FCO 21/195 Internal political situation in Hong Kong disturbances and Communist agitation

246

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TITLE:

HONG KONG

INT. POLIT. AFFAIRS:

GENERAL SITUATION & POLICY,

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ונו ידוו

In L.

ED IN

pa kesible.

No 31

428

НК

1ERPRET

FD1|1

ADORESSED CO TELEGRAM NO. 2/4 OF 14TH OCTUBER REPEATED PA SENIOR C

APUNCTUS, GENIS EPA AND SAVING TO PEKING.

FOR COUPONUSALTY OFFICE AND CABINET OFFICE FOR JIC FOLLOWING FROM LIC. WEEKLY ASSESSHE' † GF THE SITUATION AS AT DENG HOURS

14TH OCTOBER 10

FOLLOWS

THE PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF THE PERIOD HAVE FEN:

(A) CELEBRATERUS MASKING THE K.K.T, BATIGNAL DAY ON 12TH OCTOBER SEMICOLON ATTENDANCE AT MAJOR FUNCTIONS WAS GN A SIMILAR SCALE TO PREVIOUS YEARS, FUT THERE WAS A "ARKED INCREASE IN FLAGS AND DECORATIONS IR FOULCON AND THE NEW TERRITORIES COMPARED WITH 1967.

SPEECHES WERE GENERALLY

LOW-KEY WITH ONLY PASSING REFERENCE TO

יL

LOCAL COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES. SEVERAL MINOR DISPUTES AFOSE OVER THE DISPLAY CF X.R.T. FLAGS BUT, APART FROM A FIGHT ETVEEK FOURTEEN

OMMUNIST AND RIGHT-KING WORKESS IN A UNION PREMISES RESULTING IK THREE OF THE LATTER BEING CHARGED WITH CRIMINAL ASSAULT, THERE WERE NO INCIDENTS, THE COMMUNIST PRESS HAS FEATURED VIOLENT ATTACKS ON THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES AND ACCUSED COVERMENT OF COLLUSION WITH 'U.S./ CHIANG ELEMENTS IN FORCING LOCAL RESIDENTS TO SUPPORT THE CELEBRAT- IONS, CLEARLY AN ATTEMPT BY THE LOCAL COMMUNIST WIERARCHY TO COUNTER AND EXPLAIN AWAY TO SUBORDINATES AND PERHAPS PEKING, THE OUTWARD DISPLAY OF ANTI-COMMU.....IST SENTIMENTS OF A LARGE NUMBER OF HONG KONG

IESIDENTS.

(B) THE PESUMPTICS ON 19TH OCTOBER OF COMMUNIST SPONSORED VARIETY SHOWS MARKING THE C.P.G, NATIONAL LAY WHICH ARE DUE TO CONTINUE UNIL 22ND OCTOBER SFFICOLON ALL OTHER COMMUNIST FUNCTIONS ARE NOW OVER AND DECORATIONS HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM COMMUNIST PREMISES. (C) THE RELEASE ON 12TH OCTOBER OF SIX EMERGENCY DETAINEES, INCLUDING A FEMALE COMMUNIST FILM STAP AND THE EX-HEADMASTER OF THE

EREGISTERED CHUNG WA SCHOOL (TELECRAN 2088). LITTLE REACTION HAS BEEN SEEN AS YET APART FROM INITIAL WIDESPREAD COVERAGE IN ALL

SECTIONS OF THE LOCAL PRESS.

(D) CONTINUING CONCE"

OF FEDERATION OF TRADE UNION OFFICIALS

AT THE POOR MORALE OF 'STRIKERS', BUT PRESSURE TO OBTAIN ALTERATIVE EMPLOYMENT IS BEING PAINTAINED.

(E) THE ARREST OF A NUMBER OF PERSONS IN COMSECTION WITH ABDUCTIONS IN THE BORDER ABEA TO CHINESE TEKPITORY (PARAGRAPH 1(G) OF TELEGRAM 2067 AND 2792). THE AREA HAS REMAINED COMPARATIVELY QUIET APART FROM ONE MINOR STARING INCIDENT.

/2.00MLUNIST

SECRET

-2-

2. COMMUNIST ACTIVITY HAS BEEN IN A LOW-KEY NO DOUBT IN PART AN ATTEMPT TO AVOID CLASHES DURING THE DOUBLE TENTH CELEDRA

UPO, THE COMPLETION OF C.P.6. NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATIONS NEXT WEEK WE MAY EXPECT A RESURGENCE OF COMMUNIST UNITED FRONT' ACTIVITY AND INCREASING PRESSURE ON STRIKERS' TO OBTAIN ALTERNATIVE EMPLOY- KENT.

SIR D. TRENCH

FILES

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[REPEATED AS REQUESTED AND COPY SENT TO CABINET OFFICE]

GUIDANCE DEPT

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SIR A.GALSWORTHY

MR. MASON

P.S. TO LORD SHEPHERD

F.O. F.E.D.

O.P.A. O.L.A.

ADVANCE COPIES SENT

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A

ITY HONG KONG

TELEGRAM NO. 2080

¡ RECEIVED CONFIDENTI AL

ARCHIV

14 OCT 1968

FDI/

TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

12 OCTOBER 1968

Jmper

(421

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED CO TELEGRAM NO. 2080 OF 12TH OCTOBER REPEATED

PEKING

XCUFTEL 1492 DETAINEES.

SIX MORE DETAINEES WILL BE RELEASED TODAY AS FORESHADOWED IN

PARAGRAPH 5 OF HY TELEGRAM NO. 2015.

Sui

2. THEY ARE NO. 27 (SHEK WAID, FILM ACTRESS: NO. 33 CWONG CHO FANƆ HEADMASTER OF THE FORMER CHUNG WAH MIDDLE SCHOOL 1 NO.44 CLAU PING), NO. 21 CHONG YING CHEUNG), NO.35 (LEUNG SHU), TRADE UNION OFFFICIALS, AND NO. 52 CTS01 HING CHEUNG),HEMBER OF A BOMBING

GROUP.

FO PLEASE PASS PRIORITY PEKING.

SIR D. TRENCH

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Juga 11/10

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PRIORITY PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

938 10 October, 1968

RECEIVED ARCHIV

11.0CT isbu

DEDIP

CONFIDENTIAL

Personal for Janes Murray.

小

Your telegran No. 865.

Dili

Thank you for your comments.

2. I am not sure how to reconcile the first and third sentences of your paragraph 1 and relevant sections of your telogran No. 1362 to Hong Kong. If you agree that release of detainees is an important factor in easing Sino-British relations it follows that it will influence the Chinese poves on British subjects. Whether releass of detainees will be considered by the Chinese as "an appropriate quid pro quo for any significant move on British subjects" I would not like to say. Since there is unlikely to be any explicit bargaining the situation will probably not arias. The pattern I cavisage is a steady de-escalation on our side by increasing relcases coinotding with de-escalation on theirs by better treatment of British subjects which might involve visas or deportations. In this procnus it will be hard to pick out any single move as a quid pro quo. I agree to are unlikely to get Grey out merely by releasing detainees but they will certainly assist his chances and will be of great and possibly decisive halp for other British subjects in trouble.

3. I hope I have your agreement to this extent, and that final sentence of your paragraph 1 does not mean that you draw a distinction between treatment for this mission (which might be influenced or rewarded by release or detainees) and treatment for other British subjects (which would not). You will recall that paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 1562 said "Doubt very much whether it (sc. release or detainees) would directly influence their attitune toward other British subjects either".

4.. I should be grateful for early clarification of this point. It is very important that we should continus with releases of detainces in an effort to extend their beneficial effect from the Wiggion to other British subjects. One of the points at issue with the Governor at the moment is that ho apparently considers there should be no relvasva to respond to better treatment of non- Viplomatic British subjecta, (Hong Kong tologan No. 2015, paragraph 6).

5. I realise that in asking question on security in Hong Kong

I have been inviting criticism for trespass. This was done

deliberately in the knowledro that otherwias it could be impossible

Sun 03 March

that some good may have come of tais.

to 223 Arul you paragraph 4

6. I should

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7.0.

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6. I should add I do not find reasons so far elicited for holding on to detainees very convincing. The argument that release will encourage militante and discourage the loyal (Hong Kong telegram No. 2038), even if true, is hardly

It would be advanced against release

of a Communist at any time. A better question would be, will releases cause disorder? but evidence is all against. So far releases of detainees have caused no fuss. They have obviously given little encouragement to militants gince releases since July have coincided with a better atmosphere in Hong Kong, including lowered Communist morale, as well as in wider fields. The National Day celebrations in Hong Kong showed Communist leaders determination and ability to

avoid violence (Hong Kong telegram No. 2062, paragraph 6). b.

360

F23/3.

447

7. I am encouraged that you will be able to hold full consultations with the Governor on these questions beginning 21 October. The background for such talks is not too nopeful, however. Since your encouraging telegram No. 769 of 26 July, progress has been disappointing in obtaining moves in Hong Kong that should lead to a real easing of our relations with China. On Communist education a big step back has been only narrowly averted, On Grey there ia no real progress. On detainees the Governor has made clear his unwillingness to allow releases to respond to or encourage better treatment of non-diplomatic British subjects and now asserts that Chinese are not influenced by treatment of prisoners in Hong Kong (Hong Kong telegram No. 2038), As seen from here a very determined effort will be needed in discussions if any advance is to be made. If, therefore, there are any points made by this post that you think doubtful or in need of fuller argument I hope you will let me know.

Mr. Cradock

FILES

F.E.D.

Sir D. Allen

P.U.S.' office

C.0.

H.K.D.

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bbbbb

Sir D. Allen

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Encês

M B

RECEIVED IN

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7-0011968

西小

RELEASE OF DETAINEES IN HONG KONG

420

Flag A

Problem

My submission of 30 September and my subsequent minute

of 1 October dealt with the objections of the Chargé d'Affaires

in Peking to the Governor of Hong Kong's handling of the

question of detainees and took account of the Governor's reply.

The telegram agreeing that there should be no more releases

for the time being and that the whole matter should be

discussed when the Governór returns to London later this

month has issued. We have to decide what further, if

anything, need be said to Mr. Cradock.

Recommendation

2. I recommend

that we in effect invite Mr. Cradock to

desist from the debate until after we have seen the Governor

later this month. I attach a draft personal telegram.

Background and Argument

Previous exchanges between the Chargé d'Affaires in

Peking and the Governor on this subject are dealt with in my

submission of 30 September. The problem first arose earlier

this year when Sir D. Hopson proposed in the interests of

easing Sino-British relations, in particular of obtaining

exit visas for members of the Mission in Peking and better

treatment for British subjects in detention, that a major act

/ of clemency

CONFIDENTIAL

2 -

Flag B

Flag C

of clemency be made in Hong Kong to include the release

of both convicted prisoners and detainees. The Governor

was unwilling for reasons which we fully accepted to

exercise clemency in favour of convicted prisoners. He

did however agree that he would, in so far as security

considerations permitted, release detainees starting first

with those of less importance and those who had been detained

the longest. He made no commitment to release all detainees

within a given period nor did he accept that releases were to

be used as a major instrument in a policy of "de-escalation".

In August, Sir D. Hopson proposed that if the Chinese fulfilled

their undertaking given at the end of July to grant exit visas

to all members of the Mission who wished to leave China we

should respond by the release of a significant number of

detainees. This was agreed by Ministers and the Governor was

recommended to act accordingly (C.0. telegram No. 1362). The

Governor replied in Hong Kong telegram No. 1005 (after

discussion with Sir D. Hopson in Hong Kong) saying that he

would follow a policy of matching the trickle of exit visas

with a trickle of releases of detainees subject to examination

of the circumstances at each time and without aiming at

arithmetical equality. He would also prefer to release

detainees in small groups rather than in one large group.

He also made it clear that we should soon be reaching a point

when only the hard-core detainees were left and that very

careful consideration would have to be given to the

advisability of their release. I do not therefore think that

CONFIDENTIAL

/Mr. Cradock

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

Flag D

Flag E

Flag F

Mr. Cradock is justified in claiming that a definite policy

of releasing detainees in exchange for exit visas, deportations

of British subjects and so on was ever precisely agreed and

that the Governor is now going back on it.

ܢܵܐ

(a)

In Peking telegram No. 898 in reply to Hong Kong telegram

No. 2015, Kr. Cradock challenged the Governor's justification

for keeping detainees in custody on the following grounds:-

Security Since the Chinese Government had abandoned

the policy of violence it was unlikely that any released

detainees would cause trouble which might lead to a further

outbreak of violence. In any case the Chinese could if

they so wished cause trouble through the agency of

communists already at liberty.

(b) Public Opinion

Reactions to releases so far have been

calm and the policy could be easily explained as a

response to the improving political situation in the Colony.

Some face-saving victory

was essential, though in fact propaganda reaction to

releases so far have been very restrained.

(d) Releases as an instrument of political policy

It was

impossible to deny that detention was a political act;

release was therefore the same and should be used as an

instrument of "de-escalation".

Mr. Cradock reiterated his objections with considerable force

when he learned that the Governor had in fact renewed a detention

order for one detainee (Hong Kong telegram No. 2034) stating

that this would be a severe set back to easing relations, that

/ the action

CONFIDENTIAL

Flag G

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

the action should not have been taken without prior consultation,

and that the use of emergency legislation at all was

questionable.

He finally asked for a ruling on what H.M.G.'s

policy on detainees was.

5. In Hong Kong telegram No. 2038 the Governor replied

stating his view that the use of detainees as barganing

counters could be dangerous, that the extent of the security

risk involved in releasing a particular person could only be

judged in Hong Kong, and that there was no real evidence that

the release of detainees had a beneficial effect on Sino-

British relations.

Such evidence as there was indicated

rather that if the Chinese wished to improve relations they

did so in their own way irrespective of our treatment of

detainees or prisoners.

case effectively.

The Governor has answered Kr. Cradock's

There is room for argument about the effect

on security of particular releases but as indicated by the

explanation of why it was thought necessary to continue the

detention of the detainee referred to in paragraph 4 above

there are often special considerations which are not apparent

from here or Peking. The Governor would also no doubt argue

that if as a result of releasing dangerous trouble-makers the

situation once again began to deteriarate gravely, the

authorities would be obliged to take suppressive measures which

could only cause a severe set back to Sino-British relations.

In the circumstances, the lesser evil might be to hold on to

certain detainees longer.

As regards Mr. Cradock's points (b) and (c) they have some

/ validity.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 --

Flag G

validity. There are differences of view about reactions of

public opinion to what might appear to be concessions to the

communists. It is sometimes difficult to determine how

representative certain sections of opinion are and whether

there may not be a tendency for the Hong Kong Government to

select as examples those sections of opinion which suit their

book. This question is related to point (c) in that it can

be argued that any "victory" given to the communists is bad

for confidence and tends to undermine the Hong Kong Government's

authority. Just how serious this is is again a matter for

judgement.

7. Mr. Cradock's point (d) raises a matter of more weight.

From the outset the Governor has always expressed doubts as

to whether concessions in Hong Kong such as the release of

detainees do in fact contribute to the easing of Sino-British

relations. He no doubt has in mind that exit visas for the

Mission were secured without any significant concessions.

He also refere in his telegram No. 2038 to the fact that

contrary to what was said to us in Peking about Mr. Grey it

appears that the Chinese are not interested in trading him

for journaliste in prison. (I think this is stretching his

case somewhat as there must be some doubt about the reliability

of the covert channel. Moreover the Chinese made the link

between Mr. Grey and the journalists specific also in an

NONA release.) It is, I think, true however that the release

of detainees by itself would not decisively alter Chinese

policy and should not therefore be regarded, as it seems to

/ be by

CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

Flag H

be by Mr. Cradock, as a major instrument for "de-escalation".

On the other hand it can hardly fail to improve the

atmosphere and therefore should be pursued in so far as

security permits.

Whatever our own assessment of the position we must in

the last resort be very hesitant about asking the Governor

to go against his better judgement on matters concerning the

administration and security of the Colony. Confidence in

his judgement has been fortified by the fact that the policy

of patience coupled with firmness paid off last year. Seen

from Peking only there is much justification in what

Kr. Cradock says, though he is less than fair to the Hong

Kong Government in implying, for example, that they had not

made conscientious efforts to examine the individual cases

of detainees who might be released. There is clearly

nothing to be gained at this stage by pursuing the present

debate. We have accepted the Governor's view that no further

releases should be made before the turn of the month, and have

said that we wish to have a full discussion with him when he

returns to London. There will then be an opportunity to

examine more closely the various points made by Mr. Cradock.

(In Hong Kong telegram No. 2051, which has just arrived, the

Governor reports that the detention order of only one of the

40 detainees formally exphes before December; the need to

issue fresh detention orders is therefore not an immediate

problem and if all goes well it may not arise at all.)

/ 9. In the

CONFIDENTIAL

- 7 -

In the meantime I should like to send a telegram to

Mr. Cradock explaining why we agreed with the Governor and

clearly implying that he should not pursue the question

of detainees for the present.

Copy to: Mr. Carter (C.0.)

Miss Deas

Kr. Baker

Вили Гламу

(James Kurray)

3 October, 1968.

agree.

Telegram sent for despatch.

CONFIDENTIAL

14/10

Mr. Ba

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422

391

CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO

FALNO 865

CONFIDENTIAL

FOLLOWING FOR MURRAY.

PEKING

1 RECHIVED IN ¡ARCHIVES No.31 7-00T 1968

4 OCTOBER 1968

(447

419

(F)

Post!

(4+244)

Кера

Japa 7/10

YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS. 898 AND 905 AND HONG KONG TELEGRAM

NO. 2038:

DETAINEES.

WE FULLY RECOGNISE THE FORCE OF YOUR ARGUMENT THAT THE RELEASE OF DETAINEES IS A FACTOR IN EASING SINO-BRITISH RELATIONS AND THAT

WE ADHERE TO THE THE MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE SHOULD BE TAKEN OF IT. VIEWS IN C.O. TELEGRAM NO. 1362 TO HONG KONG. BUT AS THAT TELEGRAM INDICATED WE DO NOT (REPEAT NOT) THINK THAT THE CHINESE WOULD CON- SIDER THE RELEASE OF DETAINEES AS AN APPROPRIATE QUID PRO QUO FOR ANY SIGNIFICANT MOVE ON BRITISH SUBJECTS.

2. FROM THE OUTSET THE GOVERNOR HAS NEVER ACCEPTED THE THESIS THAT RELEASES SHOULD BE USED AS A MAJOR INSTRUMENT OF "DE-ESCALATION" : WHAT HE HAS DONE IS TO ACQUIESCE IN CERTAIN PROPOSALS WE MADE ABOUT RELEASES ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT HE WAS SATISFIED THEY COULD BE JUSTIFIED ON SECURITY GROUNDS. IT IS THEREFORE SCARCELY FAIR TO SUGGEST THAT HE HAS GONE BACK ON A POLICY ALREADY AGREED.

3. THERE IS CERTAINLY ROOM FOR ARGUMENT, AS THE GOVERNOR HIMSELF HAS CONCEDED, ABOUT THE EXTENT OF THE SECURITY RISKS INVOLVED IN ANY PARTICULAR RELEASE. BUT AS HE HAS INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 2 OF HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO 2038 THERE WERE SPECIAL REASONS WHY IT WAS DECIDED TO RENEW THE DETENTION OF NUMBER 3. LIKEWISE IT WAS DECIDED AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO DEFER THE RELEASE OF THE TWO FILM STARS UNTIL THE PERIOD OF NATIONAL DAYS' CELE- BRATIONS BECAUSE OF THE COMMOTION WHICH MIGHT BE CAUSED AT AN ALREADY DIFFICULT TIME BY THE RELEASE OF PERSONS ENJOYING WIDE PERSONAL POPULARITY. IN MATTERS OF THIS SORT AND INDEED IN SECURITY QUESTIONS AS A WHOLE YOU WILL I AM SURE AGREE THAT IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO TRY TO PLAY THE HAND ANYWHERE BUT IN HONG KONG. WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT WE DECIDED NOT TO ASK THE GOVERNOR TO RE- CONSIDER HIS DECISION NOT TO RELEASE ANY MORE DETAINEES UNTIL AFTER

THE HOLIDAY,

WE SEE SOME FORCE, HOWEVER, IN THE POINTS YOU MAKE ABOUT SECURITY IN RELATION TO CURRENT CHINESE POLICY, AND ABOUT PUBLIC OPINION AND PROPAGANDA. WE SHALL WISH TO DISCUSS THESE VERY FULLY WITH THE GOVERNOR IN THE COURSE OF CONSULTATIONS IN THE WEEK /BEGINNING

CONFIDENTIAL

BEGINNING 21 OCTOBER.

IN THE MEANTIME, I DO NOT THINK THAT ANY USEFUL PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED IF WE TRIED TO DEFINE POLICY MORE PRECISELY.

SOSFA

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CONFIDENTIAL

Eventrein (427 Еней такий

TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

ARCHIV -30CT 1968

28 SEPTEMBER 1968

RAM NUMBER 2034

FDI/I

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED C.O. TILE NO.

hes peuplo ребро

2034 CF 28TH SEPTEMBER REPEATED PEKING.

MY TELEGRAK NO. 1084, PARAGRAPH 2: DETAINEES.

THE CASE FOR CONTINUING THE DETENTION OF NO. 3 AS A SERIOUS

SECURITY RISK HAVING BEEN FULLY ESTABLISHED, THE COLONIAL SECRETARY

HAS SIGNED A FRESH DETENTION ORDER TAKING EFFECT TODAY. THE NEWS

WILL NO DOUBT BREAK 1H THE COMMUNIST PRESS IN THE NEXT DAY OF

TWO SOON AFTER THE DETAINEE RECEIVES HIS NEXT VISITOR.

2. WE SHALL OF COURSE MAKE NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT BUT IF QUESTIONED

WE SHALL SAY THAT CASES ARE PERIODICALLY REVIEWED AND DETAINEES

RELEASED AS SOON AS THEY ARE NO LONGER / RISK TO THE SECURITY

OF THE COLONY.

3. NO. 1 HAS BEEN RELEASED AS ARRANGED.

FO PLEASE PASS PRIORITY PEKING.

SIR D. TRENCH

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I.P.D.

DSC

PERSCITEL DEPT.

[REPEATED 18 REZUSTED]

CONFINE'TIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

ROUTINE HONGKONG

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2038

CONFIDENTIAL

TO COMBIONHEALTH OFFICE

1 OCTOBER 1958

Jupa 4/10

422

RECEIVED IN ARCHIV No.! - 30CT 1968

FDY.

ADDRESSED CC TELNO 2038 OF 1ST CCTOBER RF1 PEKING,

Heg

PEKING TELEGRA'13 898 ANI) 985. DETAINEES.

I HAVE THE FOLLOWING CON-MENTS ON TELEGRAM KIMBER 698:-

(A) PARAS 1 AND 2.

AS ¡Y TELEGRAM 2015 SAYS, WE HAVE BEEN SAILING CLOSE TO THE VIND

IN AN EFFORT TO KEET THE VIEW THAT DETAINEES CAN BE USED AS BARGAIN-

ING COUNTERS, AND THESE PARAGRAPHS AND PARAGRAPH JCD) NOT ONLY

ILLUSTRATE THIS BUT ALSO HOW EASILY WHAT WE HAVE BEEN DOING CAN

PE MISREPRESENTED.

PARA 3 (A)

(C).

THE PRINCIPLES EXPRESSED IN NY TELEGRAM 2015 ARE, AS I SAID THERE,

NOT EASY TO AFFLY AND I CONCEDE THAT THERE CAN BE DIFFERENT OPINIONS

O! THE EXTENT OF THE SECURITY RISKS INVOLVED, BUT THESE RISKS DEPEND

ON A HUMBER OF FACTORS INCLUDING THE SITUATION AT THE TME AND THE

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED, THIS ASSESSMENT CA':

ONLY BE HADE HERE.

(1) THERE IS STILL NO EVIDENCE THAT THE RELEASE OF DETAINEES HAS

HAD ANY BENEFICIAL EFFECT AT ALL ON SIND-MITISH RELATIONS, SUCH

EVIDENCE AS THERE IS INDICATES THAT THE CHINESE INTEND TO EFFECT

AN IMPROVEMENT IN THEIR OWN VAY AND IN THEIR OWN TIME, AND ARE NOT

INFLUENCED BY WHAT HAPPENS TO DETAINEES OR PRISONERS, THIS IS

BOTHE OUT BY THE TENCUR OF THE REPORTS IN TELEGRAMS ENDING WITH

NY NUMBER 2031, WHICH ALSO INDICATES HOU LITTLE RELIANCE CAN BE

PLACED ON KHAT PASSES OFFICIALLY POTWEEN MEA AND EMBASSY REPRESENT-

ATIVES IN PEKING, THE EVIDENCE IN THESE REPORTS HAY NOT BE CONCLUSIVE

C. NFIDENTIAL

/BUT

CONFIDENTIAL

BUT WHAT HAS BEEN SAID SO FAR CERTAINLY SEENS TO HAVE PROVED NEARER

THE TRUTH IN THE EVENT THAN WHAT HAS PASSED BETWEEN OFFICIAL REPRESENT

ATIVES.

<11> I HAVE NEVER SUGGESTED ''HANGING ON TO THESE DETAINEES TO (11) ↑

THE BITTER END**. I HAVE SAID CHLY THAT THE PROPER CRITERION FOR

THEIR CONTINUED DETENTION OR OTHERVISE SHOULD ME WHETHER OR NOT

THEY ARE SECURITY RISKS, A FACTOR IN WHICH ASSESSMENT IS THE

SITUATION FROM TIME TO TINE.

2. WITH REFERENCE TO TELEGRAM NUFÆPER 905, NUMBER 3 IS A MAN WITH

A DANGEROUS DEGREE OF INFLUENCE IN THE SAI KUNG AREA OF THE NEW

TERRITORIES WHERE THERE 19 A STRONG COMMINIST ELEMENT AND WHERE

TRCIPLE REMA INS CLOSE TO THE SURFACE. HIS REMOVAL HAD A SETTLING

EFFECT AND HIS RETURN THERE NOW WOULD NOT ONLY HEARTEN THE KILITANTS

IN THE AREA NUT WOULD DISHAY THOSE WHO REMAIN LOYAL. I AM UNWILLING

TO REVIEW HIS CASE NOW BUT IT WILL OF COURSE BE REVIEVED REGULARLY

WITH ALL OTHERS. HE ALSO NOW HAS ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAL

TO THE COMMITTEE OF REVIEW IF HE WISHES.

THESE DETAINEES ARE AN EMBARRASSMENT 1 WOULD BE GLAD TO BE

RID CF, BUT O'ILY IF THIS CAN BE DONE WITH SAFETY, IT IS WRONG

TO SUPPOSE THAT THE SITUATION HERE IS ENTIRELY WITHOUT DANGERS JUST

BECAUSE THE WORST VIOLENCE HAS CEASED FOR THE PRESENT. SO FAR THE

SHALLER FRY RELEASED HAVE NOT

PARTICULARLY COME TO NOTICE AGAIN: BUT THIS IS NO MORE THAN A

HOPEFUL SIGN FOR THE FUTURE WHICH CAN BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN

CONSIDERING FURTHER RELEASES. THE HARDER CASES CANNOT BE JUDGED

ENTIRELY ON THE RASIS OF THIS EXPERIENCE.

FO PLEASE PASS ROUTINE PEKING,

SIR D. TRENCH

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INMATE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TEL GRAM NUMBER 1492

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O HONG KONG

TO HONG KONG

2 OCTOBER 1968

Į RECEIVED IN {ARCHIV.S No.31

- 30CT 1968

FDIL!

ADDRESSED TO HONG KONG TELEGRAM NUMBER 1492 OF 2 OCTOBER

PEATED FOR INFORMATION TO PEKING.

OUR TELHO 2015: [DETAINEES.]

WE CONTINUE TO ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO DEMONSTRATING TO THE CHINESE THAT REASONABLE BEHAVIOUR ON THEIR PART COULD YIELD THEM ADVANTAGES WHICH HARSH TACTICS HAVE NOT. IN THE MATTER OF DETAINEES, IN VIEW OF THE ARGUMENTS YOU HAVE ADVANCED PARTICULARLY IN RELATION TO SECURITY, WE AGREE THAT YOU SHOULD' FOR THE TIME BEING PROCEED ON THE LINES OF PARAGRAPH 5 OF YOUR TELEGRAM. HOWEVER IN THE COURSE OF OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH YOU HERE IN THE WEEK BEGINNING 21 OCTOBER, WE SHALL WISH TO REVIEW THE WHOLE PROBLEM WITH YOU, PARTICULARLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE POINTS MADE IN PEKING TELEGRAMS NUMBERS 89% AND 905 AND YOUR

TEL. NO. 2038.

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Sir D. Allen

-Mr. Baker-

y & Miss Deas

flung to

Problem

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DETAINEES IN HONG KONG

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The Chargé d'Affaires in Peking has expressed doubts

whether, in the matter of the release of detainees in Hong

Kong, we have adequately matched the grant by the Chinese of

all outstanding exit visas for members of our Mission in

Peking. The Governor has argued that security considerations

must remain paramount. He released one more detainee on

27 September; but he does not intend to let any more out

He has,

until after the anniversary celebrations by the Communists

on 1 October and by the Nationalists on 10 October.

however, made a preliminary selection of about 6 more detainees

who he thinks could thereafter be released reasonably safely.

We have to consider whether the Governor should be pressed

to move rather more quickly.

Recommondation

2. I recommend that the Governor should be told that while

we in general attach importance to demonstrating to the

Chinese that reasonable behaviour on their part can yield

advantages, we are prepared to agree with his proposed way of

handling the question of detainee8. I attach a draft telegram

in which the Commonwealth Office concur.

/ Background

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Background

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Flag B

Flag

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The background is in my submission of 7 August. The

detainees now number about 40.

Flag E

2+01

4. In Peking telegram No. 851, Mr. Cradock complained that

only 5 detainees had been released since 12 August. He

suggested therefore that we were not making concessions

adequate to match the Chinese grant of all outstanding exit

visas to members of our Mission in Peking. The Governor

binted out in Hong Kong telegram No. 1084 of 17 September

that in fact 7 releases had been made but indicated that he

was reluctant to release more than one or two until after the

National Day celebrations on 1 and 10 October. Mr. Cradock

returned to the charge strongly in Peking telegram No. 871

pointing out that what the Governor had done was scarcely

"the larger gesture involving a minumum of ten persons" which >

we originally suggested should be made if the Chinese honoured

their undertaking and granted all the outstanding exit visas.

Argument

5. In fact the Governor never specifically agreed to make

"the larger gesture", but said merely that he would match the

trickle of exit visas with a trickle of releases of detainees

subject to examination of the circumstances in each case and

without aiming at arithmetical equality (Hong Kong telegram

No. 1005). I suspect that at heart he dislikes making these

concessions at all and that he will try to keep them at a

minimum. It is hard, however, to contest the arguments first

/ put forward

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Flag G

4415

Flag F put forward in his telegram No. 1063 (Personal for

Sir A. Galsworthy and not repeated to Peking) and now set out

again in greater detail in Hong Kong telegram No. 2015 of

23 September that considerations of security must be overriding.

I am less impressed by his arguments against the risks of being

seen to use detainees as political pawns, We have in fact

very few pawns in our game of chess with the Chinese and it is

perhaps no bad thing for the Chinese to have the impression

that we would be prepared to use detainees as a bargaining

weapon. I doubt however that this latter point is worth

pursuing with the Governor.

The present state of our dealings with the Chinese is

analygled fairly fully in a separate submission about

Communist education in Hong Kong. But in brief, things are

going fairly well. Conditions in regard to the grant of exit

visas seem to have reverted to exactly those pertaining before

the Cultural Revolution. In Hong Kong the indications are

that we should get through the troublesome period of the

October celebrations without serious difficulties. In these

circumstances the Governor seems bound to maintain his position

that the security risks of releasing well-known trouble-makers

from detention are out of all proportion to any political

dividends in Sino-British relations which their release might

bring. I see little point, therefore, in attempting to

press him further on this matter for the time being. After the

October anniversary celebrations are over, we might ask him to

/ review

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review the matter.

But it must be accepted that we shall

fairly soon reach the hard-core of trouble-makers.

Copy to: Mr. Carter (0.0.)

Jauns Munay

(James Kurray}

30 September, 1968.

Denis Allen. 24

Flags H & I

(417)

Flag J

Since the above submission, the Chargé d'Affaires in Peking has in Peking telegrams Nos. 898 and 905 criticised the Governor's handling of the matter of detainees; and the Governor has defended his actions (Hong Kong telegram No. 2038).

2. I think that in general the Governor has made his case. He is due here for consultations in the week beginning 21 October (followed by leave). We can then review the whole position with him in the light of the points which he and Mr. Cradock have raised. I have amended the draft telegram in this sense.

3. In an effort to prevent further acrimonious telegraphic exchanges in this matter, the Commonwealth Office are sending a personal telegram to the Governor and I propose to send a personal telegram to Mr. Cradock (whose last telegram was drafted in unduly abrasive language). submitted later.

Sir I.

Allem

CONFIDENTIAL

A draft will be

James Warray

(James Murray)

1 October, 1968.

I discussed this with me. Murray Da110

and

agree.

(416

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RECERAPIN COPY

IMMEDIATE

PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

- ARCHIVES No.3f

-1.1968

Telno 905

30 September, 1968

7.0

CONFIDENTIAL

Fall,

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 905 of 30 September, Repeated for information to Hong Kong.

Hong Kong telegram No. 2034: Detainees.

I am concerned that this decision to renew number three's detention order has been taken without consultation or even prior notification. The impression left by Hong Kong telegram No. 1084 was that No. 3 might be released at the same time as

Nothing was said about likely renewal of the detention

No. 1.

order.

2. I accept that because of date of expiry of warrant a decision had to be taken whether to release or to renew the order. Nevertheless the decision to renew has serious implications extending well outside the purely Hong Kong field and therefore deserved more careful consideration.

3. In the first place, the move runs directly counter to current trend of de-escalation and comes at a time when you have urged accelerated releases to match improving situation (your telegram No. 1362). Secondly, the move will certainly be seen by the Communists as an escalation and a slap in the

For face following recent more hopeful moves on their side. them it will be seen as a decision to imprison for another year one of their followers who had good expectation of release now. The timing, on the eve of National Day (when for the first time for a year and more this Mission is invited to a Chinese Goverment function) in unfortunate. Against background of recent release of Selfs and Saunders it is particularly so. How can we expect further hopeful moves from the Chinese, e.g• over Grey, if we act in this way?

Thirdly, the move raises the questions about treatment of other detainees whose warrants will before long reach expiry date. On this precedent we may be faced with similar fait accompli announcements from Hong Kong of extension in these cases. The use of emergency legislation in this way so long after the emergency seems in itself questionable.. Since there are no normal legal processes in these cases, since detention or release is simply a Government act and there is no legal

CONFIDENTI AL

/barrier

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- 2

barrier to indefinite detention, careful prior consideration of such moves and full justification for them seems specially

necessary.

5. The grounds advanced for renewed order are security of the Colony. The question of how far these detainees can be considered security risks now was raised in my telegram No. 898. If people like No. 3 can be detained on a new order now,

a year after arrest, there seems no logical reason why they cannot be detained indefinitely. I think it would be appropriate to have some explanation from Hong Kong Government why security would be endangered if these detainees were released now. Can we have an estimate of when No. 3 is likely to be no longer a serious security risk?

6. I assume it is too late to reconsider the matter of No. 3, though if there is any opportunity I urge it should be done. If the question cannot be reconsidered I hope everything possible will be done to soften the impact of this decision by getting it over at once to the Communists that the renewal of the order is purely an administrative matter and does not mean detention for full period of renewed warrant. It might be said that the Hong Kong Government were reluctant to release him just before 1 October.

7. This latest news makes it even more necessary to come to an urgent decision on the policy over detainees. We seem to have reached a cross-roads. Do we wish to contime a policy of de-escalation in Sino-British relations, using the release of detainees in order to encourage current improvement? My impression was that this was your intention. It seems, however, from Hong Kong telegrams Nos. 2015 and 2034 that Governor does not share this view and is pursuing a different policy. I should be grateful for a ruling on what Her Majesty's Government's policy on this issue is.

Foreign Office pass Hong Kong Immediate. Mr. Cradock

[Repeated as requested]

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Mr. Murray

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Detainees

"empatan und in lomme.

In Peking telegram No. 851 Mr. Cradock complained that only five detainees have been released since 12 August, and therefore we were not making gestures adequate to match Chinese grant of all outstanding exit visas for members of our Mission in Peking. The Governor pointed out in Hong Kong telegram No. 1084 that in fact seven visas had been granted but indicated that he was reluctant to release more than one or two additional detainees until after the National Day celebrations on 1 and 10 October. Mr. Cradock has returned to the charge strongly in Peking telegram No. 871 pointing out that what the Governor has done is scarcely the "larger gesture involving a minimum of 10 persons", which we suggested should be made if the Chinese honoured their undertaking and granted all the outstanding exit visae. (Commonwealth office telegram No. 1362).

never

2. In fact the Governor/specifically agreed to make this gesture but said merely that he would match the trickle of exit visas with a trickle of releases of detainees subject to examination of the circumstances in each case and without aiming at arithmetical equality. (Hong Kong telegram No. 1005). I suspect that at heart he dislikes making these concessions at all and that he will try to keep them to the minimum. It is however hard to contest the arguments put forward in his telegram No. 1063 (Personal for Sir A. Galsworthy and not repeated to Peking), that considerations of security must be overriding. It is presumably for this reason that he does not wish to release possible trouble makers over the National Holiday period.

3. I think both intrinsically and in the interesta of good relations with Peking, we should put some pressure on the Governor to make further releases if at all possible. The most tactful way of doing so would be in a personal telegram from Sir A. Galsworthy which might say that while we fully accept the arguments for caution in releasing detainees put forward in Paragraph 4 of Hong Kong telegram No. 1063, we are anxious that the present trend towards greater normality in relations with China, in particular in the treatment of the Mission in Peking, should be maintained, and we hoped there- fore that he might find it possible to release a greater number of detainees than the one or two he mentions. You may like to put this suggestion to 9ir A. Galsworthy.

John Denson

(J. B. Denson 23 September, 1968.

OVENT

This has now been overtaken by Hary

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Havy Kony

| Tokyś.com

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Flag & 41

telegram No. 2015 about which we spoke. You may however like to seftem your memory about the" debate"

Jom Denson

Subansin

23) 9

Mase

pas. 3073

27 Sul.

Cynher/Cat A

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со

PRIORITY PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICøp co-

RECHV:D IN

ARCHIV.S No. 34

30 SEP 1968

FDY! K..

..Das

K......

Dep

415

Telno 898

28 September, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

риза

3029

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.898 or

28 September,

Repeated for information to Hong Kong.

Hong Kong telegram No.2015: Detainees.

This telegram seems to mark a significant step back from the policy suprested in your telegram 1362 and accepted to some decree in Hong Kong telegram ro.1005. It is now proposed to wait until the second half of October before there can be 18 releases of detainees to [ omitted? orf) set 22 visna. This 139umes that proceedings ou 1 October and 10th are judged satisfactory. This total of 18 includes 4 releases made before the Chinese promise of justice. Two of these were timed in response to release of Sope and Jones (Hong Kong telegram No.845). It would also include one case where detainee was being released simply because the warrant had expired.

There would apparently be no releases in recognition of the release of the Selfs and more recently of Saunders, Although even in early July it was agreed that it would be appropriate to time release of detainees so as to show response to the release of Pope and Jones (Hong Kong telegram *.85). In fact paragraph 6 of telegram makes plain that there will in future be no releases to respond to better treatment of British subjects (other than members of this Kiasion) Apparently while an exit visa for a member of this mission may merit release of a detainee the release of any like Johnston from imprisonment would not. I find this distinction indefensible.

The reasons for this retreat so far as I understandi them seem to be four:

(a)

But

That

It is thought releases would be constituting a threat to security of the Colony. There is no doubt why detainees were originally detained: in the circumstances of 1967 they were judred a threat. are they in the circumstances of 1968? Given the present Communist policy of non-violence, are they Poing to be any more of a thre than large number or

then'larre Communists who have all along been at large or are being released after having served their terms? are released detainees going to do that their comrades at liberty could not do if instructions were riven from Peking? The detainees will. presumably all be released in any event over the next & conthe since warrants or which they are held will exmire. Will they be simificantly less, threat to security in a few months time than they would be if rele scd now? For example, are two film stars we still retain after 14 months detention a threat now to Hong Kone1a security? The Ponr Kone Special Branch resort 52 20 5 me pich this exercise is based, states while detainees can be considered a threat as confirmed Communist aritstone "it must now be taken into necourt that other and more senior militant Communists oro pitil at liberty within the Colony

in absence of any resurgence of violent Consunist activity in the

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CONWIDEY TAL

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Colony it will become increasingly difficult to justify the continuing detention of those at present in the Victoria Rond Centre.

(b) that there may be public criticism in Hong Kon so far as the release of detainees, 18 of convicted prisoners, seems to have been received very calmly so that criticism seems unlikely But if questions were to be asked, the Hong Kong Government could easily exlain that releases were natural given the improving political situation in the Colony. The detainees are not sentenced to any set tema so there can be no question of premature releases. On the other hand, as Special Branch report of 20 June indicates, continued holding of these detainees would become increasingly hard to justify to the public in quieter climate in the Colony. It might become increasingly hard to justify also to opinion outside Hong Kong;

It is

(c) that the Communists may make propaganda. the intention of the exercise that the Communista should be given small face-saving victory. But in fact they seem to have been very restrained in their propaganda about their releases so far;

(d) finally it is argued that increased releases would represent an introduction of expediency or politics into what should be a purely legal question, · ***th great respect I think this is being unrealistic, These detainees are political offenders and their detention is a political fact. What is done with then, whether they are retained or released, has unavoidable political implications. The cuestion to be asked surely in : provided we can release them safely, are there any political benefits to be pained? There is nothing shameful in considering this. Your telegram No.1362 advocated releases on just this ground and in his telegram To.1005 the Governor expressed hope that increasing releases would be noted by Chinese.

As seen from here, therefore, the arrangements put forward for hanging on to these detainees to the bitter end do not stand up to ́exuintion. On the other hand there are: strong grounds for accelerated release. We have a trend of improvements in Sino-British rela' 0.3, the Chinese have made some hopef 1 morea. Some of the I am convinced is due to restimes over detainees already made in Hong Kong. We wish to. encourage this trend and spread its pood effects from the 24 subjects of t-is Kitsion to that of other British anhjects - in China "e are approaching a critical point on the quistion of Grey. "e can pive this encours sesert at little or no cost and without, making any prior concessions I should have thought it hardly needed saying that we should grasp this chance.

Foreim Dirice please piss Hong Kong.

Mr. Cradock,

[Repeated as requested]

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CONTI U.

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28 SEPTEMBER 1968

RAM NUMBER 2034

Вра

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ADDRESSED 0.0. TFLE NO. 2034 OF 28TH SEPTEMBER REPEATED PEKING.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 1084, PARAGRAPH 2 : DETAINEES.

THE CASE FOR CONTINUING THE DETENTION OF NO. 3 AS A SERICUS

SECURITY RISK HAVING BEEN FULLY ESTABLISHED, THE COLONIAL SECRETARY

HAS SIGNED A FRESH DETENTION ORDER TAKING EFFECT TODAY. THE NEWS

WILL NO DOUBT BREAK IN THE COMMUNIST PRESS IN THE NEXT DAY OF

TWO SOON AFTER THE DETAINEE RECEIVES HIS NEXT VISITOR.

2. WE SHALL OF COURSE MAKE NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT BUT IF QUESTIONED

WE SHALL SAY THAT CASES ARE PERIODICALLY REVIEWED AND DETAINEES

RELEASED AS SOON AS THEY ARE NO LONGER RISK TO THE SECURITY

OF THE COLONY.

3. NO. 1 HAS BEEN RELEASED AS ARRANGED.

FO PLEASE PASS PRIORITY PEKING.

SIR D. TRENCH

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