FCO 21/213 Negotiations with China on improving situation in Hong Kong and release of British staff in Peking

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FOREIGN

OFFICE

SECRET

DEPT.

FAR EASTERN

TITLE: HONG KONG: POLITICAL AFFAIRS EXTERNAL

RELATIONS WITH CHINA:

SINO U.K. TALKS ON: ETC..

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DEPT.

DATE DEPT.

NAME

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LIULIZI kula

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Dearning Serase

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With the compliments of

COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

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24 Schlenker 1908

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LONDON, S.W.1.

HWB 3/2

Commonwealth Offic

S.W.1.

24 September, 1968.

You may be interested to see the

enclosed copy of a "Letter of Protest" which was received by the secretary of State in his constituency mail.

2. I am sending a copy of this letter and enclosure to John Boyd in the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office.

(K. Á. SMITH)

Hong Kong Department

R. J. T. cLaren, Esq.,

Assistant Political Adviser,

TUNG KUNG

· RECEIVED I ARCHIVES No.31

25SEP 1968

FDB15

A Letter of Protest

by relatives of patriotic Chinese unreasonably detained in the Mount Davis concentration camp by the Hongkong British authorities

In Gaminawa to se Realds/s

Constituency mail

We, all of us relatives of the patriotic Chinese who are being unjustifi- ably detained in the Mount Davis concentration camp, boiling with rage, accuse the Hongkong British authorities of persecuting our relatives with

fascist measures.

Our relatives were all illegally kidnapped by police and special agents sent by the Hongkong British authorities after the outbreak of the May Upheaval and have since been unreasonably kept under detention and sub- jected to political persecution. They consistently love our motherland, love our great

leader Chairman Mao. At their different posts, they have worked and made their contributions to the community. But the vicious Hongkong Eritish authorities persecuted them just the same. When our relatives were abducted, some of them were working as usual at their places of work, others were resting or sleeping in their homes or walking in the street. Is it guilty to work, to rest, to sleep or to walk in the street? Though the Hongkong British authorities have kidnapped our relatives and held them in détention for a long period, they have failed even to conjure up a single charge against them. Take the following example to illustrate the lawlessness of the Hongkong British authorities. Liu San, Chairman of the Stone-cutters' Union, was abducted from his home in the middle of the night by the Hong- kong British police and special agents. Trumped-up charges were brought up against him in the 'court'. But as the judge could not convict him, he had to have him released. But no sooner had Liu San come out of the 'court' than he was seized by agents of the 'special branch' and thrown into the con- centration camp. Thus one who had been acquitted and released by the 'court' was abducted by the 'special branch'. This fact brought to light, to the full, that the laws of the Hongkong British authorities are all devices to deceive the people. They had long ago become odious, but now the last fig-leaf was torn off them by none other than the Hongkong British authorities themselves.

Another well-known incident happened on March 14 this year when, to persecute Fu Chi and Shih Hui, the Hongkong British authorities deported them in a vain attempt to create a precedent. With the support of the Government and people of the motherland and the support of the four million Chinese compatriots in Hongkong and Kowloon, the couple waged a gallant fight setting their feet firmly on the Lowu Bridge. This not only foiled the *deportation' plot of the Hongkong British authorities but also landed them in à fix. At that time, the Hongkong British authorities were forced to declare through a loudspeaker that Fu and Shih were 'released'. But on March 15, just as the patriotic film couple were on their way home, they were abducted for the second time by Hongkong British police and special agents at Sheungshui and were again put in the concentration camp. This fact showed that the 'laws' as well as the words from the mouth of the Hongkong British authorities were nothing more than lies.

This is how our relatives were thrown by the savage Hongkong British

What

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authoritic in the dark concentration camp where they have been detained for long period and subjected to shocking maltreatments and tribulations.

First of all, we accuse the Hongkong British authorities of launching political persecution against our relatives.

All our relatives are workers or Chinese from all walks of life who ferently love our motherland and our great leader Chairman Mao. To jatriotic mered right which is inviolable. Yet the Hongkong British authorities have gone so far as to deprive our relatives of their freedom of reading the brilliant writings of our great leader Chairman Mao. We have repeatedly lodged protest against this and we have demanded that the camp authorities should hand over Chairman Mao's writings, and 'Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung' to our relatives. But this has been refused. Further- more, patriotic newspapers, rasgazines and 1,6ks are also banned in the camp. European officers and agents inside the concentration camp often deliberately cursed and insulted our great socialist motherland and our great leader Chairman Mao. They frenziedly attack the patriotic workers and our patriotic compatriots. By Aagrantly showing hostility towards our great motherland, its 700 million people and the four million Hongkong com- patriots, the Hongkong British authorities have belied also their talks about the Sino-British relationship and casing the Hongkong situation. Their real intention, on the contrary, is to worsen the Sino-British relationship and intensity the tension in Hongkong. All this has fully exposed the reactionary nature of the Hongkong British authorities.

Following our great leader Chairman Mao's instruction: 'We must not show the slightest timidity before a wild beast', our relatives have waged a tie- for-tat struggle against the enemy. Under the most difficult conditions, they persist in studying Mao Tse-tung's thought. Although they are in the dark prisons, they cherish in their hearts their motherland and keep in their mind the whole world. They are immensely confident that we shall win and the Hongkong British authorities will be defeated. In fact, the Hongkong British authorities' plot of political persecution has since long been bankrupt.

The tortures imposed on our relatives mentally and physically by the Hongkong British authorities will stir the blood of anyone who so much as hears about them. What we make public here is only a fraction of these atrocities. But they are enough to lay bare the Hongkong British authorities" fascist nature.

The concentration camp is located at Mt Davis on Victoria Road in the West Point of Hongkong Island. From outside, you may not know that inside it is like a dark hell. The inmates are imprisoned separately in Block B and C in the compound. There are twelve what are called 'sealed rooms' in Block B. Each of the cells, a few feet square, has only a small hole which is closed all the time except when food is brought in, and a noisy ventilation fan which keeps roaring around the clock. For a long period the cells were each lighted day and night by a roo candle-power lamp. Two patriots are detained in such small cells. There they do not know whether it is day or night, rain or shine. In these 'sealed rooms', our relatives are subjected to the roaring of the fan and the irritating light from the bulb. More air being drawn our than let in, the cells are so suffocating that our relatives have to lie on the floor to get the fresh air filtering through the door gaps. Under such living conditions deliberately brought about, it is difficult for our relatives to have proper rest and they suffer from insomnia. They said that they were able to withstand all this only because Mao Tse- tung's thought had given them the will to fight. Otherwise it would have only been a matter of days for them to crack under the strain. The

[

vours once said that no one could live in such cells for more than three meaths. So they have to acknowledge that it is a miracle for some of our relatives who have now been detained there for nearly a year. In fact, this is no miracle. It is the strong power of Mao Tse-tung's thought.

The interrogation under tortures which our inmates were subjected to in the concentration camp is hardly conceivable for those who have not gone through them. Let us cite a few examples. One of our relatives was stripped and interrogated day and night for a few days. Others were baubat up time and again at the interrogation till they fainted. Then they

sed with cold water and interrogation was resumed when they themselves. Yet others were interrogated continuously for nearly 20 days without sleep. Some of them were forced to stand up after they dosed off for only half an hour. During the winter, some of our relatives, with no warm clothing, were interrogated in air-cooled rooms. Others were taken around the camp blind-folded in a deliberate attempt to terrorize them. Last winter our relatives were made to take cold showers at five o'clock each morning, and many of them became ill.... Having been beaten up, quite a number of our relatives were wounded but were given no medical care. Similar examples on maltreatment are too numerous to

Hist.

As far as living conditions are concerned, the agents never let go any chance to persecute the inmates. For a long time they were not given enough to eat. Their meals consisted of rice mixed with sand, sprouted potatoes and sometimes stale fish. Many of our relatives contracted disease because of malnutrition. When they fell sick, a European doctor in the camp nicknamed 'miracle doctor' would attend them. He was so nick- named because a single glance is enough for him to know whether one is ill or not, or what kind of disease one is suffering from. In most cases, he would prescribe nothing. One of our relatives was examined by the "doctor" for more than ten times. But he was never given a single pill. When at times the doctor does prescribe, what he gives is almost always limited to the sume two kinds of pills no matter what the patient is sufier- ing from. Thus some of our relatives have become weaker and weaker.

Going to the lavatory, taking a bath, or having a wash-all provides opportunities for the warders to torment our relatives. When one wants to go to the lavatory one has to ask the warders to let one out. The warders often take their time to make the inmate suffer. Or he sets a strict time limit when he does let the inmate out. Even in hot weather, the inmates are sometimes not allowed to bathe or wash themselves.

The camp authorities have concocted all sorts of devices to humiliate or torture our detained relatives. Those in Block C, for example, were handcuffed when they were brought out of their cells to walk through an open space to meet their visitors. This was said to be done for security's sake'. "What sophistry! The camp is guarded by troops, police, secret agents, Ghurkas, police dogs, plus high walls and wired barriers. And there are a total of nine locked doors between Block C and the entrance of the camp. Isn't there enough 'security'? Or is it that our relatives could By or disappear through the ground? This in one way also illustrates the Hongkong British authorities' cowardice and lack of confidence. Standing by our relatives, we have waged resolute struggle against the handcuffing of our relatives. But up till now, the camp authorities, pleading 'regula- tions', have not yet discontinued this practice.

All the above-mentioned is only a few instances of the fascist atrocities which the camp authorities have imposed on our relatives. They are too

many to put all on paper. But we keep an account of all the outrages and will certainly settle the account with the Hongkong British authorities. They will not be allowed to deny these sinful deeds they have committed and they can never escape the responsibility for having committed them.

Why do the Hongkong British authorities persecute, maltreat and tor- ture our relatives in this way? It is only because they love our motherland. love our great leader Chairman Mao, oppose to the national oppression and political persecution launched by the Hongkong British authorities. In order to safeguard our national dignity and defend Mao Tse-tung's thought, our detained relatives keep rentinding themselves of Chairman Mao's instruc- tion: This army has an indomitable spirit and is determined to vanquish all enemies and never to yield. No matter what the difficulties and hard- ships, so long as a single man remains, he will fight on. Knowing well that wherever there is struggle there is sacrifice', they look death in the face. Taking the heroes in the novel Red Cliff' as their models, they brave death, suffering and tortures and withstand one after another the frenzied attacks mounted by the enemy. They have smashed to smithereens the Hongkong British authorities' evil designs. We are proud of having such relatives! They are the fine sons and daughters of the Chinese nation. "Their spirit encourages us to courageously stand up and carry on our struggle against the Hongkong British authorities.

However, our relatives, and all those Chinese patriots illegally arrested and thrown into the dark prisons by the Hongkong British authorities, are still suffering. This is what we and all patriotic Chinese cannot acquiesce in. Time and again we have talked with the departments concerned of the Hong- kong British authorities. We have lodged protests with them and put demands to them. But up to now, the Hongkong British authorities have been trying to put the matter off and refuse to settle the problems promptly.

We, relatives of the patriotic Chinese unjustifiably detained in the con- centration camp, appeal to all Chinese patriots and all those who have a sense of justice to join us in denouncing and condemning the serious fascist atrocities committed by the Hongkong British authorities in violating human rights, undermining the normal work and life of the community, and impair-- ing the running of patriotic establishments and normal business concerns and carrying out political persecution. This illegal persecution launched by the Hongkong British authorities have prevented our relatives from performing their normal work. Many of our relatives are executives or staff members of trade unions, societies or schools. By depriving them of their liberty, the Hongkong British authorities have caused the organisations concerned enor mous losses. Some of our relatives have their own businesses to look after. The detention of Tang Ping-ta, for one example, has brought great losses to his business. Our families have been placed under abnormal conditions. Children fail to see their parents; wives and husbands have been separated. Who has given the Hongkong British authorities such right to do whatever they please? We appeal to the Chinese patriots and to people with a sense of justice to support the following demands we put forward:

1. Release all the patriotic compatriots unjustifiably detained in the concentra-

tion camp and the dark prisons;

2. Compensate them for their losses suffered mentally and physically and in

their work or their businesses;

3. Give proper medical care to those who have been wounded and who have become invalid because of assaults and maltreatments administered by the Hongkong British authorities.

4. Immediately stop maitreatments and safeguard personal safety.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE

Fco

Group.

Class..

21..

Piece... 213....

Following document(s) transferred to PRO Safe Room

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сепорта

DIN M. J. Mehray.

S 0,31

19 SEP 1968

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FD315

CONFIDENTIAL

Wilkinson

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HOPSON'S CASE the brand by die D. Hofmon.

The

Following our conversation with the P.U.S., last week,

I submit a note, written without papers, as an heretical

contribution to the debate about Peking/Hong Kong.

I recognise how distasteful it is to contemplate

a transaction with murderers etc., but I believe that it is

necessary, as a human problem, to do something to get the

Peking staff out. It also seems to me quite likely to turn

into a political problem sooner or later. My thesis is that

these problems are soluble, without incurring the disastrous

consequences which the C. O. and the Governor of Hong Kong

foresee.

Having been for three years out of this game, I have

without doubt committed many errors of fact and judgement

which you will castigate, and the suggestions for possible

action may be very wide of the mark. My main point is that

we have got a hand to play if we can be brought to play it.

1. GANGY

(T.W. Garvey)

26 July, 1968.

سة

Copies: Mr. Baker

Mr. J. Murray

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PEKING/HONG KONG

Assumption and Problem

The British staff in Peking are held there as security

against the release of the Chinese held by the Hong Kong

Government, and as a means of pressure to induce British

good behaviour in Hong Kong. Is it possible, on

tolerable terms, to procure the release of the British staff

in Peking?

Negotiating positions

China derives about one-third (say £200 m.) of all her

foreign currency receipts from supplying Hong Kong with food

and raw materials. She depends on this income for financing

her imports of wheat, to feed the populations of the Easter

cities, and for buying industrial equipment from the West,

on which her economic development depends. The net effect

for China's external payments of the reincorporation of Hong

Kong into the Chinese motherland would be that supplies

sent to Hong Kong would be paid for no longer in sterling

but in yuan. This would inflict a crippling blow on China's

economy. It is the reason why for 19 years the Chinese

Communists have put up with the British in Hong Kong and

why they still need us there.

3. When I last looked at the figures (during the January

"cuta" exercise), the U.K. was in deficit with Hong Kong on

visible trade, the visible deficit being about offset by

/invisibles

CONFIDENTIAL

invisibles and i.p.d. In balance of payments terms, departure

from Hong Kong would not hurt us and might on balance benefit

us. It would cause trouble in certain specific

directions e.g.

civil aviation (where we bargain rights at Hong Kong in

But exchange for the U.K.'s own needs) and sterling balances. the resultant damage to China would be far more widespread and

lasting than the harm to ourselves.

The optimum objective for the Chinese Government would

separate from China and forming

be a Macao-style Hong Kong:

part of another currency area, but Chinese-dominated.

This

would be quite unacceptable to the U.K., which would gain

nothing at all from such an arrangement.

Our reaction in

1967 has made it clear that we will not have it.

Cultural Revolution

5. The Chinese administrators (meaning people like Chou En-ki, Li Hsien-nien and Ch'en Yi) know perfectly well on which side their bread is buttered. They put up with Khrushchev's sneers about Western colonialism (a "stinking privy") on China's

doorstep. They have intimated to us over the years that provided there is no nonsense about self-govemment or "dominion

status", a basis for coexistence exists.

Since the cultural revolution the administrators have

had their ups and downs: at times their control at the centre has been greatly weakened, and the centre has lost control of

In these parts of the periphery, including Kwangtung.

conditions, the classic policy based on Chinese interest has been periodically at risk from wild men temporarily in

the saddle in Peking or wild men off the leash in Canton.

CONFIDENTIAL

/But

CONFIDENTIAL

But it is noteworthy that the administrators have stayed

They are the people who have run China since

in the game.

1949 and are quite likely the only ones who can still do the job.

These uncertainties complicate the problem, most notably

in their effect on timing, but do not invalidate the

underlying bargaining position.

Tactics

Possessing a strategic negotiating position of some

strength vis-à-vis the Chinese, we have much better prospects

than we sometimes imagine of employing tactical flexibility for

specific ends. The Government of Hong Kong has been doing

a number of things which the Chinese Government resents. It

has imprisoned (in some cases by judicial process, in others

by executive action) perhaps 200 "patriotic Chinese". It

permits regular visits from U.S. warships. It has deregistered

a Chinese Communist school. It is open to us, if we wish, to

make temporary and tactical concessions to the Chinese on

these matters, from a position of underlying strength.

7 As I understand it the Governor takes the view that the

Communists in Hong Kong have behaved like a lot of Yahoos

(his word) and that any indication of readiness to show

flexibility towards them will be seen by them and the Chinese

Government as proof of weakness. It will lead directly or

indirectly to a Chinese take over of Hong Kong and the trust

in us of the Chinese who have taken refuge in the colony from

Communist misrule will be betrayed. I am the first to recognise

the need for Governors to govern, but this position seems to

CONFIIENTIAL

/me

COLFIDENTIAL

me to be altogether too absolute, to misconceive the

underlying power-relationship, and to over-insure.

attracts scepticism from two points of view. First,

nothing in Hong Kong is black and white.

There are some

very opaque patches indeed the border (notably Sha Tau Kok and Deep Bay), the "square boundary" (maritime frontier),

the Kowloon "walled city" (over which Sir R. Black gave in

gracefully in 1963 · I was on the opposite side) to name a

few. If either side wanted to take an all-or-nothing view

it would be almost impossible for Hong Kong and China to

Secondly, co-exist, or for the British to "run" Hong Kong.

having half-apprehended the oriental concept of "face"

The Chinese, we tend to draw the wrong inferences from it.

both in Hong Kong and the mainland, are more sophisticated than

we sometimes give them credit for. The Hong Kong Chinese

will see well enough that the British will have to make

The

If value is received, Bome concession in exchange for value.

they will regard the deal as a natural one, and will give

us credit for pursuing our own interests intelligently.

Chinese Government, after their experiences last year (this

is where Sir D. Trench's rock-like attitude then pays off)

will start from the assumption that they are not going to

get their "optimum" solution. They may or may not be

immediately prepared to do business; but they will not

conclude, if we make a proposition to them, that the

Governor has thrown in his hand. My conclusion is that we

need not fear that Britain will somehow lose virtue, or lose

control, by being willing to transact with the Chinese.

CONFIDENTIAL

A possible negotiation

8. How then could we set about negotiating? Having no

direct knowledge of recent events, I can only advance a few

haphazard thoughts:

(a) The first requisite for change is to get rid of the

(b)

psychological stop, in our minds and the Governor's,

on doing a deal with the Chinese. Perhaps the chief

obstacle is the notion that any flexibility on the U.K.'s part will imperil the freedom of 334 million "refugees"

from Chine. It won't

Since we need a valid interlocutor, we should have to

pick our moment carefully. We shall not get what we

want if matters are brought to a head at a moment when

the "wild men" are on top in Peking. But this does not

prevent us from preparing the ground now. Given the

uncertainties of the political see-saw in Peking we need

to be ready to act far more quickly than we have so far

shown ourselves able to.

across, if possible to Chou En-lai. The essential element

of such a message, however expressed, would be that the

maintenance of the status quo in Hong Kong is losing its

attraction to us; and that, in the absence of a

normalisation of Anglo-Chinese relations we should see

little point in carrying on.

(d) For such a message, and for any other exchanges, we would

need a channel.

Fractically no one in third countries is

CONFIDENTIAL

/both

CONFIDENTIAL

both sufficiently persona grata and has the guts to do a

Job for us, Three years ago President Ayub Khan would

have been a possibility. I do not know whether he still

is. Failing a satisfactory foreign intermediary we

should need to get into business ourselves. Hong Kong

would be the place to set up. I saw a recent telegram

(on a banking subject) which suggested that there is a

channel which appears to work. But we should have to

show the colour of our money. Two individuals who would

be taken by the Chinese as serious and representative are

Mr. Malcolm KacDonald and Lord Trevelyan.

(e) An alternative to the direct approach is to show "signs".

We are fortunate in having a great many more Chinese

pawns in our hands than they have of ours. It would

surely pay us to use them freely, both on the "china egg"

principle and in requital for any flexibility shown by

the Chinese, e.g. in kicking out (instead of keeping)

the Vickers-Zimmer engineers. If it does less violence

to the Governor's conscience to release detainees rather

than condemned men, we could start with the former. But

we should almost certainly have to let some of the latter

out sooner or later.

(f) However transitionally, I think we shall need to be ready

to cut down on the U. 3. Navy's access to Hong Kong. It

has never been clear to me why they cannot, for a time at

least, make more use of the Philippines. It will not kill

the Hong Kong retailers to forego a little business.

CONFIDENTIAL

/(g)

CONFIDENTIAL

(g) In dealing with the misdemeanours of Chinese Communist

schools, could we not be more selective;

for instance,

closing down science laboratories rather than

deregistering the schools outright?

CONFIDENTIAL

HWA..!^/?

Criv. No. 3

SEP 1968

FD 315

With the compliments of

COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

Hang Kam Deft като

11 September 1918

LONDON, S. W.1.

C.S. 41C

2600079

30.000-1/67-852117

No.

SCR 3/3571/68

SECRET

COLONIAL SECRETARIAT.

LOWER ALBERT ROAD,

HONG KONG.

2nd September, 1968.

Деси Судониала,

Here are six copies of a Special Branch comparison of concessions made to the Communists and vice versa since May last year.

Copies have been sent to Singapore

to JIC(FE) and to Peking.

your sincerel

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useful, but is clean interided as evidena agamor concessions in general. Since the Coniex regard Hong Kong

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REF: GEN/13/1860

ECRET

Copy No.

Copies

Special Branch,

Police Headquarters,

Hong Kong.

23rd August, 1968.

À comparative study of concessions made by the Chinese Commists and the British and Hong Kong Governments

related to the communist confrontation in the Colony

INTRODUCTION

This paper studies the concessions which have been made since

the onset of the Chinese communist confrontation with the Hong Kong Government in Hay, 1967. (Governor's Committes Xesting Hinute No. 395/68

refers). For the purpose of this study and to present a realistic picture of the policies and attitudes of both sides it has been necessary to accept a fairly wide interpretation of what is meant by the term "concession". In consunist eyes to conform with an established law or principle of conduct can be a concession. By the same token the great restraint shown in enforcing that law must also be held to be a concession

by Governsent.

It has been found useful to attempt to categorise concessions, as set out in Annexures 'A' to 'D' to this paper. Firstly there are those which have been made on a reciprocal basis and have sterned from negotiations or at least from an intimated prior agreement; these are limited to two instances, the Border talks of November last year and the special visits to prisons in Hong Kong, resulting in access to Grey in Peking (Annexure 'A'). Secondly those concessions made by the C.P.G. and E.M.G. concerning visas and restrictions on movement of Mission staff which, although not directly affecting Hong Kong, must be considered in the context of this paper as the C.P.G. authorities clearly intimated

SECRET

/that

ECRET

that the Hong Kong question was a major factor (Annexure 'B'). The third category contains concessions by local comunists and the Hong

Kong Government arising from changes in communist policy, mainly the

cessation of violence as a major means of confrontation, and a change to a political 'struggle' (Annexure 'C'). The fourth category which is,

in fact, the largest, lists the many concessions made by Government since May, 1967, either as a clear cut conciliatory act or as a part of

the very many restraints which were placed, as a matter of Hong Kong

Government policy, on perfectly justified action against communists in

the Colony (Annexure 'D'). In this context the aim was to make it

perfectly clear that Government did not wish to bring about any

aggravation of the situation and was doing all in its power to reduce

tension within the bounds of maintaining law and order.

NEGOTIATED CONCESSIONS

The Border Talks (Annexure 'A') illustrate yet again the

communists' determination to extract the maximum concessions during any

negotiated settlement; indeed their conduct during the meetings with

Hong Kong Government representatives soon made this clear. It could be

claimed that the subsequent firmer control exerciced by C.C.A. personnel

in the Border area was a direct result of the talks, but this can be

attributed equally to the change in communist policy at about that time concerning the future general conduct of confrontation (see Annexure 'C' (b) and (c)). In any event the agreement by the Chinese authorities to allow

unhindered repairs to the primary fence was not honoured, and harrassment

of British Security Forces has continued from time to time to the present

day. While access to Grey was permitted, again this was only in return for

special visits to 15 prisoners in Hong Kong, to whom access had never been

denied.

DIPLOMATIC CONCESSIONS

On the face of it, the Chinese would appear now to be considering

a return to normal diplomatic practice in respect of visas for representat- ives of H.M.G. However it is somewhat unrealistic to consider the visa

question in isolation or to suggest that the possible current change in the communist attitude on this matter is stemming directly from the relaxation of what was little more than an academic restriction placed on the Chinese

RET

/Mission

DECRET

Hission staff in England.

-3-

Clearly that this is not to be a direct

reciprocal concession is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the latest C.P.G. move to issue visas followed the Hong Kong Government announcement of steps to de-register the communist Chung Wah Middle School. Rather was it probably the result of a combination of factors, one of which may have been some forewarning of the British diplomatic campaign which was set in motion at the end of July, with a view to

bringing sons pressure to bear on the C.P.G. regarding visas. However the lifting of movement restrictions in London and Peking can be seen

as a reciprocal concession, although the C.P.G. still continues to impose

restrictions as it sees fit.

CONCESSIONS RESULTING FROM CHANGES IN COMMUNIST POLICY

As mentioned above, the largest group of concessions by

communista in Hong Kong falls within Annexure 'C', and emanates from a

deliberate change in policy towards confrontation in the Colony.

As early as September, 1967, some local C.P.G. commercial organisations were already attempting to return to normal business, rather than engaging in subversion and violence. However, with the advent of the Peking instruction in December, 1967, to end the violent phase of activity, this move quickly became more widespread. By the end of that month, through the offices of the local communist leadership, this instruction had been effectively enforced. This new communist tactic was not prompted by any response to conciliatory actions by the Hong Kong Government but by a realisation of the failure of their previous policy in the face of determined resistance

by Government and the community as a whole. Nevertheless, the fact that this major change took place must be regarded as a highly important change of policy. In ending violence Peking demonstrated that control had been

reimposed over local militants and indicated a willingness, albeit to serve

her own ends, to see a return to more normal conditions in Hong Kong. It

is considered that it is within this context that the firmer control

exercised by C.C.A. personnel in the Border area and the general lowering of tension there should be seen. The Hong Kong Government responded with a number of restraints and concessions including the general cessation of police action against communist representatives.

KON-RECIPROCAL CONCESSIONS BY HONG KONG GOVERNMENT

Since May 1967, the Hong Kong Government has ande numerous concessions, in the form of restraint in not taking justified action

SECRET

/against

SECRET

against communists in the Colony.

The extent of this holding back is woll illustrated by the list contained at Annexure 'D'. In some instances this restraint was exercised for tactical reasons, for example to ensure the fullest public support before taking steps to stop a certain line of communist activity; in others it was in the hope that the communists would respond with some reduction in the level of their opposition to Government. In many cases, of course, it was because of political factors outside the Colony. However, in general these concessions have met with little or no response by the comunists and Government has been left invariably with the alternative of allowing increasing pressure against its authority or taking positive action. In this direction it is noteworthy that, in broad terms, the communista have usually retreated in the face of firm moves against them,

g wonder

CONCLUSIONS

The Hong Kong Government has made many concessions during the confrontation with the Chinese comuniste but has received little in return. Indeed experience suggests that such conciliatory gestures, whether they are clear cut actions or restraints, are not normally reciprocated voluntarily by the communista. Instead there is evidence that, on occasions, any such moves are misinterpreted, namely as a sign of weakness, thus encouraging the opposition to increase their pressure on Government. This is not to say, of course, that any form of negotiation with the Chinese authorities should be ruled out. However it is considered that H.M.G. or E.K.G. are only likely to obtain a reasonable settlement where it is clear to the communists that our Governments will not be intimidated or agree to concessions without some clear guarantee they will result in reciprocation by the other side.

SECRE

GEN/13/1860

"CRET

Annex 'A'

Agreed Concessions on a Reciprocal Basis

Two agreements have been reached with communists, namely those resulting from the Border talks in November, 1967, and theas culminating in access to Grey in Peking and visits by N.C.N.A. and communist newspaper representatives to prisoners in Hong Kong connected with journalism.

(A) Border Talks"·

(1) Concessions by the Communists

(2) Concessions by Bong Kong Govt.

(a) Agreement that the primary Border

fence might be repaired without hindrance. (In fact repair parties were stoned frequently from Chinese Territoryh

(b) The release of two P.C.s detained in

C.T. and the return of their motor cycle and of the belongings of Senior Police Inspector Knight who had,

during the talks, escaped from C.T.

(a) The removal of those portions of the

secondary fence on land farmed by

C.T. residents;

(b) The re-opening of the Man Kan To Bridge; (c) A guarantee that production and normal activities, including the study of the

works of HAO by residenta of G.T. while on British Territory (B.T.) would not be hampered;

(d) Release of five persone to C.T. who were

charged with committing criminal offences

in the Colony;

(e) Compensation paid for crops allegedly

damaged as a result of Chinese

Territory farmers being unable to

cultivate them owing to the closure of the Man Kam To Bridge;

/(1)

SECRET

SECRE

(1) Compensation paid for graves of C.T.

residents allegedly danaged during

construction of military positions

in B.T..

(B) Prison Visits

(1) Concessions by

the Comunista

(2) Concessions by

Hong Kong Govt.

Access to Grey by staff of British Mission in Peking was permitted on 23rd April, 1968,

the first since his confinement on 21st July,

1967. There is also evidence that the

conditions under which Grey is held have been relaxed slightly, in that he has been allowed

to write a letter home and is allowed on

occasions to collect some of his belongings

from other parts of his house

Special visits by personnel of the Hong Kong

Branch of the N.C.N.A. and communist newspaper representatives were permitted on 9th and 10th April, 1968, to 15 persons employed by local

communist newspaper organisations who were

serving prison sentences in Hong Kong. (N.B. These prisoners have received normal monthly visits by relatives and friends since

their conviction in 1967).

SECRET

Annex 'B'

GEN/13/1860

Concessions by the Chinese Peoples Government and

Her Majesty's Government not Directly

Affecting Hong Kong

(1) By C.P.G.

(a) The partial lifting, on 29th November, 1967, of restrictions

on the movement of the Mission Staff imposed in August, 1967; (b) Granting of exit visas to a limited number of the Mission Staff

as well as to certain families after a delay of several months; (c) A general undertaking on 27th July, 1968, that outstanding

exit visas would be issued (of the 18 outstanding at this date,

nine have since been issued including one for H.H. Charge

d'Affaires).

(2) By H.M.G.

(a) The lifting in November, 1967, of the movement restriction on Chinese Mission Staff in London imposed in August, 1967;

(b) Relaxation in April, 1968, of a requirement for exit visas

for members of the Chinese Mission in London imposed in August, 1967.

SECRET

GEN/13/1860

SECRET

Annex 'C'

Communist Concessions Resulting from Apparent Changes

in Policy and responses by the Hong Kong

(1) Concessions by

the Communists

(2) Concessions by the

Hong Kong Govt.

Government

(a) A general compliance with the law and

co-operation with Government in

certain cases, e.g. applications for permits; payment of outstanding rates and other fees to Government; payment of fines by the three suspended

newspapers prior to reopening; overt

compliance with Education Department

regulations, at least during school

inspections; abiding by censorship

decisions for theatrical and film

performances; complying with health and

fire regulations in comunist owned or controlled buildings;

(b) A general toning-down of the violent

language in the communist prees although material continues to be published which

is in breach of the law;

serious Border incidents, although

sporadic minor harrasements such as stone throwing at British Security Forces

still continue;

(d) Leaving the Hong Kong Government shunting engine at Lo Wu free from posters and slogans since 10th June, 1968.

(a) The cessation of police searches of

Trade Union and other communist premises since November, 1967, except when major

breaches of the law have occurred.

/(b)

SECRET

CRET

- 2 -

(b) The suspension of action on arrest lists

of leading communists who were involved

in subversive activities;

(a)

communists wanted for criminal offences,

except in relation to serious and

violent cases;

The indefinite deferment of civil action

(libel suit) by Government servants against cozaunist newspapers;

(e) Restriction to token enforcement of the

13 conditions which were specially brought

to the attention of communist schools in

August, 1967, by Government;

(f) The remittance of caning sentences on

students imposed on conviction for

serious offences;

(g) Withdrawal of a deregistration notice

served on the communist controlled Paikoo

Dockyard Chinese Workers' Union upon this

body guaranteeing to stay within the law

in future;

(h) A general amnesty in respect of arms,

atrunition and explosives from 15th to 28th January, 1968;

(1) The gradual withdrawal, since May, 1968,

of British Military personnel from forward

positions on the Border.

SECRET

GEN/13/1860

SECRET

Annex 'D'

Other Concessions by the Hong Kong Government

(1) Actual Concessions

(a) Normal storage and distribution charges waived in respect of the

'gift rice' offered to Hong Kong communists by the Kwangtung Provincial Support Committee and permission given to import part of amount as a non-commercial consignment and outside the quota. (The Communists have not in fact taken advantage of this); (b) Re-licensing of the Silver Theatre on 17th May, 1968, (closed in

June 1967 when it was used for inflammatory broadcasts and the storage of weapons) although known to Government that new licensee was representing original communist licence holder; (c) The three suppressed newspapers allowed to recommence publication

on 18th February, 1968, some two weeks before the expiry of the suppression orders when it became apparent that the communists were under the impression that the six months' period of suppression commenced on the date the original suspension order came into force instead of the date of the Court's verdict.

(2)

Concessions in the Form of Restraint by the Hong Kong Government (a) Except when deemed to be in flagrant defiance of the law and

likely to cause a breach of the peace no action taken, as a matter of policy, against processions, meetings, delegations and

picnics;

(b) No immediate action against inflammatory posters in May, 1967; (c) Careful limitation of any arrest action and detention under Emergency Regulations; no attempt was made to arrest C.P.G. officials or certain senior communists in Hong Kong, although the arrest of many such persons could have been justified clearly during the violent phases of communiet activity; (d) No action against the premises of communist banks or C.P.G.

owned commercial firms, organisations or vessels, although they were used as bases for violent subversive activity, including

broadcasting of inflammatory speeches and so forth;

(e) No prosecution of the six major communist newspapers, although

they were and still are in daily breach of the law.

/(1) No......

SECRE

SECRET

- 2 -

(f) No action to close major communist schools, other than the

Chung Wah Middle School where bombs exploded, although there was evidence of their staff and students' involvement in

violent activities;

(g) No general move to deregister communist unions or associations,

although many have ceased to meet the requirements of the law and in some cases strong grounds exist, through their involve- ment in violent phases of last year;

(h) No restrictions placed on the movement between Hong Kong and

China of Communist officials.

(1) Since the beginning of confrontation C.T. farmers have been involved in a number of incidente on the Border; apart from Sha Tau Kok, these occurred mainly at Lo u, Ta Ku Ling and particularly Kan Kan To where they were supported by coolies, also from C.T. and involved attacks on security forces, the abduction of one Police officer and serious injury to another and the seizure of hostages and weapons from security forces. Throughout the tension and dangerous situations so caused, security forces behaved with great restraint and thus avoided what might have become a major escalation. During the whole of this time, apart from a period from mid-October to the end of November, 1967, when the bridge at Man Kam To was closed following the abduction of the Police officer, no restriction was placed on the entry of these farmers into B.T. despite the trouble they had caused.

(1) Arrest warrants issued in December, 1967, for six staff of the

Hon Wah Middle School who failed to pay fines imposed by the courts were not pursued to the extent of raiding the school or

staff premises;

(k) Rent for a G.I.S. teleprinter in the premises of the Hong Kong Evening News was waived for the period from 21st August, 1967, the date of auspension of the newspaper, to 18th January, 1968, the date on which the teleprinter was repossessed;

(1) Supervision Orders in respect of released communist prisoners

not enforced to the extent of raiding communist premises to effect arrest when the supervisees fail to comply with the

orders;

CRET

(m) Communists......

SECRET

-3-

(m) Communists sentenced to terms of imprisonment for offences

committed during confrontation have been granted full

remission of sentence, even though their behaviour while in

prison was such that they did not merit this,

(n) Withdrawal on 3rd April, 1968, of three arrest warrants issued

in respect of a breach of licensing conditions by the commu-

nist Han Yang Theatre on 1st October, 1967;

(6) Arrangements made in June 1968, for a representative of the

Hong Kong Government Waterworks Department to once more cross

into Chinese Territory to agree monthly figures of water supplied to the Colony although no guarantee as to his safe conduct (in

the event he was subjected on the first occasion to harrassmert by Chinese personnel);

(p) No action taken to remove an illegal structure built in June,

1968, by labourers from Chinese Territory on British Territory

at Han Kam To;

(q) The release in July and August, 1968, of a total of nine percons

detained under the Emergency Regulations before the expiry of

their respective Detention Orders.

SECRET

Flag A

Flag B

SECRET. Covering

TOP SECRET

110

Kr. Wilkinson

HONG KONG

RECFIVED IN ARCIMVES No.51

200EC 1967

FD3/5

In his telegram 1840 of 9 December, the Governor of

Hong Kong suggested that the Chinese might be trying to tell

us that they would be prepared to talk over the whole problem [of Hong Kong in fairly reasonable terms. In his comments

in Peking telegram 347 of 14 December, the Chargé d'Affaires

said that he thought it much more likely that the Chinese

wanted mutually tacit agreement for a de facto de-escalation

rather than any general discussion with us.

2. I had a meeting with the Commonwealth Office this morning

at which we had a general discussion of the issues involved.

Commonwealth Office have produced a draft telegram which we

have revised and which is now attached.

3. I suggest that the draft might be discussed with Er.

Rodgers at the meeting this afternoon.

M. Redgur.

Deanolds, I ayove

with the telegram.

ре

Jou

Hurry

(James Murray) 18 December, 1967

Whilhnion

18/111.

SECRET comoring

TOP SECRET

1812.67

I have informed To Carter (c...) that the tel. way essure.

paled.

Reisbae.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry No.

DEPARTMENT

F.E.D.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

FD315

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should wi10

reach addressee(s)

PRIORITY MARKINGS

(Date)

Despatched

Top Secret Secret

Confidential

Bastriated

En Clair. Code Cypher

Draft Telegram to;;

Mot

HONG KONG

(Date)

And to:-

Repeat to:-

PEKING

POLAD SINGAPORE

Saving to:- WASHINGTON

Distribution:--

As for H.K.

tel. No.1840

کرا

Copies to:--

Emergency s Immediate "Fronty Romina

Security classification

If any

COPY. ORIGINAL BRING SBIT BY CO.

www..c

SECRET ET

[Codeword-if any)

Hong Kong

Addressed to

telegram No.

(date)

And to...

repeated for information to Peking and POLAD Singapore

Saving to Washington

וי יו

- L¬

Hit.And

Your telegram No. 1840: Chinese Policy towards

Hong Kong

We have been very interested in the indicators

you refer to in paragraph 1. They point to

considerable uncertainty amongst the Chinese

may about policy towards Hong Kong and/betoken attempta

by the communists to disengage.

2. We agree, however, with the reading of the

situation in Peking telegram no. 347 and are not

convinced that the Chinese have any desire to talk

in în general terme about Hong Kong. It is possible

that they may in the near future be prepared to

pontuulet enter into some sort of exchanges about specific

questions, such as the deportation of prisoners,

the release of Grey or new border problems if they

arise; but it seems to us doubtful that they will

in the foreseeable future wish to go beyond this,

since they surely have little to gain and much to lose (in terms of internal politics) if they do so.

3. Our view is that we should respond cautiously

to any apparent feelere towards understandings on /matters

SECRET

matters in which the C.P.G. shows special interest. In doing

so we must avoid a situation in which we will have tied our

hande in an area where we could exert pressure, e.g. the communist

press, while leaving C.P.G. free to exploit other aspects of

confrontation.

4. If general talks with the Chinese on Hong Kong were to seem

a possibility we agree that there are arguments for holding them

elsewhere than in Hong Kong or Peking.

Kong or Peking. But we do not think that

contacts on specific points could be usefully pursued except in

Hong Kong or Peking, since it is usually necessary for such

"negotiations" to cover in some depth practical details of the

problem under discussion.

5. We agree with Hopson that the Chinese, if they wish to

disengage, will find it necessary to demonstrate some kind of

"victory". At some stage it may be useful to help them find a

face-saving formula but we should want to be pretty sure that

it would achieve the desired result. In any case this stage kas

not yet come. If it does, the Chinese will probably give us an

indication themselves of what they would expect. If we help them

in this prematurely, we are probably likely to encourage the

"extremists" rather than the "moderates".

SECRET

(01247) (2) 3004 TRAKS KA

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

(6435) D4.433274 300m 10/66 G.W.B.Lad Gp.343

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry FD

No.

FD 315

Top Secret.

Secret.

DCW

Confidential. 12/12

Restricted.

Unclassified,

Staff in Confidence.

Copy to:

Mr. Carter, Hong Kong

Department.

SECRET (Covering TOP SECRET

DRAFT

To:

Mr. Wilkinso)

-Submission

Type 1 +

From

RECE

ARCHIV>

ames Murray

Telephone No Ext.

1 8DEL 1967

Problem

FD31

Department

DISCUSSIONS WITH THE CHINESE ABOUT

TÙNG KONG

ساء

Flags

Flag A

Wores

The Governor of Hofle Kong has reported/

that various indications lead him to believe

that the Chinese may wish to hold general

ation's

scussions about Hong Kong.

He has suggested

a discreet approach to the Chinese indicating

Allienges

to explore the possibility of

reaching some sort of general understanding.

commated

Hopson has already red that he sees

the present situation as rather more complex

than the Govephor has suggested.

Recommendations

I recommend that we should pour cold

water on the idea of general discussions with

the Chinese about Hong Kong. I attach a draft

telegram.

Background and Argument

3 Mr. Hopson has commented (Peking telegram

No. 322) that he sees the situation as rather

more complex and I share his view. The Gover-

nor of Hong Kong has concluded from various indications (Hong Kong telegram No. 1840) that

/the

CONFIDENTIAL

the Chinese may be prepared to discuss in general

terms the problem of Hong Kong I

fear myself that he has been indulging in

(insert from previous plange

s ome wishful thinking.

While it is true that

there have been indications of uncertainty

amongst the Chinese about future policy towards

((Hong boung tel no 1834),

Hong Kong,

do not think that this means that

the Chinese now wish to enter into discussions.

From the Chinese point of view there is surely

nothing to be gained by such discussions and,

however secret they were, the Chinese would

always fear that news of such discussions would

leak out and be very hard to present convincingly

for internal propaganda consumption.

general

Although/discussions to me/seen to be a

non-starter, I think there may be a possibility

of some kind of exchanges about specific

issues such as the deportation of prisoners,

the release of Kr. Grey or new border problems

if they arėse.

5. Mr. Hopson has also raised the question

of whether we should make some sort of gesture

to help a trend towards disengagement.

I game Bitt him this the

251% they will find it necessary to look

for some way of representing the events of the

last few months as a "victory" for Kaoism

Flag C

Flag B.

however untrue this may be in fact.

There

may come a time at which it will be in our

interests to help them to find some face-saving

way of putting forward this idea, but I do

not think that time has yet come. Although

we have strong indications of differences

/of

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

D4.033009 Op.843

SECRET

of opinion about Hong Kong between "moderates"

and "extremists", we do not yet know which line

if either, has come out on top. I think it

is much better in these circumstances to let

the Chinese work out their own salvation.

we do this and their policy does tend towards

disengagement, I am sure that sooner or later

they will give some indication of face-savin

solutionlab, they would like to see.

If,

on the other hand, we now seek for ways to

provide them with their solution, it seers

to me likely that this would be taken as a

sign of weakness by the Chinese and only serve

to strengthen the hand of the "extremiato".

Kr. Hopson has also raised the question

of action against the communist newspapers

in Hong Kong. This has already been dealt

with in separate telegrams to Hong Kong, in

which we recommend that assessment for damages

in the case of the Wen Hui Pao should, f

the moment, be postponed.

for

269

Written AnSWETS

5 DECEMBER 1967

GIBRALTAR (INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANISATION) 73. Mr. Bryant Godman Irvine asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what progress has been made with the British appeal to the Council of the In- ternational Civil Aviation Organisation, under article 84 of the Chicago Conven- tio regards the Spanish prohibition flights in the vicinity of Gibraltar.

. William Rodgers: On 6th Sep- tember we filed with the International Civil Aviation Organisation Council in Montreal a Memorial stating our case over the Prohibited Area and setting in motion the appropriate procedure for the settlement of disputes under Article 84 of the Chicago Convention, Spain has been required to filc a Counter- Memorial by Ist February, 1968.

MR. GERALD BROOKE

Sir J. Eden asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what reply he has received from the Russian Govern- ment to his demands for the immediate release of Mr. Gerald Brooke and if he will make a statement.

;

Mr. William Rodgers: I regret that the Soviet Government have now made it clear to us that they will not release Mr. Brooke under the terms of the amnesty.

HONG KONG

Sir W. Teeling asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs what arrange- ments he has made for discussions to take place during December in Japan between British and mainland Chinese officials concerning Hong Kong.

Mr. William Rodgers: None.

FOREIGN MINISTER (VISIT TO JAPAN)

Sir William Teeling asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs when he in- tends to visit Japan.

Mr. George Brown: I hope very much to be able to visit Japan early in the New Year.

4 13 14

Written Answers

OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT Tanzania-Zambia Railway

270

74. Mr. Alexander Lyon asked the Minister of Overseas Development what conclusions Her Majesty's Government have reached following their study of the Maxwell Stamp report on the proposed railway link between Tanzania and Zambia which has been in their possession since August, 1967.

Mr. Oram: The consultants' report was addressed not to Her Majesty's Govern- ment but to a Committee of Ministers of the Governments of Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. I have nothing further to add to the replies my right hon. Friend gave to the hon. Member for Antrim, North (Mr. Henry Clark) on the 9th November.--[Vol. 753, c. 1234.]

Fiji (Survey)

Mr. Bryant Godman Irvine asked the Minister of Overseas Development what progress has been made with the survey of land resources in Fiji,

Mr. Oram: Three officers from the Directorate of Overscas Surveys are at present taking part in this survey, and it is expected that a fourth member will join the team next January. Over 80 per cent. of the necessary new air photographs for difficult weather conditions. Enumerators new mapping have been obtained, despite

are at work in the field gathering informa- tion to be used in land classification. It is expected that they will finish their work towards the end of 1968. Present esti- mates are that the timber resources survey will occupy three seasons, that is 1967, 1968 and 1969. Land classification data will be processed in Britain by computer.

Close liaison is being maintained with officers of the United Nations Develop- ment Programme, who at the request of the Government of Fiji are carrying out a study of forestry plantation development and timber processing and marketing.

RAILWAYS

Wagons (Scottish Potatoes)

75. Mr. Buchanan-Smith asked the Minister of Transport if she is aware of the difficulties of potato growers and

5/12/64

269w 755

PECTIVED IN

HIVES No.31

1 1 DEC 1967

FD3/5

p.c.

(9069) 14.832652 3m 1/47 G.WILM. Gp.363

FD315

PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION

NOW

for ORAL answer on

до

F.ED.

The draft reply should reach the Parliamentary Office through your Under-Secretary by

Noon on ilom. 4/12

Sir William Teeling (Brighton, Pavilion): To ask the Secretary of State förForeign Affairs, what arrangements he has made for discussions to take place during December in Japan between British and mainland Chinese officials concerning Hong Kong.

5 December, 1967

De Likian Rooler

Побрел

None, Sir

Affered by the Rhodges

pele.

ре

NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES

PD3/51

FD3/stw.

Sino-British Relations

1. I am quite prepared to discuss general questions of

Sino-British relations with the Chinese at any time they

show a wish to do so.

Questions on Internal Events in Hong Kong

Questions concerning the internal affairs of Hong Kong

are for my right honourable Friend, the Commonwealth Secretary.

Future Plans for Discussions with the Chinese on Hong Kong

I have no plans to hold discussions with the Chinese

Government about the status of Hong Kong.

AN Wisson Hanoice dogter

by 8/5

✓ Dec.

W-7

в рас

PQ for now

This is as agreed with

Hong Kong but has not yet gone, beyond

beyond my

whack here.

ANG

1.12,67

Draft Reply to Parliameätaw -westien kr

Colda

da Jackson, K.R

So far as the internal situation is concerned, there is

very little to add to the reply given by my boɑourable Friend, the

Minister of State, en 6th November to the Honourable Hember for

Easington. Bomb incidents have continued on a fluctuating scale

and there have been a few minor demonstrations,

ocatimes against illegal. Communist activities.

Police action

Border exchanges betwen Hong Kong Government officials

and the local Chinese berder authorities were concluded on

25th November, The exchanges vere confined to local frontier lasuna

and agressent was reashed on the return to British territory of certain

Hong Kong police personnel who had been in Chinese hands for several

weska; the deportation to China of five persons arrested for offences

committed in British territory near the bordar; the opening of the

border bridge at Man Kam To; the ralonation of a våre fence which had

been erected by the Hong Kong authorities in 1962 for immigration

perpassaj the making of paysenta by the British side to offset losses

to certain farmers from Chiness territory resulting from the closure of

the Max Lun To Bridge and damage onused to certain graves by the

construction of military verka in British territory,

The British side made it clear that they accepted no blame

for the closure of Has Kas To Bridge. They also made it clear thaš any

parsons from Chinese territory who verited land on the Hong Kong alde

vere free to cross the frontier to engage in farulag and other activities

providing that they behaved in a normal orderly manner.

Kr. Wilkinson

Parliamentary Office

CONFIDENTIAL

RECE.. ARCH

1 1 DEC 1967

+D3/5

Question by Sir William Keeling

There was press speculation about two weeks ago,

amanating from Hong Kong, to the effect that the Secretary

of State was going to hold talks with the Chinese in Japan

during his proposed visit there. News Department have already

made it clear in answer to enquiries here that no such talks

had been planned or were being considered.

2. The press speculation presumably arose from distorted

rumours about the talks which took place between Hong Kong

Government officials and the Chinese border authorities between

1 and 25 November. These talks have now been successfully

concluded with an exchange of "captured" personnel, and

agreement by the Hong Kong Government to make an ex gratia

payment to Chinese peasants who were prevented from entering

Hong Kong by the closure of one of the border bridges, and to

pay compensation for certain graves which were destroyed during

the course of constructing some military defences near the

border.

3. The Chinese originally asked that these discussions

should be kept secret. On 30 November, however, they published

a fairly accurate account of what had been agreed and,

predictably, claimed it as a great victory. The Hong Kong

/Government

CONFIDENTIAL

Flag A

wi7

Government have therefore confirmed that discussions took

place, and in answer to a question also down for Tuesday,

5 December, the Commonwealth Secretary will make a

statement giving brief details of what was agreed.

of the draft for this statement is attached.

James

Hurey

(James Murray) 4 December, 1967

A copy

Paul Office.

Philkunison

The 4th 1967.

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Peking

N- 321

8/12.

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H.K Sie. (Fo.)

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1 1 DEC 1967

8 December 1967

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Addressed to F.0. telegram No. 321 of 8 December Repeated for information to:

Hong Kong, POLAD Singapore, Washington.

fc 3/3 y telegram No. 317: Chinese Protest about Hong Kong.

You will have noted that the statement as published included the phrase about further deterioration of Sino/British relations. In my telegram No. 315 I said this had been said in an Aside. This was an eror and i have confirmed from our notes that it was in fact part of formal statement. We must therefore attribute to it a little more meaning. Nevertheless general tenor of the conversation was not particularly minatory.

F.O. pass Priority Hong Kong 163, Routine POLAD Singapore 46, Washington 46.

F.0.

Mr. Hopson

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IMMEDIATE PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Telno. 315

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- 7CCC 1967

6 December 1967

103/5

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 315 of 6 December, Repeated for information to Hong Kong, POLAD Singapore and Washington.

My immediately preceding telegram.

This interview which was in a comparatively low key seems a formalisation of the Chinese position as explained to me by Mr. Kao on 2 December. It does not seem to introduce any new elements. The emphasis throughout was that the Chinese Government expected our actions to match our words and that if Sino British relations were to improve we must show our goodwill by actions in Hong Kong. The veiled threat contained in Hsueh's statement that if suppression in Hong Kong continues relations could only deteriorate Turther was made as an aside and not (repeat not) as part of the formal statement. I concluded therefore that our star is now firmly hitched to Hong Kong but that the Chinese Government may still be willing to take further steps to normalise our position here if by some gesture in relation to Hong Kong we were to give them the opening to do so.

2. I suggest we should wait for the N.C.N.A. version before making any comment. I recommend that the News Department should in reply to any question confine themselves to saying that I Teject the protest and to rebutting Chinese version of the events as necessary. It would be preferable to avoid comment on the wider subject of Sino-British relations.

Foreign Office pass Hong Kong 157 Immediate, POLAD Singapore 42 Priority, Washington 12 Priority.

Mr. Hopson.

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TELEGRAM SECTION Room 124 K.C.S.

Communications Department

FD315

F.E.D.

* Please send copies of the following telegram

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.315

TO:

From Peking

6 December, 67.

Hong Kong Situation (4 China's attitude.)

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Action taken in Communications Department :

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6/19/67.

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En Clair

IMMEDIATE

Telno. 314

PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

UNCLASSIFIED

IVED IN LARG. VES No.31

6 December 1967

- 7 DEC 1967

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Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 314 of

6 December.

Repeated for information to Hong Kong, Washington and POLAD Singapore.

I was summoned to the Foreign Ministry this afternoon and received by the Deputy Director of Western Europe, who made an oral protest about recent events in Hong Kong. He mentioned the closure of Chung Hua school and the raiding of four other schools, the arrest of the headmaster of Chung Hua school, the banning of "Youth Garden Weekly", the judgment for libel against Wen Hui Pao, the arrest of two film directors and searching of film studio premises, the raiding of the Kowloon branch of the Motor Transport Union and three other unions.

2. Mr. Hsueh characterised these acts as further suppression of Chinese in Hong Kong which he said completely gave the lie to the British Government's professions about improving relations. Hsueh said he had already lodged a serious protest on 27 November which the British Government had completely disregarded. He was now instructed to make a further protest. He then went on to say that the Hong Kong question was at the nub of Sino/British relations and that these uld not be improved or normalised until the Hong Kong problem was solved. Indeed, if the British Government continued its suppression of Chinese in Hong Kong, relations could only deteriorate further.

3. I once more contested his version of these events, explaining that they were necessary actions on the part of the Hong Kong Government to protect the population against acts of terrorism, I repeated that the responsibility for these events lay with those who had instigated schools to take part in the terrorist campaign and the newspapers to make libellous statements. I therefore rejected in protest.

In conclusion I confirmed that it was the British Government's desire to improve Sino/British relations, but that the Government of Hong Kong nevertheless had its responsibilities for maintaining law and order there, which they were determined to carry out. I also pointed out that whereas Hong Kong was indeed a major problem in Sino/British relations, it was in such circumstances when serious problems existed between two countries that their diplomatic representatives should be able to carry out their functions normally and thus contribute to a solution.

5. Mr. Hauch expressed disagreement with my statement, and went on to say that we talked constantly about improving relations but our actions belied our words. If the British Government sincerely wished to improve relations they must first of all stop suppression in Hong Kong.

/6. In reply to

Peking telegram No. 314 to Foreign Office

- 2 -

In reply to my question he confirmed that the Chines Government intended to publish a summary of this conversation.

Mr. Hopson

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TELEGRAM SECTION Room 124 K.C.S.

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TO:

314 From Peking

6 December, 67.

khong trong

Situation 18 China's Attitude

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Entir

ARCHIVES No 3:

The

1967

FD315

BRITISH CONSULATE,

TANSUI.

23 November, 1967.

I enclose copies of two recent editorials in the English-language press here about the possibility of negotiations between Her Majesty's Government and the People's Republic of China over Hong Kong.

2. I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosures to Anthony Elliott in Hong Kong.

приземе

(R. J. Bray)

J. B. Denson, Esq., 0.B.E.,

Far Eastern Department,

Foreign Office,

LONDON. S.W.1. The

Thi

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umor be Poule of

Si WiTeching

quartor

per

Cuma 1.

15 NOV 1967

No Need For Talks

PRESS reports suggest that Lon-

dʊa and Peipang may hoid tulks on Hongkong next month.

From the British point of view. what is there to talk about?

The Chinese Communists began the Hongkong terror and they can stop it any time they wish.

If Great Brian starts paying a price for the rewìsuur of Hongkong struggle, that will be the end of British control of the crown colony.

Peiping wants what it has in Macao -a facade of colonial government bo- hind which the Communists pull all the rtrings and exercise all the power

In Hongkong, Gu's world death or imprisonment for tens of thousands of anti-Conimuart activists.

We refuse to belrose that the Brit- ish will sell out the free Chinese paple of Hongkong They have no reason to do so.

If the Communists are now pre- pared to talk. that is ample proof that their Hongkong machinstións have failed

Red newspapers of the colony are continuing to attack the British. The terrorist bombines have not beca stop- ped.

Nevertheless, the Communists have kust all except their theme:, kárd-core support. The people have boyceited Communist stores. They are cooperat- ing with the authorities as never before.

London's course in Hongkung should be to grant more democratic freedoms to the loyal anti-Communist Chinese of the colony and go after the Red terrorists harder than eve.

17 the British have learned anything from the Hongkong experience and their munication in Peiping, it should be that the Red Chinese negotiate only in order to have their own way When victory is not in sight, they do not talk.

Dennis Hopson, the courageous British representative in Peiping. bas the night idea: Hold your head up high and keep your mech shut. If indon removes hat, as rumored, the Mauists with interpret this as a sign of surrender. Hopson is a symbol of British strength and resolution that may be a bit unachuomistic but is just what Loudon needs. His presence telis Peiping that the British and frec Chinese cannot be pushed around in Hongkong and have no intention of surrendering in the face of the main- Ini-instigated teret.

China Port

16 NOV 1967

Negotiatious With Peiping Over Hongkong Crisis?

In the midst of the endless bombings and dis- turbances in the Hongkong-Kowloon area rumors have cropped up in the British colony to the effect that London may negotiate with Peiping for a solution of the present crisis. Au AP despatch from Hongkong dated November 13 reported that, according to an anti-Communist Chinese newspaper there, Peiping and London officials may meet in Tokyo early next month to discuss ways to end the trouble-making activities of the Communists. The Chinese newspaper said the meeting would be held "for the purpose that neither

side would lose face."

Another AP despatch from Hongkong dated November 14 reported that Chinese newspapers there had identified the man sent by local Communists to Tokyo to talk with the British about the situation in Hongkong and relations between Britain and Red China as Ko Chuk-hung, chairman of the Communist Chinese chamber of commerce in the colony. A Hong kong government spokesman, however, is reported to have declined to comment on the newspaper reports. In the meantime, Communist newspapers in Hongkong are continuing to attack "British Fascist authori ties."

Pending further developments it is impossible to ascertain at this moment whether there is any factual basis for the reports on the holding of nego tiations between British and Peiping officials in Tokyo. Be that as it may, we wish to point out that one thing the British authorities in London and Hongkong should consider carefully is whether or is whether or not it is worth while to hold negotiation with the Chinese Communists. To our opinion, the rumored negotiations are utterly meaningless. Negotiations of this kind invariably involve the question of give and take. What can the Chinese Communists be expected to give? Presumably they may agree to call a halt to the bombings and disturbances in the Hongkong Kowloon area, but it may be regarded as a certainty that they will not do so without "taking" something In other words, they will insist that the British make

certain concessions.

What concessions can the British make? Strictly speaking, the British authorities in Hongkong have done nothing wrong. For many years up to the outbreak of the Communist-inspired riots early in May the Communists had been permitted to carry on their normal activities without the least interference. Communist newspapers enjoyed perfect freedom in continuing their Red propaganda. Communist trad- ers and the Peiping regime's trading agencies con- tinued to make huge profits every year. And the

Communists were also permitted to

operate their schools in the colony. What more can the Commu- nists ask for?

We know what they will ask for. If the rumor- ed negotiations are actually held in Tokyo, or any-

where else, the Communists will surely confront the

British with many unreasonable demands. Those demands. ПО Inatler phrased, will add up to one thing; namely, that the how skilfully or deceitfully Chinese Communists must be given a free hand in doing anything they please. To be specific, we can perniitted to do the following things: to do whatev. easily visualize that they will demand that they be er they like against all anti-Communist Chinese in the Hongkong-Kowloon area; to deal with

deal with special severity with all Chinese well known for their loyal- ty to the Chinese government in Taipei; to be free to make all Chinese in that area study Mao Tse- tung's thought; to require all Chinese there to make contributions to the Communist coffers in one form or another; to have a voice in the administration of the British colony.

Obviously Britain's acceptance of the demands listed above will result in making Hongkong another Macao. Frankly speaking, this is the very objective. the Chinese Communists have been trying to achieve during the past months by staging a long series of riots and terrorist acts. Are the British ready to let the Communists attain this objective? If Britain were willing to humor Red China to that extent, all Britons in Britons in Hongkong might as

Hongkong might as well pack up and clear out of this part of the world lock, stock and barrel. But we know for certain that Britain is not ready to beat such an ignominious retreat.

If the British are not willing to kowtow to the Communists, then it is quite clear that they have but one course to pursue; that is, they must stick to the firm stand they have taken thus far. As we have pointed out in these columns before, the trouble with the British in Hongkong is that their stand is not firm enough. Up to now they have been entirely too lenient in dealing with the Communists, includ- ing those already arrested. Excessive leniency can only have the effect of inviting the Communists to make more troubles. There will be no end to these troubles if the British continue their present semi- soft policy in the hope that the Communists might some day show a change of heart.

And let us repeat that all negotiations will be fruitless unless the British are ready to surrender to

the Communista.

TELEGRAM SECTION Room 124 K.C.S.

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180 from Peking 26/10.

এ

TO:

Heng Когд

Borde inachents.

Kang

(Initials)

(Signed)

(Department)

(Date)

Action taken in Communications Department :

29.

(Date)

26/10

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IMMEDIATE PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE

[ARC

30 OCT 1967

lno 180

CONFIDENTIAL

FD315

26 October 1982

203/5

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 180 of

26 October.

Repeated for information to Hong Kong and to Washington, and Political Adviser Singapore.

Hong Kong telegram No. 1582 to Commonwealth Office: Projected Meeting at Frontier.

It may be useful to you to have my comments of the present situation as seen from here.

The first point I should like to establish is that sooner or later we shall have to talk to the Chinese about Hong Kong not only in order to effect the release of kidnapped policemen, but to give the Chinese opportunity of disengaging (if that is what they desire) without complete loss of face, and of re-asserting control over their men in Hong Kong.

3. My second point is that talks should be local between Hong Kong Government representatives and local Chinese Authorities. I realise that this raises the spectre of Macao, but if talks are kept local it should be easier to confine them to local issues whereas if we get involved on a Government to Govenment basis it would be more difficult to avoid wider issues which it is not in our interests to raise at present.

My third point is that now is a good time for talks. The Chinese have a special interest in maintaining calm before and during Canton Fair which opens on 15 November and closes on 15 December. Any threats they make of causing trouble at present are therefore likely to prove hollow. Furthermore present atmosphere in China with Chow En-lai apparently very much in charge and trying to re-introduce some sanity in foreign relations is more favourable than it has been for a long time. But it may not last. Although we shall certainly have to be wary, it is on the whole encouraging that Peking should be prompting talks.

15. Finally,

CONFIDENTIAL

"Difcused with c.o. (il. Carter)

in festhäs

o lake nuts account

lebgrams of the

2.c.

CONFIDENTIAL

PEKING TELEGRAM NO. 180 TU FOREIGN OFFICE

Finally, I hope it will be possible to keep situation of s Mission here entirely separate from Hong Kong problem.

this

As you know we believe it is directly related to restrictions at present placed on Chinese in London. I think this is another reason for lifting these as soon as possible before we get engaged on talks about Hong Kong.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Hong Kong 71

and Priority Singapore 9 and Washington 7.

Mr. Hopson

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