
of control over communist activities in Hong Kong which was
disrupted during the Cultural Revolution.
Mr. Anthony Grey
3. The Chinese have made it clear that they link progres8
on Mr. Grey's case with concessions in Hong Kong. In January
they indicated that access might be granted to him in exchange
for official visits by members of the New China News Agency
and others to the two N.C.N.A. representatives in prison in
Hong Kong and to "patriotic journalists". The Governor did
not feel able to agree to visits to "patriotic journalists"
and the idea came to nothing. There have been exchanges
between Sir Donald Hopson and the Governor on what might be
done to meet the Chinese requests and we now await further
proposals from Hong Kong. (It should be remembered that all
the prisoners already receive regular visite from relatives;
what the Chinese are asking for are special i.e. "official"
visits.)
Long-Term Future of Hong Kong
4. Officials are engaged on a draft report about the long-
term future of the Colony which is to be ready for the Defence
Review Working Party by 30 April. When it is eventually
approved by the Cabinet, it will be taken into account in
drafting the Defence White Paper which is to issue in July.
CONFIDENTIAL
293
23
Orka.copyon
Cy her/Cat. A
IMMEDIATE
FCB/3
CONFIDENTIAL
HONG KONG TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
200
15 February, 1968
CO. IDENTIAL
RECEIVED
ARCHIVES N. 31 | 10FEL
FO FDI/I
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 200 of 15 February, Repeated for information to Peking.
Peking telegram to Foreign Office No. 129: Prisoners.
Before we correspond further on this subject, I should be glad to have a day or two in which to prepare some suggestions which may help to resolve the problen.
Agreed with to. That
we
should
wait
for Hong Kongi proposale.
Six D. Trench
Was sce
34.4 days.
Se repeate
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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XXXXX
12.
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Onia. "Copy or Fes/3
on
43
and copy on F413/8 (147
разко
ILEDIATE HONG KONG TO COMICNWEALTH OFFICE
Telno 166 13 February 1968
CONFIDENTIAL
20
Seperate muute
Xy immediately preceding telegram. pe
Following Personal for Galsworthy.
W
2
RECEIVED ARCHIVO N".31
16 FEST
FD!|!
I am afraid there is a further important factor which must not be overlooked, Public opinion here is sympathetic to Grey's plight, but there would be deep resentment if what was considered to be any substantial Hong Kong interest were sacrificed for him.
2. A second point is that unofficial members and the local Press, although sometimes a little watchful and suspicious, broadly still trust us in these matters and have not sought to probe into what we may or may not be up to in attempting to obtain an amelioration of his condition; although it is not difficult for them to guess that we are not simply acquiescing in his imprisonment. If we once did anything in Grey's interests that was regarded as too much of a kowtow, the Press would seize upon it and it might thereafter become extremely difficult for me to operate without having to parry incessant demands for full and constant disclosure or what was being considered and discussed between London, Peking and here. While the Press could perhaps be held off, unofficial members might start to demand a say in these matters which could be extremely embarrassing and unhelpful in future manoeuvres over both Grey and the position of the Peking Mission.
3. This is not to say we cannot do something to help Grey, but whatever we do must be able to show either that it is a reasonably. nomal procedure and that we have not unduly bent to CPG demands (remembering that the smallest concession will be trumpeted by the Communist Press as a humbling of us) or that the move is in Hong Kong's interests (e.g. deportation). The concessions proposed for these prisoters come very close to the border line or what might be
acceptable to local opinion, and I should have to consider very carefully whether or not we unduly risk raising a storm if we make them.
1. I have not copied this to Peking but leave you to send an appropriate version there if you think it necessary.
Sir D. Trench
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
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+
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on
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CONFIDENTIAL
DIATE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO HONG KONG
Telno 245
CONFIDENTIAL
9 February 1968
(F)
خ الكورية
RECEIV ARCHIVES NAJI
16 FEB 03
FOR/I
Addressed to Hong Kong telegram No. 245 of 9 February Repeated for information to Peking
Peking telegram No. 122: [Prisoners].
We agree and consider that you should take no (repeat no) action with regard to the wrisoners for the time being.
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KONG TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
c. 168 8 February 1968
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
Aädressed 0.0. telegram No. 168 of 8 February Repeated for information to:
Peking.
GAA
288
RECEIVED IN
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16 FEB 1968
FOM/T
Your telegram No. 221 of 6 February: [Prison Visits).
Fot
FOX / 1 237
There has been no reaction.
1
ра
A
Sir D. Trench
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港
287
RECEIVED IN
¡ARCHIVES No 31;.
FDCI 220
Telno. 167
CONFIDENTIAL
DOPEB J68
8 February 1968
p.c.
ед
1972
ED1/!
Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No. 167 of 8 February
Repeated for information to Peking.
Peking telegram No. 106 to Foreign Office: Communist
Fenrisoners.
I entirely agree that the prospect of the operation's success would be much enhanced if the prisoners expressed willingness to return to China; and there seems some chance that it might be possible to persuade them to do so.
2. On the other hand, they might very well, in accordance with the normal practice of Communist prisoners here, refuse to sign any documents. In that event we would have to decide our line of action in the light of their general attitude. If they refused to sign but indicated that they would not be averse to returning to China, we would propose to proceed with the operation to the extent of taking them to Lo Wu Bridge and leaving them free to cross or not as they wanted. We would not try to force them over. If, on the other hand they indicated very positively that they were unwilling to return to China, I do not think that it would be profitable or wise to go ahead.
Commonwealth Office pass Peking as my telegram No. 56.
Sir D. Trench.
[Repetition to Peking referred for departmental decision]
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1872
PRIORITY COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO HONG KONG
TELEGRAM NO. 231
8 FEBRUARY, 1968 (F & KI
286
RECEIVED IN ;
ARCHIVES No.31
CFEB 968
西小
I
CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO.231 OF 8 FEBRUARY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PEKING.
YOUR TELEGRAM NO.150: PRISONERS.
J
Foll!
ZB4
IT WAS CLEARLY RIGHT TO POSTPONE ACTION UNTIL AFTER 8 FEBRUARY.
BUT WE THINK THAT YOU SHOULD STILL STRY TO DEPORT THE TWO FILM STARS. WE DO NOT SEE THIS IN ANY WAY AS A QUID PRO QUO FOR GREY
BUT RATHER AS A TEST CASE. IT SHOULD INDICATE TO THE CHINESE THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO DEAL WITH CERTAIN PRISONERS IN THIS WAY, AND THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE OPERATION SHOULD GIVE US SOME GUIDANCE
ABOUT HOW TO PROCEED WITH AN EXCHANGE FOR GREY.
2. YOU WILL SEE FROM SEPARATE TELEGRAMS THAT HOPSON HAS BREN
INSTRUCTED TO HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CHINESE ABOUT EXIT
AND ENTRY VISAS, WE WANT TO TRY TO AVOID THESE TWO EXERCISES BECOMING ENTANGLED, IT IS BEST THEREFORE THAT THE DEPORTATIONS
SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE UNTIL KOPSON HAS MADE HIS INITIAL APPROACH
TO THE CHINESE ABOUT VISAS AND GREY. IT MIGHT THEN OR A1 A LATER STAGE BE USEFUL TACTICALLY TO BE ABLE TO LAY ON THE DEPORTATION OF THE FILM STARS AT SHORT NOTICE IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE CHINESE HOW THE GREY CASE COULD BE SETTLED, WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO TAKE ALI. THE PREPARATORY STEPS (EXCEPT INFORMING THE CHINESE) IMMEDIATELY AFTER 8 FEBRUARY, BUT TO DELAY ACTUAL DEPORTATION UNTIL
WE HAVE HAD A CLEAR INDICATION OF THE CHINESE REACTION TO OUR LATEST PROPOSAL ST PRESIMABLY THIS WOULD MEAN THAT WE WOULD BE COMMITTED
/10
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIA I.
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 231 TO HONG KONG
-2-
TO CARRYING THROUGH THE DEPORTATION BEFORE THE NEXT SCHEDULED VISIT ON 22 FEBRUARY: BUT WE DO NOT SEE THIS AS A MAJOR DIFFICULTY.
鹿
I (280)
3. WE AGREE WITH PEKING TELEGRAM NO.106 THAT AN ATTEMPT TO PUSH TWO UNWILLING DEPORTEES ACROSS THE FRONTIER MIGHT WELL BOOMERANG,
AND WE VERY MUCH HOPE THEREFORE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO PERSUADE THE TWO EITHER TO SIGN SOME FORM OF WORDS OR AT LEAST TO EXPRESS WILLINGNESS ORALLY TO BE SENT BACK TO CHINA.
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1.
!.
HONG KONG
6 February 1968 (F)
A
REGLIVED IN ¡ARCHIVES No.51 | 1C FEB 268
I
FOSITI
Addressed to Hong Kong telegram No. 221 of 6 February, repeated for information to Peking.
Peking telegram No. 96: Prison Visits.
F313210 Has there been any reaction from N.C.N.A.?
ре
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IMMEDIATE
Telno 150
3 February, 1968
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CONFIDENTIAL
Addressed to Commonwealth Office Repeated for information to Peking.
16/2
telegram No. 150 of 3 February,
reply sent
p.a.
Not Reed
Your telegram No. 192:
Communist Prisoners.
roposed scheme of operations:-
Following would be our
(a) Te would put the two prisoners into solitary confinement and ask them to sign a statement broadly on the following lines:
'I .
as a supporter of the Chinese People's Government, have given great thought to my present position in H.K. and now wish to be offered the opportunity to cross the border into the Chinese People's Republic.'
We would make it clear to them at this stage that if they were released to China they would not be permitted to return to Hong Kong.
(b) Whether or not they signed, we would at once approach the China Merchants Steam Navigation Co. contact; tell him that it was our intention to release the film stars to China and that we would be resenting then at the border at a specific time and date; and ask him to inform the border authorities requesting them to accept the prisoners. If he asked us directly whether they would ever be allowed to return to H.K. from China, we would reply in the negative; but we would not volunteer the information.
(c) Unless clear and positive indication were given to us from the Chinese side that the filk stars would not be accepted in China, we should present them at the border accordingly; if they were refused, we would return them' to detention.
(d) There is a possibility that the Communists night demand to interview the prisoners before indicating whether or not they would accept them: This we would have to refuse,
CONFIDENTIAL
/(e) We would
-
2.
CONFIDENTIAL
HONG KONG Telno 150 to COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
-2-
(e) We would not propose to initiate any publicity for the operation if it went smoothly, but we should of course
work out a propaganda contingency plan against the event of a breakdown or leak, and in order to ensure that the incident did not do too much damage to the credibility of the
deportation weapon.
There is a problem about timing. The prisoners receive regular fortnightly visits of which the next is due on 8 February. Since these visits provide an obvious opportunity for their political friends to put pressure on them, it is plain that we should aim to get the operation completed in the period between visits. It seems doubtful if we could carry the whole lun through in the five days between now and 8 February; I should therefore be inclined in any case to postpone action until then.
5. It occurs to me, however, that the situation has now somewhat changed. The purpose of these moves (apart from Hong Kong's interest in getting rid of as many Communist supporters as possible) is:-
FE 3/3 (10)
(a) To test whether it would be worth attempting to pursue the proposal to exchange Grey for Hsueh. But judging from the interview reported in Peking telno 98 to Foreign Office, it seems clear the Chinese intend to extract the last ounce of value from holding Grey and that to offer the film stars may achieve nothing except to risk an unfavouracle reaction and further demands;
(b) To start a train of moves which hopefully would lead to F23/3204 some amelioration of the Peking Mission's situation.
But
from Peking telno 72 to Foreign Office it now looks as if there is a chance that the Peking Mission's movements problems can be settled without bringing in Hong Kong, and it might be risky to complicate the issue by proceeding with the film star operation at this particular moment.
In raising these doubts, I do not wish to suggest that I am unwilling to proceed I an very ready to do so. Apart from our 'Good Riddance' argument, we have to face the problem here that a number of prisoners who were convicted during the early days of the disturbances here had deportation orders made against them, and that these are due to be carried out when the prisoners are released in the next month or two. (The first release is on 19 March.) So we cannot indefinitely postpone testing the deportation weapon, although we could rescind the orders on individual cases where the behaviour of the persons concerned justified it, we could not hope to do this in all cases.
/5. I should
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I should be grateful for your urgent views and those of Peking.
F.ü. please pass Immediate Peking as mytel 50.
Sir D. Brench
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