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Cabinet Documents
Reference
Folio
No.
5 144 x (68)i
Date
OPD (67) 20th hing
25-5-67
2.5.68
The above-listed Cabinet document(s), which was/were enclosed on this file, has/have been removed and destroyed.
For complete series of Cabinet documents see CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES
signed
Xanary
15/10197
Date
25.2
Mr. Denfor
pa.
29/2
(ARLIAV
29 FEB No358
FDI3
SECRETARY OF STAZE
STAR
has saan.
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(142)
FDI!!
295
The Commonwealth Secretary was unable to see
me today but I have just spoken to him on the telephone
(11.30 p.m.). He had of course seen Peking telegram
No. 133 and been concerned by it. He said that we
must await the Governor's response but at that stage
he would look into it personally and see whether there
had been a misunderstanding and, if so, how anything
similar could occur in future. He added that the
Governor was due here shortly in any case which would
give an opportunity to look at the whole situation
and the best future course. I put to him that there
seemed to be an advantage in my going to Hong Kong to
look into particularly the whole question of the
options open in terms of our mission in Peking and the
local situation. I said that apart from any
practical advantage in this it might be helpful to
morale in Peking where one of our problems was
reassuring them that we were very concerned with the
situation. I mentioned that we had had to make it
clear to Donald Hopson that we were also concerned
/with
- 2 -
with Anthony Grey's position in which there was a
good deal of public and parliamentary interest.
Mr. Thomson said that there was the difficult problem
of balancing three and three-quarter million people
in Hong Kong against the 60 in Peking and he
appreciated that there were difficult questions here.
2. We left it at that point.
The next stage is
a more thorough discussion in the light of the
Governor's response and meanwhile perhaps you would
consider, irrespective of the outcome of the
Governor's visit, whether I should go to Hong Kong
I
as soon as it can within reason be arranged.
understand, for example, that I could go on an R.A.F.
flight on 5 March. Although my visit would be
private to Hong Kong it woud be open to consideration
whether I might also call at Saigon in the light of the circumstances at the time and any views expressed
by Murray MacLehose.
۸۴
Anders Samme
William Rodgers
21 February, 1968
(Dictated by Mr. Rodgers over the telephone at
11.45 p.m. and not signed by him.)
Ed (1625)
¡
!
Reference.
FD1/3
31140
and
141
i
See Annex.
1
I
[
Ed (4206)
Reference...
FD1/3 (139 FD43
|
See ANNEX
Mr. Wilkinson
Private Secretary
SECRET
بھر وہی
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RE
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FD1/3.
138
Flag
19/11
HONG KONG C
FR.)
обов
Mo Welem 2912
In his minute of 29 January, the Secretary of State
139 asked where matters stood with regard to our long-term
Flag B
W(133)
planning about Hong Kong.
pa.
2. The considered strategic paper which the Secretary of
State has in mind has been in the intentions of the Defence
Review Working Party for some time. At the meeting of the
Overseas Policy and Defence (Official) Committee on 29 January
when the future programme of work for the Defence Review Working
Party was discussed, it was decided that a paper on Hong Kong
covering "long-term policy: impact of withdrawal from Singapore
and Malaya: size of garrison and reinforcement plans" should
be ready by 30 April, the Departments responsible being the
Commonwealth Office with the Foreign Office and Ministry of
Defence. This timetable was to fit in with the decisions which
will be required before the White Paper on Future Defence Policy
which has been promised to Parliament and will have to be
produced in July.
3. We have just received the Commonwealth Office's preliminary
draft. It is the intention to have an inter-departmental
meeting at the end of this week at head of department level (Commonwealth Office, Foreign Office, Treasury, Ministry of Defence and Cabinet Office) for a first examination of the
/draft.
SECRET
SECRET
- 2
draft. Once we have had this discussion, it should be
easier to see those issues on which it would be best to
have Ministerial guidance here at this stage. We shall
certainly have in mind the Secretary of State's observation
in the first paragraph of his minute.
Copies to:
Mr. Samuel
Mr. Butler
James Murray)
5 February, 1968
Mitkuisa
5/2.
殛
SECRET
►
Sir E. Feck
CONFIDENTIAL
PDY/3
Mr. Muthay PD1 / 2 WITH (28) See Items 14, 15, 16 +19 Jon Denson
At the meeting of the Oversea Policy and Defence
(official) Committee on 29 January, the future programme of
work for the Defence Review Working Party was discussed. The
Committee approved, subject to endorsement by OPD probably
later this week, the programme which I attach as Annex A to
this minute.
mali
The items listed flow naturally from the recent decisions
on defence cuts. Decisions on most of them will be required
before the White Paper on Future Defence Policy, including
the shape and structure of the Armed Forces, can be produced.
This White Paper, which has been promised to Parliament, will
have to be produced in July. I attach at Annex B a provisional
timetable.
(R.A. Sykes)
30 January, 1968
Coples to:
Private Secretary Mr. O'Reill
Mr. Morland
Hr. Arbuthnott
Mr. Samuel
Mr. Baker
Sir D. Allen
Lord Hood
Sir C. O'Neill Sir C. Crowe
Sir D. Greenhill
Sir R. Jackling Sir R. Beaumont
Mr. Wilkinson
Kr. Beith
Nr. Brenchley
Head of Arabian Dept.
Head of A.E. & D. Dept.
Head of Central Dept.
Head of Defence Supply Dept.
Head of Eastern Dept.
Head of E.E.I.Dept.
Head of Far Eastern Dept.
Head of Planning Staff
Head of N.E.A. Dept.
Head of S.E.A. Dept.
Head of W.C.A. Dept.
Sir J. Henniker-Kajor Kr. Garvey
Head of Western Dept.
Head of W.0.0. Dept.
Kr. Hancock
CONFIDENTIAL
1
[
CONFIDENTIAL
ANNEX A
Subject
1.
Offset
2.
Kuwait
3.
Brunei
4.
Combat
Aircraft
5. Aircraf
Carriers
6. A.W.R.E.
7.
Overseas Works
Proxraume
8. Consequences of
F.111
Cancellation
A. To be decided at an early date
Problem for Decision
Instructions for our
negotiator
Action necessary to terminate or amend the
(See also
agreement. No. 14).
Action to terminate Anglo/ Brunei Agreement,
Early decision required on keeping open option to develop advanced combat aircraft pending decision on No. 24.
Ark Royal/Eagle refits.
Terms of reference for enquiry into A.W.R.E.
Far East and Persian Gulf.
Cancellation payments, offset targets and orders, U.S. credita, etc.
Department Responsible
and Action
Foreign Office with Treasury and Board of Trade in hand - ? very early to OPD.
Foreign Office with
Ministry of Defence,
leading to early paper to OPD.
Commonwealth Office
with Ministry of Defence: remit from OPD(67) 31st Meeting to bring back for decision early in 1968.
Ministry of Defence, with Ministry of Technology and Treasury. At an early date.
Ministry of Defence,
initially bilaterally with
Treasury, during February.
Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Folicy.
Ministry of Defence discussing with Treasury and Kinistry of Public Building and Works.
Foreign Office and Common- wealth office to be con- sulted.
Ministry of Defence and Hinistry of Technology. As soon as possible.
D
CONFIDENTIAL
/B.
CONFIDENTIAL
2
Subject
9. NATO
10. Force
Structure Exercise
11. Malta
B. To be decided in relation to the
Defence White Paper in July
Problem for Decision
Future policy towards NATO including terms of force declarations and assignments.
Including the definition of a "general capability, and the consequences of the F.111 study. (See cover note).
Future requirements.
Department Responsible and Action
Foreign Office, with Common- wealth office and Ministry of Defence. Paper to OPD, perhaps by 30 April.
Ministry of Defence.
For
discussion in Working Party by 30 April.
12.
Cyprus and
CENTO
13. Libya
Details of reduction of aircraft in Cyprus.
Assumptions on future garrison and treaty.
(1) Assumptions about
timing of run-down.
14. Persian Gulf
(ii)
(11)
Negotiations for
abrogation or
amenduent of
treaties.
(111) Future of support for local forces.
Commonwealth office, with Foreign Office and Kinistry of Defence. Paper to OPD, perhaps by 30 April.
Foreign Office, departmental action with Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, by 30 April.
Foreign Office with Ministry of Defence. For discussion in the Working Party by 31 March.
(1)
Foreign Office with Ministry of Defence for discussion in Working Party before mid-March.
(11) Foreign Office.
For submission to Minis- ters as soon as possible.
(111) As (11).
15. Far East
(a) Political
(1) proposed 5-power
(1)
conference.
(ii) Anglo/Malaysian
treaty.
(111) SEATO.
/(111)
CONFIDENTIAL
Commonwealth Office with Foreign Office and Ministry of
Defence. For eventual submission to Ministere, probably end April or early May.
(11) Commonwealth Office,
with Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence, Dependent on (1).
CONFIDENTIAL
3
Subject
15. Far East
(contd.)
Problem for Decision
(b) Defence. Plans for withdrawal from
Singapore and Malaysia.
16. Hong Kong
17. Minor
Denendencies
18. Air Routes
|
19. Gurkhas
Long-term policy: impact of withdrawal from Singapore and Kalaysia: size of garrison and reinforcement plans.
Implications for size and structure of forces of political future of minor dependencies such as Fiji, British Honduras, Falkland Islands, Caribbean, etc.
Future requirements, staging posts, overflying rights, etc.
Timing of future decisions.
20. Beira Patrol Future of commitment.
21.
Protection of British subiecta
Future use of British forces to protect British subjects abroad.
Department Responsible and Action
(iii) Foreign office with Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence. Before SEATO Council meeting in early April.
Ministry of Defence with Commonwealth Office. To Ministers not later than 30 April.
Commonwealth Office with Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence, By 30 April.
Commonwealth Office with Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence. Initially for early discussion in Working Party.
Kinistry of Defence, with Foreign Office and Common- wealth office. For #18- cussion in Working Party by 30 April.
Ministry of Defence with Foreign Office. To OPD if necessary by 30 April.
Foreign Office, with Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence. For early discussion in Working Farty.
Commonwealth Office and Foreign Office, with Ministry of Defence, OPD by 31st Karch.
To
/ANNEX B
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
ANNEX B
Time Table
House of Commons debate.
1
Publication of White Paper.
White Paper to printers.
Cabinet discussion of White Paper.
Paper circulated to Cabinet.
OPD discussions.
OPDO discussions.
Paper circulated to OPDO.
Late July (say on Konday 22nd).
Monday, 8 July.
Monday, 1 July,
Thursday, 27 June.
Monday, 24 June.
14 and 21 June.
During period 4
Wednesday, 29 May.
10 June.
NOTE:
This timetable is based on the planned timetable for the 1967 Defence Studies, adjusted to allow for the Spring Bank Roliday (31 May to 3 June). Actual timetable in 1967 was a week later, owing to the Middle East crisis.
CONFIDENTIAL
From: C.J. Howells, DS22
Please address any reply to MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
(
and
DS22
Your reference:
DS22/9B
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.I
Telephone: WHitehall 7022, ext. 6732
6th February 1868
12
137
The Howelle listed
we
There they
are not very happy about the
Would lie to dicun
Dean Dawid paper and
it before pulling delected silicisin
on pupes Hong Kong : Draft Repoft
7:00
Thank you for suggesting that I might come to the meeting you will be holding with Defence Department and the Planners later this week to discuss the draft en- closed with Carter's letter of 30th January to Murray. If you do not think it would make the meeting too unwieldy it would be most helpful if a military member of the Defence Policy Staff could come along with me.
Meanwhile we shall be considering the parts of the paper which concern us, but not formulating our views until we know what the scale and approach of the Foreign Office comments are likely to be.
Ducured with Mr Carta (co)
تمام
on 15 September. See this Youmo
рарсы
1
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David Wilson Esq.,
Far Eastern Department, Foreign Office,
S.W.1.
w
RECEIVED IN
Chuis; ARCHIVES No.31
- 8 FEB 1968
FD1/3
Ed (4206)
·
!
Reference....
10113.
See Annex
136
(4/3)
RECS ¡ARL
> IN
No 31
Few 368
FDI 3
p.w.
BRITISH EMBASSY,
TOKYO
30 January, 1968
CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL
Jear later,
Fub.
M: James Manny Me sht
famu
M: Donato Maitland.
бы
2
135
The Secretary of State and Hong Kong
128
I am sorry to have worried you about Mr. Pao and his interpretation of a remark, supposedly made by the Secretary of State to him in my house. I had already suggested the explanation, which you kindly gave me in your telegram No. 178 of 19 January, but it was helpful to have it in attributable form. In the event, the Pao resident here decided to drop the matter and told his brother in Hong Kong as much.
2.
Unfortunately they had between them conveyed the story to Mr. J.K. Swire of Butterfield and Swire and he had already left for Hong Kong, determined to put the matter to the Governor on the racecourse (old world touch!) the next day. Butterfield and
Swire's helpful manager here succeeded in dissuading Swire by telephone and the brothers Pao have now taken the face-saving line that Swire's deafness was basically at fault
3. I was therefore able to tell you that this rumour had been scotched (my telegram No. 106 of 24 January).
ever
p.a.
'i
..Z.W
7:ü
ohn
(John Pilcher)
P.A. Wilkinson, Esq., C.M.G., D.E.O., 0.B.E.,
FOREIGN OFFICE. 8.W.1.
CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL
Ed (4206)
Reference..
西
FD1/3 (130
See Annex.
En Clair
TOKYO TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno 106 24 January 1968
UNCLASSIFIED
Your telegram No. 178.
FG Divn. (133
Copy No....
3
RECEIVED IN ¡ARCHIVES No 31 2. JAN 1968
FD13
FD 1/3/128
Following for Wilkinson from Ambassador,
Genuine misunderstanding has I hope now been clarified.
Sir J. Pilcher
PRISEC (F.0.)
Feb.
Good.
It wa
Cochon Insumen.
a
pe.
2
13
E4 (4206)
!
Reference..
FD1/3 (129 FD1/3
See Annex.
132
L
LAST
REF.
127
FD1/3
KEXI
REF.
CYPHER/CAT A
CONFIDENTIAL
128
fema
COPY NO..3
FLASH FOREIGN OFFICE TO TOKYO
TELNO 178
CONFIDENTIAL
19 JANUARY, 1968 (F)
YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 91: HONG KONG.
FOLLOWING FROM WILKINSON,
(127
SECRETARY OF STATE IS NOW IN BONN, WE WILL SHOW HIM THE TELEGRAM ON RETURN.
2. MR. PAO CLEARLY GOT THE WRONG END OF THE STICK. WHAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE MAY HAVE MEANT WAS THAT THE VIOLENT PHASE OF THE COMMUNIST CAMPAIGN IN HONG KONG WAS NOW QUOTE FINISHED UNQUOTE. PLEASE EXPLAIN THIS TO MR. PAO AND ADD THAT THE PRIME MINISTER STATED CATEGORICALLY IN PARLIAMENT ON 18 JANUARY THAT THERE WAS QUOTE NO QUESTION OF REDUCING THE STRENGTH OR EFFECT- IVENESS OF THE HONG KONG GARRISON UNQUOTE WHILE, ON 17 JANUARY, THE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY SAID THAT QUOTE H.M.G. REMAINED UNCHANGED IN THEIR DETERMINATION TO MAINTAIN THEIR AUTHORITY IN THE COLONY AND TO DISCHARGE THEIR FULL RESPONSIBILITIES TOWARDS HONG KONG AND ITS PEOPLE UNQUOTE.
SOSFA
PRISEC (F.0.)
CONFIDENTIAL
Registry No.
DEPARTMENT
FD1/3
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION PRIORITY MARKINGS
Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
Restricted Unclassed.
Flash
Timmediate
Priority Robur
Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressco(s).
Dispatched
atched
129
EXPHER
---
LIL
Xxx
Private
A
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
1783/1911
PRIVACY MARKING
In Confidence
En Clair Code Cypher
Draft Telegram to:-
No.
TOKYO
[Securi
ation]
Security classification] if any
[ Privacy marking ]
-if any
[Codeword-if any]
Addressed to
telegram No.
178
And to
CONFIDENTIAL
Rakkeg (Tokyo
ve-‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒‒---------......dordiriideid=IMA
(date)
(Dale) 12 repeated for information to
And to:-
Repeat to:-
Saving to:-
John Denson
19/1
Distribution:-
PRISEC
Copies to:-
Ffice
Saving to....
Your telegram No. 91 : Hong Kong
Following from Wilkinson.
Secretary of State is now in Bonn. We will
show him the telegram on return.
2. Mr. Pao clearly got the wrong end of the stick.
What the Secretary of State may have meant was that
the violent phase of the comunist campaign in Hong
Kong was now "finished". Please explain this to
Kr. Pao and add that the Prime Minister stated
categorically in Parliament on 18 January that there
was "no question of reducing the strength or
effectiveness of the Hong Kong garrison" while,
on 17 January, the Commonwealth Secretary said that
"H.M.G. remained unchanged in their determination to
maintain their authority in the Colony and to
discharge their full responsibilities towards Hong
Kong and its people".
EXAMINED AT /.7.30////
↑ SIGNATURE
UPO 199
Cypher/Cat A
CONFIDENTIAL
FE Dim(127)
COPY NO: 3
IMMEDIATE TOKYO TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno 91
CONFIDENTIAL
19 January, 1968
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No,31
19 JAN 1968
FDI /3
Following urgent for Private Secretary from Ambassador.
Mr. C. L. Pao, & Hong Kong ship-owner, has told others that at my reception for the Secretary of State on 8 January, on hearing he was from Hong Kong the Secretary of State commented "finished".
2. This seems entirely contrary to the Secretary of State's attitude towards Hong Kong as evinced in the talks. I should like to be able to deny categorically that Mr. Pao can have understood the Secretary of State correctly. Perhaps a personal message to Mr. Pao, who is very sensitive and talkative, might be the most effective way. If I could be authorized to convey this and know in what terms today I should be grateful as Mr. Pao is likely to cause it to be taken up with the Governor of Hong Kong within 48 hours.
3. I would then inform the Governor that I had so written to Kr. Pao.
Sir J.Pilcher
PRISEC (F.0.)
88888
LARI
MEXT
REF.
128
Reply seur
p.a.
CONFIDENTIAL
10
1
Ed (4206)
+
Reference...
FD1/3
121
то
126
See Annex.
[
ORIGINAL Copy on
F21/14/225.
Mr. Wilkinson
7
SECRET
RECEIVED IN ¡ARL: #VES No.31
20 DEC 1967
FD1/3
British Mission in Peking
and Policy towards Hong Kong
रे
Mr The
bu. (120
But I far. 68.
See Fe1/14/225
де
نا.
Flag A
Problem
The Secretary of State commented on a submission of
6 December about efforts to extract members of our Mission
in Peking that the situation was "really most unsatisfactory".
Since then there has been some improvement, in that the
Blishen family have been allowed to leave. However, the
position remains that the Chinese are linking exit visas for
the British Mission in Feking with our conduct in Hong Kong.
The problem is therefore to decide what more we can do to get
our people out of Peking within the limits imposed by the
necessity of maintaining our authority in Hong Kong.
Recommendation
2.
I recommend that:
(a) for the time being the present policy of firm
but unprovocative action in Hong Kong continues to hold out the best hope of ameliorating conditions
for the Mission in Peking; but
(b) if no more visas are granted within a month or so,
we should consider giving publicity to the plight
of the Kission.
(c) Keantime we should continue to try to find ways of
making the Chinese anxious to withdraw some of
their personnel in London.
ןז ױ
+
/Background
SECRET
Background and Argument
Flag B
3.
Flag C
On 27 November the Chinese gave a clear indication that
they intended to issue exit visas for some of the members of
our Mission in Peking. On 2 December however this half promise
was withdrawn on the grounds that action in Hong Kong against
the communist newspapers and the closure of a communist school
proved that we were not "sincere" in seeking good relations.
The cases cited by the Chinese were such that they were almost
certainly an excuse rather than a reason for a change in policy.
It is possible that the Chinese had all along intended not to
issue visas and were only playing a sophisticated game of cat
and mouse, but I am inclined to doubt this as the tactics they
used were uncharacteristic. It seems to me more likely that
relatively junior officials were moving towards normal treat-
ment of the Mission and that this was either countermanded
higher up or no final decision has yet been taken. In either
case it is quite likely that the present state of uncertainty
about Chinese policy towards our Mission will continue for some
time.
4. On 11 December, however, the Chinese said that exit visas
would be issued to the Blishen family, which was the most
urgent outstanding case since Mrs. Blishen has been very
seriously ill and Mr. Blishen has also not been well. The
sensitiveness of the Chinese to Hr. Hopson's use of the term
"gangsters" suggests that they were reluctant to face publicity
I
Ľ
SECRET
/about
SECRET
-3-
1..
F1 20
7188
about inhumane treatment of the Blishens (Peking telegram
E22/7 (42) No. 328).
Flag E
5. Despite the Blishen case, it must be accepted that the
remainder of our Mission remain virtually hostages in Peking
for a soft policy towards the communists in Hong Kong. So
long as the "confrontation" in Hong Kong continues this is
likely to remain true, even if we manage to extract some of
the present members of the Mission, possibly by sending in
replacements.
6.
Chinese are in two minds about how to continue the campaign
against the Hong Kong Government. There is one group that
wishes to discontinue the "confrontation" and there have been
some indications that this policy may gradually be coming into
the ascendant. We cannot however expect the campaign to be
turned off suddenly and there is a danger that, even if Chira
wants a calming down, local communist extremists will take the
initiative into their own hands and precipitate further crises,
which will force Chine to come out in their support.
7. The Chinese have made it very clear that they are sensitive
about the treatment of Chinese owned communist newspapers and
of the communist schools in Hong Kong: both are of course
good vehicles for the propagation of Kao's Thoughts. Because
of their sensitivity and the consequent dangers of provoking
disorders in Hong Kong or further action against our Kission
in Peking, the Hong Kong Government have in fact persuaded
THIS IS A COPY
MEHAS
SRCHET
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS) ACT 1908
/two
SECRET
Flag F
two individual plaintiffs in court actions against the
communist press to postpone the assessment of damages arising
out of the successful libel actions. The Governor of Hong
Kong has also reported that the Bank of China has made
approaches to one of those concerned in what might conceivably
be an attempt to discover the terms under which the communist
press would be allowed to operate freely by the Government.
These approaches are still in an early stage and we do not
really know what the Chinese intentions are.
8.
Although the Hong Kong Government have in this way tried
to avoid provocative action, there is of course the danger of
too many minor concessions of the sort referred to in the fore-
going paragraph encouraging the communists to press for greater
I think it is right to avoid or delay action which
we know will be considered highly provocative, but I am also
convinced it is only by firm and successful action in Hong
Kong that we can persuade the Chinese that the campaign has
been a failure and must be discontinued. At some point the
victories.
Chinese will probably look for a means of saving face and
representing the campaign as a "victory", and it may well be
in our interests at that time to give them some help. But I
think that any precipitate attempt to do so would only encourage
the extremista. Sir Arthur Galsworthy, who is in Hong Kong
this week, will be discussing these issues with the Governor.
9. At present the Chinese equate treatment of our Kission
in Peking and the conduct of policy in Hong Kong.
For our
Mission
1
SECRET
[
لا
SECRET
5.
+
Kission this is obviously a dangerous equation, and it is
very much in our interests to reintroduce the Chinese Mission
in London as an element in the equation. This is, however,
not easy to do.
we might attempt to make the Chinese anxious
to remove one or more of their people from London. The possi- bilities are not extensive, but a fairly promising scheme involving one individual is being drawn up. The other possi- bility is to give publicity to the plight of our Mission in Peking, particularly in countries where the Chinese are
sensitive about their image. This is a two-edged weapon
since, although it will certainly embarrass the Chinese, it
will also make the crisis in relations between our two countrica
publicly obvious and this in turn may make it harder for the
Chinese to give concessions. It is a weapon which Mr. Hopson
has up to now been anxious that we should not use. Although I understand Mr. Hopson's hesitation, I think that we shall be forced to use the publicity weapon if the slight signs of
I think relaxation which have been apparent do not continue.
the timing of this should be to prepare the first moves in a carefully directed propaganda campaign at the beginning of
January if there has been no further progress by then.
M7: Rarger
Humay
(James Kurray)
18 December, 1967
Whilkansen
+
DECHLT
THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1968
1
نت
SECRET
DIN
719
Cypher/Cat· A
Hu RONG TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (D.T.D.)
Telno 1863
SECRET
12 December, 1967
AR
b. No.31
1 DEC 1967
FD113
Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No.1863 of 12 December, Repeated for information to Peking.
Your telegram No.2512: Deportation of Prisoners.
I would at present be reluctant to try this manoeuvre without some fairly firm indication that the deportees would be accepted at the border because once it became clear that we were unable to effect deportation, then the threat of deportation (which still has some deterrent value) would cease to have any credibility.
2. Arrangements can be made legally to effect release if deportacs are accepted back or take them into custody again if they are not: the procedures will vary with different categories of convicted prisoner or detainee. It is not however an entirely simple matter of letting then go or putting them under restraint again; there are legal processes to be gone through which cannot be entirely ignored and could be quite complex.
FD
る。
Poking telegram to Foreign Office No.326 has been received
since the above was drafted. I agree we should wait to see how we get on over Wen Woi Pao before taking this any further; but in the meanwhile we will examine the possibilities of proceeding as proposed
in more detail.
Foreign Office please pass routine to Peking as my telegram
No.663.
Sir D.Trench,
(Repetition to Peking referred for Departmental decision].
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11 December 1967
EC 1967
FD13
18
kodressed to Foreign ürrice telegram No. 526 of 11 December. Repeated for information to Hong Kong.
Your telegram No. 1069: Deportation
I agree that the Chinese are unlikely to enter into discussion on this subject. Procedure as outlined in your paragraph 2 seems best though I think our communication should be a bare statement of ract with no (repeat no) reference to improving relations. The Chinese would in any case understand it in this sense.
2. I cannot guarantee that the Chinese would agree to accept deportees. It is quite probable that they would refuse. But it is possible they would accept them and at the same time make a lot of propaganda spout illegal deportations. It would I think therefore be worth trying at some stage, providing the Governor can take them back ir necessary, Even in this case the gesture would have been made and they might come back on it later. Let us see how we get on over wen Hui Pao before taking a decision.
Foreign Ürrice please pass Priority Hong Kong 168.
Mr. Hopson
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light.
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Dec.
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PRIORITY COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO HONG KONG
0 2500
نا
Mona
O
(D.T.D.)
7 DECEMBER, 1967 (HWB 3/2)
1 DEC 1967
FD1/3
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FD1/3/113
ADDRESSED TO HONG KONG T.LEGRAM NO. 2500 OF 7 DECEMBER.
RAM NO. 2500 OF 7 DECEMBER. REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO PEKING POLAD SINGAPORE AND WASHINGTON. YOUR TELEGRAMNNO 1828 PEKING STAFF EXIT VISAS.
WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR HELPFUL COMMENTS AND AGREE WITH ANALYSIS IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 1.
THE
2. WE ACCEPT BOTH THE JUSTIFICATION AND THE NEED FOR YOUR POLICY ON COMMUNIST SCHOOLS AND PUPILS AND DO NOT WISH TO URGE THAT YOU RECONSIDER THE DECISION TO QUOTE DEREGISTER UNQUOTE CHUNG WAH SCHOOL OR ITS STAFF OR FOR THE TIME BEING THE DETENTION OF THE HEADMASTER. SUBJECT TO HOPSON'S VIEWS (SEE PARAGRAPH 4 BELOW) HE MIGHT AT SOME STAGE BE USED AS A BARGAINING COUNTER.
3. THE CONSIDERATIONS SET OUT IN YOUR PARAGRAPHS 7 AND 8 RELATING TO OUTSTANDING ACTIONS AGAINST THE PRESS ARE FULLY APPRECIATED AND UNDERSTOOD, WE DO NOT THINK THAT ANY GENERAL ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO AMELIORATE THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES FOR THESE NEWSPAPERS, BUT YOU MIGHT DELAY THE SEIZURE OF ASSETS OF NEWSPAPERS AS PROPOSED IN YOUR PARAGRAPH 8, UNTIL WE SEE HOW THE SITUATION DEVELOPS IN PEKING,
4. WE ALSO SUPPORT THE SUGGESTION IN PARAGRAPH 9 THAT IF THE CHINESE MFA ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT DEPORTEES CERTAIN OF THE DETAINEES MIGHT BE RELEASED ON CONDITION OF THEIR RETURN TO CHINA ON DEPORTATION ORDERS. HOPSON IS, HOWEVER, BEING ASKED FOR HIS VIEWS ON THIS IN A SEPARATE TELEGRAM.
CROSEC
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116
PLURITY FOREIGN OFFICE TO PEKING
TELNO. 1069
SECRET
8 DECEMBER 1967 (FED)
ADDRESSED TO PEKING TELEGRAM NUMBER 1069 OF 8 DECEMBER REPEATED
FOR INFORMATION TO HONG KONG.
HONG KONG TELEGRAM NUMBER 1820 DEPORTATION OF PRISONERS.
PARAGRAPH 9.
OUR PRELIMINARY VIEW IS THAT THE CHINESE WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO ENTER INTO A DISCUSSION ABOUT ACCEPTING DEPORTEES AND THAT THAT ONLY EFFECT OF PUTTING THE PROBLEM TO THEM WOULD BE TO MAKE
THEM PRESS FOR FULFILMENT OF ALL THE QUOTE FIVE DEMANDS UNQUOTE. 2. THERE MIGHT HOWEVER BE SOME ADVANTAGE IN SELECTING A BATCH OF SUITABLE PRISONERS AND DETAINEES AND THEN NOTIFYING THE CHINESE THAT AS AN EARNEST OF OUR DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WE INTENDED TO RELEASE THEM AND RETURN THEM TO CHINA ON A CERTAIN DAY. IF THE CHINESE WERE NOT (REPEAT NOT) PREPARED TO ACCEPT THEM THEY WOULD PROBABLY MAKE THIS CLEAR IN ADVANCE, IF THEY MADE NO REPLY BUT, WHEN THE TIME CAME, REFUSED TO ACCEPT THEM AT THE FRONTIER, THE PERSONS CONCERNED WOULD HAVE TO BE PUT BACK IN CONFINEMENT. IF THE CHINESE DID ACCEPT THE FIRST BATCH IT MIGHT THEN BE POSSIBLE TO INDICATE THAT PROVIDED AN IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS WAS MAINTAINED THERE WOULD BE FURTHER RELEASES. THIS WOULD EVENTUALLY GIVE THE CHINESE AN EXCUSE TO CLAIM THAT THEIR DEMAND ABOUT PRISONERS HAD BEEN MET, AS WELL AS RELIEVING HONG KONG OF UNWANTED PERSONS. 3. CLEARLY THIS MAY NOT EVEN BE A STARTER, BUT WE SHOULD WELCOME
YOUR VIEWS.
SOSFA
Now see reply.
р.с
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DEPARTMENT
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SECUNTY CLASSIFICATION
PRIORITY MARKINGS
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despatch
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Emergency) #
Impudiate Priority
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Cypher
Security classification
[Codeword-if any}
--
Draft Telegrando:-
Addressed to
No.
(Dale)
EK ZAG
And fo:-
1069
8/12
telegram No...
And to
repeated for information to
* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should,
reach addressee(s)
9/12
+
SECRET
Peking
Lobs (date)
ד
Hong Kong
8 Dec
(116.
.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Ø
Repeat to:-
FONG RONG
2512
Saving to:-
Григор
Distribution:-
8 the.
Departmental
F.E.D. H.K.D.
Copies to:--
1805787:2
Saving to..
+
1071
Hong Kong telegram No. 1820 paragraph I Deportation of prisoners
Paragraphe
Our preliminary view is that the Chinese
would be unlikely toenter into a discussion
about accepting deportees and that the only effect
of putting the problem to them would be to make
them press for fulfilment of all the "five demands".
2. There might however be some advantage in
selecting a batch of suitable prisoners and
detainees and then notifying the Chinese that as
an earnest of our desire to improve relations we
intended to release them and return them to China
on a certain day. If the Chinese were not (repeat not) prepared to accept them they would probably
make this clear in advance If they made no reply
but, when the time came, refused to accept them
at the frontier, the persons concerned would have
to be put back in confinement. If the Chinese
did accept the first batch it might then be
possible to indicate that provided an improvement
in relations was maintained there would be further
releases. This would eventually give the Chinese
/an
SECRET
an excuse to claim that their demand about prisoners had been
met, as well as relieving Hong Kong of unwanted persons.
MANI
theim hating many
SVEN
with even
3. Clearly this
welcome you'
VILLA
VICUS.
stanter, but we should
Алеви
Departmental dist.
(2) 100% HUAJ ŠUL
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
118
~/pher/Cat A
SECRET
Tel. Sent to Hong Kong recommending postponement
FLASH PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE"
Tel 325
SECRET
of avermers.
11 December 1967
р-с
11 SEC 1967
3
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 325 of 11 December, Repeated for information to Hong Kong, Washington, POLAD Singapore
Not yet lead
Your telegram No. 2500 to Hong Kong: Measures to assist Mission in Peking.
Not
Reedy
西
FD1/3 (102)
You will since have seen Hong Kong telegram No. 1835 and my telegram No. 322 in which I recommended evasive action in
Fen Hul Pao case. As assessment of damages is due to take place on 14 December action will have to be taken very soon.
2. I have stressed in my telegrams that as seen from here measures against Chinese press in Hong Kong are most sensitive issue here. I may be wrong but I believe action in suppressing violence e.g. [? ¿p omitted] on schools is more readily under- stood here. We have reason to think Chinese leaders dislike schools being used for this purpose though they feel it incumbent to protest ainst raids and to exploit them as useful propaganda theme. Action against press has always been a particularly sore spot and has resulted in counter case here e.g. detention of Gray and burning of this mission. The latest Chinese protest contains warning that further counter case may be taken if we press Wen Hui Al [sic] case to conclusion.
3. In paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 322 I argue that there is another reason to place action against Chinese press in a different category. According to Mr. Hsueh, Wen Hui Pao has "never incited people to make bombs". I should be grateful if Hong Kong would confirm whether this is broadly true. If it is not I should be grateful to receive by telegram some inflammatory examples, which would have to be recent to be relevant to present situation. In any case Hsueh's remarks may be relevant to the future. If the Chinese leaders wish to disengage to some extent and go over to "peaceful struggle" they will need their main organs Wen Hui Pao and Ta Kung Pao to propagandise line and reassert control. If this is true it would not (repeat not) be in our interests to interfere with them too much at present.
4. I therefore feel obliged to revert to my strong recommendation that we whould take some evasive action in Wen Hui Pao case. If it is too much to get Olivier to withdraw I hope as a minimum it would be possible to find some way of postponing assessement of damage.
5. We have just been summoned to the Consular Department this afternoon to discuss visas. I hesitate to forecast what this will bring but if it is a Christmas present then I think that arguments for stalling on Wen Hui Pao will be even stronger.
/6. I am
SECRET
SECRET
PEKING TELEGRAM NO. 325 TO FOREIGN OFFICE
2
Awriting Amil
?
6.
I am replying separately to your telegram No. 1069.
Foreign Office pass Flash Hong Kong 167, Priority Singapore 47, Washington 47.
Mr. Hopson.
[Repeated as requested]
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J.I.P.G.D.
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1
Cypher/Cat.A
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R
112
N. 31
Ná
Read
IMMEDIATE PEKING TO
Telno. 322
SECRET
FOREIGN OFFICE
9 December 1967
Soperte Rubhuise.
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ILI
1367
Fort3
"/
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram M. 322 of 9 December. Repeated for information to Hong Kong.
Hong Kong telegram No. 1835 to Commonwealth Office: Chinese Policy towards Hong Kong.
I see the situation as rather more complex. Ever since the Cultural Revolution began events in Hong Kong have to a large extent reflected events in China. Earlier this year we had a phase of extreme violence. Now the tendency in China is to try to re-impose control. But the leadership is finding this a difficult task in many provinces one of which is Kwangtung where the situation is always closely relevant to Hong Kong. It is therefore quite probable that in the present circumstances the Chinese leadership does wish to disengage to some extent in Hong Kong, but are finding it difficult to re-impose control on their groups particularly there. An important cause of this difficulty may be that the situation in Kwangtung has not yet been settled. In order to re-assert control in Hong Kong and to strengthen hand of the "moderates" they may deem it essential to show some kind of "victory".
2.
The question arises therefore as to whether we should make some kind of gesture to help this trend. There is a danger, as the Governor has pointed out, that this would be seen as a sign of weakness and might have an effect contrary to that desired by encouraging the extremists to ask for more. On the other hand it might help the Chinese leaders to reassert control and disengago. At this stage I agree that it would probably be unwise to give substantial further grofind. Nevertheless "Wen Hui Pao" must I think be seen as rather a special case. Distinctions can be drawn between operations to stop violence and action against the main Left Wing newspaper. It is relevant that on 6 December Mr. Hsueh maintained that Wen Hui Pao had never instigated [grp.omitted]ism. To allow ourselves to get into a position where with damage assessed and payment refused Hong Kong Government are obliged to take severe legal measures .g. distraint against the newspapers would I am sure be seen by the Chinese as extreme provocation. Their wrath might well be visited on this Mission as threatened in their latest protest by the imposition of further restrictions. A withdrawal by civil plaintiff would not on the other hand directly engage the prestige of Hong Kong Government.
3. We do not wish to give the Chinese Government the impression that we are vulnerable to pressure. Indeed here we are letting it be known that everyone is settling down to make the most of Christmas and we have stopped pressing daily for exit visas.
We may have
SECRET
+
SECRET
Peking telegram No. 322 to Foreign Office
- 2 -
We may have to wait some time in the hope things will calm down in Hong Kong and this may not come till the Province of Kwangtung is settled. I agree that meanwhile emphasis in Hong Kong must be on maintenance of law and order but I hope this may be done with the maximum of restraint and constant regard for possible repercussions on this Mission. Neverthe- less I think it is essential to take some evasive action in the Wen Hui Pao case if we are to avoid serious trouble and I recommend strongly that plaintiff be asked to withdraw his claim for damages unless there is some better way of shelving the case.
Foreign Office pass Immediate Hong Kong 165.
Mr. Hopson
[Repeated as requested]
FILES
F.0.
F.E.D.
Sir D. Allen
Mr. Wilkinson
P.S.
P.S.'s Dept.
P.S..to P.U.S.
H.K.D.
C.O.
F.E. & P.D.
Mr. Hall
P.S.
P.S.'s Dept.
P.S..to P.U.S.
SSSSS
SECRET
ADVANCE COPIES SENT
TELEGRAM SECTION
Room 124 K.C.S.
Communications Department FED
FD1/3
114
YTC/1
* Please send copies of the following telegram
*Copy/ies of the following telegram has/have been sent
Amended Dist 11/12/67
(* delete as applicable)
FROM PEKING 322.
TO:
9/12/67
Hong Kong Situation (" China, Altitude) Dat
(Signed)
(Department)......
(Date)......
Action taken in Communications Department:
(Initials)....
rm
(Date)....
11/12/67
AFTER ACTION THIS FORM SHOULD BE SENT TO
THE APPROPRIATE ARCHIVES DIVISION FOR RETENTION
156397 500 Pads 2/66-McC & Co Ltd-K.16430 (3609)
LOP COPY
REDES
AMENDED DISTRIBUTION
Cypher/CLV.A
ILMEDIATE PEKING TO
FOREIGN OFFICE
322
1.114
14 DECEMBER 1967-
IAR: Sew Ne 31
9 December 1967
1 20EC 1967
FD1/B
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 322 of 9 December. Repeated for informauion to Hong Kong.
Hong Kong telegram No. 1835 to Commonwealth Office: Chinese Policy Towards Hong Kong.
I see the situation es rather more complex. Ever since the Cultural Revolution began events in Hong Kong cave to a large Gliment reflected events in Chine. Earlier this year we had a Phase of extreme violence. Now the tendency in China is to
But the leadership is finding this a difficult task in many provinces one of which is Kwangtung where the situation is always al gely relvant to Hong Kong. it is
try to re-impose control.
ANTA CL
+
Tow:
Champse loddersnip does wish to disengage to some extent in hong long, but are finding it difficult to re-impose control on th.iz groups particularly there. Ar. important cause of this d.iculty may be that the situation in Kwangtung has not yet been settled. In order to re-assert control in Hong Kong and to strengthen hand of the "nuderetes" they may deem i essential to show some kind of "victory".
2.
RAK
The question arises therefore as to whether we should sore kind of gesture to help this trend. There is a danger, As the Governor has pointed out, that this would be seen as a
of weakness and might have an effect contrary to that
and diseng-ge.
kypet that it wolle partake,
be unwise to give substantial further ground. Nevertheless
+
BUL FAT" Z
think he seen so manden & oneniel nese. ORDERS DEZ qe drawn Den een operaDA ODO
is belevazu
action against the main Luib Wing newspaper. that on 6 December Kr. Egueh zairiained that Wen Hui Pao had never
To allow ourselves to get into a instigated Igrp.omittedlism. position where with damage assessed and payment refused Hong Kong Government are obliged to take severe legal measures e.g. distraint against the newspapers would I am sure be seen by the
Their wrath might well be Chinese as extreme provocation.
sited on this Mission as threatened in their latest protest bo
A withdrawal by civil the imposition of further restrictions. plaintiff would not on the cozer land direc.ly engage the prestiD- of Hong Kong Government.
3. We do not wish to give the Chinese Government the impression Indeed here we are letting it tom. we are vulnerable to pressure. be known that everyone is ttling down to make the most of Christmas and we have stopped pressing daily for exit visas.
SECRET
We may have
I
SKOREA
Peking Telegram No. 322 to Foreign Office
- 2 -
may have to wait some time in the hope things will calm
i Eong Kong and this may not angtung is settled. I agree that
till the Province of anwhile emphasis in
Hong Kong must be on maintenance of 1. and order but I hope
15 may be done with the maximum of restraint and constant regard for possible repercussions on this Kission. Neverthe- is I think it is essential to take some evasive action in the Wen Hui Pao case if we are to avoid serious trouble and I recomand strongly that plaintiff be asked to withdraw his claim for damages unless there is some better way of shelving the case.
Foreign Office pass Immediate Hong Kong 165.
Hopson
[Repeated as requested]
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1
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J
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SECRET U
Reply sear.
#gondo
113
pay (1.T.).)
TC 1820
5 DECEMBER, 1967
FD1/3
SECRET ADDRESSED C.O. TELEGRAM 1820 OF 5 DECEMBER REPEATED FOR INFORM TO. PEKING, POLAD SINGAPORE AND WASHIN
F2313-186
184
WASHINGTON
PEKING TELEGRAMS 296, 297 AND 298 PEKING STAFF EXIT VISAS.
I AM MOST ANXIOUS TO DO ANYTHING I CAN TO HELP THE STAFF IN PEKING IN THE FACE OF THIS VERY UNPLEASANT DEVELOPMENT, BUT THERE HAS BEEN
SHALL SIGN INSIDE HONG KONG OF ANY ATTEMPT BY THE COMMUNISTS TO NORMALISE THE SITUATION SEMICOLON BOMB ATTACKS CONTINUE REGULARLY
AND THE PRESS HAS MAINTAINED ITS VIRULENT CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT PRAISING VIOLENCE AND CALLING FOR PERSISTENT COUNTER-ATTACKS. SCHOOLS AND UNIONS HOLD REGULAR 'DENUNCIATION MEETINGS' AND ADVOCATE CONTIN- VALCE OF THE STRUGGLE. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THERE COULD BE. A
LOSS OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IF I WERE NOW OUT OF THE BLUE TO MAKE
SUBSTANTIAL CONCESSIONS TO THE COMMUNISTS. AGAIN, I SHOULD HAVZ THOUGHT THERE WAS A DANGER THAT IF WE YIELD MUCH GROUND IN RESPONSE
TO THIS LATEST FORII OF PRESSURE, THE COMMUNISTS CWHO MAY ALREADY HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGED BY GAINING MUCH OF WHAT THEY 'DEMANDED' IN THE
BORDER TALKS) MAY SIMPLY ASK FOR HORE.
·
2. THE POSITION IS THEREFORE A DIFFICULT ONE FROM HY POINT OF VIEW SEMICOLON BUT I TAKE THE VARIOUS HAJOR CURRENT ISSUES IN TURN SELOW
TO INDICATE WHAT MIGHT BE DONE.
3. SCHOOLS. TO ASK THE COURTS TO GIVE ONLY LIGHT SENTENCES TO PUPILS
AND TEACHERS, HANY OF WHOM HAVE COMMITTED SERIOUS OFFENCES, WOULD SE
I
BE
A DANGEROUS INTERFERENCE WITH THE NORMAL PROCESSES OF LAW. IN FACT
COURTS HAVE FREQUENTLY TRIED TO BIND OVER COMMUNIST PRISONERS INSTEAD
OF SENTENCING, BUT IMPRISONMENT HAS FOLLOWED BECAUSE PRISOMERS
AAFUSED TO ENTER INTO A DOMD.
4. ON THE OTHER HAND, IN DEALING WITH COMMUNIST SCHOOLS WE HAVE
ALWAYS DONE OUR BEST TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE CONCERNED TO
PREVENT
·
SECRET
SECRET
HONG KONG TELEGRM 89. 18OD KT. GOUNOHIFA TH OFFIGU
FOR
..
PREVRGE THE USE OF THE PAS MER HELLAL PURPOSES RATHER LIAN
I
INSTRUCTION IN THE THOUGHTS OF AO SERICOLOT! AND WE SHALL TAKE THE GREATEST CARE IN FUTURE (AS HITHERTO) TO ENSURE THAT RAIDS TAKE
PLACE ONLY WHEN WE HAVE THE CLEAREST REASON TO BELIEVE THAT OFFENCES
ARE BEING COMMITTED IN A PARTICULAR SCHOOL.
5. THE ACTION AGAINST CHUNG WALL SCHOOL WAS NOT 'PUNITIVE'. PUPILS AND STAFF OF THE SCHOOL HAVE BEEN INCREASINGLY INVOLVED IN BREACHES
OF THE LAW SEMICOLON TUO TEACHERS AND SEVENTEEN PUPILS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED FOR 'STRUGGLE' OFFENCES SINCE SEPTEMBER SEMICOLON AND WHEN
WE GOT SUCH VERY DRAMATIC AND PUBLIC EVIDENCE THAT THE PREMISES
WERE BEING USED FOR THE HANUFACTURE OF EXPLOSIVES WE HAD NO OPTION
BUT TO TAKE ACTION.EXECUTIVE COUNCIL TODAY ADVISED THE DEREGISTRATION
OF THE CHUNG WAH SCHOOL AND THE HEADMASTER AND TEACHERS SEMICOLON BUT THE TIMING OF THE DEREGISTRATIONS AND THEIR ANNOUNCEMENT HAVE
BEZH LEFT TO MY DISCRETION: AND I WILL TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION UNTIL I HEAR FURTHER FROM YOU. IF THE SCHOOL IS MOT TO BE DEREGISTERED
IRCUNST
HAP
IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, HOWEVER, IT IS HARD TO THINK OF ANY MORE
!
VALID GROUNDS FOR THE DEREGISTRATION OF A SCHOOL.
6. I COULD ALSO RECONSIDER THE DETENTION OF THE HEADMASTER WONG CHO-
I FAN LATER: BUT I DOUBT IF I COULD BOTH RELEASE HIM AND NOT DEREGISTER
THE SCHOOL.
7. THE PRESS. THE MAJOR DIFFICULTY HERE IS THAT 'WEN WEI PAO' HAVE ALREADY IN EFFECT 'DARED' US TO CONTINUE THE ACTION CHY TELEGRAN 1771 PARAGRAPII 1 REFERS) AND HAVE PROPHESIED THAT WE SHALL HOT DO
SO BECAUSE WE ARE FRIGHTENED OF THE CONSEQUENCES. NEVERTHELESS,
INTOPAGANDA CLAINS OF THIS SORT BY THE COMMUNISTS NO LONGER CUT TUD RUCH ICE IN HONG KONG SEMICOLON AND I AM PREPARED TO ASK OLIVIER IF,
IN VIEW OF THE APPARENT BEARING OF HIS CASE ON THE TREATMENT OF THE
STAFF IN PEKING, HE WOULD BE PREPARED TO WAIVE THE CLAIM FOR DAMAGES
AS PROPOSED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF PEKING TELEGRAM 298. ASSESSMENT OF
DAHAGES 15 DUE ON DECENLER 14, BUT 1-AM ADVISED THAT IT WOULD DE AS
VELL TO DISCONTINUE THE ACTION BEFORE THE DAY SET FOR THE HEAR ING. IF THIS CONCESSION HAD ANY USEFUL EFFECT ON THE C.P.G., I WOULD DE
/PREPARED TO
SECRET
!
SECRET
تا
1
HONG KONG TELEGRAM NO. 1820 TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
-3-
PREPARED TO CONSIDER SIMILAR ACTION IN THE OTHER THREE OUTSTANDING
CINTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENTS HAVE DEEN GIVEN IN ALL, BUT DANAGES
ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE ASSESSED DEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. I CANNOT
OF COURSE' GUARANTEE THAT THOSE CONCERNED WILL AGREE,
ALSO
8. I AN ALSO PREPARED TO DELAY FOR A TIME THE SEIZURE OF THE ASSETS
OF THE NEWSPAPERS CLOSED IN AUGUST CHY TELEGRAM 545 TO PEKINGS
WHICH HAVE NOT YET PAID THEIR FINES. HOWEVER THIS ACTION MUST
EVENTUALLY. BE TAKEN IN TIME TO PREVENT THE PAPERS RESUMING
PUBLICATION IN FEBRUARY.
9. DETAINEES. WE HAVE EARLIER DISCUSSED (SEE MY TELNO 1501)
THE QUESTION OF RELEASING DETAINEES AND/OR PRISONERS. ISUEN'S
REMARKS CPEKING TELNO 272) ABOUT NORMALISATION GEING DEPENDENT
O!! **THE RELEASE OF ALL PRISONERS'' SUGGEST THAT THE CHINESE MAY '....
ATTACH PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO THIS ISSUE. I COULD NOT IN
L
PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES AGREE TO THE UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE IN THE
COLONY OF ANY OF THESE PEOPLE SENICOLOM BUT I WOULD BE PREPARED
ON
+
TO RELLASE CERTAIN OF THEN ON CONDITION OF THEIR RETURN TO CHINA
ON DEPORTATION ORDERS, AND INDEED I WOULD GREATLY WELCOME THE
ASSURED ABILITY TO DO SO AND WOULD BE ABLE TO ACT WITH MORE
TOLERANCE IN OTHER WAYS IF THIS POSITION WERE ACHIEVED. IF HM
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES THOUGHT THERE WAS ANY ADVANTAGE IN SOUNDING
OUT THE CHINSES MFA ON THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT DEPORTEES,
I WOULD BE HAPPY TO PROVIDE NINI WITH DETAILS OF AN INITIAL BATCH
OF THESE PEOPLE FOR CONSIDERATION.
10. I AM AFRAID THAT NONE OF THIS HAY BE VERY EFFECTIVE, BUT IT
GOES AS FAR AS I THINK WE CAN HERE. I AM AFRAID ALSO THAT ALL
THIS MERELY ILLUSTRATES THE DANGERS OF THE DILEMHA WE ARE CONSTANTLY
III AS DETWEEN THE INTERESTS OF JONG KONG AND OUR MISSION, I WOULD
WELCOME YOUR EARLY VIEWS.
SECRET
/F.0. PLEASE PASS
'L
من
سا
SECRET
KONG TELEGRAM NO. 1820 TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
F.O. PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE PEKING AS MY TELNO 648 AND ROUTINE
WASHINGTON AS MY 404.
SIR D. TRENCH
[REPETITION TO PEKING REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION,
REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POST.]
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
C.O. HONG KONG DEPT.
FAR EAST & PACIFIC DEPT.
J.I.R.D.
NEWS DEPT.
J.I.P.G.D.
F.O. FAR EASTERN DEPT.
PROTOCOL & CONFERENCE DEPT.
PASSPORT CONTROL DEPT.
DSAO PERSONNEL DEPT.
WWWWW
SECRET
ADVANCE COPIES SENT
Mr. de la Mure
Mr. Murray o/r
SECRET
Rr.
426HIVE: Day 3
-
12.
FD1/3
100
Mr. Wilford's Paper on Hong Kong
The Defence Review Working Party have been commissioned
to make a study of the long term future of Hong Kong for the
Defence and Oversea Policy Committee. The first rough draft
has been sent to the Cabinet Office by Mr. Carter. (This is
the only copy and in the interests of speed it has not been
cleared with us at this stage.) I understand that the draft
is to be circulated for comment by interested departments.
It will inevitably cover some of the ground in Mr. Wilford's
interesting paper. I have mentioned the paper informally to
the Commonwealth Office and we have agreed that any points in
it which we consider should be brought to the notice of the
Defence Review Working Party can be included as amendments
proposed by the Foreign Office.
2. My general comment is that unless there is a radical
change in the nature of the Chinese Government, it seems
unlikely that they would be prepared to negotiate on any terms
for the extension of the New Territories' lease after 1997.
A more moderate and pragmatic Government might however be
willing to negotiate about a smooth and peaceful handover of
the Colony and about any continuing British interest. Fe
will be submitting the Commonwealth Office draft with our
comments in due course.
SECRET
John Denson
(J. B. Denson) 22 November, 1967
L
Vens
2
NI
Very well. Please ensure that (a) the Memay sees 0/2 (6) in Wilkinson sees on animal(abul "See 4)
I
I writ that, even in the interests of specs, The C.0 had not sent a draft to the Cabinet Effice with and fist apeeing it with us. kinow that we shall have an opportunity to comment, but if a craft to which we have sting objecting has already been inculated to a number of Whittall defalmeck it will be
difficult to have it amended. The then putin of thinskay is after all in were which depends primarily
much more
with China
on om relations and I think that in the whole
we should have had if any had this is thing a greater share in the drafting than the C.'O. This is not simply a matter of jurisdiction. it is an F.O. responsibility to ensure that we fel the jinglet policy.
hom
24
am
23/4
May Wilson
23
pe
291
With the Compliments of the
Political Adviser
Hang rộng
PERSONAL
SECRET
(99)
November láth,' 1967.
FD1/31
I am so sorry not to have sent an earlier reply to your letter of Outober 19th (which owing to some vagary of the bag I did not get until the end of the month). I now enclose a copy of your paper with many apologies for not having sent it before. Unfortunately, I have as yet been unable, in the caelstrom of events connected with the frontier, to get it finally approved here. I am, however, sending a copy of it, with a copy of this letter to Arthur de la Mare.
2. Tung".
3.
I also enclose your copy of the "Thoughts of Mao Tse
You will have seen that the spate of curious events in the frontiur area contimed for a considerable time, and
I should be very surprised if more do not happen in the future, though just for the present wo have a lull, for obvious reasons. I am afraid that, given the pressures from both sides, the prospects of reaching any sensible settlement seem din.
K.M. Wilford, Esq., British Embassy, WASHINGTON.
do please
Mu Dungen for de
An
Sup as wi
100
SECRET
2014
(T.A.K. Elliott)
Mle
1744
No...
ghofred by Typed by-
This is the only fully corrected aby taking account f
Commento by
OAG.
FS
DES
SLO APA.
38/8.
Mo
+
41. Wilford.
2.
and
DRAFT
P
MASTER CO PY
In the annexed paper I soci
(a) to all the origins of the aorzisítion
by the British Crown of the various
parts of what is today the GroWM
Colony of Hong Kong;
(b) to assess the likely devolopmento oz
internat
ធម៌
the China scone in co far as tim,
affect Hong Kong;
(c) to outline the possible
--thos
which China and Eritain zu *
resolve their recpuctive pos.bions
over Hong Kong;
(d) to select which of the altorno.
at (c) above is most likely to your butt
Couns Sachin
a practicable in the long term.
I submit this paper for czivi.ás-
discussion. I believe that the procent permut
has had at least the virtue of convincing people
that the future of the Colony must be seriously
pigeon-horac рідеа
considered and not pushed tanker themes for faer
of effecting confidence. I do not believe the
future is wholly black and I think it is vital
that H.N.G.. in the U.K.,as woll as the HVX.
Government, should seriously consider the Loe
with a view to deciding which of the possible
solutions outlined ought to be acceptable to them,
on the assumption that something short of total
retro-cession to China of all the Colony Duiritory
is acceptable to whatever regins onergas in Okina
from the Cultural Revolution.
سمت
AREVA
SECRET
MWA
3
L
:
0001740 0.8. 174
DRAFT
Te No. Drafted by- Typed by-
+
Hone Fong, its past and future,
In 1841 following continued allegationsor 111 treatment of the British merchants at Canton
it was decided to mount a naval show of force ofI
the forts at the entrance to the post of Canton
on the Pearl River. This show of forcu hovlag
proved successful the Chinese Viconcy as Gantun agreed to ceãe to Britain in the same year wo
island on which Victoria now stands as a baɛe tru which British merchants might prosecuto their trado with China. The Emperor subsequently repudiabet this Viceroy's signature end it uas not able Dho Troaty of Manking was signed in 1342 at the -ù c2
e first Anglo-Chinese Lar that the cassida zas
we had of may lakon possession of the island. legally confirmed, The island, at the moment of ¡ cession, was virtually barren apart rem prvy-Ling
Though
barg
the home and livelihood wer a few fisherful..
2.
It is worth recalling that Fortumna lis already been in possession of the settlement of
Facao since 1557; H.. tas therefore only the second such cession to Rest European peters chich China had been obliged to incode. She had
however since the 17th century bean involved in the placation of Imperial Jussia's culto 1.
Kanchuria, where Russian end Chinesc ingerich
interests had first came into collision about
1651.
3.
In 1856 war broke out between Britain
and China for the second tine. Following the
advance of British forces from Tientsin to Pulling
العب
SECE
/0
+
+
0001740 4.F. 174
+
DRAFT
-2-
File No.
Drafted by- Typed by-
1
a further agreement was made, repudiated again
and subsequently ensirined in the Convention of
Poking of 1860 by which Chins coded, also in
perpetuity, the piece of the minimă opposite
Hong Kong island on which the British had, during
the second Angle-Chinese war, boom recustomed to
Erm
billet troops, which today we know as Kowloon.
The land which we acquired by this second cocsion
is limited by what is today known as Boundary
Stroot (in the middle of the built up area of Kowloon) and
Twe
aproximately 2 miles from the
Star Ferry, and boussou on the Leat approximately
by the present site of Had Tali alıyort. 70 the
came time as Kowloon was acquirJÁ 23 200
Stonecutters Island; no doubt at that t
little more than a quarrying site as ilu met -
* implied.
For the next 35 years the Crown Colony
of Hong Kong romained about 40 square miles in
extent. In 1995 however China suffered a further
shattering defeat at the hands of Japan and by
the Treaty of Shimonoseki had to make turritezial
concessions to the Japanese - particularly in
Korea - over which Ching had previously exercicod
a protectorate. Other imperial powers felt that
they could not be left out in the racc
concessions from the Chinesc; the hul
obtained concessions in Kanchuria, apart from
enormous gains at Chinese expense in what aro
SELEN
/tolay
3H |
I
0001740 0.7. 174
DRAFT
File No. Drafted by- Typed by-
Kat she
feeding rected ₤
space to answer
the foroper refence
of the Colony, decited
←
today the Far Eastern maritime provinco of the Soviet Union. The Germans sought and obtainod concessions in Shantung. The French, at the conclusion of the Franco/thinese war of 1235, had obtained a foothold in southern China. Britain, feeling harcelë obligod-not to ta-loft-buhanásán the-sereable for concessions, but n
wat my
MOPARSITY-G Caca-to
10 SOPA
تا
mêy in 1898 2/r the incorporation of the Hou
in toccosby it
Territories size passiemosinalitatii on a
99 years leace. Although the extent of the loase was fairly easily agroed, questicas of jizzodietien in the lensed area and the sethod of herdoves proved core difficult problems and in the and the area was, in April 1899, more or un itches ally
lescą takon ovos
the Chinese being in no
lien
to resist. By this Icase Britain acquirtù not only the New Territories as we know them today, but also the island Swithin what we call tho Square Boundary, that is, in particular, the island of lentao, but also many other islands.
5.
-
:
To the Chinese Government the Treaty of Nanking, the Convention of Feking and the agreement by which the New Territorics vore lɛased all caus within the heading of "unequal treaties" ca unoqual treaty being defined as a treaty imposed on vaina following military defcat, or, alternatively, a truaty imposed upon her at a moment of Stato to
Accordingly to their mind not cly is
weakness.
SP...
/tho
0001740
DRAFT
-4-
די
File No.
Drafted by-
Typad by--
That remment fre
but it is also own
to the stimulus to
production given by
the lease of the New Territories invalid
which
in any case is due to come to an end in 1997, but
the cessions are also invalid.
6.
of view
It is perhaps
-
from the British point
most logical to consider the future
situation of Hong Kong using the explay of the lease of the New Territories as a starting point. The New Territories provide that elcmcnt of space
without which the Island and Kowloon cannot breathe.
also
They/contain the international airport and the major part of Hong Kong's industrial production factories. Joday/H.X. is able to produce tex
201
ريد
407
of its vegetables, and a small proportion of ita
pigs, chickens and eggs,
(hip is largel, State
1-18/
becsuce of the improved methods of farming which have been developed in the New Territories,e to-s-ii-jv extent tug to the fantastic increase in the
Colony's population first because of the Japanese invasion of China in 1937 and more recently
following the establishment of the Feople's Rep- ublic of China across the border. Coupled with the
high birth rate this has led to an increase in the
population of the Colony from 1.6 million in 1941 when the Japanese invaded and captured the Colony to almost 4 million toway, though in the intervening period it had dropped sharply, there being only approximately 600,000 at the end of
the Japanese occupation. Kore important hotover
is the fact that the New Territories provide
the catchment areas for the Colony's main
SECRET
/reservoirs
DRAFT
-4A
File No.
Drafted by- Typed by-
reservoirs at Tai Lam Cheung (Castle Peak),
Jubilee reservoir at Tsuen Wan and at Shek Pik on
Lantac island. There are smaller reservoirs on
1
SECRET
+
.. island
0001740
UN. 174
DRAFT
-5-
File No.
Drafted by- Typed by-
444H
and cutting sependence
Ź
-com China
whom the East Rive supply had just bee arrvangend
H.K. island itself at' Pokfulam, Tad Tan Tak and
Aberdeen.
Added to the existing resorvoir capacity
new
of the New Territories will be the/Plover Cove scheme in 1968 which will practically treble storage capacity to a total of 47,000 million gallons. It is already coming into use, Bere
an arm of the sea has been dammed and is being gradually diluted so that it will eventually be a fresh water res.rvoir. By far the largest proportion, therefore, of Hong Kong's water supply
(while) is conserved in the New Territories,
(passed the pipe line) through the few ferrit Some taten sup.13
(through) (watas) from the East River in China/which is provided under an agreement signed by Hong Kong and the Kwangtung provincial authorities in 1964 at a cost of HK41.06 per 1,000 gallons. A possiþlo zeans
pasiple Comoply of the Colonyd
I
of adding to the fresh water/would be by the construction of desalinisation plants.
tw
A pilot
plant converting about 2 million gallons per day
was rejected by Government some
being far too costly and too small
;
'months ago; as
s cake
to affect the
issue, when daily consumption now varios between 60 and 130 million gallons depending upon whether severe rationing or a 24 hour supply is in force. The supply_from the Sast River had then just-boca arranged. It is for future consideration ho....JP whether a nuclear plant, coupled with electricity generation might help to solve Hong Kong's
Encha problems as these are developca, though to raise even more delicate problems in relatie..
China, if China remained hostile. Moreover, the
economic disposal of the electricity might be a problem.
SECRET
0001740
1121
DRAFT
1
-6-
I File No.
Drafted by- Typed by-
unless large scale,
crobly desalinizati
pants
intere erected
7.
From the preceding paragraph it is
apparent that Hong Kong, without the New
Territories, would find itself in a very difficult
economic position and in fact it is, to say the 10222,
arguable whether Hong Kong could survive as an
antity if deprived of the New Terr. tories which
represent 350 square miles out of a total area of
approximately 400 square miles. Certainly it would
not be the economic dynamo which it is today.
Moreover, it would be largely dependent upon China
for its vater supply
which, as precent
experience shows, could be an extremely vital form
of dependency.
18.
From the military point of view while it
is possible that the present frontics night in
certain circumstances be defensible if nuclear
weapons were used to discourage invasion.
+
could in no sense be termed defensible if it wore
advanced from Shun Chun and Shataukok to EBoundary
Street in the middle of a densely populated urban
area. For all these reasons I find it impossible
to accept the premise that Hong Kong is a viable
entity in the 20th century unless it has mi
breathing space provided by the New Territories.
I conclude from this that if we are deprived of the
New Territories there would be no case for
retaining the coded parts of the Colony. 19.
But what is the likelihood of Britain
retaining the New Territories after the expiry
of the lease in 1997 The answer to this appeara
SECRET
ON 2
+
174
DRAFT
-7-
+
I
File No. Drafted by- Typed by-
and
to be that the chances are extremely slim; moreover that they depend entirely upon the outcome of the Cultural Revolution in China. At one end of the scale it can be said with certainty that if Wao Tse-tung succeeds in his
fforts to create a China in permanent revolutionary ferment, there is no chance at all of the lease being extended or inieod of any other arrangement being negotiated which might leave the New Territories within British control. At the other end of the scale there is tho possibility that Kao's efforts will prove to be a İtotal failure and that his regine will give place to another Communist, but pragmatic or technocrat, regime in which the executive Loaders of present day China such as Chou In-lai, ži Hsien-nien, Chen Yi, Li Fu-chun, Hoich Fu-chih or their successors will predominate. In these circumstances it is conceivable that there Z be in power a regine, still Communist, but doäicated to the creation of a modern 20th century State whose first ambition will be to create a China "great, rich, strong and socialist" as Li Fu-chun put it in 1960. In such circumstances it is at least conceivable that the Chinese Goverment will attach more importance to the continucâ existence of a complex which provides 45% of
their foreign exchange earnings totalling today
U.S
more than/$600 million and by 1997 perhaps as much
SECRET
/as
0001240
GIF. 174
File No.
INI
Drafted by- Typed by-
A
dechring 2
DRAFT
-8-
0.5
as $1,000 million thɛn to the extirpation of the
last colonial foothold on the mainland of Asia.
In thos circumstances it is not beyond the bounds
Lock
of possibility that the Chinese Govermont of the
time will decide to some sort of a rang
vivendi with fi.1.0. which will enablo Britain to
retain sufficient land to administo a viable
(that they)
concern, or will simply let things drift.
conclude that it is very unlikely, but just
possible, that some tacit acceptance of the continued
ར་
med existence of H.X. in its present form
might be permitted by China. But this would
provide no basis for planning and such uncertainty
! thave love would be intolerable. We shoula bu obligen/to
force the Chinese to some sort of conclusion.
10.-
The Possibilities.
In the next section of this paper
consider what I believe to be the possible
compromises between extreme positions which might
attract both sides. In descending order of
attractiveness from the British point of view I list the following:
(a) Continuation of present luase of
New Territories on the present no
rent terms;
continuod acceptance
by the Chinese of cession of HM.
island and Kowloon,
(b) Continuation of present lcase
New Territories with Britain paying
an economie rent;
rent; contimed
SECRE
/ccceptanco
0001745" GLUE, 174
File No. Drafted by-
Typed by-
DRAFT
-9-
on it's presumi per frenance HAG
is unlikely to
11.
acceptance by Chinese of cession
of H.K. island and Kowloon.
(c) Continuation of present lease of Now Territories at an exorbitant
rent as a condition of which Chinese
continue to accept cession of E.X.
island and Kowloon.
(a) Continuation of present lease of
New Territories at an economia en
exorbitant rentwith Kowloon also
converted to a rented basis; H.K.
island remaining on a ceded basis. (e) Britain retrocedes H.K. daları
and Kowloon in return for lesses of
both territories as well as the Hew
Territorios at nominal, ceont-dateN
exorbitant renta.
(f) Britain retrocedes H.X. island and
Kowloon and gives up its lease of the New Territories. (This could happen
in 1997 when the New Territories*
lease expires or at some earlier stage.)
The problems which would be created by any
of the above solutions are legion. Who, for example, would pay any agreed rent?
Almost certainly H.K. Government would have to do so, though-H4.6. night help. The question how much R.K. would be prepared
to pay to survive in its present form is impossible
SHERRY
/to
0001740
G
File No.
Drafted by-
Typed by-
זיים
rend- based in
renomable
percentage of Imestic расслобода
exports might have
1
in both sid
I
DRAFT
-10-
to assess. It would almost certainly be necessary to lease unprofitable islanda corely in order to maintain the "square boundary". Nevertheless, if the Chinese Government show eny willingness to permit the Colony to survive these are bases on which a negotiation might be possible.
12.
In addition to this list of graduated variations of leases with varying rent scales and cessions, there is another grozy of
possibilities which might be described as "three China" solutions.
{Parca}
A F Chine solution
would be based on H.K. becoming an independent territory. There are countries which are fully independent, with little more superficial area, and nothing like the population or the econonde pátential of H.K. But it seems unthinkable that China - or for that matter Taiwan eculd abu- that Hong Kong, which both regard as part of China and its inhabitants as compatriots, should become an independent sovereign state or even an international zone housing the United NationS
as has recently been suggested. Rather than allow
such a new state to be created I believe that China would invade and occupy Hong Kong. For Taivan to do so would be a much more difficult task, but not impossible given real support among the masses of H.K. But I doubt I put it no higher that such support would be forthcoming, and I conclude that a third China
/solutica
·
DRAFT
-11-
No. Drafted by-
Typed by--
IN ...-` --.......
Ten paper.
1
x
alkiugh 4K is increasingly paying for
it's ovom commercial promotion the U.K
U.KI
By termed commercial rotations
solution does not nerit further consideration.
The issues facier Z.M.G.
I consider the following points would
Choice)
13.
affect H.H.G.'s
open to it:
exice of
of the various possibilities
(a) The .. at present gains only
marginal economic advantage from the
existence of Hong Kong in terms of
trade; ita total exports to the
Colony are of the order of £65
million; and comprise at present
about 10% of the Colony's imports
though a more vigorous policy by
British firas could increase this;
' against this it buys about £80 million
of goods from the Colony;
(b) politically H.X. 13 a continuing
#
"colonial commitment in a world widel
will probably soon seu an end of
colonies; this spoils the U.K.'s
image as a decolonising power;
(c) H.K.'s industrial expansion is a
positive danger to the U,K,'s own
production in the textile and in
certain industrial fields even though
these imports contribute to a Lower
cost of living in U.K.;
(a) the very dynamism of H.K.'s expansion
poses real commercial problems to the
U.K; witch must seek in some small
measure at least to help to promote Hong Kong's products even where these compete with the U.5.'s; A
dave, hovenant, work, kat Valked |Malustaja mamma mojouts;
0001710
ALF. 174
File No.
Drafted by- Typed by-
there may be run from (within certain limits) for
<- to dolları
a variety of pour proers, but they may not be transferred
goza, cam is -repeniest members Butte sterling area, hedge against starting Fevaluation; if Britai leak contest of H.K she might houve
to agree to Convertibility of HK's
balances
if
H-K's commy earionily ram down for any rearth HK's balances would be
run a row at a
copt
to Britain's balace of
DRAFT
-12-
(e) H.K. teen_open_crar"-ecumscent
in terms of sterl
sterling
Egg-balance of
pegnatan-ninee de hac a free exchange
market;hat it is a net Collar earner
for the sterling area;
(f) H.K. provides the U.E. with a source
of substantial invisible earnings;
there arise from insurance, banking,
aircraft routes and shipping; #shipping) (cachings moved
شيدي
Batter alone baye recently beca
estimated to be running at about
£7.4 million per annum;
I from
(g) H.K. Government and private investments
in sterling in U.K. amount to about
£350 million; which if withëramm und
reinvested elscmicre_could_cause
Britain-signisicent-difficulties;
(h) H.K. contains nearly four million
people of whom a substantial porcent-
age are conscious escapees from
Communian those future would, to say
the least, be compromised by
retrocession of the territory and whose
handing over to Communist rule would
cause an outery, since it is zoɛt
unlikely that safeguards for them
could be obtained;
payments.
SECRE
L
/(1)
P
0001740 +
174
DRAFT
-124-
File No.
Drafted by- Typed by-
sime
it is
metal
+
wwww likely
that H.K.
would Rotain
mosociated stated;
1
impossibility of
anvisaging
transfer of population from HK to Britain in moer that their future may be onfeguarded
of the
strangeor
(1) if the U.K. enters the European
Common Karket in the early 1970's
it would undoubtedly have the effect
of further limiting H.K.'s ties with
Britain
(J) despite the relative economie
unimportance to the U.X. of Hong
Kong under Britain's tutelage, F.K.
has achieved something of an economic
wiracle which starãs to the crcdit of
free enterprice and which H.X.G.
would not wish to see throw away to
the detriment of H.K.'s people, or
of the free world in its struggle
with totalitarianism;
(k) withåraval from H‚Ž., or at least
an undignified scuttle, would diminish
the U.K.'s cstige and possibly
affect seriously trade with other
nations in S.2. Asia and the Far
East;
(l) 125 years of British runde inis created
es citizens of Hong Kong who are witho Strictly Chiriace now British; to itäma Whether Caniness of race, non-
mixed race or naturalis Britain retains
for
•prasibility sovereignty
craking tatay accommodation with
Juinas.
Ꮩ .
SECRET
Chamina
торною
if the wave to abando
H.K.; the Virtual
/Alicough
4
.F. 174
-
DRAFT
-13-
ile No.
Drafted by- Typed by-
Also an interest free loan of
₤3 millim pranmer for
at there have
the airport, beer capital grants of over £500,000 for hingnew There is also ₤lmithin fore the Housing Com Argaming from cos as some the and of the
ktalled about Él me the in
amgame sim 1946.
wilt the
This compares very
отторска favourably, from HEUK. print of view, large grants and Trama to the repondent m Comment formidories cominated in 1967 to
Demont ₤250 milein
Although from the conomic, and possibly political,
point of view there does not seen to be exy selfish
reason: why II.E.G. should wish to retain control
of Hong Kong, there remain very compelling porch
reasons why H.H.G. should sook to achilove one of - (ક) the compromises set out in paragrapì. 10(a)
above.
| 14.
―
It would be unprofitable at this stage
to decide how much H.M.G. might be asked to
contribute towards enabling E.K. to retain the
status quo or indeed to assess how much China
would want in the way of rent to agree to the
conversion of cessions into leases and vh
they would consider a fair ront for the Kev
Territories. At present the annual cost to
Britse Gost
Hakim kisiä, might be assessed at £12 million.
includes
This idea the (part) cost of maintaining
(about₤s)
a garrison (H.K. pays Emillion per Joer), Witte
contributions
K
Lägrenka and the cost of
{
A
maintaining representation here. There havo
seldom in H.K.'s life been direct budgetary
support grants If a satisfactory negotiation
with China should take place one would hope that
only a police force would thereaftor be needed,
plus a small armod gendarmerie to patrol the
border and to reinforce the police where
necessary. This would fall to be paid by the
But given the moral proli
H.K. Government.
H.K.G. might be willing for a satisfactory bu
/term
E
+
P
0001740
6.7. 194
DRAFT
-14
• No.
Drafted by:
Typed by-
J
ith Matting
probiome, for an maple,
L
has been willing to
provide jour quarters financial moistenca
+
H.S.
1
HMG
mjoyed.
т
term solution to pay to the H.K. Government as a
contribution towards rent to China plus military
support costs a somewhat larger sun than she pays
today, but pehaps on a tapering off basis.
15.
But the possibility of such a solution
depends entirely upon the willingness of the
Government of China to negotiato. Unless therefore
a new situation arises in China in which the
Government of that country expresses a desire to
negotiate, or H.M.G. have some inducement to cater
to China which today I am unable to sue, thon
Britain will have to make up its mind that the
conclusion of the lease of the New Territories
means the end of Hong Kong as a Grown Colony
and that steps must be taken to divest herself
of the ceded territories also. An important
facet of any such scheme must be that China wil
have to obtain official representation in the
Colony.
ד
This was a demand or which much was heard
in the past, but China seems to have decided that
it was illogical to be pressing on the one hand
for consular representation while on the other
stressing that H.K. remained part of China.
Nevertheless if there is to be any possibility of
a non-chaotic handover of responsibility to China
it is essential that there should be an official
representative in H.K. to whom the Byiti sh
authorities can speak. In that case the following
possibilities seem to present themsolves:-
E
SECRET
/(a)
+
0001743
4.F. 174
DRAFT
-15-
File No...... Drafted by- Typed by-
16.
J
27
(a) Britain should invite China to agree
to a condominium of 1.5. for limited period either immediately
preceding 1997 or carlier at the conclusion of which sovereignty
should revert to China.
(b) Britain should invite China to
participate in the governing of H.3.,
but under a ncutral Governor from an agreed third party state. Again
at the conclusion of such a period
sovereignty should pass to Chinu.
(c) Provided that China (Peking) had by
that time acquired her seat in the U.N., the U.N. should be invited to take on the responsibility for providing the neutral Governor suggested in (b) above.
(a) Subject to the same proviso; the U.N. should be invited to accept
full responsibility for H.K, either for a limited period after which Ching would resume sovereignty ca for an indefinite period with no indication as to the future of the
territory except that the inhabitants
should be free to decide it for
themselves.
An essential feature of all the schemes
listed in the preceding paragraphs would be that
/decisions
STO
0001740
174
DRAFT
-16-
г
Te No.
Drafted by-
| Typed by-
All
Z Ordim rides
سات
25 yours
but fuit
اوانه حماية مساه
に
+
ivery to fromclusi
beyond him we of
hi N.T. base alt,
العاشر اسلامي
it in pusponat tä
ن اساسه
for 20 years only.
decisions should be made sufficiently far in
advance of the critical date of 1997 for the
economy of the Colony not to have run down
disastrously. It will, for example, be necessary
very soon to take important decisions in relation
to franchises such as for telephones. The
H.K. Telephone Company's franchise runs out in
It seems unrealistic to consider an
extension for more than 20 years at the outside,
S
1975.
is
but the Company may not be willing to accept
the proining in 1995 will be imjonasian Aike this without firm guarantees from Government which
frutes/by the clear, the latter can hardly give. But equally.
ang panas rakk
Government could not possibly afford to buy out the Telephone Company. This situation obtains in
respect of other public utilities too and there
will also be the problem of ordinary am...
which are of many kinds, some in the ceded
territory being for 999 years. Unless therefore
decisions are made at a relatively carly date,
+
possibly the mid-1970s, confidence in the future
of the Colony may have ebbed to such an extent
that H.K.G. would not really be faced with a
choice between a series of possibilities, but
only with a decision that to get out without
delay in an undignified scuffle was the only
possible solution likely to commend itself to
Parliament. With this in mind if the internal
situation in China should resolve itself at
any moment in the next ten years in favour of a
government of pragmatists, to whom the maintenance
+
SEC
/02
6061740
F. 174
DRAFT
-17-
le No.
Drafted by-
Typed by-
i
of Hong Kong as a viable entity was a matter of real interest, the quicker an approach is made to them the better. In such circumstances every
effort should be made to obtain a solution which
if it must be limited in time should at least in
theory last for another 99 years.
17.
Assuming however that there a pears po
be no likelihood of any Chinese Government in power coming to an accommodation with H.E.G., but at the same time they seem willing to permit the precent arrangement to run on till the end of the ow
Territories lease, it would be essential no later than 1980 and possibly in the mid-1970s to bugia making plans for the transfer of sovereignty over H.K. to China in which case any of the possibilities listed at paragraph 15(a) to (a) could be tried out to ensure an ordered tranfes
of responsibility which must be H.W.G.'s vital
concern.
Conclusion.
18.
1
From the above study it is apparent that there are a variety of possible courses of action open to H.M.G. and the H.K. Government, some ot least of which give the possibility of the
continued existence of H.K. in the state in
which we know it today. Whether or not such a solution is feasible depends almost entirely on the Chinese Government, and the shape of
depends upon the outcome of the Cultu...
Revolution.
The equation thus has too many
+
ז
SEC
/unknowns
I
I
4.F. 174
DRAFT
-18-
File No..
cited by Typed by-
unknowns for a solution to be attempted today. What is required is that the options should be set out. Then in the light of developments in China it should be currently assessed which of the apparent options is obtainable. When devoloraents seem favourable, then there must be no hesitation in seeking a solution with despatch. Second chances may never récur.
19.
The most important feature of the prescat time is that the problem of H.K. is coming fully under discussion for perhaps the first time. Until now there has been an unwillingness to discuss the options for fear of wrecking Colony confidence. The Chinese themselves have made
that confidence a tender plant; now is the time
+
fully to assess the opiions and go all cut for
and when
a solution as the opportunity offers.
SECT
Ed (4206)
Reference
FDI 3 95 FD1/3
See Annex.
(96)
97
98
See
32 /1/
Colis 32
SECRET
F/S SECRET
AUE (POL) 6197
ATT.
R IVED IN
VAS No.31
RE
-.0V 1967
FD113
12th September, 1967
HONG KONG
You may recall that following the receipt of GERCOS 98 from the Co-mander in Chiof Far Mast of th July about paychological opera- tions and co-ordination of propaganda activity generally in Hong Kong there was some discussion between Departments about what should be done. A Working Group was cet up but I think the only meeting it held was one on 17th July.
2. So far as the military side is concerned the Staff Officer leaves on 18th September. It would be very helpful if you could let us know what is happening on the civil side, and what arrangements are being made in Hong Kong, not least because we shall have to talk to the Commander in Chief Far East about it when he returns home in the near future.
3.
I have sent a copy of this to Richard Sykes in the Foreign Office.
M. Bollano - Did
Joe
from your Dex's go to the (8. COOPER)
Working Groux ? /bidir!
9. P. Hall, Esq Commonwealth Office
SECRET
of Denm
Them was the
you allücht
mely
RAJ Ibelin. Fremmell
تسليك
14.1X we can leave a
`ryly fall.
Ed (4206)
MMBULL, AND
44
Reference
FD1/3. (W.94 D1/3
-
Comparative Covering Secret
Етор
Hong Kong Working Emrp
Mr. Compu's letter of 12 September
I attended the meeting, so did
Mr. Gammaria. I agree Mar Mr. Hall
сти
Ел Н.А.
be left to repin.
dom Denson
thanks.
day tha
27 IK
Ed (4206)
FD1/3
Reference..
9.3
SEE ANNEX
E4 (4206)
FD 1/3.
Reference...
192
SEE ANNEX
RECEIV ARCHIV
RESTRICTED
1900F
But
Mr. R.A Sykes Gy
FDIB
(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MLJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
OPDO(DR.)(67) 39th Neeting
COPY NO.
CABINET
DEFENCE AND OVERSE. POLICY (OFFICIAL COMMITTEE)
DEFENCE REVIEW WORKING PARTY
MEETING to be held in Conference Room 'B',
Cabinet Office, Whitehall, S.7.1., on MONDAY, 11th SEPTEMBER 1967 at 10.30 8.4.
AGENDUM:
HONG KONG CONTINGENCY PLANNING
Previous Reference: ÚPDO(DR)(67) 35th Meeting Minutes, Iten 1)
Memorandum by the Treasury
(OPDO(DR)(67) 54 - already circulated)
Memorandum by the Commonwealth office
(OPDO(DR)(67) 56 to be circulated)
Cabinet Office, S.V.1.
(Signed) N.C.C. TRENCH
J.R. STEPHENS
7th September 1966
Hr. E. Healen. Bank of England, is invited to attend
De
Ed (4206)
FD1/3
Reference..
Szz
ANNEX.
CONFIDENTIAL
کے
RA
Syk 39
89
(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER FRILANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
19 OCT 1967
FD1|3.
1
COPY NO.
CABINET
DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY (OFFICIAL) COMMITTEE
DEFENCE REVIEW WORKING PARTY
CORRIGENDY., TO
(c) 165/5(67) 2nd MEETING MINUTES
Page 1, paragraph 2, line 10
Delete:
"Shanghai/Hong Kong Bank."
Substitute: "Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank.
Page 3
Delete: Conclusion■ ?
Substitute:
"The Working Party took note that the Chairman would arrange for a report to be drafted on the Hines indicated in his summing up.
Cabinet Office, S.1.1.
18th July 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
12
IM
Ed (4206)
FR1/3
Reference..
...
Szz ANNEX
ᆴ
88
L
Ed (4206)
FD1|3
Reference.....
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SEE ANNEX.
LIIILI
Ed (4206)
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Reference.
186
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EA (4206)
FR: 3.
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Reference....
85
SEE ANNEX
Flags A & B
Flag C
kur. de la
de Anre
CONFIDENTIAL Covering SECRET
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.3!
1967
¡ARC)
1
F
To be returned within 11 days to Room 124, K.G. St.
MAY BE DESTI OLED AFTER THAT 1745
NOT TO BE DESTROYED
BEFORE CONSULTATION V.ITH DEPARTMENT.
French Recerta on Events in China
F013/8/8
524/3/13
The two attached telegrams from Paris (Nos. 916 and 917)
give a very interesting account of French views on what is
happening in China. They are of particular interest since the
French now have access to information, such as Red Guard posters
and newspapers, which is denied to us. It remains true,
however, that all information from Red Guard sources must be
treated with a certain amount of caution.
2. The French views expressed in these telegrams are very
much in line with our own thinking. It seems clear that Chou
En-lai continues to play an important and, to some extent..
moderating role.
Chou has recently called for a
moderation of communist tactics in the Colony. There is no
reason to believe that Chou En-lai is particularly well dis-
posed towarda Britain or Hong Kong but it does seem likely that
he, and others whose main concern is with the administration
and economy of China, realise that the present extremist policies
can only harm China and therefore try whenever possible to
moderate their effects. If this is so, we must I suggest be
particularly careful in our own policy, both in Hong Kong and
towards China herself, to act so as to encourage such moderating
influences as exist and to provide the minimum amount of
. THIS IS A COPY
/opportunities
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RÉTAINED
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
COME TO ANTICA DEINE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1988
1
+
CONFIDENTIAL Covering SECRET
- 2 -
opportunities for the extremists to take the lead.
3.
Since we ourselves now receive very little information
from Peking about internal events in China, we might, in
thanking our Embassy in Paris for their telegrams, ask them
to make the best possible use of their contacts with the
French to obtain more. We should also repeat these two
telegrams to Hong Kong, Singapore and Washington, but tell
them to protect the source.
Draft telegram submitted.
Bolles
SIL
Bolland)
1
15 September, 1967
Tel to issue. Telegram
M. Rodger. Musialg
We spoke
Felyran despatiful.
Corr
sproke this afternoon.
THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1998
My inclinating
would ch amily be i believe his statiment
cham
That Chon in lai reads l'ime noti
"
as a politi
no weaknes in the Birtish
la silmed
ultimatum in plzing, paition" The einfaces, we wen you that the note may be having an effect and that it would be com initiation has raised
vanced
L
wrong
to anume that
است
a.f.de in man
Р
COM: STUENTIAL
CONTUENTIAL Covering UBCHET
15.9.
Ed (1426)
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83
FD1/3
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Reference.
82
KAKA SA PHI--------------T.CHELLEL FILILIJK.
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SEE ANNEY
!
FA1/3
SEE ANNEX
Reference...
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I
心噹
Ed (1426)
!
:
!
I
RESTRICTED
Minister of State (Mr. Fred Mulley) Not to be entered
(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE FROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
80
K(67) 2nd Meeting
1.
2.
CABINET
MINISTERII COMITTNE ON HONG KONG
13
COPY NO.
MEETING to be held in Conference Room 'A' Cabinet Office, Whitehall, S..1, on FRIDAY, 22nd SEPTEMBER 1967 at 10.30 a. 11.
REVISED AGENDA:
RECEJ IN
0.31 ARCHIV
26 SEP 1967
FD1/3
ASSISTANCE TU HONG KONG
Menorandum by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs
(K(67) 3 to be circulated)
-
CONTINGENCY PLANNING
Previous Reference: K(67) 1st Meeting Minutes)
Note by the Secretaries
(K(67) 5 - to be circulated)
(Signed) HL. LAMÄENCE-"ILSO,
R. L. L. FACER
Cabinet Office, S.4.1.
21st September 1967
ра
RESTRICTED
see
$1
3d (1626)
;
Reference.....
2%
ad W 29
FD1/3
SEE ANNEX
Bd (1635)
Reference.
FOL/3
SEE ANNEX
78
17
Permanent Under-Secretar✦
jAR
·IVEDOWN. VES NO 31
1 S SEP 1967
FD13 (60
Please refer to your minute of 31 July
(Flag A). I raised the matter with the
Commonwealth Office, whose responsibility
technically it would seem to be.
Following
GI
62
ра
this, Sir Saville Garner wrote to Sir Denis
Allen on 18 August (Flag B). Sir Denis Allen's
letter of 30 August to Sir Saville Garner
(Flag C) sets out a suggested form of words
to deal with press enquiries should there be
a leak.
Drgreentuell
(Denis Greenhill) 12 September, 1967
Markgon
риск
F.E. Rez
し
RESTRICTED
6
(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S ÇAVERDEENT)
OPDC(18)(67) 39th Meeting
IVED IN
A
CHOYES No. 30
115EP1967
EDIT
CABINET
COPY NO.
13
DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY (OFFICIAL COMMITTEE)
DEFENCE REVIEW YORKING PARTY
MEETING to be held in Conference Room B',
Cabinet Office, Whitehall, S.ï.l., on HONDAY, 11th SEPTEMBER 1967 at 10.30 a.".
AGENDUM:
HONG KONG CONTINGNICY PLANING
Previous Reference: OPDO(DR)(67) 35th Keeting Minutos, Iten 1)
Kemorandum by the Treasury
(OPDO(DR)(67) 54
-
already circulated)
Hemorandum by the Commonwealth Office
(CPDO(DR)(67) 56 to be circulated)
Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
7th September 1966
(Signed) N.C.C. TRENCH
J.R. STEPHENS
Hr. E. Haslan, Bank of England, is invited to attend
pake
RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED
75
HIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANIC KAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)
UPDO(DR)(67) 37th Meeting
CABINGT
64
COPY NO.
EIVED IN ARCHAHIYES. NB! 1 1 SESER6967
DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY (OFFICIAL) COMMITTEE
DEFENCE REVIEW WORKING PARTY
1
MEETING to be held in Conference Room 'B', Cabinet Office, Whitehall, S..1 on FRIDAY, 8th SEPTEMBER 1967 at 10.30. a.m.
SECOND REVISED AGENDUM:*
NUCLEAR POLICY
Consideration of Preliminary Draft Paper
(Signed) N.C.C. TRENCH
J.R. STEPHENS
Х
Cabinet Office, S.7.1.
7th September 1967
Please note this replaces the Agenda on Hong Kong which is
now being taken on Monday, 11th September at 10.30 a.m.
RESTRICTED
·
:X
Ed (1626)
Reference
74
Sce Anneye.
SECRET
73 Entr
THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROFERRECHER ARIENNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNÁ
ARCHIVES NG: B1
1 1 SEPIDE
OPDO(DR)(67) 36th ¡beting
韭
COPY NO. 11
CABINET
DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY (OFFICIAL) COLLIRTEE
DEFENCE REVIEW WORKING PARTY
KINUTES of a Neoting of the Working Party held in Conference Room 'B', Cabinet Office, S.W.1, 14 on WEDNESDAY, 5th SEPTEMBER 1967 at 2.30 p.m.
¡ir. R.A. Sykes,
Foreign Office
PRESENT:
Ifr. P. Rogers,
Cabinet Office (In the Chair)
Group Captain W. Kent Ministry of Defence
Ir. E., Rose,
Cabinet Office
Ir. P. cholls,
Treasury
Kr. 7.S. Carter
THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO FRESENT:
Commonwealth Office
Mr. E. Bolland,
Foreign Office
ir. P. Cooper,
4
Ministry of Defence
SECRETARY:
ifr. N.C.C. Tronch
SUBJECT
HONG KONG
SECRET
FOG KUNG
SECRET
SECRET
THE CHAIRMAN said that he had called the meeting to enable him to convey to members of the Working Party the general sense of the discussion on our relations with China on 5th September in the Defence and Oversea Folicy Committee. Hinisters recognised the conflicting factors which must govern policy vis-a-vis China and Hong Kong on the one hand, the need not to prejudice the position of the office of the British Charge d'Affaires in Peking, and on the other, the necessity for showing firmness and maintaining control in Hong Kong. To do this, the situation needed to be kept under constant and careful review. Everything necessary must be done to hold the situation in Hong Kong, but possible repercussions on our staff in Peking and their dependants must be borne in mind. This feeling amongst Ministers did not mean that every decision need be put up to the Committee. On the contrary, it should normally be possible to settle most problems bilaterally between the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Office, after consultation with the Ministry of Defense as appropriate, and subject to referance to the Ministers in charge of those Departments on all issues of particular
political delicacy.
In discussion, it emerged that there was no conflict between the Departments concerned about the desirability of preserving a balance, so far as possible, between the two factors involved. So far as procedure was concerned, it seemed inevitable that Ministers would shortly have to be consulted again, both about action against the Press in Hong Kong and about the possible need to prescribe the death penalty for carrying bombs.
As regards reinforcing the garrison of Hong Kong for the Chinese New Year, the Committee were informed that the Ministers had not taken a decision at their meeting on whether reinforcements were to be sent before trouble started, or only in the event of trouble arising, but had instruoted that this be further considered as a matter of urgency. The present position was that one extra battalion was already in Hong Kong and that the Commandor- in-Chief, Far East, wished it to stay there until after 10th October. He had been asked whether he wanted further reinforcements and his reply was
awaited. The view was expressed that there might be political advantage in having an extra unit in the Colony before the period when trouble vas
-1-
SECRET
SECRET
likely to arise both in order to demonstrate our determination to act firmly and so that there would be no delay in bringing in reinforcements if trouble arose, thus permitting their further exacerbation. One possible solution,
if any units in Hong Kong were due for relief, might be to bring the ralioving unit into Hong Kong before the out-going one loft.so that both were present over the period of Chinese celebrations in October.
Summing up the discussion, THE CHALUMAN recalled that Hinisters had boon inclined to feel that prevention was botter than oure. The Ministry of Defence should consult the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Office when the Commander-in-Chief's reply had been received and should keep tho
Treasury informed of developments.
The Working Party
Invited the Ministry of Defence to concert with the Common::ealth Office and Foreign Office action on the possible reinforcement of the Hong Kong garrison, and to keep the Treasury informed.
Cabinet Office, 8.7.1.
7th September 1967
-2-
SECRET
RESTRICTED
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RECEIVEDIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)
HIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HERECEIVEDJS
ARCHIVES KO
13
COPY NO.
OPn(DR )
OPD DR)(67) 36th Meeting
DDR) (6
1/1/SE#A9487
GABI OD 1) 1/3
ENT
DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY (OFFICIAL) COMMITTEE
DEFENCE REVIEW WORKING PARTY
MEETING to be held in Conference Room 'B', Cabinet Office, Whitehall, S.W.1., on WEDNESDAY, 6th SEPTEMBER 1967 at 2.30 p.m.
HONG KONG
AGENDUM:
(i) Measures to be taken in Hong Kong
To be raised orally
рако
(ii) Possible Reinforcements for the Chinese New Year
To be raised orally
(Signed) N.C.C. TRENCH
J.R. STEPHENS
Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
5th September 1967
*Please note this Meeting is in addition to those already arranged for Friday, 8th September 1967 which now become the 37th and 38th Meetings.
RESTRICTED
BJ (1626)
Reference.....
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FD1/3
SEE ANNEXE.
Ed (6
Reference....
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RESTRICTED
69
RECEIVEDIAN
(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTAR CHINES BRIAN NIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)
111 SEPIA6/
PDO(DR)(67) 36th Meeting
ED1/3.
COPY NO.13
CABINET
DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY (OFFICIAL) COMMITTEE
DEFENCE REVIEW WORKING PARTY
MEETING to be held in Conference Room 'B', Cabinet Office, Whitehall, S.7.1., on FRIDAY, 8th SEPTEMBER 1967 at 10.30 a.n.
REVISED AGENDUM
HONG KONG CONTINGENCY PLANNING
(Previous Reference: OPDO (DR)(67) 35th Meeting Minutes, Item: 1)
Memorandum by the Treasury
(OPDO(DR)(67) 54 - already circulated)
Memorandun by the Commonwealth Office
(OPDO(DR)(67) 56 - to be circulated)
Cabinet Office, S.F.1.
(Signed) J.R. STEPHENS
4th September 1967
Hr. E. Haslan, Bank of England, is invited to attend.
RESTRICTED
(97795,
RESTRICTED
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES Në, 31] 11 SEP 1967
68
(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)
EDIB
OFDO(DR)(67) 36th Keeting
13
COPY NO.
CABINET
DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY (OFFICIAL) COMMITTEE
DEFENCE REVIEY WORKING PARTY
MEETING to be held in Conference Room 'B', Cabinet Office, Whitehall, S.W.l., on FRIDAY, 8th SEPTEMBER 1967 at 10.30 a.m.
AGENDUM :
HONG KONG CONTINGENCY PLANNING
(Previous Reference: OPDO (DR)(67) 35th Mooting Minutes, Item 1)
Memorandum by the Treasury
(OPDO (DR) (67) 54 already circulated) (OPDO(DR)(67)
Kenorandum by the Commonwealth Office
(OPDO (DR) (67) 56 to be circulated)
-
(Signed) R.L.L. FACER
J.R. STEPHENS
Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
1st September 1967
RESTRICTED
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SECRET
64)
(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)
RACEIVED IN
ARCHIVES BID (B)(67) 35th Moeti
11SEPH
pe Rihlater no. 13
NO.
CABINET
53A#
**N SZAIHOA
NI OBARORS
DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY (OFFICIAL) COMMITTEE
DEFENCE REVIEW WORKING PARTY
MROTING to be held in Conference Roon 'B', Cabinet Office, Whitehall, S.W.1.,
on TUESDY. 22nd AUGUST 1967 at 10.30 a.z.
REVISED AGENDA:
1.
HONG KONG:
DMMEDIATE STUDY
(Previous Reference:
C165/5(67) 3rd Meeting Minutes)
To be raised orally
2.
HONG KONG: LONG-TERM STUDY
(Previous Reference:
0165/5(67) 3rd Meeting Minutes)
Note by the Commonwealth Office
(OFDO(DR)(67) 52 to be aroulated)
-
OPDO(IR)(67) 51 is relevant?
3.
HONG KONG: SIZE OF GARRISON
To be raised orally by the Ministry of Defence
(Signed) R.L.L. FACER
M.J. MORIARTY
Cabinet Office, S.M.1.
17th August 1967
The Board of Trude are invited to be represented
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CONFIDENTIAL
P·w (49)
(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER FRITANNIC HAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
-3 AUG 1967
14
COPY NO.
FD1/3
CABINET
DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY (OFFICIAL) COMITTEE
DEFENCE REVIEW WORKING PARTY
CORRIGENTA, TO
(c) 165/5(67) 2nd MEETING MINUTES
Page 1., paragraph 2, line 10
Delete:
"Shanghai/Hong Kong Bank."
Substitute: "Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank,"
Page 3
Delete: Conclusions
Substitute:
"The Working Party took note that the Chairman would arrange for a report to be drafted on the lines indicated in his suruding up.
Cabinet Office, S.V.1.
18th July 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
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Ent(44)
Mr. de lal Køre 21/1
Es 247.
Mr. Bollend
I RECEIVED 13 ARCHIVES NË, 3!
2 JUL 1967
FD1/3
At a meeting of the Defence Review Working Party this
morning, Mr. Cooper of the Ministry of Defence told those of
us who were concerned with Hong Kong that Mr. Stoddart
of the United States Embassy had asked to see him urgently
about Hong Kong, and in response Mr. Cooper had seen him at
9.30 this morning.
2. Mr. Stoddart said that the State Department were very
worried about Hong Kong. He did not give any specific
reasons, even when asked, for the State Department's agitation,
but asked Mr. Cooper how he saw the position.
giving
Mr. Cooper
gave a fairly guarded description of the situation as we saw
it, broadly along the lines of the paper which is being prepared by the Working Party, in particular, our view that at the present time any negotiation with the Chinese was out
of the question; that we were playing this in a fairly low
key and considered that we had the internal security situation
reasonably under control; but that if the Chinese really
decided to push us out, then Hong Kong was militarily
indefensible.
3.
Mr. Stoddart said that the description which
Mr. Cooper had given him was much the same as the reports they had been receiving in the Embassy, both from the State
He added that the Russians Department and Hong Kong. had recently told him that no kind of meaningful negotiation
with the Chinese was possible at the present time.
SECRET
/Mr. Cooper
SECRET
- 2-
(Mr. Cooper did not elaborate on this, nor, apparently,
did Mr. Stoddart).
information.
He was grateful for Mr. Cooper's
ls. It was agreed that the members of the Working Party
who were present would report this to their respective
Departments. It was suggested that should we wish to
consult the Americans, i.a. over the possibility of their
sending vessels to Hong Kong (one of the possibilities
mooted in the Working Party paper) Mr. Stoddart's approach
would give us a convenient lead in. The security diffi-
culties about extending the scope of any planning would
still seem to remain valid.
3 р.а.
SECRET
RA Syke
(R.A. Sykes) 21 July, 1967
25/7
RESTRICTED
43
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COPY NO. 12
12
CABINET
MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON HONG KONG
CORRIGENDUM
TO
K(67) 2
42
Page 3, Paragraph 9
Delete:
Substitute:
Third sentence
"For the time being we are also retaining for use
in Hong Kong two minesweepers which it was originally
intended to withdraw."
Cabinet Office, S.W.1.,
21st July 1967
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 31
27 JUL 1967
FD1/3
1977779)])]
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CONFIDENTIAL
38
(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)
c 165/5(67) 3rd Meeting
CABINET
14
COPY NO.
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 31
† 27 JUL 1967
Fe 1/3
DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY (OFFICIAL) COMMITTEE
DEFENCE REVIEW WORKING PARTY
MEETING to be held in Conference Room 'A', Cabinet Office, Whitehall, S.W.1, on THURSDAY, 20th JULY 1967 at 4.00 p.m.
AGENDUM:
32
HONG KONG
(Previous Reference: C 165/5(67) 2nd Meeting Minutes)
Note by the Secretaries
(C 165/5(67) 2 to be circulated)
-
39
(Signed) R.L.L. FACER
M.J. MORIARTY
Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
19th July 1967
The following are invited to attend or to be represented:
Mr. E. Bolland, Foreign Office
Mr. W.S. Carter, Commonwealth Office Mr. M.S. Morris, Board of Trade
CONFIDENTIAL
84 (1625)
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Reference..
37
FL1/3
SEE ANNEX
必
M
2
Mr. Bolland
SECRET
Hong Kong
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 31 27 JUL 1967
FD1/3
The Foreign Secretary held a meeting this morning to discuss the situation in Hong Kong. Those present included the Commonwealth
Secretary, Mrs. Hart and Sir Arthur Galsworthy; Mr. W. Rodgers, Sir Paul Gore-Booth,
Sir D. Greenhill, Mr. de la Mare and yourself; Sir D. White and other officials.
36
The
2. The Foreign Secretary opened the meeting by asking what was the aim of the Chinese in Hong Kong. Was Peking directing the disturbances? Was Peking even involved? The Commonwealth Secretary said that the local communists were directly responsible for the disturbances in Hong Kong and the recent frontier incident. It seemed likely that while Peking was giving full moral support to the Hong Kong communists they regarded them as conducting an operation of their own. The Commonwealth Secretary went on to analyse in detail the organisation of the communists in Hong Kong. The tougher measures now being taken by the Hong Kong authorities had raised the morale of the people in the Colony and seriously weakened that of the comunists. water situation was worrying but contingency plans were being made and, even if Chină did not turn on the taps on 1 October, we could manage until next year when the Plover Cove scheme would be in operation. Sir Dick White agreed generally with the Commonwealth Secretary. thought that Peking was encouraging the long-term build-up of a mass revolutionary movement in Hong Kon. They were not preparing for direct intervention. But in certain circumstances they might be prepared to intervene. Peking's ultimate aim was to create a Macao-type situation
Mrs. Hart pointed out that if in they could not control events in Hong Kong, the Peking Government might get out on a limb. One of the dangers was that the present disturbances
ক
A Enti.
SECRET
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He
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SECRET
in Hong Kong might produce consequences which no-one could predict.
3. In subsequent discussion it was pointed out that the situation in China was very fluid and it could not be ruled out that it might develop in a way favourable to our position in Hong Kong. If we held on we might eventually be able to negotiate our withdrawal. For example, if the influence of the central government were weakened the authorities in Kwantung might adopt more reasonable policies towards Hong Kong.
4. The Foreign Secretary then said that he understood that if we left Hong Kong the Chinese would lose £200 million in foreign exchange. He asked what we would lose.
Mrs. Hart replied that there would probably not be much difference between our gains and our losses. There was not a great deal of British investment in Hong Kong. But British banks had a big stake and Hong Kong provided facilities for intelligence activities. Sir Arthur Galsworthy pointed out that Hong Kong more or less paid for itself. The only charge on H.M.G. was the cost of our troops and Hong Kong was now contributing £5 million a year to this. He went on to say, however, that if Hong Kong's economy turned down the cost to us could be very severe. If foreigh demand for Hong Kong's exports fell there would be unemployment and the cost to the British Exchequer in relief would be formidable.
5. Sir Paul Gore-Booth said an important factor in the situation was the degree to which Peking could allow the local communists in Hong Kong to suffer a defeat. Peking might eventually decide to accept the loss of face involved in accepting a setback in Hong Kong and lay off for a year or two. Sir D. Greenhill said that on the other hand the Chinese Communist Party might need a success in 1967 as a counter to the play the Russians would make with the 50th anniversary of the Revolution. The kind of success they
/needed
SECRET
SECRET
needed might be creating a Macao-type situation in Hong Kong.
6. Mrs. Hart said that two points should be borne in mind. First, it would be foolish for us to base our plans for Hong Kong on optimistic assumptions. Secondly, we should recognise that as a result of disturbances over the past few months confidence in Hong Kong's economy was already declining. Unless the growth rate was maintained at about 8 per cent per annum the economy would decline and we should be faced with unemployment. Once this began the situation would deteriorate.
7. The Foreign Secretary said it seemed likely that October would be the danger point this year.
8. Mr. Bolland said that the Hong Kong Working Party had reached the provisional conclusion that if we had to decide between accepting a Macao-type situation and withdrawal we should choose the latter. Sir Arthur Galsworthy said that if it bacame known that we intended to withdraw the morale of the police would collapse. This ruled out withdrawal from Hong Kong over a long period. Hong Kong's relations with Peking had been at their best when there had been a strong Cuinese Government. The time to start to extricate ourselves would be when our relations with Peking improved.
9. The Foreign Secretary summed up by saying that it should be our aim to look for developments in China which would provide a convenient moment to withdraw from Hong Kong in good order. In present circumstances, however, we could not plan actively to do anything except to hang on.
c.c. P.S. to Commonwealth Secretary
==
H
Mrs. Hart
Mr. Rodgers P.U.S. (F.0.)
Sir A. Galsworthy Sir D. Greenhill (2) Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Carter (0.0.) Planning Staff
The
(D. J. D. Maitland) Private Secretary
19 July, 1967
SECRET
BA. (3746)
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Registry FD13
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Top Secret.
Secret.
SECRET
DRAFT
minute
Type 1 +
To:-
+
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Mr. Bolland
- Confidential.
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PRIVACY MARKING
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Mr. Maitland
Telephone No. & Ext.
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The local communistī
were directly responsible ffor the disturbances
in Hung Kany and the
Frontier incident,
7. M' de la Mars.
8. Mr Caster C.o.
Hong Kong
The Foreign Secretary held a
meeting this morning to discuss the
situation in Hong Kong. Those present
included the Commonwealth Secretary,
Mrs. Hart and Sir Arthur Galsworthy;
Mr. W. Rodgers, Sir Paul Gore-Booth,
Sir D. Greenhill, Mr. de la Mare
Sir D. White and other
and yourself;
officials.
2.
The Foreign Secretary opened the
meeting by asking what was the aim
of the Chinese in Hong Kong. Was
Peking directing the disturbances?
Was Peking even involved? The
Commonwealth Secretary said that. that
Here was no evidence that Peking wae directly involved and It seemed
likely that while Peking was giving
full moral support to the Hong Kong
/communists
SECRET
36
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
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being taken by
SECRET
2 -
communists they regarded them as
conducting an operation of their
own. The Commonwealth Secretary
went on to analyse in detail the
organisation of the communists
The Hang Kany austinston in Hong Kong. Sir Dick White
had raised to morale
of the people in the
Colony and surously weak and NET of the Camananti. The matte siliki um
worrying but contingung
www being
unsch and, care if China did not live on
sta tape
we
could
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[next say year bown the floor Care Scheme would be in
operations.
agreed generally with the Commonwealth
Secretary.
WALL
He thought that Peking encourrying the long-tim build-up of was giving particular encouragement Tentationing movement in Hong King. They
to the communist trade unions with preparing for dives interventim. But in curéni ¿ view to building up a maas Circand tances they might be prepned to intuving.
при movement. Peking's ultimate aim was
to create a Macao-type situation
in Hong Kong. Mrs. Hart pointed
out that if they could not control
could
the
Govt
events in Hong Kong,[Peking/might
get out on a limb. One of the dangers
was that the present disturbances
in Hong Kong might produce
consequences which no-one could
predict.
3. In subsequent discussion it
was pointed out that the situation
in China was very fluid and it
could not be ruled out that it
might develop in a way favourable
to our position in Hong Kong. If
/we
SECRET
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Dd.033009 Gp.143
SECRET
3
we held out for the time being we
might eventually be able to
negotiate our withdrawal. For
example, if the influence of the
central government were weakened
the authorities in Kwantung might
adopt more reasonable policies
towards Hong Kong.
4.
The Foreign Secretary then
said that he understood that if
we left Hong Kong the Chinese
£200
would lose two hundred million
pounds in foreign exchange. He
asked what we would lose.
Mrs. Hart replied that there would
probably not be much difference
between our gains and our losses.
There was not a great deal of
British investment in Hong Kong. But
British banks had a big stake and
Hong Kong provided facilities for
intelligence activities. Sir
Arthur Galsworthy pointed out that
Hong Kong more or less paid for
itself. The only charge on H.M.G.
was the cost of our troops and
Hong Kong was now contributing
£5 million a year to this. He went
SECRET
/on
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
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SECRET
-
4
on to say, however, that if Hong
Kong's economy turned down the
cost to us could be very severe.
If foreign demand for Hong Kong's
exports fell there would be
unemployment and the cost to the
British Exchequer in relief would
be formidable.
5. Sir Paul Gore-Booth said an
important factor in the situation
was the degree to which Peking
could allow the local communists
in Hong Kong to suffer a defeat.
Peking might eventually decide to
accept the loss of face involved in
A
accepting the setback in Hong.
Kong and lay off for a year or
two. Sir D. Greenhill said that
on the other hand the Chinese
Communist Party might need a
success in 1967 as a counter to the
play the Russians would make with
the 50th anniversary of the Soviet
Revolution. The kind of success
they needed might be creating
a Macao-type situation in Hong
Kong.
/6.
SECRET
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
Dd.003809 Gp.$63
SECRET
5
6. Mrs. Hart said that two
points should be borne in mind.
First, it would be foolish for us
to base our plans for Hong Kong
on optimistic assumptions.
Secondly, we should recognise that
as a result of disturbances over the
past few months confidence in Hong
Kong's economy was already
declining. Unless the growth rate
about
was maintained at 8 per cent per
annum the economy would decline and
we should be faced with unemployment.
Once this began the situation
would deteriorate.
7. The Foreign Secretary said it
seemed likely that October would
be the danger point this year.
8.
Mr. Bolland said that the
Hong Kong Working Party had
reached the provisional conclusion
if
that/we had to decide between
A
accepting the Macao-type situation
and withdrawal we should choose the
latter.
Sir Arthur Galsworthy said
that if it became known that we
/intended
SECRET
DE81300 Gş,143
Hong Kay's relations with Peking had been
at that bell. Where
there had been the
wow in strany
Chim Garemment. The time
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
to start to extricate Ourselves would be Then our relations
with Peking improved.
SECRET
6
intended to withdraw the morale of
the police would collapse. This
ruled out withdrawal from Hong Kong
over a long period.
9.
The Foreign Secretary summed up
by saying that, it should be our
developments in China which with providkę aim to look förдa convenient
moment to withdraw from Hong Kong
in good order. In present
circumstances, however, we could
not plan actively to do anything
except to hang on.
་ ༣
SECRET
хамону 975
sliot
------
Ed (1426)
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.
Minutes.
FD1/3
34
SEE ANNEX
RESTRICTED
33
(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)
C 165/5 (67) 3rd Meeting
CABINET
COPY NO.
•14
DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY (OFFICIAL) COMINTTEE
DEFENCE REVIEW WORKING PARTY
MEETING NOTICE
The next meeting will be held in Conference Room 'A',
Cabinet Office, Whitehall, S.W.1., on THURSDAY, 20th JULY
1967 at 4.00 p.m.
An Agenda Notice will be circulated later.
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 31
¡ 27 JUL 1967
FD/3
Cabinet Office, 3.W.1.
17th July 1967
38
(Signed) R.L.L. FACER
M.J. MORIARTY
RESTRICTED
Ed (1636)
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.
L
ااس
Minutes.
SEE ANNEX
32
Ed (1626)
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.
Minutes.
FD1/3
SEE ANNEX
31
CONFIDENTIAL
30
(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT )
C 165/5(67) 2nd Meeting
CABINET
14
COPY NO.
•V-D IN ENGGAMES (No. 31
27 Jul 1967
FD1/3
DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY (OFFICIAL) COMMITTEE
DEFENCE REVIEW WORKING PARTY
MEETING to be held in Conference Room 'B', Cabinet Office, Whitehall, S.W.1, on MONDAY, 17th JULY 1967 at 2.30 p.m.
AGENDUM:
HONG KONG
Note by the Commonwealth Office
(C 165/5(67 1 to be circulated)
-
31
(Signed) R.L.L. FACER
[
M.J. MORIARTY
Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
13th July 1967
The following are invited to attend:
Mr. E. Bolland, Foreign Office Mr. W.S. Carter, Commonwealth Office Mr. M.S. Morris, Board of Trade
CONFIDENTIAL
I
RESTRICTED
į RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 3i # 27 JUL 1967
FO 1/3
29
(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)
C 165/5 (67) 2nd Meeting
COPY NO. 14
CABINET
DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY (OFFICIAL) COMMITTEE
DEFENCE REVIEW WORKING PARTY
MEETING NOTICE
The next meeting will be held in Conference Room B*, Cabinet Office, Whitehall, S.W.1., on MONDAY, 17th JULY 1967
at 2.30 p..
An Agenda Notice will be circulated later.
30
Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
11th July 1967
(Signed) R.L.L. FACER
M.J. MORIARTY
RESTRICTED
CONFIDENTIAL
14.7.67.
نسا
With the compliments of
12
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE 7
Mr. W.S. Carter
гра сод OA
CEIVED IN {
ARCHIVES No.31
LONDON, S.V.1.
20 JUL 1967
..
E. Bolland Esq.,
FD!|3
Far Eastern Department,
Foreign Office,
Downing Street, S.7.1.
+
Forster
CONNE PEITIAL
Contos tor
Sir Arthur Galsworthy Mr. Godden
Mr. Bolland (7.0,)
Your minute of 12 July regarding the interview which the Secretary of State gave to Sir Albert Rodrigues on 10 July.
2. We have recently re-examined with the Foreign Office the question of making representations or protests to the Chinese Charge d'Affaires in London (paragraph 3 of your minuta); This was in response to a muɛrastion by Feking that our protests sight also be delivered in Londen where they would not be subject to the same delays as Mr. Hopson had experienced in Paking. Our conclusions are summarinod in paragraph 2 of 7.0, telegram Jo.604 to Peking which reads as followss-
"We asked you to contact the Minister of Foreign Affairs inmediately in order to ensure that the Chinees Central Authorities should be avere of the seriousness with which ve viewed theas incidents and to make it clear to them that EX.C, were fully behind the Hong Kong Government in dealing with them. Ve sextmed you would be able to couray the message quickly without, if necessary, waiting for a formal interview. Although we are, of course, ready to pass messages here, we are not able to speak to any high ranking Chinses an you may be able to do and consequently we can get no worthwhile de response or feel of the atmosphere as you clearly did, for example, en 9 July. Shạn Ping acte se s mere transmission belt and all we get from him is a recital of abusive X.Pak, statements and People's Daily articles. Furthermore, a message through Shen Ping will not reach the K.F.A, an quick as one through you. We think therefore that it is better if we can pass messages through you unless there is a particular reason fur making representations in London",
3.
I am sending a oggy of this minute and a copy of
yours to Mr. Bolland (Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Ofrios).
(V.S. Carter)
14.7.67.
COMPADEPTIIAL
KR. CARTER Curtis Green
(COPY)
CONFIDENTIAL
Copies to:
Sir A. Galsworthy Mr. Godden
Sir Albert Rodriques had a good talk with the Secretary of State on July 10th. The object of the visit, as you surmised, was to get some more positive statement about Hong Kong's future out of the Secretary of State. Sir Albert argued that the key to the situation was to retain business confidence and, more important, mass confidence. If people were continually told that the Chinese were going to come in anyhow some day and if they did not co-operate now they would be in trouble when the Chinese did arrive, eventually they would begin to reinsure. As far as the business people were concerned, there was not much movement of capital 28 yet, but a lot of them were thinking of moving to Taiwan.
It was important to keep reiterating in positive terms that the British meant to stay. The Secretary of State authorised Sir Albert to say, if he thought it necessary on his return, that he had had a talk with the Secretary of State who had authorised him to say that what Lord Beswick said in the House of Lords still represented H.K.G's policy.
2.
In a general discussion of the situation, Sir Albert said that the Chinese were looking for a paper victory. The Hong Kong Government had won the first two rounds and the Chinese had to find some way out of the impasse. They had been frustrated at every tum. What worried bin was the fact that a large number of "bad hats" were now out of work and ready to make trouble. He thought that the deportation of four or five of the top leaders at the right moment was probably the best next move. The Communiste had good organisation but not much in the way of experienced leadership. If the deportees refused to cross the border or the Chinese refused to acoapt them, this would be a considerable propaganda victory
for the Government. Otherwise, morale was terrific and he had never Before found such a response from the ordinary people. Chinese pressure on water and food supplies had been a great mistake and had alienated the ordinary people. The police had been quite excellent and, in consequence, had retained the sympathy of the man in the street.
3. In conclusion, Sir Albert asked whether there was any point in making protests to the Chinese Charge d'Affaires in London. Tho Commonwealth Secretary said that we would look into this, but did not hold out much hope of getting anywhere by so doing.
SDL
0.G. Forster
12th July, 1967.
Ed (1626)
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Minutes.
25
бес
TEX
นา
CONFIDENTIAL
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.31
24
P.S. to Mr. Rodgers.
13 JUL 1967
10113
Secretary of State has sean.
Su 10
7
HUNG KONG
1 was disturbed by the equivocal tone
and the content of the Commonwealth Secretary's
reply to supplementary questions about Hong Kong
in the House this afternoon. He was asked by
Balniel to state that it was the Government's
intention to maintain the status quo and avoided
a reply. Pressed by Lodds-Parker to give a
categorical assurance, he merely said that we must
fulfil our full responsibilities and obligations
in Hong Kong. Pressed again by Fletcher-Cooke
to give a firm assurance he said that a reply
would not be helpful at the moment and implied
that a firm statement might make things more
difficult for us.
1 can hardly believe that these remarks
will help us at all, either in terms of morale in
Hong Kong or Chinese judgment of our intentions.
I would have read them to imply that we are very
uncertain about the future and are possibly
prepared to consider getting out.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
We shall possibly see in tomorrow's
papers how much damage has been done but when
you have read Hansard you may feel that the
matter is sufficiently serious to raise in
Cabinet.
WTR
William Rodgers
10 July, 1967.
c.c. Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Bolland
CONFIFENTIAL
стра Entir
AP.A.
From: P. Nailor, Head of DS22
MINISTRY OF defence Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.I
Telephone; whitehall 7022, ext. 3287
23
SECRET
ET
Cali
Please address any reply to MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
(
and it
DS22
Your reference:
DS22/9B
Выл. ра
Dear Sykes,
IRENEENVEEN IN 1997 & Resubmit
ARCHIVES No.31
1.. JUL 1869
FD1/3
З
چالی
I am sending you separately a copy of my letter of 10th July to Carter at the Commonwealth Office with our piece for the long-term paper on Hong Kong (C165/5(67) 1st Meeting). You may agree that this will need tying in with the Foreign Office con- tribution on the prospects of American involvement (para. 5(c) of the outline) and, unless you think the splicing better left to a later stage, we should be glad to see to it in whatever manner you suggest.
M. Bolla
22/1
Yours sincerely,
Nétéo
RAJyke Chris Howell 10 Pug
11-V" (FOR Peter Nailon) {afailo
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With the Compliments of
J522
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Main Building, Whitehall London, S.W.I.
WHItehall 7022
DS. Form 4
From:
P. Nailor, Head of DS22
S SECRET Sa
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE Main Building, Whitehall, LONDON S.W.1 Telephone: WHitehall 7022, ext. 3287
10th July 1967
Please address any reply to MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
DS22
and quote: DS22/9B Your reference:
Dear Carter,
I enclose the Ministry of Defence contribution to the long- term paper on Hong Kong which Moriarty agreed should come direct to you.
You will see that we deal only with the garrison as the section on intelligence is being prepared separately by the JIC. We shall also be in touch with the Foreign Office about paragraph 5(c) of the outline paper; it is not for us to examine the possibility of American involvement, but I think this should be mentioned in connection with the defence of Hong Kong at some point in the paper, in the general context of trying to define what "identifying aggression" means for third parties.
2.
I am sending copies of this letter to Sykes and Butler at the Foreign Office and to Moriarty and Foster at the Cabinet Office.
Yours sincerely Peter Navior
W.S. Carter, Esq., Commonwealth Office, Church House,
Great Smith Street, 3.W.1.
SECRET
SECRET
SOCKET
Reference:
D822/98
FING FAN
TES OF DEPENCE CONTRIBUTION TO KONINGSTAR CIFICE DHAFT
Until recently the Army had 62/3 major units in Hong Kong(1)
which, with supporting units, totalled about 7,300 British and Gurkha troops; there are also about 1,300 locally enlisted persoanel in toe Colony, A further Gurkha battalion has now been moved temporarily to Hong Kong. There are no RAF aircraft normally stationed in the Colony. The Royal Navy is represented by two coastal mineswe-pers and a frigate.
2. The garrison has three purpose5; to assist the Hong Kong government maintain order, to help the civil authorities control the frontier and to identify aggression in the event of an armed Chinese attack.
3. In any internal security situation the Hong Kong government could normally be expected to defer the direct involvement of troo: as long in possible. Eevertheless in serious disturbances the garrison, even if not called on, is easential as moral support for the Hong Kong police and as a visible guarantee of our inten-
to control the situation. In the event of grave internal disorders most of the garrison might have to be retained for Enter Bec ty tanka leaving only a small force available for the frontimi. This would be a calculated risk as Chinese fi-ssure at the border, right accompany disturbinoes in Hong Keys.
•
e
ite frotireole the warrison can sexist the pollon to oftus of refugena oz to control incursions by troulle-
It ent sho. 1imited nilifery threats and would thus astile forcan to deving and "ount a clearly recogni ant] - I order to invole the Colory, The garrison could not,
de und Borg Kury gainat a deliberate Invasion. The se evilmstel to have an vry (41,000 men) within enay nch of Hong Kong, They have a further amy plus an artillery division (7)%(ken) within 20% silen. They could also comand the air.
-
F..
Te save detailed plans for the reinforcement of dory Kong by ...ir and aea from Singapore/"alaysia, but there would probably bé exojatel only while the situation was still under control or
are, te pone circumstances, to cover a withdrawal.
+
No agould be anlikely to be able to reinforce effectively 1f the internal situation rot out of control as a result of increased pressure from Peking, including possibly a nase influx from China into the Colony: nor could we reinforce effectively in face of outright invasion. If internal security collapsed
coumetanoes would not favour evacuation. It is unlikely that ilitary reulotunce could then prevent or much delay a Chinese take-over, after wich the Chinese would be able to dictate highly unfavourable term of surrender.
2 Britian battalions, 3 Gurkha battalions, 1 light regiment of artillery, 1 armoured qar squadron, 1 field engineer squadron
par
Jul, 1751
SECRET
Ed (1626)
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.
ラ
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Minutes.
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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.
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34
SECRET
HONG KONG/CHINA
T!
RECEIVED IN
"ARCHIVES No.31
1 3 JUL 1967
FD1/3
I attach a copy of a minute which I have sent to Sir A. Galsworthy and to the other members of the "Hong Kong Committee".
W.20
2. I think it is going to be up to us in the Foreign Office to keep the Hong Kong Committee alive and active, and although not all its members will be direßtly concerned with some of the points raised in this minute I am working on the assumption that the more we can get them all interested in all aspects of the problem the greater our chances of getting the committee to do some useful work.
1
agree.
Aff. de balan
(A.J. de la Mare)
6 July 1967
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RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
1. JUL 1967
FD13
Jír A. Galsworthy
HONG KONG/UNIKA
Mr. John Keswick (Matheson and Company) asked me to lunch with him today.
2. He said that the long Kong Association had not this morning to discuss what could be done to restors, repert restore, business confidence in Hong Kong. I said that "restore" implied that confidence was being lost and Er. Keswick agreed that this was so. He said that a number of fastanses had been quoted at the meeting of Hong Kong manu- facturers saxing enquiries about transferring their activities to formoss, or even to this country. The loss of eonfilence, he said, want all the way down from managesent to labour. The ordinary worker, who" was being intimidated, was now taking the view that he must accommodate himself to the clearly changing times.
3. Mr. Keewiex said that Mr. Rodriques, a member of the Exsoutive Council now in this country, expected to call on the Commonwealth Jearetary on Xonday next, 10 July.
He was likely to sar Mr. Bowden to make a public statement either in his own nuze or in that of X.1.0. making it clear tout ve intended to stay in Hong Kong and were not going to be intimidated by Chinare threats. Kr. ..oiriques night sok Kr. Bowden to make it clear that we were staying certainly until 1997 when the leases on the Leased Territories expire and that even then we would not expect tamely to walk out but would seek to renegotiate the lease.
I said that speaking personally I doubted very such whether my minister, or H.X.G. collectively, would be prepared to ba committed to 1997 or beyond. (Mr. Laswick sencurred). Again speaking personally, I did think however that given our obligations to the people of Hong Kong H.X.G. might be prepared to consider a publić statement to the effect that present Chinese tactics were not going to frighten us into running away.
5. Mr. Keswick also raised the question of the treatment of foreign ships in Chinese porta. with referanse tɔ the two recent incidente in Dairen and Shanghai when British ships had been plastered with slogans and posters and their officers and erev seereed and intimidated. Mr. Laswick's own view was that in spite of thes- difficulties we shouli no: curtail or abandon our shipping trade with China but he said that a new consideration had arisen in tast the Merchant Shipping Officers Union (this may not be their exact title) were
SECRET
/becoming
Je Shorthand (persis)
it Bollya
P.A. 26%,
اکام
(ه
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"17"
becoming restive and might soon refuse to man ships plying to Chinese ports. Kr. Keswick and his shipping associates were considering whether it would advisable to spread the word around in shipping oirales throughout the world that foreign ships plying to China might be subjected to the kind of treatment the two British ships have recently suffered. The object would be to get the word back to Feking that a general boycott of Chine by foreign shipping mig:t be in the offing.
I suggested that the shipping companies might wish to bear two points in mindi
6.
(4)
that sinos, as far as we know, so far only British ships had been affected, the Chinese would know immediately that the international sove had been instigated by us and that they sight take it out on us by banning British shipping altogether. In such circumstances couli Mr. Keswick and his associates rely on the solidarity of their competitors?
(b) if they did decide to take action would
they want to to it only through shipping channels or would they expect some help from us? I explained that it waO technically quite feasible for us to have the appropriato menuage spread around in shipping eireles throughout the world but it would be necessary to decide whether such official action by H.M.G. would help or not.
Mr. Leswick unlertook to think these points over and let me know.
7. I also asked Kr. Keswick both in relation to Hong Kong in particular and to China in general, how long he thought we should be prepared to sabait to the present Chinese policy of hostility toward us. I pointed out that, quite apart from what might happen in liong Kong itself, further Chinese mob setion, for instance against our mission in Peking, night raise a demand in this country that we break off diplomatis relations with China, I explained that our present view was that we should try to hold on as long as possible because the situation in China was so fluid that a change of policy there might easily take place and perhaps it might be for the better. Mr. Keswick fully concurred. At first he said that he expected possibly quite dramatic changes within China in six months; he then
SECRET
corrected.
STORET
corrected himself and said that his long experience of Chinese affaire had taught his that what might rationally be expected elsewhere to take a given time would take three times as long in China. He therefore substituted sighteen months for six.
(A.J. de la Mare)
6 July, 1967
20
Go:des toi Mr. Hall, C.O.
Mr. Peck
Mr. Uwart-Bigge (2 copies) Kr. Bolland
5102ET
SECRET
Sir A. Galsworthy
HONG KONG/GITNA
Kr. John Keswick (Matheson and Company) asked me to lunch with him today.
2. He said that the Hong Kong Association had met this morning to discuss what could be done to restore, repeat restore, business confidence in Hong Kong. I said that "restore" implied that confidence was being lost and Mr. Keswick agreed thạt this was 80. He said that a number of instances had been quoted at the meeting of Hong Kong manu- facturers making enquiries about transferring their activities to Formosa, or even to this country. The loss of confidence, he said, went all the way down from managenent to labour. The ordinary worker, who was being intimidated, was now taking the view that he must accommodate himself to the clearly changing times
3. Mr. Keswick said that Mr. Rodriques, a member of the Executive Council now in this country, expected to call on the Commonwealth Secretary on Monday next, 10 July. He was likely to ask är. Bowden to make a public statemɑnt either in his own nane or in that of 8.3.0. making it clear that wa intended to stay in Hong Kong and were not going to be intimidated by Chinese threats. Mr. Rodriques might ask Mr. Bowden to make it clear that we were staying certainly until 1997 when the leases on the Leased Territories expire and that even then we would not expect tamely to walk out but would seek to renegotiate the lease.
4. I said that speaking personally I doubted very auch whether my minister, or H.X.G. collectively, would be prepared to be committed to 1997 or beyond. (Mr. Keswick concurred). Again speaking personally, I did think however that given our obligations to the people of Hong Kong H.M.G. might be prepared to consider a public statement to the effect that present Chinese tactios were not going to frighten us into rumning away.
5. Mr. Keswick also raised the question of the treatment of foreign ships in Chinese ports. with reference to the two recent incidents in Dairen and Shanghai when British ships had been plastered with slogans and posters and their officers and grew voereed and intimidated. Mr. Laswiek's own view was that in spite of these difficulties we should not surtail or abandon our shipping trade with China but he said that a new consiisration had arisen in that the Merchant Shipping Pping Officers Union (this may not be their exact title) were
JEORST
/becoming
becoming restive and might soon refuse to man ships plying to Chinese ports. Er. Keswick and his shipping associates were considering whether it would advisable to spread the word around in shipping oireles throughout the world that foreign ships plying to China might be subjected to the kind of treatment the two British ships have recently suffered. The object would be to get the word back to Peking that a general boycott of China by foreign shipping might be in the offing.
6.
I sugested that the shipping companies might wish to bear two points in winds
(=)
that since, as far as we know, so far only British ships had been affected, the Chinese would know immediately that the international sove had been instigated by us and that they night take it out on us by banning British shipping altogether. In such circumstances couli Hr. Kaswick and his associates rely on the solidarity of their competitors?
(b) if they did decide to take action would
they want to do it only through shipping channels or would they expect some help from us? I explained that it wLE technically quite feasible for us to have the appropriate message spread around in shipping ciroles throughout the world but it would be necessary to decide whether such official action by H.M.O. would help or not.
Coswick undertook to think these points over and let me know
7. I also asked Mr. Loowiek. both in relation to Hong Kong in particular and to China in general, how long he thought we should be prepared to submit to the present Chinese policy of hostility toward us. I pointed out that, quite apart from what might happen in Hong Kong itself, further Chinese nob sation, for instance against our mission in Peking, might raise a demand in this country that we break off diplomatic relations with China. I explained that our present view was that we should try to hold on as long as possible because the situation in China was so fluid that a change of policy there night easily Mr. Kesriek take plase and perhaps it might be for the better.
At first he said that he expected possibly quite dramatic changes within China in six months; he then
SECRET
/corrected
SECRET
sorrected himself and said that his long experience of Chinese affairs had taught him that what night rationally be expected elsewhere to take a given time would take three times as long in China. He therefore substituted eighteen months for six.
(A.J. de la Xare)
6 July, 1967
Copies to:
Mr. Hall, C.o.
Kr. Pack
Kr. Zwart-Bigge (2 copies) Kr. Bolland
SECRIT
SEORET
Sir A. Halsworthy
HONG KONG/CHINA
Mr. John Keswick (Matheson and Company) asked me to lunch with him today.
2. He said that the Hong Kong Association had net this morning to discuss what could be done to restore, repeat restore, business confidence in Hong Kong - I said that "restore" implied that confidence was being lost and Mr. Keswick agreed that this was so. He said that a number of instances had been quoted at the meeting of Hong Kong manu- facturers making enquiries about transferring their activities to Formosa, or even to this country. The loss of confidence. he said, went all the way down from management to labour. The ordinary worker, who was being intimidated, was now taking the view that he must accommodate himself to the clearly changing times.
3. Ir. Keswick said that Mr. Rodriques, a member of the Executive Council now in this country, expected to call on
He was the Commonwealth Secretary on Monday next, 10 July. likely to ask Kr. Bowden to make a public statement either in his own name or in that of H.M.G. making it clear that we intended to stay in Hong Kong and were not going to be intimidated by Chinese threats. Mr. Rodriques might ask Mr. Bowden to make it olear that we were staying certainly until 1997 when the leases on the Leased Territories expire and that even then we would not expect tamely to walk out but would seek to renegotiate the lease.
4. I said that speaking personally I doubted very much
her any minister, or B.M.G. collectively, would be prepared to be committed to 1997 or beyond. (Mr. Keswick concurred). Again speaking personally, I did think however that given our obligations to the people of Hong Kong H.M.G. might be prepared to consider a public statement to the effect that present Chinese taotios were not going to frighten us into running away.
5. Mr. Keswick also raised the question of the treatment of foreign ships in Chinese ports. with reference to the two recent incidents in Dairen and Shanghai when British ships had been plastered with slogans and posters and their officers
Mr. Keswick'a own view was and crew coerced and intimidated. that in spite of these difficulties we should not curtail or abandon our shipping trade with China but he said that a new consideration had arisen in that the Merchant Shipping Officers Union (this may not be their exact title) were
/becoming
SECRET
bey
becoming restive and might soon refuse to man ships plying to Chinese ports. Mr. Keswick and his shipping associates were considering whether it would/advisable to spread the word around in shipping circles throughout the world that foreign ships plying to China might be subjected to the kind of treatment the two British ships have recently suffered. The object would be to get the word back to Peking that a general boycott of China by foreign shipping might be in the offing.
6.
I surgented that the shipping companies might wish to bear two points in mind:
(a) that since, as far as we know, so far
only British ships had been affected, the Chinese would know immediately that the international move had been instigated by us and that they might take it out on us by banning British shipping altogether. In such circumstances could Mr. Keswick and his associates rely on the solidarity of their competitors?
(b) if they did decide to take action would
they want to do it only through shipping channels or would they expect some help from us? I explained that it was technically quite feasible for us to have the appropriate message spread around in shipping ciroles throughout the world but it would be necessary to decide whether such official sotion by H.M.G. would help or not.
Mr. Keswick undertook to think these points over and let me know
7. I also asked Mr. Keswick. both in relation to Hong Kong in particular and to China in general, how long he thought we should be prepared to submit to the present Chinese policy of hostility toward us. I pointed out that, quite apart from what might happen in Hong Kong itself, further Chinese mob sation, for instance against our mission in Peking, might raise a demand in this country that we break off diplomatic relations with China. I explained that our present view was that we should try to hold on as long as possible because the situation in China was so fluid that a change of policy there might easily Mr. Keswick take place and perhaps it might be for the better. fully concurred. At first he said that he expected possibly quite dramatic changes within China in six months; he then
/corrected
[
SECRET
1
SECRET
corrected himself and said that his long experience of Chinese affairs had taught him that what might rationally be expected elsewhere to take a given time would take three times as long in China. He therefore substituted eighteen months for six.
Copien to:
(A.J. de la Mare)
6 July, 1967
Kr. Hall, 0.0.
Kr. Pack
Kr. Ewart-Biggs (2 copies) Kr. Bolland
SECRET
EJ (1626)
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.
20
FD
Minutes.
1/3
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Bd (1636)
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CONFIDENTIAL
25/
(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC HATESTY'S JOVERNMEN'S)
CEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 31
Ent.
14
FD 1/3
CABINET
COFF NO.
14
ра
pake
DRGENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY (OFFICIAL) COMMITTEE
DEFENCE REVIEW WORKING PARTY
MEETING ARRANGEMENTS
A nocting of the Working Party will be held in Conference Room 'B', Cabinet Office, Whitehall, S.W.1., on HONDAY, 26th JUNE 1967 at 2.30 p.a.
This will be the meeting to discuss Hong Kong which was foreshadowed in OFDO(DR)(67) 24th Mooting, Minute 3. In addition to members of the Working Party the persons named below are invited to attend the nooting Hombers of the Working Party who do not feel it necessary to attend this nooting, or who would wish someone else to reprosent their Departzont for this meeting, are invited to notify Mr. Harrison, Cabinet Office,
Extension 23,
Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
22nd Juno 1967
(Signed) M.J. MORIARTY
The following are invited to attend:
Mr. E. Bolland, Foreign Office Mr. H.P. Hall, Commonwealth Offico Mr. W.S. Carter, Commonwealth Office Mr. M.S. Harris, Board of Trade
CONFIDENTIAL
Ed (1626)
|
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FD1|3
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MESSAGE INSTRUCTIONS
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محمد
SECURITY PLASSIFICATION
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OPERATOR
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
-N
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25
INFO
COPIES
#5398
CINCTE
27 JUN 1967
DESPATCH
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FD1/3
SERIAL No. (inserted by COMMCEN)
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1.
From the Chief of the Defence Staff
The Chiefs of Staff would be grateful if the Governor of Hong Kong would be willing to attend our meeting at 1445 on
We would much appreciate this opportunity Tuesday 27th Juna.
to hear the Governor's views on the latest situation in Hong Kong.
and to exchange views on current problems.
2.
The Commonwealth Office are aware that we are contacting the Governor through you and have provisionally included our proposed meeting in his programme.
3.
We would be grateful therefore, if you would pass this
invitation to the Governor.
DISTRIBUTION (To Include originator)
CDS (7)
CITS
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CAPE
DOC/COSSEC (9)
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NUMBER
DRAFTER'S NAME
IN BLOCK LETTERS
DIV.DIR/BRANCH
TELEPHONE NUMBER
RELEASING
OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
DATE
AME IN ALOCK LETTERS
21.6.67
KANK
0.G.H. ARMOND
COSSEC
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Note: Mossagas comprising five or more pages must be collated
CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
Kulis
HWB.1/21.
RECEIVED IN 1 Commonwealth Office (Church House)
¡ARCHIVES No.31
JUN 1967
FD113
S.W.1.
15 June, 1967.
Col.A.
ی
---
+
Dear Calibe
In Hong Kong telegram No.809 the Governor has suggested the establishment of an interdepartmental committee in Whitehall to consider questions sách as those which he has raised in that telegram. It could also be the forum for preliminary consideration of such questions as our trade with China (Hong Kong
telegram No.790). Fe6/120
2. As you know, we discussed this in the Foreign Office on 12 June and it was agreed that a small committee night serve a useful purpose. It could be enlarged as necessary for the consideration of specific items. We had in mind a committee on which the following departments would be more or less permanently represented:-
Commonwealth Office
(Hong Kong Department and
Asia Economic Department)
Board of Trade
Foreign Office
(Far Eastern Department)
Treasury
Hong Kong Government Office
Others could be invited to send representatives as appropriate (e.g. Bank of England, E.C.G.D.). The Board of Trade, Foreign Office or Treasury night wish to add other representatives of their departments for particular items,
3. We envisaged that representation would normally be at Assistant Secretary level although departments might find it convenient to send other representatives.
4. If you agree to these proposals, I would like to call the first meeting for 2.30 p.m. on Tuesday, 20 Jung, when we might considers-
(a) adraft guidance telegram to posts abroad (paragraph 2(a)
of Hong Kong telegram No.809); I hope to circulate a first draft before the meeting;
(b) the question of trade with China (Hong Kong telegram No.790),
as well as some of the other points raised by the Governor in his telegram No.809. I would be glad to know whether the suggested date and time would be convenient.
5. I am sending copies of this letter to Morris (Board of Trade), Lucas (Treasury), Whitebead (Asia Economic Department), Rawlings(E.C.G.D.) and Sedgwick (Hong Kong Government Office).
E. Bolland Esq.,
Far Eastern Department,
lows
Bunny
(W.S. Carter)
London, S.W.1.
SECRET
Foreign Office,
SECRET
Commonwealth Office
S.W.1
15 June, 1967.
10
Dear Arth
When we were discussing Hong Kong
affairs on Monday we also discussed the
proposals put forward in Hong Kong telegram
Fril (120) 809.
809. I attach a draft reply and would be
grateful for your comments before I submit
it to Sir Saville Garner, who said he would
like to see the draft.
Jaureu
Hey Hall
Clared with Orde la More.
(H.P. Hall)
of Carter informed.
SPA
A.J. de la Mare, Esq., C.M.G.
SECRET
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.31
1 6 JUN 1967
FD1/3
DRAF
Her Governor,
PRIGEIST AND SPORNT
(w.RD)
POLAR SERGAPORE AND VASKEOPON
Polagać Singapore
Washington
Your telegram No.809.
As for Hong Kong telegram No.809.
ntation in Bong Kong
An inter-departmental comed÷tes is being set up to
consider questions such as those which you have raised.
At thé present tips our thinking is that it would be
preferable to confine membership to a few departments
(Sedgiick of course will also be a member), bringing in
otħar departments by ad bog arrangémonie as necessary.
Our preliminary thoughts on the other suggestions
2.
1
(in your paragraph 2]are as
- FollowBe (a) to have it in kind so B circular guidance
Commornemal th and foreiɛn postaj
(1) we agree that occasional visita by large
Amariom naval vessels may help to keep the
Chiness guessing about Amsulosa intentiona
in relation to Hong Kong. We think that
some of the Amerioan requests for sock
visita oeuld be accepted, each request
/beling
1. CLE
+
SPORT
-2-
being considered on its merits in the light of the
situation at the time. In this conusation, we
content that you should agree to the vizit of the
3.9.3. MAROCK (your talegram #o.835 reform).*
fw. Lagan
feel some doubts about more direct indications of
Amerieen interest and começar in Hong Kong, There is
perhaps a danger that these night serve the purpose
of the extremløbs in China rather than sat sa I
deterrent. Clearly we need to look very carefully
at the fom and nextent of my American gesture of
support. We are studying this and vill let you kara
our farther viewüş
Aur, for
! Ai Tim being we
(c) we are not at all happy about the idea that Hong Kơng
sight seek closer alignment and identity of interesta
vd th countries in the region that hava basioally right-
wing regimes in Chinese eyes. That dividend this sight
bring for local confidence could be more than offest
by the provocation it will give in Pekings
(d) we do not think an approach to the Japanese Government
ane sfond
would prodños
I should do not
Footer vid.
byd yn from
Vom (pora
Jyou 67. No 727)..
Other methods have boeri
rée are considering
(a) we roslly do not see any future in trying to find out what
vould matšaty Faking, in approach in a third country or
through a third party will not result in a response that
would be my different to the one we would get if we made
our own approach in Peking or Londong no such approach
would be amovered directly but would be referred back to
Peking whose responas | SAND be the reiteration of their
/full
+
(r)
ful` domande. As we see it, there could
be no other respons in the propert
situation in Peking? It soose to us that
ndth the sample of Kaoso before we ve
most avoid entering into any negotiations
et
Eff
unless Peking itself [nakas 'the running with}
Which could promile sta
teams that indicate there is a baste for an
acceptable settlement;
nd
of Trade are taking à
FCCD
Killə bəllideblo Iine fa
enquizion both from
rier-alike. ́% shall do
to back up Sadgulek's efforts
through his contacts with B.V.R.C., V.B.I.
sol other bodies to push the line that
Hong Kong remaine
good market for British
exports and that Hong Kong industry and
trode continues to function normally. We
suggestions to Selgadok about
artending the distribution of the material
being put out by his office and will
in touch with 1500 on this.
(Hi) RAVE - Malague www HK.
15.6.67.
M.F.P
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.
stupi D=
Minutes
19
SEG ANNEX
M.F.P
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN this margIN.
FO 1/3
8
SEE ANNEX
M.F.P
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.
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SEE ANNEX
Ed (1626)
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.
FO 1/3
Minutes.
SEE ANNEX
رو
Cypher
CONFIDENTIAL
OUTWARD TELEGRAM
FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
ज
דין
| EDI/3
HWB 1/17
Sent 2nd June, 1967 2200Z
FD1/6 17
IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL No. 1112
Your telegram No. 699,
ре
It is proposed that statement on Hong Kong disturbances should be made in House of Lords on 6th June. Regret that our telegram No. 1106 misinformed you on this point since no statement has yet been made in that House.
2.
It may be possible to include in statement a reference to the public challenge mentioned in your telegram.
We shall accordingly be grateful to learn whether anyone has taken up the challenge and if so with what result?
Distribution
H.K. WID 'C' I.G.D.
J.1.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
Copies also sent to:-
P.S. to Prime Minister
Cabinet Office
Foreign Office
-
D.I.O., J.I.R. P.S. to Mr. Rodgera Mr. de la Mare
ศ
*
#
11
#
Treasury
Export Credits Guarantee Dept.
Ministry of Defence (Room 7365)
+
11
Board of Trade
-
忖
H 7163)
-
忡
tt 51 31)
-
Commonwealth office (News Dept.)
CONFIDENTIAL
Mr. Bolland
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Denson
Mr. Foggon
Mr. D. Hawkins
Mr. C.P. Rawlings
Mr. Henn
Major Koe
M.0.2.
Mr.J.A.B.
Darlington
Mr. Carrocher
4
He BillLd.
Lave
Reference.
01/3 (W-1
FD1|3
Long term planning for Hong Kong
I do not think that you
yet
Been
こ
The Tetter.
il. Ellisht in certainly night bur his predicted crisis han overlaken consideration of the letter.
any
pour will now
I think his pour
be taken care of by the
reconsideration of ou
да
genera
position
に
Hong Kong.
↑agra. P.A
с
Sz
مساعد
V1
John Denson
Thi
CONFIDENTIAL
Private Secretary
RECEIVED IN
CHIVES NON.
- 2 JUN 1967
FD 1/3
HONG KONG
Hilo.
The Minister of State at the
Commonwealth Office is making a statement
in the House of Commons this afternoon on
the recent disturbances in Hong Kong. An
identical statement will be made by Lord
Beswick in the House of Lords. I attach
a copy of the latest available draft of the
It has been prepared in consulta-
statement.
tion with the Department.
SEEN BY
SECRETARY OF
John Densen
(J.B. Denson)
1 June, 1967
STATE.
Copies to:
Mr. Samuel
Mr. de la Mare
P
pe
CONFIDENTIAL
سر
W3
....
I wish to make a statement about liong Kong.
In the period between the 6th and 22nd May there nas a series of disturbances. These arose originally frea a labour dispute in two factories. but what began as a genuine labour dispute was then taken up and exploited for quite different ends by local Communists with stimulated intervention by hooligan elements, some of whom were paid. Organised demonstrations were no nted as a direct and deliberate challenge
In some cases to the authority of the Hong Kong Government. these were orderly but in others they led to disturbanc÷s involving police action. There has been open incitement to .iolence and to disaffection,
of Kowloont
Up the 17th May the demonstrations were confined to parts
thereafter they spread to Victoria on ling kog Islond. Processions, assemblies in public places and the sticking of posters on public buildings and at the entrance gates to the grounds of Government House, although unlcwful, were tolerated so long as demonstrators remained fairly orderly,
It become apart from chanting and shouting venɛmais obuse, necessary, however, on the 20th tiny, because of increasing romliness, to diaperse further unlawful assemblies and processions, although up to the 22nd May orderly groups of 20 persons were still permitted to present petitions at Government ffouse.
Throughout the disturbances the Hong Kong police have succeeded in controlling the situation with the minimum amount of force. Apart from the firing of three revolver shots rounding one man, by a constable over whom petrol had been throw no firearms have been used, The greatest restraint has been exercised throw hout by the police, despite extrene provocation. The Secretary of State and I have already poid public tribute to them in Hong Xin, and I will do so ngain.
now.
The know casualties comprise 36 police and 70 demonstrators, of these, three police and 14 other casualties were admitted to hospital, All have since been discharged. There has been only one death, that of a bystander who was killed by a stone. 815 persons were arrested, of whom 65 have been released without proceedings or acquitted. Of the remainder 565 have been convi, ted of riot, unlawful assembly, assault, breaking curfew and other off.nces, and 185 cases are pending. All persona arrested are being trested in the normal way in accordance with the due process of the low, The House may fect that these frete contrast somewhat with other reports alleging, for example, that on 22nd May "at lenɑt two hundred compatriota
1
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were
صيني
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were killed or severely injured" in Hong Kong and Kowloon,
There have been no demonstrations since the 22nd May But there have been a series of token stoppages notably in certain transport and supply services. These were all politically motivated.
In Hong Kong itself there has been widespread and forth- right public support for the Government's measures to deal with violence, intimidation and hooliganism by a small minority, including messages of support to the Governor from over 500 representative organisations.
As regards the original labour dispute, my latest information is that work at both the factories has now been
resumed. I am in consultation with the Governor about changes in the field of labour relations which I think we would all feel would be timely. I have in mind such matters as hours of work for women and young persons, conciliation machinery rad factory legislation.7
For the future, we must hope that good sense will prevail, I am of course, in close and constant touch with the Governor. There have been statements alleging that the Hong Kong Goverment have been acting out of motives of enmity towards
China. I do not need to say in this louse that we, like ell
sections of opinion in Hong Kong, đesire friendly and good- neighbourly relations with China. Eut the Government of long Kong has the duty to raintain peace, order and good government. This task they must fulfil, and we have, iven them clear
assurances of our complete support and determination to maintain our position there,
Finally, I wish to pay tribute to the calm and couragecus Leadership during these difficult times of the Govemor, Sir David Trench; to the ability and th...: determination shov by the whole Hong Kong Administration; to the
to the splendid and exemptory manner in which the police have acquitted themselves; and to the indomitable spirit and unity of the people of long Kong in facing the difficulties created by a minority of
trouble-makers.
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-- 2 JUN 1967
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TEXT OF YESTERDAYS STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT ABOUT
HONGKONG NOT YET RECEIVED PLEASE EXPEDITE
HOPSON
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38,850-4/85-B47061
REF.
PERSONAL
Mr. With othe butt.
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT
LOWER ALBERT ROAD
HOME HONG
Formy
We shall nam
Iear Edi
consitu This in
Yo
unis Defens "P.U.S's Dimo
ва
May 4th, 1967.
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No 31
1. AY 1967
FD1/3
I was most interested to read the Steering Committee's paper (SC(67)11) of February 23rd on "Policy Towards Japan", not least because it contained a general statement (in paragraph 9) of British policy in Asia based on the "peripheral strategy".
2.
but
There was of course much discussion of the "peripheral strategy" at the Heads of Mission Conference in Hong kong last June. I am very glad to see that it has now been accepted; the fact that it has been accepted confirms me in the view, which I put to John Thomson when he was here last year (and also in conversation to uore-Booth) that there ought to be a new planning study of H.M.G.'s policy towards Hong Kong. If the "peripheral strategy" is accepted, the position of Hong Kong is surely an anomaly.
3.
During my two years here, I have become increasingly conscious of the fact that H.M.G.'s policy towards Hong Kong has not been examined in detail for (I believe) ten years; and quite possibly for a much longer time than that This lack of a long-term policy naturally makes it much more difficult to be certain that such decisions as are taken on short-term policy are on the right lines. Indeed, short-term policy has often enough to be worked out, as it were, from back to front. As the Hong Kong uefence Secretary, Jack Cater, will be informing Bunny Carter in a letter this week, discussions are now taxing place between the C. in C. F.E. and the C.B.F.Zabout the revision of the latter's "directive"; and faute de mieux these discussions have had to proceed on the basis of only the most vague assumptions about what n.M.c.'s long-term policy towards Hong Kong may be. The risk that in these circumstances military planning may get out of touch with political realities seems considerable.
4.
What i am thinking of is a joint study by the Foreign uffice and Commonwealth Office of п.M.G.'s policy for nong Kong nong_kong over the next ten years. Ubviously, there are imponderables in the situation, notably the lines on which Chinese policy is
/going
s. Bolland, Esq., Far Eastern Dept.,
be should discuss the when
Foreign urrice, he dust
London, 8.#.1.
Settler.
Bu. 2. weekn
19:
3600073
SECRET
CA HA
30,000-4/65-347M1
REF.
-2-
COLONIAL SECRETARIAT
LOWER ALBERT ROAD
HONG KONG
going to develop, which would make the preparation of a paper of this sort a difficult matter. The events of the last year, both in China and Macau, cast doubt on some of the more comfortable assumptions that have been made about Hong Kong's future. But it seems to me that this fact in itself provides a very strong reason for making some attempt now to rethink
long-term policy. We cannot now rule out quite so happily as we could, say, in 1963, the possibility of a serious crisis developing over Hong Kong (though this still does not seem very likely). What does seem important is that if such a crisis were to develop suddenly some of the possible options open to Ministers should have been considered beforehand at a fairly high level.
5. I ought to say that I am writing this entirely on my own initiative. But it is, I believe, becoming generally more obvious here that the lack of even a sketch of any carefully thought out long-term policy towards Hong Kong does create short-term planning difficulties. Obviously, Ministers have other more pressing problems to consider, but Hong Kong after all is now the most significant remaining dependent territory; and it could become the centre of an international crisis.
b.
I hope to be going on leave for two months in July, and should be back in London about the 8th. I look forward to seeing you then.
L
SECRET
Yours aver,
Away [hine
(T.A.K. Elliott)